Pakistan's army chief Asim Munir recently made wild headlines in the US, casually threatening nuclear apocalypse at a private dinner. He claimed that if India ever attacked, Pakistan would "take half the world down" with it. Yes, really.
In this episode, defence journalist Sandeep Unnithan joins host Dev Goswami to unpack what's behind this latest nuclear sabre-rattling. Why would Pakistan's top general say something so reckless -- and why now, and in Florida of all places?
We also dive into:
-The factors behind the US's new-found but old love for the Pakistan military
-The "Mercedes vs dump truck" analogy
-The US designation of Baloch Liberation Army as a terror group, timed right after Munir's visit
-How Pakistan developed nukes so fast after India's 1998 Pokhran
-The legend of US control over Pakistan's nuclear button
-How worried should India be about Asim Munir's
Produced by Garvit Srivastava
Sound mixed by Rohan Bharti
In this episode, defence journalist Sandeep Unnithan joins host Dev Goswami to unpack what's behind this latest nuclear sabre-rattling. Why would Pakistan's top general say something so reckless -- and why now, and in Florida of all places?
We also dive into:
-The factors behind the US's new-found but old love for the Pakistan military
-The "Mercedes vs dump truck" analogy
-The US designation of Baloch Liberation Army as a terror group, timed right after Munir's visit
-How Pakistan developed nukes so fast after India's 1998 Pokhran
-The legend of US control over Pakistan's nuclear button
-How worried should India be about Asim Munir's
Produced by Garvit Srivastava
Sound mixed by Rohan Bharti
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
This is India Today Podcasts.
Speaker 2 (00:05):
Welcome to Season three of Another Defense, the podcast that
takes you inside the world of conflict. I'm your host,
Deve Goswami and every week I sit down with experts
and retired officers from the Army, Navy and Air Force
to decode all things to do with India security and
explore what it truly means to serve. Get ready for
(00:27):
stories of strategy, sacrifice and strength.
Speaker 1 (00:32):
This is in our defense. Welcome to Another Defense.
Speaker 2 (00:37):
Kiki maklijs Ma Kali josakti heir but mah Mahoir. I
don't know what that means. But that's one of the
comments that Field Marshal Assimunir is reported to have said.
When he was in the US recently. He'd gone there
for an event, for a formal event. Actually he'd gone
there to a bit farewell to a top US military general,
(00:58):
somebody with whom he was in close touch with when
the general was serving in the in the Asia Pacific region.
Speaker 3 (01:04):
Uh.
Speaker 2 (01:04):
But there in the US he attended a private dinner
hosted by a Pakistani businessman where he's made this comment.
Speaker 4 (01:11):
Uh.
Speaker 2 (01:12):
This is part of many comments. The one that actually
has caught the tension of many in India and across
the world. Is where he basically went on new Nucleus
saber at ring by saying that if a push comes
to shave, Pakistan is ready to take down half the
world with it, by saying that we're a nuclear nation
and if it comes to that, we'll take down half
the world with it. Uh, you know, to unpack what's
(01:35):
happened exactly and what may have made him say this,
the timing of the comments, the location of the comment
coming when he was in the US, and for that
I have.
Speaker 3 (01:46):
Are you good to be back there? I thought for
a second we were going to talk about Shirley or something,
you know, when you.
Speaker 2 (01:51):
Begin thank god this is yeah Bollywood, Yeah, yeah, pretty
absurd statements. And we must say, by the very report
by Pravian Swami for the print, that's the one.
Speaker 1 (02:01):
Who got the scoop.
Speaker 2 (02:03):
There's no official confirmation obviously he pra means Swami says
he's spoken to people who were at the dinner who
told him in multiple so multiple sources who told him
in confidence of what Field Marsha Muni had said at
the dinner. Pakistan while reacting to India's statement on that
said that was a misinterpretation of his comments. I don't
(02:24):
know what, but yeah, pretty absurd comments, especially the one
what I said, the one about you know, India's like
Mercedes speeding along like a Ferrari and Pakistan is a
dumpster full of gravel. And if Mercedes speeding like a
Ferrari hits the dumster.
Speaker 3 (02:40):
Possibly the first Pakistani dictator who's called his country a
dumpster exactly. I don't know how he gets away with
so many things, but but you know, they've there's there's
a method to his madness, right. It's not an isolated statement.
It's certainly not Bollywood or Lolliwood whatever place in Pakistan.
There is a certain pattern to this us Munir. And
(03:00):
you know, I've been studying him for a couple of
months now, and I think he's a guy who flew
completely below the radar. Nobody really kind of figured what
kind of guy this chap was. You know, Initially one
thought that he is one of those people, one of
those wanna be dictators who think they are God's gift
to all of Pakistan's problems. We've seen that four times
(03:22):
in the past. But with Munir, it's something else. And
this is really scary because not only is this guy
he's very deeply he's a religious fundamentalist.
Speaker 4 (03:33):
Right.
Speaker 3 (03:33):
He makes no bones about the fact that he's memorized
the Qoran. That's not bad in itself, but you know,
he goes on to talk the kind of rhetoric that
he's been using very unlike any Pakistani military dictator or
even any Pakistani army chief. You know, they've been very
measured in what they say in public. Right, Munir is
someone who doesn't make any bones about what he thinks
(03:54):
and it just comes out like that. But that's not
an isolated phenomenon. The thing is that there seems to
be an increasing convergence between the US and Pakistan relationship,
and Munir is a symptom of a larger problem that
we are facing in our neighborhood, which is the United
(04:15):
States coming back into Pakistan about four years after it
had quit and run in a hurry. You know, under
Joe Biden's tenure, when they exited Afghanistan, they lost all
interests in Pakistan. And this is the pattern we've seen
repeatedly after eighty eight. You know, Pakistan's uses over after
the Afghan War, the US exits, and then you know
(04:35):
you have al Kai that they come back in. Then
twenty years later they lose interest and now they're coming
back in. And which is why I believe Munir's ranks
are a phenomenon. It's a pattern that's slowly building up.
Where it's going to head is something that we need
to figure out because I don't see good times ahead.
(04:58):
You know, when a Pakistani dictator and this way and
he's got the support of the United States, bad things
have happened in the past.
Speaker 2 (05:05):
Yeah, right, Uh, good point about how he's sort of
been under under the redar for the last couple of
years because I remember Ben Brankhan was the Prime Minister.
You had this whole sort of succession controversy in the
partisan in military. You had a fight between the military
and the PM on who would be the chief of
the I S I uh. And then there was some
(05:27):
some controversy about you know, there was this whole section
of general supporting this one general and that was happening.
Speaker 1 (05:33):
No one need that name never came up. It just
sort of just before.
Speaker 2 (05:38):
The attack that happened was when he made that rabbit
speech which many have linked to the attack itself. That's
when he sort of got of got some prominence in
Indian media and then you know what's happened, what happened since?
Uh So, before we actually go to the US comments
and the US backing the park military bit, because you
brought this up.
Speaker 1 (05:57):
You know, in the last episode, the last season of In.
Speaker 2 (06:01):
Our Defense, when I had Shivaru as the guest, we
talked many times about how in the last couple of years,
Pakistan has stopped sort of being India's big warry.
Speaker 4 (06:11):
Right.
Speaker 2 (06:11):
It was China the stand up that began during COVID
You had the Galvan Valley clash where you know, we
had many people dying, including the commanding officers. Right, so
China was the top focus and Pakistan seemed to have
been like you know, done and dusted because, like you said,
the US had no interest in it. Pakistan's economy was
in a free fall, so they had no finances sort
(06:31):
of back terrorism to forment trouble along the yellowc You
had that declaration to follow the seas Fire Agreement that
was signed many years earlier between the two dgmos of Pakistan.
Speaker 4 (06:41):
Because we wanted the Western front to be quite.
Speaker 1 (06:43):
Exactly to be quiet that we could focus on China.
Speaker 2 (06:45):
Then with the hell Caam that seems to have turned.
Pakistan now is in headlines. Pakistan has become a talking
point and the US again is involved.
Speaker 3 (06:52):
Right, so you know, good observations that they've and you
know what I see is a slow pattern emerging over here,
which is when Donald Trump comes into the White House,
you see a lot of activity suddenly, right, Pakistan is
all out to woo the United States. They say that, oh,
we've got this guy who was responsible for the ster
(07:13):
attack which killed American civilians a serviceman in Afghanistan twenty
twenty one. They handed over some low life and they
said he was the mastermind. And Trump appreciates it. There's
a minerals deal that's been talked about. There is another
deal for prospecting oil and gas, and all of that.
They're playing into Trump's hands.
Speaker 4 (07:33):
Literally.
Speaker 3 (07:34):
Yeah, they're telling Trump all the things that Trump wants
to hear, right, which is basically resources for peace and
to convince him somehow that you know, South Asia or
the Indian subcontinent is a deeply destabilized place and he
needs to come in use his good offices and which
is what happened during Operations Sindhur. Right, so Pakistan seems
(07:55):
to have got an edge over India in playing Donald
Trump charging is ego doing all of that, And there
was a slow build up which we kind of missed
right from January on. We thought that, you know, well,
Trump is a friend of India, upkey bar, Trump's our car,
all of that, right, But there was something else. There
was another game that was playing on there and we
(08:16):
saw that the ugly phase of that during Operations Sindur,
where Pakistan seems to have convinced the world that look
they got the United States to mediate, and not just
the United States, it's Donald Trump to mediate, right, And
Trump then picks that line and he goes on and
repeating it, much to our discomfort and embarrassment. And we
(08:36):
have called that out, Sala. The Government of India has
called it out, the maas called it out, the Prime
Minister has said so he's called Trump and said, look.
Speaker 4 (08:44):
There was no Pea state.
Speaker 3 (08:45):
We agreed to cease fire only when the pakistanis called
up on the tenth of May and said enough, you know,
stop and we be escalated. Then the operation continues. Now
my point is that US couldn't have said all of
this if he did not have the backing of the
United States. Pakistani military dictators don't function very well in isolation.
(09:10):
When they have the United States behind them, bad things
happen in the neighborhood. We saw that in the seventies
when you had General Ziaoul Haku was in the doghouse
for unseating Zulfi Karali Bhuto, no friend of India. Incidentally,
he executed Zerei Bhutto and the entire Pakistani nuclear weapons
(09:33):
program was under American sanctions. And then lo and behold,
the Soviets invade Afghanistan in nineteen seventy nine and Zia
becomes this frontline ally in this war against the Soviets.
The Americans turn a blind eye to the nuclear weapons
program and the proliferation that's going on. Pakistan gets the bomb,
and then the Americans exit. Pakistan is once again in
(09:56):
the wilderness, and then lo and behold, nine to eleven happen.
The Americans re enter the scene. Musharaf is the dictator.
He escapes sanctions, and forget escaping sanctions, he manages to
expand the Pakistani nuclear arsenal while the Americans are watching, right,
Pakistan is already a nuclear weapons state in nineteen ninety eight.
(10:17):
So that's what my point is. If you know, every
time the Americans enter the subcontinent, Pakistani dictators get emboldened,
their behavior changes, and we're seeing that with Muni a
third time when Trump is entered the Indian subcontinent supposedly
playing this you know peacemaker. You know, he wants a
Nobel prize, and he's trying to build up his case
(10:38):
for a Nobel because he says, look, I've so called
mediated this peace thing between India and Pakistan. I have
brought Armenia and Azerbaijan to the negotiating table. I am
now off to Russia and Ukraine to end the war
in the longest, the most savage war of the twenty
first century. So Trump is making a case for him
and Pakistan seems to have figured that out. They're massaging Ego,
(11:00):
they're giving him all the resources and you know, the oil.
There's no oil in Pakistan's snake oil. Right, there's probably
some gas. A lot of it is in GSQ Rabble
Pindy incident. Right. They seem to have fool Trump. And
this happens every time. They've done it with Ronald Reagan,
in the seventies and eighties, they did it with George W. Bush,
and now they're doing it with Trump. It's a familiar pattern.
(11:23):
It's a familiar playbook. Anyone who's been around long enough
would know that this is the Ghq Rabble Pindy playbook.
And that's playing out in front of our eyes.
Speaker 2 (11:33):
Which is exactly what the statement also said when they
responded to Moni's comments in the US that they said, basically,
this is exactly what happens when you have the US
packing the parfessonal military. But what I'm still not able
to understand is the why of it. So the previous
examples you gave that those make they made such strategic sense.
So you had the Soviets invading the Khanistan, so US
(11:54):
wanted to contain them. Pakistan as the staging base Afghanistan
response to the nine eleven at time, So you began
this war on terror, and again you need a Pakistan
for your basis and support.
Speaker 1 (12:06):
Briefly, we thought.
Speaker 2 (12:07):
Of when the Israeli Ran conflict was at a peak,
that the US may need Pakistan once again for staging basis, support, visits,
et cetera. But that sort of phizzled out and after
the US bombing Iran's and you civil nuclear side. It's
what Iran claims.
