September 12, 2025 • 49 mins
India is betting big on the Holistic Development of Great Nicobar Island, a decades-long project to build a massive transshipment port, a new airport, a power plant, a township, and associated military build-up at the doorstep of the Strait of Malacca, the world’s busiest shipping lane.
The project had been flying under the radar until this month when concerns of ecological damage and impact on tribal population put the spotlight on this venture.
On this episode, host Dev Goswami and national security expert Sandeep Unnithan dive deep into this project and explore why this could be India’s most significant infrastructure project in history.
What makes the Malacca Strait the most crucial chokepoint in global trade?
And how does Great Nicobar give India a leg up in its long-running maritime rivalry with China?
The two decode the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean, the ecological and tribal concerns around the project, and why the next big global contest may not be on land, but at sea.
Produced by Taniya Dutta
Sound Mix by Rohan Bharti
The project had been flying under the radar until this month when concerns of ecological damage and impact on tribal population put the spotlight on this venture.
On this episode, host Dev Goswami and national security expert Sandeep Unnithan dive deep into this project and explore why this could be India’s most significant infrastructure project in history.
What makes the Malacca Strait the most crucial chokepoint in global trade?
And how does Great Nicobar give India a leg up in its long-running maritime rivalry with China?
The two decode the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean, the ecological and tribal concerns around the project, and why the next big global contest may not be on land, but at sea.
Produced by Taniya Dutta
Sound Mix by Rohan Bharti
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
This is India Today Podcasts.
Speaker 2 (00:05):
Welcome to season three of Another Defense, the podcast that
takes you inside the world of conflict. I'm your host,
Deve Goswami, and every week I sit down with experts
and retired officers from the Army, Navy and Air Force
to decode all things to do with India security and
explore what it truly means to serve. Get ready for
(00:27):
stories of strategy, sacrifice and strength.
Speaker 1 (00:32):
This is in Our Defense.
Speaker 2 (00:35):
The Anderma Nicobar Islands have been a very big focus
area this week thanks to the opposition, which has raised
complaints about what's officially known as the Great Sorry officially
known as the holistic development of the Great Nicobar Islands,
it's simply known as the Great Nigoga Project, or as
experts likean have called it, the Pearl Harbor of India
(00:58):
or somebody else who said it was the Hong Kong
of India. Because of the focus on this, I got
thinking this week that perhaps it's a good time to
explore that one massive domain that we haven't really done
much on the third season of Another Defense, which is
the maritime domain, a domain which where I am a
(01:19):
bit out of depth pun non intended because the sheer
vastness of the sea, of the ocean, and the sheer
difficulty in terms of wrapping your head around how do
you actually control the ocean, control the sea. To understand that,
to understand this project, to understand what else India has
(01:39):
been doing on the eastern seaboard we have with us,
say are you.
Speaker 3 (01:44):
Good to be back there? Yeah?
Speaker 2 (01:46):
Great to have you as always Sunday by You a
sea person?
Speaker 3 (01:50):
Are you so?
Speaker 2 (01:50):
Are you beach person? Are you a mountain person when
it comes to vacations.
Speaker 3 (01:53):
I'm I am a beach person. I'm a sea person.
Speaker 2 (01:56):
That's exactly what somebody from Mombay would say, like me right,
So absolutely, have you been to the Andermans?
Speaker 3 (02:02):
I have lovely.
Speaker 2 (02:03):
I've always been meaning to go there, haven't unfortunately yet.
Speaker 3 (02:06):
Yeah you should, you should. I mean it is It's
one of those greatest, you know, territories that we should
we should be so proud of that they're part of India,
you know. I mean, there are such incredibly beautiful landscapes
in India in the north, in the south east west,
but I think the Adlemans is unique in its position
and it's geography and it's terry in topography, all of that.
(02:28):
Whichever you look at it, it's closer to three countries
than it's the Indian Mania, right, And it's so far
out there that when you actually land that you realize
that it's literally you've flown something like thirteen hundred kilometers
from the Indian mainland to come here to the Andermans.
It's it's an incredibly beautiful part of this world. And
I recommend everyone who's watching this too, you know, try
(02:49):
and make that trip once or twice in your life
at least.
Speaker 2 (02:52):
In fact, quite often going to the Anderman Kubas is
more expensive than flying to another foreign country.
Speaker 3 (02:57):
It is. It's a function of demand and sub exactly. Uh.
Speaker 2 (03:01):
And you know, the other interesting aspect of of of
these islands is its population.
Speaker 1 (03:09):
Uh.
Speaker 2 (03:09):
It's the fact that various areas of these islands are
completely out of bounds for reasons such as ecology, for reasons.
Just as certain tribes, some of whom have not been
contacted by by by the world ever of them ever, ever.
Speaker 3 (03:28):
Yeah, have been there in uh splendid isolation for tens
of thousands of years. Yes, uh.
Speaker 2 (03:34):
And one of them not linked to what we'll discuss today.
But are the Sentinellies which made worldwide headlines actually a
few years ago when an American missionary tried to go
there and convert them to Christianity and he was peered
literally on. The body still lies there because the Indian
government decided it was too risky for people to go
(03:55):
there to retrieve that that body. In fact, if people
want an image that, we'll actually have a producer put
it up on this on video. But for people who
listening to us, I have a link in the show notes.
Is a very iconic image. I think it was a
short by a native photographer after the tsunami where you
have one of the sentiliest people trying to throw us
peer at a course carlicopter that was holding in the
(04:17):
area to sort of check on them, are you okay
or not? Because India has since long decided not to
contact them, But that person was trying to throw us
peer at that.
Speaker 3 (04:27):
But you know, here's the thing they've while it. Those
images may convey the fact that they're violent and there
they could kill you, which they will, of course if
you go to a certain distance. The fact is that
they are far more vulnerable than we are, right because
the kind of infections that we carry could just wipe
out the entire population on that island. So in a sense,
they're extremely vulnerable. It's a good thing that the government
(04:50):
keeps them that way out of contact from you know,
all of humanity. But that you know, this is my
personal thing that we should study them in some form
of the other, remotely, perhaps using technology, because they are
a very incredible people, and you know, if there is
a way technology allows you to do that remotely, we
(05:10):
can kind of document their life history, their culture and
preserve it for all time to come. So I mean,
but that's just a personal opinion. But that said, it's
an incredible feat of survival, of preservation and the fact
that these are some of the most unique Indians that
(05:31):
we have amongst the one point four billion Indians, they
are the most amazing race and they believe to have
been what humanity was in its original form when we
exited Africa exactly we're forty to fifty thousand years back,
and that great march out of Africa. This is one
(05:52):
of those lost tribes that actually stayed behind in that island,
and so to study them would be a great thing,
but of course, not endiangering them Uh.
Speaker 2 (06:00):
And the reason I bought brought to the centralies up
was because there's another similar tribe called the Humping tribe,
which actually is at the heart of the controversy that
we're about to talk about. But before we do that,
and before we talk about this project, we talk about
what else India has been doing in this in this region.
Speaker 3 (06:16):
UH.
Speaker 2 (06:18):
Explain the dynamics of strategic moves at the sea, yea
visibly land, because like I said, it's something that for
me is way difficult to wrap my head around, simply
because of the fact I cannot picture it. And I
look at the map of let's say India, China, India, Pakistan.
I can see mountain rangers, I can see entry, I
can see there's a road over there's a there's a
(06:38):
rail line over there. When I look at a map
of the sea, it is blue everywhere. I don't know
what is going where. And then you have these terms
just choke points and sea lanes and stuff like that.
So break that concept down for us before we enter
this topic.
Speaker 3 (06:54):
Well, you know, the factor is that we are astride
the Indian Ocean, and the Indian Ocean is practically the
most important stretch of water in the world today simply
because of the economies around it. You have Japan, you
have China, you have India. That's three of the five
biggest economies in the world around this Indo Pacific if
(07:15):
and call it the Japanese of course a little further
towards the Pacific, but it's China, and it's India, and
you have the Indoor Pacific, and you have this huge
movement of trade, commerce, energy flowing through the Indian Ocean.
It's just imagine it as a gigantic oceanic expressway that's
moving from the Malacca Streets near south of Sri Lanka
(07:38):
and towards the Cape of Good Hope and towards West Asia.
It's just this huge, pulsing oceanic highway through which hundreds
of thousands of ships pass. Every year, something like one
hundred thousand ships pass through this. Fifty to sixty percent
of the world's energy passes through this oil, gas, all
(08:00):
of that cargo. So what you're looking at might look
blue for you, but actually it's pulsing red with the
lifeline of global commerce. So it's right here. It's just
below our subcontinent, below sub you know, Sri Lanka so
it's actually the veins of oceanic commerce passed through the
(08:21):
Indian Ocean, and that's why this stretch is so important,
and it's always been the case if you look at it,
going back to thousands of years. I'm going back to
the time when India and China were once the biggest
economies in the world. Sheer size Indian ships used to
sail as far as you know Malaya, the used to
go to China, the used to sail into West Asia,
(08:43):
of course, further down to Africa. Chinese ships have been
recorded as coming here in the twelve Imperial voyages of
chang Hei the Admiral. So it's been pulsating with trade
and commerce for decades, for centuries in fact, and today
we are coming back to that old time when India
(09:03):
and China were once the most prosperous trading nations. We
are returning to that time where India is the fourth
largest economy, soon to be the third largest economy. China
is of course the second largest, soon to be the
largest economy. So the Indian Ocean then once again becomes
really important. And it's not just trade. It's also important
(09:24):
because of naval presence, like as you know, the PLA
Navy is the largest navy in the world in terms
of sheer number of warships. It has something like four
hundred warships all told, it has more warships than the
United States Navy, which is a feat when you consider
that the Chinese began their modernization just about three decades ago.
(09:46):
Of course, if you look at tonnage, the US Navies
has bigger ships. It has eleven aircraft carriers, it has
eleven lpds, and you know, assault ships and amphibias, assault ships,
and also it's a far more powerful navy. But in
terms of a number of platforms, the Chinese Navy's way ahead.
