INS Aridhaman coming soon: Inside India's Secret Nuclear Submarine Project | S3 | Ep 32

India is set to commission its third -- and most powerful -- nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, the INS Aridhaman (codename: S4). But this isn't just another ship joining the fleet, it marks a critical tipping point in India's national security architecture.

INS Aridhaman is the most complex and devastating weapon to exist in India's weapons arsenal.

In this episode of In Our Defence, host Dev Goswami and defence expert Sandeep Unnithan decode the secrecy shrouding the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project. They explain the "Rule of Three" (why you need three subs to keep one at sea), the massive upgrade in firepower with the K-4 missiles, and how a memo during the 1960s kickstarted India's quest for nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.

Key discussion points:

The Upgrade: Why Aridhaman is bigger, deadlier, and carries double the missiles of INS Arihant.

The Range War: How the K-4 missile (3,500km) finally allows Indian subs to target threats without leaving the safety of home waters.

The History: PN Haksar memo and the birth of the Indian nuclear submarine program.

The Command: Who actually presses the red button? (Hint: It's not the Navy Chief).

Tune in for a deep dive into the "Silent Service" that protects India from the deep.

Produced by Taniya Dutta

Sound mixed by Aman Pal

Episode Transcript

Speaker 1 (00:00):
This is India Today Podcasts.

Speaker 2 (00:05):
Welcome to Season three of Another Defense, the podcast that
takes you inside the world of conflict. I'm your host,
Deve Goswami, and every week I sit down with experts
and retired officers from the Army, Navy and Air Force
to decode all things to do with India security and
explore what it truly means to serve. Get ready for

(00:27):
stories of strategy, sacrifice and strength.

Speaker 1 (00:32):
This is in our Defense.

Speaker 2 (00:36):
Welcome to Another Defense. I'm very, very excited about the
topic that we're going to discuss on this episode. It's
one where I get to pick my guest sand Punin's
brains on a topic, on a subject rather on which
he's known in the country to be the go to expert,
and that is submarines, especially nuclear submodies. So if you

(00:58):
ask some he thinks there's only one kind of somebodies.
Those are nuclear submaries. There are no other kind of
summarines everything else. These are powered electric whatever. It's for him,
a submersivil without any offense to his friends in the Navy,
right something.

Speaker 3 (01:10):
Absolutely absolutely we nailed it.

Speaker 2 (01:14):
We've talked about nuclear submaries previously, nuclear powered attack somebodies.
The yesess sense that the need be uh trimmed not
tremped is the wrong word, but considering they haven't tried
dreaming is perhaps the right word. But the Navy thought
of having around two decades ago. Uh, the plan was
that it set the ball rolling for that, but never
seen the light of detail today. Even now, the deal

(01:35):
that was supposed to be signed signed between Moscow Dogs
Limited and the German Group has not yet conventional boats.
Yeah sorry, Sorryry, I got confusion that that those were
those those are different, those are different. The same project
is is on track, but hasn't really seen the like.

Speaker 3 (01:51):
It's going to take a more years. Yeah uh.

Speaker 2 (01:53):
And which is why it's very crucial for our listeners
and viewers for to refer to that episode because it
will give you some good background to what we're about
discussed on this episode. This is the ballistic Submary is
the nuclear power ballistic submanies basically submarines that are capable
and able to carry nuclear tip to missiles uh and
basically stay out at sea.

Speaker 3 (02:13):
And ballistic missile submaries.

Speaker 2 (02:15):
Yeah.

Speaker 3 (02:15):
Uh.

Speaker 2 (02:16):
The crucial part about the submarines, uh, just the short
grass course for our for our listeners of viewers, is
that this gives you guaranteed second strikeability because these summaries
are extremely difficult to track and you can it's a
given that once out at sea, people will not know
where they are, right they can just like you know,

(02:37):
slumber around and underwater and then launch their missiles when
ordered to h which is very crucial, especially for a
country like India with the stated no first use policy,
with the policy that says that if somebody fires at us,
we will wreck havoc to that particular nation, and for
that you need this ability. Why are we talking about
this though? The Navy chief in his annual press conference

(02:57):
held just yesterday said that the word Indian made nuclear
power ballistic missile submarine Aridman will be commissioned very soon.
It will probably be in a few months. This is
after as Arikat which was commissioned last year late twenty
twenty four UH and Arihant, the main boat of this class,
which was commission in twenty sixteen after being launched in

(03:19):
two thousand and nine under the UPA government. We've kind
of talked about the difference from the nuclear powered attack SMRIE,
which is basically like you see, like you've said in
the previous episode, it's a fighter jet of sorts. It's
the one that can stay underwater very long, it moves
very fast, carries usually conventional missiles, and is basically a
fighting arm of the navy, while the Bulliet is part

(03:41):
of the conventional navy. Maybe, yeah, while this is a
strategic acid that you have which is used primary launch
nuclear and is part of the strategic states exactly. So
before we talk about the programs and the very innocuous name,
by the way, advanced technologically technology vessel. It's a very
safe sounding. I think there's a reason for that. Yeah,

(04:02):
we'll talk to that. Yeah, So before we talk about
the project, its inception, and its history, I want to
talk about the significance of in the first place, third
in our in our itally and some with reference to
two things. One something that came up in my research,
the term that is known as CSD continuous actial deterrent.
This is something that is practiced by the US and

(04:23):
the UK navies. In fact, the Royal Navy is supposed
to have had one nuclear submarine out at sea in
the last six decades. Yeah, at least one. The patrol
is basically twenty four to seven three sixty five days.
So essentially both the countries have one nuclear submarine out
at sea at all times. No matter what, this actually
gives you the guaranteed seconds ability. So what how many

(04:46):
summaries do you need to get this ability? Where? Where
is India right now? That's point number one. Point number
two is the significance of the Navy chief actually talking
about it, because apart from ins Arihant, which was obviously
a grand thing, a grand development that you made, so
you wanted to tell the world that you have this ability,
apart from Arihant, you haven't talked about nuclear submarines at all.

(05:08):
In fact, Arikat was launched very quietly. There was just
one ceremony where Raja saying commission the submarine, but not
a single photo of Arika, by the way, and even
had itself in the official photos is two or three
including one just two photograph two official including one where
God or the wife of form the then PM one
more saying cracked a coconut on the hull of the submarine.

