October 31, 2025 • 55 mins
India's Navy faces two very different fronts at sea. To the west, it has history and geography on its side against Pakistan -- think Karachi aflame in 1971 and quiet coercion in Kargil. To the east, a bigger, busier chessboard: the Chinese PLAN surging into the Indian Ocean and sniffing around the Bay of Bengal.
On this episode, national security expert Sandeep Unnithan joins host Dev Goswami to separate swagger from substance: Pakistan's problem of not enough 'sea room', what the Indian Navy did in 1971 and Kargil, how INS Vikrant shaped the '71 East theatre, and whether modern India should "pop up" in the South China Sea or lock down the Andamans.
On this episode:
- Pakistan's coastline and its geographical vulnerability
- 1971 War: Op Trident & Op Python; Karachi burning, costs and consequences
- Kargil: the Navy's "quiet pressure" playbook
- Op Sindoor: what a modern surge looks like and deterrence without tripping red lines
- China, the Indian Ocean Region, and the Indian Navy area of influence
- Can India routinely show up east of Malacca or is gatekeeping the chokepoints the smarter flex?
Produced by Taniya Dutta
Sound mix by Rohan Bharti
On this episode, national security expert Sandeep Unnithan joins host Dev Goswami to separate swagger from substance: Pakistan's problem of not enough 'sea room', what the Indian Navy did in 1971 and Kargil, how INS Vikrant shaped the '71 East theatre, and whether modern India should "pop up" in the South China Sea or lock down the Andamans.
On this episode:
- Pakistan's coastline and its geographical vulnerability
- 1971 War: Op Trident & Op Python; Karachi burning, costs and consequences
- Kargil: the Navy's "quiet pressure" playbook
- Op Sindoor: what a modern surge looks like and deterrence without tripping red lines
- China, the Indian Ocean Region, and the Indian Navy area of influence
- Can India routinely show up east of Malacca or is gatekeeping the chokepoints the smarter flex?
Produced by Taniya Dutta
Sound mix by Rohan Bharti
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
This is India Today Podcasts.
Speaker 2 (00:05):
Welcome to Season three of Another Defense, the podcast that
takes you inside the world of conflict. I'm your host,
Deve Goswami and every week I sit down with experts
and retired officers from the Army, Navy and Air Force
to decode all things to do with India security and
explore what it truly means to serve. Get ready for
(00:27):
stories of strategy, sacrifice and strength.
Speaker 1 (00:32):
This is in our defense.
Speaker 2 (00:34):
Welcome to Another Defense. This week we focus on the
Indian Navy and how a dead cow led to the
Navy's famed seventy one wargame engagement. That's maybe a joke,
but we actually want to focus on the Indian Navy
and specifically the two front scenario where on the one
hand it's sort of outclasses Pakistan, where on the other
(00:56):
it faces a step challenge from China and it's expanding
navy which is now the largest in the world in
terms of the number of ships it has. And for this,
who better than who in the defense circles is known
as the go to person when it comes to all
things Indian Navy, isn't it?
Speaker 3 (01:12):
Yeah, that's what they say. They good to be back.
Speaker 2 (01:15):
But yeah, you know, we've kind of briefly discussed this
when we talked about submarines. But when it comes to
three forces, three armed forces, Army, Navy, Air Force, how
is it that you developed a deeper passion for the
navy come visibly the army or the air force. Did
it just happened naturally or was it something or like
you said in the sum Many episode, because you were
(01:36):
a water.
Speaker 4 (01:37):
Baby, Well, the naval background did help. But also when
you you know, study history, I think I developed a
passion for naval history. And the fact is that, you know,
India was what it was over a thousand years back
because we were trading out at sea and we had
a very exceptional empire, the Chola Empire for a thousand years,
(02:01):
which we are not taught enough about, and they searched
forth and they created this, you know, fascinating empire, and
they expanded through trade, our soft power cultural influences all
across Southeast Asia, partly because of the fact that the
Chola steered to the sea. And I think, you know,
I believe this that if you are to become a
(02:24):
power of consequence, you have to be a maritime power
and not just a military maritime power.
Speaker 3 (02:31):
But also a commercial power.
Speaker 4 (02:34):
You must have both aspects of being a merchantile mercantile
power and a military power without you see, no country
in history has succeeded without having a strong navy and
a strong navy to protect sea lanes of communication. You've
seen it with a British Empire, with the American navy
and the economy, and of course China.
Speaker 3 (02:55):
China today is where.
Speaker 4 (02:56):
It is and it realizes it to be where it
wants to be with a very strong navy of over
five hundred ships, and the Indian Navy. We've known that
India has realized the fact that if it is to
grow as a nation, it needs very a strong navy,
it needs a strong mercantile marine. And all of these
(03:17):
are happening now as we speak, so.
Speaker 2 (03:20):
On this episode, actually I wanted to talk That's exactly
one of the reason I want to talk about the
Indian Navy because I think that when it comes to
military discuss in India, it doesn't really come up very
often for discussion. India has the coast and that is
that is bigger and longer. Then it's land borders with
either Pakistan, or China. Yet the Indian Navy is the
(03:40):
smallest of the three forces. And we've sort of discussed
briefly about this on two episodes previously, links to which
will be there in the show notes, and I would
really urge our listeners and viewers to sort of refer
to them as well. Is the Summarine episode and the
Great Nikoba episode, the Great Project episode where we talked
(04:01):
about the importance of the maritime power that talking about.
But this episode will focus solely on the navy and
it's two adversaries so to speak, Pakistan Navy and the
Chinese Navy. To start with Pakistan, Uh, the idea came
from something that you wrote last week for our website ten.
Speaker 1 (04:18):
We'll have that article in the S as well.
Speaker 2 (04:21):
Is why the Pakistan Navy basically fears the Indian Navy.
Speaker 1 (04:25):
Now, when I look at the map of.
Speaker 2 (04:28):
The Arabian c when I look at the map of India, Africa, Pakistan,
it's pretty obvious that Pakistan geography speaking, is not in
a very advantaged position.
Speaker 3 (04:38):
Right.
Speaker 2 (04:38):
It's almost like you, like you wrote, it's a CULTI sact,
like you know, it doesn't really have a lot of
space at the back for its navy to stay away
from the Indian navy. Uh At the most it can
sort of escape towards the Gulf of Oman and then
go deeper into towards Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and uh and Iran.
But that's not really that's more of a When I
(04:59):
look at the app to me as a layperson, that
seems more of a hiding position than any sort of
defensive offensive position, which makes me think that it's always
going to be very easy for the Indian Navy to
sort of blockade Pakistan if it comes to that. So
before we talk about the real world implications of this
(05:20):
in terms of we'll go back to the sixty five war,
will talk about the seventy one war, will talk about
operations Indur as well. Before we do that, tell us
about this geography and how it puts Pakistan in a
very sort of disadvantaged.
Speaker 4 (05:31):
Good question, Dave, And you know, the thing is that
geography dictates history. And in the case of Pakistan, as
you mentioned and I've written that, it's a culty sac,
it's a thousand kilometer long coastline. It's very strategic. It's
really important for pakistan survival because it literally ninety percent
of its maritime commerce. Its energy supplies come through this
(05:54):
coastline that's very close to the oil rich countries of
the Gulf and also needs the port's Guada Jivani. Let's
not forget Karachi, the main port Binkasim. All of these
are very critical to Pakistan's economy, but for several reasons,
the primary one being the geography itself, and the second one,
(06:17):
of course, is the fact that India's geography is very
suitable for naval operations, given that it's if you look
at the Indian map upside down, it's a peninsula that's
jutting out into the Indian Ocean. And this is an
advantage that has been long understood by empires that have
ruled in India, the maritime empires like of course the
Chola Empire that I mentioned and the British. Now, when
(06:40):
the British came, for instance, they turned the Indian Ocean
into a British lake. They were on the Indian coast,
and from there they built up a series of forts
like Singapore was their eastern fortress and Aiden was the
western fortress. They controlled all the access points into the
Indian Ocean, and they ruled that way for almost two
(07:03):
centuries until they were then displaced by the American Navy,
which is today the most powerful navy extra territorial navy
in the Indian Ocean region, which operates primarily from Diego,
Gashia and of course in Bahrain and several other bases
in the ir But the most powerful regional navy is
of course the Indian Navy. And like I mentioned it,
(07:25):
geography favors us. The fact that we have a peninsula,
we have basis on both sides, we were able to
disperse our fleets and at the same time converge them
to a point of action. And that point of action
in the last couple of decades has usually been the
coast of Pakistan, first in nineteen seventy one and then
of course we saw it in twenty twenty five. Shots
(07:46):
weren't fired. But the fact is that the Indian Navy
and the Government of India has underlining the vulnerability of Pakistan.
Pakistan talks about just two fronts that they're worried about,
their Afghani and the Indian front. The Government of India
saying there's a third front that you have to be
very worried about your southern flanks, which is if you
(08:07):
don't have a strong navy which protects your sea lanes
of communication, which is able to protect your mercantile marine,
then you're effectively a landlocked country. And that is what
happens to Pakistan usually in conflicts like we've seen in
nineteen seventy one, where you had East Pakistan, you had
(08:27):
West Pakistan, both of them very important maritime boundaries for both,
and you had the sea lanes of communication between the
two provinces that actually were the only link connecting East
and West Pakistan. And once the sea lanes of communication
were cut, you had these two provinces literally floating, and
independence of Bangladesh was a foregone conclusion because you could
(08:50):
not run away. All your soldiers were literally bottled up.
That entire garrison fell and they were captured. The same
thing was with the West. When the Indian Navy, you know,
literally rained missiles down on the fourth of December and
subsequently destroying something like four warships, four merchantmen, it created
(09:11):
the impact that it wanted, which is to literally every
foreign ship that was to come in or go out
of the coastline of Karachi stayed away. They stayed away
from the Pakistan coastline, converting Pakistan literally into a landlocked
state which could not rely on.
Speaker 3 (09:30):
The seas for its sustenance.
Speaker 4 (09:32):
It could not get supplies, it got completely bottled up,
and that is when it kind of relies more on
its neighbors like Iran for instance, for overland passage. But
as we know that it is the maritime route that
is the fastest, the most economical way of getting your
goods and your commodities and your energy lines and all that,
which is why nations all over the world they invest
(09:52):
so heavily in oceanic trade, and which is why India
as well has built up all its port infrastructures and
all that and planning big ports like the great Nikobar
Island that we've discussed in the part so the past.
So this is literally, you know, a geographical curse for Pakistan,
and it looks at it's the way it's been structured,
(10:12):
and it's not been able to invest substantial resources to
beef up its navy where it has the same problem
in a sense like India, that you have a large
maritime boundary relative to your borders, but because your disputed
boundaries are all on land. It's the land or the
(10:35):
continental you know theory that kind of prevails over the
maritime you know dimension. And because you have contested land boundaries,
a greater share of resources are taken by the army
and by the air force. And that's the case with
both the Pakistan navy and with the Indian navy. Now
the Indian navy what gets about eighteen percent of the
(10:55):
defense budget, where there's been a case that has been
made for the indianager go beyond twenty percent. China has
actually been cutting down on its soldiers, its land forces,
and focusing more on its air force and on its navy.
And the reasons for that are not far to see
if you see the kind of warfare. That is, if
you're not getting into a kind of war of attrition
(11:18):
like Russia has in Ukraine, then the fastest and the
swiftest way of both initiating a conflict and terminating one
is the naval realm and of course the air force.
So China is focusing more on airpower and on the
naval aspect, and we need to be doing the same
as well. We've been under investing actually, if you ask me,
on both the naval side and also on the air
(11:41):
force side.
Speaker 2 (11:42):
India's blessed with a national sort of build that is
suited for my rid empower. Because I can think of
when you were answering that, when you were saying that,
I could think of myself back in my childhood and
as playing Age of Empires out of listeners and viewers
have ever played that game. And for a second, if
you forget the Pakistan thread, then I could so easily
imagine that, you know, my Maharashtra and Bengal coast would
(12:03):
be where I would build my ships because they're deep inside,
they're safe.
Speaker 3 (12:06):
Uh.