So they're doing it because the Indian Ocean is extremely
(10:07):
important for them. A lot of their energy passes through
the Indian Ocean. They of course draw all their sixty
something like fifty to sixty percent of their oil gas
flows in through West Asia and it passes through all
the choke points around the Indonesian islands. Now, the chokepoints,
as the terminology suggests, is a point that can be choked,
(10:29):
which is why when you have this large number of
ships then suddenly coming into this constricted area that becomes
a choke point. The Malaca is one choke point. It's
about just about nine hundred kilometers long. You have other
such choke points around the Indonesian islands Sunda, Lombok, Umbai, Weta,
So that's a total of four choke points which connect
(10:49):
the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. So that's when
these areas become so vital to global commerce simply because
they're so narrow and their straits literally surrounded by land
masses on both sides. And of course there is what
the Chinese ujintaw Wan's called the Malacca dilemma, right, how
(11:10):
can we allow so much of our oil and gas
to pass through such a short, small, narrow, constricted gap.
You know, it's like it's that thing in why do
you get heart attacks because your arteries get clogged. And
they're always worried about the fact that if somebody stops
their maritime energy roots, they could have the Chinese economy
(11:31):
could have a problem. So that is something that countries
have kind of played on the United States. Is for instance,
they did this to the Imperial Japanese Navy in the
Second World War. They shot up all their ships, they
destroyed all their you know, warships, merchant ships, and this
whole Imperial Japan, which was actually a thalasocracy, which is
(11:53):
an oceanic empire, just collapsed because it could not sustain
these sea roots. It could not protect its sea roots,
it could not sail ships, it could not bring raw materials,
could not make this thing. So you know, it was
a concerted campaign over three four years using ships, submarines, aircraft,
and this empire was converted into an island and then
(12:15):
finally it was defeated in nineteen forty five. So that's
just about eighty years back. Now I see China trying
to occupy the space that Imperial Japan had just about
eighty years back. The resurgent Chinese economy, the resurgent PLA navy,
all of these factors are going to determine the geopolitics
(12:37):
of the Indian Ocean region well into this twenty first century.
And you know that's everything that you see now they're
moving around, All the chess pieces moving around are in
response to this very unprecedented set of circumstances, which is
the rise of China. And as China rises, it becomes
more assertive, it starts surging out ships, merchant ships, of course,
(12:59):
it starts building alliances, it starts creating port facilities, it
activates its friends who have a number of friends that
it has, whether it's Pakistan or Myanmar or North Korea,
all of that, and then you will see countries around
the region that are worried by the rise of China, India,
for instance, the Philippines, Vietnam, all of these traditional countries
(13:22):
which are worried that rising China is a hegemon. It's
a regional hegemon that could actually impede upon their economic progress,
which will make them subservient, which will treat them like
an empire treats its subjects. That's the kind of fear
that's playing in the minds of a lot of Asian countries.
And if you see the kind of weapons acquisitions over
(13:44):
the last decade, they are all made in response to
China's rise. Whether it's Vietnam going in for submarines now
talking to us for BrahMos missiles, Philippines buying several sets
of BrahMos missiles. They're going in for repeat orders. We've
already sold them three batteries and now we're going to
buy you know, they're going to buy three more is
what we're hearing. Indonesia's as well, very you know, unsettled
(14:08):
by the rise of China. So the whole thing is
that while China keeps trying to tell everyone, you know,
our rise is going to be peaceful and we're here
to be good neighbors. But when you see the parades,
you see the kind of you know, aggression on the
high seas, most people aren't convinced that China's rise is
going to be peaceful. So everyone's investing. They're building up
(14:28):
their ports, they're building up their forts, they're building up
their militaries, they're you know, hedging their bets. They want
to ensure that they have everything ready in case China
decides to muscle around, you know, throw its weight around
in the in the region. So what you're seeing in
the Indian Ocean region one of the most fascinating geopolitical
(14:49):
stories of the twenty first century. Right.
Speaker 2 (14:53):
It's a fascinating answer, And I think that kind of
explains something that I've asked you before when we've talked
about this time of along the LC, is that why
does China in the first place feel the need to
need all India when, like you discussed that a majority
of its population is far east uh and there's no
real threat per se on the on the on the borders.
(15:14):
But I guess this is ultimately why, because the game
actually is being played in the ocean, and this is
just various pressure points that the country users to sort
of need India.
Speaker 3 (15:22):
So it's to focus get ours, you know, leadership, to
focus on the land frontiers area, which is where you
have the disputed regions, so that you don't look seawards
and you continuously spend less. You know, they the government
spends only about sixteen percent on the navy, wevisa something
like sixty percent on the army, and the army's relevance
(15:45):
will remain. Of course, I'm not disputing that as long
as we have disputed land frontiers, you don't have disputed
maritime frontiers. But the maritime frontier is somewhere that you
need to spend a lot more. You need to spend
more on the air force as well. So you know,
that's the state of play right now. And China is
ensuring that you look landwards because if you start looking seawards,
(16:05):
if you start investing greater resources, then it becomes a
problem for China.
Speaker 2 (16:11):
But we're doing that. We're trying to do that. And
that brings me to that great Nicobar project. It's been
in the works for the last couple of years, and
I think construction is that's said to begin very soon
in the next couple of years.
Speaker 3 (16:24):
I'm not wrong.
Speaker 2 (16:25):
It's a total project right now of for p seventy
thousand frore. That includes one tranship port, which basically, if
I were to explain it to my listeners and viewers,
is basically like an airport that is dedicated to transfers
and layovers. Basically, so you have not a destination, yeah,
a destination, you have goods coming there. They kind of
(16:46):
kind of get offloaded and then put in two different
ships and then send to their actual destinations. There's a
full fledged airport that's going to come up. There's a
power plant and a township. All of this will happen
in the southern most island of and Amandicubar Islands just
above in their point, which is India's last point on Earth.
Speaker 1 (17:10):
Now, this controversy.
Speaker 2 (17:12):
Obviously like it espar at the beginning of this episode,
and we'll get into that briefly, But why do you
call this on the like you just did the Pearl
Harbor of India and break this project down for us actually,
because you know why, this has been in the works
for a couple of years. There hasn't been much chatter
about this up until you had Sunya Gandhi of the
(17:35):
Congress writing an opinion piece in the Hindu and then
suddenly it became a trend. And now people try to
explain it, and some are talking about the advantages. Some
are talking about the sort of damage it will do
to the ecology over there, to the tribes over there.
Shopping tribe is one of them. They say, So tell
us about this project, what is it? And as a
national security expert, why do you think this is a
(17:57):
very important, crucial project?
Speaker 3 (17:59):
Right? Well, they you know, I've looked at the project.
I've spoken to a few people, and what my understanding is
that this is the most important infrastructure project India has
ever attempted in its history in terms of the ability
to influence global events. You know, I'm not talking of
(18:22):
a project on the Indian mainland. You have port projects,
you have airport projects, you have military bases, your strategic
basis and all that, but none of them affects global
commerce in a way that the ICTP does the Karatia
Bay project in Nicoba Island because simply because of its location.
(18:42):
You know, it is a strike the world's most important
shipping street, the Malaca Streets. I've already told you the numbers.
It's something like almost one hundred thousand ships passed through
there every year and thirteen million barrels of oil passed
through there every single day. It has very sensitive location
in Singapore on the one end, Port Klang on the other,
(19:04):
Colombo at the third. But we've never seen India move
forward with a project that will actually put us into
the big league like this project. It's a global project.
It's not just a pure India project. This is India
signaling that we are going to put a project that's
going to put us on the global map that will
(19:26):
serve our interests when we've become the world's third largest
economy the world's second largest economy in the next couple
of decades. And this is a slow burner of a project.
It's going to take several years to be realized. Right.
The first phase comes up in twenty twenty eight, that's
three years from now, and the last phase will be
(19:47):
in twenty fifteen nine. Right, that's more than two and
a half decades from now. So it's like it's a
very ambitious project and if it's realized, it aims to
make a singaporeind of port for India, which is astride
the global shipping lanes. See, the problem is that India
is we like to say that, you know, we are
(20:08):
astride the global shipping lanes and all that, but the
fact is that that flow that that highway that I
told you actually passes far south. It goes out of
the Malaca streets and then it comes down below Colombo
and then it goes up like that. So we actually
it makes more sense for a lot of companies which
carry these massive merchant ships to offload onto smaller ships,
(20:31):
tranship them and then send them up to the mainland
Indian mainland. But here, now you have an Indian port
that's going to be right there astride the Malaca Street,
just about forty nautical miles forty or fifty nautical miles away,
which means that the ship has to make the smallest
possible detor touch over there, offload its cargo and then
continue down its path. And this is going to save
(20:54):
there are estimates which say that India could save something
like two hundred million dollars in transhipment costs, which is
what we pay other ports like Klang, Singapore, Colombo. Right
now we offload cargo destined for India onto these ports
and from there it's tranship to the Indian mainland. But
(21:15):
here now for the first time you have an Indian port.
It's going to take time, which is going to be
located there. That's the maritime commerce part of it. Then
you have this strategic angle to this. Now, this port
is going to be like a dual use project. It's
going to have a civil enclave, it will have a
military enclave as well. The military on clave is where
(21:36):
you're going to have birthing areas for ships, warships, for submarines.
It will kind of use the airfields around of course
for air cover and all that. But it will allow
India to base very large warships over there, like aircraft
carriers for instance, submarines, and you of course have to
create I mean, this is not something that you say
(21:56):
it and it will be done. You know, the fact
is that it's so far away from in the Indian mainland.
Twelve hundred and fourteen hundred kilometers away. So the port
facilities over there will allow us to birth large warships,
aircraft carriers, destroyers, submarines and they're like and of course
the fact that you're located so close to the maritime
(22:17):
choke points like I mentioned the Malaka Straits, Sundha, Lombok, Kumbai.
Vetar suggests that Indian warships can go closer to these
choke points much swifter when they're deployed forward, deployed in
the Underman islands than they would be on the Indian mainland.