Speaker 1 (12:22):
So what's the need for the US to cozy up
to Pakistan?
Speaker 3 (12:26):
Well, you know several reasons there they and the first
reason is of course the basis. Right, you enter Pakistan,
you get access to their basis, which I believe Muni
has already promised them. You can look at Iran, you
can look at Afghanistan, you can look at China and India. Right,
that's a very strategic location. And that is all Pakistan
(12:49):
is to the west. Pakistan is strategically located. It is
like a massive, massive base. It has no qualms about
renting its territory out. This is a country that has
allowed its citizens to be killed by the Americans and
then claimed bounties for that. Can you believe that this
is unimaginable parves measure of said that, you know, the
(13:13):
former dictator of Pakistan mentioned that in his autobiography that
we were actually collecting bounties from the United States for
pakistanis who are terrorists?
Speaker 4 (13:23):
Right?
Speaker 3 (13:23):
That's how low it gets. You're allowing a foreign country.
It's like you know those scanned hunts that we hear
of in South Africa where you can go and pay
a lot of money and shoot elephant and wild game
and all that.
Speaker 4 (13:32):
Pakistan is like that.
Speaker 3 (13:34):
It's a wild game preserve and you know, you can
do what you want to in Pakistan as long as
the money is right. But you know there's another subtext
to this what we're seeing right now. Theyve that is
what happened on the tenth of May, right, Yeah, a
lot of us don't understand how truly groundbreaking. What happened
(13:56):
on the tenth of me is operations indur. We just say, oh,
operations in India struck, you know, Pakistani air bases and
all that. But you have to understand that what India
actually did was to strike at Pakistan's nuclear vectors. And
by nuclear vectors, I mean the means to deliver a
(14:16):
nuclear weapon. Pakistans rise on the Atra for the last
four decades. When it comes to the nuclear weapons, is
that it wants to establish deterrence against India. They have
what is called nuclear weapons enabled terrorism, which means that
it uses nuclear weapons as a shield while it uses
a sword of the War of one thousand cuts you know,
(14:37):
terror attacks against India, and when we threaten to attack
them conventionally, they say, look, we have nuclear weapons, the
subcontinent will be nuclear.
Speaker 4 (14:45):
You know, there will be a nuclear war, you know.
Speaker 3 (14:47):
And then they shout and then they ask for the
world to intervene to prevent an attack on them. Now,
this strategy is held from the eighties through the nineties
and for over two and a half decades ever since
they became a nuclear weapons par and if you look
at it, the pattern is similar. They attack parliament, India mobilizers.
(15:07):
There's a nuclear weapons threat that's made the situation disengages.
They tried that several times, several sensational attacks twenty sixty
eleven and all of that. But now, for the first time,
you have a political leadership that is not deterred by
Pakistan's nuclear weapons, which carries out a series of attacks.
(15:29):
I call it a rampage because a BrahMos missile attack
of the time that we launched on Pakistan in thirty minutes,
attacking their air bases from the north to the south,
completely shook Pakistan's nuclear establishment. The Strategic Plans Division, which
you know, strategizes how they move their nuclear weapons that
(15:49):
handles their nuclear weapons. They must have been in a
state of panic because Pakistan has two nuclear vectors, right,
It has air launched weapons and it has ground launched weapons.
Launched weapons are its F sixteens and its Mirage threes,
which are configured to drop gravity bombs at atomic weapons.
And the ground based vector are the tls, the transporter
(16:10):
erector launchers which are their Abdhali series and the Shahin
series missiles which have nuclear weapons on them. Now, when
you attack their air bases, it means they can't fly
their aircraft, right, they have to withdraw to other bases.
They have to withdraw away from the basis where they've
kept their nuclear weapons, which means you have negated the
(16:32):
air vector. Now for the tels to move, you need
the air cover that the aircraft of the Air Force provide.
So when there are no aircraft flying, you don't have
your ground based vector as well. So they are deeply vulnerable.
And I think this is the kind of panic that
we're seeing in Pakistan, that their entire nuclear doctrine, which
(16:54):
they've built on three decades, in half an hour, the
Indian political leadership, the Prime Minister, Prime MINISTERM. Modia said
We're not going to be blackmailed by a nuclear weapons
and that is frightened them. And I think what Muni
has said in Tampa, Florida just last week is a
(17:14):
manifestation of that utter panic in pakistan strategic community. And
this is I spoke with left General Rabishankar. Actually I
must give him credit for that. We spoke together on
this and he believes this is what's going on right now,
that there is panic in pakistan strategic community because they
feel that their nuclear weapons. See, Pakistan's nuclear weapons are
(17:38):
not about deterring the Indian military, right, that's a fact.
It is to deter the Indian political leadership. Pakistan achieved
nuclear weapons parity with India the minute the first F
sixteen flew with a nuclear weapon under its belly. When
one bomb could fly in an F six team, the
(18:01):
Indian political leadership was, which actually is going to you know,
initiate a conventional war. They took a pause. They said, look,
you know what if it goes nuclear. They didn't understand
the escalation ladder, which is what this government seems to
have understood. There's that one comment that Admiral Promote made
in the brieface. If you remember we discussed this where
(18:22):
he said that we had an escalation ladder worked out,
and that must have scared them because now you're looking
not just as the Indian leadership that has figured out
the escalation ladder, but is now slowly calibrating moving up
the ladder. So even as you know, as unreasonable as
(18:42):
these attacks might look to the Pakistanis, it was very calibrated.
They only hit about eleven or twelve bases. There is
a lot more BrahMos missiles from where they came from, right,
But it was messaging to Pakistan right sees, desist, do
not escalate because if you escalate, there will be war attacks.
Speaker 4 (19:01):
Right.
Speaker 3 (19:01):
So what you're seeing now with Munir's rant, oh nuclear weapons,
we're going to do this, that is they really don't
know what's going on. And the one person I'm waiting
for to come out and speak is a gentleman of
Lieutenant General Khalid Kidway. Now he was the head of
the Strategic Plant's Division in Pakistan. He is like literally
(19:23):
their nuclear Ayatollahs, a very calm, quiet composed guy. He's
headed the SPD for several years. And when Khalid Kidway
speaks the world listens, and he's spoken only publicly only twice,
in two thousand and in two thousand and two. I remember, Yes,
two thousand and two is the first time he spoke
(19:44):
when he said, when he enunciated the red lines that
Pakistan had before it would go nuclear. It is that
if you conquered a large part of Pakistan's territory, if
you destroyed their military machinery, their capability to capacity to
wage war, if you strangulated them economically, or if you
(20:05):
destabilize them politically, these are four red lines, we would
go nuclear as soon as.
Speaker 4 (20:10):
They were crossed.
Speaker 3 (20:11):
So it was basically telling us that if you do
these things to us, we will attack you with nuclear weapons.
And then he said he spoke again in twenty twenty
after Balacote, Yes, where he said, look, we aim to
not establish parity with India. We want escalation dominance, which
is we will threaten you with so many nuclear weapons
that you will be forced to, you know, rethink and a.
(20:32):
And now five years later there's utter silence. So I
believe that the Pakistan strategic community has, you know, gone
back to the drawing board. They're trying to work things
out because they've been hit by a number of things,
by a number of vectors, not just by missiles. The
Indus Water Treaty, that's again an out of syllabus questions.
You know, sixty five years nobody ever thought that the
(20:55):
IWT was on the table. It was that it will
never be touched. It is this enduring treaty. It will
last until you know, the Earth, until the sun burns
out a million years from now or something like that.
But it is now on the table, right, And which
is why they're confused, like, oh, these guys have called
out our nuclear blackmail and they've they're squeezing us in
(21:18):
the Indus Water Treaty. So while Munir might have been
shouting in April about Kashmir being his juggler and all that,
it's the Indus that's his juggler, right, and they're aware
of that. They're frightened. They're back at the drawing board.
I'm sure Karige Kidway, he's very old now, he must
be in his early eighties from.
Speaker 4 (21:35):
What I remember.
Speaker 3 (21:36):
They're sitting and they're working out how do we deter
the Indians. Now, you know, these guys are unpredictable. They're
becoming like us, you know, what we once were, right,
So that's frightened them, and I think Muniir is a
manifestation of that. He has to show strength, he has
to show bluster, and like all Pakistan military dictators in
(21:57):
the past, he is a dictator. He's de facto control
ruler of Pakistan. I feel that he is going to
do something really stupid to prove his point. Where that's
going to end. I really don't know.
Speaker 2 (22:09):
Right, you know, I obviously want to talk a bit
more about Pakistan's than nukes. But before we do that again,
back to his comments in the US.
Speaker 1 (22:17):
Whom were they aimed at?
Speaker 2 (22:19):
Because or am I to naive to think that Asimuni thought,
it's a close to an event of mostly Pakistanis. I'm
guessing all of them Pakistanis. It's not going to go anywhere.
He was not expecting it to go out in the media.
Whom were those comments aimed Well, you know.
Speaker 3 (22:33):
Both his comments they have been made before the Pakistani diaspora, right,
the first one in April that ran about two nation
theory and Hindu Muslim and all that street thug language.
That was also the diaspora. Then you had this one
in Tampa, Florida, as about nuclear weapons and you know
Pakistan and India and all that. So you know, in
(22:54):
a very narrow sense, I think it was to the diaspora.
He was talking to them, because there's nothing you can
tell the diaspora that will encourage them, that will motivate them,
that will get them to lose in their pockets. He
needs money, yeah, he needs money, right, Which is the
only two emotive things that Muni can think of is religion.
(23:17):
Pakistan was created on the basis of religion and the
only technological breakthrough that they have had since nineteen forty seven,
which is nuclear weapons. So in one speech in April
before six days before Parlagam, he talks about religion. The
second speech he talks about religion and nuclear weapons. Oh,
we have this great nuclear power and we're going to
(23:39):
whack them and we'll bomb them and drop missiles on them,
and you know stuff like that. So in a narrow sence,
he's talking to the diaspora. And I know for a
fact that the diaspora is now Pakistan is realized that
they need to weaponize their diaspora, not only get money
from them. There is there are credible reports of the
diaspora being used even to get weapons as well through
(24:02):
front companies. Right in the UK. They're on a weapons
buying spree as you know. Uh, they're trying to you know,
build up whatever they lost during operations Sindur and to
get weapons. They believe we are going to give them
a conventional edge over India. They need the diaspora for that.
So Muni needs to talk to the diaspora, he needs
to motivate them. So that is one part of his speech.
(24:26):
The other one, of course, is to tell America that, look,
you know, as you said about Pakistan, Pakistan is a
country that negotiates with a gun to its head, right,
So he says, hello, we're extremely you know, we're a
very unstable part of the world.
Speaker 4 (24:43):
Mister Trump. We need you.
Speaker 3 (24:44):
You need to come and make peace between US and
India because otherwise it's going to be nuclear weapons launch.
And Trump will wag in and say that, oh, look,
look I told you this place is so unstable. They
need a peacemaker like me. They need to give me
a Nobel. And you know I would even go so far.
They have to say, I wouldn't put it past Asimuni
if he actually tests a nuclear weapon. I mean The
(25:06):
guy is in such a bad spot right now, right,
he needs to do something to recover his lost crown.
And what better way to flex your muscle and prove
your matches more than to detonate a weapon. Imran Khan
couldn't detonate a bomb. I detonated a nuclear war. You know,
he could even do that, And I think we should
prepare for all of these contingencies.
Speaker 4 (25:28):
What if he does that?
Speaker 3 (25:30):
And you know it was it was different if it
was another American president, and even Biden, right even, but
with Trump, an unpredictable Pakistani dictator, an unpredictable US president
who knows how did he'd react. He wouldn't impose sanctions,
even he might say, look, I told you they've exploded
(25:51):
a weapon, they've tested a weapon.
Speaker 4 (25:53):
South Asia is very unstable.
Speaker 3 (25:55):
They need me. We need to bring peace over there.
I've just started talking to put In. Looks like I
had to talk to India and Pakistan as well. So
this plays into Trump's playbook, Right, I brought peace, I
bombed Iran, and I brought peace in between Iran and Israel.
So this is part of this whole playbook that's going on.
(26:17):
And that's the reason I feel that the next few
months are going to be very, very.
Speaker 1 (26:23):
Scary.
Speaker 2 (26:24):
Also in fact, I mean, you know, knowing Trump's love
for strong men, Oh he loves dictators. He might actually
love love the idea of Pakistani. Pakistani of course great
loves nuclear weapons.
Speaker 3 (26:36):
Yeah, show off strength, Look, strong man, Pakistan, strong man
detonates weapon. I mean, this is crazy, and you know,
I see the pain in our diplomats, in our military people,
in our politicians. We can't do this kind of stuff, right.
We are a responsible nation and we have no option
but to keep calm and carry on. Right. We cannot
(26:59):
be unpredicted. Well, we can't be mercurial. We have a
reputation to protect. We are not going to toss aside
twenty five fifty seventy five years of what we've built
so far just because we want to, you know, react
to some crazy guy on the block.