Speaker 2 (12:07):
And like towards the south where you have Kerala AmLaw,
do you have Luxure, the you have Adam Nicoba islands,
and that would be my sort of you know, offensive
attacking points, right, Send my build my ships back in
the base, send them out and then you know allis
from there. And of course the world of course, but
we have no world domination of world dominition that.
Speaker 4 (12:26):
We just want to, you know, be where we are
and kind of prevail over the regions. The fact is
that the under in Nicoba Islins don't forget there, and
we've discussed that in the past installment of your show
where we've spoken about the Great Nicobar Island Project. I mean,
this is literally God's gift to India, the fact that
you have an island chain that is so close to
Southeast Asia and actually if you build that up, it
(12:48):
actually brings you UH as a Southeast Asian power of consequence.
You're right there in the Malacca streets and you will
be more than just the eleventh man sitting on a
bench while the Rcan countries situ and you know, deliberate
and discuss as we've just seen the last few days,
you will actually have a very strong case for being
(13:10):
part of our CM.
Speaker 2 (13:11):
Right right, So let's focus on if we've talked of
the geography, let's focus on what has actually happened in
the past with in terms of our advantage and the
table front and what could have happened on during operations
did not happen because the Navy's offensive role in that
conflict was limited to sort of just building some pressure
(13:32):
but not more than that. First, what actually happened, and
then we can talk about the hypotheticals of what could
have happened in cos in sixty five War, seventy one War,
the Cargole War Office seventy one was the one that
saw the heaviest use of the navy. Sixty five was limited.
The seven Cargulab was also some sort of offense in
terms of, you know, trying to build pressure and like
(13:52):
you said in the first answer, sort of you know,
ensuring that the conflict does not stay on for longer,
bring it.
Speaker 3 (13:59):
Down conflict termination.
Speaker 2 (14:00):
Oh yeah, yeah, So let's talk about sixty five, seventy
one and Cargill and especially the story you were just
telling you before we began recording of Howard Dead Cow
in sixty five led to the seventy one Bombard.
Speaker 4 (14:12):
Interesting, so sixty five actually led to the Indian navy
spectacular showing in nineteen seventy one. In fact, nineteen seventy
one is such a groundbreaking event for the Indian Navy.
They actually saw the birth of the modern Indian Navy.
Right there was an Indian Navy before nineteen seventy one,
very conservative, British inspired, British influenced You had, you know,
(14:35):
British surface warships, you know aircraft, you had admirals were
trained by the British, you know, literally right onto the
fifties and post nineteen seventy one, we saw a very new, aggressive,
confident Indian navy that had actually demonstrated its you know,
sea legs in the seventy one war, and it had
(14:56):
carried out spectacular operations. And it all begins with that.
What you say said is the story of the cow
in nineteen sixty five in Dwarka where this was in September,
when on the seventh of night of seventh of September,
there was a Pakistan A surface action group comprising several warships,
about half a dozen warships and a tanker, a fleet tanker.
(15:18):
They landed up off Dwarka and they carried out a shelly.
Now Dwarka, as you know, is on the Gujarat coast,
and they carried out a you know, thirty minute bombardment,
a shore bombardment of the temple town. I mean they
claimed that there was a radar station there and you
know they wanted to you know, disable the radar station,
(15:39):
but they were clearly aiming at the temple. They were about,
like I mentioned, about six or seven warships. They carried
out a thirty minute what is called shore bombardment naval
gun fire support. They shelled the town They missed the temple,
of course, but they destroyed the There was a railway
(15:59):
station and there two big structures along the coast, and
they hit the one of the buildings of.
Speaker 3 (16:05):
The railway station. They destroyed the shed.
Speaker 4 (16:09):
And it so happens that there was a cow in
the vicinity who was killed in that shelling, and so
there was a big debate, you know, after this incident. Now,
the tragedy was that you had what was then the
most powerful frigate in Asia possibly that was anchored just
(16:30):
thirteen kilometers north of Twarka in a place called Oka.
You're from Gujard, you know the geography. Right just up
the coast, you had the Irons Talvar that was there
that night and which was actually picking up this Pakistani
naval group that was there, the Surface Action Group, because
they were transmitting and the Talwar was intercepting these messages.
(16:53):
And it so happened that war had already begun by then,
the India Pakistan War was in full swing. The first
of September is when Pakistan launched its armored thrust towards Aknur,
where they wanted to actually see where the land links
between Jamu and Kashmir.
Speaker 3 (17:11):
And India.
Speaker 4 (17:11):
It was Field Marshal Ayub Khan's big play at you know,
grabbing Jamu and Kashmir by force because he saw that
window of opportunity closing after you know, India began its
rearmament post nineteen sixty two. This was Ayub's plan. So
there was a sea leg operation. This was Operation Dwaraka
that they launched was meant to Actually it's a very
(17:35):
carefully thought out planet's a tactically sounded very good on paper.
Speaker 3 (17:39):
The idea was that this surface Action group.
Speaker 4 (17:42):
Would go there, shell the coastal town, destroy this invisible
radar that nobody's seen, and draw out the Indian Navy
from Bombay, which is several hundred kilometers south. And they
had positioned the Pianist Ghazi, which is the only submarine
then on the Indians continent. It's a US loaned TENCH
(18:02):
class submarine, very powerful, you know, under sea combatant for
its time in the sixties, built to do battle with
the Japanese in the Second World War. So the Tazi
was positioned off Mumbai and the idea was that they
would lure the Indian fleet and as the fleet came
out to go and do Battle of Gujarat, the Ghazi
(18:23):
would torpedo them. Now, two things happened. The Talwar didn't
joined the battle because the Navy was not part of
the conflict. It had been actually expressly put There was
a signal which mentioned that then Indian Navy was not
to join this conflict, the India Pakistan War. And the
second part is, of course the Navy didn't sail out
of Bombay because they were deployed elsewhere on exercises. So
(18:47):
there was a lot of you know, after this happened
and the Park Navy turnback. They declared the eighth of
September is officially Pakistan Navy Day for destroying a building
and killing a cow. They claim it as a big,
spectacular victory and they you know, and Karachi is just
you know, fifty or sixteen artical miles away. So there
(19:08):
was a big debate within the navy. We said, oh,
what did they do? They just killed a cow. But
there were a very different set of individuals, very bright
admirals then captains who took a front to this attack,
you know, Vice Admiral Krishnan, then Captain meir Roy. They
were outreached. They said, how could Pakistan come here? You know,
(19:30):
carry out this bombard and so what if it's just
a cow, then they killed. Let's build a memorial to
that cow and we can say that the cow died
with her hoofs on. That's that's what Mickey roy said.
Oh no, that was Admiral Krishnan. Now Mickey Roys had
a very roundabout way of looking at it. He said,
he invoked the legend of admiral being buying or how
(19:54):
do you pronounce it, b yn g whould been executed
by the Royal Navy because he didn't sail out and
do battle with the French fleet. And he said that,
you know, he hinted at the fact that the commanding
officer of theist Alvar should have sailed out and done
battle with the Pakistan Surface Action Group. Now, even today,
more than sixty years later, you asked the Indian Navy.
(20:16):
There is a division down the line about the Talvar incident.
There's one set of people who will tell you, look,
we had to face we had to obey orders. Navies
cannot just seek out battle and you know, act as
rambo forces, whereas the another group will say, look, it
is in the navy's charter to go and defend your coastline,
irrespective to the fact whether the war has not been
(20:36):
has been called or not. The CEO of the Inistalva,
the commanding officers should have gone out and done battle
with the Pakistan Surface Action Group. So what if he's
just one ship and there are seven facing him, he
could have fired. He had far better you know, guns
than the pakistanis. Those were Second World War winted ships.
His was a very modern warship. It was a British
(20:58):
built frigate had been acquired just about five or six
years prior late fifties. This was a chance for the
Indian Navy to prove its metal and this guy stayed
out of battle. Now what this does is to the
Navy is that you had a very pride bunch of officers,
very very aggressive, ambitious like Admiral Krishnan. Don't forget Admiral Nanda,
(21:24):
who's a chief in nineteen seventy one, then Captain Mickey
Roy who said we've got to do something. If we
don't get the Indian Navy to fight in the nineteen
seventy one war, we might as well be what is
called in the Navy of force in being or a
fleet in being. Now, a fleet in being is a
pejorative in the navy. It is a fleet that exists
(21:45):
during peace time, but in war time is in ports
and harbor.
Speaker 3 (21:50):
It's bottled up.
Speaker 4 (21:50):
It doesn't sail out because it knows that if it
sails out, it will be instantly vaporized. So a bit
like what possibly the Talvar thought during sixty five, it's
a you know, it's a matter of perception. Really now
in seventy one, so the Navy went in all guns blazing.
Admiral Dunda had this plan set before the war began.
(22:14):
Somewhere in the middle of nineteen seventy one. They said that, look,
we are going to attack Karachi.
Speaker 3 (22:20):
And he was.
Speaker 4 (22:21):
He grew up in Karachi, Admiral Danda, on this Monorah Island.
He spent his early years. They knew Karachi like the
back of his hand. They got their new missile boats
acquired from the Soviet Union. The missile boats didn't have
the range to go all the way to Karachi and
come back to Bombay or even Gujarat, which is why
(22:42):
the Navy then towed these boats as they would, you know,
tie them behind another frigate. They would launch them off Karachi,
they would carry out the attack and then these missile
boats would come back on their own steam. Now, when
Pakistan looked at the missile boats and their acquisition by
the Indian Navy, they said, these guys don't have the range.
They can't go the way up to Karachi and back.
(23:03):
And Admiral Nanda proved them wrong. So in a span
of thirty minutes of Karachi on the night of fourth December,
the Indian name missile boats went in and in less
than thirty minutes they had sunk a destroyer, they had
sunk a minesweeper, disabled another destroyer that was escorting guess
(23:23):
what an ammunition ship that was bringing ammunition and spears
from the US military for the Pakistan in you know,
under cover of darkness. So in thirty minutes there were
blazing wrecks all around Karachi. All of these were fired
missiles that were fired by our missile boats. It is
then and until today, it is the most devastating naval missile.
Speaker 3 (23:48):
Engagement in history.
Speaker 4 (23:50):
Missile to you know, an anti ship missile to hitting
another missile. There's never been so many combatants that have
been destroyed in the span of thirty minutes and a
few days later you had Operation Python where one missile boat,
the ins Vinash, fired four missiles at Karachi with again
three merchant ships were knocked out and then the tanker Pianist.
Speaker 3 (24:13):
Dhaka that was there was destroyed.
Speaker 4 (24:15):
So two attacks on Karachi and you've sung something like
eight ships, seven destroyed, one completely damaged. And three of
those ships happened to be those that took part in
the shelling of Dwaraka in nineteen sixty five. So it
was like, you know, the navy kind of avenging if
you can say that, the attack on Karachi in nineteen
sixty five. So it is one of those things that
(24:37):
you know, maybe what if the Pakistan navy had not
struck in sixty five, then possibly the Indian navy would
have possibly taken it easy in seventy one as well,
you know, and not sprung into action.
Speaker 3 (24:48):
Now the east, you know what happened. The Vikrant moved in.
Speaker 4 (24:52):
It cut off the seaward escape of the Pakistan garrison.
That garrison collapsed, literally all of them had to surrender
because there was no way of escaping.
Speaker 3 (25:01):
Then you had this Operation X which was.
Speaker 4 (25:03):
This covert maritime guerrilla war which I have a book
on which actually.
Speaker 3 (25:11):
Went in before the war began.
Speaker 4 (25:13):
It was a covert operation where the governments will not
take ownership of that. But these operations began in August,
four months before the actual war began. And like one
hundred thousand tons of shipping inside of East Pakistan, then
East Pakistan was either sunk or disabled.
Speaker 3 (25:31):
So you look at these three.
Speaker 4 (25:33):
Big major operations, the missile boat attacks on Karachi, the
paralyzing of the sea lanes of communication in East Pakistan
by Operation X and of course the Bikrantz of his
action group. And don't forget the Ghazi sinking of Vishaka Putnam.