(05:30):
And even that photo is not full, by the way,
you don't see the entire submarine, so secretive. But here
you have a Navy chief talking about the submarine at
a press conference, talking about before its commissioned significance of
that and yes, the significance of us getting a third
nuclear blak.

Speaker 4 (05:45):
Right, Well, they've the uh Ari Daman is the most
powerful combatant that India has ever built. It's a seven
thousand ton ballistic missile submarine, which means it is places
more than seven thousand tons. It carries eight SLBMs seal

(06:05):
launched ballistic missiles, and it carries as many nuclear tip
missiles as the as the Arihant and the Arigath combined.
So the Arihant has four missiles nuclear tipped. The Arigat
has four missiles nuclear tip. I'm not going into the
smaller ones, the K fifteen. I'm looking at the big ones,
the K force. The Arihan carries four K force, the

(06:28):
Arigath carries four K fours. The Aridaman carries eight K force.
So if you look at it in terms of deterrence,
it's a very big number. Because this point about deterrence
that you made c ASD continuous at sea deterrence is
something that it means that at any given point you

(06:48):
have a certain number of nuclear warheads away from the mainland.
So which means that when one of the Arihan class
submarines sails out on patrol, nobody knows where the arian
this it will be deemed that there are so many
number of x number of warheads that have sailed out
of the Indian mainland, nobody knows where they are. So

(07:10):
no adversary can launch a surprise attack against your cities
or your you know, population centers, or your military targets
because there will be an assured retaliation. And this is
part of the India's nuclear doctrine. So that is the
significance of this, and it is in terms of its displacement,
in terms of its complexity, it's the number of missiles

(07:34):
that carries. It is the most powerful weapon of war
that India has ever built.

Speaker 2 (07:40):
Right right, And the point about the navichif openly talking
about this very unusual.

Speaker 4 (07:45):
I was there at the press conference on the second
of December when he said it. It was a question
that was asked to him about the commissioning of this,
and he very you know, he took it front foot,
played it out. He said, yes, the Aridaman, it will
be commissioned very soon. And I think it's very rare
for the Navy chiefs to speak about the SSBNs of

(08:06):
the Arihant class, and I think this reflects a growing
confidence in the Indian military about our capabilities where India's
place is in the world. You mentioned that thing about
the ATV program. Why is it given such an enofuous name.
It was given an enocuous name because simply because it
was a stealth program. Right, it was a black program.

(08:29):
It was a secret program. It is something that we
wanted to keep under wraps for the longest time. You know,
this program began in the late sixties, yes, sixties seven,
and it continued through the seventies and eighties. You're living
looking at a third world country which is trying to
develop its own nuclear weapons program, and also platforms like aircraft,

(08:54):
ballistic missile, ballistic missiles like the Agney series and the
Arianth class cuclear submarines. Now, we wanted to make sure
that these were all kept under wraps because the minute
you announced that you have a ballistic missile submarine program,
that very clearly tells the rest of the world that
you have a nuclear weapons program as well. Let's not

(09:17):
forget the fact that in the seventies our bombs were
in the basement. We never brought them out. We never
told anyone that we had intentions of becoming a nuclear
weapons state. So precisely for this reason is why the
ATV nomenclature was coined. It was so inoquous, nobody would
even imagine advanced technology vessel. It could be anything, right,

(09:39):
And if you go back into history, the Manhattan Project,
for instance, it was named by General Leslie Groves. And
if for those of you watched Oppenheimer, that's the character
that's played by Matt Damon, and he gave the program
a name called the Manhattan Project because his unit was
in the Manhattan district. So it was and alquose names

(10:01):
like this. Militive, very very high technology strategic programs are
usually couched in these kinds of you know, nomenclature. A.
You don't even reveal the existence of it. There's very
little documentation of it that's kept. And you make the
program sound as harmless as possible, as routine, mundane every

(10:23):
day something like. So one of the scientists was telling
me that, you know, we made a mistake when we
released a picture of a missile called the Sagarika, And
this is the dawn of the Internet. Everybody went ballistic,
literally because that was the first acknowledgement that we had
a ballistic missile program and a SELBM program.

Speaker 3 (10:38):
They had a.

Speaker 4 (10:39):
Picture of the launcher and so they had to keep
changing the name of the program and the missiles. And
because you know, what happens is that it's like a magnet, right,
You put a magnet out there and then it attracts attention.
The entire Indian nuclear weapons program is about stealth, keeping
things below the radar. You know, very little documentation of

(10:59):
that for a reason, because we are operating in an
environment of very high technology denial regimes. A minute, they
know that you have a bailistic missile submarine program, then
they will try and curtail technologies. They'll say, let's not
give them this because they're trying to develop.

Speaker 3 (11:15):
This, you know.

Speaker 4 (11:16):
So that's how the world is a very cruel world.
And you know, even countries that pretend to be your
technology partners and all that, they'll give you all these nominations,
strategic partnerships and all that. All the other countries except
the Russian Federation is they're the ones who will not
give you anything. They will not even sell you, you know,
machines CNC machines will not be sold to you because

(11:38):
they suspect, oh, this is going to be used for
your strategic program. So that's how our program has kind
of you know, been in stelled.

Speaker 2 (11:45):
In fact, Russian help was crucial for this program to
the extent to the extent of intel learning or developing
the ability of miniaturizing the nuclear reactory yet, which is
something I think some people get to as we now
get to the inception of this program and how it's
progressed over the years. No matter what I do, this

(12:05):
one name comes up in my research when I talk
about nuclear submarines. That's p and Huksar and a famous
memo that he wrote that sort of build the foundations
of what's to be how India sees its nuclear weapons,
how India develops its nuclear weapons. And it will be
very surprising. It was very surprising for me when I
first read it, and it will be very surprising to

(12:27):
people who haven't that this clarity of thought that for
India to be a true nuclear weapons power, you would
always always need a nuclear powered ballistic missile. Somebody was
there back then in the sixties, So who was this
gentleman p and Huckster, what was this memoir all about?
Tell us about this memoi, the exception of this program

(12:48):
and how it's progressed over the years.