Speaker 2 (27:18):
One point on the US US topic is how much
of this is linked to what we discuss in the
previous episode, where India seemingly is playing a bit of
a hard ball game with the US and Trump definitely
not liking it. India is saying, insisting that you were
not involved in lating the pause.
Speaker 4 (27:38):
Of fighting.
Speaker 2 (27:40):
India and its stocks being consistent on that point that
you will not get access to completely all of agriculture
market in India. How much of this is linked to
that or do you think both of these are entirely
separate issue.
Speaker 3 (27:54):
No, I think they're linked. They've and you knows, as
you mentioned, the fact is that Trump wants a win
from India. He wants to say that, oh, you know,
there was this thing I negotiated with India, and there was,
you know, such a hard bargain and finally we agreed
at this I got what I wanted. Or you have
to say, oh, you know, I negotiated this speech deal
(28:14):
and Indians loved me for it and they hailed me
and they nominated me for a Nobel or they're going
to buy ten billion dollars worth of uh, you know
arms from the United States.
Speaker 4 (28:26):
Look, I did it. I did it.
Speaker 3 (28:27):
We haven't given him a win, and he doesn't know
what to do right. The silence here is that the
fifty years of Shorely, right, Can I can I use
a can I use.
Speaker 4 (28:36):
A shole line?
Speaker 3 (28:37):
Yet?
Speaker 1 (28:38):
Of course? Yeah?
Speaker 3 (28:39):
No, sanata q By, she doesn't know why we haven't
responded yet, and we haven't risen to the bait, you know.
So I think he's a little confused, he's a little puzzled,
and he's now you know, going to uh probably take
the tariffs even higher to get a reaction out of us.
Speaker 4 (28:56):
Right.
Speaker 3 (28:56):
So, but but you know, the point being that he
loves dictators, and he says it more openly there. But
I think Americans, the American establishment, they love dictators. They
love them across the world. And you've seen it, and
you know, there's a playbook here, and I would say
it because when you mentioned Imran Khan, that was the
first thing that flashed through my mind. You remember the
(29:18):
Egyptian experiment post the Arab Spring, Yes, where they had
this popular elected uh Mohammed Morcy, who came there. He
was in a he was wearing a suit, and he
was wearing rimless glasses. He was on the cover of
Time magazine and says he's the man of the moment,
Mohmed Morcy, representative of people. And then they discover, oh
(29:40):
he's Muslim brotherhood. Oh he's an extremist. Oh you know,
and can we get someone else? Uh, can we get
another host name of Barak? Yeah? Sure, there's the former
chief there, General Alcci. So lo and behold, Morcy is
in prison and Cissy's in power.
Speaker 4 (29:57):
Right, this is the playbook.
Speaker 3 (29:59):
Imran Khan shows a bit of independence and he starts
speaking his own mind. He actually believes he's in control
and lo and behold he's in prison and.
Speaker 1 (30:09):
His life we'll see, we'll see.
Speaker 2 (30:15):
Yeah, but good point on that, because you know there's
something we were discussing in the newsroom that uh, you know,
India was very wise to reject Trump's offer when he
called Modi just before his first visit to the US,
and he invited him very strangely.
Speaker 4 (30:30):
So it was a trap.
Speaker 2 (30:31):
Yeah, it was a trap because I think what he
wanted was a photo. Actually he wanted to have the
arsimonyal by side, like raising hands.
Speaker 4 (30:38):
You saw that.
Speaker 3 (30:40):
Photograph exactly Trump with those you know, saying I did it.
You know, I said, my god.
Speaker 1 (30:44):
But he wanted he wanted that, and again did not
give him that some right, we'll talk more about this,
but a quick break when the.
Speaker 5 (30:55):
Activor came, it was such a revolution. It was a scooter,
which means it was more worth the time.
Speaker 3 (31:03):
It wasn't fast, it was very plain looking, it was
very simple, and that was what it's sort of USB was.
Speaker 5 (31:11):
That's what clicked the simplicity. You remember, I spoke about
the tranetic Honda, each and every feature which the kinetic
Honda had, which was essentially a Honda. The act ever
did it slightly better, so much so viewers. The Active
in two thousand and one had the same suspension as
(31:33):
the CAN so when you would break the front breaks,
it would come up, and if you would hit the
rear breaks, it would dip because it was anti diveno sense,
you know, like even recently, I think Active has discovered
discovered telescopic folks.
Speaker 1 (31:52):
Last to last year, I think so.
Speaker 2 (31:55):
Yeah.
Speaker 4 (31:55):
I think it was the.
Speaker 5 (31:56):
Same suspension which kept on going, going, going, even until
the last couple of years.
Speaker 4 (32:02):
But it worked.
Speaker 1 (32:08):
Welcome back, Sandip.
Speaker 2 (32:10):
I want to talk a bit about Pakistan's nuclear weapons,
the program itself and the situation right now.
Speaker 1 (32:19):
The program, you know, growing.
Speaker 2 (32:21):
Up, I've read lots about how it was a dirty program,
but unfortunately I haven't done a deep dive into it.
Speaker 1 (32:28):
So I think I am very interested.
Speaker 2 (32:31):
I'm pretty sure our listeners and viewers will be pretty
interested if you can sort of give us a sort
of a very short history lesson on how did Pakistan
end up getting its nuclear weapons?
Speaker 1 (32:40):
The iq Khant chapter.
Speaker 2 (32:42):
And also, even though this may be a naive question,
but how is it that when it comes to nuclear
program which will take decades for any country, it has
taken decades for many countries. How is it that when
India had its second round of tests, pok run to
Pakistan was able to test within a couple of weeks.
Speaker 4 (33:00):
Good question.
Speaker 3 (33:00):
You want me to answer that first? I will answer
that that last part of your question. First, The fact
is that Pakistan weaponized before we did, right, Yeah, we tested,
but the weapon that we tested was not a weapon,
was not a deliverable weapon.
Speaker 1 (33:20):
Right right.
Speaker 3 (33:21):
It was a large device. And that device could not
be put onto a vector. It couldn't be put in
a on the tip of a missile or even you know,
rolled out of a cargo aircraft or launched in any
particular way. It was a test of a device. That
device was very large. I don't want to get into
the details of that device. But that was nineteen seventy four,
(33:43):
the poke Roon one test, that's right. And but what
we did, what we tested in ninety eight was a deliverable.
Speaker 1 (33:50):
Device or a series of five.
Speaker 3 (33:52):
The five tests were deliverable devices and then nuclear power.
Speaker 4 (33:56):
That's correct.
Speaker 3 (33:57):
So how it starts is that India's new clear weapons
program was a reaction to China going nuclear. So when
we fought with that border war with China in nineteen
sixty two, neither India nor China were nuclear weapon states.
China went nuclear in nineteen sixty four, just two years
(34:17):
after the war. And you must understand that in sixty two,
the kind of shock to the Indian system that you
could well have lost the entire northeast of India, right
that is a large chunk of territory. There was nothing
between the Chinese and say East Pakistan. They could have
just rolled all the way up there. We would have
(34:38):
lost the entire northeast. That frightened the America, the Indian establishment,
and that is one of the reasons that we started
going nuclear. We started pursuing a covert nuclear program. It
was couched in the civilian Nuclear Energy program sixty four.
When China tested, we accelerated the program. They were they
(35:02):
were bomb scientists like Homi Baba who said we need
to all of you watched rocket boys.
Speaker 4 (35:08):
You know the story. Homi Baba was.
Speaker 3 (35:10):
One of our most ardent advocates of a nuclear bomb.
And in seventy two, when Pakistan came out of the
Indoor Park War with half of Pakistan it lost East Pakistan.
Speaker 4 (35:26):
They were in a state of shock.
Speaker 3 (35:28):
And Sulfi Bhutto Zai Bhutto lined up all the Pakistani
scientists and military men and said, we will eat grass,
but we will build a bomb. Now, when a country,
even as poor and as technologically challenged as Pakistan, sets
its mind to a nuclear weapons program, they can get it.
(35:50):
And the proof is North Korea. Yes, despite all of
the you know, the economy and all of that, it's
become a state project. They got the bomb two decades ago.
Pakistan began the nuclear weapons program. It was there in
the sixties. They also had civilian nuclear reactors. But the
interesting thing is that when they began the program in
(36:10):
seventy two, they found a very powerful set of allies,
the United States and China. Now, the US was deeply
worried about India coming out the way it did in
nineteen seventy one. He had disregarded American saber rattling. Kissinger
wanted the Chinese to roll down the things and tell
(36:31):
the Indians, you know, all those declassified things are there.
We were literally fighting a three front walk Pakistan on
one side, the United States and China, like three of
them had ganged upon India. We only had the Soviet Union. Now,
Pakistan comes out in the seventies with its nuclear weapons program.
It accelerates through the late seventies. When ziaulhak Stage is
(36:54):
a coup in the late seventies, he not only executes
zere Bhutto, but he gets the military into the nuclear
weapons program. The military grabs the Pakistani nuclear weapons program
nascent program then and it never lets go. It is
the only country in the world today out of the
eight nuclear powers, it is the only country where the
military directly controls nuclear weapons. And that's the reason we
(37:17):
must take what Asimuni said very seriously. He actually has
his finger on the button.
Speaker 4 (37:22):
Right.
Speaker 3 (37:22):
But back to this story of how they got it
is China entered the game in the seventies a very
close ally of Pakistan, and in the early eighties they
did something that no country has done in eighty years
that nuclear weapons have been around. Right. August twenty twenty
five is the eightieth anniversary of the first use of
(37:45):
nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In eighty years, no
country has transferred nuclear weapons blueprints fissile material to another country.
China did that in the early eighties, and we believe
that the Chinese even tested a nuclear weapon for the Pakistanis.
We know that because in nearly two decades ago, when
(38:10):
Gadafi surrendered his nuclear weapons program to the United Nations,
he feared the Americans would invade, so he surrendered whatever
he had. They found bomb blueprints of a weapon called
the CCHI C four, which is a Chinese fifteen kilotan
nuclear device, which had been given to Pakistan. So the
Chinese had not only given the and of course Pakistan
(38:32):
sold it to got to see the Aku.
Speaker 4 (38:35):
Khan, you know network.
Speaker 3 (38:38):
Now, China not only gave them the design, the blueprints,
the facile material, they tested the weapon for them. They
even gave them the missiles to launch those nuclear weapons.
This kind of close collaboration between two countries is unheard of,
even in the world of nuclear prot feration. This kind
(39:02):
of support one country has given to the other. So
the Akugan was a smoke screen. He did get some
of those centrifugies, but the bulk of the stuff actually
came from China, right, So it was Chinese support that
made Pakistan and nuclear weapons state. And why did the
Chinese do it? Next question is they wanted to firewall India.
They saw, I mean, they are an empire, right, they
(39:24):
play the long game. They understood that if India kept advancing, modernizing,
became a military part, they'd become a threat to China. Right,
So they've wanted to create Pakistan as that subcontinental threat
for India that would forever firewalls into the Indian subcontinent.
And they've done that not just with Pakistan, they've done
(39:46):
it with North Korea. They support North Korea because North
Korea acts as a hedge against South Korea and Japan
and of course the United States.
Speaker 4 (39:54):
So their whole worldview is.
Speaker 3 (39:56):
That the barbarians at the gate must never unify because
if they un they will threaten US. So keep them
fighting amongst themselves. That's how they played. They played the
long game. They saw Pakistan as useful in this war
against India, and therefore they armed them. So that's the
birth of Pakistan's.
Speaker 4 (40:13):
Nuclear weapons program.
Speaker 3 (40:14):
And so back to your question of nineteen ninety eight,
how did they test, they already had the weapon, they
had several weapons. They had about a dozen weapons then
I'm not sure what our numbers were. We tested because
our weapons program was one of the last things that
the outgoing Raji Gandi government sanctioned in nineteen eighty nine,
(40:35):
One of the last things that Raji Gandhi okaide was
to restart the Indian nuclear weapons program, which had been
actually put back in the basement after seventy four because
we came under tremendous sanctions global sanctions. Right we were
the sixth country. This exclusive club of five countries was
not going to allow a sixth country to enter this
(40:55):
exclusive club. They put all manner of sanctions to ensure
that our our capacity to develop this weapons program was crippled.
Enormous tanctions of put our reactors would not get fuel,
which is one reason we went for the Indo US
nuclear Right, but in ninety eight, it was almost nine
years since we had developed the weapons, and the scientists
(41:15):
told the Indian political leadership, you got to test because
we see a window closing. We have to test now
we have these designs, otherwise we will never be a
nuclear weapons program. So while narsamraw did try and test.
I think the evidence was detected by the US. They
warned us, they said, look, if you test, will come
(41:36):
down like a ton of bricks on you. Whatever the
word the wordage of that communication was but watched by
test today ninety eight and since then, the publicly available
figures suggest that we have about one hundred and fifty
weapons nuclear weapons. These are just estimates. I could be
(41:57):
way off, but the only estimates that you know. One
of the Federation of Atomic Scientists that tracks this says
that Pakistan has about one hundred and seventy yeah bombs
and we have a little less than that. So Pakistan
would have the world's sixth largest arsenal of nuclear weapons, and.