And a simple thumb rule thing would be a conventional
submarine for instance, if it has to sail from Vishaka Putnam,
(22:39):
which is the current port, if it has to sail
all the way to the choke points, it spends something
like eight days one way, where as if it were
located in port player it would cut down by fifty percent.
It's three or four days to these choke points. So
that economizes on you know, the usage of the submarines,
on the downtime and all that. You save a lot
of time cost all of that, and you know it's
(23:02):
the best place for you to be located in. So
it has enormous commercial benefits and it's a huge strategic project.
I think it is possibly, like I said, it is
the most important project that India has ever attempted until now.
Speaker 2 (23:19):
Wow, fantastic. That's actually I didn't know about this honestly because.
Speaker 3 (23:24):
It was flying under the raid exactly. And it was
kept that way because you don't want to make a
big song and dance about it, because when you start
saying a lot of things, when you start, you know,
projecting all of this out there, a lot of invested
interests start to get hurt. Of course, it affects several
countries across the world, especially in the region and beyond,
(23:48):
and they will have a reason to ensure that a
project like this doesn't happen, right, it's pure market economics,
and they will of course be people who would be
worried about its rategic and jew strategic impact on the region. Right.
You don't want India to be looking far east building
up these very strategic port facilities, forward basing its navy
(24:12):
for instance. All of these have connotations. They make people uncomfortable. Right,
So we've been playing this game for almost eighty years.
There were very happy on the mainland. No, we shall
not explore this. About twenty years back, twenty five years back,
there was Admiral Bagworth who spoke of a far eastern command,
and immediately the Asian countries went into a flux. Oh
(24:33):
you know, India's got great power ambitions and all that,
but it's taken us so long to get here. And
then finally we've actually started pouring cement into those great
power dreams. And we're doing it on our own territory.
We're not going into anyone else's home and building. We're
not reclaiming islands and building them like the Chinese. We're
(24:54):
not doing it in the global comments. We're building it
on Indian territory. We're doing what is legitimate on our
own soil. Uh.
Speaker 2 (25:03):
In fact, like the way you've described the project, I
wouldn't be surprised that when the first phase sort of
gets operational in a couple of years from now, you'll
have another standard along the L A C. Because China
is going to throw a fit about this project, and
not like what you're doing in the Indian Ocean.
Speaker 3 (25:18):
Right.
Speaker 1 (25:19):
Uh.
Speaker 2 (25:20):
The second aspect of this, in the the ecological aspect,
the concerns over that and this is not the first
time a concern like this has been raised on a
project that's been developed on in Indian Island.
Speaker 3 (25:31):
UH.
Speaker 2 (25:32):
Two years ago, you had a similar controversy over a
base that was inaugurated in luxury on the island Minicoy
iron is Garuda. If I'm not known, it wasn't it was?
It was? Was it Medico Island?
Speaker 3 (25:45):
Mini Cooy was?
Speaker 2 (25:46):
Was it.
Speaker 3 (25:49):
Island? Anyway?
Speaker 2 (25:49):
It doesn't matter. The point being it was also that
that that that base was far away from India. It's
actually closer to the Maldives and it is to to India.
Speaker 3 (25:59):
UH.
Speaker 2 (25:59):
And the logic is the same. I'm guessing you that
is just another side of the Indian Ocean and you.
Speaker 3 (26:06):
Are trying the western.
Speaker 2 (26:07):
Theater theaters UH, and you're trying to control the flow
of cargo that's coming from down South Africa. But this
question then remains, where do you draw the line? How
do you have that balance?
Speaker 3 (26:20):
Uh?
Speaker 2 (26:21):
Point number one, point number two. UH. Keeping this in
mind and also the fact that you say you've described
this as a project that's going to take easily three decades. UH,
do you see uh successive governments in the future. And
I'm not trying to say it's going to be of
this party or that party regardless. But because this is
going to require a lot of investment, this is going
(26:43):
to require that constant stay at it, stay at it,
stay at it over multiple governments. If you say to
two and a half decades, at least four or five governments,
four of five prime ministers, how do you ensure that
you end up achieving what you've set up to achieve.
Speaker 3 (26:56):
Well, of course, you know the first part of your question. First,
the fact is that projects are going to create some
kind of ecological impact. Right There are going to be
people who will be displaced, tribals, There will be for
us that will have to be cut down, Trees will
have to be cut down. It might alter the flora
and faun on that particular island to some extent because
(27:20):
it is a huge project lasting over three decades. So finally,
you know, at the end of the day, it is
the cost benefit analysis that we can continue to keep
the Anderman Islands the way we are and be a
third rate power or step up, make a compromise there
and say I do a cost benefit analysis, I will
(27:42):
reduce my florain phon on this island, for instance, by
so much because it will give me so much more
strategic benefits to not just my military but also to
my economy, and thereby it would benefit more people on
India than say this one particular island were if it
were just left alone. So those you know, answers have
to be those questions have to be asked, those answers
(28:05):
have to be recorded. Now, the thing about the project,
the political consensus. It is important because, as you correctly
pointed out, it's several decades down the line and there
needs to be a greater political understanding and awareness about it.
There's one way of doing it is to build it
(28:26):
in stealth and then present a fate to comply to
whichever government takes over. But there is another way of
doing it, which is to build up this whole narrative
of how it benefits the Indian economy, how it creates
huge downstream impact, how it generates jobs, how it makes
(28:47):
India competitive in the world market. And these are things
that we've never really done, you know, and we've seen
projects being detailed for exactly the reasons that human mentioned.
The Sardars Over project, for instance. I mean, as a
young reporter, I remember covering you know, endless protests over
the sardars over dam and they said, you know, it's
(29:08):
going to create chaos, it's going to create destruction and
all of that. But then if you look at it today,
the benefits of the sardars are over project far outweigh
the kind of so cao ecological damage that it caused.
It's brought water to so many parts of Gujara that
were all parted and they were dry. There's agriculture going
on there, so it's actually improved the lives and uh
(29:30):
you know, livelihoods of people. Is created jobs over there,
and similarly, this is a project that could do the
same though not for people of the island because there
are very few people who live there. It is the tribals,
of course, it's the flora, it's the fauna of the uh,
you know, great Nicobar Island. But it could create a
lot more downstream impact for people on the Indian mainland.
(29:53):
The other shipping and the merchant shipping, the cargo handling, transhipment,
all of that is going to create opportunities for employment.
And you know this, I consider this project as one
of those things that we should have done a long
time ago, you know, And in nineteen ninety one, for instance,
when we began the whole process of economic liberalization. Now
(30:13):
that's something that there is bipartisan consensus on. You ask
when even the CPIM would not want to roll back
you know, liberalization. Right, everybody agrees that this is the
only way forward. And similarly, this is actually a spin
off of liberalization, a project of the size of this nature,
(30:33):
not only for the economy, but also for the Indian military,
for the Indian Navy, which is an arm of which
is one of only two government services that are that
look way beyond India's territory, which is the MEA is
the only other one. The MEA and the Indian Navy
look far beyond our geographies. So it is a project
(30:56):
that benefits us strategically and economically, and the benefits of
this should be communicated. I'm sure at some point it
will be done. But it's you know, better late than never.
Speaker 2 (31:07):
Yeah, right, we'll talk more about this, but after a quick.
Speaker 4 (31:10):
Break to see that to roka to upcome my list,
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butcha or per time road to is I see you?
(31:54):
Our theory of relati four dimens.
Speaker 5 (31:59):
Up at m k.
Speaker 4 (32:02):
Okay, thank car or three elements, electron, paton, neutron sal.
Speaker 5 (32:11):
Or her particle may should I smallest particle?
Speaker 4 (32:17):
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not electron or joska neutron porton watation or hamas caper
(32:38):
her can.
Speaker 5 (32:43):
Or energy or skender or speed break or a violence
or with never.
Speaker 2 (33:01):
Welcome back something before the break. We've talked about the
what's officially known as the Holistic development of the Great
Nigoma Islands. It's a massive project for a massive port,
a huge airport, a township, and a power center, power
generation center.
Speaker 3 (33:18):
Uh.
Speaker 2 (33:19):
We've talked about you've you've described the sheer vastness of it,
how you describe it to be India's greatest infrastructure project
ever undertaken.
Speaker 3 (33:30):
And military it would be akin to what Pearl Harbor
is to the US. The US, yeah, uh.
Speaker 2 (33:36):
And we've also talked about the reasons for doing so,
the reasons for you having a sort of foot in
the door, so to speak, of the international shipping lines
that passed under India. And now that I now that
you talk about it, it actually makes sense. And once
again we'll try to have a map for people watching
us of the ander Mandiguma Islands. Uh and what you
(33:58):
were describing that the shipments move from down south of
Sri Lanka and then towards the country Singapore and etcetera.
So meinland India does not really have that much of
a sort of a leverage on those movements unless you
have ships that can reach that very very I think
the process has begun.
Speaker 3 (34:15):
If you've seen the container terminal, that gigantic trunship and
port that has mean that was inaugurated a few months
back in Wearying Import in Kerala. That's a very large
transhipment port that is inaugurated there. So there are some
moves that are being made over the last couple of
years now to realize that fact that listen, we need
(34:35):
to start attracting bigger ships. Ships are getting bigger because
economies of scale. It's a simple thing that the bigger ship,
the more cargo it can carry. The more cargo you carry,
the less are your shipping costs. That comes down. So
that is a reason why countries going for these massive
one lacked don plus ships which carry tens of thousands
(34:56):
of you know, containers, and that's the reason that we
must attract these kind of ships to our own thing ports.
And the other aspect of this, of course, is the
fact that there has been this great awakening, as I
call it, over the last three years that suddenly we
woke up and realized that ninety percent of Indian cargo
wasn't being ferried on Indian bottoms, Indian ships, Indian flagships,
(35:19):
and we realize that thanks to the houthis so if
the one thing that the Hoothies have done is to
make us aware, acutely aware of the fact that we
had no control over the nationality of the ships that
were bringing cargoes to our shores or exporting our car
So you're looking at India, the fourth largest economy in
the world, completely at the whims of you know, international
(35:43):
shipping lines, simply because we never built our own ships.
