October 24, 2025 • 52 mins
Once Islamabad's (or Rawalpindi's) protégés, the Taliban are now exchanging gunfire with Pakistan. The recent clashes mark the deadliest fighting between the two since Taliban seized control of Afghanistan in 2021. What changed?
In this episode, host Dev Goswami and national security expert Sandeep Unnithan unpack the clash along the Durand Line -- a fight tangled in Pashtun identity, militant kinships, and Pakistan's own Frankenstein problem.
The two trace the origin the Taliban, explain how it is wrongly believed to be synonymous with the Al Qaeda, and explore how its Pashtun roots put it at odds with Pakistan's military elite. Also a topic of discussion is the TTP (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan) and how it seems to be punching above its weight. And finally, the episode looks at India's cautious recent outreach to Kabul and how it fits into this very messy map.
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Produced by Taniya Dutta
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In this episode, host Dev Goswami and national security expert Sandeep Unnithan unpack the clash along the Durand Line -- a fight tangled in Pashtun identity, militant kinships, and Pakistan's own Frankenstein problem.
The two trace the origin the Taliban, explain how it is wrongly believed to be synonymous with the Al Qaeda, and explore how its Pashtun roots put it at odds with Pakistan's military elite. Also a topic of discussion is the TTP (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan) and how it seems to be punching above its weight. And finally, the episode looks at India's cautious recent outreach to Kabul and how it fits into this very messy map.
Tune in!
Produced by Taniya Dutta
Sound mixed by
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
This is India Today Podcasts.
Speaker 2 (00:05):
Welcome to season three of In Our Defense, the podcast
that takes you inside the world of conflict. I'm your host,
Deve Goswami and every week I sit down with experts
and retired officers from the Army, Navy and Air Force
to decode all things to do with India security and
explore what it truly means to serve. Get ready for
(00:27):
stories of strategy, sacrifice and strength.
Speaker 1 (00:32):
This is In Our Defense.
Speaker 2 (00:34):
Welcome to A Our Defense and I'm very happy the
vali to our our listeners and viewers.
Speaker 1 (00:39):
This week, we're going to talk about.
Speaker 2 (00:40):
Something that we refer to briefly during our episode last week,
which is the fighting between Taliban and Pakistan. The fighting
has now sort of paused. There's a seas fight in
place the Sea Square that was broken in Doha, which
is going to be also a question on this episode,
and Pakistan has oddly been saying something that India offense
is that this ceasefire is contingent on the Taliban ensuring
(01:03):
that nomlitant activities happen inside Pakistan. This is the worst
fighting between the two since Taliban sees power in Afghanistan
after the US just like you know, went away from
that country after decades of a long standing war and
involvement in Afghanistan post the nine eleven attacks. It's a
topic that I don't really understand very much because it's
(01:27):
something that you know, I don't think gets a lot
of attention in India, and which is exactly why I wanted
to do this episode with sand so to help us
decode what's happening between Taliban and Pakistan.
Speaker 1 (01:37):
And by the way, keeping.
Speaker 2 (01:38):
In mind, this is happening when India is sort of
warming up to Taliban reopening it's embassy and couple hosting
Taliban foreign minister on a visit to Delhi. What's going
on for that? We have something Munatan is on the
How are.
Speaker 3 (01:48):
You good to be back? They're great as always, Sandi.
Speaker 2 (01:51):
You know, I chanced upon this tweet by ex post,
I should say now by Stanley John the foreign first
editor of The Hindu, where he posted very and a
couple of days ago. When Taliban returned to Carbul in
August twenty twenty one, two decades after they were toppled
by the Americans, Imran Khan, then Prime Minister of Pakistan, said,
and he quotes Afghans have broken the shackles of slavery.
(02:12):
Today Khanas in jail and Pakistan and Taliban and Afghanistan
are firing at each other.
Speaker 1 (02:18):
So that's how the things have turned.
Speaker 2 (02:20):
So it's going to be a very like, you know,
teach me, sir moment, because like I said, I don't
really know much of this topic, which is exactly what
I want you to do. But before we talk about
why Taliban and Pakistan do not like each other, what
trolled does the ttp the Taliban that is in Pakistan
play in all of this, whether it is linked to
(02:42):
the Pashtun minority that's in that sort of hyper Paktuna
region of Pakistan. I want to actually go back to
twenty twenty one and this Taliban that came to power
and how did that happen because this has been one
question I've always wanted to ask. It's sort of a
tangent right at the start of the show, But the
US withdrawal, the US had been talking about that since
(03:02):
twenty fourteen, fifteen, when Obama said that We're going to
pull out of Afghanistan. They had been there for over
a decade. They had fort Taliban because they accused Taliban
of harboring al Qaeda, which was responsible for nine to
eleven the god Osama, but they were still involved because
this region was unstable. A few presidents, a couple of
presidents later, finally the withdrawal happened under President Trump. Biden
(03:25):
was the Biden was the one sort of you know,
get the final final picture, and it was what people say,
a disaster. The assumption was that with US gone, Taliban
and the then Afghan government would sort of come to
an agreement and sort of run the country together. But
what happened was a sheer collapse of the Afghan government.
(03:46):
Taliban retook cities in a matter of days lightning speed,
and seized Tabul as well. Before we talk about Pakistan
and Taliban, I want your thoughts on what happened with
the US. Was it a field presidential decision? Was it
a bad tactical call by the commanders on the ground.
(04:07):
What happened and why was the disaster? Why was it
withdrawals for disastrous?
Speaker 3 (04:11):
Well, they've withdrawal was disastrous because they hadn't you know,
thought it through. And the fact is that you know,
I was thinking, I was I was in a couple
incidentally a couple of weeks after the Taliban were out.
Taliban one point two, right, just three months after nine eleven,
This is December of two thousand and one, and exactly
(04:34):
the same thing happened to the Taliban at that time.
Taliban one point two just vanished without a fight. You
saw the US which was so angry with nine to eleven.
They came in in US bombers and fighters were hammering
the Taliban. They conducted a lot of precision bombing missions,
and they had special forces on the ground with the
Northern Alliance troops and stuff, and they literally walked into
(04:56):
all of these cities. The Taliban many routed, they ran away,
most them ran into sanctuaries and the mountains or into Pakistan. Now,
at that time, one of the generals in Russia, the
Russian Federation, General Boris Gromov, famously the last commander of
the Soviet Army in Afghanistan. He had given a statement
(05:22):
and he said, listen, entering Afghanistan is very easy. It's
leaving that's the difficult part, right, And he was speaking
out of experience. The Soviets were there between seventeen nine
and eighty eight, and they left in a hurry over
the Amudaria. It's a very iconic kind of photograph. And
this is the thing with Afghanistan that empires and countries
(05:43):
don't seem to remember that easy entering Afghanistan the easiest part.
It's leaving that is so tough. The British have been
through that, the Soviets have been through it, and now
it was turn of the Americans. Right, how do you
withdraw from, you know, a quagmire like Afghanistan? And you
saw that in you know, the exit was so hurried.
(06:06):
There were planes literally with people falling off. Very tragic
because the Taliban were coming in and you had an
entire twenty year government that was there, the Ghani government
that was literally it seems built on a foundation of
sand that completely you know. And this is what we
saw in Vietnam as well, those famous pictures of the
(06:28):
last American chopper of the building near the American embassy
in Saigon taking off. So it was just that it
was a botched mission. They should have gone in there
in two thousand and one targeted the Al Qaeda and
all that had moved out. Don't even this is something
like Mission Creep that you first you come in with
the aim of hunting al Qaeda. Then it becomes the
(06:50):
aim of hunting the Taliban, and the Taliban, you forget,
are an insurgency all across the country. They're basically pushtoons, right,
and you're at war with half of Afghanistan. So it
became mission creep. Then it became about governance and setting
up structures and democracy and became so many you know,
finally they lost sight of what they had actually come
(07:12):
into Afghanistan for, and that is one reason why they
retreated the way they did in two thousand and twenty one,
humiliating exit. But then, you know, the United States is
such a big country, so far away, it's you know,
naturally insulated. It's protected from shocks like Vietnam and Afghanistan
because they happened so far away from home. So you know,
(07:32):
the domestic audiences, it doesn't you know, shake them so
much as say an incident like nine eleven, because nine
eleven happened in on American soil, Pearl Harbor. Also it
happened on American soil. This was far off. So I
think America has moved on since then. And now you
have a president ofs and I want to come in.
I want to come back and you better give me
that air base.
Speaker 2 (07:52):
Yes, oh, yes, that's happening. And also a president who
wants to solve this Pakistan. I've got some conflict that's
going on.
Speaker 3 (07:58):
Is that number nine or is it number ten?
Speaker 1 (07:59):
Number ten?
Speaker 2 (08:00):
Right now, he's focused on Russia. He's going to finish
that first and then come.
Speaker 3 (08:03):
To this, right, so that the Russia is eight I
think is it eight or nine? I do strike Apollo.
Speaker 2 (08:08):
Will know next ye when the Nobel Committee gives a
citation of why exactly he got the Nowelki's price, So
they'll give you the numbers, you know, the.
Speaker 3 (08:14):
First of January twenty twenty sixth last year, well ear
twenty six.
Speaker 2 (08:20):
Right, So Sandeba, what is the Taliban Because for many
people like me who've grown up during this time, when
the US sort of innovaded Afghanistan, Taliban almost becomes synonymous
with al Qaeda. It becomes synonymous with the terrorist group.
But people forgot that for the longest time, it also
ran a country. It runs a country right now. People
(08:40):
do not like its policies, people do not like its
extremeist Islamist stand but they are the government right now.
Speaker 1 (08:47):
So what is the Taliban. And also, by the.
Speaker 2 (08:49):
Way, you know, many people like me also often think
that the Taliban and Pakistan should be natural allies. So
the question always becomes why are they fighting? So explain
what is the Taliban and what is a Taliban wiserviy
Pakistan and why do they not like each other?
Speaker 3 (09:06):
Well, good question, Dave. Now the thing is that the
first thing is that the Taliban is very different from
al Kaieda. Right, there are two different animals altogether. The
Taliban are a guerrilla movement that's risen out of the Pashtuns. Right,
they're purely Pashtun. Al Qaeda is a terrorist organization which
dreams of a larger Islamic state, which is a transnational
(09:29):
Islamic state, which will have a lot of nationalities from
all across. Right, you had Egyptians, you had Uzbeks, you
had Saudi Arab Arabs like Osama bin lad and all
of those. You know, nationality, it's a patchwork quilt of
ethnic nationalities across the globe. Now, al Qaida's a shadow
of what it was more than two decades ago. The
(09:52):
Taliban are an ethnic Pashtun movement which believes in a Pashtunistan,
which transcends which straddles both sides of the Durand line,
which they don't recognize. And the origins of the Taliban
are very interesting. You know, you had the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan between seventy nine and eighty eight, when they
(10:15):
intervened to prop up one of their socialist governments, which
was a socialist government running Afghanistan. You had the Mujahidin,
who were basically a lot of those groups who were
opposed to the socialist government of Afghanistan and opposed naturally
to the Soviets. You had Amazura Amasu, then you had
a whole lot of other people who were fighting the Soviets,
(10:37):
and that was again seventy nine to eighty eight. Now
when these groups captured Afghanistan, when Najibula was overthrown, it
was in ninety two or was it ninety four ninety four,
I think, So they ruled Afghanistan for a few years
until about the mid nineties early two thousands, So they
(10:58):
were in power for about a couple of years, and
then what happened was that a lot of oil companies
started coming in. You know, the Soviet Union had begun
to break up after ninety one. So the Stans were there,
the new Central Asian Republic's, newly independent Centralationan Republics. And
there were companies like you know, cal An American oil
(11:20):
company that came in in the nineties and they said, look,
we want a pipeline to go through Pakistan into Central
Asia through Afghanistan. Now Afghanistani had Remember there is a
bit like a is like a junction. Right you enter Afghanistan,
you go to so many places from Afghanistan. You can
go to China, you can go to Pakistan, you can
(11:41):
go to the Centralation Republic Stans. You know, it's like
a crossroads of history. It's always been the case for
thousands of years. I mean Alexander came to India more
than two millennia ago. He had to go through Afghanistan.