Speaker 4 (12:50):
So I'm glad you brought that up, because you know,
Huksar is a far sighted man, visionary and IFS officer.
He was very close to Missus Gandhi. He was it
was like a Quasai national security advisor to Missus Gandhi.
And in the late sixties is when he's drafted this
and we know it thanks to some declassified documents a
few years back, which you know, just to cut the

(13:14):
long story short, the Huksar memo actually puts out the
fact that this comes out of just three years after
China has tested the bomb, and China tested the bomb
just two years after this nineteen sixty two war with India.
And we've gone over this in previous episodes of your
program where we've discussed why India had to go nuclear

(13:36):
because of the Chinese threat that you were faced with
a country on your borders, a hostile country that had
tested nuclear weapons. Huckster puts it down in that memo
of his, which is our version of the Long Telegram
George Cannon's long Telegram that he wrote to the United
States at the start of the so called Cold War,
and Huckster very clearly identifies the fact that we need

(13:59):
to have a nuclear triad if we are to counter China,
and that is a troika of land, sea, and air
based weapons. So we, of course, as we tested in
Pokrun and then of course uh pok Run two, we
got the air air vectors and the land based missiles

(14:20):
the Ugne series.

Speaker 3 (14:21):
The sea based.

Speaker 4 (14:22):
Deterrent which is the Ariihan class was the most complex
one because, as you know, there's just five countries in
the world have mastered the technology of a nuclear powered submarine,
which is a basically a nuclear reactor, a compact nuclear
reactor which can fit into the hull of a submarine.

(14:43):
It's about a ten diameter a hull a little bigger
than a you know, a one storied building. You have
to compact a reactor that will fit in that environment,
and it has to be you know, ruggedized, marinized. It
has to withstand all kinds of shocks. So to do
something like that, only five countries have done it. And
the last country before India's leap with the ins Arihant

(15:09):
in two thousand and nine, and then of course twenty
sixteen was the PLA the China and they, yeah, the
PLA Navy launched the submarine in the early nineteen seventy
seventy two, if I recall correctly, the Long March is
what they launched then. And since then there has been
complete silence for almost half a century until India starts

(15:31):
entering the party.

Speaker 3 (15:32):
You know.

Speaker 4 (15:32):
So we have one of the last countries to enter
this very exclusive club of countries that have these ballistic
missile firing submarines. And you mentioned this point of CASD
continuous at sea deterrent, that is that you need to
have a minimum number of nuclear powts submarines, a small
fleet of which one will always be out at sea

(15:55):
on CASD, which means that an adversary will not, you know, surprise,
you will not strike at you. And that number, we
believe is four. I have no access to any information
other than the numbers of submarines that are under construction.
There are four Indian submarines in the water. The third
one is Aridaman is the third and there will be

(16:15):
a fourth one after that, which is the yet unnamed
S four star, and once that comes into the water,
we will have a certain number of warheads out at
sea which can go out at see and a certain
number of platforms like SSPNS, which means that out of
these four one will be out on patrol at any
unit point, and that allows us to enhance our the

(16:40):
robustness of our second strike capability. So Huckster saw all
this in the late sixties, and in that memo of
his he mentions with very great, great clarity that till
the time, we don't threaten China with a retaliatory strike.
And he's always presuming the fact that the Chinese will
attack us first, and we need to attack them after
that a second strike. You're pretty and we need to

(17:02):
deter them from attacking us. Right, You're looking at a
young democracy that's you know, paced up against a Chinese
Communist Party dictatorship. And that was the kind of existential
threat that the political leadership of the sixties faced, and
that has been continued from the sixties. Government after government
has come. The ATV files remain with a PMO. It's

(17:25):
one of our most classified programs. Very few people are
allowed into that facility, and it was only in two
thousand and nine that we actually, for the first time
the government of India acknowledged that it had a program
like this, they launched the submarine.

Speaker 3 (17:40):
Those two photographs were released.

Speaker 4 (17:42):
I was one of those fortunate, privileged few who was
there on the dockyard when it was when the waters
were flooded and the submarine was lifted off its chalks,
and that was twenty sixth of July two thousand and nine,
and we also saw a very important admission over there
by the Prime Minister of the day. Someone moan seeing
and I was surprised because as I looked down that

(18:03):
dockyard we saw on it's a dry dock, so basically
the submarine is there in the dry dock and then
the water is filled in and the submarine then floats
up right right towards the end of the dockyard, we
saw rows and rows of Russian specialists. And these were
the guys who had helped us build it. They were
project consultants and and I remember the Prime Minister turning

(18:26):
and thanking the Russians for the assistance that they had given. So,
you know, this is a very special relationship there, and
I can't explain it. You know in words, almost it
is a relationship like no other. It's you have Indian
delegations going to the former Soviet Union and they're saying that,

(18:47):
you know, we want a Charlie class. They'll say, no, no,
take a Victor class. And these are nuclear part attacks.
These are the most These are the deadliest platforms that
are ever designed and built. And you have a very
great sense of camaraderie between the two countries from the
Soviet times, which has continued into the times of the
Russian Federation. You have President putin coming and you'll see

(19:08):
more of that. So the Russians did help us a
lot with the design aspects because they had already reached
the pinnacle of designing this kind of technology. I mean,
the Americans there are only two poles when it comes
to nuclear submarines. There is the American pole and there
is the Russian Federation, right, and the Americans give it
to their allies like the Brits. The French, of course

(19:31):
are a smaller pole, but they're on their own. They
do their own stuff. The Chinese have kind of also
learned from their own and today you know, they are
where they are. They have six plus ballistic missile submarines.
We have four of a smaller kind, and we will
have bigger ones in the twenty thirties and onwards.

Speaker 2 (19:49):
So tell me about the program as much as you can.
Like you said, it's highly classified. I'm going to compare it,
not compare it pose, but I'm going to take the
reference of the Tagus program, another high tech effort where
you developed a fighter jet, which is not very easy
thing to do. We know a lot of a lot
about stages. We know there were controversies. We know the

(20:10):
Air Force was very much against it initially then sort
of came around to it. Uh, And we know about
the delays, the infamous delays that still continued this.

Speaker 3 (20:18):
Yeah.

Speaker 2 (20:18):
Uh, we don't know a lot about the ATV project.
We don't know if there were any controversies. We don't
know if there were any delays, we don't know if
they were any tech challenges. Uh. There is something I
read online, a very vague reference. I could not actually
get time to read more about it. Maybe you must
have heard of it. There was some tiff or some

(20:39):
issue between the Department of Atomic Energy and the Indian
Navy regarding this project. So in your research that you've
done over the years. How much can you tell us
about the project itself and whether it was just all
hunky doory, smooth sailing.