Speaker 4 (42:17):
It's growing.
Speaker 3 (42:19):
By the end of this decade, they could get something
like upwards of two hundred nuclear weapons. Because it's a
production line, you know, it's a production line that's been
churning out weapons for twenty years. And it's worrying because
the country the size of Pakistan, which has no geographical depth,
which is driven with extremism, and which is an economic
(42:41):
basket case. Where are they going to hide all these weapons?
Speaker 4 (42:44):
You know, they're going to run out of space. They're
going to run out of bases.
Speaker 3 (42:46):
They all had to dig deeper and deeper to hide
these weapons.
Speaker 1 (42:51):
Yeah, that was gonna be my next question.
Speaker 2 (42:53):
Kind of that actually is that you have a country
where unknown gunmen run.
Speaker 4 (42:59):
Right, all manner of people run, not.
Speaker 2 (43:02):
Just so how real is the fear, especially within the
Indian national security setup, of Pakistan's nukes falling into rogue
I mean, I would say roguer hands And a link
question to that, there is this widely held belief that
(43:23):
because of this fear, the US has some strict oversight
on Pakistan's nuclear weapons, and some actually say to the
extent of them being able to cancel a launch if
it were to happen. So one, do you think that
is the case, the US having that much oversight? And
the larger question, how big is the worry that at
some point they met up hands of people You don't well.
Speaker 4 (43:47):
Good question, Dave.
Speaker 3 (43:48):
And this has been a problem, This has been a
global worry actually ever since nine eleven, when al Kaeda
kept saying that look after the nine eleven attacks where
close to three thousand US civilians were killed, that said
they wanted to get hold of weapons of mass destruction,
and the closest address to that was Pakistan, right, because
they were all in Pakistan. Alca that was in Pakistan.
(44:10):
And you had this nuclear scientist called Sultan Bashiru Memo
who was a very bright nuclear scientist who was actually
in touch with al Kahi that he had gone and
met Osama bin Laden, right, And this is what worried
the United States, that they could be elements within the
(44:31):
Pakistani state that could compromise their nuclear weapons. There could
be a situation where there would be political instability, there
would be a regime collapse, and this rogue nukes lose
nukes kind of thing. Some general would run away with
a nuclear weapon or too and will they will use
it almost immediately. They will use it against the West.
(44:52):
They will try and attack targets in Saudi abr smuggle
it into the United States or into the West. And
this was a if you remember, this was a constant
trope in all the Hollywood movies of the early twenty
first century, right, you had the movies like The Peacemaker
and all of that. Yeah, this thing of a loose
nuke being used. So the Americans prepared contingency plans for this,
(45:16):
specifically for the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, what will they do
if there is this kind of an emergency. This was
somewhere after nine to eleven where you had a special
team that was you know, with with the spurts drawn
from all you know, not just the military, but civilians.
(45:39):
There were spies, special forces, guys who could be airborne
in a matter of hours and would reach the spot
and then try and you know, kind of extricate these
weapons or something like that. So there is and I
believe that that was a story that Samor Hirsch broke
in the New Yorker way back in two thousand and nine.
And I believe these contingencies have you know, the Americans,
(46:00):
I mean, you have to give it to them. They
prepare for all manner of contingencies and they have this
one contingency. And I believe they would have worked on this.
The possibility that, you know, extremeists could get hold of
nuclear weapons. What would they do in that thing? How
would they cancel a launch? How would they prevent this
kind of a launch. But that was a scenario where
Pakistan Siemini convinced the world their military was perfectly all right,
(46:25):
it's British trained, it's westernized, We're just like you. You know,
we love our whiskey and cigars and.
Speaker 1 (46:32):
You know all of that, flats in London.
Speaker 3 (46:34):
And flats in London and Dubai. But what do you
do in a scenario where you have somebody like Asimuni,
an extremist who takes over so here you are trying
to protect the Pakistani nuclear weapons from falling into extremists hands,
and lo and behold you have an extremist to the
army chief, you know, what do you say to that?
Speaker 4 (46:55):
Right?
Speaker 2 (46:55):
You know, in fact, I think I mean if he
make it ideas if he's watching this podcast, that actually
might be a good calling card for us in money.
For Trump, knowing from the way he is that you know,
he might say, hey, we need money to ensure the
safe ons.
Speaker 1 (47:07):
You help us, you know, ghq.
Speaker 4 (47:11):
Ravel Pinty playbook.
Speaker 3 (47:12):
You know, I'm sure we can actually sit and make
that pinty playbook. How to get money out of the Americans?
Right Number one, tell them that you're you know, extremists
are going to get hold of the nuclear weapons, Please
give us money. Number two, uh, India is going to
invaders and you know they're going to attack a lot
of American aircraft on the ground, give us money. Number three,
(47:36):
if you don't give us weapons free of course, if
you don't give us weapons, uh, you know we're going
to use nuclear weapons, so you better give us some
conventional weapons and given, you know, give them free.
Speaker 4 (47:47):
Number four.
Speaker 3 (47:48):
Uh, if you don't give us weapons, we'll go to
the Chinese. Chinese will become most He is our iron
brother and all that. So you know, Pakistan Munei, actually
not Pakistan. Money is a they've done doing that balancing
act between Shi Jinping and you know, Donald Trump, and
I'm sure he's going to meet an electric pole very soon.
Speaker 4 (48:09):
Yeah, it always happens.
Speaker 3 (48:10):
Look, look, every single dictator in Pakistan comes with this
idea that I am larger than life. You know, I
am the answer to all of Pakistan's problems.
Speaker 4 (48:21):
Are you what happened to you?
Speaker 3 (48:22):
Yeah? He was flushed down the toilet literally by the Pakistanis.
He's a good guy, right, well, meaning not to us,
but the Pakistanis. Ya Ya Khan triggers off a genocide
in Pakistan, loses half of Pakistan, and lives the rest
of his life in utter disgrace. He's an under house arrest.
That's Dictator number two. Dictator number three, ziaulhak Ah, I'm
(48:46):
God's answer to Pakistan and less than a decade exploding
mangoes right, Dictator number four Musharraff, I am finally the
answer to all of Pakistan's problems. What happens exile in
Dubai and the pervissure of who's on that hospital bed
is not the pervis measure of who we recognize. Who
I met here incidentally at the India Today conclave, completely unrecognizable, broken, defeated,
(49:13):
you know, forgotten by his people, and now it's the
data number five Simon, Yeah, so.
Speaker 2 (49:20):
I think, like you said earlier, it's not that much
of a laughing matter, because he might end up hitting
that electric pole eventually. But what he does until then,
until then, especially considering his views and his fundamentals beliefs,
that's going to be quite something.
Speaker 1 (49:36):
To watch, and we will watch.
Speaker 2 (49:37):
So my last question was going to be about, actually,
what's the endgame for him, but like you said, we
didn't watch right now. It's pretty dangerous what he said.
So my last question is going to be about the
US's gift to Pakistan. When Arsimuni was in the US
designation of the Baloche Liberation Army as a terrisk group
straight up gift obviously, because I think before this ide
(50:00):
I didn't even know the US was interested in the
Blocibration Army. I don't think even I don't think Trump
even news.
Speaker 3 (50:05):
So they designated them as a global terrorists in twenty nineteen.
So now what they've done is the Maji Brigade, which
is the unit of the BLA, has been designated you know, Okay,
So it's basically they're just you know, climping down very
hard on them. But you know, like you said that,
there's ever every reason to believe that this could be
one of the deliverables that you know, what did mo
(50:27):
you sit and talked to Trump for two hours about
must have gone with a long.
Speaker 4 (50:30):
List of yeah yeah stuff.
Speaker 3 (50:32):
So it's it's it's usual, it's predictable. The first couple
of things would have been points would have been conventional weapons.
I need F sixteen's, I need long range missiles, I
need radars, I need this, I need them free. I
have no money. I need this thing. In return, I'll
give you. I'll give you the Nobel Prize, I'll give
you minerals, I'll give you gas I'll give you my
(50:54):
non existent oil I'll give you. I'll rat on Iran
for you. I have all their this thing intel. I'll
write on Afghanistan for you if you want to even
sell the Chinese out for you.
Speaker 4 (51:04):
So you know.
Speaker 3 (51:06):
Pakistan, JSQ Rabbal Pindi, they're extremely transactional. And that's the
reason that this is like a meeting of minds. It's
a transactional US president meeting with a transactional Pakistan's.
Speaker 1 (51:20):
Meeting a CEO.
Speaker 4 (51:21):
Actually, yeah, it is.
Speaker 3 (51:22):
It is two CEOs meeting each other. So it's like
ravel Pindi meeting New York, New York realtor.
Speaker 2 (51:29):
Right, yeah, so I start cutting on my bla point.
But the question was also going to come to after
that was is this also part of Trump trying to
turn the crews on India. The reason I asked that
as because obviously Pakistan has been accusing India of fomenting
undressed in Balajhistan uh and has obviously accused India of
backing the bl and other such elements over there. So
(51:52):
this was sort of you know, something we were discussing
in the newsroom when this news came yesterday is that
would this be sort of a stepping stone for Trump
to at some point into three and a half years
he's still in the presidency to take that unprecedented step
of ending up naming an Indian as a potential terrorist.
(52:12):
So you know, you have only the case of the
former officer of Kasia, the US labels credit for taking
part in them. Yes, so do you think that may also.
Speaker 4 (52:22):
Have quite possible?
Speaker 3 (52:23):
I mean, this is a this is the playbook, and
you know what I really want to know at the
stage there is I don't know, we need more evidence
on this. Has Trump turned against the Indian government or
is it the entire US establishment? Because that would be worrisome.
If the US establishment is turned against us, then we
have a problem because then you're going back on a
(52:47):
relationship that you've built over twenty five years. Right, I'm
not for a minute advocating that we don't need better
ties with.
Speaker 4 (52:52):
The United States.
Speaker 3 (52:53):
We need even better ties than we have now. Right,
the US is simply too large to ignore. But still
we have to do it in such a way that
it doesn't compromise on our dignity and our sovereignty. Right,
they can't write rough shot on us. It has to
be on our terms, right, and what Trump is doing
(53:14):
the way he's humilating leaders, the way his name calling them,
and I think he's used some very harsh words with India,
you know, the dead economy and you know all of that.
I mean, this is not what there's not the language
that mature leaders use when they're talking of other countries
which you've built up relationships with and stuff. So I
think that that is always going to be the you know,
(53:37):
a sore point. But the point we have to look
for is that is the American establishment not running against us?
Because if that's the case, then we have a problem UH.
And we have a problem with this convergence of interest
that we discussed with Pakistan as well. And Pakistan is
always happy to play, you know, the useful idiots for
(53:57):
American games in this part of the world, like they.
Speaker 4 (54:00):
Have done in the past.
Speaker 3 (54:03):
And yeah, I think it's going to be a very
rough and tumultus three and a half years for US.
I four see, unless there is some breakthrough with UH
in Alaska who knows the fifteenth of August and you know,
going forward, possibly an end to the conflict where Trump
kind of gets distracted with you know, ending the war
and getting and getting the Nobel Priests gave him the
(54:24):
Nobel Peace.
Speaker 2 (54:27):
But yeah, you know a good point, Actuallyaim, I think
that's something that's a good idea for another.
Speaker 1 (54:30):
Episode we do, maybe very shortly.
Speaker 2 (54:32):
Actually, it's the turn in the US India try ties
because that's something when I've been wondering, because I've always
believed that when it comes to foreign policy, UH, leaders
don't really drastically change the country's policy. Been India, for example,
what you've talked about this sclation ladder, It's not as
though it's just the PM mode let government that's done that.
It's been happening on a snow boil over. The current
(54:54):
regime may have accelerated that process, been a bit more
you know, aggressive in that regard, but that was happen anyway.
So I've always felt that, you know, presidents, prime ministers, leaders,
they just sort of take that policy forward faster, slower,
but they do that.
Speaker 1 (55:09):
But this would be.
Speaker 2 (55:10):
Like you said, that's what, that's what, that's what I'm monday. Actually,
how is it possible for this one guy to certainly
just make the entire USD Department amenable to this idea
of what he's doing, but I think that's something we
can discuss at length or a different.
Speaker 3 (55:24):
Oh, this is a this is a long soapopular, yeah,
fastening half and a half.
Speaker 2 (55:30):
Ye man, it's just January, and I think most.
Speaker 3 (55:34):
Feels like it's been yeah, two or three years. The
trumpets like that, what's the time dilation? Yeah, you know,
it's like you think the days. You know, events that
happen over years now happening in days.
Speaker 4 (55:47):
Exactly right.
Speaker 1 (55:48):
Great, then I think we'll end the chat there.