We never you know, flagged our own ships. You have
Indian shipping companies which are minute, you know, which we
make like less than two percent of the world's ships
that are ever made less in fact, less than a
one percent. That's a we're not even a percent. That
(36:06):
is how tiny air ship building is. And this is
ironic because we have a Navy. That's really powerful. It's
one hundred and thirty ships warships. We're building them very quickly.
We just commissioned two of them recently. Last month in August,
we built an aircraft carrier. But when it comes to
the merchant shipping, you know, space, we aren't building enough
(36:27):
merchant ships. It's China that's building them, South Korea, Japan,
of course, even the United States isn't building them. And
I think this is a fallout of this whole twenty
year thing that you had twenty years back, when this
whole world was flat kind of thing where the US
was outsourcing across the world. And you know, now today
(36:47):
the geopolitics has flipped. You're talking of near shoring. Everybody
wants to make everything themselves. And you know, the trade
what it was twenty years back, it's not the case anymore.
You have the right of China. So all these geopolitical factors,
the rise of Trump, geopolitics has changed, and this whole
thing of the US making cheap goods overseas and then
(37:09):
shipping them back to the United States that itself has
undergoone a fundamental change. And because of the way geopolitics
is unfolded in the last couple of years, particularly after
the pandemic, is forcing us to ressr strategies that you
start building your own ships because you never know that
tomorrow some country might come and enforce a blockade around
(37:32):
the Indian mainland and say I'm not going to allow
any ships to enter or leave peninsula or India. What
do you do then you don't have your own ships.
So these kind of critical vulnerabilities was something that were
never thought of. And you know, it goes down to
as simple, something as important rather as a jet engine.
It's only when someone says, oh, I'm sorry, there are
(37:53):
supply chain issues. We are not going to be able
to deliver your jet engine, then you realized, oh my god.
We should never have closed the car Very engine in
twenty fourteen. We should have gone on with it. We
should have persevered till the time we came to a
Mark two or a Mark three that was your seventy
eight kilo a Newton Trust engine. So this is thanks
to all these wake up calls that we've seen in
(38:14):
the last five years. Were suddenly realizing that the world
is not the you know, rosy picture that we were painted,
that we were given a vision of twenty twenty five
years back.
Speaker 2 (38:26):
Yeah, excell point about Indian flagships, because that's something actually
that's always struck me when I'm on the news floor
and I'm covering an incident of a fire or anything
else on board a cargo ship that has Indian sealers involved,
and I always wondered, but by ship to Indian? Hey
in a Indian who spec arm? But you know, where
are your Indian ships? I've never actually come across one
(38:47):
single instance of an Indian flagship being under.
Speaker 3 (38:50):
There are a few, there are Shipping Corporation of India
has a few, but they're just few, and farca, it's
again one of you know, it's a it's more it
makes more economical sense for you to have foreign flagship
just you know, charter these ships and all. But then
what do you do in an emergency? Exactly That's what
we realize when the Huti's uh, you know, shut off
the Barbel Manda and they said that we are only
(39:11):
going to allow We're going to attack all countries that
have ties with Israel, right, so then try to enforce
a maritime blockade. And that's when you realize. Listen, today,
it was the Barbe and Wanda. Tomorrow it could be
the Indian subcontinent. You know, some foreign power might just
come up land off our show. Someone with a large
navy with multiple carrier battle groups could land up. No
(39:34):
prizes for guessing which one it could be, which of
the two options it could be. And I said, listen,
we don't like you very much, we don't like your
government very much, so therefore we're going to enforce a
maritime blockade. So please do as we say, and we
don't have any option then, and your trade is going
to suffer. And as it is, you're so dependent on
the oceans for your commerce because you have no land
(39:57):
word trading routes because of all the disputes you have
on the western border, on the northern border, and of
course now in the eastern border. So you're today you
are primarily an ocean going country. You have no open borders,
no area that you can sail unhindered, but for the seas.
And that is why these projects become so much more
(40:19):
important and in fact critical to the Indian economy.
Speaker 2 (40:23):
Don't give the grand person sitting in that grand White
house ideas and deep you know, like that's like I'm
just like, you know, that's a great idea, you know,
or in Beijing to put some leverage and let me
just send my one of my fleets over there, or
two of you of my fleets or three or four,
and you won't have the Russians over here to help
because they're got up in their own wars.
Speaker 3 (40:43):
It's not nineteen seventy one again. We have to fight
our own battles.
Speaker 2 (40:49):
That is true, fight around battle, It's exactly what we're
trying to do. A couple of last points on the
one is something that also happened a week or so ago,
something linked to what you've talked about is India wants
to be part of what's known as the Malaca Straits Patrol.
Speaker 3 (41:06):
Yeah.
Speaker 2 (41:06):
Right now it's been run by Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thaighland
obvious kind it's because they are the ones around that strait. Yeah,
India wants to be part of it now. One of
my talking one of my questions was why but now
it does that That questions makes no sense because you've
discussed exactly why, so that sort of it unded. But
what I want to ask you is is it possible?
(41:28):
Like do you think it's a practical request or or
or what is it? Because like you know, in the
world of geopolitics, you don't make such requests unless there's
some backroom talk already happened about Khoga, right, So do
you think this is actually a serious request that's actually
going to see the light of day and obviously China's
(41:49):
going be very pissed about them.
Speaker 3 (41:50):
Yes, Well, you know what you just said is is
very slow shift, a maritime shift, a strategic shift of
India are looking away from the west now more towards
the east. Our focus on the west remains. The west
is very critical the western seaboard. For instance, you have
one of our largest oil refineries there, jam Nagger. You
(42:11):
have the Pakistan Navy there just off jam Nuggar, and
of course Pakistan remains a problem. On the western shores,
you have all our oil and energy that comes from
West Asia. That's very critical. A lot of our oil
is so forty fifty percent of it comes from West Asia.
So our focus remains on the west. But now what
we're looking at is that increasingly there is an eastward
(42:33):
focus over the last couple of years. Now what you're seeing,
for instance, is that those two ships. The two frontline
frigates or the Agree and Himgriy that were commissioned. They
were commissioned and they were homeported in Vishaka, Putnam. That's
very interesting for the first time you have two very
critical frontline assets being based there. You have the other
Shivali class that are already operating there. So there's a
(42:54):
very conscious eastwards shift in India's maritime security policy where
you're looking at not just warships submarines as well, but
also the aircraft carrier BI Krant is going to be
moving there very shortly, so you have one carrier on
the east and one on the west, but you're looking
at basing more warships. And my guess is that in
(43:16):
the next couple of years, when the Andermen the Great
nikobarra Port project increases in shape and size, you will
see more warships being based there. And now coming to
your point about the joint patrolling with Singapore and Indonesia,
you have to have very strong friendship with these countries
there which are close to the Malaca Straits, primarily because
(43:39):
you also want to tell them I lay their fears
that a big port project like that is not going
to take business away from them. It is a project
that everybody can benefit from. I think that is something
that the government really needs to convey to them that
this needs to be a shared port, like for instance,
Singapore Port is the property of this government of Singapore,
(43:59):
but everybody around it benefits. It's not just Singapore, it
is Malaysia, it's Indonesia, Philippines, all the countries India also
because it's so important to ship. You know, there's a
ship movement in Singapore every two minutes. That's how important
that port is. Now. The idea is that Galatia Bay
will eventually get there three four, five decades from now,
(44:21):
but it should be a project that all the neighbors
benefit from it, just as our outlook, maritime outlook is
not one of threatening people or you know, flexing our
muscles at sea or intimidating neighbors or anything of that.
And that is one reason why this joint patrolling for
the Indian Navy to become the preferred partner of choice.
(44:43):
And you only have to look back at the tsunami
of two thousand and four when the Indian Navy was
a first responder there to all of these areas. Bandhachi
and all those places just shattered by the tsunami. Despite
losing our own bases and you know personnel and Anderman's,
we were the first to reach out with a hand
of f and ship to all of those countries there.
So this is India basically doing the Indian thing, which
(45:05):
is to render aid assistance and to know indicate to
all of these countries that we are your preferred security partner.
Don't forget that we may be fourteen hundred the mainland,
maybe fourteen hundred kilometers away, but our territory is just
about sixteen utical miles away from you. And we're building
this great port, this base, and in the next couple
(45:27):
of years we're going to be there right there. So
this is us laying the grounds for what will eventually
become a very large base and a more or less
a permanent presence. And you're also in a sense you're
looking at the way the PLA Navy is growing at
the rate that they are. In the next couple of years,
(45:47):
you will have a permanent presence of the PLA Navy
here in much larger numbers than they are presently based today.
The Indian Ocean coadon is a couple of warships tomorrow
it could be larger with more aircraft. So you're actually
thinking ahead, moving ahead, and prepositioning yourself for a time
(46:08):
when you will compete with China in this eastern battle
space in a way that you will present options not
just to the navy but also to the political leadership
that we have these certain options in case things go
south on the land frontiers. We have maritime options, and
(46:28):
those options are very well known to the government and
of course to the navy. Against the Chinese, the PLA
navy in the south and the far east. Of course
it is going to be a battle. But the fact
is that navies by presenting by force projection, by presenting
all of these options, they induce worry. They induce kind
(46:50):
of a deterrent impact on the adversary that he will
not move in a certain way because he sees that
you're already there. So you it's it's a game of chess.
Exactly like in a game of chess, all the pieces
are transparent. This is our big chess move into the
eastern battle spaces. I called it a.
Speaker 2 (47:10):
Massive chess mover, and actually, in fact I wanted to
talk more about the ander Man Nicoba Islands. That the
idea of turning that into sort of a sort of
an aircraft carrier, the experiment that began there in two
thousand and three of having India's only Try Services comand
the only non strategic Try Services Command.
Speaker 3 (47:31):
But I don't think we've time.
Speaker 2 (47:33):
Theft for that, because this project itself, the sheer vastness
of it, I had sort of underappreciated before we talked
about this. So I think we ended there. Thanks on
the fantastic chat. Learned many things that I did not
know about before we begn this recording, So.
