April 28, 2025 • 55 mins
In this episode of 'In Our Defence', Dev Goswami talks to Major Manik M Jolly about his time in military intelligence, how to gather information after a major terrorist attack like Pahalgam, and how accurate is the "intelligence failure" question that is being asked.
Produced by Prateek Lidhoo
Sound mix by Suraj Singh
Produced by Prateek Lidhoo
Sound mix by Suraj Singh
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
This is India Today Podcasts.
Speaker 2 (00:05):
Welcome to season three of In Our Defense, the podcast
that takes you inside the world of conflict. I'm your host,
Dave Goswami, and every week I sit down with experts
and retired officers from the Army, Navy and Air Force
to decode all things to do with India security and
explore what it truly means to serve. Get ready for
(00:27):
stories of strategy, sacrifice and strength. This is in Our Defense. Hello,
This is another episode of In Our Defense within season
three and in the season. On the season, I've been
getting people retired from the from the military, Army, Air Force, Navy.
We began the season with Major Marning Jolly, decorated veteran
(00:52):
of the Army, and he's back with this again. Welcome
Major Jolly. We're recording this episode in the somber aftermath
for terrorist attack in Jermin, Kashmir. Twenty six people were
massacred by terrorists in Palkam, not in pe Healcam, a
a near to Picam, around five to six klometers away
in a place known as the best in Meadow, where
(01:13):
a group of terrorists basically rounded up a bunch of
tourists and shot them at point blank range. In the
aftermath of this of this attack, we have seen various
trands of discussion happening in the country, from what would
be India's response, whether it's diplomatic to military, to what
what what went wrong in the first place that allowed
(01:35):
us an attack to happen? Uh, And quite expectedly and
perhaps not and perhaps rightfully so, one of the biggest
questions that has been raised has been about intelligence failure.
You see this term crop up very often whenever an
attack of this magnitude happens. What I want to want
to do on this episode Major is to from you
(01:56):
and from your experience, give not just our listeners viewers,
but also me that insight into what this world of
intelligence is all about. Because you know, I've been told
this by various people who covered the world of defense.
Speaker 3 (02:11):
Quite often it.
Speaker 2 (02:12):
Is only the attacks that sort of fall through the cracks.
Is the are the ones that we hear about and
not the ones that are successfully stopped. In a year,
you'll probably have hundreds of such threats being utilized. You
won't hear about them, because that's the world of intelligence. Uh,
You'll only end up hearing about the ones that kind
of you know, succeed. Not that that is any defense
(02:33):
for or that is any excuse for what happened in Pellgam.
But like I said, this episode we will focus on
we will try to understand what this world is about
so that I, my listeners and my viewers can get
a get a better at a fuller picture of when
something does go wrong, how and why probably it went wrong.
Speaker 3 (02:55):
Would you mind if I give a little disclaimer. Whatever
I'm speaking here is my personal opinions. Nobody should consider
this as an official statement from either the Directorate of
Military Intelligence or Indian Army or government. We are just
sharing personal views. Yes, yes, and in no way. Yeah,
you know, I would like to comment on what the
operations are, the quality. I would like to start on
(03:17):
this thing, the intelligence failure thing. Why it is so
commonly used whenever something goes wrong. I think it's the
perfect alibi for everyone. Uh. Let's divide any action into
three three parts, right, one is the information gathering about it,
second is the guys who operate on it, and third
is the government that makes the policy. Right. So the
(03:38):
operational guys, let's say police CRPI for that. People who
are operationalizing also have a front where they can defend themselves.
Kind of right, why did this happen? They have spokespersonal
all This second part is the government, which always has
a lot of spokesperson Actually why this thing went wrong?
Over the intelligence community is the only one which never
(03:59):
comes ahead to defend themselves, So it becomes a perfect
alibi in that sense and in another sense. The reason
is that the intelligence community canerys say that it is
miib raw state policy idea. Everybody who's working in cosme
trying to generate intelligence on terrorist activities, they would send
a lot of inputs every day. Nobody there is a
(04:23):
system in which information translates into intelligence will get to that.
But the point is a lot of intelligence is shared
on daily basis because there's so much going on. Right
from what is you get to know some Tansiem leader
has moved from place to be in Pakistan. That's a
worthwhile input, you will share it. Two, I came to
(04:44):
know that two terrorists have entered the nearby village or
something that's worthwhile information you would share. The onus is
on the operational command or the operational leaders. What do
they do with it? Our job is not execution. Our
job is not take going for operations. Our job is
to turn all the information that we get and turn
(05:04):
it into actionable intelligence as much as possible at whatever stage,
and share it with the decision makers. In that what happened.
The strength of intelligence community lies in the in the
quality of its operators. I can give you ten points, right,
I can give ten people ten points, all ten of
(05:26):
them will come a bit different analysis. So the quality
of intelligence operators is what it matters. And in that
am I has done a fantastic job right from you know,
the wars we fought and in Punjab and in Castmeida,
consistently giving very solid, actionable intelligence all the time. But
in the end our job actually finishes. There After that
(05:48):
it is the you know, the core or brigade or
division whichever wants to take act on it, or even
the unit level. So that is why, in a way
it becomes easier to say it's intelligence failure, because somewhere
in the labyrinth of all this intelligence that would have
been generated in the last six months, something would have
(06:08):
come up in on these lines that the build up
and some also the thing is it's very difficult to
infer intelligence in a black and white scenario. You will
never get an intelligence. It's I mean one in a
billion chance, not even a million. That so and so people,
a group of swuantsho are coming to attack here. This
is what their plan. Although if you catch somebody or kuda,
(06:31):
that's a different thing. But otherwise you say a build
up is happening, they're likely to come inside. The target
could be a group of civilian people. Now that group
of civilian people could be a bus stand, that could
be a household, that could be a village, that could
be a tourist spot like this that could bust convoy
like earlier civilian attacks on civilians. As that we laa
(06:52):
so the range in which information comes is always very vague.
And again come back to the so intelligence work is
not very glamorous as it seems to be in movies
and all. That's a pretty misrepresentation. It's a lot of
hard work, a lot of reading, a lot of studying transcripts,
a lot of paperwork, a lot of analystis a lot
(07:13):
of midnight oil just going through whatever data you have
again and again and again connected with how these people talk.
Actually when he spoke like this that time, what did happen?
Who's connected to whom you have so much gaps in it.
Tomorrow I come to Nodve has crossed LCA and he's
planning something. It is a confirmed information, but I don't
(07:35):
know anything ahead of that. I don't know whether you're
going to so Poor or you're going to shar. I
don't know who your friends are. I don't know what
are you planning to do. So there is so much gap,
and hence it is easy to label it as an
intelligence failure. The community works in a very restained mold.
As far as the input is coming. You have, yes,
this part of the show, writing, movies or series and
(07:56):
all that, or even books, you have sources. You have
multiple channels of information coming in. But processing it is
a challenge because of so much gaps and also the
capabilities of the information gathering that we have. So like
they say they will send a small drone, a camera,
remain movies and also absolutely really complicated. Right.
Speaker 2 (08:18):
I like the part where you said about how this
is almost like an alibi for everybody, because I get that,
and that's actually exactly the reason I wanted to do
this episode, especially with you, somebody who's worked in this field.
You know, before we talk a bit more about your
life in m I and what the day was like
for you and stuff like that. I wanted to first
(08:38):
understand from you why and how did you end up
being in military intelligence? So tell us from infantry, how
did you end up being in military intelligence?
Speaker 3 (08:47):
Okay, that's a question a lot of people have asked,
include my family people. The thing is that I did
my first tenure in Copoda, and just to clarify, even
the book Codes is a mixure of my infantry as
well as intelligence. Right, there's a lot of intelligence operations
happening in that and the second book is all about
pure into operations. So but after that, I went to
(09:09):
a DC as a ADC to dev commander. It was
around a year and a half there, and that's when
I met a couple of intelligence officers who were operating.
The found their work very interesting. I found it, you know,
I mean cognitively very challenged, challenging, right, So I thought
I should give it a try. So you have to
(09:30):
apply for it. There's a written test, there's an interview,
and then there's a two year probation period. Okay, after
that they see if you have the right aptitude for it.
Because there's a certain kind of mindset that you need
to be in intelligence. I mean you have to have
a very analytical mind which is able to process the
(09:54):
information in a faster and more you know, bullet point
format if for lack of it, the world. Secondly, by
nature you will find I mean it might sound a
little oxymoor on me sitting here on a podcast and
saying that interstage only not looking for operators across the world,
and not the guys who are looking for limelight. Ever,
(10:16):
yes we I mean, even if nobody calls me for
podcasts next five hundred years, I want to live that
next twenty years. I've ilb you all right with it.
But yes, I actually go to a lot of places
for guest lectures or panel discussion motivation. That's a professional
part of it. But the fact that you will rarely
find anybody talking about I did I did that. That's
(10:38):
not a that that that's that's not how we are.
So whenever you ask anybody who's a genuine good interpreator,
he will say I did my job what I had to.
I think that's where we summ it up, most of us.
But then, yes, you have some people who love the limelight.
So this kind of I mean, it's a personality thing.
(10:58):
Working in it is not about qualify cations. It's about
what personality you are. Are you able to listen more,
speak less? Are you able to get more information and
give less in any surroundings? How do you view a thing? Again,
I'm saying, I'll come back to you. We can give
the same situation to ten different people. All ten will
(11:18):
come up with different outcomes. In that you have to
pick up the guy who's coming up with what you want.
Is he able to analyze it right? Plus you should
have a lot of I mean, as far as working
with data is concerned, you should have patients and capability
to do that. So all data data DA data, whether
lega phone transcripts or call logs or you just studying
(11:41):
map for days and days. So that's a So the
seniors who evaluated me during my probation, obviously they were
looking for and that's how I cleared the probation. My
first posting was in Pune and that's how I got
into am I and I always I have loved my
time there. For some domestic reasons, I had to leave Army,
(12:02):
but I absolutely love my time and am I army
will be always my first love. So it was very
learning and something that shaped me for my future life also.
And I can't say everybody should join it because everybody
won't be able to, but it's a great place to
work for sure. Yeah.
Speaker 2 (12:23):
Yeah, it's very interesting the way you describe the sort
of character you need to be an intelligence operative. And
you know, while you were while you were saying, I
kind of remember this, recalled this this moment from some
some movie. I cannot quite picture which one it was,
but I think this was about if I'm not an
adjacent one movie where the operative is getting some first
(12:45):
and experience where they are being taught that the moment
you enter a room you are supposed to like, you know,
look for these ten ways you can sort of escape
from that room as quickly as possible.
