September 3, 2025 • 60 mins
Dive into Hegels enlightening lectures on the philosophy of world history, crafted to ease students into his complex ideas. Hegels engaging discourse sheds light on accessible themes like world events while he intricately defines and explores the concept of Geist, or spirit. This notion reflects the evolving culture of humanity, continuously adapting to societal changes while simultaneously driving those transformations through what Hegel termed the cunning of reason. A significant focus of the text is on world history rather than confined regional narratives. Influenced by the enigmatic writings of Jakob Bhme and captivated by the thoughts of Spinoza, Kant, Rousseau, and Goethe, Hegel examined the contradictions of modern philosophy and society. He sought to interpret these tensions‚like those between knowledge and faith, freedom and authority‚as part of a comprehensive, evolving rational unity he called the absolute idea or absolute knowledge. This unity emerges through contradiction and negation, leading to an uplifting resolution that preserves these conflicts as integral phases of development. Ultimately, Hegel posits that this rational, self-conscious whole is realized through individual minds, culminating in a collective understanding of this intricate developmental process. (summary by Wikipedia and D.E. Wittkower)
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Speaker 1 (00:00):
The Essential Destiny of Reason sub Section two. This is
a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
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Introduction to the Philosophy of History by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.
(00:30):
The Essential Destiny of Reason Subsection two. What means spirit
uses in order to realize its idea? The question of
the means by which freedom develops itself to a world
conducts us to the phenomenon of history itself. Although freedom
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is primarily an undeveloped idea, the means it uses are
external and phenomenal, presenting themselves in history to our sensuous vision.
The first glance at history convinces us that the actions
of men proceed from their needs, their passions, their characters
and talents, and impresses us with a belief that such needs, passions,
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and interests are the soul springs of action, the efficient
agents in this scene of activity. Among these may perhaps
be found aims of a liberal or universal kind, benevolence
it may be, or noble patriotism. But such virtues and
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general views are but insignificant as compared with the world
and its doings. We may perhaps see the ideal of
reason actualized in those who adopt such aims and within
the sphere of their influence. But they bear only a
trifling portion to the mass of the human race, and
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the extent of that influence is limited. Accordingly, Passions, private aims,
and the satisfaction of selfish desires are, on the other hand,
most effective springs of action. Their power lies in the
fact that they respect none of the limitations which justice
and morality would impose on them, and that these natural
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impulses have a more direct influence over man than the
artificial and tedious discipline that tends to order and self restraint,
law and morality. When we look at this display of
passions and the consequences of their violence, the unreason which
is associated not only with them, but even rather, we
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might say, especially with good designs and righteous aims. When
we see the evil, the vice, the ruin that has
befallen the most flourishing kingdoms which the mind of man
ever created, we can scarce avoid being filled with sorrow
at this universal taint of corruption. And since this decay
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is not the work of mere nature, but of the
human will, a moral embitterment, a revolt of the good spirit,
if it have a place within us, may well be
the result of our reflections without rhetorical exaggeration. A simply
truthful combination of the miseries that have overwhelmed the noblest
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of nations and polities and the finest exemplars of private virtue,
forms a picture of most fearful aspect and excites emotions
of the profoundest and most hopeless sadness counterbalanced by no
consolatory result. We endure in beholding it a mental torture,
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allowing no defense or escape, but the consideration that what
has happened could not be otherwise, that it is a
fatality which no intervention could alter. And at last we
draw back from the intolerable disgust with which these sorrowful
reflections threaten us, into the more agreeable environment of our
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individual life, the present formed by our private aims and interests.
In short, we retreat into the selfishness that stands on
the quiet shore, and thence enjoy in safety the distant
spectacle of RECs confusedly hurled, but even regarding history as
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the slaughter bench at which the happiness of peoples, the
wisdom of states and the virtue of individuals have been victimized.
The question involuntarily arises to what principle, to what final
aim these enormous sacrifices have been offered. From this point
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the investigation usually proceeds to that which we have made
the general commencement of our inquiry. Starting from this, we
pointed out those phenomena which made up a picture so
suggestive of gloomy emotions and thoughtful reflections, as the very
field which we, for our part regard as exhibiting only
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the means for realizing what we assert to be the
essential destiny, the absolute aim, or which comes to the
same thing, the true result of the world's history. We
have all along purposely eschewed moral reflections as a method
of rising from the scene of historical specialities to the
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general principles which they embody. Besides, it is not the
interest of such sentimentalities really to rise above these depressing
emotions and to solve the enigmas of providence which the
consideration that occasioned them present. It is essential to their
character to find a gloomy satisfaction in the empty and
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fruitless sublimities of that negative result. We return then to
the point of view which we have adopted, observing that
the successive steps of the analysis to which it will
lead us will also evolve the conditions requisite for answering
the inquiries suggested by the panorama of sin and suffering
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that history unfolds. The first remark we have to make,
and which though already presented more than once, cannot be
too often repeated when the occasion seems to call for it,
is that what we call principle, aim, destiny, or the
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nature and idea of spirit, is something merely general and abstract. Principle,
plan of existence, law is a hidden, undeveloped essence which
has such however true in itself, is not completely real. Aims, principles,
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et cetera have a place in our thoughts, in our
subjective design only, but not yet in the sphere of reality.
That which exists for itself only is a possibility, a potentiality,
but has not yet emerged into existence. A second element
must be introduced in order to produce actuality, namely actuation realization,
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and whose motive power is the will, the activity of man.
In the widest sense. It is only by this activity
that that idea, as well as abstract characteristics generally are
realized actualized. For of themselves they are powerless. The motive
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power that puts them in operation and gives them some
determinate existence is the need, instinct, inclination, and passion of
man that some conception of mine should be developed into
act and existence. Is my earnest desire. I wish to
assert my personality in connection with it. I wish to
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be satisfied by its execution. If I am to exert
myself for any object, it must, in some way or other,
be my object. In the accomplishment of such or such designs.
I must at the same time find my satisfaction, although
the purpose for which I exert myself includes a complication
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of results, many of which have no interest for me.
This is the absolute right of personal existence to find
itself satisfied in activity and labor. If men are to
interest themselves for anything, they must, so to speak, have
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part of their existence involved in it, find their individuality
gratified by its attainment. Here a mistake must be avoided.