Speaker 2 (55:50):
Thanks, and the fantastic chat has always loved by the
way you're insight and your answer about Pakistan nuclear program
and the fact that they got it before. I think
now that you've seen the weaponiz is before, weaponize before us,
now that you say it, it seems.
Speaker 3 (56:05):
Fairly deliverable weapons, deliverable weapons.
Speaker 1 (56:07):
Now that you say it, seems very fairly obvious. But
I think not a lot of people put their minds
to it and think of it that way.
Speaker 2 (56:12):
So thanks, great chat, Thanks a lot, Thank you, thanks
as always to our listeners and viewers. That's it for
this weeks, depends throughs for more tune in next week.
Tell then, stay safe and do not lost any boundaries.
Speaker 3 (56:21):
For the passport
This is India Today Podcasts.
Speaker 2 (00:05):
Welcome to Season three of Another Defense, the podcast that
takes you inside the world of conflict. I'm your host,
Deve Goswami and every week I sit down with experts
and retired officers from the Army, Navy and Air Force
to decode all things to do with India security and
explore what it truly means to serve. Get ready for
(00:27):
stories of strategy, sacrifice and strength.
Speaker 1 (00:32):
This is in our defense. Welcome to Another Defense.
Speaker 2 (00:37):
Kiki maklijs Ma Kali josakti heir but mah Mahoir. I
don't know what that means. But that's one of the
comments that Field Marshal Assimunir is reported to have said.
When he was in the US recently. He'd gone there
for an event, for a formal event. Actually he'd gone
there to a bit farewell to a top US military general,
(00:58):
somebody with whom he was in close touch with when
the general was serving in the in the Asia Pacific region.
Speaker 3 (01:04):
Uh.
Speaker 2 (01:04):
But there in the US he attended a private dinner
hosted by a Pakistani businessman where he's made this comment.
Speaker 4 (01:11):
Uh.
Speaker 2 (01:12):
This is part of many comments. The one that actually
has caught the tension of many in India and across
the world. Is where he basically went on new Nucleus
saber at ring by saying that if a push comes
to shave, Pakistan is ready to take down half the
world with it, by saying that we're a nuclear nation
and if it comes to that, we'll take down half
the world with it. Uh, you know, to unpack what's
(01:35):
happened exactly and what may have made him say this,
the timing of the comments, the location of the comment
coming when he was in the US, and for that
I have.
Speaker 3 (01:46):
Are you good to be back there? I thought for
a second we were going to talk about Shirley or something,
you know, when you.
Speaker 2 (01:51):
Begin thank god this is yeah Bollywood, Yeah, yeah, pretty
absurd statements. And we must say, by the very report
by Pravian Swami for the print, that's the one.
Speaker 1 (02:01):
Who got the scoop.
Speaker 2 (02:03):
There's no official confirmation obviously he pra means Swami says
he's spoken to people who were at the dinner who
told him in multiple so multiple sources who told him
in confidence of what Field Marsha Muni had said at
the dinner. Pakistan while reacting to India's statement on that
said that was a misinterpretation of his comments. I don't
(02:24):
know what, but yeah, pretty absurd comments, especially the one
what I said, the one about you know, India's like
Mercedes speeding along like a Ferrari and Pakistan is a
dumpster full of gravel. And if Mercedes speeding like a
Ferrari hits the dumster.
Speaker 3 (02:40):
Possibly the first Pakistani dictator who's called his country a
dumpster exactly. I don't know how he gets away with
so many things, but but you know, they've there's there's
a method to his madness, right. It's not an isolated statement.
It's certainly not Bollywood or Lolliwood whatever place in Pakistan.
There is a certain pattern to this us Munir. And
(03:00):
you know, I've been studying him for a couple of
months now, and I think he's a guy who flew
completely below the radar. Nobody really kind of figured what
kind of guy this chap was. You know, Initially one
thought that he is one of those people, one of
those wanna be dictators who think they are God's gift
to all of Pakistan's problems. We've seen that four times
(03:22):
in the past. But with Munir, it's something else. And
this is really scary because not only is this guy
he's very deeply he's a religious fundamentalist.
Speaker 4 (03:33):
Right.
Speaker 3 (03:33):
He makes no bones about the fact that he's memorized
the Qoran. That's not bad in itself, but you know,
he goes on to talk the kind of rhetoric that
he's been using very unlike any Pakistani military dictator or
even any Pakistani army chief. You know, they've been very
measured in what they say in public. Right, Munir is
someone who doesn't make any bones about what he thinks
(03:54):
and it just comes out like that. But that's not
an isolated phenomenon. The thing is that there seems to
be an increasing convergence between the US and Pakistan relationship,
and Munir is a symptom of a larger problem that
we are facing in our neighborhood, which is the United
(04:15):
States coming back into Pakistan about four years after it
had quit and run in a hurry. You know, under
Joe Biden's tenure, when they exited Afghanistan, they lost all
interests in Pakistan. And this is the pattern we've seen
repeatedly after eighty eight. You know, Pakistan's uses over after
the Afghan War, the US exits, and then you know
(04:35):
you have al Kai that they come back in. Then
twenty years later they lose interest and now they're coming
back in. And which is why I believe Munir's ranks
are a phenomenon. It's a pattern that's slowly building up.
Where it's going to head is something that we need
to figure out because I don't see good times ahead.
(04:58):
You know, when a Pakistani dictator and this way and
he's got the support of the United States, bad things
have happened in the past.
Speaker 2 (05:05):
Yeah, right, Uh, good point about how he's sort of
been under under the redar for the last couple of
years because I remember Ben Brankhan was the Prime Minister.
You had this whole sort of succession controversy in the
partisan in military. You had a fight between the military
and the PM on who would be the chief of
the I S I uh. And then there was some
(05:27):
some controversy about you know, there was this whole section
of general supporting this one general and that was happening.
Speaker 1 (05:33):
No one need that name never came up. It just
sort of just before.
Speaker 2 (05:38):
The attack that happened was when he made that rabbit
speech which many have linked to the attack itself. That's
when he sort of got of got some prominence in
Indian media and then you know what's happened, what happened since?
Uh So, before we actually go to the US comments
and the US backing the park military bit, because you
brought this up.
Speaker 1 (05:57):
You know, in the last episode, the last season of In.
Speaker 2 (06:01):
Our Defense, when I had Shivaru as the guest, we
talked many times about how in the last couple of years,
Pakistan has stopped sort of being India's big warry.
Speaker 4 (06:11):
Right.
Speaker 2 (06:11):
It was China the stand up that began during COVID
You had the Galvan Valley clash where you know, we
had many people dying, including the commanding officers. Right, so
China was the top focus and Pakistan seemed to have
been like you know, done and dusted because, like you said,
the US had no interest in it. Pakistan's economy was
in a free fall, so they had no finances sort
(06:31):
of back terrorism to forment trouble along the yellowc You
had that declaration to follow the seas Fire Agreement that
was signed many years earlier between the two dgmos of Pakistan.
Speaker 4 (06:41):
Because we wanted the Western front to be quite.
Speaker 1 (06:43):
Exactly to be quiet that we could focus on China.
Speaker 2 (06:45):
Then with the hell Caam that seems to have turned.
Pakistan now is in headlines. Pakistan has become a talking
point and the US again is involved.
Speaker 3 (06:52):
Right, so you know, good observations that they've and you
know what I see is a slow pattern emerging over here,
which is when Donald Trump comes into the White House,
you see a lot of activity suddenly, right, Pakistan is
all out to woo the United States. They say that, oh,
we've got this guy who was responsible for the ster
(07:13):
attack which killed American civilians a serviceman in Afghanistan twenty
twenty one. They handed over some low life and they
said he was the mastermind. And Trump appreciates it. There's
a minerals deal that's been talked about. There is another
deal for prospecting oil and gas, and all of that.
They're playing into Trump's hands.
Speaker 4 (07:33):
Literally.
Speaker 3 (07:34):
Yeah, they're telling Trump all the things that Trump wants
to hear, right, which is basically resources for peace and
to convince him somehow that you know, South Asia or
the Indian subcontinent is a deeply destabilized place and he
needs to come in use his good offices and which
is what happened during Operations Sindhur. Right, so Pakistan seems
(07:55):
to have got an edge over India in playing Donald
Trump charging is ego doing all of that, And there
was a slow build up which we kind of missed
right from January on. We thought that, you know, well,
Trump is a friend of India, upkey bar, Trump's our car,
all of that, right, But there was something else. There
was another game that was playing on there and we
(08:16):
saw that the ugly phase of that during Operations Sindur,
where Pakistan seems to have convinced the world that look
they got the United States to mediate, and not just
the United States, it's Donald Trump to mediate, right, And
Trump then picks that line and he goes on and
repeating it, much to our discomfort and embarrassment. And we
(08:36):
have called that out, Sala. The Government of India has
called it out, the maas called it out, the Prime
Minister has said so he's called Trump and said, look.
Speaker 4 (08:44):
There was no Pea state.
Speaker 3 (08:45):
We agreed to cease fire only when the pakistanis called
up on the tenth of May and said enough, you know,
stop and we be escalated. Then the operation continues. Now
my point is that US couldn't have said all of
this if he did not have the backing of the
United States. Pakistani military dictators don't function very well in isolation.
(09:10):
When they have the United States behind them, bad things
happen in the neighborhood. We saw that in the seventies
when you had General Ziaoul Haku was in the doghouse
for unseating Zulfi Karali Bhuto, no friend of India. Incidentally,
he executed Zerei Bhutto and the entire Pakistani nuclear weapons
(09:33):
program was under American sanctions. And then lo and behold,
the Soviets invade Afghanistan in nineteen seventy nine and Zia
becomes this frontline ally in this war against the Soviets.
The Americans turn a blind eye to the nuclear weapons
program and the proliferation that's going on. Pakistan gets the bomb,
and then the Americans exit. Pakistan is once again in
(09:56):
the wilderness, and then lo and behold, nine to eleven happen.
The Americans re enter the scene. Musharaf is the dictator.
He escapes sanctions, and forget escaping sanctions, he manages to
expand the Pakistani nuclear arsenal while the Americans are watching, right,
Pakistan is already a nuclear weapons state in nineteen ninety eight.
(10:17):
So that's what my point is. If you know, every
time the Americans enter the subcontinent, Pakistani dictators get emboldened,
their behavior changes, and we're seeing that with Muni a
third time when Trump is entered the Indian subcontinent supposedly
playing this you know peacemaker. You know, he wants a
Nobel prize, and he's trying to build up his case
(10:38):
for a Nobel because he says, look, I've so called
mediated this peace thing between India and Pakistan. I have
brought Armenia and Azerbaijan to the negotiating table. I am
now off to Russia and Ukraine to end the war
in the longest, the most savage war of the twenty
first century. So Trump is making a case for him
and Pakistan seems to have figured that out. They're massaging Ego,
(11:00):
they're giving him all the resources and you know, the oil.
There's no oil in Pakistan's snake oil. Right, there's probably
some gas. A lot of it is in GSQ Rabble
Pindy incident. Right. They seem to have fool Trump. And
this happens every time. They've done it with Ronald Reagan,
in the seventies and eighties, they did it with George W. Bush,
and now they're doing it with Trump. It's a familiar pattern.
(11:23):
It's a familiar playbook. Anyone who's been around long enough
would know that this is the Ghq Rabble Pindy playbook.
And that's playing out in front of our eyes.
Speaker 2 (11:33):
Which is exactly what the statement also said when they
responded to Moni's comments in the US that they said, basically,
this is exactly what happens when you have the US
packing the parfessonal military. But what I'm still not able
to understand is the why of it. So the previous
examples you gave that those make they made such strategic sense.
So you had the Soviets invading the Khanistan, so US
(11:54):
wanted to contain them. Pakistan as the staging base Afghanistan
response to the nine eleven at time, So you began
this war on terror, and again you need a Pakistan
for your basis and support.
Speaker 1 (12:06):
Briefly, we thought.
Speaker 2 (12:07):
Of when the Israeli Ran conflict was at a peak,
that the US may need Pakistan once again for staging basis, support, visits,
et cetera. But that sort of phizzled out and after
the US bombing Iran's and you civil nuclear side. It's
what Iran claims.
Speaker 1 (12:22):
So what's the need for the US to cozy up
to Pakistan?
Speaker 3 (12:26):
Well, you know several reasons there they and the first
reason is of course the basis. Right, you enter Pakistan,
you get access to their basis, which I believe Muni
has already promised them. You can look at Iran, you
can look at Afghanistan, you can look at China and India. Right,
that's a very strategic location. And that is all Pakistan
(12:49):
is to the west. Pakistan is strategically located. It is
like a massive, massive base. It has no qualms about
renting its territory out. This is a country that has
allowed its citizens to be killed by the Americans and
then claimed bounties for that. Can you believe that this
is unimaginable parves measure of said that, you know, the
(13:13):
former dictator of Pakistan mentioned that in his autobiography that
we were actually collecting bounties from the United States for
pakistanis who are terrorists?