Speaker 3 (12:55):
Does that actually happen in training? So the thing is,
I mean, that's a movie. It has to be sensationalized,
you know, you have to come up with so any
movie that we make or any OTT series, whether it's Indian,
whether it's Western, you have to create these guys into superheroes,
and you have to make these guys into something they
(13:15):
are like they can get into a ac duct and
you know, they can jump from hair and climb from hair. Yes,
there are some operatives who especially would have done these
kinds of operations, but mostly you don't go to I mean,
there's rarely a situation where you have to enter a
room and look for ten places to escape. But your
mind is very agile, that's for sure, because especially when
(13:39):
you're meeting people for information, people you're meeting your so
a lot of work happens where you are not actually
saying who you are. You work a little under the
shades of cover. In that you have to be very sharp.
A small mistake can give you up right. There's a
very famous story which was done in newspaper about an
(14:03):
Indian guy who was caught in Pakistan. So some agency
would have sent him. He did everything, he learned the language, culture,
custom every and did not even first visit there. But
there during the checking at some checkpost, he was wearing
asama and the kurta had made in Patankot tag years
(14:23):
of training down the train for a simple small mistake,
you know. And he was then in jail for almost
ten twelve years there and he narrated his story when
he came back. So my point mean that this was
covered in newspapers, so I'm giving you open information right
which is available on media. My point being that mental
agility is very critical araw than you. There rarely will
(14:48):
be a chance in life where you have to jump
around like a James band, but there will be daily
requirement would be to actually think, act, analyzes, create. As
I said, the ability of a good inter operator is
to analyze the situation and not get a very unbiased approach.
Is what we take when we analyze the data. Because
(15:09):
if we find you know this is your enemy, these
are your friends, this is a gray zone. All that
is okay. But when you're working, if you are shit,
if you're shrouded by any kind of bias, you will
come up with long data. Plus, we don't get into
too much jinguism. That's a fact. That's that's what sets
us very apart from regular soldiers. I was to say,
(15:29):
because it is your job. It is a primary task
to advise the commander what root he should take. We
are advisors intelligence office advisors, as intelligence providers. What is
a This route is the best, this is the least resistance.
Here are the enemy camps, the here, the local supporters
(15:49):
here are here's what terrorists sacco. All that means that
you are very critical in decision making, and hence you
cannot be biased, you cannot be jinguist, you cannot be
over the top. You have to have a very stable
approach to everything today. If you ask me, and a
lot of people don't like when I say that, at
a lot of places should be fight. India should be fight,
(16:11):
Pakistan should be fight China. You'll never hear missaying let's go,
let's take them on something. It's just not in my
nature and personality. I'll say, these are the risks. Yes,
this is where we can go wrong. Hence, now you
take the call whether we should do it or not.
Because the wall is a brutal business. It's very violent
(16:32):
and it causes a lot of damage to everybody who's
involved in it. And if you have stomach for it,
then get into it. So it's our job to tell
our commanders that focus is always on the worst case scenario,
best stop nap hoojai. If it turns out right right,
our job is to give the worst case scenario. This
is what can go bad. These are our weak points,
this is where we can be compromised or we can
(16:53):
be exploited or leveraged. That's how that's so, that's what
it takes to actually become a good staff of self.
When you're in field, when you're operating, that's mostly intelligence
gathering or counterintelligence. That mean either you are gathering the
intelligence or stopping your intelligence going on. Both are equally
(17:14):
important roles. So that's more or less the graph of it.
Speaker 2 (17:19):
Yeah, it's I think just about cold hard facts. Basically,
this is what it is. This is the I think
your job as an intelligence officer would have been to
present the real picture as far as possibility the best
of your ability, and then it's for the decision makes
make a decision. Keep by this is what it is
that I'm guessing there is no space for emotions then
to be involved, right, So I wanted to also obviously
(17:43):
dive into your time in military intelligence and sort of
your experiences. Uh and before we get to the actual aspect,
and obviously only what you can tell us, because there
will be several things you cannot tell us on this podcast.
But I think there are a couple of hypotheticals I
want to do with you of like sort of real
(18:03):
word scenarios where that would I think help me and
the viewers and our listeners sort of get a picture
of what the day in the life of actually into
this office is all about. Let's say you were in
the you were in am I right now in the
aftermath of the massacre that just happened in pe Hellcam.
What would have been the last three four days like
(18:24):
days for you? Would you have been like, you know,
no sleep at all, or the all day at office?
I mean you been told you this has happened.
Speaker 3 (18:31):
What do you do next? It definitely would be like
that that because even in something as catastrophic happens like that, right,
it's all hands on deck. My point being that that
is a time you actually the most critical thing is
to solve it. Who did it, why he did it,
and most of where did they come from? How did
(18:53):
this gap happen? That's also very important to investigate how
did they get here? Even if they had support, who
supported them? All these required a lot of investigations. So
first thing is you, like anybody would assume, I'm not
giving some national secrets here, you activate all your sources
and the thing is a sources also, everybody knows this
(19:15):
is a high priority, just like you know red zone. Now,
so there's a let's say, for you know better understanding,
you have ten tasks, you would have a some marked
with red dots, green, yellow, that priority vice right, so
everything else goes back. You just get focused. What it
does is that in your team, if you have ten people,
(19:37):
two people are on one investigations, two are handling something else.
You say a bit through a whole everything right, come back,
get into the ops room. Let us all sit together
and focus on this for until the time we get
to the base of this that happens. Then a lot
of coordination happens. Actually, what happens in the intelligence community
(19:57):
is the bane of this community that people don't share
in you would know as anybody else. And this is
not limited to India, this across the world. Agencies are
very territorial about their information source says even operations. So
till the time it matures and you actually successfully do it,
people don't share it. So they would give a random
NT today I came to know like this would be
(20:20):
great in conference happening and say, I know there's a
guy called they who's driving very fast. This is nothing,
so that kind of thing. So people don't share good information.
But it's how it is. There is no answer to that.
But that is the time people let go of this.
They come to table and everybody shares, actually shares a lot.
(20:40):
We have this, what do you have? We have this?
And somehow dots tend to join, which at the end
the you know, the everything goes to Pakistan and there
are different channels coming and now everything is coming to Pelgam.
So let's say it's a kind of a situation where
a lot of lines diverged and then they concentrated again
on Pelgam. A lot of people would have info a
(21:02):
lot of these lines. If you start connecting them to shape,
starts to emerge. Right then you figure out then the
best thing that you do is you ask who has
the best who's most well positioned in that zone where
you know the ground zero. Let's say it isn't Jummu,
for example, so I would say, yeah, we know a
(21:24):
lot of guys there, because let's say if it isn't
somewhere in Delhi, so I w would say we know
a lot of people. So that kind of then then
they take the lead on it, and then they start
investigating and on the ops room, those inputs are shared.
This is how This is more or less how they
show in movies and a pretty normal common sense kind
of input. Then you start collating whatever you so you
(21:49):
have input coming in from all sources, but you have
your base information with you. You start creating a picture
at your own end, and that again it's it's a
reputative process. You keep improving on what you have to
arrive at analysis and I'll again go back. Information does
not matter. Intelligence is the first step. Intelligence is, let's say,
(22:10):
a smart analysis of information that you have.
Speaker 1 (22:13):
Right.
Speaker 3 (22:14):
What matters is actionable intelligence most importantly, and that comes
from a lot of analysis. So the day to day
job is actually turning data into actionable intelligence. In this case,
also the moment something on new input comes and it
changes the way looking at operation or trying trying to
do the investigation, you immediately submit it so that the
(22:34):
other guy who's working on it also has a new
data point which he can include in his analysis. So
that's how it works. Mostly it's a very high pressure
work because everybody's asking you, like after anything happens, you
hear the right the patrols were sent out, armies, a
(22:56):
lot of jungle bashging happening, happening, and people are all
on the play looking how do they know where to go? Actually,
that's what guys tell Fine, you can say, if the
operation has happened here, let's search the jungle around. But
there's a very rare chance they'll be sitting in the
same jungle they do the these tailors do their operation,
(23:17):
and they'll keep sitting there. So it's kind of defeats
the purpose. And hence for that they go back to
the inky sky. Where should we start the search? What
is the last input you have? Something is always there.
We just said to shift through those thousands of data
points and figure out, yeah, this is where I think,
this is the one I remember something happened, or this
(23:38):
is what I have. So even post action, when the
operations start, then also you come back to the incus
and say where do we start from? Where should we
put our pressure on, who are the people we should
talk to, How do we reach from here to there?
What is the path we should take?
Speaker 2 (23:56):
So that's that's I want to now talk about what,
in my mind is the more difficult aspect of intelligence operations,
and I think also the majority of it because what
you've talked about, right now is more of investigating something
that has happened after the fact, investigating something that has
happened after an attack, which I would presume would be
(24:16):
easier because you know the end point, you know, so
now you have to go back and retrace what you
missed earlier, where the gapsure earlier that led to this
attack in this particular part of Jamoan and Kashmir, which
I think would be sort of easier compared to launching
an operation from scratch to compared to finding something that
(24:38):
you don't even know what you're looking for. So let's
take one more hypothetical the Balacote strike, not hypothetically the
sense that had not happened. It didn't happen, there was
an operation, but hypothetical for our viewers and listeners, hypothetical
for me and for you, to the point that you
were not involved in the operation that took place. So
had happened. The government has tasked the various intelligence agencies
(25:00):
to find potential attack spots in Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir,
spots that you know, where either of the three military
arms can safely target and attack. How does an operation
like that happen? What are the different aspects involved. Is
it just you know, satellite imagery. Are the human sources involved?
Is it just called records? What would have happened to
(25:21):
find that spot on Jaba Top hill and for that
report to be sent to the higher UPSKI This is
one of the locations that we think you could be
attacked where x number of people X number of terrorists
we believe are training stuff like that.
Speaker 3 (25:35):
Great. So firstly, there are two aspects to this. Let's
say if commander came to them, I, director, we're planning
this chief for them. You know this, especially because you
mentioned Bala, it has a lot of air intelligence, does
not a pure you know, gunfight kind of a situation. Hence,
(25:57):
a line will be there, sorry, a line will be
there where are inputs are handed over to air intelligence
and they plan ahead because a strike we don't know
how they operate right their dog whites, their LGBs, their
range and all that. The part that the Army would
handle is we mora l less always have the am
I Direct Rate, which is manned by some of the
(26:20):
sharpest people in the direct rate. So the postings are
sometimes you're in field, sometimes you come back to army headquarters.