The Navy claims that it was the inis Rashpuoth that
sank the Ghazi. We don't know exactly what happened, but
(25:56):
the end result is that the Ghazi exploded, sank almost
one hundred crew died. So a very comprehensive naval defeat
of Pakistan by the Indian Navy. And that's why I
call seventy one the birth of the modern Indian Navy.
Speaker 1 (26:12):
Yeah, right, very interesting.
Speaker 2 (26:15):
Now, all this happened in a time when both India
and Pakistan were not nuclear powers. Right now the two are,
which brings me to Indur and why perhaps the government
would have thought several times over before deciding on using
the navy for an offensive in an offensive role, whether
there was the bombardment of.
Speaker 1 (26:35):
The Karachi Port.
Speaker 2 (26:36):
By the Karachi Port, pitty the location, Yeah, it's just
so close to India.
Speaker 1 (26:40):
I mean, it's just very strategically very very bad location.
But anyway, so.
Speaker 2 (26:44):
Whether it's the bombardment of the Karachi Port or whether
it's an economic blockade, because like you've said previously on
this on this on this podcast, that Pakistan has underlined
four red lines where it says that if those lines
are crossed, that is when it would consider launching a
nuclear weapon.
Speaker 3 (27:03):
Right.
Speaker 2 (27:03):
One of them is the economic strangulation of Pakistan, which
would happen.
Speaker 1 (27:07):
If the Indian Navy were to.
Speaker 2 (27:09):
Successfully blockade the Pakistani coast or even the Karachi Port, because,
like you said, nineteen ninety five percent of all its
trade and oil comes through that. So do you think
during Kargil and during operations Sindhur, the reason the Navy
was not used in a more offensive role was this
kept this thinking that was in mind of the interim
(27:31):
military planners and if we were to ever use it
what do you think would happen on that escalation ladder.
Speaker 4 (27:39):
Well, you know, if you look at it, in the
past operations they've we've not even used the air force
if you look at it. After the attack on Parliament
two thousand and one, there were some very nascent plans
for striking at terror launch pads and all that, but
only in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. There was, of course during
(28:02):
Cargill also there was talk of you know, prior to that,
three years prior to that, there was talk of going
in and striking at targets across the line of control
and across the international border as well. But these didn't happen.
The conflicts were confined. The government of the day, in fact,
you know, gave them very strict orders that no operation,
(28:23):
no air operations would have happen across transce Aluci. You know,
all of those nothing was to happen. So I think
it was still not very confident, especially given the fact
that you had a nuclearized sub continent in nineteen ninety eight.
But what we're seeing now there was a very different
political leadership that has risk taking ability, that understands the
(28:44):
escalation ladder and the calibrated use of force. That's very
important because not every action, not every skirmish, not every
surgical strike, will lead to a nuclear attack. So if
you've noticed that from twenty sixteen onwards, beginning with the
cross border so called surgical strikes, which I actually call
(29:05):
cross border commando raids, but the fact is that there
was signaling that we have done smaller operations like this
in the past, but this is the first time in
twenty sixteen that we signaled where the DGMO came out
and gave out a statement saying that yes, we did
carry out these attacks on launch pads. So it was
the Government of India signaling intent. Twenty nineteen you saw
(29:26):
the Indian Air Force being used for the first time
to attack a target in mainland Pakistan, Kayber paktun Kua
where they struck that camp and Palacot Jabatop And in
twenty twenty five where again the air Force was the
instrument of first resort. The air force and of course
backed by some artillery as well. These were very very
(29:46):
significant milestones in the fact that the government is understood
calibrated force and the escalation ladder, and they decided that
the Navy would come in at stage three or four, Stage.
Speaker 3 (29:58):
Four or five or beyond that.
Speaker 4 (30:00):
So initially it was all army and air force actions,
but if you look at it, the navy would have
been possibly after the tenth of May, and it's very
clear indications. We don't know for a fact. We know
that there was a very carefully thought out escalation ladder
that the government and the military had worked out. That
(30:20):
was alluded to by Vice Admiral Promote when you mentioned
that there was an escalation ladder, And it's quite possible,
given the fact that you had the entire Vikran Surface
Action Group there of Pakistan, with all its warships, all
of them armed with Bramos missiles, there's a very fair
possibility that the next strike after the tenth would have
(30:41):
come from the sea, and this would again have been
from warships firing at either Pakistani warships or certain installations
over there. But you know, telling Pakistan, you know, reminding
them of the vulnerability of the maritime boundary, of their
maritime frontier and the fact that how high do you
want to go up the escalation ladder? We are prepared
(31:02):
to climb that, and that would achieve that kind of
escalation dominance which would force Pakistan then to kind of
be escalate. So it was you know, very calibrated use
of the air force and the navy. Now then the army,
for very obvious reasons, was not used because the a
lot of you know, chatter came out at that time.
(31:23):
Oh you didn't you know, Pok is still there. You
haven't captured Pok. But the idea of the operation was
not to liberate Pok, or to capture Gilgate Baltistan, or
to link up with Afghanistan. You know, it had very
very definite set of aims which the government then decided
on the tenth that we have achieved what we wanted
to do and therefore let us now de escalate. But
(31:47):
the reason why you're talking about all of this now
is that then the narrative kind of spun out of
control and that entered a very different dimension, which is
why the sixth dimension that we've not seen, you know,
in any conflict at least to this level, which is
the narrative warfare realm became super active. And that's going
(32:08):
on till date if you look at it with President
Trump's statements and what the Pakistani leadership has been talking about.
But be that as it made. The fact is that
the government achieved its objectives. They wanted to punish Pakistan
for that Helgam terror attack, horrible terror attack where civilians
were massacred very brutally cold blooded fashion. They want to,
(32:29):
you know, send out a message to Pakistan not to
sponsor terrorism.
Speaker 3 (32:33):
It was that was what the whole objective was.
Speaker 4 (32:35):
And then over the next couple of days that we
slowly went up an escalation ladder and then de escalated
on the tenth. So the fact is that when you
have an air force that is able to inflict such
heavy damage on the Pakistan Air Force by destroying all
its airfields, forcing them to operate off runways or you know,
(32:56):
moving into your depth basis, you have a navy that
has the ability to convert Pakistan into a landlocked state. Right,
you can forget about that. That's the messaging. You can
forget about your thousand kilometer long coastline. You will become
a landlocked state like Afghanistan. You will not have the
use of the sea or the coastline or your seileians
(33:18):
of communication in the duration of this conflict. So that
is the kind of signaling that I see as having
come out and This is something that we've hinted at
in the past, in two thousand and one when you
had the Opera Kram mobilization. Before that you had Kargil
as well, of course, where the Indian Navy was mobilized
off the coast of Pakistan. But it is only in
(33:39):
twenty twenty five that we've seen this four sacretion being
part of an escalation ladder where the leadership in JHQ
ravel Pint is clearly looking at it. Look, this is
what happened on day one, this is what happened on
day two, this is what happened on day three, Day four,
I might lose whatever is left of my air basis
or my radar cover.
Speaker 3 (34:00):
Day five, I might lose my maritime boundary.
Speaker 4 (34:03):
They may not physically blockade it, you know, to in
a way that was done in a full scale war
in seventy one, but they would harass my shipping, They
would not allow my warships to sail out. They would
become targets instantly. So thereby you know, skirting these red
lines that Kali Kidwai mentioned, that shot of a full
scale economic blockade that would only play out possibly in
(34:25):
a full scale war, but in a conflict like this,
I would call it a special military operation.
Speaker 3 (34:31):
Sound is not exactly a war, it was.
Speaker 4 (34:34):
It was a very unusual kind of a conflict that
we saw both sides not crossing each other's by you know, borders,
your favorite line not cross borders without a passport, right,
so no one cross borders. They had standoff missile attacks, right.
So this is a kind of new kind of war fighting,
(34:55):
and I think it isn't this kind of war fighting
where you're looking at not waging wars of attrition, where
the air force becomes really important, where the navy becomes
really important.
Speaker 2 (35:06):
Right, So you know, then it would seem that it's
all hunky dory with the Indian Navy. But there's a
big butt over here, and that's something going to discuss
part of a quick break.
Speaker 1 (35:16):
So what is this?
Speaker 5 (35:16):
Is this that Punjabi Muslim arrogance that comes that Maria, Maria, I.
Speaker 6 (35:23):
Think there's a kind of hubris that Panjab is Pakistan.
Then the other ethnic cities and the other provinces are
much smaller, and really they don't at the end of.
Speaker 1 (35:44):
The day matter because of population.
Speaker 6 (35:47):
Because of population resources, the army's main recruiting grounds are
still Punjab. The officer class is still Punjabi. There are
a number of other officers quest but at the end
of the day, it's Punjab. And I know I've been well.
(36:09):
I know because I've been told by some Pakistani retired officers.
Of course that MS you mentioned him earlier in the conversation,
that was always very conscious of his of his Mohajir background,
and therefore he tried to compensate it. To my mind,
he tried to compensate it by being even more aggressive
(36:30):
towards us.
Speaker 5 (36:32):
But tell me something. You know, you spoke of hubris
is Pakistan and especially under Assimuni. I would love to
know from you, what is your reading of U Asseimunir
right now? Even Musharraf was very careful, or all Pakistani
generals are very careful that nothing.
Speaker 1 (36:49):
Should happen in Pakistan's Punjab province.
Speaker 5 (36:52):
So when Kargil War that I covered, you know Nli
troops were killed. They were all from POJK and you
know also northern areas. So they didn't mind two hundred
three hundred being buried by India or eight hundred dying.
It was okay for them. The only body they asked
for it you were js by even that.
Speaker 6 (37:08):
Time, Shahan, Yeah, sher Khan, you know.
Speaker 5 (37:11):
And this sought a body of a Pakistani officer who
was killed and buried by India. They said, exhume him
and return it to us, because he was apparently from
Pakistan's Punjab province.
Speaker 6 (37:21):
No, that was also because the Indian and this was
the professionalism of the Indian army that the Indian commander
who's commanding the place where this where Sharkhan was fighting,
praised his bravery.
Speaker 1 (37:38):
And in fact I reported it that time.
Speaker 6 (37:40):
And he said when the Pakistani plane came and to
take his body along with the coffin, he sent a
letter to the commander of Sharhan's unit praising his valet.
Speaker 1 (38:01):
Welcome back.
Speaker 2 (38:02):
Suddenly, what we've discussed before the break would warm the
hearts of many. But there is a big butt, like
I said at the before taking the break, and that
butt comes because of China. And that's something that you've
sort of alluded to at the end of recording very recently,
where you said, but this is not where we should
be looking, because this is something that we have sorted
(38:24):
that we have got sorted one thanks to our geophical
advantage what we discussed in the first half and then
second thanks to the sort of tactics we're able to
develop and sort of how you're able to use that
space to your advantage. The real focus should always be China,
and that's what we've been seeing of in the last
few years. China is rapidly expanding its navy. It's now
bigger than the US Navy in terms of the number
(38:46):
of ships, but technologically, obviously the US Navy is far
far far ahead.
Speaker 1 (38:50):
There's no match.
Speaker 2 (38:50):
Obviously, you've had a Chinese so called research vehicles entering
towards coming towards the Bay of Being, or especially during
times when India is sort of testing a missile or
is issuing you no time to test a missile.
Speaker 1 (39:06):
They've been making those stories.
Speaker 2 (39:08):
There have been reports of Chinese submarines also sort of
looking around in that area. I don't want to ask
the question of how does the Indian Navy match up
to the Chinese Navy because that would be a very no.
Speaker 3 (39:20):
Key the beam counter, yeah exactly.
Speaker 2 (39:23):
I'd rather do it in the map analygy that we
began this episode with. So you look at the map.
Now you look that if we of Being all is
our backyard. There is only one place where you can
sort of threaten or harassed China, which is South China
Sea or the East China see slightly higher up right,
we'll have the map for our viewers.
Speaker 1 (39:40):
It's easier for them to understand.
Speaker 2 (39:42):
Now if we were to talk about the Indian Navy strengths,
the way I would ask you this question now is
does the Indian Navy right now possess the ability or
the capability to pop up in South China Sea or
even East China see? And if it does not, what
does it need to do that to get that? And
does it want to do that?