We intend blame and justly impute it as a fault
when we say of an individual that he is interested
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in taking part in such or such transactions, that is,
seeks only his private advantage. In reprehending this, we find
fault with him for furthering his personal aims without any
regard to a more comprehensive design of which he takes
advantage to promote his own interest, or which he even sacrifices.
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With this view, but he who is active in promoting
an object is not simply interested, but interested in that
object itself. Language faithfully expresses this distinction. Nothing therefore happens,
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Nothing is accomplished unless the individuals concerns seek their own
satisfaction in the issue. They are particular units of society.
That is, they have special needs, instincts, and interests generally
peculiar to themselves. Among these needs are not only such
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as we usually call necessities, the stimuli of individual desire
and volition, but also those connected with individual views and convictions, or,
to use a term expressing less decision leanings of opinion,
supposing the impulses of reflection, understanding, and reason to have
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been awakened. In these cases, people demand, if they are
to exert themselves in any direction, that the object should
commend itself to them that in point of opinion, whether
as to its goodness, justice, advantage, profit, they should be
able to enter into it. This is a consideration of
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especial importance in our age when people are less than
formerly influenced by reliance on others and by authority, when
on the contrary, they devote their activities to a cause
on the ground of their own understanding, their independent conviction
and opinion. We assert then that nothing has been accomplished
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without interest on the part of the actors. And if
interest be called passion, inasmuch as the whole individuality, to
the neglect of all other actual or possible interest, trusts,
and claims, is devoted to an object, with every fiber
of volition, concentrating all its desires and powers upon it,
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we may affirm absolutely that nothing great in the world
has been accomplished without passion. Two elements therefore enter into
the object of our investigation, the first the idea, the
second the complex of human passions, the one the warp,
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the other the woof of the vast aris web of
universal history. The concrete mean and union of the two
is liberty under the conditions of morality and estate. We
have spoken of the idea of freedom as the nature
of spirit, and the absolute goal of history. Passion is
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regarded as a thing of sinister aspect, as more or
less immoral man is required to have no passions. Passion,
it is true, is not quite the suitable word for
what I wish to express. I mean here nothing more
than human activity as resulting from private interests, special or
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if you will, self seeking designs, with this qualification, that
the whole energy of will and character is devoted to
their attainment, That other interests, which would in themselves constitute
attractive aims, or rather all things else, are sacrificed to them.
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The object in question is so bound up with the
man's will that it entirely and alone determines the hue
of resolution, and is inseparable from it. It has become
the very essence of his volition. For a person is
a specific existence, not man in general, a term to
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wi which no real existence corresponds, but a particular human being.
The term character likewise expresses this idiosyncrasy of will and intelligence.
But character comprehends all peculiarities, whatever the way in which
a person conducts himself in private relations, et cetera, and
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is not limited to his idiosyncrasy in its practical and
active phase. I shall therefore use the term passion, understanding
thereby the particular bent of character as far as the
peculiarities of volition are not limited to private interest, but
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supply the impelling and actuating force for accomplishing deeds shared
in by the community at large. Passion is in the
first instance the subjective and therefore the formal side of energy,
will and activity, leaving the object or aim still undetermined.
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And there is a similar relation of formality to reality
in merely individual conviction, individual views, individual conscience. It is
always a question of essential importance. What is the purport
of my conviction? What the object of my passion? In
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deciding whether the one or the other is of a
true and substantial nature. Conversely, if it is so, it
will inevitably attain actual existence be realized. From this comment
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on the second essential element in the historical embodiment of
an aim, we infer, glancing at the institution of the state,
in passing that a state is then well constituted and
internally powerful when the private interest of its citizens is
one with the common interest of the state, when the
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one finds its gratification and realization in the other. A
proposition in itself very important. But in a state, many
institutions must be adopted, much political machinery invented, accompanied by
appropriate political arrangements, necessitating long struggles of the understanding before
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what is really appropriate can be discovered, involving moreover contentions
with private interest and passions, and a tedious discipline of
these latter in order to bring about the desired harmony.
The epoch when a state attains this harmonious condition marks
the period of its bloom, its virtue, its vigor, and
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its prosperity. But the history of mankind does not begin
with a conscious aim of any kind, as it is
the case with the particular circles into which men form
themselves of set purpose. The mere social instinct implies a
conscious purpose of security for life and property, and when
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society has been constituted, this purpose becomes more comprehensive. The
history of the world begins with its general aim, the
realization of the idea of spirit, only in an implicit form,
that is, as nature a hidden, most profoundly hidden, unconscious instinct,
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and the whole process of history, as already observed, is
directed to rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one. Thus,
appearing in the form of merely natural existence, natural will,
that which has been called the subjective side, physical craving, instinct, passion,
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private interest, as also opinion and subjective conception, spontaneously present
themselves at the very commencement. This vast conjuries of volitions, interests,
and activities constitute the instruments and means of the world
spirit for attaining its object, bringing it to consciousness, and
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realizing it. And this aim is none other than finding itself,
coming to itself, and contemplating itself in concrete actuality. But
that those manifestations of vitality on the part of individuals
and peoples in which they seek and satisfy their own purposes,
are at the same time the means and instruments of
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a higher and broader purpose of which they know nothing,
which they realize unconsciously, might be made a matter of question,
rather has been questioned, and in every variety of form negatived, decried,
and contemned as mere dreaming and philosophy. But on this
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point I announced my view at the very outset and
asserted our hypothesis, which, however, will appear in the sequel
in the form of a legitimate inference and our belief
that reason governs the world and has consequently governed its history.
In relation to this independently universal and substantial existence, all
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else is subordinate, subservient to it and the means for
its development. The union of universal abstract existence generally with
the individual. The subjective that this alone is truth belongs
to the department of speculation, and is treated in this
general form in logic, But in the process of the
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world's history itself as still incomplete, the abstract final aim
of history is not yet made the distinct object of
desire and interest. While these limited sentiments are still unconscious
of the purpose they are fulfilling, the universal principle is
implicit in them and is realizing itself through them. The
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question also assumes the form of the union of freedom
and necessity, the latent, abstract process of spirit being regarded
as necessity, while that which exhibits itself in the conscious
will of men as their interest belongs to the domain
of freedom. As the metaphysical connection, that is, the connection
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in the idea of these forms of thought, belongs to logic,
it would be out of place to analyze it here.