Speaker 3 (47:48):
Thanks so much, thanks for having me there.
Speaker 2 (47:50):
Yeah, and thanks to our listeners and viewers. That's it
for this week's defense. Does for more tune in next week? Well,
then stay safe and do not cross any boundaries for
that passport.
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Speaker 2 (00:05):
Welcome to season three of Another Defense, the podcast that
takes you inside the world of conflict. I'm your host,
Deve Goswami, and every week I sit down with experts
and retired officers from the Army, Navy and Air Force
to decode all things to do with India security and
explore what it truly means to serve. Get ready for
(00:27):
stories of strategy, sacrifice and strength.
Speaker 1 (00:32):
This is in Our Defense.
Speaker 2 (00:35):
The Anderma Nicobar Islands have been a very big focus
area this week thanks to the opposition, which has raised
complaints about what's officially known as the Great Sorry officially
known as the holistic development of the Great Nicobar Islands,
it's simply known as the Great Nigoga Project, or as
experts likean have called it, the Pearl Harbor of India
(00:58):
or somebody else who said it was the Hong Kong
of India. Because of the focus on this, I got
thinking this week that perhaps it's a good time to
explore that one massive domain that we haven't really done
much on the third season of Another Defense, which is
the maritime domain, a domain which where I am a
(01:19):
bit out of depth pun non intended because the sheer
vastness of the sea, of the ocean, and the sheer
difficulty in terms of wrapping your head around how do
you actually control the ocean, control the sea. To understand that,
to understand this project, to understand what else India has
(01:39):
been doing on the eastern seaboard we have with us,
say are you.
Speaker 3 (01:44):
Good to be back there? Yeah?
Speaker 2 (01:46):
Great to have you as always Sunday by You a
sea person?
Speaker 3 (01:50):
Are you so?
Speaker 2 (01:50):
Are you beach person? Are you a mountain person when
it comes to vacations.
Speaker 3 (01:53):
I'm I am a beach person. I'm a sea person.
Speaker 2 (01:56):
That's exactly what somebody from Mombay would say, like me right,
So absolutely, have you been to the Andermans?
Speaker 3 (02:02):
I have lovely.
Speaker 2 (02:03):
I've always been meaning to go there, haven't unfortunately yet.
Speaker 3 (02:06):
Yeah you should, you should. I mean it is It's
one of those greatest, you know, territories that we should
we should be so proud of that they're part of India,
you know. I mean, there are such incredibly beautiful landscapes
in India in the north, in the south east west,
but I think the Adlemans is unique in its position
and it's geography and it's terry in topography, all of that.
(02:28):
Whichever you look at it, it's closer to three countries
than it's the Indian Mania, right, And it's so far
out there that when you actually land that you realize
that it's literally you've flown something like thirteen hundred kilometers
from the Indian mainland to come here to the Andermans.
It's it's an incredibly beautiful part of this world. And
I recommend everyone who's watching this too, you know, try
(02:49):
and make that trip once or twice in your life
at least.
Speaker 2 (02:52):
In fact, quite often going to the Anderman Kubas is
more expensive than flying to another foreign country.
Speaker 3 (02:57):
It is. It's a function of demand and sub exactly. Uh.
Speaker 2 (03:01):
And you know, the other interesting aspect of of of
these islands is its population.
Speaker 1 (03:09):
Uh.
Speaker 2 (03:09):
It's the fact that various areas of these islands are
completely out of bounds for reasons such as ecology, for reasons.
Just as certain tribes, some of whom have not been
contacted by by by the world ever of them ever, ever.
Speaker 3 (03:28):
Yeah, have been there in uh splendid isolation for tens
of thousands of years. Yes, uh.
Speaker 2 (03:34):
And one of them not linked to what we'll discuss today.
But are the Sentinellies which made worldwide headlines actually a
few years ago when an American missionary tried to go
there and convert them to Christianity and he was peered
literally on. The body still lies there because the Indian
government decided it was too risky for people to go
(03:55):
there to retrieve that that body. In fact, if people
want an image that, we'll actually have a producer put
it up on this on video. But for people who
listening to us, I have a link in the show notes.
Is a very iconic image. I think it was a
short by a native photographer after the tsunami where you
have one of the sentiliest people trying to throw us
peer at a course carlicopter that was holding in the
(04:17):
area to sort of check on them, are you okay
or not? Because India has since long decided not to
contact them, But that person was trying to throw us
peer at that.
Speaker 3 (04:27):
But you know, here's the thing they've while it. Those
images may convey the fact that they're violent and there
they could kill you, which they will, of course if
you go to a certain distance. The fact is that
they are far more vulnerable than we are, right because
the kind of infections that we carry could just wipe
out the entire population on that island. So in a sense,
they're extremely vulnerable. It's a good thing that the government
(04:50):
keeps them that way out of contact from you know,
all of humanity. But that you know, this is my
personal thing that we should study them in some form
of the other, remotely, perhaps using technology, because they are
a very incredible people, and you know, if there is
a way technology allows you to do that remotely, we
(05:10):
can kind of document their life history, their culture and
preserve it for all time to come. So I mean,
but that's just a personal opinion. But that said, it's
an incredible feat of survival, of preservation and the fact
that these are some of the most unique Indians that
(05:31):
we have amongst the one point four billion Indians, they
are the most amazing race and they believe to have
been what humanity was in its original form when we
exited Africa exactly we're forty to fifty thousand years back,
and that great march out of Africa. This is one
(05:52):
of those lost tribes that actually stayed behind in that island,
and so to study them would be a great thing,
but of course, not endiangering them Uh.
Speaker 2 (06:00):
And the reason I bought brought to the centralies up
was because there's another similar tribe called the Humping tribe,
which actually is at the heart of the controversy that
we're about to talk about. But before we do that,
and before we talk about this project, we talk about
what else India has been doing in this in this region.
Speaker 3 (06:16):
UH.
Speaker 2 (06:18):
Explain the dynamics of strategic moves at the sea, yea
visibly land, because like I said, it's something that for
me is way difficult to wrap my head around, simply
because of the fact I cannot picture it. And I
look at the map of let's say India, China, India, Pakistan.
I can see mountain rangers, I can see entry, I
can see there's a road over there's a there's a
(06:38):
rail line over there. When I look at a map
of the sea, it is blue everywhere. I don't know
what is going where. And then you have these terms
just choke points and sea lanes and stuff like that.
So break that concept down for us before we enter
this topic.
Speaker 3 (06:54):
Well, you know, the factor is that we are astride
the Indian Ocean, and the Indian Ocean is practically the
most important stretch of water in the world today simply
because of the economies around it. You have Japan, you
have China, you have India. That's three of the five
biggest economies in the world around this Indo Pacific if
(07:15):
and call it the Japanese of course a little further
towards the Pacific, but it's China, and it's India, and
you have the Indoor Pacific, and you have this huge
movement of trade, commerce, energy flowing through the Indian Ocean.
It's just imagine it as a gigantic oceanic expressway that's
moving from the Malacca Streets near south of Sri Lanka
(07:38):
and towards the Cape of Good Hope and towards West Asia.
It's just this huge, pulsing oceanic highway through which hundreds
of thousands of ships pass. Every year, something like one
hundred thousand ships pass through this. Fifty to sixty percent
of the world's energy passes through this oil, gas, all
(08:00):
of that cargo. So what you're looking at might look
blue for you, but actually it's pulsing red with the
lifeline of global commerce. So it's right here. It's just
below our subcontinent, below sub you know, Sri Lanka so
it's actually the veins of oceanic commerce passed through the
(08:21):
Indian Ocean, and that's why this stretch is so important,
and it's always been the case if you look at it,
going back to thousands of years. I'm going back to
the time when India and China were once the biggest
economies in the world. Sheer size Indian ships used to
sail as far as you know Malaya, the used to
go to China, the used to sail into West Asia,
(08:43):
of course, further down to Africa. Chinese ships have been
recorded as coming here in the twelve Imperial voyages of
chang Hei the Admiral. So it's been pulsating with trade
and commerce for decades, for centuries in fact, and today
we are coming back to that old time when India
(09:03):
and China were once the most prosperous trading nations. We
are returning to that time where India is the fourth
largest economy, soon to be the third largest economy. China
is of course the second largest, soon to be the
largest economy. So the Indian Ocean then once again becomes
really important. And it's not just trade. It's also important
(09:24):
because of naval presence, like as you know, the PLA
Navy is the largest navy in the world in terms
of sheer number of warships. It has something like four
hundred warships all told, it has more warships than the
United States Navy, which is a feat when you consider
that the Chinese began their modernization just about three decades ago.
(09:46):
Of course, if you look at tonnage, the US Navies
has bigger ships. It has eleven aircraft carriers, it has
eleven lpds, and you know, assault ships and amphibias, assault ships,
and also it's a far more powerful navy. But in
terms of a number of platforms, the Chinese Navy's way ahead.
So they're doing it because the Indian Ocean is extremely
(10:07):
important for them. A lot of their energy passes through
the Indian Ocean. They of course draw all their sixty
something like fifty to sixty percent of their oil gas
flows in through West Asia and it passes through all
the choke points around the Indonesian islands. Now, the chokepoints,
as the terminology suggests, is a point that can be choked,
(10:29):
which is why when you have this large number of
ships then suddenly coming into this constricted area that becomes
a choke point. The Malaca is one choke point. It's
about just about nine hundred kilometers long. You have other
such choke points around the Indonesian islands Sunda, Lombok, Umbai, Weta,
So that's a total of four choke points which connect
(10:49):
the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. So that's when
these areas become so vital to global commerce simply because
they're so narrow and their straits literally surrounded by land
masses on both sides. And of course there is what
the Chinese ujintaw Wan's called the Malacca dilemma, right, how
(11:10):
can we allow so much of our oil and gas
to pass through such a short, small, narrow, constricted gap.