Speaker 3 (40:03):
Well?
Speaker 4 (40:03):
So they if you know, the naval leadership has taken
its q from the political leadership, which is articulated India's
area of influence as being from the Gulf of Aden
right at the Straits of Malacca. Now, the Navy in
its present form, with all its platforms, all its combatants
is more than adequate for this area of influence where
(40:24):
you have your twin carrier battle groups. The Navy's maritime
strategy revolves around aircraft carriers. You have the Vikrant and
you have the Vikramaditya which have their own escort ships,
they have submarines and all that. So these are fit
for this existing area of influence from the Gulf of
Aden to the Malaca Straits. Now Malaca Straits are important
(40:50):
because you have the Malaca Straits, then you have the Umbai, Veta,
the Sunda and the Lombox Straits. These four straits are
going to be used by the PLA Navy to end
the Indian Ocean and they've been doing that over the
last nearly sixteen or seventeen years that they've been deployed
in the anti piracy patrols of the Red Sea. They've
used it to expand their influence, to test their readiness
(41:13):
to deploy forward deploy in the Indian Ocean region because
more than sixty percent of their energy supplies flow through
the Persian Gulf and they're very worried about the safety
of these being disrupted in conflict, possibly with the United States,
so they've been forward positioning their ships and building up
their sea legs. Now, if the PLA Navy were to
(41:36):
come in strength, the Indian Navy strategy, my understanding, would
be to tackle them at the choke points at Malacca,
at Sunda, Lombok, Umbai, Vatar. Now if you were to
go beyond these choke points, then you would need a
whole new set of combatants. Your existing warships would not
be adequate. Then you would need a very large force
(41:58):
of nuclear power attack submarines. Because nuclear powered attack submarines,
or assessens as they're called, they are the only combatants
that can operate on their own in enemy waters, in
contested waters. Because you know, conventional submarines I call conventional
submarines they are actually submersibles and no offencemen to all
my friends out there on the conventional boats are doing
(42:20):
a great job, but they are limited by their design,
by their diesel electric propulsion. Even if they have air
independent propulsion, they're usually they're submersibles. They go out, they
you know, they sail, they're submerged for a certain number
of days, and then they have to resurface for air.
Whereas a nuclear powder attack submarine is not limited by
(42:43):
any of this. In fact, it's only limited by the
food on board, carried on board, or by the endurance
of the crew. Because that nuclear reactor gives you unlimited power.
You can stay underwater almost indefinitely, and it is a
platform like this which is able to carry a very
large weapon load of torpedoes, anti ship missiles and land
(43:06):
attack cruise missiles.
Speaker 3 (43:07):
That has the.
Speaker 4 (43:08):
Ability to significantly influence the maritime battle and also the
battle on land. So if you look at it, the
US Navy has something like more than fifteen nuclear power
attack submarines. It has more nuclear power attack submarines than
the rest of the world put together. And that is
how they exercise sea control and they dominate the oceans
(43:30):
of the world. So if India were to go beyond
the barrier I call it of the Malacca Streets, it
will have to build up a larger force of nuclear
power attack submarines. Now we have one that's we've had
this very unique arrangement with first the USSR and then
later with the Russian Federation to lise one such Chakra,
(43:53):
the Chakara one. Then we had the Chakara two, and
now we have the Chakara II that will be inducted
towards the end of this day. But that's not enough
because you would need a force of something like six
of these submarines at the very minimum, because you would
have to assume that if you have six boats, only
three or four of them would be operational at any
given line. The others would be under refit maintenance. And
(44:15):
the government has cleared a proposal for building two of these,
but they're still on the design stage and they will
not enter service at least until the late twenty thirties,
more than a decade from now ten to fifteen years,
if that's how long it takes to build.
Speaker 3 (44:31):
These boats.
Speaker 4 (44:31):
Are very complex platforms. They're over twelve thousand tons in displacement,
the very difficult to master the technology to build them.
The reactor is a completely different beast. The reactor that
takes them to such great speeds of more than twenty
twenty five thirteen knots. Even those have to be specially
designed constructed for the massive burst of speed that it needs.
(44:55):
So these platforms will come in only in the late
twenty thirties. But you know, I don't like get into
this thing of you know, being a platform centric. Maybe
I think you need to network your existing assets and
look for other ways that you can project power if
need be across these the barriers of these choke points.
And you know, coming to the Chinese Navy that you
(45:18):
mentioned that they are growing in numbers. But let's not
forget that the PLA Navy is not the only one
that could strike at the Indian Navy. It could be
the PLA Air Force as well. They have a long
range bomber fleet, they have long range ballistic missiles, anti
ship ballistic missiles. So the threat could come not just
from PLA Navy warships or submarines. They could be from
(45:43):
the long range bomber fleet. They could be from their
anti ship ballistic missile fleet as well. So there's a
lot of things that the Indian Navy, you know, needs
to look out for when it comes to fighting an
adversary or deterring an adversary. Let's say that's that's the
more politically correct way of saying, it's deterring an adversary
like China from imposing its will all on us in.
Speaker 3 (46:05):
The Indian Ocean.
Speaker 2 (46:06):
Yeah right, uh, you know, and this all harks back
to the episode on the submarines that we did and
what you describe as the lost decade. Because of the
enaction that you did in the previous decade, you will
have nothing in the near future, which is exactly what
happened with the nuclear power attack. Somebody is something that
the Navy had envisioned long back, but it just five
(46:27):
except now that it's happening. And I think also a
big part of what you said, especially the part about
India wanting to not limit per se, but you're not
seeing more than like you said, the girl for Faid
and then the Malaca streets, because I think it also
again goes back to what you briefly said that we
don't really have.
Speaker 1 (46:44):
An expansions mindset. We just want to live peacefully.
Speaker 2 (46:48):
But a lot of these the entire question, the question
that I asked you that we should, can we pop
up in the South tend to see only happens because
that would be when China's needling you. If there was
no China and needling, you would not need to even
envision that.
Speaker 4 (47:02):
Well, answer your question, they've I mean, there has been
one such pop up or no pop up in the
South China Sea.
Speaker 3 (47:08):
There's only one.
Speaker 4 (47:11):
Naval unit that has operated in the South China Sea
in a condition of conflict or an impending conflict or
a standoff with China, and that is the Indian Navy's
Chucker Out who I've written about this in the past.
This is during the dog Lam standoff. A couple of
years back is when the Indian Navy deployed the ins
Chakra as a proof of concept to see if the
(47:31):
Chakra could operate in contested enemy waters.
Speaker 3 (47:35):
And from all accounts.
Speaker 4 (47:37):
That was an extremely successful deployment where they validated a
number of concepts that a nuclear submarine could not only
target warships out in enemy harbors, but also attack targets
on land. So you know that that is a very
important deployment. It's not in the public domain yet from
(47:58):
those who know about it.
Speaker 3 (48:00):
H they know about it.
Speaker 2 (48:01):
Wow, that's very very interesting, and I'm pretty sure China
knows about it, and it must have gotten quite the scare.
Speaker 1 (48:09):
Wow.
Speaker 2 (48:09):
Fantastic, Right, cool, Well, and this episode there, but before
we go, one quick sort of tangent on the topic
of navies and this legend that's there around the seventy
one war, and I just want your brains on what
do we know of What actually happened is the legend
of the US sending its seventh fleet into the Bay
(48:30):
of Pingal and Russia rushing some of its surface ships
and one submarine to scare them off. What has happened, unfortunately,
is that over a period of time, this has just
been embellished, embellished, embellished, and it's come to a stage.
Speaker 1 (48:44):
But I don't know what actually happened back then and
how real.
Speaker 2 (48:48):
Was the threat of the Seventh Fleet sort of you know,
potentially engaging with the Indian navy, and did the Russians
actually you know, sort of intercede and sort of you know,
scared the US Navy off. So what do you know
of what exactly has happened.
Speaker 4 (48:58):
Well, it's a fact that the US did deploy. It
was President Nixon and his National Security advisor, Henry Kissinger,
who saw the way things were playing out like the yeah,
and they hated Indira Gandhi of course, and they saw
the East Pakistan collapsing. Now, the idea was to send
(49:19):
the USS Enterprise, which is then the most powerful naval
platform in the world. It was a nuclear power aircraft carrier.
It carried sixty seventy aircraft on board, and it had
a USS Tripoli, which was a landing platform DOC ship
which carried marines almost one thousand marines, and its escort
(49:42):
ships as well that half a dozen escorts. So it's
very powerful flotilla of ships. It was I think it
was Carrier Strike Group It was task for seventy four,
if I remember correctly, and it was headed by a
very bright US admiral whose name will come to me.
They were sailing out of Vietnam and they were pushed
(50:04):
across into the Bay of Bengal. The idea was to
send India a message. It was gunboard diplomacy exactly of
the kind that you see off the coast of Venezuela.
That's playing out right now right, the US has deployed
more warships off the coast of Venezuela, the first time
that has deployed so many warships in the Caribbean since
the Cuban Missile Crisis of nineteen sixty two.
Speaker 3 (50:25):
So the US.
Speaker 4 (50:27):
Fleet did deploy there, and what the Soviets did at
that time was Admiral Gorshkov, the legendary Admiral Gorshkov. He
sent another Soviet fleet to tail the Americans. And it
so happened that the submarines that were tailing the US's enterprise,
and this was something that they did as a matter
of courtesy during the Cold War, that you had US
(50:50):
fleets that were shadowed or tailed by Russian submarines, and
you had American submarines tailing the Soviets, and it so
happens that, but it was two or three ships and
two submarines, if I remember correctly the number. They were
asked by the Soviets to surface so that the US
(51:11):
Navy could see them. So you saw the prospect of
the US seventh Fleet actually sailing into the Indian Ocean.
And they did this big loop around the Indian Ocean,
and they realized that the game was up in East
Pakistan and they had no option but to withdraw. But
the interesting thing is that what happened when the news
(51:32):
of this flotilla heading towards East Pakistan, it actually brought
in a lot of confidence in the garrison there where
General Niazi was holding out.
Speaker 3 (51:41):
Actually believed that.
Speaker 4 (51:42):
They were coming to his rescue, and he was all
set for that evacuation that would be done under the
supervision of the Americans. The Indian political leadership got spooked
a bit by that, of course, who's and spoke by
mass flotilla of that size, which is why possibly they
(52:02):
leaned on the Soviets to send in do their bit,
which the Soviets complied. But if you see the way
the Seventh Fleet then quickly turned around and went back.
And now, interestingly, Henry Kissinger was here for the India
Today Conclave many years back, and I was his layers
of person, and I was I spent a lot of
time with him, and I asked him, doctor Kissinger. He said, yes,
(52:26):
it's that question which every Indian asks me. Yes, go
ahead ask me this. So I said, why why did
you send the seventh fleet till so he said this,
and he said, look, it wasn't meant to prevent the
fall of East Pakistan. We knew that East Pakistan was
a gonner. It was to signal to the Indian political
leadership that do not move into the west. They were
(52:49):
very worried that not only was the east, not only
had the East fallen, but now India would take the
battle into the west and they would, you know, humiliate Pakistan,
They would capture territory over there. They would destabilize the
thing to a point where the US could not have
a viable client or a satellite state in the form
(53:11):
of Pakistan. And we actually agreed, We said, look this
much and no further. And there was no major thrust
into the west. So there was a section of the
Indian political leadership, the military leadership that believed that we
should have transferred our forces back to the west and
continued the battle over there and defeated, you know, recaptured
(53:32):
parts of Hajipi or you know, Pok could have taken
away territory there, but that option was lost because there
was a ceasefire in the west. There was, of course,
another small part of the military leadership as well, which
I've spoken to, actually thought of contingency planning. What would
they do if the Americans actually entered the Bay of Bengal,
(53:52):
that we would have to fly one way missions because
they didn't have the reach of the range at that time.
Their fighter jets would have to fly one way missions
to attack the American fleet because if they entered there,
they would then target the Wikaran carrier strike group that
was there in the North Bay of Bengal. So the
Air Force would have to be pulled in. But of
course this didn't come to pass. These were just you know,
(54:17):
ideas in people's imagination because the US Seventh Fleet then
just did that quick thing and went back.