He fought some of these tribes who are the ancestors
of the Pashtuns of today. And there are eye witness
accounts of Alexander massacring entire villages because the resistance that
(12:05):
he faced in Afghanistan then Gandhara was so severe that
he had to literally, you know, impose such punitive massacres
and you know, destroy villagers, killed civilians, all of that
horrific wartime massacres and those who were basically in present
day Afghanistan. So Afghanistan has been at a crossroads. And
when you had companies like Unocal coming in, what did
(12:26):
they want? They wanted peace and stability. You if you
run a pipeline through a country, you need to have peace, stability,
good governance, all of those things. And what they had
was basically warlords. So after the fall of the Najibula government,
which was after the Soviets withdrew in eighty eight. From
eighty eight to about the mid nineties early nineties, you
(12:49):
had Najibula, Najibula fell, then you had the mujahide in
coming to power, which was this am masu Hekmatyar and
you know ban within Rabani and all of these warlords.
They were Tajik warlords, they were Usbek warlords, they were Pashtoons,
they were a couple of they were. It was a
Patuak quilt of ethnic so Afghanistan is a quilt of nationalities, right,
(13:15):
It's a It sees its origin in the Durani Empire
of the eighteenth century. Ms Abdhli, the Duranid Empire was
set up by Abdhali in the eighteenth century. And you
have Usbeks in Afghanistan, you have persums of the dominant majority.
They're mainly in the south. In the north you have
the Tajiks. Then you have to the west you have
(13:37):
the Usbeks. In the center you have the Hazaras, who
descendants of the Chinese invaders, and the Pashtuns are the
most dominant. So when this American company came, he said, look,
we can't deal with these guys, the warlords. They've just
put you know, checkposts all over the country and they're
extorting money from people. There is no you can't travel
(13:58):
through Afghanistan. Is when this gentleman called General Nazirula Barber,
who was a confidante of Benezerbuto, he came up with
this idea, let's just get some guys from these seminaries
and you know, form a group and get them to
impose some kind of peace and order and you know
(14:18):
all of that. And one of those guys was Mullah Omar.
And Mullahmar was a cleric who basically born in Afghanistan
but spent a lot of his time in Pakistan. And
one famous instance is of when there was a kidnapping
or something, I forget what exactly it was. Mullahmar went
(14:40):
to the nearest mosque and he got a whole lot
of boys, armed them, went and rescued those hostages. So
there's that legend about his early years. And he became
the nucleus of this group that Nazila Barber and the
Pakistanis got together. The Park military was definitely involved. The ISI,
(15:00):
the I S. I was also sick of these guys, bandits,
these Mujahidin who are not listening to us. They're not
giving us any strategic depth in Afghanistan. But then we
heard that before. We're not getting strategic depth in Afghanistan.
How can we get strategic depth? We need to get
our own boys there. So who's going to get our
own boys there? Mullah Omar and his band of merry
men Robin Hood kind of figures, right. So that's when
(15:21):
the Taliban coalice is around Mulaomar and lo and behold,
they become a movement through the countryside and they capture
a part, They eject the hated warlords, They bring order
to Afghanistan. You know, the most important thing we talk
about human rights, women's rights. Certainly, these are very very
important things. But we're talking to them in countries which
(15:43):
are peaceful, which are stable, right, But in countries like Afghanistan,
which are tribal societies, they're you know, what is the
option that they have warlordism, They have this kind of
infighting and all, and you have a force that comes
in over there and promises peace, tranquility, stability, their version
of good governance, which is of course throwing women in
(16:05):
burkas and you know, pushing them into homes and denying
them education, all of that. It's a deeply fundamentally tribal
society and the Afghans, the Taliban are symptomatic of that society.
So they impose some kind of order in Afghanistan between
ninety six and two thousand and one. Now they made
(16:26):
the mistake of sheltering this contractor from Saudi arabas Osama
bin Laden, who sat over there, and the tradition of
pash Pashtun Vali, that spirit of giving, you know, shelter
to friends and you will protect your guests, and that's
what happened. So in their presence, the al Qaeda planned
(16:50):
Al Qaida incidentally means the base, and that also rose
out of the Afghan War, where Osama was a fighter.
He was actually brought in by the CIA and other
forces to build cave complexes so that the Mujahidin could
hide their stuff. They hide their weaponry and you know,
run hospitals and bases and all that. So that is
when the al Qaeda in the Taliban became kind of
(17:13):
synonymous in the late nineties and when the nine to
eleven happened. I'm not sure how aware of this the
the Taliban were this simple, you know, country folk kind of.
They're not because their horizon doesn't extend beyond Afghanis right. Yeah,
they're not transnational. They certainly not a threat to other
(17:35):
countries in the US and all in a way that
al Qaida was. So they got hammered because of they
sheltered al Kayla and they fought this insurgency all through
nearly two decades. The first couple of years were bad.
They were hammered, they were pushed into Pakistan and then
the Pakistanis ran the Afghan Taliban for several years. They
(17:57):
sheltered their most important leaders, they gave them support, they
gave them arms, ammunition. So Pakistan of course did this
if you think that you had the Western equivalent of
the great game that been played there in the region
from the nineteenth century. The Pakistanis were playing their own
little game, you know, with the Americans. They were running
with the hares and hunting with the hounds, and as always,
(18:20):
and they've done that for decades now, and they particularly
did this under Musharaff the second time. See Zia didn't
have to run with the hairs and hunt with the hounds.
For ZII it was black and white. General Ziaoul Huck
seventeen nine to eighty eight. He had to side with
the Mujaiden, support them to all that, and they had
to fight the evil Soviet Union. And then once the
(18:41):
Soviets were over, the Americans were out, and Zia fell
out of favor very quickly. And Musharaff's case was a
little more complicated. He had to win two thousand and
one the Americans tole him you're either with us or
against us. If you don't cooperate with us, will bomb
you to the stone age. That was George Bush's government
fell in line. He had no option. He opened up
(19:01):
his country, he gave them bases, he allowed them over flights.
So you know, planes that were bombing Afghanistan were flying
over Pakistani airspace, they were drone bases that were set
up there. All of this happened, and Musharaf had the
tough choice and the Pakistani deep states said, look, we
can't get rid of all the Taliban, right, we have
(19:23):
to support them. They allowed them sanctuary. Like I said,
you know, study, they gave them strategic depth in the
hope that someday when the government in Afghanistan collapses, the
Taliman are going to take over. And when the Taliban
take over, we get strategic depth. This is this is
a very interesting concept that Missa Islam Big basically came
up with. Missa Islam Bik is one of the shrewdest
(19:44):
of the Pakistani generals related he came after Ziah and
for those of you who who've read a Case of
Exploding Mangoes, Missa Islam Bik is the guy who's got
the ray bands on. And yeah, you know that it
is of course all make believe that Zia wants to
get him take his ray bands off. And there's a
scene in that in the book where Zia se him
(20:07):
to take his ray bands off and give it to him,
he gives it to it and that smooth motion, he
puts another fair from his process. So Biza is the
one who came up with this idea of strategic depth,
saying that, look, we are very vulnerable to India's you know, landforces,
air forces and all that. In Afghanistan we get sanctuary,
we get you know, additional thing. And so this is
(20:28):
something that JHQ. Robalt Pindi has pushed from the eighties.
Afghanistan is strategic tip for US. We need to have
a government in Afghanistan in our rear which is always friendly,
which is pliable also, which will always listen to us.
Because we get strategic depth, we just have to focus
(20:49):
on India then, right, So that was their entire game
plan from the eighties on. So nineties they had a
bit of a thing when the Mujaidin came, so that's
when they created the Taliban, and then early two thousands
you had this with us my Way or the Highway,
so they had to side with the US, but at
the same time they're you know, propping up the Taliban.
(21:09):
And twenty twenty one, that very famous photograph of the
Isi chief standing in the Kabul hotel sipping you know,
a cup of tea because they thought they'd you know,
mission accomplished. Said that, yeah, it's like, oh wow, we
won the war, and they announced that on the fifteenth
of August. I think there was a conspiracy behind that.
You know, Indian Independence Day. Fifteenth August is when the
(21:33):
ISI chief was there sipping his tea. But that was
four years ago. And then you realized that, my god,
four years is a long time in the subcontinent. How
things change? Yeah, so yeah, how have things changed? And
what has happened?
Speaker 2 (21:47):
Because yeah, you've kind of given us a very nice
detailed look into the Taliban and sort of you know,
answered why people conflate.
Speaker 1 (21:55):
Taliban and Pakistan. You know, for example, when.
Speaker 2 (21:58):
The US left, such was the such was the assumption
that so friendly would the Taliban and Pakistan be that phariah, Yeah, yeah,
that all the weapons left by the US would end
up flowing two militants in Kashmir, which actually happened because
you have discovered rifles that the US US, the US
Army users in the hands of terrorists in in in Jaman, Kashmir.
Speaker 1 (22:20):
So what happened in the last.
Speaker 2 (22:22):
Four years and how did we reach a point where
they've been fighting to that extent that Qatar had to
come into the picture and do what it always does,
broker a ceasefire.
Speaker 3 (22:30):
Right. So they what happened was when the Taliban took
over in twenty twenty one, they one of the first
things that they did was to crack down on the
opium and the poppies. It just forbade the cultivation of
poppies and the growing of that. You know, Afghanistan is
one of the largest sources of heroin in the world, right,
(22:53):
and that commands a premium Afghan heroine. This has been
going on through the the twenty years that the US
was there in Afghanistan, and you know conspiracy theories, I mean,
was there was this link to the US presence over there.
Somehow You saw very large drug cultivation, which the Taliban
(23:13):
crackdown on, and they called a lot of the BBC.
They called for instance, they showed them look way cracking
down on poppy fields. No heroin cultivation, nothing, no heroin labs.
We're destroying everything here.
Speaker 2 (23:25):
A side questions or you can completely answer why though,
I think because they genuinely believe that, you know, this
is un Islamic you can't.
Speaker 3 (23:34):
Yeah, it is Haram and you can't have a country
that purports to be an Islamic emirate and at the
same time is allowing for drugs and liquor and you
know all of that. So I think it is part
of their fundamental core belief. But I think what happened
is that there were a lot of people in Pakistan
who obviously benefited from this trade. Right now, heroin, like
(23:58):
in South Asia or the Indian subcontinent, is to the
Indian Subcontinent what cocaine is to South America. If, for instance,
the cocaine growing the coca plantations just dried up in
South America, can you imagine the geopolitical impact of that.
What would happen across South America? There would be companies, individuals,
(24:20):
governments that would fall because a lot of them are
narco states. Yes, you know, they're dependent on the money
that comes out of this. There's a lot of money.