So they we maintained data. It's been like Pakistan is
there for last so many decades. We also know inch
by inch a lot of stuff. And as terrorists keep
getting interrogated killed, the information that comes from the documents
(26:44):
or people we interrogate, or people who spill our sources
and all. So you more or less have an idea
where these centers are training centers. What is critical piece
of information is if you want to launch this attack. Right,
So in nineties, when just a quick background in nineties
(27:04):
on you know everything, Benezebutto, she wanted to start these
terrorist organizations and her foreign minister who was an ex general,
they started with al Qaeda and all that and Taliban
and they'd create a lot of training centers across the
Pakistan Afghanistan border, both sides, right, So that was open
(27:27):
information kind of thing because they used to behave like
this is so like you start schools, colleges, universities. They
started these very organized training camps. It was a known thing.
Those are like stage one where people are getting trained.
From there, they come to a stage two where they
camp and stay for some time before they are ready
(27:49):
to be lost into India. This would be let's say
in more interior of Pakistan where all these are staying
under their leader and he's training them everything, radicalizing them
even more. All that these things happen and then they
come to launch pads where you're just waiting when do
you cross over? So it's like immediate notice kind of
(28:10):
a thing. They can be many stages to This is
not sacroocent, but more or less these are the phases right.
So the data is available, but as I said, the
critical input is you would want to cause maximum damage.
So where do you have maximum numbers available at what time?
This is part of the army part of it that
(28:30):
we can give them input. So you talk to your
sources across you talk to your sources this side that
we want to figure out when do you have maximum
people moving towards launch pad at which center? That is
what you're looking for. Plus they should be there for
some time. That's very critical. I mean, because you know
(28:52):
the aim is air rate. Now the Air Force guys
might say, I don't know. They can have ten reasons
for not to do that. Yes, you could have hostile
air space in Pakistan. They might be carrying out their exercise.
Timing might not be right, so you can't actually, I
personally can't tell what Air Force would reply. So you
(29:14):
want to have a you know, a certain time frame
in which you can do it. And in that timeframe
those people should be there, whether it's a week, ten
days to two days there. So that is what the
pointers you're looking for. Once you get to know through
all your sources possible, you share that with the Air
Force and actually leave it to them. That's the job.
(29:38):
But another thing is once that has happened, you do
keep your sources active. You know, the the quantum of damage,
the impact, what did the leaders behind, What did tanjims
are saying, or do terrorist leaders are saying or did
they impact them? What did the government saying? What is
the internal gossip? So all those kinds, So all these
things are very important. There part of you know, functioning
(30:00):
on operation like this from planning to the result. As
in review of the impact, you have to come back
with that we did this, this is what it has achieved.
It is also part of your duty. And if it
was let's say something totally from the scratch. So we're
talking about some basis that we already know right then
(30:22):
you task only the tasking differs that in that area
what are we looking for? Then maybe the Air Force
gives you a first pariety that we want to target
the area. Do you have something there? Hence, that is
how it changes. It's just the tasking, but the sources
and the there is satellite imaging. Nowadays, it's like it's
a whole different world. You can track everything and see everything.
(30:45):
Back in the day when it was so that was
a little bit more challenging. People had to go physically
and click cameras there used to be. When internet came,
we did so. I was specialized in this social thing.
Yes that we had to talk a lot on chat
Yahoo Chat and in for turn data into intelligence. A
(31:09):
lot of all agencies were doing it is I was
doing in India, we were doing there. Whole of the
world was doing it. You try and make sense of things.
Say I'm talking to you, and you say, I'm acting
like a young pretty girl and you are talking to
me and very nice all that, and then you say,
I say, I really want to come and visit you,
(31:29):
but I'm scared keep you must be living in some
remote village and all. So no, no, no, I have
a full fledged road in front of my house. My
government just built a new bridge. We are accessible. There,
you have a point you turn it into and key,
okay new. So this is pre satellite imaging and Google maps,
where where you say okay, a new bridge built on
(31:51):
this road, that single piece of information is very critical
for your entire military operations in that area, for armored
troops to move, for infant to plan, or ultimately to
break that bridge if they want to, or air force
to break over. So this is how it was a
very tedious, slow process. But within these things you would
always find a gem you could actually pick up and
(32:13):
turn it into a good intelligence input. But now that
all that is, it's not that it has gone away.
The value of human intelligence will never go away, yes,
because because it is worth its value in gold. However,
this sat imaging, Google map, it's a two way thing, right.
If we can see, they can also see, and in
(32:35):
that you are as exposed as they are. So now
you have not only you have to think like that
that it's not a happy situation. Actually that at least
from an ind guy's perspective. And tell you we just
hate exposure of any kind. So while we can celebrate
that we can see more into the enemy space, but
we just hate when we get also because of the
(32:57):
same technology, so you have to now start balancing it
out somehow. So there is sad satellite, and there is electronic,
and there's human and oskull you know, there's people use
it on rumorant rumint That's really funny actually, because the
thing is, how can you use two words in the
same thing. If it's a rumor, it's a rumor, right,
(33:18):
And if it's intelligence, it is Intellience is very fight
solid rock solid thing, intelligence, hamiary pass. The other thing
is a rumor. So rumant is kind of an oxymoronic thing.
I don't know how many people like it, but personally
I don't. So all these things get to it. So
just to rumorant is like people try to gauge the
(33:39):
mood of gossip. Okay, okay, key article rumors, a part
of the tech is done, that's not that's just a rumor.
Actually that's gossip. That's you can't associate into work with, right.
So but I don't know. It's a fancy of fancy
corporate where people keep coming up to terms, so they
do that. But the solid thing is human, satellite, electronic,
(34:04):
All these things you depend a lot on them. The
phones made a big change in it tower. So we
I mean, as you see every in every investigation nowadays,
key called crime patrol makes seconds to a year. There's
not even need to look further, but yes, we all
(34:25):
it's very many years back. The triangulation method was actually
used by signal so that was signal intelligence. So all
these things help in creating a scenario, a picture, a perspective,
something that the operational forces can work on. So all
these inputs are sent to coming back to the original
(34:47):
question that you ask, all the field commanders would send
all these inputs whatever they can gather, whatever they had,
whatever they can gather in that time frame, back to
the mill am I direct it in army headquarters. The
officers there would turn that into a single picture, turn
that into a crisp note. Actually, this is the place
(35:10):
you have to go. This is the time frame you have.
These are the best timings because if you don't give
the time all these terrorists could be out training or something,
or you've just gone for a bath or walk around
the jungle or something like that. You have to have
them there. So all these are the part of that
information that you pass it on to air force ormod
and they take on after that, the Air Force guys,
(35:34):
the flyboys, whatever.
Speaker 2 (35:35):
They want to do after that, their right and that,
like you said, I think that what you just said
right now that I think is perhaps the most crucial
aspect of the world of intelligence, the analysis part.
Speaker 3 (35:46):
Of it, and that's where I want to focus a bit.
Speaker 2 (35:50):
And also, like I said, talk a bit about your tenure,
am I, the decade that you've served anywhere in the army.
Speaker 3 (35:57):
But after a quick.
Speaker 1 (35:57):
Break, do you sometimes get frustrated choosing what to eat
for diabetes management while stopping yourself from eating that chocolate
pudding is good? But is it really enough? This month,
(36:17):
Health Wealth will be doing a special podcast on World
Diabetes Day, which is the fourteenth of November. Tune in
and discover with me what nutrients diabetics should be having
and how to supplement your diet for your long term
well being. You can catch the episode on our website, YouTube, Apple,
(36:37):
Spotify and other audio streaming platforms.
Speaker 3 (36:46):
Macha.
Speaker 2 (36:47):
Before break, you know, we've talked about what if your
high hypothetical, so you told us about what a crisis
situation in again, second, am I, would be when something
like what happened in Pelgram, a couple of you or
days ago happens. I want to sort of drawn out
from your experience of being an mi I for a decade,
And of course you can't tell us specific missions that
(37:07):
you're part of, specific things that you may or may
not have done, but rather what a day for you
would look like. And from that, what I want to
understand is what is operating in intelligence, specifically in Jump
and Kashmir. Actually, Like when we went on the break,
(37:32):
I said that I think, apart from gathering the intelligence,
analyzing it perhaps is one of the biggest and most
challenging tasks. And the reason I kind of also relate
with it is because in journalism as well, where I
work on the desk.
Speaker 3 (37:46):
So for me, our.
Speaker 2 (37:48):
Primary job for people who work on the desk in
any media media house is you get bombarded with lots
of information from your different sources. You have your own reporters,
you have social media, you have other publications. So you
have all this information with you when you're supposed to
sign sort of sift through it and find that headline.
And now for us, it is at headline that will
(38:09):
click and when I say click, it is that that
will get us the most number of viewers that will
get us the most number of readers. I can sort
of picture that with you as well when you were
talking about what it's like in being intelligence, because I
think that's sort of what you're doing as well. That's
shifting to information and finding that point that will click
for you. Click means getting that pinpoint accurate information that
(38:30):
you know would help you find that particular person that
you're looking for, just one example. So, yeah, tell us
what a day of typical day for you would be
like when you were in an emilitan intelligence and yes,
especially what is it like being in this field, especially in.
Speaker 3 (38:45):
So you rightly differentiated. There's a piece so peace time
soldiering and then there's a field right, peace time soldiering.
You are very focused on your counterit tilted and stoles
because you're not, you know, terrace. You're hunting around. So
for the priority becomes that who's floating around together our information? Right,
(39:06):
who's trying to take pictures? Who's trying to send data?
Now there's the last couple of decades there have been
the cyber angle to it, so you have to scan
with your resources available, you scan that also, you try
and take Obviously you have source friends in place, or
sources here and there, somebody coming in who's suspicious and
(39:26):
staying around Kent or doing something. You try and gather
that you meet with your team. You decide a day
to day think like a morning briefing kind of a thing.
Today we will do this, you will go there, we
take a update on where where are we on. It's
like office. So but the not that the stakes are
any lesser because but then everybody moves out. You do
(39:49):
your thing, and but the summary has to be logged
every day. That's the thing. Whatever you do, logging is
the most important thing. So anybody who whose averse to
paperwork will not do good in intelligence. You have to
write a lot. You have to read a lot. Because
(40:09):
I came to know I don't I have a suspicion
on you. Today. I came to know you live in
X society. Okay, great, I came to know this input
I went and checked some surveillance. But then I allies
you took a car and went to some other society,
and then I somehow figured out spoken and then that
(40:29):
your actual house is there. That was your maybe in
law's house, right, So yes, that data has to go
in that very day with what do I make out
of it that if this guy is giving impression of
that he stays there actually, but what is the reason?