The chief and cardinal points only shall be mentioned plosophy
shows that the idea advances to an infinite antithesis, that namely,
between the idea in its free, universal form in which
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it exists for itself, and the contrasted form of abstract
introversion reflection on itself, which is formal existence for self,
personality formal freedom such as belongs to spirit only. The
universal idea exists thus as the substantial totality of things
on the one side, and as the abstract essence of
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free volition on the other side. This reflection of the
mind on itself is individual self consciousness, the polar opposite
of the idea in its general form, and therefore existing
in absolute limitation. This polar opposite is consequently limitation particularization
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for the universal absolute being. It is the side of
its deafath finite existence, the sphere of its formal reality,
the sphere of the reverence paid to God. To comprehend
The absolute connection of this antithesis is the profound task
of metaphysics. This limitation originates all forms of particularity of
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whatever kind. The formal volition of which we have spoken
wills itself desires to make its own personality valid in
all that it purposes and does even the pious individual
wishes to be saved and happy. This pole of the
antithesis existing for itself, is in contrast with the absolute universal,
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being a special, separate existence, taking cognizance of speciality only
and willing that alone. In short, it plays its part
in the region of mere phenomena. This is the sphere
of particular purposes, in effecting which individuals exert themselves on
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behalf of their individuality, give it full play and objective realization.
This is also the sphere of happiness and its opposite.
He is happy who finds his condition suited to his
special character, will and fancy, and so enjoys himself in
that condition. The history of the world is not the
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theater of happiness. Periods of happiness are blank pages in it,
for they are periods of harmony, periods when the antithesis
is in abeyance reflection on self. The freedom above described
is abstractly defined as the formal element of the activity
of the absolute idea. The realizing activity of which we
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have spoken is the middle term of the syllogism, one
of whose extremes is the universal essence, the idea which
reposes in the penetralia of spirit, and the other the
complex of external things objective matter. That activity is the
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medium by which the universal latent principle is translated into
the domain of objectivity. I will endeavor to make what
has been said more vivid and clear. By examples. The
building of a house is, in the first instance, a
subject of aim and design. On the other hand, we
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have as means these several substances required for the work
iron wood, stones. The elements are made use of in
working up this material. Fire to melt the iron, wind
to blow the fire, water to set wheels in motion
in order to cut the wood, et cetera. The result
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is that the wind, which has helped to build the
house is shut out by the house. So also are
the violence of rains and floods, and the destructive powers
of fire. So far as the house is made fireproof,
the stones and beams obey the law of gravity pressed downward,
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and so high walls are carried up. Thus the elements
are made use of in accordance with their nature, and
yet to cooperate for a product by which their operation
is limited. Thus the passions of men are gratified. They
develop themselves and their aims in accordance with their natural tendencies,
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and build up the edifice of human society, thus fortifying
a position for right and order against themselves. The connection
of events above indicated involves also the fact that in
history an additional result is commonly pretty used by human actions.
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Beyond that which they aim at and obtain that which
they immediately recognize and desire, they gratify their own interest,
but something farther is thereby accomplished, latent in the actions
in question, though not present to their consciousness and not
included in their design. An analogous example is offered in
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the case of a man who, from a feeling of revenge,
perhaps not an unjust one, but produced by injury on
the other's part, burns that other man's house. A connection
is immediately established between the deed itself and the train
of circumstances not directly included in it. Taken abstractly in itself,
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it consisted in merely presenting a small flame to a
small portion of a beam. Events not involved in that
simple act follow of themselves. The part of the beam
which was set fire to is connected with its remote portions.
The beam itself is united with the woodwork of the
house generally, and this with other houses, so that a
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wide conflagration ensues, which destroys the goods and chattels of
many other persons besides his, against whom the act of
revenge was first directed, perhaps even costs not a few
men their lives. This lay neither in the deed abstractly,
nor in the design of the man who committed it.
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But the action has a further general bearing in the
design of the doer. It was only revenge executed against
an individual in the destruction of his property, but it
is moreover a crime, and that involves punishment. Also this
may not have been present to the mind of the perpetrator,
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still less in his intention, but his deed itself, the
general principles it calls into play, its substantial content, entails it.
By this example, I wish only to impress on you
the consideration that in a simple act, something farther may
be implicated than lies in the intention and consciousness of
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the agent. The example before us involves, however, this additional
consideration that the substance of the act. Consequently, we may say,
the act itself recoils upon the perpetrator reacts upon him
with destructive tendency. The union of the two extremes, the
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embodiment of a general idea in the form of direct reality,
and the elevation of a speciality into connection with universal
truth is brought to pass at first sight under the
conditions of an utter diversity of nature between the two
and an indifference of the one extreme towards the other.
The aims which the agent set before them are limited
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and special, But it must be remarked that the agents
themselves are intelligent, thinking beings. The purport of their desires
is interwoven with general essential considerations of justice, good, duty,
et cetera. For mere desire volition, in its rough and
savage forms, falls not within the scene and sphere of
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universal history. Those general considerations, which form at the same
time a norm for directing aims and actions, have determinate purport.
For such an abstraction as good for its own sake,
has no place in living reality. If men are to act,
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they must not only intend the good, but must have
decided for themselves whether this or that particular thing is
a good. What special course of action, however, is good
or not, is determined as regards the ordinary contingencies of
private life by the laws and customs of a state,
and here no great difficulty is presented. Each individual has
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his position. He knows on the whole what a just,
honorable course of conduct is as to ordinary private relations.
The assertion that it is difficult to choose the right
and good, the regarding it as the mark of an
exalted morality. To find difficulties and raise scruples on that
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score may be set down to an evil or perverse will,
which seeks to evade duties not in themselves of a
perplexing nature, or at any rate, to an idly reflective
habit of mind. Where a feeble will affords no sufficient
exercise to the faculties, leaving them therefore to find occupation
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within themselves and to expend themselves on moral self adulation.
It is quite otherwise with the comprehensive relations that history
has to do with. In this sphere are presented those
momentous collisions between existing acknowledged duties, laws, and rights, and
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those contingencies which are adverse to this fixed system, which
assail and even destroy its foundations and existence, whose tenor
may nevertheless seem good on the large scale, advantageous, yes,
even indispensable and necessary. These contingencies realize themselves in history.