Speaker 3 (54:24):
So it is it's a fact that the US did deploy.
Speaker 4 (54:27):
It was gunboard diplomacy, and it is gunboard diplomacy of Venezuela.
Speaker 3 (54:32):
But that's how the way of the world is.
Speaker 4 (54:34):
When the United States is, it is the strong do
as they please, and the week have to just bear it.
Speaker 1 (54:41):
Yeah right, great, We end the episode there.
Speaker 2 (54:44):
Thanks on the fantastic chat has always had lots of fun.
Speaker 3 (54:47):
Thank you, thanks for having me there.
Speaker 2 (54:49):
Yeah, and thanks as always to our listeners and viewers.
Speaker 1 (54:52):
That's it for this fixed Defense pros. For more, tune
in next week.
Speaker 2 (54:55):
Till then, stay safe and not cross any boundaries without
a passport.
This is India Today Podcasts.
Speaker 2 (00:05):
Welcome to Season three of Another Defense, the podcast that
takes you inside the world of conflict. I'm your host,
Deve Goswami and every week I sit down with experts
and retired officers from the Army, Navy and Air Force
to decode all things to do with India security and
explore what it truly means to serve. Get ready for
(00:27):
stories of strategy, sacrifice and strength.
Speaker 1 (00:32):
This is in our defense.
Speaker 2 (00:34):
Welcome to Another Defense. This week we focus on the
Indian Navy and how a dead cow led to the
Navy's famed seventy one wargame engagement. That's maybe a joke,
but we actually want to focus on the Indian Navy
and specifically the two front scenario where on the one
hand it's sort of outclasses Pakistan, where on the other
(00:56):
it faces a step challenge from China and it's expanding
navy which is now the largest in the world in
terms of the number of ships it has. And for this,
who better than who in the defense circles is known
as the go to person when it comes to all
things Indian Navy, isn't it?
Speaker 3 (01:12):
Yeah, that's what they say. They good to be back.
Speaker 2 (01:15):
But yeah, you know, we've kind of briefly discussed this
when we talked about submarines. But when it comes to
three forces, three armed forces, Army, Navy, Air Force, how
is it that you developed a deeper passion for the
navy come visibly the army or the air force. Did
it just happened naturally or was it something or like
you said in the sum Many episode, because you were
(01:36):
a water.
Speaker 4 (01:37):
Baby, Well, the naval background did help. But also when
you you know, study history, I think I developed a
passion for naval history. And the fact is that, you know,
India was what it was over a thousand years back
because we were trading out at sea and we had
a very exceptional empire, the Chola Empire for a thousand years,
(02:01):
which we are not taught enough about, and they searched
forth and they created this, you know, fascinating empire, and
they expanded through trade, our soft power cultural influences all
across Southeast Asia, partly because of the fact that the
Chola steered to the sea. And I think, you know,
I believe this that if you are to become a
(02:24):
power of consequence, you have to be a maritime power
and not just a military maritime power.
Speaker 3 (02:31):
But also a commercial power.
Speaker 4 (02:34):
You must have both aspects of being a merchantile mercantile
power and a military power without you see, no country
in history has succeeded without having a strong navy and
a strong navy to protect sea lanes of communication. You've
seen it with a British Empire, with the American navy
and the economy, and of course China.
Speaker 3 (02:55):
China today is where.
Speaker 4 (02:56):
It is and it realizes it to be where it
wants to be with a very strong navy of over
five hundred ships, and the Indian Navy. We've known that
India has realized the fact that if it is to
grow as a nation, it needs very a strong navy,
it needs a strong mercantile marine. And all of these
(03:17):
are happening now as we speak, so.
Speaker 2 (03:20):
On this episode, actually I wanted to talk That's exactly
one of the reason I want to talk about the
Indian Navy because I think that when it comes to
military discuss in India, it doesn't really come up very
often for discussion. India has the coast and that is
that is bigger and longer. Then it's land borders with
either Pakistan, or China. Yet the Indian Navy is the
(03:40):
smallest of the three forces. And we've sort of discussed
briefly about this on two episodes previously, links to which
will be there in the show notes, and I would
really urge our listeners and viewers to sort of refer
to them as well. Is the Summarine episode and the
Great Nikoba episode, the Great Project episode where we talked
(04:01):
about the importance of the maritime power that talking about.
But this episode will focus solely on the navy and
it's two adversaries so to speak, Pakistan Navy and the
Chinese Navy. To start with Pakistan, Uh, the idea came
from something that you wrote last week for our website ten.
Speaker 1 (04:18):
We'll have that article in the S as well.
Speaker 2 (04:21):
Is why the Pakistan Navy basically fears the Indian Navy.
Speaker 1 (04:25):
Now, when I look at the map of.
Speaker 2 (04:28):
The Arabian c when I look at the map of India, Africa, Pakistan,
it's pretty obvious that Pakistan geography speaking, is not in
a very advantaged position.
Speaker 3 (04:38):
Right.
Speaker 2 (04:38):
It's almost like you, like you wrote, it's a CULTI sact,
like you know, it doesn't really have a lot of
space at the back for its navy to stay away
from the Indian navy. Uh At the most it can
sort of escape towards the Gulf of Oman and then
go deeper into towards Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and uh and Iran.
But that's not really that's more of a When I
(04:59):
look at the app to me as a layperson, that
seems more of a hiding position than any sort of
defensive offensive position, which makes me think that it's always
going to be very easy for the Indian Navy to
sort of blockade Pakistan if it comes to that. So
before we talk about the real world implications of this
(05:20):
in terms of we'll go back to the sixty five war,
will talk about the seventy one war, will talk about
operations Indur as well. Before we do that, tell us
about this geography and how it puts Pakistan in a
very sort of disadvantaged.
Speaker 4 (05:31):
Good question, Dave, And you know, the thing is that
geography dictates history. And in the case of Pakistan, as
you mentioned and I've written that, it's a culty sac,
it's a thousand kilometer long coastline. It's very strategic. It's
really important for pakistan survival because it literally ninety percent
of its maritime commerce. Its energy supplies come through this
(05:54):
coastline that's very close to the oil rich countries of
the Gulf and also needs the port's Guada Jivani. Let's
not forget Karachi, the main port Binkasim. All of these
are very critical to Pakistan's economy, but for several reasons,
the primary one being the geography itself, and the second one,
(06:17):
of course, is the fact that India's geography is very
suitable for naval operations, given that it's if you look
at the Indian map upside down, it's a peninsula that's
jutting out into the Indian Ocean. And this is an
advantage that has been long understood by empires that have
ruled in India, the maritime empires like of course the
Chola Empire that I mentioned and the British. Now, when
(06:40):
the British came, for instance, they turned the Indian Ocean
into a British lake. They were on the Indian coast,
and from there they built up a series of forts
like Singapore was their eastern fortress and Aiden was the
western fortress. They controlled all the access points into the
Indian Ocean, and they ruled that way for almost two
(07:03):
centuries until they were then displaced by the American Navy,
which is today the most powerful navy extra territorial navy
in the Indian Ocean region, which operates primarily from Diego,
Gashia and of course in Bahrain and several other bases
in the ir But the most powerful regional navy is
of course the Indian Navy. And like I mentioned it,
(07:25):
geography favors us. The fact that we have a peninsula,
we have basis on both sides, we were able to
disperse our fleets and at the same time converge them
to a point of action. And that point of action
in the last couple of decades has usually been the
coast of Pakistan, first in nineteen seventy one and then
of course we saw it in twenty twenty five. Shots
(07:46):
weren't fired. But the fact is that the Indian Navy
and the Government of India has underlining the vulnerability of Pakistan.
Pakistan talks about just two fronts that they're worried about,
their Afghani and the Indian front. The Government of India
saying there's a third front that you have to be
very worried about your southern flanks, which is if you
(08:07):
don't have a strong navy which protects your sea lanes
of communication, which is able to protect your mercantile marine,
then you're effectively a landlocked country. And that is what
happens to Pakistan usually in conflicts like we've seen in
nineteen seventy one, where you had East Pakistan, you had
(08:27):
West Pakistan, both of them very important maritime boundaries for both,
and you had the sea lanes of communication between the
two provinces that actually were the only link connecting East
and West Pakistan. And once the sea lanes of communication
were cut, you had these two provinces literally floating, and
independence of Bangladesh was a foregone conclusion because you could
(08:50):
not run away. All your soldiers were literally bottled up.
That entire garrison fell and they were captured. The same
thing was with the West. When the Indian Navy, you know,
literally rained missiles down on the fourth of December and
subsequently destroying something like four warships, four merchantmen, it created
(09:11):
the impact that it wanted, which is to literally every
foreign ship that was to come in or go out
of the coastline of Karachi stayed away. They stayed away
from the Pakistan coastline, converting Pakistan literally into a landlocked
state which could not rely on.
Speaker 3 (09:30):
The seas for its sustenance.
Speaker 4 (09:32):
It could not get supplies, it got completely bottled up,
and that is when it kind of relies more on
its neighbors like Iran for instance, for overland passage. But
as we know that it is the maritime route that
is the fastest, the most economical way of getting your
goods and your commodities and your energy lines and all that,
which is why nations all over the world they invest
(09:52):
so heavily in oceanic trade, and which is why India
as well has built up all its port infrastructures and
all that and planning big ports like the great Nikobar
Island that we've discussed in the part so the past.
So this is literally, you know, a geographical curse for Pakistan,
and it looks at it's the way it's been structured,
(10:12):
and it's not been able to invest substantial resources to
beef up its navy where it has the same problem
in a sense like India, that you have a large
maritime boundary relative to your borders, but because your disputed
boundaries are all on land. It's the land or the
(10:35):
continental you know theory that kind of prevails over the
maritime you know dimension. And because you have contested land boundaries,
a greater share of resources are taken by the army
and by the air force. And that's the case with
both the Pakistan navy and with the Indian navy. Now
the Indian navy what gets about eighteen percent of the
(10:55):
defense budget, where there's been a case that has been
made for the indianager go beyond twenty percent. China has
actually been cutting down on its soldiers, its land forces,
and focusing more on its air force and on its navy.
And the reasons for that are not far to see
if you see the kind of warfare. That is, if
you're not getting into a kind of war of attrition
(11:18):
like Russia has in Ukraine, then the fastest and the
swiftest way of both initiating a conflict and terminating one
is the naval realm and of course the air force.
So China is focusing more on airpower and on the
naval aspect, and we need to be doing the same
as well. We've been under investing actually, if you ask me,
on both the naval side and also on the air
(11:41):
force side.
Speaker 2 (11:42):
India's blessed with a national sort of build that is
suited for my rid empower. Because I can think of
when you were answering that, when you were saying that,
I could think of myself back in my childhood and
as playing Age of Empires out of listeners and viewers
have ever played that game. And for a second, if
you forget the Pakistan thread, then I could so easily
imagine that, you know, my Maharashtra and Bengal coast would
(12:03):
be where I would build my ships because they're deep inside,
they're safe.
Speaker 3 (12:06):
Uh.
Speaker 2 (12:07):
And like towards the south where you have Kerala AmLaw,
do you have Luxure, the you have Adam Nicoba islands,
and that would be my sort of you know, offensive
attacking points, right, Send my build my ships back in
the base, send them out and then you know allis
from there. And of course the world of course, but
we have no world domination of world dominition that.
Speaker 4 (12:26):
We just want to, you know, be where we are
and kind of prevail over the regions. The fact is
that the under in Nicoba Islins don't forget there, and
we've discussed that in the past installment of your show
where we've spoken about the Great Nicobar Island Project. I mean,
this is literally God's gift to India, the fact that
you have an island chain that is so close to
Southeast Asia and actually if you build that up, it
(12:48):
actually brings you UH as a Southeast Asian power of consequence.
You're right there in the Malacca streets and you will
be more than just the eleventh man sitting on a
bench while the Rcan countries situ and you know, deliberate
and discuss as we've just seen the last few days,
you will actually have a very strong case for being
(13:10):
part of our CM.