What could be the possible reason? And then you list
out this is what I suspect him from, this is
(40:50):
what he's showcasing, and this is what it would mean.
So I'm going to follow these four aspects of his
activities and figure out where he is moving most maybe
take a month or two when you figure out, okay,
he is actually a car thief, so that is right.
So then once your path is a little accurate, then
(41:10):
you start viewing that person or that suspect in that mode.
And once you've reached a place where you've said, yes,
this is what it is, then you prepare a case
and submit to you higher authorities and that means the
commander of the formation or the senior in your intelligence chain,
and they decide what is to be done with that.
So they come back to you, let's build it some more,
(41:32):
or they say, okay, good, this is a case we
share with desidency or for this operation or with police
or something like that. So that's what a day to
day work looks like. It's all about gathering inputs, turning
them into reports, and writing your analysis, logging data. That's
like any office, any regular office, but when you're in field,
(41:56):
it means no office hours because you're dealing with obviously,
you can't imagine office in terrorism, right or office work
or there. You're spending a lot of time outside. A
very critical differentiator between regular forces and int is we
don't move around with a lot of people, right. That's
(42:17):
a big risk also, but that's a necessity. I can't
like if an officer is moving from place A to B,
there's only a small convoy. They move around with their
q AT, a quick quick reaction team or their subordinates
and at least fifteen twenty people will always move in
a team. That Those are the requirements of field. Everybody
(42:39):
knows that. But when ain't guys move out there actually
mostly alone, totally alone on a bike or a car
or switch source or two of you just hanging around
here and there. It's a very high risk stop that way,
and we have had some really phenomenal legends in AM.
I it's very sad their operations will never come out,
but genuinely devils. I can't even begin to tell you
(43:03):
that admiration I have for these people. There are a couple
of these officers who have done fantastic operations. Actually this
is not that's the thing the social media, the Bollywood,
the people who tend to write, they inflate the story
so much for sensationalism. These are guys who've actually done
(43:26):
that right and again they'll never come and speak about
the operations. So I worked with them. I've learned from them,
I've done operations with them, and it gives you a
sense of you know, humble le that you know there
these are the legends of intelligence world and how humble
they are actually about everything. So that is what I
(43:49):
was very lucky to work with these guys that did
great operations and you tend to copy them that you know,
I should also work like that. So in field they
would meet with the sources. The source say is that
there is something which is on top of that mountain,
right you will go. There is never a This is
what Indian Army is known for. We barely brush off
(44:11):
our input. Every day, millions of soldiers are walking out
on just a hint of information. Some villagers who come
and say I heard there are five guys terrists who
were in that jeneral. Great, let's go. We'll have hundreds
of soldiers marching around all directions. We don't brush off inputs,
so you find somebody there are not It's a different thing,
(44:35):
but I'm very glad that this camaraderie or this coordination
between the military intelligence and the operational forces exists an
army where generally nobody brushes off input. They are always
ready to do that operation, and hence it becomes moral
responsibility of the I guys also to actually work up
(44:57):
to a level where the operation is successful. That's you
know that, it's a two way kind of thing. So
you spend a lot of time chasing around information, even
if sometimes you're out for days, staying here, staying there
actually very highest job that way, especially in feed you're
I mean, you are just taking him on a facial
(45:17):
This is a source who said you can stay at
this or that hotel. So keep working on that, and
then you can come back again to your bread and
butter writing, report writing, analysis, and then you turn it
into a report and share it with your bosses and
then they decide what is to be done.
Speaker 2 (45:34):
Yeah, can you tell us that analysis part of it?
When you have so much information in front of you.
Is there a process through which you kind of, you know,
build that strand or build that thread that makes sort
of a coherent narrative from all that that is there
in front of he Or is it as simple as
(45:55):
like you just said, is reading reading reading and then
falling back on your training and your instinct kind of
you getting a darrative out of it.
Speaker 3 (46:01):
It's a lot of gut feeling and experience trains you
for it. So it's all about this. Both you and
I could join am I. We could pass that probation
or boss might feel do not bring them in. But
the thing is I could still be a huge failure
and you could actually be aware and by failure and
means my analysis is bad, right, but your analysis spot
(46:27):
on and that only comes from aptitude. You just cannot
lease that just there is no training available to that.
For that. You have to have that mind. Either you
are able to see through or you're not. I can
tell you can send four four guys to a shop,
four different intelligence operators to a shop, and that shop guy,
(46:48):
that shopkeeper is selling drugs underhand. Maybe none of them
will be able to figure out by his behavior talking
he will not expose to them that, but there will
be one guy who will figure out he does that,
he'll make a deal also, he will buy also, he'll
get approve also, and he'll come back with the operation.
So that is very in built. And that comes from
(47:12):
having a knack of faith in your gut, feeling of
faith in your instincts. And lastly, I would again say
absorption of information. If you talk a lot and you're
not open to listening, you're not open to observation, you
will miss out a lot. You have to be very
sharp in understanding what he's saying, what does it mean.
(47:34):
The CPU has to work very fast. If he's saying
that I gave the shopkeeper, he would say that to everybody.
Are you able to take it ahead? Are you able
to take it to a conversation where he says, That's
where the difference comes. We don't use force. We are.
(47:55):
I mean that's actually a If you have to beat
somebody to get information, you're not a great professional, to
be honest, because the thing is when you when I'm
beating you and break somebody's finger or kneecap, the pain
is enormous. Nobody can survive that pain. You can do
it for a couple of hours maybe, but once it
gets to extreme, nobody can survive. You will say something
(48:17):
to save yourself. You will say he will know that
it will take three days for these guys to go,
and at least till that time, I'm out of pain.
So the strength of an interrogator, which is also part
am task, is to be sharp enough to have carry
out good investigations and interrogations. And I don't believe too
(48:39):
much in beating up. I mean some I don't know.
There are stories which I have never been part of
such things. But you have to be skilled. Actually, that
skill comes from practice, and by practice you get experience,
and you get a lot of experience by making bad
decisions good decisions. So figure out over a while that
(49:01):
what is lacking in me? I thought these guys are
like this, but it turned out they weren't. Where did
I analyze it wrong? What part of this guy's personality
did I pick up which made me think he's like that?
But so it's a continuous self improvement. Also, right, everybody
you're making I'll give you a small how to process
(49:21):
information and your listeners would actually use that in real life. Also,
whenever somebody tells you something, there are two parameters to
judge that who is telling it and what is he telling?
If Dave Tomorrow tells me last week when I was
in Japan, I jumped from a satellite, Like what the
possibility in this is they could have been in Japan.
(49:44):
The possibility that you took us skydive from satellite is impossible.
That's how fine. I'm speaking in extremes, but you get
my part right. You downgrade the information that this information
cannot be tested. Second, I meet somebody who has I
know for a fact that he he has never traveled
outside India. He says the same thing. So not only
that source is untrustworthy that information, so he is like
(50:07):
downgraded to D four. He's like totally finished. So whenever
you get in foot and puts you alphanumeric, immediately quote
them in your mind that this is a one, this
is a three, this B four. This That helps you
process the information in your mind faster. That helps you
put pointers key. These are the good points. I should
(50:27):
work on them. So, uh, you are able, you get
used to it, and you are able to not store
useless data in your mind. Was happier delet but focus
on that one thing that he will say that will
make your day. That is critical. You can be sitting
with somebody of five hours. He will not tell you
anything important. A third person listening might think it's very important.
(50:53):
Know you what you are looking for might just be
like a half hour sentence and that is a one
so you converse for that. You hang around. A lot
of work is just hanging around. It's a very boring
job that way. You're sitting there just just observing things
because you're looking for a When they say there is
(51:16):
movement around, what does it actually imply? Actually, if you
think of it, what does it mean there is movement
around that some people are moving around? How do you
judge that? That means a lot of surveillance hours and
days and you know, shift after shift to keep so
you keep shitting, looking, keep sitting and looking. Is there
something that is worthwhile? So it's as I said, slow,
(51:37):
tedious and sometimes gets boring because you're just sitting there
doing nothing. So but your mind is always on. You're
looking for that little bit of observation or information or
discussion that can help you turn that into something which
you can present to the headquarters that I thought, I
think this is happening. You should have a look at it.
Speaker 2 (52:00):
Right A slight tangent. I thought of when you were
just talking, Uh, are you talking about being out in
the field and how at times it could be very unsafe.
How often was it that you had a side down
with you when you went out in the field.
Speaker 3 (52:12):
Always, always, Yeah, you can't be without. That's the minimum
you should be had. But but the reason I asked
that is key at times. Wouldn't that also be like,
you know, that could be.
Speaker 2 (52:23):
A giveaway if, like you know, someone sees you.
Speaker 3 (52:26):
Don't carry it open. I mean, obviously I won't get
into details of but yes, you are very right in saying,
this is not like a policing job. Uh, this's not
like even so people tend to carry side arms and
they would lift their shirt around it, and so I'm
carrying by logan, we're not there. That's not a requirement.
(52:49):
We want to be as as invisible as possible. Like
the greatest place in a bar is to sit behind
a pillar and look at everyone. That's the greatest place
sit and drink. It's like that you just don't know
anybody looking at you. So to merge with the crowd
to be achieved. That invisibility actually takes effort. I won't
(53:10):
say a lot of but it actually takes some thinking
and effort. You're at a bust end. You anyway look
different from the locals. Let's say physical appearance. How do
you do that that I merge in the crowd, but
nobody looks at me because you look physically so different.
So these are the things you work on. These are
(53:31):
the things you would work on. How do I address?
Speaker 1 (53:32):
So?
Speaker 3 (53:32):
Where do I? How do I behave? You know? A
small thing can give you away, A small thing will
make everybody understand this guy is not from here. So
those are the things you work on, practice, practice, learn
every day improve your work. So it's an endless process, right,
I think we und the episode there.
Speaker 2 (53:51):
Thank you so much for being on this episode. A
great chat with you, and honestly lots to learn and
lots to sort of unpack from what you what you've
hold us called me because this was the intent as well.
I wanted to understand from you what that world of
intelligence is all about?
Speaker 3 (54:08):
Uh, and you give me lots to think about it.
Thank you so much.