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They involve a general principle of a different order from
that on which depends the permanence of a people or
a state. This principle is an essential phase in the
development of the creating idea of truth, striving and urging
towards consciousness of itself. Historical men world historical individuals are
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those in whose aims such a general principle lies. Caesar
in danger of losing a position, not perhaps at that time,
of superiority, yet at least of equality with the others
who were at the head of the state, and of
succumbing to those who were just on the point of
becoming his enemies. Belongs essentially to this category. These enemies,
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who were at the same time pursuing their personal aims,
had the form of the Constitution and the power conferred
by an appearance of justice on their side. Caesar was
contending for the maintenance of his position, honor, and safety,
and since the power of his opponents included the sovereignty
over the provinces of the Roman Empire, his victory secured
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for him the conquest of that entire empire, and he
thus became, though, leaving the form of the constitution, the
autocrat of the state that which secured for him the
execution of a design which in the first instance was
of negative import. The autocracy of Rome was, however, at
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the same time an independently necessary feature in the history
of Rome and of the world. It was not then
his private gain merely, but an unconscious impulse that occasioned
the accomplishment of that for which the time was ripe.
Such are all great historical men whose own particular aims
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involve those large issues which are the will of the
world spirit. They may be called heroes inasmuch as they
have derived their purposes and their vocation not from the calm,
regular course of things, sanctioned by the existing order, but
from a concealed fount, one which has not attained to
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phenomenal present existence, from that inner spirit still hidden beneath
the surface, which, impinging on the outer world, as on
a shell, bursts it in pieces, because it is another
kernel than that which belonged to the shell in question.
They are men, therefore, who appear to draw the impulse
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of their life from themselves, and whose deeds have produced
a condition of things and a complex of historical relations,
which appear to be only their interest and their work.
Such individuals had no consciousness of the general idea they
were unfolding while prosecuting those aims of theirs. On the contrary,
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they were practical political men, but at the same time
they were thinking men who had an insight into the
requirements of the time. What was ripe for development. This
was the very truth for their age, for their world,
the species next in order, so to speak, and which
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was already formed the womb of time. It was theirs
to know this nascent principle, the necessary, directly sequent step
in progress which their world was to take. To make
this their aim and to expend their energy in promoting it.
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World historical men, the heroes of an epoch, must therefore
be recognized as its clear sighted ones. Their deeds their
words are the best of that time. Great men have
formed purposes to satisfy themselves, not others. Whatever prudent designs
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and counsels they might have learned from others would be
the more limited and inconsistent features in their career. For
it was they who best understood affairs from whom others
learned and approved, or at least acquiesced in their policy.
For that spirit which had taken this fresh a step
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in history is the inmost soul of all individuals, but
in a state of unconsciousness, which the great men in
question aroused. Their fellows. Therefore follow these sole leaders, for
they feel the irresistible power of their own inner spirit
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thus embodied. If we go on to cast a look
at the fate of these world historical persons, whose vocation
it was to be the agents of the world spirit,
we shall find it to have been no happy one.
They attained no calm enjoyment. Their whole life was labor
and trouble. Their whole nature was nought else but their
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master passion. When their object is attained, they fall off
like empty holes from the colonel. They die early, like Alexander.
They are murdered like Caesar, transported to Saint Helena, like Napoleon.
This fearful consolation, that historical men have not enjoyed what
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is called happiness, and of which only private life, and
this may be passed under very various external circumstances, is capable.
This consolation those may draw from history who stand in
need of it, And it is craved by envy, vexed
at what is great and transcendent, striving therefore to depreciate
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it and to find some flaw in it. Thus, in
modern times it has been demonstrated ad nauseum that princes
are generally unhappy on their thrones, in consideration of which
the possession of a throne is tolerated, and men acquiesce
in the fact that not themselves, but the personages in
question are its occupants. The free man, we may observe,
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is not envious, but gladly recognizes what is great and exalted,
and rejoice that it exists. It is in the light
of those common elements which constitute the interest and therefore
the passions of individuals, that these historical men are to
be regarded. They are great men because they willed and
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accomplished something great, not a mere fancy, a mere intention,
but that which met the case and fell in with
the needs of the age. This mode of considering them
also excludes the so called psychological view, which, serving the
purpose of envy, most effectually contrives so to refer all
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actions to the heart, to bring them under such a
subject of aspect as that their authors appear to have
done everything under the impulse of some passion, mean or grand,
some morbid craving, and on account of these passions and
cravings to have been not moral men, Alexander of Macedon
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partly subdued Greece and then Asia. Therefore he was possessed
by a morbid craving for conquest. He is alleged to
have acted from a craving for fame for conquest, and
the proof that these were the impelling motives is that
he did that which resulted in fame. What pedagogue has
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not demonstrated of Alexander the Great of Julius Caesar that
they were instigated by such passions and were consequently immoral men.
Whence the conclusion immediately follows that he, the pedagogue, is
a better man than they, because he has not such passions,
a proof of which lies in the fact that he
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does not conquer Asia, vanquish Darius and Porus. But while
he enjoys life himself, lets others enjoy it too. These
psychologists are particularly fond of contemplating those peculiarities of great
historical figures which appertain to them. As private persons. Man
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must eat and drink, he sustains relations to his friends,
and acquaintances he has, passing impulses and abolitions of temper.
No man is a hero to his valet de champs
is a well known proverb I have added and Guta
repeated it ten years later, But not because the former
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is no hero, but because the latter is a valet.
He takes off the hero's boots, assists him to bed,
knows that he prefers Champagne, et cetera. Historical personages waited
upon in historical literature by such psychological valets come poorly off.
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They are brought down by these their attendants to a
level with or rather a few degrees below the level
of the morality of such exquisite discerners of spirits. The
thersites of Homer, who abuses the king's is a standing
figure for all times blows, that is, beating with a
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solid cudgel. He does not get in every age, as
in the Homeric one. But his envy, his egotism, is
the thorn which he has to carry in his flesh,
and the undying worm that gnaws him is the tormenting
consideration that his excellent views and vituperations remain absolutely without
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result in the world. But our satisfaction at the fate
of Thersitism also may have its sinister side. A world
historical individual is not so unwise as to indulge a
variety of wishes to divide his regards. He is devoted
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to the one aim, regardless of all else. It is
even possible that such men may treat other great, even
sacred interests inconsiderately, conduct which is indeed obnoxious to moral reprehension.
But so mighty a form must trample down many an
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innocent flower, crushed to pieces many an object in its path.