There's tens and billions of dollars worth of money that
is generated through the drug trade. So my belief is,
I've not got anything yet to substantiate this. I believe
is that the drugs, the crackdown the Afghan crackdown on
(24:42):
the drug trade had something to do with it, the
Taliban's crackdown. That is one fissure in the relations between
the deep state in Pakistan and the Afghan talibrasting and
a couple of other things. I think the Afghans, to
the shock and horror of JHQ rawal Pindi, started to
take decisions of their own and that is where that
(25:03):
because let's not forget they were not fighting this war
for Pakistan. They took a lot of hospitality, sanctuary, shelter
from the pakistanis they've been. There have been two generations
of Afghans who've grown up in Pakistan. And that's the
reason when you meet a lot of Afghans here in Delhi,
you'd see them speak flawless Urdu and you know Hind
(25:25):
the event because a lot of them have been educated
in Pakistan, right they know Urdu as opposed to Pasta
and Dhari, which he would speak in Afghanistan. So they
had an independent mind. And I think somewhere down the
line jh Q rawl Pindi, the park deep state underestimated
Pashtuan nationalism right where they are very proud people who
(25:49):
don't take orders from anyone. And that's history is witnessed
to this. Whether it's the Brits, it's the Soviets, the Americans,
the West, whoever, they're very independent. And this is what
the Park military might have realized. And that's when the
first fissure started coming in into the relations. And then
they said, okay, if that's the case, then we're going
(26:10):
to throw all your people out. The three hundred thousand
of Ghans quarter of a million. That's a very large
mass of people that are literally uprooting from their lives
in Pakistan and throwing them across into Afghanistan. That's created
problems in Afghanistan. It's a very poor country. It's a
dirt poor country. It's hardly any money that they have,
so that created a rift. Then of course you have
(26:33):
the TTP. That's the biggest bone of contention. Now. The
pakistanis wanted Afghanistan to crack down on the TTP. Now
they assume that if they get our boys in Kabul,
our boys are going to crack down on our biggest worry,
which is the terry k Taliban Pakistan, which had been
around since two thousand and seven. Now these are Pashtuns
(26:54):
and they've been family for thousands of years. They familiar
ties between them are thousands of years older than the
Durand line, which is why they don't recognize the Duran line.
When the time that I was there for almost two
weeks and people were laughing at what Duran line, we
(27:14):
don't recognize it for us. The only nation actually is
not Afghanistan Pashuns. I would talk to Pashikistan. We want Pashtunistan.
We want an independent homeland for the Pashtun people of Afghanistan,
Pakistan and Iran even right they're Pashtuans in Iran. So
this is when I think this miscalculation that Pakistan always makes.
(27:37):
You know, when is the last time they made this
kind of miscalculation, Yeah, quick question, nineteen seventy one. They
completely miscalculated Bengali nationalists. Now they assume that well, because
the East Pakistanis are Muslim, therefore they're you know, they're
going to vote for this larger Islamic republic, which is Pakistan,
(27:58):
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. But they underestimated Bengali nationalism
where they were actually Bengali's first and Muslims later. Now,
the same mistake they seem to have made here with
the Pashtuns, and when they tried to push them around,
you know, tell them do this, do that. That's when
things went as they say south and the TTP, which
(28:19):
is now resurgent, operates out of Afghanistan. It's a known
fact they operate out of Aghanistan. They're attacking across the
Duran line, which they don't recognize, and in twenty twenty
five they've carried out something like six hundred attacks and
they openly defiant of the Pakistani state. The writ of
the Pakistan government and the military doesn't run in many districts,
(28:40):
especially in Kaiber Paku. Yeah.
Speaker 2 (28:43):
In fact, this year, I mean just not this year,
just the last couple of months. This train called the
Kafu Express has been the news so many times because
of the repeated attacks by TTP on that train because
liberation sorry sorry say yeah yeah, but so tell me
something when it comes to military prowess, how do these
(29:06):
compare whether you have the Taliban in Afghanistan, whether you
have the TTP running ractag over there. Because the Taliban
has always been pictured as this rat tag bunch of
fighters you know, with like you know, they don't have
an artillery.
Speaker 1 (29:21):
So to speak. They don't have an air force.
Speaker 2 (29:22):
Pakistan has some of the latest equipment thanks to China
and a bit of the US. It has an air force,
It has a well equipped army. How is it that
in the last one year we've come across repeated news items,
repeated headlines where the Pakistani army seems to have suffered
a big setback, And in fact, if you look at
(29:42):
Pakistani media, there's been a lot of questioning about how
is it that the current government establishment, i should say,
is allowing so many Pakistan soldiers to die? And which
is I think what lies at the heart of the
current crisis is that I think the military sort of
just had it with them and they start started more
ming inside Afghanistan, which is then led to the real
(30:03):
fighting as across Like, so what and how is it
possible that ttp and Taliban managed to annoy the Pakistan
military so much that they've almost had to go to
the brink of war right Well?
Speaker 3 (30:17):
They So the thing is that how they Afghans fight.
You have to understand how they Afghans fight and why
they're such deadly fighters is positional warfare is not their thing.
They can't stand and fight, They can't fight conventionally, and
that's also a function of the terrain of Afghanistan. If
you see, the terrain of Afghanistan doesn't lend itself to
large masses of troops moving around, you know, in terms
(30:39):
of the way you would say, imagine on the steps
of Europe or on the planes of India the Indo
ganjectic plane or something like that. We can't move large
forces like that. So they're very good guerrilla fighters and
they've been so for hundreds of years. They're very good
at hid and run tactics, which is what they specialize in.
And you have to see this place called Puanchhet, believe it,
(31:00):
which is north of Kabul, which is where the Amcha Masud,
one of the greatest guerilla commanders of the twentieth century,
his redoubt was. It was basically this mountain fortress with
valleys in between, where the Tajiks used to live and
they beat back numerous attempts by the Soviets because they
were hitting and you know, running, and the Soviets could enter,
but then they would be massacred. So it was so
(31:23):
this actually is the Afghan way of war fighting. They
have fought conventional wars. Let's not forget Pany, but in
the eighteenth centuries when they defeated the Marathas in the
Third Battle of Paniput, that is a different era. That
was Amcha Abdali. They were fighting conventionally, but if you
look at it in history, they've been greater guerrilla fighters
(31:43):
than they have been conventional fighters. So what you're seeing
in the last few years along the Duran line is
the TTP staging terror attacks, suicide bombings, hitting boasts and
running away, ambushing military convoys. The Pakistan mil has no
reply to this. They can only try and do what
the Americans did in the two decades that they were
(32:06):
in Afghanistan, which is maybe drone strikes, bombing their bases,
you know, killing assassinating senior figures. And they chose the
timing of the Taliban foreign Minister's visit to New Delhi,
Murturkey's visit to actually, you know, sender, yeah, hit two
birds with one stone, say that hit not just the
TTP paces inside Afghanistan, but also to warn the Afghans
(32:29):
that look, if you go closer to India, you will
bear the consequences of this. So that is you know,
literally the nub of the problem. The fact is that
the Pashtuan nationalismen be the way they fight. The Pakistan
army has no option for that, and it's only a
matter of time, I believe, in the current scenario, if
the TTP attacks keep increasing the way they are they
(32:49):
are today the TTPs attacking Pakistan. This is the deadliest year,
to put it, since two thousand and nine. So the
TDP attacks searched in two thousand and nine and they
kind of dropped off. So in twenty twenty five they've
again picked up. And if it continues at this rate,
the park military is going to have no option but
(33:10):
to move in again into Kyber Pakdunqua do some massive
attacks base. It is Urvali Messud that they're after the
TTP chief, and he's done extremely well for the TTP.
I mean, he's a terrorist and all of that massacres people,
but if you look at it, he's a Messud, one
of the original like you know Hakimula and Bertula, the
(33:32):
Mesu tribes of Waziristan. Astwhile which is now subsumed into
Kaiber Pakdunqua and Kybur Paktunqua is a state that's only
about seven or eight years old. They had those northwest.
You know, they had North Waziristan, South Waziristan, all of
that was subsumed into this one comprehensive state called Kyber Paktunka.
They thought it'd be easier to administer put all the
(33:53):
Pashians in one box, you know. But now with this
nur Vali mesa suit coming in. He's a formidable fighter.
He's been around for seven eight years, he's put a
code of conduct, ethics, he's united all the factions of
the TTP, and he's proving to be a nightmare for
the Pakistanis. So all the attacks that you see are
(34:16):
basically directed at the TTP. And now because they're striking
inside Afghanistan, the Taliban, Afghan Taliban have no option but
to hit back attack the Pakistan military. And you've seen
the videos of the Taliban figures saying that, look, if
you hit us with your AFOs and your drones, of
course they have no reply to that. We are going
(34:36):
to bleed you on the board.
Speaker 1 (34:38):
Yeah right.
Speaker 2 (34:39):
We'll talk more about this, especially about how India sees
itself in this contribute in Afghanistan and sorry, between Taliban
and Pakistan.
Speaker 3 (34:47):
But a truck quick break.
Speaker 4 (34:49):
I read in one of the newspapers at that time
that the Golden Quadrilateral, the dream project of various prime ministers,
was like ninety eight percent or ninety six percent complete,
and I thought, okay, I mean, if it's ninety six
percent complete, why don't we go try it out, check
(35:09):
it out. So that was one aspect of it. Then okay,
let's also try and compare cars across this distance. So
you're driving like six thousand odd kilometers at a go,
and then you're taking three different and that time we
took three different cars as at that time, and we said, okay,
(35:33):
let's try out these cars across these roads. And it
turned out to be such a fantastic experience tests of
both man machine and also the roads.
Speaker 3 (35:46):
I mean.
Speaker 4 (35:47):
So the interesting bit was that, okay, it was ninety
six or ninety eight percent complete, but the parts that
weren't complete were the bridges all across the country, So
bridges were in various states of construction, but the entire
roads were finished.
Speaker 3 (36:04):
So fantastic road.
Speaker 4 (36:07):
No traffic, you're barreling down, no speed limits on those
roads where nobody's supposed to be. You're barreling down at whatever.
Suddenly the road disappears.
Speaker 1 (36:25):
Welcome back, Sane.
Speaker 2 (36:27):
I obviously want to talk about how India is placed
all of this, especially because we just recently had the
Taliban foreign Minister Mutaki in Terry, a controversial visit which
will also come to especially in our in our fraternity.
We'll come to that, but before we do that, so
am I to then think that, based on what you've
said in the first half of this episode, that the
(36:50):
TTP is obviously going to keep radying against the Pakistani
military UH and the Taliban because of their push two nationality,
the identification with that, they're gonna more or less continue
with that covert support regardless of what agreements are signed
in Doha or elsewhere. Would it then be fair to
assume that this is going to remain a live scenario
(37:12):
for the foreseeable future.
Speaker 3 (37:13):
Absolutely, as long as the TTP still is operating in
Afghanistan continues to attack the park military. Look, I have
no sympathy for the Pakistan Army, right they deserve what
they're getting for what they've done to all those people
and the fact that they routinely capture bar in Pakistan.
They're in par there right now. But the fact is
(37:34):
that as long as the TTP is there in Afghanistan,
the sanctuaries in Afghanistan. As long as it's operating in Kaeberpat,
there can be no peace between Afghanistan and Pakistan, no
lasting peace because the TTP does not exist there. For
it's not an NGO, right, It's got very clear aims.
It wants to bring Sharia into Pakistan. Right, it wants
(37:58):
to overthrow the state of Parker Kistan, and it believes
it's on the way of way to achieve that. And
if they can't do that, then they're going to create
something like a Kaiber Paktun Kua which is integrated into Afghanistan,
engineered the breakup of Afghanistan Pakistan and integrate hyper Paktun
(38:19):
Kua into Afghanistan. Because if the insurgency continues at this rate,
the state loses control of Kyber Paktun Kui, say the
other provinces start acting up, as say Baluchistan for instance,
if there's an insurgency in Panjab with the with the
(38:40):
civilian outfits over there which have been massacred by the
Pakistan military, if there is an insurgency there, there's just
literally going to be too many fires for the park
military to be able to put out. And so the
persums run away with their you know, peace and the
Baluchu with there and who knows something would happen in Panjab.