Speaker 4 (20:55):
Sailing. I can assure you that it was. It's a long, complicated,
you know process. It's a big program that's run like
from the sixties now. The Huckster memo, the Huckster document
was just a statement of intent, right, it was nothing
more than a so called nuclear hawk, and yeah, I

(21:16):
want it.

Speaker 3 (21:16):
And it takes you, you.

Speaker 4 (21:18):
Know, almost half essentially to get there, right, the entire
twentieth century passes. You lay the steel for the you
cut the steel on the Inis Sarri Hunt in nineteen
ninety eight, in the year of your nuclear tests, and
that is what almost three decades after Huckster has written
that paper, and we've tested nuclear weapons, we've come out

(21:38):
of the closet, so called the closet. But the program
actually begins somewhere in the sixties, of course, with the
reactor program, and it always starts as a naval propulsion
reactor program. So it's very in of coourse. You know,
I have I want to develop a diesel engine. I
can choose to put it into a tank or I

(22:00):
can choose to put it into a passenger bus or
into some kind of an application. But it starts with
the with the engine, the reactor, and that is how
this naval propulsion reactor picks up in barc and towards
the it goes through the seventies and the eighties. In
the eighties is interestingly very it's a milestone in the
program because in nineteen eighty four you have the program

(22:22):
formerly launched, where the Soviets agreed to help us in
the program. You have in nineteen eighty one you have Ogarkov,
the defense Soviet Defense Minister who visits, and of course
you have in the background you have one of the
most influential people in the Soviet Union, who's the father
of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergery Gorshkov. It's been the

(22:43):
navy chief for almost four decades. There's been no naval
chief with that kind of a tenure. And Gorshkov is
an interesting guy because he is the Russian equivalent of
Hymen recover Admirlitary recover. He's the guy who got the
Americans their nuclear navy. I mean, he recovers a legend.
He's been again half a century plus he's headed the

(23:04):
nuclear submarine building programs of the United States. Gorshkov is
someone who loves India unqualified love and admiration, and under
his guidance and of course the larger Soviet leadership, they
decide to help India with its nuclear submarine program. Eighty
four is when it formally starts. You have the first DGATV.

(23:26):
That's when the coinage happens, with this very quiet, in
aquose program begins. It's headed by Vice Admiral Mickey Roy
Emin Roy, one of the most enigmatic naval admirals, the
most un celebrated admirals that we ever had. I've had
the honor of meeting him several occasions, and he was
the star of this book Operation X. He is a

(23:48):
naval spymaster, the ideal person to launch a nuclear power
submarine program. You know, quiet below the data. I never
told his left hand what his right hand was up to,
you know that kind of guy. Eighty four it picks
up there are as you mentioned, there were several disagreements
of the kind of propulsion to use for the reactor.
We weren't getting anywhere. But in the nineteen nineties when

(24:11):
Pokern happens, the program picks up speed. The reactor design
is finally zero in on a reactor which is about
eighty three megawatts, which corresponds to the reactor of the
Chakra one, which is a nuclear power attack submarine that
we leased from the Russian Federation from the Soviet Yunit

(24:34):
between nineteen eighty seven and nineteen ninety for about three
years now, the Chakra is an interesting attack Submarine's got
this reactor compact eighty three megawatt reactor, which we then
decide to use for the Arihanklass. So in nineteen ninety
eight darianth Is the steel cutting begins. The design is
thanks to a lot of assistance from the Russian Federation,

(24:56):
and this relationship actually picks up speed under President Putin
in two thousand and on, where there's design consultancy. So
there's a common myth that the Soviets built the submarines
for our other Russians built the submarine for No. Absolutely no,
we built the submarine ourselves. The design is a Russian
design which we then kind of adapted. We built our own.
We tinkered with the design. So if you see the

(25:18):
Arihant and the Arigat, they are of one class, the
Aridaman and the yet to be named S four Star
is called S fur So i'll tell you why it's
called the S four Star.

Speaker 3 (25:30):
It's an interesting story. These are of a separate class.

Speaker 4 (25:34):
So it's like the arianth is about six thousand tons,
the Aridaman and the sister ship are about seven thousand
tons plus, primarily because it has four more missiles, so
they've added one more section. It's a slightly bigger SSBN
and the program picks up speed in nineteen in the
two thousands, it is launched by two thousand and nine.

(25:55):
That's about nine years from the steel being cut, but
it takes years after that, so it's by the time
the submarine actually goes into a patrol it is twenty eighteen.
It's two decades. And that tells you how complex nuclear
parts submarines are. And they are incredibly complex platforms. You know,

(26:19):
they have all kinds of pipes, fittings, pressure walls, a reactor.
It's a steam ship actually, So what a nuclear part
submarine is, for the benefit of viewers, very simply, it
is a nuclear It's a controlled nuclear reaction in that
nuclear reactor which boils water to very high temperatures, creates

(26:42):
superheated steam, and that steam drives a turbine which then
drives the propeller.

Speaker 3 (26:47):
Right.

Speaker 4 (26:47):
That's as simply as I can put it. So it's
basically a steamship, right, but a very sophisticated.

Speaker 3 (26:53):
One of that.

Speaker 4 (26:53):
And that is why I call the Arihant program India's
most complex scientific technological achievement.

Speaker 3 (27:03):
Right.

Speaker 4 (27:03):
It is absolutely a breakthrough moment for our defense industrial complex.
And tragically, I think that the secrecy that we've put
this program under has kind of camouflaged a lot.

Speaker 3 (27:18):
Of our achievements.

Speaker 4 (27:19):
Where you know, there secrecy exists for a time, for
a particular purpose when you're struggling nation, when you're under
global sanctions. But once you've now arrived to a certain
you're almost acknowledged as the nuclear weapons power. You're not
part of the P five, but you can, you know,
trade in nuclear you can be part of the nuclear commerce,

(27:42):
and you can buy uranium for your react as all
of that. Because of the Civil Nuclear Deal. It is
time to come out and claim ownership of this program,
which is remarkable, the kind of breakthroughs that we've done
in this the kind of design stuff that we've done
you know, we are fully capable today. I believe this
information comes from a lot of the people who worked

(28:04):
on the program. They're fully capable of designing our own submarines,
whether it's a bigger version of the Arihant class like
the S five, which is the thirteen thy five hundred
ton submarine. And to give our viewers an idea of
how big the S five is, that these are the
bigger submarines that will join, which are under construction now,
which will be inducted in the twenty thirties. It's thirteen

(28:26):
thousand tons plus, which is almost more than double the
size of the Aria Hunt and it would be a
little smaller than our first aircraft carrier, you know, in
terms of displacement. That's how big and complex these platforms are.
So it is a phenomenal achievement. And the other great
thing about this day is that, you know, the fact
is that we've managed to bring down the indigenization or

(28:51):
the import components to this write down to almost eighty
percent in the last two boats. Right, So when you
talk about Arthmannerberg, yeah, you're just you're just importing all
about a little over twenty percent of the when you're
talking about niber Bara.