Speaker 2 (54:13):
Thanks, it's great having you, and thanks as always to
our listeners and viewers.
Speaker 3 (54:17):
That's it for the Defense stores.
Speaker 2 (54:18):
For more, tune in next week till they stay safe
and not cross any boundaries to the passport. Okay, kab
(54:48):
arch the radio, Apple podcast, Spotify audio platform, it but
about can
This is India Today Podcasts.
Speaker 2 (00:05):
Welcome to season three of In Our Defense, the podcast
that takes you inside the world of conflict. I'm your host,
Dave Goswami, and every week I sit down with experts
and retired officers from the Army, Navy and Air Force
to decode all things to do with India security and
explore what it truly means to serve. Get ready for
(00:27):
stories of strategy, sacrifice and strength. This is in Our Defense. Hello,
This is another episode of In Our Defense within season
three and in the season. On the season, I've been
getting people retired from the from the military, Army, Air Force, Navy.
We began the season with Major Marning Jolly, decorated veteran
(00:52):
of the Army, and he's back with this again. Welcome
Major Jolly. We're recording this episode in the somber aftermath
for terrorist attack in Jermin, Kashmir. Twenty six people were
massacred by terrorists in Palkam, not in pe Healcam, a
a near to Picam, around five to six klometers away
in a place known as the best in Meadow, where
(01:13):
a group of terrorists basically rounded up a bunch of
tourists and shot them at point blank range. In the
aftermath of this of this attack, we have seen various
trands of discussion happening in the country, from what would
be India's response, whether it's diplomatic to military, to what
what what went wrong in the first place that allowed
(01:35):
us an attack to happen? Uh, And quite expectedly and
perhaps not and perhaps rightfully so, one of the biggest
questions that has been raised has been about intelligence failure.
You see this term crop up very often whenever an
attack of this magnitude happens. What I want to want
to do on this episode Major is to from you
(01:56):
and from your experience, give not just our listeners viewers,
but also me that insight into what this world of
intelligence is all about. Because you know, I've been told
this by various people who covered the world of defense.
Speaker 3 (02:11):
Quite often it.
Speaker 2 (02:12):
Is only the attacks that sort of fall through the cracks.
Is the are the ones that we hear about and
not the ones that are successfully stopped. In a year,
you'll probably have hundreds of such threats being utilized. You
won't hear about them, because that's the world of intelligence. Uh,
You'll only end up hearing about the ones that kind
of you know, succeed. Not that that is any defense
(02:33):
for or that is any excuse for what happened in Pellgam.
But like I said, this episode we will focus on
we will try to understand what this world is about
so that I, my listeners and my viewers can get
a get a better at a fuller picture of when
something does go wrong, how and why probably it went wrong.
Speaker 3 (02:55):
Would you mind if I give a little disclaimer. Whatever
I'm speaking here is my personal opinions. Nobody should consider
this as an official statement from either the Directorate of
Military Intelligence or Indian Army or government. We are just
sharing personal views. Yes, yes, and in no way. Yeah,
you know, I would like to comment on what the
operations are, the quality. I would like to start on
(03:17):
this thing, the intelligence failure thing. Why it is so
commonly used whenever something goes wrong. I think it's the
perfect alibi for everyone. Uh. Let's divide any action into
three three parts, right, one is the information gathering about it,
second is the guys who operate on it, and third
is the government that makes the policy. Right. So the
(03:38):
operational guys, let's say police CRPI for that. People who
are operationalizing also have a front where they can defend themselves.
Kind of right, why did this happen? They have spokespersonal
all This second part is the government, which always has
a lot of spokesperson Actually why this thing went wrong?
Over the intelligence community is the only one which never
(03:59):
comes ahead to defend themselves, So it becomes a perfect
alibi in that sense and in another sense. The reason
is that the intelligence community canerys say that it is
miib raw state policy idea. Everybody who's working in cosme
trying to generate intelligence on terrorist activities, they would send
a lot of inputs every day. Nobody there is a
(04:23):
system in which information translates into intelligence will get to that.
But the point is a lot of intelligence is shared
on daily basis because there's so much going on. Right
from what is you get to know some Tansiem leader
has moved from place to be in Pakistan. That's a
worthwhile input, you will share it. Two, I came to
(04:44):
know that two terrorists have entered the nearby village or
something that's worthwhile information you would share. The onus is
on the operational command or the operational leaders. What do
they do with it? Our job is not execution. Our
job is not take going for operations. Our job is
to turn all the information that we get and turn
(05:04):
it into actionable intelligence as much as possible at whatever stage,
and share it with the decision makers. In that what happened.
The strength of intelligence community lies in the in the
quality of its operators. I can give you ten points, right,
I can give ten people ten points, all ten of
(05:26):
them will come a bit different analysis. So the quality
of intelligence operators is what it matters. And in that
am I has done a fantastic job right from you know,
the wars we fought and in Punjab and in Castmeida,
consistently giving very solid, actionable intelligence all the time. But
in the end our job actually finishes. There After that
(05:48):
it is the you know, the core or brigade or
division whichever wants to take act on it, or even
the unit level. So that is why, in a way
it becomes easier to say it's intelligence failure, because somewhere
in the labyrinth of all this intelligence that would have
been generated in the last six months, something would have
(06:08):
come up in on these lines that the build up
and some also the thing is it's very difficult to
infer intelligence in a black and white scenario. You will
never get an intelligence. It's I mean one in a
billion chance, not even a million. That so and so people,
a group of swuantsho are coming to attack here. This
is what their plan. Although if you catch somebody or kuda,
(06:31):
that's a different thing. But otherwise you say a build
up is happening, they're likely to come inside. The target
could be a group of civilian people. Now that group
of civilian people could be a bus stand, that could
be a household, that could be a village, that could
be a tourist spot like this that could bust convoy
like earlier civilian attacks on civilians. As that we laa
(06:52):
so the range in which information comes is always very vague.
And again come back to the so intelligence work is
not very glamorous as it seems to be in movies
and all. That's a pretty misrepresentation. It's a lot of
hard work, a lot of reading, a lot of studying transcripts,
a lot of paperwork, a lot of analystis a lot
(07:13):
of midnight oil just going through whatever data you have
again and again and again connected with how these people talk.
Actually when he spoke like this that time, what did happen?
Who's connected to whom you have so much gaps in it.
Tomorrow I come to Nodve has crossed LCA and he's
planning something. It is a confirmed information, but I don't
(07:35):
know anything ahead of that. I don't know whether you're
going to so Poor or you're going to shar. I
don't know who your friends are. I don't know what
are you planning to do. So there is so much gap,
and hence it is easy to label it as an
intelligence failure. The community works in a very restained mold.
As far as the input is coming. You have, yes,
this part of the show, writing, movies or series and
(07:56):
all that, or even books, you have sources. You have
multiple channels of information coming in. But processing it is
a challenge because of so much gaps and also the
capabilities of the information gathering that we have. So like
they say they will send a small drone, a camera,
remain movies and also absolutely really complicated. Right.
Speaker 2 (08:18):
I like the part where you said about how this
is almost like an alibi for everybody, because I get that,
and that's actually exactly the reason I wanted to do
this episode, especially with you, somebody who's worked in this field.
You know, before we talk a bit more about your
life in m I and what the day was like
for you and stuff like that. I wanted to first
(08:38):
understand from you why and how did you end up
being in military intelligence? So tell us from infantry, how
did you end up being in military intelligence?
Speaker 3 (08:47):
Okay, that's a question a lot of people have asked,
include my family people. The thing is that I did
my first tenure in Copoda, and just to clarify, even
the book Codes is a mixure of my infantry as
well as intelligence. Right, there's a lot of intelligence operations
happening in that and the second book is all about
pure into operations. So but after that, I went to
(09:09):
a DC as a ADC to dev commander. It was
around a year and a half there, and that's when
I met a couple of intelligence officers who were operating.
The found their work very interesting. I found it, you know,
I mean cognitively very challenged, challenging, right, So I thought
I should give it a try. So you have to
(09:30):
apply for it. There's a written test, there's an interview,
and then there's a two year probation period. Okay, after
that they see if you have the right aptitude for it.
Because there's a certain kind of mindset that you need
to be in intelligence. I mean you have to have
a very analytical mind which is able to process the
(09:54):
information in a faster and more you know, bullet point
format if for lack of it, the world. Secondly, by
nature you will find I mean it might sound a
little oxymoor on me sitting here on a podcast and
saying that interstage only not looking for operators across the world,
and not the guys who are looking for limelight. Ever,
(10:16):
yes we I mean, even if nobody calls me for
podcasts next five hundred years, I want to live that
next twenty years. I've ilb you all right with it.
But yes, I actually go to a lot of places
for guest lectures or panel discussion motivation. That's a professional
part of it. But the fact that you will rarely
find anybody talking about I did I did that. That's
(10:38):
not a that that that's that's not how we are.
So whenever you ask anybody who's a genuine good interpreator,
he will say I did my job what I had to.
I think that's where we summ it up, most of us.
But then, yes, you have some people who love the limelight.
So this kind of I mean, it's a personality thing.
(10:58):
Working in it is not about qualify cations. It's about
what personality you are. Are you able to listen more,
speak less? Are you able to get more information and
give less in any surroundings? How do you view a thing? Again,
I'm saying, I'll come back to you. We can give
the same situation to ten different people. All ten will
(11:18):
come up with different outcomes. In that you have to
pick up the guy who's coming up with what you want.
Is he able to analyze it right? Plus you should
have a lot of I mean, as far as working
with data is concerned, you should have patients and capability
to do that. So all data data DA data, whether
lega phone transcripts or call logs or you just studying
(11:41):
map for days and days. So that's a So the
seniors who evaluated me during my probation, obviously they were
looking for and that's how I cleared the probation. My
first posting was in Pune and that's how I got
into am I and I always I have loved my
time there. For some domestic reasons, I had to leave Army,
(12:02):
but I absolutely love my time and am I army
will be always my first love. So it was very
learning and something that shaped me for my future life also.
And I can't say everybody should join it because everybody
won't be able to, but it's a great place to
work for sure. Yeah.
Speaker 2 (12:23):
Yeah, it's very interesting the way you describe the sort
of character you need to be an intelligence operative. And
you know, while you were while you were saying, I
kind of remember this, recalled this this moment from some
some movie. I cannot quite picture which one it was,
but I think this was about if I'm not an
adjacent one movie where the operative is getting some first
(12:45):
and experience where they are being taught that the moment
you enter a room you are supposed to like, you know,
look for these ten ways you can sort of escape
from that room as quickly as possible.