Speaker 4 (13:23):
Right?
Speaker 3 (13:23):
That's how low it gets. You're allowing a foreign country.
It's like you know those scanned hunts that we hear
of in South Africa where you can go and pay
a lot of money and shoot elephant and wild game
and all that.
Speaker 4 (13:32):
Pakistan is like that.
Speaker 3 (13:34):
It's a wild game preserve and you know, you can
do what you want to in Pakistan as long as
the money is right. But you know there's another subtext
to this what we're seeing right now. Theyve that is
what happened on the tenth of May, right, Yeah, a
lot of us don't understand how truly groundbreaking. What happened
(13:56):
on the tenth of me is operations indur. We just say, oh,
operations in India struck, you know, Pakistani air bases and
all that. But you have to understand that what India
actually did was to strike at Pakistan's nuclear vectors. And
by nuclear vectors, I mean the means to deliver a
(14:16):
nuclear weapon. Pakistans rise on the Atra for the last
four decades. When it comes to the nuclear weapons, is
that it wants to establish deterrence against India. They have
what is called nuclear weapons enabled terrorism, which means that
it uses nuclear weapons as a shield while it uses
a sword of the War of one thousand cuts you know,
(14:37):
terror attacks against India, and when we threaten to attack
them conventionally, they say, look, we have nuclear weapons, the
subcontinent will be nuclear.
Speaker 4 (14:45):
You know, there will be a nuclear war, you know.
Speaker 3 (14:47):
And then they shout and then they ask for the
world to intervene to prevent an attack on them. Now,
this strategy is held from the eighties through the nineties
and for over two and a half decades ever since
they became a nuclear weapons par and if you look
at it, the pattern is similar. They attack parliament, India mobilizers.
(15:07):
There's a nuclear weapons threat that's made the situation disengages.
They tried that several times, several sensational attacks twenty sixty
eleven and all of that. But now, for the first time,
you have a political leadership that is not deterred by
Pakistan's nuclear weapons, which carries out a series of attacks.
(15:29):
I call it a rampage because a BrahMos missile attack
of the time that we launched on Pakistan in thirty minutes,
attacking their air bases from the north to the south,
completely shook Pakistan's nuclear establishment. The Strategic Plans Division, which
you know, strategizes how they move their nuclear weapons that
(15:49):
handles their nuclear weapons. They must have been in a
state of panic because Pakistan has two nuclear vectors, right,
It has air launched weapons and it has ground launched weapons.
Launched weapons are its F sixteens and its Mirage threes,
which are configured to drop gravity bombs at atomic weapons.
And the ground based vector are the tls, the transporter
(16:10):
erector launchers which are their Abdhali series and the Shahin
series missiles which have nuclear weapons on them. Now, when
you attack their air bases, it means they can't fly
their aircraft, right, they have to withdraw to other bases.
They have to withdraw away from the basis where they've
kept their nuclear weapons, which means you have negated the
(16:32):
air vector. Now for the tels to move, you need
the air cover that the aircraft of the Air Force provide.
So when there are no aircraft flying, you don't have
your ground based vector as well. So they are deeply vulnerable.
And I think this is the kind of panic that
we're seeing in Pakistan, that their entire nuclear doctrine, which
(16:54):
they've built on three decades, in half an hour, the
Indian political leadership, the Prime Minister, Prime MINISTERM. Modia said
We're not going to be blackmailed by a nuclear weapons
and that is frightened them. And I think what Muni
has said in Tampa, Florida just last week is a
(17:14):
manifestation of that utter panic in pakistan strategic community. And
this is I spoke with left General Rabishankar. Actually I
must give him credit for that. We spoke together on
this and he believes this is what's going on right now,
that there is panic in pakistan strategic community because they
feel that their nuclear weapons. See, Pakistan's nuclear weapons are
(17:38):
not about deterring the Indian military, right, that's a fact.
It is to deter the Indian political leadership. Pakistan achieved
nuclear weapons parity with India the minute the first F
sixteen flew with a nuclear weapon under its belly. When
one bomb could fly in an F six team, the
(18:01):
Indian political leadership was, which actually is going to you know,
initiate a conventional war. They took a pause. They said, look,
you know what if it goes nuclear. They didn't understand
the escalation ladder, which is what this government seems to
have understood. There's that one comment that Admiral Promote made
in the brieface. If you remember we discussed this where
(18:22):
he said that we had an escalation ladder worked out,
and that must have scared them because now you're looking
not just as the Indian leadership that has figured out
the escalation ladder, but is now slowly calibrating moving up
the ladder. So even as you know, as unreasonable as
(18:42):
these attacks might look to the Pakistanis, it was very calibrated.
They only hit about eleven or twelve bases. There is
a lot more BrahMos missiles from where they came from, right,
But it was messaging to Pakistan right sees, desist, do
not escalate because if you escalate, there will be war attacks.
Speaker 4 (19:01):
Right.
Speaker 3 (19:01):
So what you're seeing now with Munir's rant, oh nuclear weapons,
we're going to do this, that is they really don't
know what's going on. And the one person I'm waiting
for to come out and speak is a gentleman of
Lieutenant General Khalid Kidway. Now he was the head of
the Strategic Plant's Division in Pakistan. He is like literally
(19:23):
their nuclear Ayatollahs, a very calm, quiet composed guy. He's
headed the SPD for several years. And when Khalid Kidway
speaks the world listens, and he's spoken only publicly only twice,
in two thousand and in two thousand and two. I remember, Yes,
two thousand and two is the first time he spoke
(19:44):
when he said, when he enunciated the red lines that
Pakistan had before it would go nuclear. It is that
if you conquered a large part of Pakistan's territory, if
you destroyed their military machinery, their capability to capacity to
wage war, if you strangulated them economically, or if you
(20:05):
destabilize them politically, these are four red lines, we would
go nuclear as soon as.
Speaker 4 (20:10):
They were crossed.
Speaker 3 (20:11):
So it was basically telling us that if you do
these things to us, we will attack you with nuclear weapons.
And then he said he spoke again in twenty twenty
after Balacote, Yes, where he said, look, we aim to
not establish parity with India. We want escalation dominance, which
is we will threaten you with so many nuclear weapons
that you will be forced to, you know, rethink and a.
(20:32):
And now five years later there's utter silence. So I
believe that the Pakistan strategic community has, you know, gone
back to the drawing board. They're trying to work things
out because they've been hit by a number of things,
by a number of vectors, not just by missiles. The
Indus Water Treaty, that's again an out of syllabus questions.
You know, sixty five years nobody ever thought that the
(20:55):
IWT was on the table. It was that it will
never be touched. It is this enduring treaty. It will
last until you know, the Earth, until the sun burns
out a million years from now or something like that.
But it is now on the table, right, And which
is why they're confused, like, oh, these guys have called
out our nuclear blackmail and they've they're squeezing us in
(21:18):
the Indus Water Treaty. So while Munir might have been
shouting in April about Kashmir being his juggler and all that,
it's the Indus that's his juggler, right, and they're aware
of that. They're frightened. They're back at the drawing board.
I'm sure Karige Kidway, he's very old now, he must
be in his early eighties from.
Speaker 4 (21:35):
What I remember.
Speaker 3 (21:36):
They're sitting and they're working out how do we deter
the Indians. Now, you know, these guys are unpredictable. They're
becoming like us, you know, what we once were, right,
So that's frightened them, and I think Muniir is a
manifestation of that. He has to show strength, he has
to show bluster, and like all Pakistan military dictators in
(21:57):
the past, he is a dictator. He's de facto control
ruler of Pakistan. I feel that he is going to
do something really stupid to prove his point. Where that's
going to end. I really don't know.
Speaker 2 (22:09):
Right, you know, I obviously want to talk a bit
more about Pakistan's than nukes. But before we do that again,
back to his comments in the US.
Speaker 1 (22:17):
Whom were they aimed at?
Speaker 2 (22:19):
Because or am I to naive to think that Asimuni thought,
it's a close to an event of mostly Pakistanis. I'm
guessing all of them Pakistanis. It's not going to go anywhere.
He was not expecting it to go out in the media.
Whom were those comments aimed Well, you know.
Speaker 3 (22:33):
Both his comments they have been made before the Pakistani diaspora, right,
the first one in April that ran about two nation
theory and Hindu Muslim and all that street thug language.
That was also the diaspora. Then you had this one
in Tampa, Florida, as about nuclear weapons and you know
Pakistan and India and all that. So you know, in
(22:54):
a very narrow sense, I think it was to the diaspora.
He was talking to them, because there's nothing you can
tell the diaspora that will encourage them, that will motivate them,
that will get them to lose in their pockets. He
needs money, yeah, he needs money, right, Which is the
only two emotive things that Muni can think of is religion.
(23:17):
Pakistan was created on the basis of religion and the
only technological breakthrough that they have had since nineteen forty seven,
which is nuclear weapons. So in one speech in April
before six days before Parlagam, he talks about religion. The
second speech he talks about religion and nuclear weapons. Oh,
we have this great nuclear power and we're going to
(23:39):
whack them and we'll bomb them and drop missiles on them,
and you know stuff like that. So in a narrow sence,
he's talking to the diaspora. And I know for a
fact that the diaspora is now Pakistan is realized that
they need to weaponize their diaspora, not only get money
from them. There is there are credible reports of the
diaspora being used even to get weapons as well through
(24:02):
front companies. Right in the UK. They're on a weapons
buying spree as you know. Uh, they're trying to you know,
build up whatever they lost during operations Sindur and to
get weapons. They believe we are going to give them
a conventional edge over India. They need the diaspora for that.
So Muni needs to talk to the diaspora, he needs
to motivate them. So that is one part of his speech.
(24:26):
The other one, of course, is to tell America that, look,
you know, as you said about Pakistan, Pakistan is a
country that negotiates with a gun to its head, right,
So he says, hello, we're extremely you know, we're a
very unstable part of the world.
Speaker 4 (24:43):
Mister Trump. We need you.
Speaker 3 (24:44):
You need to come and make peace between US and
India because otherwise it's going to be nuclear weapons launch.
And Trump will wag in and say that, oh, look,
look I told you this place is so unstable. They
need a peacemaker like me. They need to give me
a Nobel. And you know I would even go so far.
They have to say, I wouldn't put it past Asimuni
if he actually tests a nuclear weapon. I mean The
(25:06):
guy is in such a bad spot right now, right,
he needs to do something to recover his lost crown.
And what better way to flex your muscle and prove
your matches more than to detonate a weapon. Imran Khan
couldn't detonate a bomb. I detonated a nuclear war. You know,
he could even do that, And I think we should
prepare for all of these contingencies.
Speaker 4 (25:28):
What if he does that?
Speaker 3 (25:30):
And you know it was it was different if it
was another American president, and even Biden, right even, but
with Trump, an unpredictable Pakistani dictator, an unpredictable US president
who knows how did he'd react. He wouldn't impose sanctions,
even he might say, look, I told you they've exploded
(25:51):
a weapon, they've tested a weapon.
Speaker 4 (25:53):
South Asia is very unstable.
Speaker 3 (25:55):
They need me. We need to bring peace over there.
I've just started talking to put In. Looks like I
had to talk to India and Pakistan as well. So
this plays into Trump's playbook, Right, I brought peace, I
bombed Iran, and I brought peace in between Iran and Israel.
So this is part of this whole playbook that's going on.
(26:17):
And that's the reason I feel that the next few
months are going to be very, very.
Speaker 1 (26:23):
Scary.
Speaker 2 (26:24):
Also in fact, I mean, you know, knowing Trump's love
for strong men, Oh he loves dictators. He might actually
love love the idea of Pakistani. Pakistani of course great
loves nuclear weapons.
Speaker 3 (26:36):
Yeah, show off strength, Look, strong man, Pakistan, strong man
detonates weapon. I mean, this is crazy, and you know,
I see the pain in our diplomats, in our military people,
in our politicians. We can't do this kind of stuff, right.
We are a responsible nation and we have no option
but to keep calm and carry on. Right. We cannot
(26:59):
be unpredicted. Well, we can't be mercurial. We have a
reputation to protect. We are not going to toss aside
twenty five fifty seventy five years of what we've built
so far just because we want to, you know, react
to some crazy guy on the block.
Speaker 2 (27:18):
One point on the US US topic is how much
of this is linked to what we discuss in the
previous episode, where India seemingly is playing a bit of
a hard ball game with the US and Trump definitely
not liking it. India is saying, insisting that you were
not involved in lating the pause.
Speaker 4 (27:38):
Of fighting.
Speaker 2 (27:40):
India and its stocks being consistent on that point that
you will not get access to completely all of agriculture
market in India. How much of this is linked to
that or do you think both of these are entirely
separate issue.