Speaker 2 (13:11):
Right right, So let's focus on if we've talked of
the geography, let's focus on what has actually happened in
the past with in terms of our advantage and the
table front and what could have happened on during operations
did not happen because the Navy's offensive role in that
conflict was limited to sort of just building some pressure
(13:32):
but not more than that. First, what actually happened, and
then we can talk about the hypotheticals of what could
have happened in cos in sixty five War, seventy one War,
the Cargole War Office seventy one was the one that
saw the heaviest use of the navy. Sixty five was limited.
The seven Cargulab was also some sort of offense in
terms of, you know, trying to build pressure and like
(13:52):
you said in the first answer, sort of you know,
ensuring that the conflict does not stay on for longer,
bring it.
Speaker 3 (13:59):
Down conflict termination.
Speaker 2 (14:00):
Oh yeah, yeah, So let's talk about sixty five, seventy
one and Cargill and especially the story you were just
telling you before we began recording of Howard Dead Cow
in sixty five led to the seventy one Bombard.
Speaker 4 (14:12):
Interesting, so sixty five actually led to the Indian navy
spectacular showing in nineteen seventy one. In fact, nineteen seventy
one is such a groundbreaking event for the Indian Navy.
They actually saw the birth of the modern Indian Navy.
Right there was an Indian Navy before nineteen seventy one,
very conservative, British inspired, British influenced You had, you know,
(14:35):
British surface warships, you know aircraft, you had admirals were
trained by the British, you know, literally right onto the
fifties and post nineteen seventy one, we saw a very new, aggressive,
confident Indian navy that had actually demonstrated its you know,
sea legs in the seventy one war, and it had
(14:56):
carried out spectacular operations. And it all begins with that.
What you say said is the story of the cow
in nineteen sixty five in Dwarka where this was in September,
when on the seventh of night of seventh of September,
there was a Pakistan A surface action group comprising several warships,
about half a dozen warships and a tanker, a fleet tanker.
(15:18):
They landed up off Dwarka and they carried out a shelly.
Now Dwarka, as you know, is on the Gujarat coast,
and they carried out a you know, thirty minute bombardment,
a shore bombardment of the temple town. I mean they
claimed that there was a radar station there and you
know they wanted to you know, disable the radar station,
(15:39):
but they were clearly aiming at the temple. They were about,
like I mentioned, about six or seven warships. They carried
out a thirty minute what is called shore bombardment naval
gun fire support. They shelled the town They missed the temple,
of course, but they destroyed the There was a railway
(15:59):
station and there two big structures along the coast, and
they hit the one of the buildings of.
Speaker 3 (16:05):
The railway station. They destroyed the shed.
Speaker 4 (16:09):
And it so happens that there was a cow in
the vicinity who was killed in that shelling, and so
there was a big debate, you know, after this incident. Now,
the tragedy was that you had what was then the
most powerful frigate in Asia possibly that was anchored just
(16:30):
thirteen kilometers north of Twarka in a place called Oka.
You're from Gujard, you know the geography. Right just up
the coast, you had the Irons Talvar that was there
that night and which was actually picking up this Pakistani
naval group that was there, the Surface Action Group, because
they were transmitting and the Talwar was intercepting these messages.
(16:53):
And it so happened that war had already begun by then,
the India Pakistan War was in full swing. The first
of September is when Pakistan launched its armored thrust towards Aknur,
where they wanted to actually see where the land links
between Jamu and Kashmir.
Speaker 3 (17:11):
And India.
Speaker 4 (17:11):
It was Field Marshal Ayub Khan's big play at you know,
grabbing Jamu and Kashmir by force because he saw that
window of opportunity closing after you know, India began its
rearmament post nineteen sixty two. This was Ayub's plan. So
there was a sea leg operation. This was Operation Dwaraka
that they launched was meant to Actually it's a very
(17:35):
carefully thought out planet's a tactically sounded very good on paper.
Speaker 3 (17:39):
The idea was that this surface Action group.
Speaker 4 (17:42):
Would go there, shell the coastal town, destroy this invisible
radar that nobody's seen, and draw out the Indian Navy
from Bombay, which is several hundred kilometers south. And they
had positioned the Pianist Ghazi, which is the only submarine
then on the Indians continent. It's a US loaned TENCH
(18:02):
class submarine, very powerful, you know, under sea combatant for
its time in the sixties, built to do battle with
the Japanese in the Second World War. So the Tazi
was positioned off Mumbai and the idea was that they
would lure the Indian fleet and as the fleet came
out to go and do Battle of Gujarat, the Ghazi
(18:23):
would torpedo them. Now, two things happened. The Talwar didn't
joined the battle because the Navy was not part of
the conflict. It had been actually expressly put There was
a signal which mentioned that then Indian Navy was not
to join this conflict, the India Pakistan War. And the
second part is, of course the Navy didn't sail out
of Bombay because they were deployed elsewhere on exercises. So
(18:47):
there was a lot of you know, after this happened
and the Park Navy turnback. They declared the eighth of
September is officially Pakistan Navy Day for destroying a building
and killing a cow. They claim it as a big,
spectacular victory and they you know, and Karachi is just
you know, fifty or sixteen artical miles away. So there
(19:08):
was a big debate within the navy. We said, oh,
what did they do? They just killed a cow. But
there were a very different set of individuals, very bright
admirals then captains who took a front to this attack,
you know, Vice Admiral Krishnan, then Captain meir Roy. They
were outreached. They said, how could Pakistan come here? You know,
(19:30):
carry out this bombard and so what if it's just
a cow, then they killed. Let's build a memorial to
that cow and we can say that the cow died
with her hoofs on. That's that's what Mickey roy said.
Oh no, that was Admiral Krishnan. Now Mickey Roys had
a very roundabout way of looking at it. He said,
he invoked the legend of admiral being buying or how
(19:54):
do you pronounce it, b yn g whould been executed
by the Royal Navy because he didn't sail out and
do battle with the French fleet. And he said that,
you know, he hinted at the fact that the commanding
officer of theist Alvar should have sailed out and done
battle with the Pakistan Surface Action Group. Now, even today,
more than sixty years later, you asked the Indian Navy.
(20:16):
There is a division down the line about the Talvar incident.
There's one set of people who will tell you, look,
we had to face we had to obey orders. Navies
cannot just seek out battle and you know, act as
rambo forces, whereas the another group will say, look, it
is in the navy's charter to go and defend your coastline,
irrespective to the fact whether the war has not been
(20:36):
has been called or not. The CEO of the Inistalva,
the commanding officers should have gone out and done battle
with the Pakistan Surface Action Group. So what if he's
just one ship and there are seven facing him, he
could have fired. He had far better you know, guns
than the pakistanis. Those were Second World War winted ships.
His was a very modern warship. It was a British
(20:58):
built frigate had been acquired just about five or six
years prior late fifties. This was a chance for the
Indian Navy to prove its metal and this guy stayed
out of battle. Now what this does is to the
Navy is that you had a very pride bunch of officers,
very very aggressive, ambitious like Admiral Krishnan. Don't forget Admiral Nanda,
(21:24):
who's a chief in nineteen seventy one, then Captain Mickey
Roy who said we've got to do something. If we
don't get the Indian Navy to fight in the nineteen
seventy one war, we might as well be what is
called in the Navy of force in being or a
fleet in being. Now, a fleet in being is a
pejorative in the navy. It is a fleet that exists
(21:45):
during peace time, but in war time is in ports
and harbor.
Speaker 3 (21:50):
It's bottled up.
Speaker 4 (21:50):
It doesn't sail out because it knows that if it
sails out, it will be instantly vaporized. So a bit
like what possibly the Talvar thought during sixty five, it's
a you know, it's a matter of perception. Really now
in seventy one, so the Navy went in all guns blazing.
Admiral Dunda had this plan set before the war began.
(22:14):
Somewhere in the middle of nineteen seventy one. They said that, look,
we are going to attack Karachi.
Speaker 3 (22:20):
And he was.
Speaker 4 (22:21):
He grew up in Karachi, Admiral Danda, on this Monorah Island.
He spent his early years. They knew Karachi like the
back of his hand. They got their new missile boats
acquired from the Soviet Union. The missile boats didn't have
the range to go all the way to Karachi and
come back to Bombay or even Gujarat, which is why
(22:42):
the Navy then towed these boats as they would, you know,
tie them behind another frigate. They would launch them off Karachi,
they would carry out the attack and then these missile
boats would come back on their own steam. Now, when
Pakistan looked at the missile boats and their acquisition by
the Indian Navy, they said, these guys don't have the range.
They can't go the way up to Karachi and back.
(23:03):
And Admiral Nanda proved them wrong. So in a span
of thirty minutes of Karachi on the night of fourth December,
the Indian name missile boats went in and in less
than thirty minutes they had sunk a destroyer, they had
sunk a minesweeper, disabled another destroyer that was escorting guess
(23:23):
what an ammunition ship that was bringing ammunition and spears
from the US military for the Pakistan in you know,
under cover of darkness. So in thirty minutes there were
blazing wrecks all around Karachi. All of these were fired
missiles that were fired by our missile boats. It is
then and until today, it is the most devastating naval missile.
Speaker 3 (23:48):
Engagement in history.
Speaker 4 (23:50):
Missile to you know, an anti ship missile to hitting
another missile. There's never been so many combatants that have
been destroyed in the span of thirty minutes and a
few days later you had Operation Python where one missile boat,
the ins Vinash, fired four missiles at Karachi with again
three merchant ships were knocked out and then the tanker Pianist.
Speaker 3 (24:13):
Dhaka that was there was destroyed.
Speaker 4 (24:15):
So two attacks on Karachi and you've sung something like
eight ships, seven destroyed, one completely damaged. And three of
those ships happened to be those that took part in
the shelling of Dwaraka in nineteen sixty five. So it
was like, you know, the navy kind of avenging if
you can say that, the attack on Karachi in nineteen
sixty five. So it is one of those things that
(24:37):
you know, maybe what if the Pakistan navy had not
struck in sixty five, then possibly the Indian navy would
have possibly taken it easy in seventy one as well,
you know, and not sprung into action.
Speaker 3 (24:48):
Now the east, you know what happened. The Vikrant moved in.
Speaker 4 (24:52):
It cut off the seaward escape of the Pakistan garrison.
That garrison collapsed, literally all of them had to surrender
because there was no way of escaping.
Speaker 3 (25:01):
Then you had this Operation X which was.
Speaker 4 (25:03):
This covert maritime guerrilla war which I have a book
on which actually.
Speaker 3 (25:11):
Went in before the war began.
Speaker 4 (25:13):
It was a covert operation where the governments will not
take ownership of that. But these operations began in August,
four months before the actual war began. And like one
hundred thousand tons of shipping inside of East Pakistan, then
East Pakistan was either sunk or disabled.
Speaker 3 (25:31):
So you look at these three.
Speaker 4 (25:33):
Big major operations, the missile boat attacks on Karachi, the
paralyzing of the sea lanes of communication in East Pakistan
by Operation X and of course the Bikrantz of his
action group. And don't forget the Ghazi sinking of Vishaka Putnam.
The Navy claims that it was the inis Rashpuoth that
sank the Ghazi. We don't know exactly what happened, but
(25:56):
the end result is that the Ghazi exploded, sank almost
one hundred crew died. So a very comprehensive naval defeat
of Pakistan by the Indian Navy. And that's why I
call seventy one the birth of the modern Indian Navy.
Speaker 1 (26:12):
Yeah, right, very interesting.
Speaker 2 (26:15):
Now, all this happened in a time when both India
and Pakistan were not nuclear powers. Right now the two are,
which brings me to Indur and why perhaps the government
would have thought several times over before deciding on using
the navy for an offensive in an offensive role, whether
there was the bombardment of.
Speaker 1 (26:35):
The Karachi Port.
Speaker 2 (26:36):
By the Karachi Port, pitty the location, Yeah, it's just
so close to India.
Speaker 1 (26:40):
I mean, it's just very strategically very very bad location.
But anyway, so.