The special interest of passion is thus inseparable from the
active development of a general principle. For it is from
the special and determinate, and from its negation that the
universal results. Particularity contends with its like, and some loss
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is involved in the issue. It is not the general
idea that is implicated in opposition and combat, and that
is exposed to danger. It remains in the background, untouched
and uninjured. This may be called the cunning of reason,
that it sets the passions to work for itself, while
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that which develops its existence through such impulsion pays the
penalty and suffers loss, for it is phenomenal being that
is so treated, and of this part is of no value,
part is positive and real. The particular is, for the
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most part, of too trifling value. As compared with the general.
Individuals are sacrificed and abandoned. The idea pays the penalty
of determinate existence and of corruptibility, not from itself but
from the passions of individuals. But though we might tolerate
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the idea that individuals, their desires and the gratification of
them are thus sacrificed and their happiness given up to
the empire of chance to which it belongs, and that
as a general rule, individuals come under the category of
means to an ulterior end, there is one aspect of
human individuality which we should hesitate to regard in that
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subordinate light, even in relation to the highest, since it
is absolutely no subordinate element, but exists in those individuals
as inherently eternal and divine I mean morality, ethics, religion.
Even when speaking of the realization of the great ideal
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aim by means of individuals, the subjective element in them
their interest and that of their cravings and impulses, their
views and judgments, though exhibited as the merely formal side
of their existence was spoken of as having an infinite
right to be consulted. The first idea that presents itself
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in speaking of means is that of something external to
the object, and having no share in the object itself,
but merely natural things. Even the commonest lifeless objects used
as means must be of such a kind as adapts
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them to their purpose. They must possess something in common
with it. Human beings, least of all, sustain the bare
external relation of mere means to the great ideal aim.
Not only do they, in the very act of realizing it,
make it the occasion of satisfying personal desires whose purport
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is diverse from that aim, but they share in that
ideal aim itself, and are for that very reason objects
of their own existence, not formally merely as the world
of living beings generally is, whose individual life is essentially
subordinate to that of man and is properly used up
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as an instrument. Men, on the contrary, are objects of
existence to themselves, as regards the intrinsic import of the
aim in question. To this order belongs that in them
which we would exclude from the category of mere means. Morality, ethics, religion.
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That is to say, man is an object of existence
in himself only in virtue of the divine, that is
in him, that which was designated at the outset as reason, which,
in view of its activity and power of self determination,
was called freedom. And we affirm, without entering at present
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on the proof of the assertion, that religion, morality, et cetera,
have their foundation and source in that principle, and so
are essentially elevated above all alien necessity and chance. And
here we must remark that individuals, to the extent of
their freedom, are responsible for the deprivation and enfeeblement of
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morals and religion. This is the seal of the absolute
and sublime destiny of man. That he knows what is
good and what is evil, that his destiny is his
veryability to will either good or evil. In one word,
that he is the subject of moral imputation, imputation not
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only of evil but of good, and not only concerning
this or that particular matter and all that happens ab extra,
but also the good and evil attaching to his individual freedom.
The brute alone is simply innocent. It would, however, demand
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an extensive explanation, as extensive as the analysis of moral
freedom itself to preclude or obviate all the misunderstandings which
the statement that what is called innocent imports the entire
unconsciousness of evil is wont to occasion. In contemplating the
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fate which virtue, morality, even piety experience in history, we
must not fall into the litany of lamentations that the
good and pious, often or for the most part, fare
ill in the world, while the evil disposed and wicked prosper.
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The term prosperity is used in a variety of meanings
riches outward honor and the like, But in speaking of
something which in and for itself constitutes an aim of existence,
that so called well well or ill faring of these
or those isolated individuals cannot be regarded as an essential
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element in the rational order of the universe. With more
justice than happiness or a fortunate environment for individuals. It
is demanded of the grand aim of the world's existence,
that it should foster, nay involve, the execution and ratification
of good, moral, righteous purposes. What makes men morally discontented,
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a discontent by the bye on which they somewhat pride
themselves is that they do not find the present adapted
to the realization of aims which they hold to be
right and just, more, especially in modern times, ideals of
political constitutions. They contrast unfavorably things as they are with
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their idea of things as they ought to be. In
this case, it is not private interest nor passion that
desires gratification, but reason, justice, liberty, and equipped with this title,
the demand in question assumes a lofty bearing and readily
adopts a position not merely of discontent, but of open
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revolt against the actual condition of the world. To estimate
such a feeling and such views aright, the demands insisted upon,
and the very dogmatic opinions asserted, must be examined. At
no time so much as in our own have such
general principles and notions been advanced, or with greater assurance
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if in days gone by, History seems to present itself
as a struggle of passions. In our time, though displays
of passion are not wanting, it exhibits partly a predominance
of the struggle of notions, assuming the authority of principles,
partly that of passions and interests essentially subjective, but under
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the mask of such higher sanctions. The pretensions thus contended
for as legitimate in the name of that which has
been stated as the ultimate aim of reason, pass accordingly
for absolute aims, to the same extent as religion, morals, ethics. Nothing,
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as before remarked, is now more common than the complaint
that the ideals which imagination sets up are not realized,
that these glorious dreams are destroyed by cold actuality. These ideals, which,
in the voyage of life founder on the rocks of
hard reality, may be in the first instance only subjective
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and belong to the idiosyncrasy of the individual imagining himself
the highest and wisest. Such do not properly belong to
this category. For the fancies which the individual, in his
isolation indulges cannot be the model for universal reality, just
as universal law is not designated for the units of
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the mass. These, as such may in fact find their
interest decidedly thrust into the background. But by the term
ideal we also understand the ideal of reason, of the
good of the true Poets, as for example, Schiller, have
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painted such ideals touchingly and with strong emotion, and with
the deeply melancholy conviction that they could not be realized.
In affirming, on the contrary that the universal reason does
realize itself, we have indeed nothing to do with the
individual as empirically regarded that admits of decrease of better
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or worse, since here chance and speciality have received authority
from the idea to exercise their monstrous power. Much therefore,
in particular aspects of the grand phenomenon might be found
fault with this subjective fault finding, which however, only keeps
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in view the individual and its deficiency without taking notice
of reason, pervading the whole is easy, and inasmuch as
it asserts an excellent intention with regard to the good
of the whole, and seems to result from a kindly heart,
it feels authorized to give itself errs and assume great consequence.
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It is easier to discover a deficiency in individuals in
states and in providence than to see their real import
and value. For in this merely negative fault finding, a
proud position is taken, one which overlooks the object without
having entered into it, without having comprehended its positive aspect.