Speaker 3 (12:55):
Does that actually happen in training? So the thing is,
I mean, that's a movie. It has to be sensationalized,
you know, you have to come up with so any
movie that we make or any OTT series, whether it's Indian,
whether it's Western, you have to create these guys into superheroes,
and you have to make these guys into something they
(13:15):
are like they can get into a ac duct and
you know, they can jump from hair and climb from hair. Yes,
there are some operatives who especially would have done these
kinds of operations, but mostly you don't go to I mean,
there's rarely a situation where you have to enter a
room and look for ten places to escape. But your
mind is very agile, that's for sure, because especially when
(13:39):
you're meeting people for information, people you're meeting your so
a lot of work happens where you are not actually
saying who you are. You work a little under the
shades of cover. In that you have to be very sharp.
A small mistake can give you up right. There's a
very famous story which was done in newspaper about an
(14:03):
Indian guy who was caught in Pakistan. So some agency
would have sent him. He did everything, he learned the language, culture,
custom every and did not even first visit there. But
there during the checking at some checkpost, he was wearing
asama and the kurta had made in Patankot tag years
(14:23):
of training down the train for a simple small mistake,
you know. And he was then in jail for almost
ten twelve years there and he narrated his story when
he came back. So my point mean that this was
covered in newspapers, so I'm giving you open information right
which is available on media. My point being that mental
agility is very critical araw than you. There rarely will
(14:48):
be a chance in life where you have to jump
around like a James band, but there will be daily
requirement would be to actually think, act, analyzes, create. As
I said, the ability of a good inter operator is
to analyze the situation and not get a very unbiased approach.
Is what we take when we analyze the data. Because
(15:09):
if we find you know this is your enemy, these
are your friends, this is a gray zone. All that
is okay. But when you're working, if you are shit,
if you're shrouded by any kind of bias, you will
come up with long data. Plus, we don't get into
too much jinguism. That's a fact. That's that's what sets
us very apart from regular soldiers. I was to say,
(15:29):
because it is your job. It is a primary task
to advise the commander what root he should take. We
are advisors intelligence office advisors, as intelligence providers. What is
a This route is the best, this is the least resistance.
Here are the enemy camps, the here, the local supporters
(15:49):
here are here's what terrorists sacco. All that means that
you are very critical in decision making, and hence you
cannot be biased, you cannot be jinguist, you cannot be
over the top. You have to have a very stable
approach to everything today. If you ask me, and a
lot of people don't like when I say that, at
a lot of places should be fight. India should be fight,
(16:11):
Pakistan should be fight China. You'll never hear missaying let's go,
let's take them on something. It's just not in my
nature and personality. I'll say, these are the risks. Yes,
this is where we can go wrong. Hence, now you
take the call whether we should do it or not.
Because the wall is a brutal business. It's very violent
(16:32):
and it causes a lot of damage to everybody who's
involved in it. And if you have stomach for it,
then get into it. So it's our job to tell
our commanders that focus is always on the worst case scenario,
best stop nap hoojai. If it turns out right right,
our job is to give the worst case scenario. This
is what can go bad. These are our weak points,
this is where we can be compromised or we can
(16:53):
be exploited or leveraged. That's how that's so, that's what
it takes to actually become a good staff of self.
When you're in field, when you're operating, that's mostly intelligence
gathering or counterintelligence. That mean either you are gathering the
intelligence or stopping your intelligence going on. Both are equally
(17:14):
important roles. So that's more or less the graph of it.
Speaker 2 (17:19):
Yeah, it's I think just about cold hard facts. Basically,
this is what it is. This is the I think
your job as an intelligence officer would have been to
present the real picture as far as possibility the best
of your ability, and then it's for the decision makes
make a decision. Keep by this is what it is
that I'm guessing there is no space for emotions then
to be involved, right, So I wanted to also obviously
(17:43):
dive into your time in military intelligence and sort of
your experiences. Uh and before we get to the actual aspect,
and obviously only what you can tell us, because there
will be several things you cannot tell us on this podcast.
But I think there are a couple of hypotheticals I
want to do with you of like sort of real
(18:03):
word scenarios where that would I think help me and
the viewers and our listeners sort of get a picture
of what the day in the life of actually into
this office is all about. Let's say you were in
the you were in am I right now in the
aftermath of the massacre that just happened in pe Hellcam.
What would have been the last three four days like
(18:24):
days for you? Would you have been like, you know,
no sleep at all, or the all day at office?
I mean you been told you this has happened.
Speaker 3 (18:31):
What do you do next? It definitely would be like
that that because even in something as catastrophic happens like that, right,
it's all hands on deck. My point being that that
is a time you actually the most critical thing is
to solve it. Who did it, why he did it,
and most of where did they come from? How did
(18:53):
this gap happen? That's also very important to investigate how
did they get here? Even if they had support, who
supported them? All these required a lot of investigations. So
first thing is you, like anybody would assume, I'm not
giving some national secrets here, you activate all your sources
and the thing is a sources also, everybody knows this
(19:15):
is a high priority, just like you know red zone. Now,
so there's a let's say, for you know better understanding,
you have ten tasks, you would have a some marked
with red dots, green, yellow, that priority vice right, so
everything else goes back. You just get focused. What it
does is that in your team, if you have ten people,
(19:37):
two people are on one investigations, two are handling something else.
You say a bit through a whole everything right, come back,
get into the ops room. Let us all sit together
and focus on this for until the time we get
to the base of this that happens. Then a lot
of coordination happens. Actually, what happens in the intelligence community
(19:57):
is the bane of this community that people don't share
in you would know as anybody else. And this is
not limited to India, this across the world. Agencies are
very territorial about their information source says even operations. So
till the time it matures and you actually successfully do it,
people don't share it. So they would give a random
NT today I came to know like this would be
(20:20):
great in conference happening and say, I know there's a
guy called they who's driving very fast. This is nothing,
so that kind of thing. So people don't share good information.
But it's how it is. There is no answer to that.
But that is the time people let go of this.
They come to table and everybody shares, actually shares a lot.
(20:40):
We have this, what do you have? We have this?
And somehow dots tend to join, which at the end
the you know, the everything goes to Pakistan and there
are different channels coming and now everything is coming to Pelgam.
So let's say it's a kind of a situation where
a lot of lines diverged and then they concentrated again
on Pelgam. A lot of people would have info a
(21:02):
lot of these lines. If you start connecting them to shape,
starts to emerge. Right then you figure out then the
best thing that you do is you ask who has
the best who's most well positioned in that zone where
you know the ground zero. Let's say it isn't Jummu,
for example, so I would say, yeah, we know a
(21:24):
lot of guys there, because let's say if it isn't
somewhere in Delhi, so I w would say we know
a lot of people. So that kind of then then
they take the lead on it, and then they start
investigating and on the ops room, those inputs are shared.
This is how This is more or less how they
show in movies and a pretty normal common sense kind
of input. Then you start collating whatever you so you
(21:49):
have input coming in from all sources, but you have
your base information with you. You start creating a picture
at your own end, and that again it's it's a
reputative process. You keep improving on what you have to
arrive at analysis and I'll again go back. Information does
not matter. Intelligence is the first step. Intelligence is, let's say,
(22:10):
a smart analysis of information that you have.
Speaker 1 (22:13):
Right.
Speaker 3 (22:14):
What matters is actionable intelligence most importantly, and that comes
from a lot of analysis. So the day to day
job is actually turning data into actionable intelligence. In this case,
also the moment something on new input comes and it
changes the way looking at operation or trying trying to
do the investigation, you immediately submit it so that the
(22:34):
other guy who's working on it also has a new
data point which he can include in his analysis. So
that's how it works. Mostly it's a very high pressure
work because everybody's asking you, like after anything happens, you
hear the right the patrols were sent out, armies, a
(22:56):
lot of jungle bashging happening, happening, and people are all
on the play looking how do they know where to go? Actually,
that's what guys tell Fine, you can say, if the
operation has happened here, let's search the jungle around. But
there's a very rare chance they'll be sitting in the
same jungle they do the these tailors do their operation,
(23:17):
and they'll keep sitting there. So it's kind of defeats
the purpose. And hence for that they go back to
the inky sky. Where should we start the search? What
is the last input you have? Something is always there.
We just said to shift through those thousands of data
points and figure out, yeah, this is where I think,
this is the one I remember something happened, or this
(23:38):
is what I have. So even post action, when the
operations start, then also you come back to the incus
and say where do we start from? Where should we
put our pressure on, who are the people we should
talk to, How do we reach from here to there?
What is the path we should take?
Speaker 2 (23:56):
So that's that's I want to now talk about what,
in my mind is the more difficult aspect of intelligence operations,
and I think also the majority of it because what
you've talked about, right now is more of investigating something
that has happened after the fact, investigating something that has
happened after an attack, which I would presume would be
(24:16):
easier because you know the end point, you know, so
now you have to go back and retrace what you
missed earlier, where the gapsure earlier that led to this
attack in this particular part of Jamoan and Kashmir, which
I think would be sort of easier compared to launching
an operation from scratch to compared to finding something that
(24:38):
you don't even know what you're looking for. So let's
take one more hypothetical the Balacote strike, not hypothetically the
sense that had not happened. It didn't happen, there was
an operation, but hypothetical for our viewers and listeners, hypothetical
for me and for you, to the point that you
were not involved in the operation that took place. So
had happened. The government has tasked the various intelligence agencies
(25:00):
to find potential attack spots in Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir,
spots that you know, where either of the three military
arms can safely target and attack. How does an operation
like that happen? What are the different aspects involved. Is
it just you know, satellite imagery. Are the human sources involved?
Is it just called records? What would have happened to
(25:21):
find that spot on Jaba Top hill and for that
report to be sent to the higher UPSKI This is
one of the locations that we think you could be
attacked where x number of people X number of terrorists
we believe are training stuff like that.
Speaker 3 (25:35):
Great. So firstly, there are two aspects to this. Let's
say if commander came to them, I, director, we're planning
this chief for them. You know this, especially because you
mentioned Bala, it has a lot of air intelligence, does
not a pure you know, gunfight kind of a situation. Hence,
(25:57):
a line will be there, sorry, a line will be
there where are inputs are handed over to air intelligence
and they plan ahead because a strike we don't know
how they operate right their dog whites, their LGBs, their
range and all that. The part that the Army would
handle is we mora l less always have the am
I Direct Rate, which is manned by some of the
(26:20):
sharpest people in the direct rate. So the postings are
sometimes you're in field, sometimes you come back to army headquarters.