You know, it's like it's that thing in why do
you get heart attacks because your arteries get clogged. And
they're always worried about the fact that if somebody stops
their maritime energy roots, they could have the Chinese economy
(11:31):
could have a problem. So that is something that countries
have kind of played on the United States. Is for instance,
they did this to the Imperial Japanese Navy in the
Second World War. They shot up all their ships, they
destroyed all their you know, warships, merchant ships, and this
whole Imperial Japan, which was actually a thalasocracy, which is
(11:53):
an oceanic empire, just collapsed because it could not sustain
these sea roots. It could not protect its sea roots,
it could not sail ships, it could not bring raw materials,
could not make this thing. So you know, it was
a concerted campaign over three four years using ships, submarines, aircraft,
and this empire was converted into an island and then
(12:15):
finally it was defeated in nineteen forty five. So that's
just about eighty years back. Now I see China trying
to occupy the space that Imperial Japan had just about
eighty years back. The resurgent Chinese economy, the resurgent PLA navy,
all of these factors are going to determine the geopolitics
(12:37):
of the Indian Ocean region well into this twenty first century.
And you know that's everything that you see now they're
moving around, All the chess pieces moving around are in
response to this very unprecedented set of circumstances, which is
the rise of China. And as China rises, it becomes
more assertive, it starts surging out ships, merchant ships, of course,
(12:59):
it starts building alliances, it starts creating port facilities, it
activates its friends who have a number of friends that
it has, whether it's Pakistan or Myanmar or North Korea,
all of that, and then you will see countries around
the region that are worried by the rise of China, India,
for instance, the Philippines, Vietnam, all of these traditional countries
(13:22):
which are worried that rising China is a hegemon. It's
a regional hegemon that could actually impede upon their economic progress,
which will make them subservient, which will treat them like
an empire treats its subjects. That's the kind of fear
that's playing in the minds of a lot of Asian countries.
And if you see the kind of weapons acquisitions over
(13:44):
the last decade, they are all made in response to
China's rise. Whether it's Vietnam going in for submarines now
talking to us for BrahMos missiles, Philippines buying several sets
of BrahMos missiles. They're going in for repeat orders. We've
already sold them three batteries and now we're going to
buy you know, they're going to buy three more is
what we're hearing. Indonesia's as well, very you know, unsettled
(14:08):
by the rise of China. So the whole thing is
that while China keeps trying to tell everyone, you know,
our rise is going to be peaceful and we're here
to be good neighbors. But when you see the parades,
you see the kind of you know, aggression on the
high seas, most people aren't convinced that China's rise is
going to be peaceful. So everyone's investing. They're building up
(14:28):
their ports, they're building up their forts, they're building up
their militaries, they're you know, hedging their bets. They want
to ensure that they have everything ready in case China
decides to muscle around, you know, throw its weight around
in the in the region. So what you're seeing in
the Indian Ocean region one of the most fascinating geopolitical
(14:49):
stories of the twenty first century. Right.
Speaker 2 (14:53):
It's a fascinating answer, And I think that kind of
explains something that I've asked you before when we've talked
about this time of along the LC, is that why
does China in the first place feel the need to
need all India when, like you discussed that a majority
of its population is far east uh and there's no
real threat per se on the on the on the borders.
(15:14):
But I guess this is ultimately why, because the game
actually is being played in the ocean, and this is
just various pressure points that the country users to sort
of need India.
Speaker 3 (15:22):
So it's to focus get ours, you know, leadership, to
focus on the land frontiers area, which is where you
have the disputed regions, so that you don't look seawards
and you continuously spend less. You know, they the government
spends only about sixteen percent on the navy, wevisa something
like sixty percent on the army, and the army's relevance
(15:45):
will remain. Of course, I'm not disputing that as long
as we have disputed land frontiers, you don't have disputed
maritime frontiers. But the maritime frontier is somewhere that you
need to spend a lot more. You need to spend
more on the air force as well. So you know,
that's the state of play right now. And China is
ensuring that you look landwards because if you start looking seawards,
(16:05):
if you start investing greater resources, then it becomes a
problem for China.
Speaker 2 (16:11):
But we're doing that. We're trying to do that. And
that brings me to that great Nicobar project. It's been
in the works for the last couple of years, and
I think construction is that's said to begin very soon
in the next couple of years.
Speaker 3 (16:24):
I'm not wrong.
Speaker 2 (16:25):
It's a total project right now of for p seventy
thousand frore. That includes one tranship port, which basically, if
I were to explain it to my listeners and viewers,
is basically like an airport that is dedicated to transfers
and layovers. Basically, so you have not a destination, yeah,
a destination, you have goods coming there. They kind of
(16:46):
kind of get offloaded and then put in two different
ships and then send to their actual destinations. There's a
full fledged airport that's going to come up. There's a
power plant and a township. All of this will happen
in the southern most island of and Amandicubar Islands just
above in their point, which is India's last point on Earth.
Speaker 1 (17:10):
Now, this controversy.
Speaker 2 (17:12):
Obviously like it espar at the beginning of this episode,
and we'll get into that briefly, But why do you
call this on the like you just did the Pearl
Harbor of India and break this project down for us actually,
because you know why, this has been in the works
for a couple of years. There hasn't been much chatter
about this up until you had Sunya Gandhi of the
(17:35):
Congress writing an opinion piece in the Hindu and then
suddenly it became a trend. And now people try to
explain it, and some are talking about the advantages. Some
are talking about the sort of damage it will do
to the ecology over there, to the tribes over there.
Shopping tribe is one of them. They say, So tell
us about this project, what is it? And as a
national security expert, why do you think this is a
(17:57):
very important, crucial project?
Speaker 3 (17:59):
Right? Well, they you know, I've looked at the project.
I've spoken to a few people, and what my understanding is
that this is the most important infrastructure project India has
ever attempted in its history in terms of the ability
to influence global events. You know, I'm not talking of
(18:22):
a project on the Indian mainland. You have port projects,
you have airport projects, you have military bases, your strategic
basis and all that, but none of them affects global
commerce in a way that the ICTP does the Karatia
Bay project in Nicoba Island because simply because of its location.
(18:42):
You know, it is a strike the world's most important
shipping street, the Malaca Streets. I've already told you the numbers.
It's something like almost one hundred thousand ships passed through
there every year and thirteen million barrels of oil passed
through there every single day. It has very sensitive location
in Singapore on the one end, Port Klang on the other,
(19:04):
Colombo at the third. But we've never seen India move
forward with a project that will actually put us into
the big league like this project. It's a global project.
It's not just a pure India project. This is India
signaling that we are going to put a project that's
going to put us on the global map that will
(19:26):
serve our interests when we've become the world's third largest
economy the world's second largest economy in the next couple
of decades. And this is a slow burner of a project.
It's going to take several years to be realized. Right.
The first phase comes up in twenty twenty eight, that's
three years from now, and the last phase will be
(19:47):
in twenty fifteen nine. Right, that's more than two and
a half decades from now. So it's like it's a
very ambitious project and if it's realized, it aims to
make a singaporeind of port for India, which is astride
the global shipping lanes. See, the problem is that India
is we like to say that, you know, we are
(20:08):
astride the global shipping lanes and all that, but the
fact is that that flow that that highway that I
told you actually passes far south. It goes out of
the Malaca streets and then it comes down below Colombo
and then it goes up like that. So we actually
it makes more sense for a lot of companies which
carry these massive merchant ships to offload onto smaller ships,
(20:31):
tranship them and then send them up to the mainland
Indian mainland. But here, now you have an Indian port
that's going to be right there astride the Malaca Street,
just about forty nautical miles forty or fifty nautical miles away,
which means that the ship has to make the smallest
possible detor touch over there, offload its cargo and then
continue down its path. And this is going to save
(20:54):
there are estimates which say that India could save something
like two hundred million dollars in transhipment costs, which is
what we pay other ports like Klang, Singapore, Colombo. Right
now we offload cargo destined for India onto these ports
and from there it's tranship to the Indian mainland. But
(21:15):
here now for the first time you have an Indian port.
It's going to take time, which is going to be
located there. That's the maritime commerce part of it. Then
you have this strategic angle to this. Now, this port
is going to be like a dual use project. It's
going to have a civil enclave, it will have a
military enclave as well. The military on clave is where
(21:36):
you're going to have birthing areas for ships, warships, for submarines.
It will kind of use the airfields around of course
for air cover and all that. But it will allow
India to base very large warships over there, like aircraft
carriers for instance, submarines, and you of course have to
create I mean, this is not something that you say
(21:56):
it and it will be done. You know, the fact
is that it's so far away from in the Indian mainland.
Twelve hundred and fourteen hundred kilometers away. So the port
facilities over there will allow us to birth large warships,
aircraft carriers, destroyers, submarines and they're like and of course
the fact that you're located so close to the maritime
(22:17):
choke points like I mentioned the Malaka Straits, Sundha, Lombok, Kumbai.
Vetar suggests that Indian warships can go closer to these
choke points much swifter when they're deployed forward, deployed in
the Underman islands than they would be on the Indian mainland.
And a simple thumb rule thing would be a conventional
submarine for instance, if it has to sail from Vishaka Putnam,
(22:39):
which is the current port, if it has to sail
all the way to the choke points, it spends something
like eight days one way, where as if it were
located in port player it would cut down by fifty percent.
It's three or four days to these choke points. So
that economizes on you know, the usage of the submarines,
on the downtime and all that. You save a lot
of time cost all of that, and you know it's
(23:02):
the best place for you to be located in. So
it has enormous commercial benefits and it's a huge strategic project.
I think it is possibly, like I said, it is
the most important project that India has ever attempted until now.
Speaker 2 (23:19):
Wow, fantastic. That's actually I didn't know about this honestly because.
Speaker 3 (23:24):
It was flying under the raid exactly. And it was
kept that way because you don't want to make a
big song and dance about it, because when you start
saying a lot of things, when you start, you know,
projecting all of this out there, a lot of invested
interests start to get hurt. Of course, it affects several
countries across the world, especially in the region and beyond,
(23:48):
and they will have a reason to ensure that a
project like this doesn't happen, right, it's pure market economics,
and they will of course be people who would be
worried about its rategic and jew strategic impact on the region. Right.