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Age generally makes men more tolerant. Youth is always discontented.
The tolerance of age is the result of the ripeness
of a judgment which, not merely as the result of indifference,
is satisfied even with what is inferior, but more deeply
taught by the grave experience of life, has been led
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to perceive the substantial solid worth of the object in question.
The insight than to which, in contradistinction from those ideals
philosophy is to lead us, is that the real world
is as it ought to be, That the truly good,
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the universal divine reason, is not a mere abstraction, but
a vital principle capable of realizing itself. This good, This reason,
in its most concrete form, is God. God governs the world.
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The actual working of his government, the carrying out of
his plan, is the history of the world. This plan
philosophy strives to comprehend, for only that which has been
developed as the result of it possesses bonafide reality. That
which does not accord with it is negative, worthless existence.
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Before the pure light of this divine idea, which is
no mere ideal, the phantom of a world whose events
are an incoherent concourse of fortuitous circumstances utterly vanishes. Philosophy
wishes to discover the substantial purport, the real side of
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the divine idea, and to justify the so much despised
reality of things for reason is the comprehension of the
divine work. But as to what concerns the perversion, corruption,
and ruin of religious, ethical, and moral purposes and states
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of society generally, it must be affirmed that in their
essence these are infinite and eternal, but that the forms
they assume may be of a limited order and consequently
belong to the domain of mere nature and be subject
to the sway of chance. They are therefore perishable and
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exposed to decay and corruption. Religion and morality in the
same way as inherently universal essences, have the peculiarity of
being present in the individual soul in the full extent
of their idea, and therefore truly and really, although they
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may not manifest themselves in it in extenso and are
not applied to fully developed relations. The religion, the morality
of a limited sphere of life, that of a shepherd
or a peasant, for example, in its intensive concentration and
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limitation to a few perfectly simple relations of life, has
infinite worth. The same worth as the religion and morality
of extensive knowledge, and of an existence rich in the
compass of its relations and actions. This inner focus, this
simple region of the claims of subjective freedom, the home
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of volition, resolution, and action. The abstract sphere of conscience,
that which comprises the response, visibility, and moral value of
the individual, remains untouched and is quite shut out from
the noisy din of the world's history, including not merely
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external and temporal changes, but also those entailed by the
absolute necessity inseparable from the realization of the idea of
freedom itself. But as a general truth, this must be
regarded as settled that whatever in the world possesses claims
as noble and glorious has nevertheless a higher existence above it.
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The claim of the world Spirit rises above all special claims.
These observations may suffice in reference to the means which
the World Spirit uses for realizing its idea. Stated simply
and abstractly, this meditation involves the activity of personal existences
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in whom reason is present as their absolute, substantial being,
but a basis in the first instance still obscure and
unknown to them. But the subject becomes more complicated and
difficult when we regard individuals not merely in their aspect
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of activity, but more concretely in conjunction with a particular
manifestation of that activity in their religion and morality, forms
of existence which are intimately connected with reason and share
in its absolute claims. Here the relation of mere means
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to an end disappears, and the chief bearings of this
seeming difficulty in reference to the absolute aim of spirit
have been briefly considered end the essential DestinE of reason
Subsection two. What means Spirit uses in order to realize
(01:00:07):
its idea. This recording is in the public domain.
The Essential Destiny of Reason sub Section two. This is
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For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
Introduction to the Philosophy of History by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.
(00:30):
The Essential Destiny of Reason Subsection two. What means spirit
uses in order to realize its idea? The question of
the means by which freedom develops itself to a world
conducts us to the phenomenon of history itself. Although freedom
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is primarily an undeveloped idea, the means it uses are
external and phenomenal, presenting themselves in history to our sensuous vision.
The first glance at history convinces us that the actions
of men proceed from their needs, their passions, their characters
and talents, and impresses us with a belief that such needs, passions,
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and interests are the soul springs of action, the efficient
agents in this scene of activity. Among these may perhaps
be found aims of a liberal or universal kind, benevolence
it may be, or noble patriotism. But such virtues and
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general views are but insignificant as compared with the world
and its doings. We may perhaps see the ideal of
reason actualized in those who adopt such aims and within
the sphere of their influence. But they bear only a
trifling portion to the mass of the human race, and
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the extent of that influence is limited. Accordingly, Passions, private aims,
and the satisfaction of selfish desires are, on the other hand,
most effective springs of action. Their power lies in the
fact that they respect none of the limitations which justice
and morality would impose on them, and that these natural
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impulses have a more direct influence over man than the
artificial and tedious discipline that tends to order and self restraint,
law and morality. When we look at this display of
passions and the consequences of their violence, the unreason which
is associated not only with them, but even rather, we
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might say, especially with good designs and righteous aims. When
we see the evil, the vice, the ruin that has
befallen the most flourishing kingdoms which the mind of man
ever created, we can scarce avoid being filled with sorrow
at this universal taint of corruption. And since this decay
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is not the work of mere nature, but of the
human will, a moral embitterment, a revolt of the good spirit,
if it have a place within us, may well be
the result of our reflections without rhetorical exaggeration. A simply
truthful combination of the miseries that have overwhelmed the noblest
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of nations and polities and the finest exemplars of private virtue,
forms a picture of most fearful aspect and excites emotions
of the profoundest and most hopeless sadness counterbalanced by no
consolatory result. We endure in beholding it a mental torture,
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allowing no defense or escape, but the consideration that what
has happened could not be otherwise, that it is a
fatality which no intervention could alter. And at last we
draw back from the intolerable disgust with which these sorrowful
reflections threaten us, into the more agreeable environment of our
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individual life, the present formed by our private aims and interests.
In short, we retreat into the selfishness that stands on
the quiet shore, and thence enjoy in safety the distant
spectacle of RECs confusedly hurled, but even regarding history as
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the slaughter bench at which the happiness of peoples, the
wisdom of states and the virtue of individuals have been victimized.