So it's actually a polychromes that Pakistan is facing right now.
(39:02):
But you know, yes, who benefits from crisis in Pakistan
the CEOs of the military.
Speaker 2 (39:09):
The CEO, that's right, the Field Marshal Field Marshal, which
was going to be a tangent as well. Then do
you think a lot of what you've said right now
and the fact that you also have a very far
right movement happening in some of the urban centers of Pakistan.
You have massive protests happening in Lahore and other cities,
uh sort of linked to this if I could call
(39:30):
it that, because I would, I would see it that way,
Like the Pashtuns want sort of a very far right
version of Islam and there are certain civilian groups as
well in the urban centers who want that. So the
military has been grappling with all of this, not just
right now for the last several.
Speaker 1 (39:43):
Months, for a couple of years.
Speaker 2 (39:45):
Do you think that all of this may have been
part of the motivation for Asimunir to launch the Pehlkamter
attack so that he could then you know, have a
fight with India and then go to the US crying
for help and then so of get some money in
some weaponary would I would.
Speaker 3 (40:03):
Never discount that possibility there. And you know the fact
is that for the park military to be there, to
be relevant, it needs a crisis because you know what uses.
Speaker 1 (40:14):
The fire brigade if there's no fires there?
Speaker 3 (40:16):
Right? If you imagine a land which was you know,
constantly like a cherrapunjik kind of country, which is raining
all the time, and you didn't have a you know,
a fire ever because it was so wet, you didn't
need a fire brigade, right, But you need a country
that's dry as a tinder box, where there are frequent fires.
(40:38):
And who do you call but the military. It's always
been the case since October of nineteen fifty eight when
Field Marshal, the first Field Marshal took over Pakistan. And
it's always been there that and this I keep saying
this that you know, every now and then we have
to look out for one general who thinks who he
is Pakistan's savior, who's going to save Pakistan from this evil?
(41:01):
And it began in nineteen fifty eight, and they've been
trying ever since. You know, it's been Ayu, it's been
Yaya in Zia, Musha Raff and now you have the
Great Field Marshal again. So he thrives in crisis. And
I would think that some of this crisis has been
engineered himself. You know, how do you explain this crackdown
on the Labaya Terika labayk TLP, which is like a
(41:25):
it's a civilian arm of the Park military. It was
created by the Park military. It was it was like
their you know, it was their guys that they would
use against all to destabilize Nava Sharif distabilished Shabaz, distabilized
Imran Khan. The Labay would hit the road almost instantly.
You know, they were their Roland boys. And why would
(41:47):
they massacre them the way they did either it was
to send a message to the the the local people
that listen, if you protest against what we are doing,
this is a hard state, as Muni kept, you know,
reminding us. Or it could be that he's just playing
this whole game to tell the Americans that, look, I
can't deploy anywhere else, least of all in Khaza because
(42:09):
I've got a problem here in my hands. Yeah, I
have no internet and cities are in you know, lockdown.
No one knows how many people were massacred by the
military in Lahore, those mass firings and all that. They
say upwards of two hundred people. But so you know,
they have a problem. They have a poly crisis. But
(42:29):
as I said before, it's the military that thrives in
such a crisis, so stronger and stronger with every crisis.
Speaker 2 (42:36):
So a very good point, right, final thoughts, and now
coming to India. So the recent fighting that we saw
between Taliban and Pakistan had happened just when the Foreign
Minister of Taliban was in New Delhi. He met Ja
Shankar and a few other top officials. Following the meeting,
India has said that will reopened the Kabul Embasi, which
(42:57):
was downgraded after the Taliban took over in.
Speaker 4 (43:00):
Uh.
Speaker 1 (43:02):
Many people have not liked it.
Speaker 2 (43:03):
Uh jaw that actually said he hangs his head in
shame that India is doing it. But I think India
obviously has a strategic and geobodical reasons for doing this,
and something that we often talk about on this podcast.
Speaker 1 (43:15):
It is one thing to have models. It's one thing
to have the utopian.
Speaker 2 (43:19):
Idea of a world, but the real world is dirty,
it's messy, and the world of geoprat is even more so.
Speaker 3 (43:25):
Yeah.
Speaker 2 (43:26):
So, obviously India has reasons to sort of warm up
to Taliban, especially after what's happened with the Palm attack
and options. But is it a coincidence that you've seen
the worst fighting between the two Taliban and Pakistan just
when the Foriger minister's visit was being planned, was being prepped,
and then finally he was in India, and like you said,
(43:46):
a day or two just before that, Pakistan launched that
air rate that actually then also spiraled this.
Speaker 3 (43:51):
Into Yeah, I think I think that the pakistanis you
know that when they saw what was unfolding here, it's
that whole thing of you know, never want to have
a hostile Afghanistan in your backyard. And you know the
time that they had the Northern Alliance that was there
in Kabul, you had a Northern Alliance that was not
(44:12):
very friendly to Pakistan. But now you haven't opened the
hostile regime. There a Taliban regime and this was their way,
this was the military's way of telling the Afghans to
back off, don't build bridges with India because we don't
want to be sandwiched between a hostile India and a
hostile Afghanistan. And you know, this is something that they've
(44:35):
paranoid about a two front war, which if you've heard
it started to emerge in there's you know, the Foreign
Minister quadja as If, the Defense Minister quadjas If I
said that that we are caught in a two front situation.
And this two front situation is created by the Pakistan military. See.
I mean, the thing is, it's such a tragedy that
here you have people of India who invest every five
(44:58):
years in a civilian government and a and a prime minister,
and across the border you have people investing every five
years in a dictator. You know, you bring in one dictator,
you give him a two year extension, he gets a
five year extension, then you give him another five year extension,
and then he becomes a field marshal and then he'd
probably be looking at becoming president or generalist. There's no
(45:20):
end to ambitions, you know, once you get into that
position of absolute power, which is where what the military
enjoys in Pakistan. And you know this is this is
the problem that we have to deal with because for them,
it's an existential threat. Also they believe India is an
existential threat, and by provoking India they generate some kind
(45:44):
of hysteria within Pakistan because there are strikes, and then
they try to unify the country behind them, which is
what mo Need seems to have done because if you remember,
on the seventh of May, the most popular person in
Pakistan was Imran Khan and it was I mean, the
(46:05):
guy was really resilient and he was there. He was
holding out, not breaking, unbending, unbowing. And by the tenth
or eleventh of May, the most popular man in Pakistan
which a general Assimoni, and that went to his head
and he anointed himself Field Marshals, you know, shortly after.
So now for him to remain there, he has to deliver, right,
(46:29):
so you see him doing this frantic deal making, going
into the White House doing this, the mineral's deal, the
ports deal. Is that moving around Beijing, Saudi Arabia, you know.
But sooner or later, this is this, the effects of
this are going to wear out. That's when tough questions
are going to be asked and what option does he
have but to create another permanent state of chaos and
(46:52):
confusion around which is where, Which is a very tough
call for India. Really, if you ask me, we were
talking about Sindhur two point zero. The next time we
do that, next time he tries out a peelgam, we're
going to give him Sindour two point two. Forgetting that
when you do Sindu two point two, you might actually
be strengthening him. You might shatter his air bases and
(47:13):
you know, destroy his sports and infrastructure and convert him
into a landlocked country. But then the military becomes strong
because then the people rally behind them the military. So
it's a tough catch twenty two for us. And this
has been a problem for us from the very beginning
for the civilian establishments in India to how do you
do business with a civilian government which is being held
(47:37):
hostage by a park military. How do you you know,
ensure that you target the park military without harming the
civilian government. And today the civilian government is a puppet.
It's completely captive of the Park Army. It's a hybrid government,
they call it that, but in reality it is a
(47:59):
civil a military controlled government where the civilians are just
a facade. They're like a you know, a shield to
absorb a lot of the brig bads and stuff. But
while the military does its own thing.
Speaker 2 (48:12):
I think it's like the military has a civilian wing
to take care of all the municipal works over there
in and for that you have the civilian wing which
does that will take care of everything else. Right, great
final points on deep This is about the controversy that
broke out with the Taliban formaces visit to India among
in our fraternity. So the minister held a press conference
(48:35):
at the Afghan Embassy, very important, where.
Speaker 1 (48:39):
He did not They did not call any of the
women have a bar.
Speaker 2 (48:42):
Basically, yes, the invites only went out to all male journalists.
Not a single woman was invited and this was pointed
out obviously on social media by women journalists.
Speaker 1 (48:51):
Uh.
Speaker 2 (48:52):
The initial response was he, hey, it's the Taliban Afgharistan
Embassi technically Afghan soil, so they rules apply over there.
Speaker 1 (49:01):
Sorry, you can't do much. The MEA India has been
known to be very smart.
Speaker 2 (49:08):
Don't be very you think they really just messed this
up because it's impossible for them not to know that
he was going to pull this he's coming to your country.
Obviously there may have been a hint, or they may
have been a guest. There was no back channel, there
was no fore warning, key boys, you cannot do that
in India. Because then later I think the message was
(49:28):
sent to a Taliban and said, you know, you.
Speaker 1 (49:30):
Have to call it press.
Speaker 3 (49:31):
I think you're right. I don't think they anticipated this
little thing, that Motaki would call a press conference and
say that, you know, only male journalists would be allowed.
But then you have to see what happened the next day.
You had all our journalist colleagues who are up there
in the front row, and none of them availed. They're
not wearing even a head covering. And this is amazing
(49:54):
for me when you see Western journalists traveling in Afghanistan
or they're all you know in Hi jobs and their
heads are covered in Iran, in Afghanistan and all that.
So I think we came out really well out of
this day, and who knows, it could lead to better
and bigger things. Yeah, you've got a foot in the
door and you could probably use that to tell the
(50:16):
Afghan Taliban listen, it makes sense to educate women. Also,
you know, you can't run a country on just one engine.
If you've got two engines, you've got to run it
on two engines. You can't shut down one and run
on one, right you could. I mean, let's I wouldn't
say we should get into this thing of nation building
and all that, which the Americans frequently do when they
(50:37):
go into these exotic parts of the world, but we
could very through our engagement with the Taliban, you know,
our support for the people of Afghanistan, which is where
we have We are not a militaristic society. We don't
prop up dictatorships and do all of that, but we
basically emphasize people to people contacts. And if you see
(50:59):
all our invests in Afghanistan, a majority of us more
than ninety percent, I have been primarily towards the civilian infrastructure.
We're building, you know, our dams, we've you know, fixed highways,
We've built buildings over there, which is what we'll continue doing,
right because at the end of the day, we mean
well for the people of Afghanistan, build schools, colleges, hospitals,
(51:19):
that kind of stuff. Right, Who knows prevail upon the
Afghan people the Taliban through our sustained outreach to kind
of relax. This thing on not educating women that is
that is so medieval and dark ages thing. But let's
(51:40):
not do that in a hurry. Let's go one step
at a time. Who knows this could have been the
first step. I think that's the first time probably in
his life, that Mutaky has ever seen women sitting like that,
you know, in front of him, and that he's going
to take those memories back with him, and who knows,
it could lead to something else, and it could set
a precedent, could be other women journalists who come into
(52:02):
Afghanistan and say, listen, I'm not going to wear a
veil or hijab and sit in front of you. I've
seen how my friends in India were sitting and asking
you those questions and you're embassy in Delhi. Yeah.