Speaker 3 (27:54):
No, I think they're linked. They've and you knows, as
you mentioned, the fact is that Trump wants a win
from India. He wants to say that, oh, you know,
there was this thing I negotiated with India, and there was,
you know, such a hard bargain and finally we agreed
at this I got what I wanted. Or you have
to say, oh, you know, I negotiated this speech deal
(28:14):
and Indians loved me for it and they hailed me
and they nominated me for a Nobel or they're going
to buy ten billion dollars worth of uh, you know
arms from the United States.
Speaker 4 (28:26):
Look, I did it. I did it.
Speaker 3 (28:27):
We haven't given him a win, and he doesn't know
what to do right. The silence here is that the
fifty years of Shorely, right, Can I can I use
a can I use.
Speaker 4 (28:36):
A shole line?
Speaker 3 (28:37):
Yet?
Speaker 1 (28:38):
Of course? Yeah?
Speaker 3 (28:39):
No, sanata q By, she doesn't know why we haven't
responded yet, and we haven't risen to the bait, you know.
So I think he's a little confused, he's a little puzzled,
and he's now you know, going to uh probably take
the tariffs even higher to get a reaction out of us.
Speaker 4 (28:56):
Right.
Speaker 3 (28:56):
So, but but you know, the point being that he
loves dictators, and he says it more openly there. But
I think Americans, the American establishment, they love dictators. They
love them across the world. And you've seen it, and
you know, there's a playbook here, and I would say
it because when you mentioned Imran Khan, that was the
first thing that flashed through my mind. You remember the
(29:18):
Egyptian experiment post the Arab Spring, Yes, where they had
this popular elected uh Mohammed Morcy, who came there. He
was in a he was wearing a suit, and he
was wearing rimless glasses. He was on the cover of
Time magazine and says he's the man of the moment,
Mohmed Morcy, representative of people. And then they discover, oh
(29:40):
he's Muslim brotherhood. Oh he's an extremist. Oh you know,
and can we get someone else? Uh, can we get
another host name of Barak? Yeah? Sure, there's the former
chief there, General Alcci. So lo and behold, Morcy is
in prison and Cissy's in power.
Speaker 4 (29:57):
Right, this is the playbook.
Speaker 3 (29:59):
Imran Khan shows a bit of independence and he starts
speaking his own mind. He actually believes he's in control
and lo and behold he's in prison and.
Speaker 1 (30:09):
His life we'll see, we'll see.
Speaker 2 (30:15):
Yeah, but good point on that, because you know there's
something we were discussing in the newsroom that uh, you know,
India was very wise to reject Trump's offer when he
called Modi just before his first visit to the US,
and he invited him very strangely.
Speaker 4 (30:30):
So it was a trap.
Speaker 2 (30:31):
Yeah, it was a trap because I think what he
wanted was a photo. Actually he wanted to have the
arsimonyal by side, like raising hands.
Speaker 4 (30:38):
You saw that.
Speaker 3 (30:40):
Photograph exactly Trump with those you know, saying I did it.
You know, I said, my god.
Speaker 1 (30:44):
But he wanted he wanted that, and again did not
give him that some right, we'll talk more about this,
but a quick break when the.
Speaker 5 (30:55):
Activor came, it was such a revolution. It was a scooter,
which means it was more worth the time.
Speaker 3 (31:03):
It wasn't fast, it was very plain looking, it was
very simple, and that was what it's sort of USB was.
Speaker 5 (31:11):
That's what clicked the simplicity. You remember, I spoke about
the tranetic Honda, each and every feature which the kinetic
Honda had, which was essentially a Honda. The act ever
did it slightly better, so much so viewers. The Active
in two thousand and one had the same suspension as
(31:33):
the CAN so when you would break the front breaks,
it would come up, and if you would hit the
rear breaks, it would dip because it was anti diveno sense,
you know, like even recently, I think Active has discovered
discovered telescopic folks.
Speaker 1 (31:52):
Last to last year, I think so.
Speaker 2 (31:55):
Yeah.
Speaker 4 (31:55):
I think it was the.
Speaker 5 (31:56):
Same suspension which kept on going, going, going, even until
the last couple of years.
Speaker 4 (32:02):
But it worked.
Speaker 1 (32:08):
Welcome back, Sandip.
Speaker 2 (32:10):
I want to talk a bit about Pakistan's nuclear weapons,
the program itself and the situation right now.
Speaker 1 (32:19):
The program, you know, growing.
Speaker 2 (32:21):
Up, I've read lots about how it was a dirty program,
but unfortunately I haven't done a deep dive into it.
Speaker 1 (32:28):
So I think I am very interested.
Speaker 2 (32:31):
I'm pretty sure our listeners and viewers will be pretty
interested if you can sort of give us a sort
of a very short history lesson on how did Pakistan
end up getting its nuclear weapons?
Speaker 1 (32:40):
The iq Khant chapter.
Speaker 2 (32:42):
And also, even though this may be a naive question,
but how is it that when it comes to nuclear
program which will take decades for any country, it has
taken decades for many countries. How is it that when
India had its second round of tests, pok run to
Pakistan was able to test within a couple of weeks.
Speaker 4 (33:00):
Good question.
Speaker 3 (33:00):
You want me to answer that first? I will answer
that that last part of your question. First, The fact
is that Pakistan weaponized before we did, right, Yeah, we tested,
but the weapon that we tested was not a weapon,
was not a deliverable weapon.
Speaker 1 (33:20):
Right right.
Speaker 3 (33:21):
It was a large device. And that device could not
be put onto a vector. It couldn't be put in
a on the tip of a missile or even you know,
rolled out of a cargo aircraft or launched in any
particular way. It was a test of a device. That
device was very large. I don't want to get into
the details of that device. But that was nineteen seventy four,
(33:43):
the poke Roon one test, that's right. And but what
we did, what we tested in ninety eight was a deliverable.
Speaker 1 (33:50):
Device or a series of five.
Speaker 3 (33:52):
The five tests were deliverable devices and then nuclear power.
Speaker 4 (33:56):
That's correct.
Speaker 3 (33:57):
So how it starts is that India's new clear weapons
program was a reaction to China going nuclear. So when
we fought with that border war with China in nineteen
sixty two, neither India nor China were nuclear weapon states.
China went nuclear in nineteen sixty four, just two years
(34:17):
after the war. And you must understand that in sixty two,
the kind of shock to the Indian system that you
could well have lost the entire northeast of India, right
that is a large chunk of territory. There was nothing
between the Chinese and say East Pakistan. They could have
just rolled all the way up there. We would have
(34:38):
lost the entire northeast. That frightened the America, the Indian establishment,
and that is one of the reasons that we started
going nuclear. We started pursuing a covert nuclear program. It
was couched in the civilian Nuclear Energy program sixty four.
When China tested, we accelerated the program. They were they
(35:02):
were bomb scientists like Homi Baba who said we need
to all of you watched rocket boys.
Speaker 4 (35:08):
You know the story. Homi Baba was.
Speaker 3 (35:10):
One of our most ardent advocates of a nuclear bomb.
And in seventy two, when Pakistan came out of the
Indoor Park War with half of Pakistan it lost East Pakistan.
Speaker 4 (35:26):
They were in a state of shock.
Speaker 3 (35:28):
And Sulfi Bhutto Zai Bhutto lined up all the Pakistani
scientists and military men and said, we will eat grass,
but we will build a bomb. Now, when a country,
even as poor and as technologically challenged as Pakistan, sets
its mind to a nuclear weapons program, they can get it.
(35:50):
And the proof is North Korea. Yes, despite all of
the you know, the economy and all of that, it's
become a state project. They got the bomb two decades ago.
Pakistan began the nuclear weapons program. It was there in
the sixties. They also had civilian nuclear reactors. But the
interesting thing is that when they began the program in
(36:10):
seventy two, they found a very powerful set of allies,
the United States and China. Now, the US was deeply
worried about India coming out the way it did in
nineteen seventy one. He had disregarded American saber rattling. Kissinger
wanted the Chinese to roll down the things and tell
(36:31):
the Indians, you know, all those declassified things are there.
We were literally fighting a three front walk Pakistan on
one side, the United States and China, like three of
them had ganged upon India. We only had the Soviet Union. Now,
Pakistan comes out in the seventies with its nuclear weapons program.
It accelerates through the late seventies. When ziaulhak Stage is
(36:54):
a coup in the late seventies, he not only executes
zere Bhutto, but he gets the military into the nuclear
weapons program. The military grabs the Pakistani nuclear weapons program
nascent program then and it never lets go. It is
the only country in the world today out of the
eight nuclear powers, it is the only country where the
military directly controls nuclear weapons. And that's the reason we
(37:17):
must take what Asimuni said very seriously. He actually has
his finger on the button.
Speaker 4 (37:22):
Right.
Speaker 3 (37:22):
But back to this story of how they got it
is China entered the game in the seventies a very
close ally of Pakistan, and in the early eighties they
did something that no country has done in eighty years
that nuclear weapons have been around. Right. August twenty twenty
five is the eightieth anniversary of the first use of
(37:45):
nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In eighty years, no
country has transferred nuclear weapons blueprints fissile material to another country.
China did that in the early eighties, and we believe
that the Chinese even tested a nuclear weapon for the Pakistanis.
We know that because in nearly two decades ago, when
(38:10):
Gadafi surrendered his nuclear weapons program to the United Nations,
he feared the Americans would invade, so he surrendered whatever
he had. They found bomb blueprints of a weapon called
the CCHI C four, which is a Chinese fifteen kilotan
nuclear device, which had been given to Pakistan. So the
Chinese had not only given the and of course Pakistan
(38:32):
sold it to got to see the Aku.
Speaker 4 (38:35):
Khan, you know network.
Speaker 3 (38:38):
Now, China not only gave them the design, the blueprints,
the facile material, they tested the weapon for them. They
even gave them the missiles to launch those nuclear weapons.
This kind of close collaboration between two countries is unheard of,
even in the world of nuclear prot feration. This kind
(39:02):
of support one country has given to the other. So
the Akugan was a smoke screen. He did get some
of those centrifugies, but the bulk of the stuff actually
came from China, right, So it was Chinese support that
made Pakistan and nuclear weapons state. And why did the
Chinese do it? Next question is they wanted to firewall India.
They saw, I mean, they are an empire, right, they
(39:24):
play the long game. They understood that if India kept advancing, modernizing,
became a military part, they'd become a threat to China. Right,
So they've wanted to create Pakistan as that subcontinental threat
for India that would forever firewalls into the Indian subcontinent.
And they've done that not just with Pakistan, they've done
(39:46):
it with North Korea. They support North Korea because North
Korea acts as a hedge against South Korea and Japan
and of course the United States.
Speaker 4 (39:54):
So their whole worldview is.
Speaker 3 (39:56):
That the barbarians at the gate must never unify because
if they un they will threaten US. So keep them
fighting amongst themselves. That's how they played. They played the
long game. They saw Pakistan as useful in this war
against India, and therefore they armed them. So that's the
birth of Pakistan's.
Speaker 4 (40:13):
Nuclear weapons program.
Speaker 3 (40:14):
And so back to your question of nineteen ninety eight,
how did they test, they already had the weapon, they
had several weapons. They had about a dozen weapons then
I'm not sure what our numbers were. We tested because
our weapons program was one of the last things that
the outgoing Raji Gandi government sanctioned in nineteen eighty nine,
(40:35):
One of the last things that Raji Gandhi okaide was
to restart the Indian nuclear weapons program, which had been
actually put back in the basement after seventy four because
we came under tremendous sanctions global sanctions. Right we were
the sixth country. This exclusive club of five countries was
not going to allow a sixth country to enter this
(40:55):
exclusive club. They put all manner of sanctions to ensure
that our our capacity to develop this weapons program was crippled.
Enormous tanctions of put our reactors would not get fuel,
which is one reason we went for the Indo US
nuclear Right, but in ninety eight, it was almost nine
years since we had developed the weapons, and the scientists
(41:15):
told the Indian political leadership, you got to test because
we see a window closing. We have to test now
we have these designs, otherwise we will never be a
nuclear weapons program. So while narsamraw did try and test.
I think the evidence was detected by the US. They
warned us, they said, look, if you test, will come
(41:36):
down like a ton of bricks on you. Whatever the
word the wordage of that communication was but watched by
test today ninety eight and since then, the publicly available
figures suggest that we have about one hundred and fifty
weapons nuclear weapons. These are just estimates. I could be
(41:57):
way off, but the only estimates that you know. One
of the Federation of Atomic Scientists that tracks this says
that Pakistan has about one hundred and seventy yeah bombs
and we have a little less than that. So Pakistan
would have the world's sixth largest arsenal of nuclear weapons, and.
Speaker 4 (42:17):
It's growing.
Speaker 3 (42:19):
By the end of this decade, they could get something
like upwards of two hundred nuclear weapons. Because it's a
production line, you know, it's a production line that's been
churning out weapons for twenty years. And it's worrying because
the country the size of Pakistan, which has no geographical depth,
which is driven with extremism, and which is an economic
(42:41):
basket case. Where are they going to hide all these weapons?
Speaker 4 (42:44):
You know, they're going to run out of space. They're
going to run out of bases.