Speaker 3 (29:07):
The ATV program is art manable. From its inception.

Speaker 4 (29:11):
You assume that you're going to be up against high
technology you know, denial regimes, so you have to you know, improvise.
You have to get create that defense ecosystem within the country.
You have to look for private guys who can do it,
you know, create industries. Literally industries have sprung up around
last count there were five hundred industries who support the

(29:34):
ATV program. I mean these are you know almost it's
got an old it's got an entire ecosystem of its own.
Just the way the Maruti eight hundred was again using
that at automobile analogy, the way the Maruti eight hundred
was for India's automobile sector in the eighties. The ATV

(29:55):
the Aria hunt has been for our submarine ecosystem that
you know, the entire thing. You have companies that have
you know, built pressure walls or doing reactor UH vessels.
You have you know, companies, private sector companies are lent
that were you know, hiking pressure hulls, they were welding.
Because of their expertise in welding you know, steel, they

(30:17):
were brought in to do the pressure hulls of the
Arian Class all of those things. And you know, so
when you read this that, hey, Anilburg bar is not
a slogan now that we came up. We've always had this.
So when you're looking at high technology strategy programs like
the Arian Class, there is no way to go but Athmanilburg.
When it comes to tactical you know, platforms like say

(30:40):
fighter jets and tanks and missiles and assault trifles. Even then,
you know, you you you're a little more laid back,
so you kind of, you know, resort to imports. So
now I think the biggest thing in the government's mind
is that why can't we have more programs like the
arianth Class that can actually drive indigenous design, you know,
indigenous innovation, build up our own indigenous military industrial complex.

Speaker 2 (31:05):
A very good point about, you know, the need to
document the history of this program.

Speaker 3 (31:09):
Man.

Speaker 2 (31:09):
I think in fact, you'd be the perfect person to
write that history. So perhaps you should talk to your
friends in the navy or.

Speaker 4 (31:14):
A lot enough documents about this. It's it's a it's
a very closely guarded thing.

Speaker 2 (31:18):
What it meant was like, you know, speak to them
and convince them of the need to document this, and.

Speaker 4 (31:22):
Well I must mention there is a very interesting book
that's due out on this. There's a rear Admirals Ursan
Street contain a Nabal scholar his PhD thesis which was
on India's nuclear submarine programs is due out, uh, you
know as a book, and that is that is a
book I'm really waiting to read interest because it will

(31:42):
actually exactly what you mentioned it will have. It will
be the go to compendium for you know, a lot
of open source literature on our nuclear submarine program written
by a few people I mean like me and a
few others who like documented this. So he's put together
and it's a fantastic narrative from what I've read of it.

(32:03):
It gives a whole you know, the logic of the
SSP and why we have it and you know where
the program is headed and beautifully and analyzing.

Speaker 3 (32:12):
So that that's a book to watch out for.

Speaker 2 (32:14):
Right, we'll talk more about this part of for a
quick break.

Speaker 5 (32:17):
Let's start from Delhi. What cars did you all take?
What route did you all take? Why did you all
take it? Well, we took two, my Hindrus. I think
the best money was Yes, the best Mahindras to take
for the job, any guesses, I know, So the THAROCKX
and the Scorpio and both in the top of the

(32:39):
line automatic four by four d automatics, yeah, automatics. And
we drove from Deli, went through Chuandiger, we went to Manali,
we crossed the.

Speaker 3 (32:48):
Auto tunnel and from Anali we went straight to n
We did not drive. It wasn't very long.

Speaker 6 (32:57):
I mean, like I think, how many climators is it
four hundred?

Speaker 3 (33:00):
Yeah, that's that's significantly. Yeah.

Speaker 6 (33:04):
I mean we took that decision because I mean, most
people go to Lay for most things in Lada, but
we wanted to go to Hanley because I mean it's
just fifty kilometers from where you can reach Migla, Like
it will be easier and you know, more possible also.

Speaker 5 (33:20):
To like travel from Lay to Hanley and then travel
back on the same day.

Speaker 6 (33:28):
Yeah, I mean pushing it.

Speaker 3 (33:30):
It's pushing. I've done that road.

Speaker 1 (33:32):
I think it is.

Speaker 5 (33:33):
It's one of the most beautiful that as you exit
that that what is that wy point called the one
and two Shay After Oh yeah, at Shay you take
the Why point to and you turn towards the indust
and then that road running along the industry is beautiful,

(33:54):
truly beautiful. And then it's like beyond that point there's
a turn over.

Speaker 3 (34:02):
To Yea that goes to Pangam which which rute did
you all take? Did you all take the go to yes?

Speaker 6 (34:11):
No, So we went we crossed Bara, we went ahead
and we got to Debring. We took her right from
deboring the road that goes to so Mauriri and we
crossed Puga and then we joined that road and then
moved towards lay At all Yeah, no, no.

Speaker 3 (34:30):
So the entire thing.

Speaker 5 (34:33):
Puga, which by the way is hot Springs and there
we have we have some epic footage of it.

Speaker 2 (34:39):
We'll put it up on screen.

Speaker 5 (34:40):
It's beautiful, yaks YACs the hot springs as well.

Speaker 3 (34:45):
Those were so we reased. Hanley, welcome back.

Speaker 2 (34:53):
Before the breaks on deeper. You refer to the next
somewhere in the Spins project, that is the S Force Star.
I've always been meaning to ask you where the hell
is S one? I mean arians S two, apparently arigat
S three. The one which will get commissioned a couple
of months is S four, and the upcoming one is
AS four Star one where is one second? Why not

(35:14):
S five and y S four.