Speaker 2 (52:12):
So it's a good point actually, and I think a
good point and good note on which to end this episode.
So thanks on Deep. Actually a fantastic discussion really. I
think if anyone wants a crash course in terms of
why Pakistan and Taliban am not getting together right now
and the misdsteps Pakistan made in terms of understanding the
pastun identity, I think this is that episode so thanks
(52:35):
on Deep, thanks.
Speaker 3 (52:36):
A lot as always, Thank you Dave great have you.
Speaker 2 (52:39):
And thanks as always to our listeners and viewers. That's
it for this fixed defense toores for more tune in
next week. Till then, stay safe and not lost any
boundaries with the passport
This is India Today Podcasts.
Speaker 2 (00:05):
Welcome to season three of In Our Defense, the podcast
that takes you inside the world of conflict. I'm your host,
Deve Goswami and every week I sit down with experts
and retired officers from the Army, Navy and Air Force
to decode all things to do with India security and
explore what it truly means to serve. Get ready for
(00:27):
stories of strategy, sacrifice and strength.
Speaker 1 (00:32):
This is In Our Defense.
Speaker 2 (00:34):
Welcome to A Our Defense and I'm very happy the
vali to our our listeners and viewers.
Speaker 1 (00:39):
This week, we're going to talk about.
Speaker 2 (00:40):
Something that we refer to briefly during our episode last week,
which is the fighting between Taliban and Pakistan. The fighting
has now sort of paused. There's a seas fight in
place the Sea Square that was broken in Doha, which
is going to be also a question on this episode,
and Pakistan has oddly been saying something that India offense
is that this ceasefire is contingent on the Taliban ensuring
(01:03):
that nomlitant activities happen inside Pakistan. This is the worst
fighting between the two since Taliban sees power in Afghanistan
after the US just like you know, went away from
that country after decades of a long standing war and
involvement in Afghanistan post the nine eleven attacks. It's a
topic that I don't really understand very much because it's
(01:27):
something that you know, I don't think gets a lot
of attention in India, and which is exactly why I wanted
to do this episode with sand so to help us
decode what's happening between Taliban and Pakistan.
Speaker 1 (01:37):
And by the way, keeping.
Speaker 2 (01:38):
In mind, this is happening when India is sort of
warming up to Taliban reopening it's embassy and couple hosting
Taliban foreign minister on a visit to Delhi. What's going
on for that? We have something Munatan is on the
How are.
Speaker 3 (01:48):
You good to be back? They're great as always, Sandi.
Speaker 2 (01:51):
You know, I chanced upon this tweet by ex post,
I should say now by Stanley John the foreign first
editor of The Hindu, where he posted very and a
couple of days ago. When Taliban returned to Carbul in
August twenty twenty one, two decades after they were toppled
by the Americans, Imran Khan, then Prime Minister of Pakistan, said,
and he quotes Afghans have broken the shackles of slavery.
(02:12):
Today Khanas in jail and Pakistan and Taliban and Afghanistan
are firing at each other.
Speaker 1 (02:18):
So that's how the things have turned.
Speaker 2 (02:20):
So it's going to be a very like, you know,
teach me, sir moment, because like I said, I don't
really know much of this topic, which is exactly what
I want you to do. But before we talk about
why Taliban and Pakistan do not like each other, what
trolled does the ttp the Taliban that is in Pakistan
play in all of this, whether it is linked to
(02:42):
the Pashtun minority that's in that sort of hyper Paktuna
region of Pakistan. I want to actually go back to
twenty twenty one and this Taliban that came to power
and how did that happen because this has been one
question I've always wanted to ask. It's sort of a
tangent right at the start of the show, But the
US withdrawal, the US had been talking about that since
(03:02):
twenty fourteen, fifteen, when Obama said that We're going to
pull out of Afghanistan. They had been there for over
a decade. They had fort Taliban because they accused Taliban
of harboring al Qaeda, which was responsible for nine to
eleven the god Osama, but they were still involved because
this region was unstable. A few presidents, a couple of
presidents later, finally the withdrawal happened under President Trump. Biden
(03:25):
was the Biden was the one sort of you know,
get the final final picture, and it was what people say,
a disaster. The assumption was that with US gone, Taliban
and the then Afghan government would sort of come to
an agreement and sort of run the country together. But
what happened was a sheer collapse of the Afghan government.
(03:46):
Taliban retook cities in a matter of days lightning speed,
and seized Tabul as well. Before we talk about Pakistan
and Taliban, I want your thoughts on what happened with
the US. Was it a field presidential decision? Was it
a bad tactical call by the commanders on the ground.
(04:07):
What happened and why was the disaster? Why was it
withdrawals for disastrous?
Speaker 3 (04:11):
Well, they've withdrawal was disastrous because they hadn't you know,
thought it through. And the fact is that you know,
I was thinking, I was I was in a couple
incidentally a couple of weeks after the Taliban were out.
Taliban one point two, right, just three months after nine eleven,
This is December of two thousand and one, and exactly
(04:34):
the same thing happened to the Taliban at that time.
Taliban one point two just vanished without a fight. You
saw the US which was so angry with nine to eleven.
They came in in US bombers and fighters were hammering
the Taliban. They conducted a lot of precision bombing missions,
and they had special forces on the ground with the
Northern Alliance troops and stuff, and they literally walked into
(04:56):
all of these cities. The Taliban many routed, they ran away,
most them ran into sanctuaries and the mountains or into Pakistan. Now,
at that time, one of the generals in Russia, the
Russian Federation, General Boris Gromov, famously the last commander of
the Soviet Army in Afghanistan. He had given a statement
(05:22):
and he said, listen, entering Afghanistan is very easy. It's
leaving that's the difficult part, right, And he was speaking
out of experience. The Soviets were there between seventeen nine
and eighty eight, and they left in a hurry over
the Amudaria. It's a very iconic kind of photograph. And
this is the thing with Afghanistan that empires and countries
(05:43):
don't seem to remember that easy entering Afghanistan the easiest part.
It's leaving that is so tough. The British have been
through that, the Soviets have been through it, and now
it was turn of the Americans. Right, how do you
withdraw from, you know, a quagmire like Afghanistan? And you
saw that in you know, the exit was so hurried.
(06:06):
There were planes literally with people falling off. Very tragic
because the Taliban were coming in and you had an
entire twenty year government that was there, the Ghani government
that was literally it seems built on a foundation of
sand that completely you know. And this is what we
saw in Vietnam as well, those famous pictures of the
(06:28):
last American chopper of the building near the American embassy
in Saigon taking off. So it was just that it
was a botched mission. They should have gone in there
in two thousand and one targeted the Al Qaeda and
all that had moved out. Don't even this is something
like Mission Creep that you first you come in with
the aim of hunting al Qaeda. Then it becomes the
(06:50):
aim of hunting the Taliban, and the Taliban, you forget,
are an insurgency all across the country. They're basically pushtoons, right,
and you're at war with half of Afghanistan. So it
became mission creep. Then it became about governance and setting
up structures and democracy and became so many you know,
finally they lost sight of what they had actually come
(07:12):
into Afghanistan for, and that is one reason why they
retreated the way they did in two thousand and twenty one,
humiliating exit. But then, you know, the United States is
such a big country, so far away, it's you know,
naturally insulated. It's protected from shocks like Vietnam and Afghanistan
because they happened so far away from home. So you know,
(07:32):
the domestic audiences, it doesn't you know, shake them so
much as say an incident like nine eleven, because nine
eleven happened in on American soil, Pearl Harbor. Also it
happened on American soil. This was far off. So I
think America has moved on since then. And now you
have a president ofs and I want to come in.
I want to come back and you better give me
that air base.
Speaker 2 (07:52):
Yes, oh, yes, that's happening. And also a president who
wants to solve this Pakistan. I've got some conflict that's
going on.
Speaker 3 (07:58):
Is that number nine or is it number ten?
Speaker 1 (07:59):
Number ten?
Speaker 2 (08:00):
Right now, he's focused on Russia. He's going to finish
that first and then come.
Speaker 3 (08:03):
To this, right, so that the Russia is eight I
think is it eight or nine? I do strike Apollo.
Speaker 2 (08:08):
Will know next ye when the Nobel Committee gives a
citation of why exactly he got the Nowelki's price, So
they'll give you the numbers, you know, the.
Speaker 3 (08:14):
First of January twenty twenty sixth last year, well ear
twenty six.
Speaker 2 (08:20):
Right, So Sandeba, what is the Taliban Because for many
people like me who've grown up during this time, when
the US sort of innovaded Afghanistan, Taliban almost becomes synonymous
with al Qaeda. It becomes synonymous with the terrorist group.
But people forgot that for the longest time, it also
ran a country. It runs a country right now. People
(08:40):
do not like its policies, people do not like its
extremeist Islamist stand but they are the government right now.
Speaker 1 (08:47):
So what is the Taliban. And also, by the.
Speaker 2 (08:49):
Way, you know, many people like me also often think
that the Taliban and Pakistan should be natural allies. So
the question always becomes why are they fighting? So explain
what is the Taliban and what is a Taliban wiserviy
Pakistan and why do they not like each other?
Speaker 3 (09:06):
Well, good question, Dave. Now the thing is that the
first thing is that the Taliban is very different from
al Kaieda. Right, there are two different animals altogether. The
Taliban are a guerrilla movement that's risen out of the Pashtuns. Right,
they're purely Pashtun. Al Qaeda is a terrorist organization which
dreams of a larger Islamic state, which is a transnational
(09:29):
Islamic state, which will have a lot of nationalities from
all across. Right, you had Egyptians, you had Uzbeks, you
had Saudi Arab Arabs like Osama bin lad and all
of those. You know, nationality, it's a patchwork quilt of
ethnic nationalities across the globe. Now, al Qaida's a shadow
of what it was more than two decades ago. The
(09:52):
Taliban are an ethnic Pashtun movement which believes in a Pashtunistan,
which transcends which straddles both sides of the Durand line,
which they don't recognize. And the origins of the Taliban
are very interesting. You know, you had the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan between seventy nine and eighty eight, when they
(10:15):
intervened to prop up one of their socialist governments, which
was a socialist government running Afghanistan. You had the Mujahidin,
who were basically a lot of those groups who were
opposed to the socialist government of Afghanistan and opposed naturally
to the Soviets. You had Amazura Amasu, then you had
a whole lot of other people who were fighting the Soviets,
(10:37):
and that was again seventy nine to eighty eight. Now
when these groups captured Afghanistan, when Najibula was overthrown, it
was in ninety two or was it ninety four ninety four,
I think, So they ruled Afghanistan for a few years
until about the mid nineties early two thousands, So they
(10:58):
were in power for about a couple of years, and
then what happened was that a lot of oil companies
started coming in. You know, the Soviet Union had begun
to break up after ninety one. So the Stans were there,
the new Central Asian Republic's, newly independent Centralationan Republics. And
there were companies like you know, cal An American oil
(11:20):
company that came in in the nineties and they said, look,
we want a pipeline to go through Pakistan into Central
Asia through Afghanistan. Now Afghanistani had Remember there is a
bit like a is like a junction. Right you enter Afghanistan,
you go to so many places from Afghanistan. You can
go to China, you can go to Pakistan, you can
(11:41):
go to the Centralation Republic Stans. You know, it's like
a crossroads of history. It's always been the case for
thousands of years. I mean Alexander came to India more
than two millennia ago. He had to go through Afghanistan.