Speaker 2 (26:44):
Whether it's the bombardment of the Karachi Port or whether
it's an economic blockade, because like you've said previously on
this on this on this podcast, that Pakistan has underlined
four red lines where it says that if those lines
are crossed, that is when it would consider launching a
nuclear weapon.
Speaker 3 (27:03):
Right.
Speaker 2 (27:03):
One of them is the economic strangulation of Pakistan, which
would happen.
Speaker 1 (27:07):
If the Indian Navy were to.
Speaker 2 (27:09):
Successfully blockade the Pakistani coast or even the Karachi Port, because,
like you said, nineteen ninety five percent of all its
trade and oil comes through that. So do you think
during Kargil and during operations Sindhur, the reason the Navy
was not used in a more offensive role was this
kept this thinking that was in mind of the interim
(27:31):
military planners and if we were to ever use it
what do you think would happen on that escalation ladder.
Speaker 4 (27:39):
Well, you know, if you look at it, in the
past operations they've we've not even used the air force
if you look at it. After the attack on Parliament
two thousand and one, there were some very nascent plans
for striking at terror launch pads and all that, but
only in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. There was, of course during
(28:02):
Cargill also there was talk of you know, prior to that,
three years prior to that, there was talk of going
in and striking at targets across the line of control
and across the international border as well. But these didn't happen.
The conflicts were confined. The government of the day, in fact,
you know, gave them very strict orders that no operation,
(28:23):
no air operations would have happen across transce Aluci. You know,
all of those nothing was to happen. So I think
it was still not very confident, especially given the fact
that you had a nuclearized sub continent in nineteen ninety eight.
But what we're seeing now there was a very different
political leadership that has risk taking ability, that understands the
(28:44):
escalation ladder and the calibrated use of force. That's very
important because not every action, not every skirmish, not every
surgical strike, will lead to a nuclear attack. So if
you've noticed that from twenty sixteen onwards, beginning with the
cross border so called surgical strikes, which I actually call
(29:05):
cross border commando raids, but the fact is that there
was signaling that we have done smaller operations like this
in the past, but this is the first time in
twenty sixteen that we signaled where the DGMO came out
and gave out a statement saying that yes, we did
carry out these attacks on launch pads. So it was
the Government of India signaling intent. Twenty nineteen you saw
(29:26):
the Indian Air Force being used for the first time
to attack a target in mainland Pakistan, Kayber paktun Kua
where they struck that camp and Palacot Jabatop And in
twenty twenty five where again the air Force was the
instrument of first resort. The air force and of course
backed by some artillery as well. These were very very
(29:46):
significant milestones in the fact that the government is understood
calibrated force and the escalation ladder, and they decided that
the Navy would come in at stage three or four, Stage.
Speaker 3 (29:58):
Four or five or beyond that.
Speaker 4 (30:00):
So initially it was all army and air force actions,
but if you look at it, the navy would have
been possibly after the tenth of May, and it's very
clear indications. We don't know for a fact. We know
that there was a very carefully thought out escalation ladder
that the government and the military had worked out. That
(30:20):
was alluded to by Vice Admiral Promote when you mentioned
that there was an escalation ladder, And it's quite possible,
given the fact that you had the entire Vikran Surface
Action Group there of Pakistan, with all its warships, all
of them armed with Bramos missiles, there's a very fair
possibility that the next strike after the tenth would have
(30:41):
come from the sea, and this would again have been
from warships firing at either Pakistani warships or certain installations
over there. But you know, telling Pakistan, you know, reminding
them of the vulnerability of the maritime boundary, of their
maritime frontier and the fact that how high do you
want to go up the escalation ladder? We are prepared
(31:02):
to climb that, and that would achieve that kind of
escalation dominance which would force Pakistan then to kind of
be escalate. So it was you know, very calibrated use
of the air force and the navy. Now then the army,
for very obvious reasons, was not used because the a
lot of you know, chatter came out at that time.
(31:23):
Oh you didn't you know, Pok is still there. You
haven't captured Pok. But the idea of the operation was
not to liberate Pok, or to capture Gilgate Baltistan, or
to link up with Afghanistan. You know, it had very
very definite set of aims which the government then decided
on the tenth that we have achieved what we wanted
to do and therefore let us now de escalate. But
(31:47):
the reason why you're talking about all of this now
is that then the narrative kind of spun out of
control and that entered a very different dimension, which is
why the sixth dimension that we've not seen, you know,
in any conflict at least to this level, which is
the narrative warfare realm became super active. And that's going
(32:08):
on till date if you look at it with President
Trump's statements and what the Pakistani leadership has been talking about.
But be that as it made. The fact is that
the government achieved its objectives. They wanted to punish Pakistan
for that Helgam terror attack, horrible terror attack where civilians
were massacred very brutally cold blooded fashion. They want to,
(32:29):
you know, send out a message to Pakistan not to
sponsor terrorism.
Speaker 3 (32:33):
It was that was what the whole objective was.
Speaker 4 (32:35):
And then over the next couple of days that we
slowly went up an escalation ladder and then de escalated
on the tenth. So the fact is that when you
have an air force that is able to inflict such
heavy damage on the Pakistan Air Force by destroying all
its airfields, forcing them to operate off runways or you know,
(32:56):
moving into your depth basis, you have a navy that
has the ability to convert Pakistan into a landlocked state. Right,
you can forget about that. That's the messaging. You can
forget about your thousand kilometer long coastline. You will become
a landlocked state like Afghanistan. You will not have the
use of the sea or the coastline or your seileians
(33:18):
of communication in the duration of this conflict. So that
is the kind of signaling that I see as having
come out and This is something that we've hinted at
in the past, in two thousand and one when you
had the Opera Kram mobilization. Before that you had Kargil
as well, of course, where the Indian Navy was mobilized
off the coast of Pakistan. But it is only in
(33:39):
twenty twenty five that we've seen this four sacretion being
part of an escalation ladder where the leadership in JHQ
ravel Pint is clearly looking at it. Look, this is
what happened on day one, this is what happened on
day two, this is what happened on day three, Day four,
I might lose whatever is left of my air basis
or my radar cover.
Speaker 3 (34:00):
Day five, I might lose my maritime boundary.
Speaker 4 (34:03):
They may not physically blockade it, you know, to in
a way that was done in a full scale war
in seventy one, but they would harass my shipping, They
would not allow my warships to sail out. They would
become targets instantly. So thereby you know, skirting these red
lines that Kali Kidwai mentioned, that shot of a full
scale economic blockade that would only play out possibly in
(34:25):
a full scale war, but in a conflict like this,
I would call it a special military operation.
Speaker 3 (34:31):
Sound is not exactly a war, it was.
Speaker 4 (34:34):
It was a very unusual kind of a conflict that
we saw both sides not crossing each other's by you know, borders,
your favorite line not cross borders without a passport, right,
so no one cross borders. They had standoff missile attacks, right.
So this is a kind of new kind of war fighting,
(34:55):
and I think it isn't this kind of war fighting
where you're looking at not waging wars of attrition, where
the air force becomes really important, where the navy becomes
really important.
Speaker 2 (35:06):
Right, So you know, then it would seem that it's
all hunky dory with the Indian Navy. But there's a
big butt over here, and that's something going to discuss
part of a quick break.
Speaker 1 (35:16):
So what is this?
Speaker 5 (35:16):
Is this that Punjabi Muslim arrogance that comes that Maria, Maria, I.
Speaker 6 (35:23):
Think there's a kind of hubris that Panjab is Pakistan.
Then the other ethnic cities and the other provinces are
much smaller, and really they don't at the end of.
Speaker 1 (35:44):
The day matter because of population.
Speaker 6 (35:47):
Because of population resources, the army's main recruiting grounds are
still Punjab. The officer class is still Punjabi. There are
a number of other officers quest but at the end
of the day, it's Punjab. And I know I've been well.
(36:09):
I know because I've been told by some Pakistani retired officers.
Of course that MS you mentioned him earlier in the conversation,
that was always very conscious of his of his Mohajir background,
and therefore he tried to compensate it. To my mind,
he tried to compensate it by being even more aggressive
(36:30):
towards us.
Speaker 5 (36:32):
But tell me something. You know, you spoke of hubris
is Pakistan and especially under Assimuni. I would love to
know from you, what is your reading of U Asseimunir
right now? Even Musharraf was very careful, or all Pakistani
generals are very careful that nothing.
Speaker 1 (36:49):
Should happen in Pakistan's Punjab province.
Speaker 5 (36:52):
So when Kargil War that I covered, you know Nli
troops were killed. They were all from POJK and you
know also northern areas. So they didn't mind two hundred
three hundred being buried by India or eight hundred dying.
It was okay for them. The only body they asked
for it you were js by even that.
Speaker 6 (37:08):
Time, Shahan, Yeah, sher Khan, you know.
Speaker 5 (37:11):
And this sought a body of a Pakistani officer who
was killed and buried by India. They said, exhume him
and return it to us, because he was apparently from
Pakistan's Punjab province.
Speaker 6 (37:21):
No, that was also because the Indian and this was
the professionalism of the Indian army that the Indian commander
who's commanding the place where this where Sharkhan was fighting,
praised his bravery.
Speaker 1 (37:38):
And in fact I reported it that time.
Speaker 6 (37:40):
And he said when the Pakistani plane came and to
take his body along with the coffin, he sent a
letter to the commander of Sharhan's unit praising his valet.
Speaker 1 (38:01):
Welcome back.
Speaker 2 (38:02):
Suddenly, what we've discussed before the break would warm the
hearts of many. But there is a big butt, like
I said at the before taking the break, and that
butt comes because of China. And that's something that you've
sort of alluded to at the end of recording very recently,
where you said, but this is not where we should
be looking, because this is something that we have sorted
(38:24):
that we have got sorted one thanks to our geophical
advantage what we discussed in the first half and then
second thanks to the sort of tactics we're able to
develop and sort of how you're able to use that
space to your advantage. The real focus should always be China,
and that's what we've been seeing of in the last
few years. China is rapidly expanding its navy. It's now
bigger than the US Navy in terms of the number
(38:46):
of ships, but technologically, obviously the US Navy is far
far far ahead.
Speaker 1 (38:50):
There's no match.
Speaker 2 (38:50):
Obviously, you've had a Chinese so called research vehicles entering
towards coming towards the Bay of Being, or especially during
times when India is sort of testing a missile or
is issuing you no time to test a missile.
Speaker 1 (39:06):
They've been making those stories.
Speaker 2 (39:08):
There have been reports of Chinese submarines also sort of
looking around in that area. I don't want to ask
the question of how does the Indian Navy match up
to the Chinese Navy because that would be a very no.
Speaker 3 (39:20):
Key the beam counter, yeah exactly.
Speaker 2 (39:23):
I'd rather do it in the map analygy that we
began this episode with. So you look at the map.
Now you look that if we of Being all is
our backyard. There is only one place where you can
sort of threaten or harassed China, which is South China
Sea or the East China see slightly higher up right,
we'll have the map for our viewers.
Speaker 1 (39:40):
It's easier for them to understand.
Speaker 2 (39:42):
Now if we were to talk about the Indian Navy strengths,
the way I would ask you this question now is
does the Indian Navy right now possess the ability or
the capability to pop up in South China Sea or
even East China see? And if it does not, what
does it need to do that to get that? And
does it want to do that?
Speaker 3 (40:03):
Well?