So they we maintained data. It's been like Pakistan is
there for last so many decades. We also know inch
by inch a lot of stuff. And as terrorists keep
getting interrogated killed, the information that comes from the documents
(26:44):
or people we interrogate, or people who spill our sources
and all. So you more or less have an idea
where these centers are training centers. What is critical piece
of information is if you want to launch this attack. Right,
So in nineties, when just a quick background in nineties
(27:04):
on you know everything, Benezebutto, she wanted to start these
terrorist organizations and her foreign minister who was an ex general,
they started with al Qaeda and all that and Taliban
and they'd create a lot of training centers across the
Pakistan Afghanistan border, both sides, right, So that was open
(27:27):
information kind of thing because they used to behave like
this is so like you start schools, colleges, universities. They
started these very organized training camps. It was a known thing.
Those are like stage one where people are getting trained.
From there, they come to a stage two where they
camp and stay for some time before they are ready
(27:49):
to be lost into India. This would be let's say
in more interior of Pakistan where all these are staying
under their leader and he's training them everything, radicalizing them
even more. All that these things happen and then they
come to launch pads where you're just waiting when do
you cross over? So it's like immediate notice kind of
(28:10):
a thing. They can be many stages to This is
not sacroocent, but more or less these are the phases right.
So the data is available, but as I said, the
critical input is you would want to cause maximum damage.
So where do you have maximum numbers available at what time?
This is part of the army part of it that
(28:30):
we can give them input. So you talk to your
sources across you talk to your sources this side that
we want to figure out when do you have maximum
people moving towards launch pad at which center? That is
what you're looking for. Plus they should be there for
some time. That's very critical. I mean, because you know
(28:52):
the aim is air rate. Now the Air Force guys
might say, I don't know. They can have ten reasons
for not to do that. Yes, you could have hostile
air space in Pakistan. They might be carrying out their exercise.
Timing might not be right, so you can't actually, I
personally can't tell what Air Force would reply. So you
(29:14):
want to have a you know, a certain time frame
in which you can do it. And in that timeframe
those people should be there, whether it's a week, ten
days to two days there. So that is what the
pointers you're looking for. Once you get to know through
all your sources possible, you share that with the Air
Force and actually leave it to them. That's the job.
(29:38):
But another thing is once that has happened, you do
keep your sources active. You know, the the quantum of damage,
the impact, what did the leaders behind, What did tanjims
are saying, or do terrorist leaders are saying or did
they impact them? What did the government saying? What is
the internal gossip? So all those kinds, So all these
things are very important. There part of you know, functioning
(30:00):
on operation like this from planning to the result. As
in review of the impact, you have to come back
with that we did this, this is what it has achieved.
It is also part of your duty. And if it
was let's say something totally from the scratch. So we're
talking about some basis that we already know right then
(30:22):
you task only the tasking differs that in that area
what are we looking for? Then maybe the Air Force
gives you a first pariety that we want to target
the area. Do you have something there? Hence, that is
how it changes. It's just the tasking, but the sources
and the there is satellite imaging. Nowadays, it's like it's
a whole different world. You can track everything and see everything.
(30:45):
Back in the day when it was so that was
a little bit more challenging. People had to go physically
and click cameras there used to be. When internet came,
we did so. I was specialized in this social thing.
Yes that we had to talk a lot on chat
Yahoo Chat and in for turn data into intelligence. A
(31:09):
lot of all agencies were doing it is I was
doing in India, we were doing there. Whole of the
world was doing it. You try and make sense of things.
Say I'm talking to you, and you say, I'm acting
like a young pretty girl and you are talking to
me and very nice all that, and then you say,
I say, I really want to come and visit you,
(31:29):
but I'm scared keep you must be living in some
remote village and all. So no, no, no, I have
a full fledged road in front of my house. My
government just built a new bridge. We are accessible. There,
you have a point you turn it into and key,
okay new. So this is pre satellite imaging and Google maps,
where where you say okay, a new bridge built on
(31:51):
this road, that single piece of information is very critical
for your entire military operations in that area, for armored
troops to move, for infant to plan, or ultimately to
break that bridge if they want to, or air force
to break over. So this is how it was a
very tedious, slow process. But within these things you would
always find a gem you could actually pick up and
(32:13):
turn it into a good intelligence input. But now that
all that is, it's not that it has gone away.
The value of human intelligence will never go away, yes,
because because it is worth its value in gold. However,
this sat imaging, Google map, it's a two way thing, right.
If we can see, they can also see, and in
(32:35):
that you are as exposed as they are. So now
you have not only you have to think like that
that it's not a happy situation. Actually that at least
from an ind guy's perspective. And tell you we just
hate exposure of any kind. So while we can celebrate
that we can see more into the enemy space, but
we just hate when we get also because of the
(32:57):
same technology, so you have to now start balancing it
out somehow. So there is sad satellite, and there is electronic,
and there's human and oskull you know, there's people use
it on rumorant rumint That's really funny actually, because the
thing is, how can you use two words in the
same thing. If it's a rumor, it's a rumor, right,
(33:18):
And if it's intelligence, it is Intellience is very fight
solid rock solid thing, intelligence, hamiary pass. The other thing
is a rumor. So rumant is kind of an oxymoronic thing.
I don't know how many people like it, but personally
I don't. So all these things get to it. So
just to rumorant is like people try to gauge the
(33:39):
mood of gossip. Okay, okay, key article rumors, a part
of the tech is done, that's not that's just a rumor.
Actually that's gossip. That's you can't associate into work with, right.
So but I don't know. It's a fancy of fancy
corporate where people keep coming up to terms, so they
do that. But the solid thing is human, satellite, electronic,
(34:04):
All these things you depend a lot on them. The
phones made a big change in it tower. So we
I mean, as you see every in every investigation nowadays,
key called crime patrol makes seconds to a year. There's
not even need to look further, but yes, we all
(34:25):
it's very many years back. The triangulation method was actually
used by signal so that was signal intelligence. So all
these things help in creating a scenario, a picture, a perspective,
something that the operational forces can work on. So all
these inputs are sent to coming back to the original
(34:47):
question that you ask, all the field commanders would send
all these inputs whatever they can gather, whatever they had,
whatever they can gather in that time frame, back to
the mill am I direct it in army headquarters. The
officers there would turn that into a single picture, turn
that into a crisp note. Actually, this is the place
(35:10):
you have to go. This is the time frame you have.
These are the best timings because if you don't give
the time all these terrorists could be out training or something,
or you've just gone for a bath or walk around
the jungle or something like that. You have to have
them there. So all these are the part of that
information that you pass it on to air force ormod
and they take on after that, the Air Force guys,
(35:34):
the flyboys, whatever.
Speaker 2 (35:35):
They want to do after that, their right and that,
like you said, I think that what you just said
right now that I think is perhaps the most crucial
aspect of the world of intelligence, the analysis part.
Speaker 3 (35:46):
Of it, and that's where I want to focus a bit.
Speaker 2 (35:50):
And also, like I said, talk a bit about your tenure,
am I, the decade that you've served anywhere in the army.
Speaker 3 (35:57):
But after a quick.
Speaker 1 (35:57):
Break, do you sometimes get frustrated choosing what to eat
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(36:17):
Health Wealth will be doing a special podcast on World
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(36:37):
Spotify and other audio streaming platforms.
Speaker 3 (36:46):
Macha.
Speaker 2 (36:47):
Before break, you know, we've talked about what if your
high hypothetical, so you told us about what a crisis
situation in again, second, am I, would be when something
like what happened in Pelgram, a couple of you or
days ago happens. I want to sort of drawn out
from your experience of being an mi I for a decade,
And of course you can't tell us specific missions that
(37:07):
you're part of, specific things that you may or may
not have done, but rather what a day for you
would look like. And from that, what I want to
understand is what is operating in intelligence, specifically in Jump
and Kashmir. Actually, Like when we went on the break,
(37:32):
I said that I think, apart from gathering the intelligence,
analyzing it perhaps is one of the biggest and most
challenging tasks. And the reason I kind of also relate
with it is because in journalism as well, where I
work on the desk.
Speaker 3 (37:46):
So for me, our.
Speaker 2 (37:48):
Primary job for people who work on the desk in
any media media house is you get bombarded with lots
of information from your different sources. You have your own reporters,
you have social media, you have other publications. So you
have all this information with you when you're supposed to
sign sort of sift through it and find that headline.
And now for us, it is at headline that will
(38:09):
click and when I say click, it is that that
will get us the most number of viewers that will
get us the most number of readers. I can sort
of picture that with you as well when you were
talking about what it's like in being intelligence, because I
think that's sort of what you're doing as well. That's
shifting to information and finding that point that will click
for you. Click means getting that pinpoint accurate information that
(38:30):
you know would help you find that particular person that
you're looking for, just one example. So, yeah, tell us
what a day of typical day for you would be
like when you were in an emilitan intelligence and yes,
especially what is it like being in this field, especially in.
Speaker 3 (38:45):
So you rightly differentiated. There's a piece so peace time
soldiering and then there's a field right, peace time soldiering.
You are very focused on your counterit tilted and stoles
because you're not, you know, terrace. You're hunting around. So
for the priority becomes that who's floating around together our information? Right,
(39:06):
who's trying to take pictures? Who's trying to send data?
Now there's the last couple of decades there have been
the cyber angle to it, so you have to scan
with your resources available, you scan that also, you try
and take Obviously you have source friends in place, or
sources here and there, somebody coming in who's suspicious and
(39:26):
staying around Kent or doing something. You try and gather
that you meet with your team. You decide a day
to day think like a morning briefing kind of a thing.
Today we will do this, you will go there, we
take a update on where where are we on. It's
like office. So but the not that the stakes are
any lesser because but then everybody moves out. You do
(39:49):
your thing, and but the summary has to be logged
every day. That's the thing. Whatever you do, logging is
the most important thing. So anybody who whose averse to
paperwork will not do good in intelligence. You have to
write a lot. You have to read a lot. Because
(40:09):
I came to know I don't I have a suspicion
on you. Today. I came to know you live in
X society. Okay, great, I came to know this input
I went and checked some surveillance. But then I allies
you took a car and went to some other society,
and then I somehow figured out spoken and then that
(40:29):
your actual house is there. That was your maybe in
law's house, right, So yes, that data has to go
in that very day with what do I make out
of it that if this guy is giving impression of
that he stays there actually, but what is the reason?