He fought some of these tribes who are the ancestors
of the Pashtuns of today. And there are eye witness
accounts of Alexander massacring entire villages because the resistance that
(12:05):
he faced in Afghanistan then Gandhara was so severe that
he had to literally, you know, impose such punitive massacres
and you know, destroy villagers, killed civilians, all of that
horrific wartime massacres and those who were basically in present
day Afghanistan. So Afghanistan has been at a crossroads. And
when you had companies like Unocal coming in, what did
(12:26):
they want? They wanted peace and stability. You if you
run a pipeline through a country, you need to have peace, stability,
good governance, all of those things. And what they had
was basically warlords. So after the fall of the Najibula government,
which was after the Soviets withdrew in eighty eight. From
eighty eight to about the mid nineties early nineties, you
(12:49):
had Najibula, Najibula fell, then you had the mujahide in
coming to power, which was this am masu Hekmatyar and
you know ban within Rabani and all of these warlords.
They were Tajik warlords, they were Usbek warlords, they were Pashtoons,
they were a couple of they were. It was a
Patuak quilt of ethnic so Afghanistan is a quilt of nationalities, right,
(13:15):
It's a It sees its origin in the Durani Empire
of the eighteenth century. Ms Abdhli, the Duranid Empire was
set up by Abdhali in the eighteenth century. And you
have Usbeks in Afghanistan, you have persums of the dominant majority.
They're mainly in the south. In the north you have
the Tajiks. Then you have to the west you have
(13:37):
the Usbeks. In the center you have the Hazaras, who
descendants of the Chinese invaders, and the Pashtuns are the
most dominant. So when this American company came, he said, look,
we can't deal with these guys, the warlords. They've just
put you know, checkposts all over the country and they're
extorting money from people. There is no you can't travel
(13:58):
through Afghanistan. Is when this gentleman called General Nazirula Barber,
who was a confidante of Benezerbuto, he came up with
this idea, let's just get some guys from these seminaries
and you know, form a group and get them to
impose some kind of peace and order and you know
(14:18):
all of that. And one of those guys was Mullah Omar.
And Mullahmar was a cleric who basically born in Afghanistan
but spent a lot of his time in Pakistan. And
one famous instance is of when there was a kidnapping
or something, I forget what exactly it was. Mullahmar went
(14:40):
to the nearest mosque and he got a whole lot
of boys, armed them, went and rescued those hostages. So
there's that legend about his early years. And he became
the nucleus of this group that Nazila Barber and the
Pakistanis got together. The Park military was definitely involved. The ISI,
(15:00):
the I S. I was also sick of these guys, bandits,
these Mujahidin who are not listening to us. They're not
giving us any strategic depth in Afghanistan. But then we
heard that before. We're not getting strategic depth in Afghanistan.
How can we get strategic depth? We need to get
our own boys there. So who's going to get our
own boys there? Mullah Omar and his band of merry
men Robin Hood kind of figures, right. So that's when
(15:21):
the Taliban coalice is around Mulaomar and lo and behold,
they become a movement through the countryside and they capture
a part, They eject the hated warlords, They bring order
to Afghanistan. You know, the most important thing we talk
about human rights, women's rights. Certainly, these are very very
important things. But we're talking to them in countries which
(15:43):
are peaceful, which are stable, right, But in countries like Afghanistan,
which are tribal societies, they're you know, what is the
option that they have warlordism, They have this kind of
infighting and all, and you have a force that comes
in over there and promises peace, tranquility, stability, their version
of good governance, which is of course throwing women in
(16:05):
burkas and you know, pushing them into homes and denying
them education, all of that. It's a deeply fundamentally tribal
society and the Afghans, the Taliban are symptomatic of that society.
So they impose some kind of order in Afghanistan between
ninety six and two thousand and one. Now they made
(16:26):
the mistake of sheltering this contractor from Saudi arabas Osama
bin Laden, who sat over there, and the tradition of
pash Pashtun Vali, that spirit of giving, you know, shelter
to friends and you will protect your guests, and that's
what happened. So in their presence, the al Qaeda planned
(16:50):
Al Qaida incidentally means the base, and that also rose
out of the Afghan War, where Osama was a fighter.
He was actually brought in by the CIA and other
forces to build cave complexes so that the Mujahidin could
hide their stuff. They hide their weaponry and you know,
run hospitals and bases and all that. So that is
when the al Qaeda in the Taliban became kind of
(17:13):
synonymous in the late nineties and when the nine to
eleven happened. I'm not sure how aware of this the
the Taliban were this simple, you know, country folk kind of.
They're not because their horizon doesn't extend beyond Afghanis right. Yeah,
they're not transnational. They certainly not a threat to other
(17:35):
countries in the US and all in a way that
al Qaida was. So they got hammered because of they
sheltered al Kayla and they fought this insurgency all through
nearly two decades. The first couple of years were bad.
They were hammered, they were pushed into Pakistan and then
the Pakistanis ran the Afghan Taliban for several years. They
(17:57):
sheltered their most important leaders, they gave them support, they
gave them arms, ammunition. So Pakistan of course did this
if you think that you had the Western equivalent of
the great game that been played there in the region
from the nineteenth century. The Pakistanis were playing their own
little game, you know, with the Americans. They were running
with the hares and hunting with the hounds, and as always,
(18:20):
and they've done that for decades now, and they particularly
did this under Musharaff the second time. See Zia didn't
have to run with the hairs and hunt with the hounds.
For ZII it was black and white. General Ziaoul Huck
seventeen nine to eighty eight. He had to side with
the Mujaiden, support them to all that, and they had
to fight the evil Soviet Union. And then once the
(18:41):
Soviets were over, the Americans were out, and Zia fell
out of favor very quickly. And Musharaff's case was a
little more complicated. He had to win two thousand and
one the Americans tole him you're either with us or
against us. If you don't cooperate with us, will bomb
you to the stone age. That was George Bush's government
fell in line. He had no option. He opened up
(19:01):
his country, he gave them bases, he allowed them over flights.
So you know, planes that were bombing Afghanistan were flying
over Pakistani airspace, they were drone bases that were set
up there. All of this happened, and Musharaf had the
tough choice and the Pakistani deep states said, look, we
can't get rid of all the Taliban, right, we have
(19:23):
to support them. They allowed them sanctuary. Like I said,
you know, study, they gave them strategic depth in the
hope that someday when the government in Afghanistan collapses, the
Taliman are going to take over. And when the Taliban
take over, we get strategic depth. This is this is
a very interesting concept that Missa Islam Big basically came
up with. Missa Islam Bik is one of the shrewdest
(19:44):
of the Pakistani generals related he came after Ziah and
for those of you who who've read a Case of
Exploding Mangoes, Missa Islam Bik is the guy who's got
the ray bands on. And yeah, you know that it
is of course all make believe that Zia wants to
get him take his ray bands off. And there's a
scene in that in the book where Zia se him
(20:07):
to take his ray bands off and give it to him,
he gives it to it and that smooth motion, he
puts another fair from his process. So Biza is the
one who came up with this idea of strategic depth,
saying that, look, we are very vulnerable to India's you know, landforces,
air forces and all that. In Afghanistan we get sanctuary,
we get you know, additional thing. And so this is
(20:28):
something that JHQ. Robalt Pindi has pushed from the eighties.
Afghanistan is strategic tip for US. We need to have
a government in Afghanistan in our rear which is always friendly,
which is pliable also, which will always listen to us.
Because we get strategic depth, we just have to focus
(20:49):
on India then, right, So that was their entire game
plan from the eighties on. So nineties they had a
bit of a thing when the Mujaidin came, so that's
when they created the Taliban, and then early two thousands
you had this with us my Way or the Highway,
so they had to side with the US, but at
the same time they're you know, propping up the Taliban.
(21:09):
And twenty twenty one, that very famous photograph of the
Isi chief standing in the Kabul hotel sipping you know,
a cup of tea because they thought they'd you know,
mission accomplished. Said that, yeah, it's like, oh wow, we
won the war, and they announced that on the fifteenth
of August. I think there was a conspiracy behind that.
You know, Indian Independence Day. Fifteenth August is when the
(21:33):
ISI chief was there sipping his tea. But that was
four years ago. And then you realized that, my god,
four years is a long time in the subcontinent. How
things change? Yeah, so yeah, how have things changed? And
what has happened?
Speaker 2 (21:47):
Because yeah, you've kind of given us a very nice
detailed look into the Taliban and sort of you know,
answered why people conflate.
Speaker 1 (21:55):
Taliban and Pakistan. You know, for example, when.
Speaker 2 (21:58):
The US left, such was the such was the assumption
that so friendly would the Taliban and Pakistan be that phariah, Yeah, yeah,
that all the weapons left by the US would end
up flowing two militants in Kashmir, which actually happened because
you have discovered rifles that the US US, the US
Army users in the hands of terrorists in in in Jaman, Kashmir.
Speaker 1 (22:20):
So what happened in the last.
Speaker 2 (22:22):
Four years and how did we reach a point where
they've been fighting to that extent that Qatar had to
come into the picture and do what it always does,
broker a ceasefire.
Speaker 3 (22:30):
Right. So they what happened was when the Taliban took
over in twenty twenty one, they one of the first
things that they did was to crack down on the
opium and the poppies. It just forbade the cultivation of
poppies and the growing of that. You know, Afghanistan is
one of the largest sources of heroin in the world, right,
(22:53):
and that commands a premium Afghan heroine. This has been
going on through the the twenty years that the US
was there in Afghanistan, and you know conspiracy theories, I mean,
was there was this link to the US presence over there.
Somehow You saw very large drug cultivation, which the Taliban
(23:13):
crackdown on, and they called a lot of the BBC.
They called for instance, they showed them look way cracking
down on poppy fields. No heroin cultivation, nothing, no heroin labs.
We're destroying everything here.
Speaker 2 (23:25):
A side questions or you can completely answer why though,
I think because they genuinely believe that, you know, this
is un Islamic you can't.
Speaker 3 (23:34):
Yeah, it is Haram and you can't have a country
that purports to be an Islamic emirate and at the
same time is allowing for drugs and liquor and you
know all of that. So I think it is part
of their fundamental core belief. But I think what happened
is that there were a lot of people in Pakistan
who obviously benefited from this trade. Right now, heroin, like
(23:58):
in South Asia or the Indian subcontinent, is to the
Indian Subcontinent what cocaine is to South America. If, for instance,
the cocaine growing the coca plantations just dried up in
South America, can you imagine the geopolitical impact of that.
What would happen across South America? There would be companies, individuals,
(24:20):
governments that would fall because a lot of them are
narco states. Yes, you know, they're dependent on the money
that comes out of this. There's a lot of money.