Speaker 4 (35:15):
Star is okay, good question. So S one is the
shore based reactor in Culpacam. So there is an identical
eighty three mega what shore based UH test reactor which
is in Culpacam in the DA premises, and it looks
there's just been one photograph of it released by the
DA Department of Atomic Energy, which is it looks like

(35:39):
a section of the it's the reactor compartment of the
submarine where they actually this reactor, which is the toughest
thing to get actually, because without a reactor, without a
nuclear power reactor, a submarine is is just steel, right,
It's a conventional submary submersive, right, So this is what

(35:59):
they had to perfect first. So while the Arihan design
was being worked upon and UH steel cutting had begun,
the DA the bark had already its reacted division and
had figured this S one prototype thing at Culpakam and
that was where all the testing was done, and they
perfected it and then the serial produced it. So S

(36:22):
two is Arihant S stands for submarine. So submarine one
is your shore based reactor. S two is of course
the Arihant. S three is the Arighat and S four
is the Aridaman. The two be commissioned. Now, this program
was supposed to have just three submarines. It was to

(36:44):
be terminated at Aridaman, right, they would not be an
S four start. Now, what happened is that when these
three submarines were being constructed, the strategic community, within the
political military leadership, they felt that these submarines were insufficient
in size and most importantly the missile ranges. So it's

(37:08):
all about submarines are, of course just the platform. At
the end of the day, they have a utility. They
have a strategic utility. What do they carry? They carry
the missiles? Do they carry adequate missiles to ensure a
survival second strike option? And that is when they felt
that these current three submarines were not adequate and therefore

(37:30):
they went to a new project called the S five.
So when S four that is Aridaman, was completed, they
would go on to a new number project series called
the S five, which is the submarine that I mentioned,
the thirteen five hundred ton submarine, which is larger, displaced
twice the displacement of the Aria Hunt.

Speaker 2 (37:50):
Really like the US submarine.

Speaker 3 (37:52):
Yeah, absolutely, it's exactly like the Ohist one.

Speaker 2 (37:54):
Actually, if you look the size reference, Arihans is puny compared.

Speaker 4 (37:58):
To it is what I call it one of my
pieces of baby boomer. Yeah, it's the smallest, the world's
smallest ballistic missile submarine. And I think it's, you know,
a measure of our technological capability that we did not
at that time in the nineteenth station. We didn't have
the ability to build a submarine that was bigger than

(38:20):
six or seven thousand tons. Let's not forget that. We
are a country that had built exactly two submarines, right,
and that way assembled submarines. We never designed our own submarines.
When the Aria hunt was when you cut the steel
on the Arihant in ninety eight, we had built exactly
two submarines. We had assembled two small German submarines of
about less than two thousand tons, right, So this was

(38:41):
a big leave for us. Then now we're going on
to the next level. S five and S five will
I believe have about four units exactly like the arianth class.
So when the S five started construction, the project was sanctioned,
that project got going. That is when the ARBO said, hey, listen,
we could build a fourth submarine because our yard is
going to be idle after the third submarine comes out,

(39:01):
and that is when the additional sans yes st Star. Yeah,
so that's how it came out. So so you already
you couldn't call it S five because you have a
separate line. So they said, okay, S four and after
S four there will be S four. They put an
astix on S four Star, so it's actually called the
S four Star, and that is going to be the

(39:22):
last submarine of this class.

Speaker 3 (39:23):
And then you will of.

Speaker 4 (39:24):
Course born to a and and you know, no one
knows what the S four Star is called yet. There
is a name, but it's not out in the public domain.

Speaker 2 (39:33):
Do you know it?

Speaker 3 (39:33):
I don't know.

Speaker 4 (39:35):
I'm just guessing, but if you look at it, it
has to be. It will have to begin with, it
has to be an Ari series. So for those of
you are watching there, you could probably you know, respond
in the comment combat what name is exactly that they're
all sunscript names. So it's Ari Hunt, it's Ari Dumman,
it's Ari Garth, and Ari of course means enemy enemy,

(39:57):
so it will have to be Ari something.

Speaker 2 (40:00):
So Arihan, by the way, is the destroyer of enemies.
A regard is a slaughter of enemies, is the suppressor
of enemies. So let's see what S four star will be. Yeah, right, Suddenly,
last major point on this episode before I move to
some trivia questions as well. Uh, is like you were

(40:20):
talking about the missiles because we talk about the submarine,
but that's just half the story. It's the missiles that
they carry that ensured distraction. They will also need to
be developed. They will also need some extra development because
you're not launching them from you know, not dropping them
from there. It's just quite simple. You're not launching them
from land, which you've developed and mastered because you have

(40:41):
a great rocket rocket force anyway, Uh, you're launching this
from c and these kind of sumbarines. I would I
would guess deep underwater. So they'll have to travel that
part perhaps without being detected, surface and then sort.

Speaker 3 (40:57):
Of you know it from under the water.

Speaker 2 (41:01):
No, I'm talking about the missiles. The missile we have
to surface and then go to space and come down.
So the K series tell us about the series the
missiles that we have right now, what's under development and
what is so specially happening in the Bay of Bengal
that you have four Chinese spywave vessels there. There's a
lot of chatter online about you know, what kind of
hossile is India testing and the fact that it's happening

(41:23):
off the coast of Weizag leads people to think it's
probably a summer submarine missile. Anyway, let's talk about the
case series of missiles that we have. What do we
have and what are we developing?

Speaker 4 (41:34):
So we started with the Cave fifteen, which is now
called B zero five because the name got leaked out
and it was first called the Sagarika, then it became
the Cave. Now it's called the B zero five after
one of the project director's birthdays. Interesting, it's B stands
for the name of the project director of the ATV
and zero five is his birthday, which is the fifth

(41:56):
of January. So all those people out there, you know
who it's a secret.

Speaker 3 (42:01):
I'm not going to put.

Speaker 4 (42:02):
His name out here. But the fact is that it
started as a seven to fifty kilometer range missile, a
K fifteen, and it's a very interesting missile. It's an
aeroballistic missile, which is a maneuvering ballistic missile approaching near
you know, hypersonic speed. So it's the Arihan class carries

(42:24):
are twelve of them. But the problem is that they
are short range. They're very capable missiles, but they only
seven hundred and fifty kilometers range. And if you look
at it, the rest of the world, to give you
an idea where we are in Wesa, we the rest
of the world with our SSBNs. These are the missile
ranges that we have with the ari with the K

(42:45):
four and the K five is something that the Russian
Federal with the Soviet Union and the Americans started feeling
in the nineteen sixties, so they have like a more
than a half century lead over the rest of the world.