What could be the possible reason? And then you list
out this is what I suspect him from, this is
(40:50):
what he's showcasing, and this is what it would mean.
So I'm going to follow these four aspects of his
activities and figure out where he is moving most maybe
take a month or two when you figure out, okay,
he is actually a car thief, so that is right.
So then once your path is a little accurate, then
(41:10):
you start viewing that person or that suspect in that mode.
And once you've reached a place where you've said, yes,
this is what it is, then you prepare a case
and submit to you higher authorities and that means the
commander of the formation or the senior in your intelligence chain,
and they decide what is to be done with that.
So they come back to you, let's build it some more,
(41:32):
or they say, okay, good, this is a case we
share with desidency or for this operation or with police
or something like that. So that's what a day to
day work looks like. It's all about gathering inputs, turning
them into reports, and writing your analysis, logging data. That's
like any office, any regular office, but when you're in field,
(41:56):
it means no office hours because you're dealing with obviously,
you can't imagine office in terrorism, right or office work
or there. You're spending a lot of time outside. A
very critical differentiator between regular forces and int is we
don't move around with a lot of people, right. That's
(42:17):
a big risk also, but that's a necessity. I can't
like if an officer is moving from place A to B,
there's only a small convoy. They move around with their
q AT, a quick quick reaction team or their subordinates
and at least fifteen twenty people will always move in
a team. That Those are the requirements of field. Everybody
(42:39):
knows that. But when ain't guys move out there actually
mostly alone, totally alone on a bike or a car
or switch source or two of you just hanging around
here and there. It's a very high risk stop that way,
and we have had some really phenomenal legends in AM.
I it's very sad their operations will never come out,
but genuinely devils. I can't even begin to tell you
(43:03):
that admiration I have for these people. There are a couple
of these officers who have done fantastic operations. Actually this
is not that's the thing the social media, the Bollywood,
the people who tend to write, they inflate the story
so much for sensationalism. These are guys who've actually done
(43:26):
that right and again they'll never come and speak about
the operations. So I worked with them. I've learned from them,
I've done operations with them, and it gives you a
sense of you know, humble le that you know there
these are the legends of intelligence world and how humble
they are actually about everything. So that is what I
(43:49):
was very lucky to work with these guys that did
great operations and you tend to copy them that you know,
I should also work like that. So in field they
would meet with the sources. The source say is that
there is something which is on top of that mountain,
right you will go. There is never a This is
what Indian Army is known for. We barely brush off
(44:11):
our input. Every day, millions of soldiers are walking out
on just a hint of information. Some villagers who come
and say I heard there are five guys terrists who
were in that jeneral. Great, let's go. We'll have hundreds
of soldiers marching around all directions. We don't brush off inputs,
so you find somebody there are not It's a different thing,
(44:35):
but I'm very glad that this camaraderie or this coordination
between the military intelligence and the operational forces exists an
army where generally nobody brushes off input. They are always
ready to do that operation, and hence it becomes moral
responsibility of the I guys also to actually work up
(44:57):
to a level where the operation is successful. That's you
know that, it's a two way kind of thing. So
you spend a lot of time chasing around information, even
if sometimes you're out for days, staying here, staying there
actually very highest job that way, especially in feed you're
I mean, you are just taking him on a facial
(45:17):
This is a source who said you can stay at
this or that hotel. So keep working on that, and
then you can come back again to your bread and
butter writing, report writing, analysis, and then you turn it
into a report and share it with your bosses and
then they decide what is to be done.
Speaker 2 (45:34):
Yeah, can you tell us that analysis part of it?
When you have so much information in front of you.
Is there a process through which you kind of, you know,
build that strand or build that thread that makes sort
of a coherent narrative from all that that is there
in front of he Or is it as simple as
(45:55):
like you just said, is reading reading reading and then
falling back on your training and your instinct kind of
you getting a darrative out of it.
Speaker 3 (46:01):
It's a lot of gut feeling and experience trains you
for it. So it's all about this. Both you and
I could join am I. We could pass that probation
or boss might feel do not bring them in. But
the thing is I could still be a huge failure
and you could actually be aware and by failure and
means my analysis is bad, right, but your analysis spot
(46:27):
on and that only comes from aptitude. You just cannot
lease that just there is no training available to that.
For that. You have to have that mind. Either you
are able to see through or you're not. I can
tell you can send four four guys to a shop,
four different intelligence operators to a shop, and that shop guy,
(46:48):
that shopkeeper is selling drugs underhand. Maybe none of them
will be able to figure out by his behavior talking
he will not expose to them that, but there will
be one guy who will figure out he does that,
he'll make a deal also, he will buy also, he'll
get approve also, and he'll come back with the operation.
So that is very in built. And that comes from
(47:12):
having a knack of faith in your gut, feeling of
faith in your instincts. And lastly, I would again say
absorption of information. If you talk a lot and you're
not open to listening, you're not open to observation, you
will miss out a lot. You have to be very
sharp in understanding what he's saying, what does it mean.
(47:34):
The CPU has to work very fast. If he's saying
that I gave the shopkeeper, he would say that to everybody.
Are you able to take it ahead? Are you able
to take it to a conversation where he says, That's
where the difference comes. We don't use force. We are.
(47:55):
I mean that's actually a If you have to beat
somebody to get information, you're not a great professional, to
be honest, because the thing is when you when I'm
beating you and break somebody's finger or kneecap, the pain
is enormous. Nobody can survive that pain. You can do
it for a couple of hours maybe, but once it
gets to extreme, nobody can survive. You will say something
(48:17):
to save yourself. You will say he will know that
it will take three days for these guys to go,
and at least till that time, I'm out of pain.
So the strength of an interrogator, which is also part
am task, is to be sharp enough to have carry
out good investigations and interrogations. And I don't believe too
(48:39):
much in beating up. I mean some I don't know.
There are stories which I have never been part of
such things. But you have to be skilled. Actually, that
skill comes from practice, and by practice you get experience,
and you get a lot of experience by making bad
decisions good decisions. So figure out over a while that
(49:01):
what is lacking in me? I thought these guys are
like this, but it turned out they weren't. Where did
I analyze it wrong? What part of this guy's personality
did I pick up which made me think he's like that?
But so it's a continuous self improvement. Also, right, everybody
you're making I'll give you a small how to process
(49:21):
information and your listeners would actually use that in real life. Also,
whenever somebody tells you something, there are two parameters to
judge that who is telling it and what is he telling?
If Dave Tomorrow tells me last week when I was
in Japan, I jumped from a satellite, Like what the
possibility in this is they could have been in Japan.
(49:44):
The possibility that you took us skydive from satellite is impossible.
That's how fine. I'm speaking in extremes, but you get
my part right. You downgrade the information that this information
cannot be tested. Second, I meet somebody who has I
know for a fact that he he has never traveled
outside India. He says the same thing. So not only
that source is untrustworthy that information, so he is like
(50:07):
downgraded to D four. He's like totally finished. So whenever
you get in foot and puts you alphanumeric, immediately quote
them in your mind that this is a one, this
is a three, this B four. This That helps you
process the information in your mind faster. That helps you
put pointers key. These are the good points. I should
(50:27):
work on them. So, uh, you are able, you get
used to it, and you are able to not store
useless data in your mind. Was happier delet but focus
on that one thing that he will say that will
make your day. That is critical. You can be sitting
with somebody of five hours. He will not tell you
anything important. A third person listening might think it's very important.
(50:53):
Know you what you are looking for might just be
like a half hour sentence and that is a one
so you converse for that. You hang around. A lot
of work is just hanging around. It's a very boring
job that way. You're sitting there just just observing things
because you're looking for a When they say there is
(51:16):
movement around, what does it actually imply? Actually, if you
think of it, what does it mean there is movement
around that some people are moving around? How do you
judge that? That means a lot of surveillance hours and
days and you know, shift after shift to keep so
you keep shitting, looking, keep sitting and looking. Is there
something that is worthwhile? So it's as I said, slow,
(51:37):
tedious and sometimes gets boring because you're just sitting there
doing nothing. So but your mind is always on. You're
looking for that little bit of observation or information or
discussion that can help you turn that into something which
you can present to the headquarters that I thought, I
think this is happening. You should have a look at it.
Speaker 2 (52:00):
Right A slight tangent. I thought of when you were
just talking, Uh, are you talking about being out in
the field and how at times it could be very unsafe.
How often was it that you had a side down
with you when you went out in the field.
Speaker 3 (52:12):
Always, always, Yeah, you can't be without. That's the minimum
you should be had. But but the reason I asked
that is key at times. Wouldn't that also be like,
you know, that could be.
Speaker 2 (52:23):
A giveaway if, like you know, someone sees you.
Speaker 3 (52:26):
Don't carry it open. I mean, obviously I won't get
into details of but yes, you are very right in saying,
this is not like a policing job. Uh, this's not
like even so people tend to carry side arms and
they would lift their shirt around it, and so I'm
carrying by logan, we're not there. That's not a requirement.
(52:49):
We want to be as as invisible as possible. Like
the greatest place in a bar is to sit behind
a pillar and look at everyone. That's the greatest place
sit and drink. It's like that you just don't know
anybody looking at you. So to merge with the crowd
to be achieved. That invisibility actually takes effort. I won't
(53:10):
say a lot of but it actually takes some thinking
and effort. You're at a bust end. You anyway look
different from the locals. Let's say physical appearance. How do
you do that that I merge in the crowd, but
nobody looks at me because you look physically so different.
So these are the things you work on. These are
(53:31):
the things you would work on. How do I address?
Speaker 1 (53:32):
So?
Speaker 3 (53:32):
Where do I? How do I behave? You know? A
small thing can give you away, A small thing will
make everybody understand this guy is not from here. So
those are the things you work on, practice, practice, learn
every day improve your work. So it's an endless process, right,
I think we und the episode there.
Speaker 2 (53:51):
Thank you so much for being on this episode. A
great chat with you, and honestly lots to learn and
lots to sort of unpack from what you what you've
hold us called me because this was the intent as well.
I wanted to understand from you what that world of
intelligence is all about?
Speaker 3 (54:08):
Uh, and you give me lots to think about it.
Thank you so much.
Speaker 2 (54:13):
Thanks, it's great having you, and thanks as always to
our listeners and viewers.
Speaker 3 (54:17):
That's it for the Defense stores.
Speaker 2 (54:18):
For more, tune in next week till they stay safe
and not cross any boundaries to the passport. Okay, kab
(54:48):
arch the radio, Apple podcast, Spotify audio platform, it but
about can
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