There's tens and billions of dollars worth of money that
is generated through the drug trade. So my belief is,
I've not got anything yet to substantiate this. I believe
is that the drugs, the crackdown the Afghan crackdown on
(24:42):
the drug trade had something to do with it, the
Taliban's crackdown. That is one fissure in the relations between
the deep state in Pakistan and the Afghan talibrasting and
a couple of other things. I think the Afghans, to
the shock and horror of JHQ rawal Pindi, started to
take decisions of their own and that is where that
(25:03):
because let's not forget they were not fighting this war
for Pakistan. They took a lot of hospitality, sanctuary, shelter
from the pakistanis they've been. There have been two generations
of Afghans who've grown up in Pakistan. And that's the
reason when you meet a lot of Afghans here in Delhi,
you'd see them speak flawless Urdu and you know Hind
(25:25):
the event because a lot of them have been educated
in Pakistan, right they know Urdu as opposed to Pasta
and Dhari, which he would speak in Afghanistan. So they
had an independent mind. And I think somewhere down the
line jh Q rawl Pindi, the park deep state underestimated
Pashtuan nationalism right where they are very proud people who
(25:49):
don't take orders from anyone. And that's history is witnessed
to this. Whether it's the Brits, it's the Soviets, the Americans,
the West, whoever, they're very independent. And this is what
the Park military might have realized. And that's when the
first fissure started coming in into the relations. And then
they said, okay, if that's the case, then we're going
(26:10):
to throw all your people out. The three hundred thousand
of Ghans quarter of a million. That's a very large
mass of people that are literally uprooting from their lives
in Pakistan and throwing them across into Afghanistan. That's created
problems in Afghanistan. It's a very poor country. It's a
dirt poor country. It's hardly any money that they have,
so that created a rift. Then of course you have
(26:33):
the TTP. That's the biggest bone of contention. Now. The
pakistanis wanted Afghanistan to crack down on the TTP. Now
they assume that if they get our boys in Kabul,
our boys are going to crack down on our biggest worry,
which is the terry k Taliban Pakistan, which had been
around since two thousand and seven. Now these are Pashtuns
(26:54):
and they've been family for thousands of years. They familiar
ties between them are thousands of years older than the
Durand line, which is why they don't recognize the Duran line.
When the time that I was there for almost two
weeks and people were laughing at what Duran line, we
(27:14):
don't recognize it for us. The only nation actually is
not Afghanistan Pashuns. I would talk to Pashikistan. We want Pashtunistan.
We want an independent homeland for the Pashtun people of Afghanistan,
Pakistan and Iran even right they're Pashtuans in Iran. So
this is when I think this miscalculation that Pakistan always makes.
(27:37):
You know, when is the last time they made this
kind of miscalculation, Yeah, quick question, nineteen seventy one. They
completely miscalculated Bengali nationalists. Now they assume that well, because
the East Pakistanis are Muslim, therefore they're you know, they're
going to vote for this larger Islamic republic, which is Pakistan,
(27:58):
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. But they underestimated Bengali nationalism
where they were actually Bengali's first and Muslims later. Now,
the same mistake they seem to have made here with
the Pashtuns, and when they tried to push them around,
you know, tell them do this, do that. That's when
things went as they say south and the TTP, which
(28:19):
is now resurgent, operates out of Afghanistan. It's a known
fact they operate out of Aghanistan. They're attacking across the
Duran line, which they don't recognize, and in twenty twenty
five they've carried out something like six hundred attacks and
they openly defiant of the Pakistani state. The writ of
the Pakistan government and the military doesn't run in many districts,
(28:40):
especially in Kaiber Paku. Yeah.
Speaker 2 (28:43):
In fact, this year, I mean just not this year,
just the last couple of months. This train called the
Kafu Express has been the news so many times because
of the repeated attacks by TTP on that train because
liberation sorry sorry say yeah yeah, but so tell me
something when it comes to military prowess, how do these
(29:06):
compare whether you have the Taliban in Afghanistan, whether you
have the TTP running ractag over there. Because the Taliban
has always been pictured as this rat tag bunch of
fighters you know, with like you know, they don't have
an artillery.
Speaker 1 (29:21):
So to speak. They don't have an air force.
Speaker 2 (29:22):
Pakistan has some of the latest equipment thanks to China
and a bit of the US. It has an air force,
It has a well equipped army. How is it that
in the last one year we've come across repeated news items,
repeated headlines where the Pakistani army seems to have suffered
a big setback, And in fact, if you look at
(29:42):
Pakistani media, there's been a lot of questioning about how
is it that the current government establishment, i should say,
is allowing so many Pakistan soldiers to die? And which
is I think what lies at the heart of the
current crisis is that I think the military sort of
just had it with them and they start started more
ming inside Afghanistan, which is then led to the real
(30:03):
fighting as across Like, so what and how is it
possible that ttp and Taliban managed to annoy the Pakistan
military so much that they've almost had to go to
the brink of war right Well?
Speaker 3 (30:17):
They So the thing is that how they Afghans fight.
You have to understand how they Afghans fight and why
they're such deadly fighters is positional warfare is not their thing.
They can't stand and fight, They can't fight conventionally, and
that's also a function of the terrain of Afghanistan. If
you see, the terrain of Afghanistan doesn't lend itself to
large masses of troops moving around, you know, in terms
(30:39):
of the way you would say, imagine on the steps
of Europe or on the planes of India the Indo
ganjectic plane or something like that. We can't move large
forces like that. So they're very good guerrilla fighters and
they've been so for hundreds of years. They're very good
at hid and run tactics, which is what they specialize in.
And you have to see this place called Puanchhet, believe it,
(31:00):
which is north of Kabul, which is where the Amcha Masud,
one of the greatest guerilla commanders of the twentieth century,
his redoubt was. It was basically this mountain fortress with
valleys in between, where the Tajiks used to live and
they beat back numerous attempts by the Soviets because they
were hitting and you know, running, and the Soviets could enter,
but then they would be massacred. So it was so
(31:23):
this actually is the Afghan way of war fighting. They
have fought conventional wars. Let's not forget Pany, but in
the eighteenth centuries when they defeated the Marathas in the
Third Battle of Paniput, that is a different era. That
was Amcha Abdali. They were fighting conventionally, but if you
look at it in history, they've been greater guerrilla fighters
(31:43):
than they have been conventional fighters. So what you're seeing
in the last few years along the Duran line is
the TTP staging terror attacks, suicide bombings, hitting boasts and
running away, ambushing military convoys. The Pakistan mil has no
reply to this. They can only try and do what
the Americans did in the two decades that they were
(32:06):
in Afghanistan, which is maybe drone strikes, bombing their bases,
you know, killing assassinating senior figures. And they chose the
timing of the Taliban foreign Minister's visit to New Delhi,
Murturkey's visit to actually, you know, sender, yeah, hit two
birds with one stone, say that hit not just the
TTP paces inside Afghanistan, but also to warn the Afghans
(32:29):
that look, if you go closer to India, you will
bear the consequences of this. So that is you know,
literally the nub of the problem. The fact is that
the Pashtuan nationalismen be the way they fight. The Pakistan
army has no option for that, and it's only a
matter of time, I believe, in the current scenario, if
the TTP attacks keep increasing the way they are they
(32:49):
are today the TTPs attacking Pakistan. This is the deadliest year,
to put it, since two thousand and nine. So the
TDP attacks searched in two thousand and nine and they
kind of dropped off. So in twenty twenty five they've
again picked up. And if it continues at this rate,
the park military is going to have no option but
(33:10):
to move in again into Kyber Pakdunqua do some massive
attacks base. It is Urvali Messud that they're after the
TTP chief, and he's done extremely well for the TTP.
I mean, he's a terrorist and all of that massacres people,
but if you look at it, he's a Messud, one
of the original like you know Hakimula and Bertula, the
(33:32):
Mesu tribes of Waziristan. Astwhile which is now subsumed into
Kaiber Pakdunqua and Kybur Paktunqua is a state that's only
about seven or eight years old. They had those northwest.
You know, they had North Waziristan, South Waziristan, all of
that was subsumed into this one comprehensive state called Kyber Paktunka.
They thought it'd be easier to administer put all the
(33:53):
Pashians in one box, you know. But now with this
nur Vali mesa suit coming in. He's a formidable fighter.
He's been around for seven eight years, he's put a
code of conduct, ethics, he's united all the factions of
the TTP, and he's proving to be a nightmare for
the Pakistanis. So all the attacks that you see are
(34:16):
basically directed at the TTP. And now because they're striking
inside Afghanistan, the Taliban, Afghan Taliban have no option but
to hit back attack the Pakistan military. And you've seen
the videos of the Taliban figures saying that, look, if
you hit us with your AFOs and your drones, of
course they have no reply to that. We are going
(34:36):
to bleed you on the board.
Speaker 1 (34:38):
Yeah right.
Speaker 2 (34:39):
We'll talk more about this, especially about how India sees
itself in this contribute in Afghanistan and sorry, between Taliban
and Pakistan.
Speaker 3 (34:47):
But a truck quick break.
Speaker 4 (34:49):
I read in one of the newspapers at that time
that the Golden Quadrilateral, the dream project of various prime ministers,
was like ninety eight percent or ninety six percent complete,
and I thought, okay, I mean, if it's ninety six
percent complete, why don't we go try it out, check
(35:09):
it out. So that was one aspect of it. Then okay,
let's also try and compare cars across this distance. So
you're driving like six thousand odd kilometers at a go,
and then you're taking three different and that time we
took three different cars as at that time, and we said, okay,
(35:33):
let's try out these cars across these roads. And it
turned out to be such a fantastic experience tests of
both man machine and also the roads.
Speaker 3 (35:46):
I mean.
Speaker 4 (35:47):
So the interesting bit was that, okay, it was ninety
six or ninety eight percent complete, but the parts that
weren't complete were the bridges all across the country, So
bridges were in various states of construction, but the entire
roads were finished.
Speaker 3 (36:04):
So fantastic road.
Speaker 4 (36:07):
No traffic, you're barreling down, no speed limits on those
roads where nobody's supposed to be. You're barreling down at whatever.
Suddenly the road disappears.
Speaker 1 (36:25):
Welcome back, Sane.
Speaker 2 (36:27):
I obviously want to talk about how India is placed
all of this, especially because we just recently had the
Taliban foreign Minister Mutaki in Terry, a controversial visit which
will also come to especially in our in our fraternity.
We'll come to that, but before we do that, so
am I to then think that, based on what you've
said in the first half of this episode, that the
(36:50):
TTP is obviously going to keep radying against the Pakistani
military UH and the Taliban because of their push two nationality,
the identification with that, they're gonna more or less continue
with that covert support regardless of what agreements are signed
in Doha or elsewhere. Would it then be fair to
assume that this is going to remain a live scenario
(37:12):
for the foreseeable future.
Speaker 3 (37:13):
Absolutely, as long as the TTP still is operating in
Afghanistan continues to attack the park military. Look, I have
no sympathy for the Pakistan Army, right they deserve what
they're getting for what they've done to all those people
and the fact that they routinely capture bar in Pakistan.
They're in par there right now. But the fact is
(37:34):
that as long as the TTP is there in Afghanistan,
the sanctuaries in Afghanistan. As long as it's operating in Kaeberpat,
there can be no peace between Afghanistan and Pakistan, no
lasting peace because the TTP does not exist there. For
it's not an NGO, right, It's got very clear aims.
It wants to bring Sharia into Pakistan. Right, it wants
(37:58):
to overthrow the state of Parker Kistan, and it believes
it's on the way of way to achieve that. And
if they can't do that, then they're going to create
something like a Kaiber Paktun Kua which is integrated into Afghanistan,
engineered the breakup of Afghanistan Pakistan and integrate hyper Paktun
(38:19):
Kua into Afghanistan. Because if the insurgency continues at this rate,
the state loses control of Kyber Paktun Kui, say the
other provinces start acting up, as say Baluchistan for instance,
if there's an insurgency in Panjab with the with the
(38:40):
civilian outfits over there which have been massacred by the
Pakistan military, if there is an insurgency there, there's just
literally going to be too many fires for the park
military to be able to put out. And so the
persums run away with their you know, peace and the
Baluchu with there and who knows something would happen in Panjab.
So it's actually a polychromes that Pakistan is facing right now.
(39:02):
But you know, yes, who benefits from crisis in Pakistan
the CEOs of the military.
Speaker 2 (39:09):
The CEO, that's right, the Field Marshal Field Marshal, which
was going to be a tangent as well. Then do
you think a lot of what you've said right now
and the fact that you also have a very far
right movement happening in some of the urban centers of Pakistan.