Speaker 3 (42:58):
And indeed India.

Speaker 4 (43:00):
So we started with the K fifteen, and then we
quickly realized that, look, seven fifty is not going to
be enough, because seven to fifty will mean that you
will have to close the adversary's coast to attack any
targets of high value. And let's not forget that these
are political platforms. These are not weapons of war fighting.
These will not be deployed in any conventional attack or

(43:21):
any of those kind of things. These are purely meant
for nuclear warfighting, and we hope that day never comes.
They are essentially political tools. There are instruments of political signaling,
instruments of deterrence, instruments of planting the seed of doubt
in the adversary's mind that if I try and launch
a first strike, there will be a second strike coming

(43:44):
at me from various places from under the sea. And
that is what the Arisant class is supposed to do.

Speaker 3 (43:50):
So we moved up.

Speaker 4 (43:51):
The Laddy gradually from the K fifteen, we went up
to the K four, which is an early Polarists range missile.
Polarist is the missile that equipped the George Washington class,
an early ballistic missile program submarine program of the United States.
And this is about three thousand, five hundred kilometers, and

(44:14):
then you move up to the K five. Now, the
K five is when we will start getting to some
respectable SLBM launch capability. It's about five thousand kilometers. I
have no information about what missile is being tested in
the way of Bengal, but looking at the range, you

(44:34):
know that that notification that was issued then no time
suggests that it was a missile, possibly a submarine launched
ballistic missile of about five thousand kilometers and that could
only mean one missile, which is the K five, and
the K five is the final evolution of these the
K fifteen K series missiles, the K fifteen, the K four,

(44:58):
the K five. You top it at about five thousand
kilometers plus. The K five is believed to be nerved,
which means that it will have more than one war
will have multiple warrants. We don't know how many. It
will be more than one, which means that when the
Arihant class boats sail out and these can all be
the K five can be carried by all boats. Right,

(45:19):
So the ari Arihans will carry four, the Ari Garth
will carry for the Aridaman will carry eight, the KS
four Star will carry eight. So that increases the number
of nuclear weapons that you can take out to see.

Speaker 2 (45:32):
That's a lot of nuclear weapons.

Speaker 4 (45:33):
It will yeah, it will be all. It all depends
on how many weapons are there and how many warheads.

Speaker 2 (45:38):
Especially because each can have multiple multiple warheads.

Speaker 4 (45:41):
So the MIRVed thing is really important, and that is
why the K five is so important, and that is
the reason why I believe that the Chinese surged all
their ocean so called oceanographic research vessels into the Bay
of in the vicinity of the Bay of BEng called
Indian Ocean Region to pick up these missile trajectories, signatures,
splash down points, analysis of all of that to build

(46:03):
up their library, you know, their threat library.

Speaker 3 (46:05):
The Chinese do it. Everyone does it in the world. Yeah.

Speaker 4 (46:07):
So the final thing of the K six will not
be in the arihanth class. It will actually be onto
the S five, where you have a completely new series
of missiles called the K six. Now, the K six
is the primary weapon of the S five ballistic missile submarine,

(46:30):
which is more than six thousand kilometers. I'm not privy
to the ranges or anything, but it is a significantly
larger missile than these K fifteen, K four and K five,
and the K six cannot be carried by the arihanth
class simply because the diameter is is a fatter missile,
right and longer range missile three stage missile and a

(46:54):
very long range missile from what we hear. But that's
I believe in development, and at some point in that
possibly will intertesting by the end of this decade or
maybe in the early part of the next decade. So
I think, once we get to a point where you
have the K five inducted in you know, numbers equipping

(47:16):
the Arihan class, and then of course you have the
first unit of the K of the S five out
in the water, then you can have then you can
say that we will have arrived with our second strike
litter and capability, and then you know C ASD and
all of that becomes really important.

Speaker 2 (47:33):
Yeah, just as a reference. So when you say five
thousand kilometers in terms of missile range, would that give
these summer is the ability to strike most of eastern
China from the Bay of Bengal.

Speaker 3 (47:45):
Yes.

Speaker 4 (47:46):
So the ideal thing is that all of these submarines,
you would want to fire your missiles from the Bay
of Bengal, not go far out right, not sail out
into the Pacific or any other because our threats are
addressed by firing these missiles from within the Bay of Pingol.

Speaker 3 (48:05):
And the ultimate thing would.

Speaker 4 (48:07):
Be to fire them from I'm notre where in the
way of Bingal, but somewhere in the Bay of Bingal
where they would reach their intended targets, which are two
nuclear armed adversaries that you should have the ability I'm
thinking aloud here that our nuclear deterrent should have the
ability to target both our adversaries from one location in

(48:31):
the Bay of pingal.

Speaker 2 (48:33):
Right, great, And a couple of trivia questions as we
end this episode, one specific to the Indian system of
how we operate our nuclear weapons, and the other just
generic about nuclear sumonies in general. Who does the commander
of the summonies report? Is it the Navy chief indirectly
obviously or is it the command of the Strategic forces?

Speaker 3 (48:51):
Command the strategic forces? Come on, right, Okay, So.

Speaker 2 (48:54):
The Navy has nearly no day to day role in
sort of these summaries except the operational and the maintenance
aspect of it.

Speaker 3 (49:01):
It's just the operational maintenance.

Speaker 2 (49:03):
Interesting. The second one comes from one of my favorite movies,
Crimson Tide if you've watched it, thriller, I think, highly unrealistic,
by the way, but I think you've got a sense
of where I'm going with this. So explain in technology
terms of how a command to fire a nuclear weapon
is given to a submarine. Considering the fact that these

(49:25):
have to be extremely quiet, so they don't emit any waves,
any waves to be detected by any radar, So how
is that would that message be communicated, and is there
ever a possibility of a Crimson Tide like thing happening. Well,
the commander of the ship has the final authority because

(49:46):
the ship is not being able to communicate with the
civilian command.

Speaker 4 (49:49):
Well, second part of your question. First, I hope we
never get to that point, and it's just in the
realm of you know, movie fiction. But you know, to
answer your question, see our ballistic missile captains, whoever they are,
they're never seen or you know, they never come out
in public.