You don't want India to be looking far east building
up these very strategic port facilities, forward basing its navy
(24:12):
for instance. All of these have connotations. They make people uncomfortable. Right,
So we've been playing this game for almost eighty years.
There were very happy on the mainland. No, we shall
not explore this. About twenty years back, twenty five years back,
there was Admiral Bagworth who spoke of a far eastern command,
and immediately the Asian countries went into a flux. Oh
(24:33):
you know, India's got great power ambitions and all that,
but it's taken us so long to get here. And
then finally we've actually started pouring cement into those great
power dreams. And we're doing it on our own territory.
We're not going into anyone else's home and building. We're
not reclaiming islands and building them like the Chinese. We're
(24:54):
not doing it in the global comments. We're building it
on Indian territory. We're doing what is legitimate on our
own soil. Uh.
Speaker 2 (25:03):
In fact, like the way you've described the project, I
wouldn't be surprised that when the first phase sort of
gets operational in a couple of years from now, you'll
have another standard along the L A C. Because China
is going to throw a fit about this project, and
not like what you're doing in the Indian Ocean.
Speaker 3 (25:18):
Right.
Speaker 1 (25:19):
Uh.
Speaker 2 (25:20):
The second aspect of this, in the the ecological aspect,
the concerns over that and this is not the first
time a concern like this has been raised on a
project that's been developed on in Indian Island.
Speaker 3 (25:31):
UH.
Speaker 2 (25:32):
Two years ago, you had a similar controversy over a
base that was inaugurated in luxury on the island Minicoy
iron is Garuda. If I'm not known, it wasn't it was?
It was? Was it Medico Island?
Speaker 3 (25:45):
Mini Cooy was?
Speaker 2 (25:46):
Was it.
Speaker 3 (25:49):
Island? Anyway?
Speaker 2 (25:49):
It doesn't matter. The point being it was also that
that that that base was far away from India. It's
actually closer to the Maldives and it is to to India.
Speaker 3 (25:59):
UH.
Speaker 2 (25:59):
And the logic is the same. I'm guessing you that
is just another side of the Indian Ocean and you.
Speaker 3 (26:06):
Are trying the western.
Speaker 2 (26:07):
Theater theaters UH, and you're trying to control the flow
of cargo that's coming from down South Africa. But this
question then remains, where do you draw the line? How
do you have that balance?
Speaker 3 (26:20):
Uh?
Speaker 2 (26:21):
Point number one, point number two. UH. Keeping this in
mind and also the fact that you say you've described
this as a project that's going to take easily three decades. UH,
do you see uh successive governments in the future. And
I'm not trying to say it's going to be of
this party or that party regardless. But because this is
going to require a lot of investment, this is going
(26:43):
to require that constant stay at it, stay at it,
stay at it over multiple governments. If you say to
two and a half decades, at least four or five governments,
four of five prime ministers, how do you ensure that
you end up achieving what you've set up to achieve.
Speaker 3 (26:56):
Well, of course, you know the first part of your question. First,
the fact is that projects are going to create some
kind of ecological impact. Right There are going to be
people who will be displaced, tribals, There will be for
us that will have to be cut down, Trees will
have to be cut down. It might alter the flora
and faun on that particular island to some extent because
(27:20):
it is a huge project lasting over three decades. So finally,
you know, at the end of the day, it is
the cost benefit analysis that we can continue to keep
the Anderman Islands the way we are and be a
third rate power or step up, make a compromise there
and say I do a cost benefit analysis, I will
(27:42):
reduce my florain phon on this island, for instance, by
so much because it will give me so much more
strategic benefits to not just my military but also to
my economy, and thereby it would benefit more people on
India than say this one particular island were if it
were just left alone. So those you know, answers have
to be those questions have to be asked, those answers
(28:05):
have to be recorded. Now, the thing about the project,
the political consensus. It is important because, as you correctly
pointed out, it's several decades down the line and there
needs to be a greater political understanding and awareness about it.
There's one way of doing it is to build it
(28:26):
in stealth and then present a fate to comply to
whichever government takes over. But there is another way of
doing it, which is to build up this whole narrative
of how it benefits the Indian economy, how it creates
huge downstream impact, how it generates jobs, how it makes
(28:47):
India competitive in the world market. And these are things
that we've never really done, you know, and we've seen
projects being detailed for exactly the reasons that human mentioned.
The Sardars Over project, for instance. I mean, as a
young reporter, I remember covering you know, endless protests over
the sardars over dam and they said, you know, it's
(29:08):
going to create chaos, it's going to create destruction and
all of that. But then if you look at it today,
the benefits of the sardars are over project far outweigh
the kind of so cao ecological damage that it caused.
It's brought water to so many parts of Gujara that
were all parted and they were dry. There's agriculture going
on there, so it's actually improved the lives and uh
(29:30):
you know, livelihoods of people. Is created jobs over there,
and similarly, this is a project that could do the
same though not for people of the island because there
are very few people who live there. It is the tribals,
of course, it's the flora, it's the fauna of the uh,
you know, great Nicobar Island. But it could create a
lot more downstream impact for people on the Indian mainland.
(29:53):
The other shipping and the merchant shipping, the cargo handling, transhipment,
all of that is going to create opportunities for employment.
And you know this, I consider this project as one
of those things that we should have done a long
time ago, you know, And in nineteen ninety one, for instance,
when we began the whole process of economic liberalization. Now
(30:13):
that's something that there is bipartisan consensus on. You ask
when even the CPIM would not want to roll back
you know, liberalization. Right, everybody agrees that this is the
only way forward. And similarly, this is actually a spin
off of liberalization, a project of the size of this nature,
(30:33):
not only for the economy, but also for the Indian military,
for the Indian Navy, which is an arm of which
is one of only two government services that are that
look way beyond India's territory, which is the MEA is
the only other one. The MEA and the Indian Navy
look far beyond our geographies. So it is a project
(30:56):
that benefits us strategically and economically, and the benefits of
this should be communicated. I'm sure at some point it
will be done. But it's you know, better late than never.
Speaker 2 (31:07):
Yeah, right, we'll talk more about this, but after a quick.
Speaker 4 (31:10):
Break to see that to roka to upcome my list,
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tik tail but chea after repairing but are we seeing
butcha or per time road to is I see you?
(31:54):
Our theory of relati four dimens.
Speaker 5 (31:59):
Up at m k.
Speaker 4 (32:02):
Okay, thank car or three elements, electron, paton, neutron sal.
Speaker 5 (32:11):
Or her particle may should I smallest particle?
Speaker 4 (32:17):
Hey them can the electron patron net neutron porton nucleus
not electron or joska neutron porton watation or hamas caper
(32:38):
her can.
Speaker 5 (32:43):
Or energy or skender or speed break or a violence
or with never.
Speaker 2 (33:01):
Welcome back something before the break. We've talked about the
what's officially known as the Holistic development of the Great
Nigoma Islands. It's a massive project for a massive port,
a huge airport, a township, and a power center, power
generation center.
Speaker 3 (33:18):
Uh.
Speaker 2 (33:19):
We've talked about you've you've described the sheer vastness of it,
how you describe it to be India's greatest infrastructure project
ever undertaken.
Speaker 3 (33:30):
And military it would be akin to what Pearl Harbor
is to the US. The US, yeah, uh.
Speaker 2 (33:36):
And we've also talked about the reasons for doing so,
the reasons for you having a sort of foot in
the door, so to speak, of the international shipping lines
that passed under India. And now that I now that
you talk about it, it actually makes sense. And once
again we'll try to have a map for people watching
us of the ander Mandiguma Islands. Uh and what you
(33:58):
were describing that the shipments move from down south of
Sri Lanka and then towards the country Singapore and etcetera.
So meinland India does not really have that much of
a sort of a leverage on those movements unless you
have ships that can reach that very very I think
the process has begun.
Speaker 3 (34:15):
If you've seen the container terminal, that gigantic trunship and
port that has mean that was inaugurated a few months
back in Wearying Import in Kerala. That's a very large
transhipment port that is inaugurated there. So there are some
moves that are being made over the last couple of
years now to realize that fact that listen, we need
(34:35):
to start attracting bigger ships. Ships are getting bigger because
economies of scale. It's a simple thing that the bigger ship,
the more cargo it can carry. The more cargo you carry,
the less are your shipping costs. That comes down. So
that is a reason why countries going for these massive
one lacked don plus ships which carry tens of thousands
(34:56):
of you know, containers, and that's the reason that we
must attract these kind of ships to our own thing ports.
And the other aspect of this, of course, is the
fact that there has been this great awakening, as I
call it, over the last three years that suddenly we
woke up and realized that ninety percent of Indian cargo
wasn't being ferried on Indian bottoms, Indian ships, Indian flagships,
(35:19):
and we realize that thanks to the houthis so if
the one thing that the Hoothies have done is to
make us aware, acutely aware of the fact that we
had no control over the nationality of the ships that
were bringing cargoes to our shores or exporting our car
So you're looking at India, the fourth largest economy in
the world, completely at the whims of you know, international
(35:43):
shipping lines, simply because we never built our own ships.
We never you know, flagged our own ships. You have
Indian shipping companies which are minute, you know, which we
make like less than two percent of the world's ships
that are ever made less in fact, less than a
one percent. That's a we're not even a percent. That
(36:06):
is how tiny air ship building is. And this is
ironic because we have a Navy. That's really powerful. It's
one hundred and thirty ships warships. We're building them very quickly.
We just commissioned two of them recently. Last month in August,
we built an aircraft carrier. But when it comes to
the merchant shipping, you know, space, we aren't building enough
(36:27):
merchant ships. It's China that's building them, South Korea, Japan,
of course, even the United States isn't building them. And
I think this is a fallout of this whole twenty
year thing that you had twenty years back, when this
whole world was flat kind of thing where the US
was outsourcing across the world. And you know, now today
(36:47):
the geopolitics has flipped. You're talking of near shoring. Everybody
wants to make everything themselves. And you know, the trade
what it was twenty years back, it's not the case anymore.