Speaker 3 (42:46):
They all had to dig deeper and deeper to hide
these weapons.
Speaker 1 (42:51):
Yeah, that was gonna be my next question.
Speaker 2 (42:53):
Kind of that actually is that you have a country
where unknown gunmen run.
Speaker 4 (42:59):
Right, all manner of people run, not.
Speaker 2 (43:02):
Just so how real is the fear, especially within the
Indian national security setup, of Pakistan's nukes falling into rogue
I mean, I would say roguer hands And a link
question to that, there is this widely held belief that
(43:23):
because of this fear, the US has some strict oversight
on Pakistan's nuclear weapons, and some actually say to the
extent of them being able to cancel a launch if
it were to happen. So one, do you think that
is the case, the US having that much oversight? And
the larger question, how big is the worry that at
some point they met up hands of people You don't well.
Speaker 4 (43:47):
Good question, Dave.
Speaker 3 (43:48):
And this has been a problem, This has been a
global worry actually ever since nine eleven, when al Kaeda
kept saying that look after the nine eleven attacks where
close to three thousand US civilians were killed, that said
they wanted to get hold of weapons of mass destruction,
and the closest address to that was Pakistan, right, because
they were all in Pakistan. Alca that was in Pakistan.
(44:10):
And you had this nuclear scientist called Sultan Bashiru Memo
who was a very bright nuclear scientist who was actually
in touch with al Kahi that he had gone and
met Osama bin Laden, right, And this is what worried
the United States, that they could be elements within the
(44:31):
Pakistani state that could compromise their nuclear weapons. There could
be a situation where there would be political instability, there
would be a regime collapse, and this rogue nukes lose
nukes kind of thing. Some general would run away with
a nuclear weapon or too and will they will use
it almost immediately. They will use it against the West.
(44:52):
They will try and attack targets in Saudi abr smuggle
it into the United States or into the West. And
this was a if you remember, this was a constant
trope in all the Hollywood movies of the early twenty
first century, right, you had the movies like The Peacemaker
and all of that. Yeah, this thing of a loose
nuke being used. So the Americans prepared contingency plans for this,
(45:16):
specifically for the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, what will they do
if there is this kind of an emergency. This was
somewhere after nine to eleven where you had a special
team that was you know, with with the spurts drawn
from all you know, not just the military, but civilians.
(45:39):
There were spies, special forces, guys who could be airborne
in a matter of hours and would reach the spot
and then try and you know, kind of extricate these
weapons or something like that. So there is and I
believe that that was a story that Samor Hirsch broke
in the New Yorker way back in two thousand and nine.
And I believe these contingencies have you know, the Americans,
(46:00):
I mean, you have to give it to them. They
prepare for all manner of contingencies and they have this
one contingency. And I believe they would have worked on this.
The possibility that, you know, extremeists could get hold of
nuclear weapons. What would they do in that thing? How
would they cancel a launch? How would they prevent this
kind of a launch. But that was a scenario where
Pakistan Siemini convinced the world their military was perfectly all right,
(46:25):
it's British trained, it's westernized, We're just like you. You know,
we love our whiskey and cigars and.
Speaker 1 (46:32):
You know all of that, flats in London.
Speaker 3 (46:34):
And flats in London and Dubai. But what do you
do in a scenario where you have somebody like Asimuni,
an extremist who takes over so here you are trying
to protect the Pakistani nuclear weapons from falling into extremists hands,
and lo and behold you have an extremist to the
army chief, you know, what do you say to that?
Speaker 4 (46:55):
Right?
Speaker 2 (46:55):
You know, in fact, I think I mean if he
make it ideas if he's watching this podcast, that actually
might be a good calling card for us in money.
For Trump, knowing from the way he is that you know,
he might say, hey, we need money to ensure the
safe ons.
Speaker 1 (47:07):
You help us, you know, ghq.
Speaker 4 (47:11):
Ravel Pinty playbook.
Speaker 3 (47:12):
You know, I'm sure we can actually sit and make
that pinty playbook. How to get money out of the Americans?
Right Number one, tell them that you're you know, extremists
are going to get hold of the nuclear weapons, Please
give us money. Number two, uh, India is going to
invaders and you know they're going to attack a lot
of American aircraft on the ground, give us money. Number three,
(47:36):
if you don't give us weapons free of course, if
you don't give us weapons, uh, you know we're going
to use nuclear weapons, so you better give us some
conventional weapons and given, you know, give them free.
Speaker 4 (47:47):
Number four.
Speaker 3 (47:48):
Uh, if you don't give us weapons, we'll go to
the Chinese. Chinese will become most He is our iron
brother and all that. So you know, Pakistan Munei, actually
not Pakistan. Money is a they've done doing that balancing
act between Shi Jinping and you know, Donald Trump, and
I'm sure he's going to meet an electric pole very soon.
Speaker 4 (48:09):
Yeah, it always happens.
Speaker 3 (48:10):
Look, look, every single dictator in Pakistan comes with this
idea that I am larger than life. You know, I
am the answer to all of Pakistan's problems.
Speaker 4 (48:21):
Are you what happened to you?
Speaker 3 (48:22):
Yeah? He was flushed down the toilet literally by the Pakistanis.
He's a good guy, right, well, meaning not to us,
but the Pakistanis. Ya Ya Khan triggers off a genocide
in Pakistan, loses half of Pakistan, and lives the rest
of his life in utter disgrace. He's an under house arrest.
That's Dictator number two. Dictator number three, ziaulhak Ah, I'm
(48:46):
God's answer to Pakistan and less than a decade exploding
mangoes right, Dictator number four Musharraff, I am finally the
answer to all of Pakistan's problems. What happens exile in
Dubai and the pervissure of who's on that hospital bed
is not the pervis measure of who we recognize. Who
I met here incidentally at the India Today conclave, completely unrecognizable, broken, defeated,
(49:13):
you know, forgotten by his people, and now it's the
data number five Simon, Yeah, so.
Speaker 2 (49:20):
I think, like you said earlier, it's not that much
of a laughing matter, because he might end up hitting
that electric pole eventually. But what he does until then,
until then, especially considering his views and his fundamentals beliefs,
that's going to be quite something.
Speaker 1 (49:36):
To watch, and we will watch.
Speaker 2 (49:37):
So my last question was going to be about, actually,
what's the endgame for him, but like you said, we
didn't watch right now. It's pretty dangerous what he said.
So my last question is going to be about the
US's gift to Pakistan. When Arsimuni was in the US
designation of the Baloche Liberation Army as a terrisk group
straight up gift obviously, because I think before this ide
(50:00):
I didn't even know the US was interested in the
Blocibration Army. I don't think even I don't think Trump
even news.
Speaker 3 (50:05):
So they designated them as a global terrorists in twenty nineteen.
So now what they've done is the Maji Brigade, which
is the unit of the BLA, has been designated you know, Okay,
So it's basically they're just you know, climping down very
hard on them. But you know, like you said that,
there's ever every reason to believe that this could be
one of the deliverables that you know, what did mo
(50:27):
you sit and talked to Trump for two hours about
must have gone with a long.
Speaker 4 (50:30):
List of yeah yeah stuff.
Speaker 3 (50:32):
So it's it's it's usual, it's predictable. The first couple
of things would have been points would have been conventional weapons.
I need F sixteen's, I need long range missiles, I
need radars, I need this, I need them free. I
have no money. I need this thing. In return, I'll
give you. I'll give you the Nobel Prize, I'll give
you minerals, I'll give you gas I'll give you my
(50:54):
non existent oil I'll give you. I'll rat on Iran
for you. I have all their this thing intel. I'll
write on Afghanistan for you if you want to even
sell the Chinese out for you.
Speaker 4 (51:04):
So you know.
Speaker 3 (51:06):
Pakistan, JSQ Rabbal Pindi, they're extremely transactional. And that's the
reason that this is like a meeting of minds. It's
a transactional US president meeting with a transactional Pakistan's.
Speaker 1 (51:20):
Meeting a CEO.
Speaker 4 (51:21):
Actually, yeah, it is.
Speaker 3 (51:22):
It is two CEOs meeting each other. So it's like
ravel Pindi meeting New York, New York realtor.
Speaker 2 (51:29):
Right, yeah, so I start cutting on my bla point.
But the question was also going to come to after
that was is this also part of Trump trying to
turn the crews on India. The reason I asked that
as because obviously Pakistan has been accusing India of fomenting
undressed in Balajhistan uh and has obviously accused India of
backing the bl and other such elements over there. So
(51:52):
this was sort of you know, something we were discussing
in the newsroom when this news came yesterday is that
would this be sort of a stepping stone for Trump
to at some point into three and a half years
he's still in the presidency to take that unprecedented step
of ending up naming an Indian as a potential terrorist.
(52:12):
So you know, you have only the case of the
former officer of Kasia, the US labels credit for taking
part in them. Yes, so do you think that may also.
Speaker 4 (52:22):
Have quite possible?
Speaker 3 (52:23):
I mean, this is a this is the playbook, and
you know what I really want to know at the
stage there is I don't know, we need more evidence
on this. Has Trump turned against the Indian government or
is it the entire US establishment? Because that would be worrisome.
If the US establishment is turned against us, then we
have a problem because then you're going back on a
(52:47):
relationship that you've built over twenty five years. Right, I'm
not for a minute advocating that we don't need better
ties with.
Speaker 4 (52:52):
The United States.
Speaker 3 (52:53):
We need even better ties than we have now. Right,
the US is simply too large to ignore. But still
we have to do it in such a way that
it doesn't compromise on our dignity and our sovereignty. Right,
they can't write rough shot on us. It has to
be on our terms, right, and what Trump is doing
(53:14):
the way he's humilating leaders, the way his name calling them,
and I think he's used some very harsh words with India,
you know, the dead economy and you know all of that.
I mean, this is not what there's not the language
that mature leaders use when they're talking of other countries
which you've built up relationships with and stuff. So I
think that that is always going to be the you know,
(53:37):
a sore point. But the point we have to look
for is that is the American establishment not running against us?
Because if that's the case, then we have a problem UH.
And we have a problem with this convergence of interest
that we discussed with Pakistan as well. And Pakistan is
always happy to play, you know, the useful idiots for
(53:57):
American games in this part of the world, like they.
Speaker 4 (54:00):
Have done in the past.
Speaker 3 (54:03):
And yeah, I think it's going to be a very
rough and tumultus three and a half years for US.
I four see, unless there is some breakthrough with UH
in Alaska who knows the fifteenth of August and you know,
going forward, possibly an end to the conflict where Trump
kind of gets distracted with you know, ending the war
and getting and getting the Nobel Priests gave him the
(54:24):
Nobel Peace.
Speaker 2 (54:27):
But yeah, you know a good point, Actuallyaim, I think
that's something that's a good idea for another.
Speaker 1 (54:30):
Episode we do, maybe very shortly.
Speaker 2 (54:32):
Actually, it's the turn in the US India try ties
because that's something when I've been wondering, because I've always
believed that when it comes to foreign policy, UH, leaders
don't really drastically change the country's policy. Been India, for example,
what you've talked about this sclation ladder, It's not as
though it's just the PM mode let government that's done that.
It's been happening on a snow boil over. The current
(54:54):
regime may have accelerated that process, been a bit more
you know, aggressive in that regard, but that was happen anyway.
So I've always felt that, you know, presidents, prime ministers, leaders,
they just sort of take that policy forward faster, slower,
but they do that.
Speaker 1 (55:09):
But this would be.
Speaker 2 (55:10):
Like you said, that's what, that's what, that's what I'm monday. Actually,
how is it possible for this one guy to certainly
just make the entire USD Department amenable to this idea
of what he's doing, but I think that's something we
can discuss at length or a different.
Speaker 3 (55:24):
Oh, this is a this is a long soapopular, yeah,
fastening half and a half.
Speaker 2 (55:30):
Ye man, it's just January, and I think most.
Speaker 3 (55:34):
Feels like it's been yeah, two or three years. The
trumpets like that, what's the time dilation? Yeah, you know,
it's like you think the days. You know, events that
happen over years now happening in days.
Speaker 4 (55:47):
Exactly right.
Speaker 1 (55:48):
Great, then I think we'll end the chat there.
Speaker 2 (55:50):
Thanks, and the fantastic chat has always loved by the
way you're insight and your answer about Pakistan nuclear program
and the fact that they got it before. I think
now that you've seen the weaponiz is before, weaponize before us,
now that you say it, it seems.
Speaker 3 (56:05):
Fairly deliverable weapons, deliverable weapons.
Speaker 1 (56:07):
Now that you say it, seems very fairly obvious. But
I think not a lot of people put their minds
to it and think of it that way.
Speaker 2 (56:12):
So thanks, great chat, Thanks a lot, Thank you, thanks
as always to our listeners and viewers. That's it for
this weeks, depends throughs for more tune in next week.
Tell then, stay safe and do not lost any boundaries.
Speaker 3 (56:21):
For the passport
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