You have massive protests happening in Lahore and other cities,
uh sort of linked to this if I could call
(39:30):
it that, because I would, I would see it that way,
Like the Pashtuns want sort of a very far right
version of Islam and there are certain civilian groups as
well in the urban centers who want that. So the
military has been grappling with all of this, not just
right now for the last several.
Speaker 1 (39:43):
Months, for a couple of years.
Speaker 2 (39:45):
Do you think that all of this may have been
part of the motivation for Asimunir to launch the Pehlkamter
attack so that he could then you know, have a
fight with India and then go to the US crying
for help and then so of get some money in
some weaponary would I would.
Speaker 3 (40:03):
Never discount that possibility there. And you know the fact
is that for the park military to be there, to
be relevant, it needs a crisis because you know what uses.
Speaker 1 (40:14):
The fire brigade if there's no fires there?
Speaker 3 (40:16):
Right? If you imagine a land which was you know,
constantly like a cherrapunjik kind of country, which is raining
all the time, and you didn't have a you know,
a fire ever because it was so wet, you didn't
need a fire brigade, right, But you need a country
that's dry as a tinder box, where there are frequent fires.
(40:38):
And who do you call but the military. It's always
been the case since October of nineteen fifty eight when
Field Marshal, the first Field Marshal took over Pakistan. And
it's always been there that and this I keep saying
this that you know, every now and then we have
to look out for one general who thinks who he
is Pakistan's savior, who's going to save Pakistan from this evil?
(41:01):
And it began in nineteen fifty eight, and they've been
trying ever since. You know, it's been Ayu, it's been
Yaya in Zia, Musha Raff and now you have the
Great Field Marshal again. So he thrives in crisis. And
I would think that some of this crisis has been
engineered himself. You know, how do you explain this crackdown
on the Labaya Terika labayk TLP, which is like a
(41:25):
it's a civilian arm of the Park military. It was
created by the Park military. It was it was like
their you know, it was their guys that they would
use against all to destabilize Nava Sharif distabilished Shabaz, distabilized
Imran Khan. The Labay would hit the road almost instantly.
You know, they were their Roland boys. And why would
(41:47):
they massacre them the way they did either it was
to send a message to the the the local people
that listen, if you protest against what we are doing,
this is a hard state, as Muni kept, you know,
reminding us. Or it could be that he's just playing
this whole game to tell the Americans that, look, I
can't deploy anywhere else, least of all in Khaza because
(42:09):
I've got a problem here in my hands. Yeah, I
have no internet and cities are in you know, lockdown.
No one knows how many people were massacred by the
military in Lahore, those mass firings and all that. They
say upwards of two hundred people. But so you know,
they have a problem. They have a poly crisis. But
(42:29):
as I said before, it's the military that thrives in
such a crisis, so stronger and stronger with every crisis.
Speaker 2 (42:36):
So a very good point, right, final thoughts, and now
coming to India. So the recent fighting that we saw
between Taliban and Pakistan had happened just when the Foreign
Minister of Taliban was in New Delhi. He met Ja
Shankar and a few other top officials. Following the meeting,
India has said that will reopened the Kabul Embasi, which
(42:57):
was downgraded after the Taliban took over in.
Speaker 4 (43:00):
Uh.
Speaker 1 (43:02):
Many people have not liked it.
Speaker 2 (43:03):
Uh jaw that actually said he hangs his head in
shame that India is doing it. But I think India
obviously has a strategic and geobodical reasons for doing this,
and something that we often talk about on this podcast.
Speaker 1 (43:15):
It is one thing to have models. It's one thing
to have the utopian.
Speaker 2 (43:19):
Idea of a world, but the real world is dirty,
it's messy, and the world of geoprat is even more so.
Speaker 3 (43:25):
Yeah.
Speaker 2 (43:26):
So, obviously India has reasons to sort of warm up
to Taliban, especially after what's happened with the Palm attack
and options. But is it a coincidence that you've seen
the worst fighting between the two Taliban and Pakistan just
when the Foriger minister's visit was being planned, was being prepped,
and then finally he was in India, and like you said,
(43:46):
a day or two just before that, Pakistan launched that
air rate that actually then also spiraled this.
Speaker 3 (43:51):
Into Yeah, I think I think that the pakistanis you
know that when they saw what was unfolding here, it's
that whole thing of you know, never want to have
a hostile Afghanistan in your backyard. And you know the
time that they had the Northern Alliance that was there
in Kabul, you had a Northern Alliance that was not
(44:12):
very friendly to Pakistan. But now you haven't opened the
hostile regime. There a Taliban regime and this was their way,
this was the military's way of telling the Afghans to
back off, don't build bridges with India because we don't
want to be sandwiched between a hostile India and a
hostile Afghanistan. And you know, this is something that they've
(44:35):
paranoid about a two front war, which if you've heard
it started to emerge in there's you know, the Foreign
Minister quadja as If, the Defense Minister quadjas If I
said that that we are caught in a two front situation.
And this two front situation is created by the Pakistan military. See.
I mean, the thing is, it's such a tragedy that
here you have people of India who invest every five
(44:58):
years in a civilian government and a and a prime minister,
and across the border you have people investing every five
years in a dictator. You know, you bring in one dictator,
you give him a two year extension, he gets a
five year extension, then you give him another five year extension,
and then he becomes a field marshal and then he'd
probably be looking at becoming president or generalist. There's no
(45:20):
end to ambitions, you know, once you get into that
position of absolute power, which is where what the military
enjoys in Pakistan. And you know this is this is
the problem that we have to deal with because for them,
it's an existential threat. Also they believe India is an
existential threat, and by provoking India they generate some kind
(45:44):
of hysteria within Pakistan because there are strikes, and then
they try to unify the country behind them, which is
what mo Need seems to have done because if you remember,
on the seventh of May, the most popular person in
Pakistan was Imran Khan and it was I mean, the
(46:05):
guy was really resilient and he was there. He was
holding out, not breaking, unbending, unbowing. And by the tenth
or eleventh of May, the most popular man in Pakistan
which a general Assimoni, and that went to his head
and he anointed himself Field Marshals, you know, shortly after.
So now for him to remain there, he has to deliver, right,
(46:29):
so you see him doing this frantic deal making, going
into the White House doing this, the mineral's deal, the
ports deal. Is that moving around Beijing, Saudi Arabia, you know.
But sooner or later, this is this, the effects of
this are going to wear out. That's when tough questions
are going to be asked and what option does he
have but to create another permanent state of chaos and
(46:52):
confusion around which is where, Which is a very tough
call for India. Really, if you ask me, we were
talking about Sindhur two point zero. The next time we
do that, next time he tries out a peelgam, we're
going to give him Sindour two point two. Forgetting that
when you do Sindu two point two, you might actually
be strengthening him. You might shatter his air bases and
(47:13):
you know, destroy his sports and infrastructure and convert him
into a landlocked country. But then the military becomes strong
because then the people rally behind them the military. So
it's a tough catch twenty two for us. And this
has been a problem for us from the very beginning
for the civilian establishments in India to how do you
do business with a civilian government which is being held
(47:37):
hostage by a park military. How do you you know,
ensure that you target the park military without harming the
civilian government. And today the civilian government is a puppet.
It's completely captive of the Park Army. It's a hybrid government,
they call it that, but in reality it is a
(47:59):
civil a military controlled government where the civilians are just
a facade. They're like a you know, a shield to
absorb a lot of the brig bads and stuff. But
while the military does its own thing.
Speaker 2 (48:12):
I think it's like the military has a civilian wing
to take care of all the municipal works over there
in and for that you have the civilian wing which
does that will take care of everything else. Right, great
final points on deep This is about the controversy that
broke out with the Taliban formaces visit to India among
in our fraternity. So the minister held a press conference
(48:35):
at the Afghan Embassy, very important, where.
Speaker 1 (48:39):
He did not They did not call any of the
women have a bar.
Speaker 2 (48:42):
Basically, yes, the invites only went out to all male journalists.
Not a single woman was invited and this was pointed
out obviously on social media by women journalists.
Speaker 1 (48:51):
Uh.
Speaker 2 (48:52):
The initial response was he, hey, it's the Taliban Afgharistan
Embassi technically Afghan soil, so they rules apply over there.
Speaker 1 (49:01):
Sorry, you can't do much. The MEA India has been
known to be very smart.
Speaker 2 (49:08):
Don't be very you think they really just messed this
up because it's impossible for them not to know that
he was going to pull this he's coming to your country.
Obviously there may have been a hint, or they may
have been a guest. There was no back channel, there
was no fore warning, key boys, you cannot do that
in India. Because then later I think the message was
(49:28):
sent to a Taliban and said, you know, you.
Speaker 1 (49:30):
Have to call it press.
Speaker 3 (49:31):
I think you're right. I don't think they anticipated this
little thing, that Motaki would call a press conference and
say that, you know, only male journalists would be allowed.
But then you have to see what happened the next day.
You had all our journalist colleagues who are up there
in the front row, and none of them availed. They're
not wearing even a head covering. And this is amazing
(49:54):
for me when you see Western journalists traveling in Afghanistan
or they're all you know in Hi jobs and their
heads are covered in Iran, in Afghanistan and all that.
So I think we came out really well out of
this day, and who knows, it could lead to better
and bigger things. Yeah, you've got a foot in the
door and you could probably use that to tell the
(50:16):
Afghan Taliban listen, it makes sense to educate women. Also,
you know, you can't run a country on just one engine.
If you've got two engines, you've got to run it
on two engines. You can't shut down one and run
on one, right you could. I mean, let's I wouldn't
say we should get into this thing of nation building
and all that, which the Americans frequently do when they
(50:37):
go into these exotic parts of the world, but we
could very through our engagement with the Taliban, you know,
our support for the people of Afghanistan, which is where
we have We are not a militaristic society. We don't
prop up dictatorships and do all of that, but we
basically emphasize people to people contacts. And if you see
(50:59):
all our invests in Afghanistan, a majority of us more
than ninety percent, I have been primarily towards the civilian infrastructure.
We're building, you know, our dams, we've you know, fixed highways,
We've built buildings over there, which is what we'll continue doing,
right because at the end of the day, we mean
well for the people of Afghanistan, build schools, colleges, hospitals,
(51:19):
that kind of stuff. Right, Who knows prevail upon the
Afghan people the Taliban through our sustained outreach to kind
of relax. This thing on not educating women that is
that is so medieval and dark ages thing. But let's
(51:40):
not do that in a hurry. Let's go one step
at a time. Who knows this could have been the
first step. I think that's the first time probably in
his life, that Mutaky has ever seen women sitting like that,
you know, in front of him, and that he's going
to take those memories back with him, and who knows,
it could lead to something else, and it could set
a precedent, could be other women journalists who come into
(52:02):
Afghanistan and say, listen, I'm not going to wear a
veil or hijab and sit in front of you. I've
seen how my friends in India were sitting and asking
you those questions and you're embassy in Delhi. Yeah.
Speaker 2 (52:12):
So it's a good point actually, and I think a
good point and good note on which to end this episode.
So thanks on Deep. Actually a fantastic discussion really. I
think if anyone wants a crash course in terms of
why Pakistan and Taliban am not getting together right now
and the misdsteps Pakistan made in terms of understanding the
pastun identity, I think this is that episode so thanks
(52:35):
on Deep, thanks.
Speaker 3 (52:36):
A lot as always, Thank you Dave great have you.
Speaker 2 (52:39):
And thanks as always to our listeners and viewers. That's
it for this fixed defense toores for more tune in
next week. Till then, stay safe and not lost any
boundaries with the passport
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