You have the right of China. So all these geopolitical factors,
the rise of Trump, geopolitics has changed, and this whole
thing of the US making cheap goods overseas and then
(37:09):
shipping them back to the United States that itself has
undergoone a fundamental change. And because of the way geopolitics
is unfolded in the last couple of years, particularly after
the pandemic, is forcing us to ressr strategies that you
start building your own ships because you never know that
tomorrow some country might come and enforce a blockade around
(37:32):
the Indian mainland and say I'm not going to allow
any ships to enter or leave peninsula or India. What
do you do then you don't have your own ships.
So these kind of critical vulnerabilities was something that were
never thought of. And you know, it goes down to
as simple, something as important rather as a jet engine.
It's only when someone says, oh, I'm sorry, there are
(37:53):
supply chain issues. We are not going to be able
to deliver your jet engine, then you realized, oh my god.
We should never have closed the car Very engine in
twenty fourteen. We should have gone on with it. We
should have persevered till the time we came to a
Mark two or a Mark three that was your seventy
eight kilo a Newton Trust engine. So this is thanks
to all these wake up calls that we've seen in
(38:14):
the last five years. Were suddenly realizing that the world
is not the you know, rosy picture that we were painted,
that we were given a vision of twenty twenty five
years back.
Speaker 2 (38:26):
Yeah, excell point about Indian flagships, because that's something actually
that's always struck me when I'm on the news floor
and I'm covering an incident of a fire or anything
else on board a cargo ship that has Indian sealers involved,
and I always wondered, but by ship to Indian? Hey
in a Indian who spec arm? But you know, where
are your Indian ships? I've never actually come across one
(38:47):
single instance of an Indian flagship being under.
Speaker 3 (38:50):
There are a few, there are Shipping Corporation of India
has a few, but they're just few, and farca, it's
again one of you know, it's a it's more it
makes more economical sense for you to have foreign flagship
just you know, charter these ships and all. But then
what do you do in an emergency? Exactly That's what
we realize when the Huti's uh, you know, shut off
the Barbel Manda and they said that we are only
(39:11):
going to allow We're going to attack all countries that
have ties with Israel, right, so then try to enforce
a maritime blockade. And that's when you realize. Listen, today,
it was the Barbe and Wanda. Tomorrow it could be
the Indian subcontinent. You know, some foreign power might just
come up land off our show. Someone with a large
navy with multiple carrier battle groups could land up. No
(39:34):
prizes for guessing which one it could be, which of
the two options it could be. And I said, listen,
we don't like you very much, we don't like your
government very much, so therefore we're going to enforce a
maritime blockade. So please do as we say, and we
don't have any option then, and your trade is going
to suffer. And as it is, you're so dependent on
the oceans for your commerce because you have no land
(39:57):
word trading routes because of all the disputes you have
on the western border, on the northern border, and of
course now in the eastern border. So you're today you
are primarily an ocean going country. You have no open borders,
no area that you can sail unhindered, but for the seas.
And that is why these projects become so much more
(40:19):
important and in fact critical to the Indian economy.
Speaker 2 (40:23):
Don't give the grand person sitting in that grand White
house ideas and deep you know, like that's like I'm
just like, you know, that's a great idea, you know,
or in Beijing to put some leverage and let me
just send my one of my fleets over there, or
two of you of my fleets or three or four,
and you won't have the Russians over here to help
because they're got up in their own wars.
Speaker 3 (40:43):
It's not nineteen seventy one again. We have to fight
our own battles.
Speaker 2 (40:49):
That is true, fight around battle, It's exactly what we're
trying to do. A couple of last points on the
one is something that also happened a week or so ago,
something linked to what you've talked about is India wants
to be part of what's known as the Malaca Straits Patrol.
Speaker 3 (41:06):
Yeah.
Speaker 2 (41:06):
Right now it's been run by Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thaighland
obvious kind it's because they are the ones around that strait. Yeah,
India wants to be part of it now. One of
my talking one of my questions was why but now
it does that That questions makes no sense because you've
discussed exactly why, so that sort of it unded. But
what I want to ask you is is it possible?
(41:28):
Like do you think it's a practical request or or
or what is it? Because like you know, in the
world of geopolitics, you don't make such requests unless there's
some backroom talk already happened about Khoga, right, So do
you think this is actually a serious request that's actually
going to see the light of day and obviously China's
(41:49):
going be very pissed about them.
Speaker 3 (41:50):
Yes, Well, you know what you just said is is
very slow shift, a maritime shift, a strategic shift of
India are looking away from the west now more towards
the east. Our focus on the west remains. The west
is very critical the western seaboard. For instance, you have
one of our largest oil refineries there, jam Nagger. You
(42:11):
have the Pakistan Navy there just off jam Nuggar, and
of course Pakistan remains a problem. On the western shores,
you have all our oil and energy that comes from
West Asia. That's very critical. A lot of our oil
is so forty fifty percent of it comes from West Asia.
So our focus remains on the west. But now what
we're looking at is that increasingly there is an eastward
(42:33):
focus over the last couple of years. Now what you're seeing,
for instance, is that those two ships. The two frontline
frigates or the Agree and Himgriy that were commissioned. They
were commissioned and they were homeported in Vishaka, Putnam. That's
very interesting for the first time you have two very
critical frontline assets being based there. You have the other
Shivali class that are already operating there. So there's a
(42:54):
very conscious eastwards shift in India's maritime security policy where
you're looking at not just warships submarines as well, but
also the aircraft carrier BI Krant is going to be
moving there very shortly, so you have one carrier on
the east and one on the west, but you're looking
at basing more warships. And my guess is that in
(43:16):
the next couple of years, when the Andermen the Great
nikobarra Port project increases in shape and size, you will
see more warships being based there. And now coming to
your point about the joint patrolling with Singapore and Indonesia,
you have to have very strong friendship with these countries
there which are close to the Malaca Straits, primarily because
(43:39):
you also want to tell them I lay their fears
that a big port project like that is not going
to take business away from them. It is a project
that everybody can benefit from. I think that is something
that the government really needs to convey to them that
this needs to be a shared port, like for instance,
Singapore Port is the property of this government of Singapore,
(43:59):
but everybody around it benefits. It's not just Singapore, it
is Malaysia, it's Indonesia, Philippines, all the countries India also
because it's so important to ship. You know, there's a
ship movement in Singapore every two minutes. That's how important
that port is. Now. The idea is that Galatia Bay
will eventually get there three four, five decades from now,
(44:21):
but it should be a project that all the neighbors
benefit from it, just as our outlook, maritime outlook is
not one of threatening people or you know, flexing our
muscles at sea or intimidating neighbors or anything of that.
And that is one reason why this joint patrolling for
the Indian Navy to become the preferred partner of choice.
(44:43):
And you only have to look back at the tsunami
of two thousand and four when the Indian Navy was
a first responder there to all of these areas. Bandhachi
and all those places just shattered by the tsunami. Despite
losing our own bases and you know personnel and Anderman's,
we were the first to reach out with a hand
of f and ship to all of those countries there.
So this is India basically doing the Indian thing, which
(45:05):
is to render aid assistance and to know indicate to
all of these countries that we are your preferred security partner.
Don't forget that we may be fourteen hundred the mainland,
maybe fourteen hundred kilometers away, but our territory is just
about sixteen utical miles away from you. And we're building
this great port, this base, and in the next couple
(45:27):
of years we're going to be there right there. So
this is us laying the grounds for what will eventually
become a very large base and a more or less
a permanent presence. And you're also in a sense you're
looking at the way the PLA Navy is growing at
the rate that they are. In the next couple of years,
(45:47):
you will have a permanent presence of the PLA Navy
here in much larger numbers than they are presently based today.
The Indian Ocean coadon is a couple of warships tomorrow
it could be larger with more aircraft. So you're actually
thinking ahead, moving ahead, and prepositioning yourself for a time
(46:08):
when you will compete with China in this eastern battle
space in a way that you will present options not
just to the navy but also to the political leadership
that we have these certain options in case things go
south on the land frontiers. We have maritime options, and
(46:28):
those options are very well known to the government and
of course to the navy. Against the Chinese, the PLA
navy in the south and the far east. Of course
it is going to be a battle. But the fact
is that navies by presenting by force projection, by presenting
all of these options, they induce worry. They induce kind
(46:50):
of a deterrent impact on the adversary that he will
not move in a certain way because he sees that
you're already there. So you it's it's a game of chess.
Exactly like in a game of chess, all the pieces
are transparent. This is our big chess move into the
eastern battle spaces. I called it a.
Speaker 2 (47:10):
Massive chess mover, and actually, in fact I wanted to
talk more about the ander Man Nicoba Islands. That the
idea of turning that into sort of a sort of
an aircraft carrier, the experiment that began there in two
thousand and three of having India's only Try Services comand
the only non strategic Try Services Command.
Speaker 3 (47:31):
But I don't think we've time.
Speaker 2 (47:33):
Theft for that, because this project itself, the sheer vastness
of it, I had sort of underappreciated before we talked
about this. So I think we ended there. Thanks on
the fantastic chat. Learned many things that I did not
know about before we begn this recording, So.
Speaker 3 (47:48):
Thanks so much, thanks for having me there.
Speaker 2 (47:50):
Yeah, and thanks to our listeners and viewers. That's it
for this week's defense. Does for more tune in next week? Well,
then stay safe and do not cross any boundaries for
that passport.
Speaker 1 (48:06):
In a world of contested porterers and silent battles. One
voice cut through the noise.
Speaker 6 (48:18):
Was Israel able to achieve its aim when Israel bombed Iran?
Speaker 2 (48:24):
Do you think that Chinese army is at war with itself?
Speaker 6 (48:29):
Joined veteran war correspondent God of Savon, one of India's
most trusted voices in defense journalism.
Speaker 1 (48:37):
Navaskar and jahand I'm God.
Speaker 6 (48:39):
A seventh Listen to Chuck review with God of Savon
on India Today Podcasts, Spotify, Apple podcasts, YouTube music and
your favorite audio utity platform.
Speaker 1 (48:53):
Stay alert. The war for truth start here.
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