Speaker 4 (40:03):
So they if you know, the naval leadership has taken
its q from the political leadership, which is articulated India's
area of influence as being from the Gulf of Aden
right at the Straits of Malacca. Now, the Navy in
its present form, with all its platforms, all its combatants
is more than adequate for this area of influence where
(40:24):
you have your twin carrier battle groups. The Navy's maritime
strategy revolves around aircraft carriers. You have the Vikrant and
you have the Vikramaditya which have their own escort ships,
they have submarines and all that. So these are fit
for this existing area of influence from the Gulf of
Aden to the Malaca Straits. Now Malaca Straits are important
(40:50):
because you have the Malaca Straits, then you have the Umbai, Veta,
the Sunda and the Lombox Straits. These four straits are
going to be used by the PLA Navy to end
the Indian Ocean and they've been doing that over the
last nearly sixteen or seventeen years that they've been deployed
in the anti piracy patrols of the Red Sea. They've
used it to expand their influence, to test their readiness
(41:13):
to deploy forward deploy in the Indian Ocean region because
more than sixty percent of their energy supplies flow through
the Persian Gulf and they're very worried about the safety
of these being disrupted in conflict, possibly with the United States,
so they've been forward positioning their ships and building up
their sea legs. Now, if the PLA Navy were to
(41:36):
come in strength, the Indian Navy strategy, my understanding, would
be to tackle them at the choke points at Malacca,
at Sunda, Lombok, Umbai, Vatar. Now if you were to
go beyond these choke points, then you would need a
whole new set of combatants. Your existing warships would not
be adequate. Then you would need a very large force
(41:58):
of nuclear power attack submarines. Because nuclear powered attack submarines,
or assessens as they're called, they are the only combatants
that can operate on their own in enemy waters, in
contested waters. Because you know, conventional submarines I call conventional
submarines they are actually submersibles and no offencemen to all
my friends out there on the conventional boats are doing
(42:20):
a great job, but they are limited by their design,
by their diesel electric propulsion. Even if they have air
independent propulsion, they're usually they're submersibles. They go out, they
you know, they sail, they're submerged for a certain number
of days, and then they have to resurface for air.
Whereas a nuclear powder attack submarine is not limited by
(42:43):
any of this. In fact, it's only limited by the
food on board, carried on board, or by the endurance
of the crew. Because that nuclear reactor gives you unlimited power.
You can stay underwater almost indefinitely, and it is a
platform like this which is able to carry a very
large weapon load of torpedoes, anti ship missiles and land
(43:06):
attack cruise missiles.
Speaker 3 (43:07):
That has the.
Speaker 4 (43:08):
Ability to significantly influence the maritime battle and also the
battle on land. So if you look at it, the
US Navy has something like more than fifteen nuclear power
attack submarines. It has more nuclear power attack submarines than
the rest of the world put together. And that is
how they exercise sea control and they dominate the oceans
(43:30):
of the world. So if India were to go beyond
the barrier I call it of the Malacca Streets, it
will have to build up a larger force of nuclear
power attack submarines. Now we have one that's we've had
this very unique arrangement with first the USSR and then
later with the Russian Federation to lise one such Chakra,
(43:53):
the Chakara one. Then we had the Chakara two, and
now we have the Chakara II that will be inducted
towards the end of this day. But that's not enough
because you would need a force of something like six
of these submarines at the very minimum, because you would
have to assume that if you have six boats, only
three or four of them would be operational at any
given line. The others would be under refit maintenance. And
(44:15):
the government has cleared a proposal for building two of these,
but they're still on the design stage and they will
not enter service at least until the late twenty thirties,
more than a decade from now ten to fifteen years,
if that's how long it takes to build.
Speaker 3 (44:31):
These boats.
Speaker 4 (44:31):
Are very complex platforms. They're over twelve thousand tons in displacement,
the very difficult to master the technology to build them.
The reactor is a completely different beast. The reactor that
takes them to such great speeds of more than twenty
twenty five thirteen knots. Even those have to be specially
designed constructed for the massive burst of speed that it needs.
(44:55):
So these platforms will come in only in the late
twenty thirties. But you know, I don't like get into
this thing of you know, being a platform centric. Maybe
I think you need to network your existing assets and
look for other ways that you can project power if
need be across these the barriers of these choke points.
And you know, coming to the Chinese Navy that you
(45:18):
mentioned that they are growing in numbers. But let's not
forget that the PLA Navy is not the only one
that could strike at the Indian Navy. It could be
the PLA Air Force as well. They have a long
range bomber fleet, they have long range ballistic missiles, anti
ship ballistic missiles. So the threat could come not just
from PLA Navy warships or submarines. They could be from
(45:43):
the long range bomber fleet. They could be from their
anti ship ballistic missile fleet as well. So there's a
lot of things that the Indian Navy, you know, needs
to look out for when it comes to fighting an
adversary or deterring an adversary. Let's say that's that's the
more politically correct way of saying, it's deterring an adversary
like China from imposing its will all on us in.
Speaker 3 (46:05):
The Indian Ocean.
Speaker 2 (46:06):
Yeah right, uh, you know, and this all harks back
to the episode on the submarines that we did and
what you describe as the lost decade. Because of the
enaction that you did in the previous decade, you will
have nothing in the near future, which is exactly what
happened with the nuclear power attack. Somebody is something that
the Navy had envisioned long back, but it just five
(46:27):
except now that it's happening. And I think also a
big part of what you said, especially the part about
India wanting to not limit per se, but you're not
seeing more than like you said, the girl for Faid
and then the Malaca streets, because I think it also
again goes back to what you briefly said that we
don't really have.
Speaker 1 (46:44):
An expansions mindset. We just want to live peacefully.
Speaker 2 (46:48):
But a lot of these the entire question, the question
that I asked you that we should, can we pop
up in the South tend to see only happens because
that would be when China's needling you. If there was
no China and needling, you would not need to even
envision that.
Speaker 4 (47:02):
Well, answer your question, they've I mean, there has been
one such pop up or no pop up in the
South China Sea.
Speaker 3 (47:08):
There's only one.
Speaker 4 (47:11):
Naval unit that has operated in the South China Sea
in a condition of conflict or an impending conflict or
a standoff with China, and that is the Indian Navy's
Chucker Out who I've written about this in the past.
This is during the dog Lam standoff. A couple of
years back is when the Indian Navy deployed the ins
Chakra as a proof of concept to see if the
(47:31):
Chakra could operate in contested enemy waters.
Speaker 3 (47:35):
And from all accounts.
Speaker 4 (47:37):
That was an extremely successful deployment where they validated a
number of concepts that a nuclear submarine could not only
target warships out in enemy harbors, but also attack targets
on land. So you know that that is a very
important deployment. It's not in the public domain yet from
(47:58):
those who know about it.
Speaker 3 (48:00):
H they know about it.
Speaker 2 (48:01):
Wow, that's very very interesting, and I'm pretty sure China
knows about it, and it must have gotten quite the scare.
Speaker 1 (48:09):
Wow.
Speaker 2 (48:09):
Fantastic, Right, cool, Well, and this episode there, but before
we go, one quick sort of tangent on the topic
of navies and this legend that's there around the seventy
one war, and I just want your brains on what
do we know of What actually happened is the legend
of the US sending its seventh fleet into the Bay
(48:30):
of Pingal and Russia rushing some of its surface ships
and one submarine to scare them off. What has happened, unfortunately,
is that over a period of time, this has just
been embellished, embellished, embellished, and it's come to a stage.
Speaker 1 (48:44):
But I don't know what actually happened back then and
how real.
Speaker 2 (48:48):
Was the threat of the Seventh Fleet sort of you know,
potentially engaging with the Indian navy, and did the Russians
actually you know, sort of intercede and sort of you know,
scared the US Navy off. So what do you know
of what exactly has happened.
Speaker 4 (48:58):
Well, it's a fact that the US did deploy. It
was President Nixon and his National Security advisor, Henry Kissinger,
who saw the way things were playing out like the yeah,
and they hated Indira Gandhi of course, and they saw
the East Pakistan collapsing. Now, the idea was to send
(49:19):
the USS Enterprise, which is then the most powerful naval
platform in the world. It was a nuclear power aircraft carrier.
It carried sixty seventy aircraft on board, and it had
a USS Tripoli, which was a landing platform DOC ship
which carried marines almost one thousand marines, and its escort
(49:42):
ships as well that half a dozen escorts. So it's
very powerful flotilla of ships. It was I think it
was Carrier Strike Group It was task for seventy four,
if I remember correctly, and it was headed by a
very bright US admiral whose name will come to me.
They were sailing out of Vietnam and they were pushed
(50:04):
across into the Bay of Bengal. The idea was to
send India a message. It was gunboard diplomacy exactly of
the kind that you see off the coast of Venezuela.
That's playing out right now right, the US has deployed
more warships off the coast of Venezuela, the first time
that has deployed so many warships in the Caribbean since
the Cuban Missile Crisis of nineteen sixty two.
Speaker 3 (50:25):
So the US.
Speaker 4 (50:27):
Fleet did deploy there, and what the Soviets did at
that time was Admiral Gorshkov, the legendary Admiral Gorshkov. He
sent another Soviet fleet to tail the Americans. And it
so happened that the submarines that were tailing the US's enterprise,
and this was something that they did as a matter
of courtesy during the Cold War, that you had US
(50:50):
fleets that were shadowed or tailed by Russian submarines, and
you had American submarines tailing the Soviets, and it so
happens that, but it was two or three ships and
two submarines, if I remember correctly the number. They were
asked by the Soviets to surface so that the US
(51:11):
Navy could see them. So you saw the prospect of
the US seventh Fleet actually sailing into the Indian Ocean.
And they did this big loop around the Indian Ocean,
and they realized that the game was up in East
Pakistan and they had no option but to withdraw. But
the interesting thing is that what happened when the news
(51:32):
of this flotilla heading towards East Pakistan, it actually brought
in a lot of confidence in the garrison there where
General Niazi was holding out.
Speaker 3 (51:41):
Actually believed that.
Speaker 4 (51:42):
They were coming to his rescue, and he was all
set for that evacuation that would be done under the
supervision of the Americans. The Indian political leadership got spooked
a bit by that, of course, who's and spoke by
mass flotilla of that size, which is why possibly they
(52:02):
leaned on the Soviets to send in do their bit,
which the Soviets complied. But if you see the way
the Seventh Fleet then quickly turned around and went back.
And now, interestingly, Henry Kissinger was here for the India
Today Conclave many years back, and I was his layers
of person, and I was I spent a lot of
time with him, and I asked him, doctor Kissinger. He said, yes,
(52:26):
it's that question which every Indian asks me. Yes, go
ahead ask me this. So I said, why why did
you send the seventh fleet till so he said this,
and he said, look, it wasn't meant to prevent the
fall of East Pakistan. We knew that East Pakistan was
a gonner. It was to signal to the Indian political
leadership that do not move into the west. They were
(52:49):
very worried that not only was the east, not only
had the East fallen, but now India would take the
battle into the west and they would, you know, humiliate Pakistan,
They would capture territory over there. They would destabilize the
thing to a point where the US could not have
a viable client or a satellite state in the form
(53:11):
of Pakistan. And we actually agreed, We said, look this
much and no further. And there was no major thrust
into the west. So there was a section of the
Indian political leadership, the military leadership that believed that we
should have transferred our forces back to the west and
continued the battle over there and defeated, you know, recaptured
(53:32):
parts of Hajipi or you know, Pok could have taken
away territory there, but that option was lost because there
was a ceasefire in the west. There was, of course,
another small part of the military leadership as well, which
I've spoken to, actually thought of contingency planning. What would
they do if the Americans actually entered the Bay of Bengal,
(53:52):
that we would have to fly one way missions because
they didn't have the reach of the range at that time.
Their fighter jets would have to fly one way missions
to attack the American fleet because if they entered there,
they would then target the Wikaran carrier strike group that
was there in the North Bay of Bengal. So the
Air Force would have to be pulled in. But of
course this didn't come to pass. These were just you know,
(54:17):
ideas in people's imagination because the US Seventh Fleet then
just did that quick thing and went back.
Speaker 3 (54:24):
So it is it's a fact that the US did deploy.
Speaker 4 (54:27):
It was gunboard diplomacy, and it is gunboard diplomacy of Venezuela.
Speaker 3 (54:32):
But that's how the way of the world is.
Speaker 4 (54:34):
When the United States is, it is the strong do
as they please, and the week have to just bear it.
Speaker 1 (54:41):
Yeah right, great, We end the episode there.
Speaker 2 (54:44):
Thanks on the fantastic chat has always had lots of fun.
Speaker 3 (54:47):
Thank you, thanks for having me there.
Speaker 2 (54:49):
Yeah, and thanks as always to our listeners and viewers.
Speaker 1 (54:52):
That's it for this fixed Defense pros. For more, tune
in next week.
Speaker 2 (54:55):
Till then, stay safe and not cross any boundaries without
a passport.
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