The question involuntarily arises to what principle, to what final
aim these enormous sacrifices have been offered. From this point
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the investigation usually proceeds to that which we have made
the general commencement of our inquiry. Starting from this, we
pointed out those phenomena which made up a picture so
suggestive of gloomy emotions and thoughtful reflections, as the very
field which we, for our part regard as exhibiting only
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the means for realizing what we assert to be the
essential destiny, the absolute aim, or which comes to the
same thing, the true result of the world's history. We
have all along purposely eschewed moral reflections as a method
of rising from the scene of historical specialities to the
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general principles which they embody. Besides, it is not the
interest of such sentimentalities really to rise above these depressing
emotions and to solve the enigmas of providence which the
consideration that occasioned them present. It is essential to their
character to find a gloomy satisfaction in the empty and
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fruitless sublimities of that negative result. We return then to
the point of view which we have adopted, observing that
the successive steps of the analysis to which it will
lead us will also evolve the conditions requisite for answering
the inquiries suggested by the panorama of sin and suffering
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that history unfolds. The first remark we have to make,
and which though already presented more than once, cannot be
too often repeated when the occasion seems to call for it,
is that what we call principle, aim, destiny, or the
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nature and idea of spirit, is something merely general and abstract. Principle,
plan of existence, law is a hidden, undeveloped essence which
has such however true in itself, is not completely real. Aims, principles,
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et cetera have a place in our thoughts, in our
subjective design only, but not yet in the sphere of reality.
That which exists for itself only is a possibility, a potentiality,
but has not yet emerged into existence. A second element
must be introduced in order to produce actuality, namely actuation realization,
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and whose motive power is the will, the activity of man.
In the widest sense. It is only by this activity
that that idea, as well as abstract characteristics generally are
realized actualized. For of themselves they are powerless. The motive
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power that puts them in operation and gives them some
determinate existence is the need, instinct, inclination, and passion of
man that some conception of mine should be developed into
act and existence. Is my earnest desire. I wish to
assert my personality in connection with it. I wish to
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be satisfied by its execution. If I am to exert
myself for any object, it must, in some way or other,
be my object. In the accomplishment of such or such designs.
I must at the same time find my satisfaction, although
the purpose for which I exert myself includes a complication
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of results, many of which have no interest for me.
This is the absolute right of personal existence to find
itself satisfied in activity and labor. If men are to
interest themselves for anything, they must, so to speak, have
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part of their existence involved in it, find their individuality
gratified by its attainment. Here a mistake must be avoided.
We intend blame and justly impute it as a fault
when we say of an individual that he is interested
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in taking part in such or such transactions, that is,
seeks only his private advantage. In reprehending this, we find
fault with him for furthering his personal aims without any
regard to a more comprehensive design of which he takes
advantage to promote his own interest, or which he even sacrifices.
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With this view, but he who is active in promoting
an object is not simply interested, but interested in that
object itself. Language faithfully expresses this distinction. Nothing therefore happens,
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Nothing is accomplished unless the individuals concerns seek their own
satisfaction in the issue. They are particular units of society.
That is, they have special needs, instincts, and interests generally
peculiar to themselves. Among these needs are not only such
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as we usually call necessities, the stimuli of individual desire
and volition, but also those connected with individual views and convictions, or,
to use a term expressing less decision leanings of opinion,
supposing the impulses of reflection, understanding, and reason to have
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been awakened. In these cases, people demand, if they are
to exert themselves in any direction, that the object should
commend itself to them that in point of opinion, whether
as to its goodness, justice, advantage, profit, they should be
able to enter into it. This is a consideration of
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especial importance in our age when people are less than
formerly influenced by reliance on others and by authority, when
on the contrary, they devote their activities to a cause
on the ground of their own understanding, their independent conviction
and opinion. We assert then that nothing has been accomplished
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without interest on the part of the actors. And if
interest be called passion, inasmuch as the whole individuality, to
the neglect of all other actual or possible interest, trusts,
and claims, is devoted to an object, with every fiber
of volition, concentrating all its desires and powers upon it,
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we may affirm absolutely that nothing great in the world
has been accomplished without passion. Two elements therefore enter into
the object of our investigation, the first the idea, the
second the complex of human passions, the one the warp,
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the other the woof of the vast aris web of
universal history. The concrete mean and union of the two
is liberty under the conditions of morality and estate. We
have spoken of the idea of freedom as the nature
of spirit, and the absolute goal of history. Passion is
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regarded as a thing of sinister aspect, as more or
less immoral man is required to have no passions. Passion,
it is true, is not quite the suitable word for
what I wish to express. I mean here nothing more
than human activity as resulting from private interests, special or
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if you will, self seeking designs, with this qualification, that
the whole energy of will and character is devoted to
their attainment, That other interests, which would in themselves constitute
attractive aims, or rather all things else, are sacrificed to them.
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The object in question is so bound up with the
man's will that it entirely and alone determines the hue
of resolution, and is inseparable from it. It has become
the very essence of his volition. For a person is
a specific existence, not man in general, a term to
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wi which no real existence corresponds, but a particular human being.
The term character likewise expresses this idiosyncrasy of will and intelligence.
But character comprehends all peculiarities, whatever the way in which
a person conducts himself in private relations, et cetera, and
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is not limited to his idiosyncrasy in its practical and
active phase. I shall therefore use the term passion, understanding
thereby the particular bent of character as far as the
peculiarities of volition are not limited to private interest, but
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supply the impelling and actuating force for accomplishing deeds shared
in by the community at large. Passion is in the
first instance the subjective and therefore the formal side of energy,
will and activity, leaving the object or aim still undetermined.
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And there is a similar relation of formality to reality
in merely individual conviction, individual views, individual conscience. It is
always a question of essential importance. What is the purport
of my conviction? What the object of my passion? In
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deciding whether the one or the other is of a
true and substantial nature. Conversely, if it is so, it
will inevitably attain actual existence be realized. From this comment
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on the second essential element in the historical embodiment of
an aim, we infer, glancing at the institution of the state,
in passing that a state is then well constituted and
internally powerful when the private interest of its citizens is
one with the common interest of the state, when the
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one finds its gratification and realization in the other. A
proposition in itself very important. But in a state, many
institutions must be adopted, much political machinery invented, accompanied by
appropriate political arrangements, necessitating long struggles of the understanding before
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what is really appropriate can be discovered, involving moreover contentions
with private interest and passions, and a tedious discipline of
these latter in order to bring about the desired harmony.