Speaker 3 (50:09):
But I'm sure whoever they.

Speaker 2 (50:10):
Are would be pretty you know that sure, and I've
seen them probably pretty sure. Okay, silence, all.

Speaker 4 (50:20):
Right, So whoever they are, they would be chosen through
battery of psychological tests to ensure that they don't crack
under pressure, because you know, when you are sailing, when
you've sailed out with the ultimate weapon, and it is
very different from all other vectors. Yes, in the sense
it's not like your rail launched a nuclear missile. It's

(50:44):
not like your air launched nuclear missile. It's certainly not
like your land launched transporter erector launched missile, which are
there in your control, and it's there on a surface
whereas a nuclear part ballistic missile submarine, to again use
the Andine analogy, once he sails out, nobody knows where
he is. He could be anywhere, right, very few people

(51:07):
in the command chain would know patrol areas. Now patrol
areas are extremely sensitive. Probably there would be as many
people on the fingers of one hand who would know
where the submarine would be or the petrol area is
very very super secret locations. And what they do is

(51:28):
that I am not privy to how our submarines operate,
but if you look at the way the open literature
suggests that in the American in the Russian case, for instance,
what they do is they trail and ELF antenna. They
come up to a certain depth and they trail a
long antenna on the surface of the ocean, and that

(51:50):
picks up ELF communication, extremely low frequency communication, very very
faint communication that goes out which be activated in case
of a nuclear emergency. Right, And there are special transmitters
for this thing on the mainland. So if there was
an emergency where you would you have a submarine out there,

(52:11):
you would be able to communicate with the submerged submarine
with your ELF communication exactly like what you saw in Crimson,
dieties that there's no other way of doing it, not
that we know of at least, but that's how it's communicated.
And once that communication is conveyed to the nuclear submarine
which is on patrol with nuclear weapons locked and loaded,

(52:34):
then there would be a set of codes that would
have to be The codes would be related to him
from the strategic Command, Strategic Forces Command, and the commander
on board would then crack the codes, open the thing,
and then initiate the launch sequence. It's exactly there's no
other way of doing it. It's exactly the way the

(52:55):
other five p five countries do it, and I don't
believe that we would be any different from that.

Speaker 2 (53:01):
Yeah, yeah, why re invent the bill? I guess the
only the only understick part in Crimson, because they show
actually much of this. The only understick part is that
they sort of lose communication because then gets broken. Uh,
and the captain of the ship is going by the
previous orders.

Speaker 4 (53:18):
The device that's the plot device, and yeah, it's it's so,
I mean, it would be really boring if you just
kind of fired off all the miss but there are
movies like that incidentally.

Speaker 2 (53:26):
Yeah, and then he gets into a fight. The second
in Commander over that good watch.

Speaker 4 (53:31):
By the way, there's a good watch, very entertaining Gene
Hackman and Denzel Washington.

Speaker 3 (53:34):
What's not to like about?

Speaker 2 (53:36):
Yeah? The final trivia point, are these missiles made it?
When I say made it for the benefit of oursism viewers.
It's widely believed that India. It's simply report the global
body that tracks nuclear missile movements. They have said that
in their annual reports that Indian missiles are never made
it as in, the warhead is not on the launcher,
it's kept separate. They would be made only times if

(53:58):
an emergency or when you want totally use them. But
I don't think that's quite possible. Not something is it
technology speaking?

Speaker 3 (54:05):
It is, it is possible.

Speaker 4 (54:06):
But then you know, if a submarine sails without the
warheads being mated, then it is a points. Yeah, well
then he's not on deterrent patrol. So the two words
most important words are deterrent patrol. A deterrent patrol is
what the Ariyan did for the first time in twenty
nine eighteen I think it was twenty eighteen. Yeah, when
the Arian sailed out with its full load of nuclear weapons.

(54:30):
That's twelve K fifteens with their nuclear warheads. And there
was a ceremony, there was a public release. The Prime
Minister pellucitated the Arian crew, he got a cap from
the captain of the Arihant. All that is public knowledge.
But without nuclear weapons being you know, mated onto the missiles,

(54:52):
then it would not be a deterrent patrol, which then
it would be just an ordinary you know, a ce sort.
It would be a submarine on a routine deployment without
its think, but a deterrent patrol is thing. And the
thing is that you know, as secret as the Indian
nuclear weapons program is and the strategic submarine program is,
these are things we will never know. So it's always

(55:13):
that element of doubt that our planners put in the
mind of whoever's watching, whether it's on mass media or
it's those guys who are looking at the satellite imagery
that they see, you know, on the east coast of India.

Speaker 2 (55:28):
Or those so called survey based vessels that is looking
at the fishes, you know, in the bay of mapping
the seabed in the seabed right Great Sunday Path. End episode.
There a fantastic chat as always and like I said,
it was always a dream for me to discuss both
the submarines with you, the nuclear power attack seremonies and
the nuclear powered the side suminies. And that's now done.

Speaker 4 (55:50):
Yeah, and then in a few months from now, from
possibly early next year, I'm guessing web March twenty twenty
six is when we possibly would see the Aridavan.

Speaker 2 (55:59):
Or we might not see exactly.

Speaker 4 (56:03):
We never And you know that that's the greatest thing
about these subs before we went up there, is that
the power that they have is being invisible. The most
terrifying image your adversary can actually see is when his
satellite picks up a pass over your births, your submarine
pens and he sees nothing there, which means they're.

Speaker 3 (56:25):
All out exactly.

Speaker 2 (56:28):
Yeah right, great, Thanks and deep as always, thanks, thanks,
thanks for having me, and thanks as always to our
listeners and viewers. That's it for this week's defense goes
for more tune in next week till then, stay safe
and not cross any boundaries without a passport.

Speaker 1 (56:48):
In a world of contested powders and silent batters, one
voice cut through the noise. Was Israel able to achieve
its aim? When Israel bombed Iran. Do you think that
Chinese army is at war with itself?

Speaker 7 (57:11):
Joined veteran war correspondent Gore of savanth one of India's
most trusted voices in defense journalism.

Speaker 3 (57:19):
Namaskar and jahend I'm God of Seventh.

Speaker 7 (57:22):
Listen to Chuck Review with Gor of Savard on India
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Speaker 1 (57:34):
Stay alert. The war for truth start here.