The epoch when a state attains this harmonious condition marks
the period of its bloom, its virtue, its vigor, and
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its prosperity. But the history of mankind does not begin
with a conscious aim of any kind, as it is
the case with the particular circles into which men form
themselves of set purpose. The mere social instinct implies a
conscious purpose of security for life and property, and when
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society has been constituted, this purpose becomes more comprehensive. The
history of the world begins with its general aim, the
realization of the idea of spirit, only in an implicit form,
that is, as nature a hidden, most profoundly hidden, unconscious instinct,
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and the whole process of history, as already observed, is
directed to rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one. Thus,
appearing in the form of merely natural existence, natural will,
that which has been called the subjective side, physical craving, instinct, passion,
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private interest, as also opinion and subjective conception, spontaneously present
themselves at the very commencement. This vast conjuries of volitions, interests,
and activities constitute the instruments and means of the world
spirit for attaining its object, bringing it to consciousness, and
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realizing it. And this aim is none other than finding itself,
coming to itself, and contemplating itself in concrete actuality. But
that those manifestations of vitality on the part of individuals
and peoples in which they seek and satisfy their own purposes,
are at the same time the means and instruments of
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a higher and broader purpose of which they know nothing,
which they realize unconsciously, might be made a matter of question,
rather has been questioned, and in every variety of form negatived, decried,
and contemned as mere dreaming and philosophy. But on this
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point I announced my view at the very outset and
asserted our hypothesis, which, however, will appear in the sequel
in the form of a legitimate inference and our belief
that reason governs the world and has consequently governed its history.
In relation to this independently universal and substantial existence, all
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else is subordinate, subservient to it and the means for
its development. The union of universal abstract existence generally with
the individual. The subjective that this alone is truth belongs
to the department of speculation, and is treated in this
general form in logic, But in the process of the
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world's history itself as still incomplete, the abstract final aim
of history is not yet made the distinct object of
desire and interest. While these limited sentiments are still unconscious
of the purpose they are fulfilling, the universal principle is
implicit in them and is realizing itself through them. The
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question also assumes the form of the union of freedom
and necessity, the latent, abstract process of spirit being regarded
as necessity, while that which exhibits itself in the conscious
will of men as their interest belongs to the domain
of freedom. As the metaphysical connection, that is, the connection
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in the idea of these forms of thought, belongs to logic,
it would be out of place to analyze it here.
The chief and cardinal points only shall be mentioned plosophy
shows that the idea advances to an infinite antithesis, that namely,
between the idea in its free, universal form in which
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it exists for itself, and the contrasted form of abstract
introversion reflection on itself, which is formal existence for self,
personality formal freedom such as belongs to spirit only. The
universal idea exists thus as the substantial totality of things
on the one side, and as the abstract essence of
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free volition on the other side. This reflection of the
mind on itself is individual self consciousness, the polar opposite
of the idea in its general form, and therefore existing
in absolute limitation. This polar opposite is consequently limitation particularization
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for the universal absolute being. It is the side of
its deafath finite existence, the sphere of its formal reality,
the sphere of the reverence paid to God. To comprehend
The absolute connection of this antithesis is the profound task
of metaphysics. This limitation originates all forms of particularity of
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whatever kind. The formal volition of which we have spoken
wills itself desires to make its own personality valid in
all that it purposes and does even the pious individual
wishes to be saved and happy. This pole of the
antithesis existing for itself, is in contrast with the absolute universal,
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being a special, separate existence, taking cognizance of speciality only
and willing that alone. In short, it plays its part
in the region of mere phenomena. This is the sphere
of particular purposes, in effecting which individuals exert themselves on
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behalf of their individuality, give it full play and objective realization.
This is also the sphere of happiness and its opposite.
He is happy who finds his condition suited to his
special character, will and fancy, and so enjoys himself in
that condition. The history of the world is not the
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theater of happiness. Periods of happiness are blank pages in it,
for they are periods of harmony, periods when the antithesis
is in abeyance reflection on self. The freedom above described
is abstractly defined as the formal element of the activity
of the absolute idea. The realizing activity of which we
(23:51):
have spoken is the middle term of the syllogism, one
of whose extremes is the universal essence, the idea which
reposes in the penetralia of spirit, and the other the
complex of external things objective matter. That activity is the
(24:12):
medium by which the universal latent principle is translated into
the domain of objectivity. I will endeavor to make what
has been said more vivid and clear. By examples. The
building of a house is, in the first instance, a
subject of aim and design. On the other hand, we
(24:36):
have as means these several substances required for the work
iron wood, stones. The elements are made use of in
working up this material. Fire to melt the iron, wind
to blow the fire, water to set wheels in motion
in order to cut the wood, et cetera. The result
(24:57):
is that the wind, which has helped to build the
house is shut out by the house. So also are
the violence of rains and floods, and the destructive powers
of fire. So far as the house is made fireproof,
the stones and beams obey the law of gravity pressed downward,
(25:17):
and so high walls are carried up. Thus the elements
are made use of in accordance with their nature, and
yet to cooperate for a product by which their operation
is limited. Thus the passions of men are gratified. They
develop themselves and their aims in accordance with their natural tendencies,
(25:41):
and build up the edifice of human society, thus fortifying
a position for right and order against themselves. The connection
of events above indicated involves also the fact that in
history an additional result is commonly pretty used by human actions.
(26:01):
Beyond that which they aim at and obtain that which
they immediately recognize and desire, they gratify their own interest,
but something farther is thereby accomplished, latent in the actions
in question, though not present to their consciousness and not
included in their design. An analogous example is offered in
(26:23):
the case of a man who, from a feeling of revenge,
perhaps not an unjust one, but produced by injury on
the other's part, burns that other man's house. A connection
is immediately established between the deed itself and the train
of circumstances not directly included in it. Taken abstractly in itself,
(26:47):
it consisted in merely presenting a small flame to a
small portion of a beam. Events not involved in that
simple act follow of themselves. The part of the beam
which was set fire to is connected with its remote portions.
The beam itself is united with the woodwork of the
house generally, and this with other houses, so that a
(27:10):
wide conflagration ensues, which destroys the goods and chattels of
many other persons besides his, against whom the act of
revenge was first directed, perhaps even costs not a few
men their lives. This lay neither in the deed abstractly,
nor in the design of the man who committed it.
(27:32):
But the action has a further general bearing in the
design of the doer. It was only revenge executed against
an individual in the destruction of his property, but it
is moreover a crime, and that involves punishment. Also this
may not have been present to the mind of the perpetrator,
(27:53):
still less in his intention, but his deed itself, the
general principles it calls into play, its substantial content, entails it.
By this example, I wish only to impress on you
the consideration that in a simple act, something farther may
be implicated than lies in the intention and consciousness of
(28:13):
the agent. The example before us involves, however, this additional
consideration that the substance of the act. Consequently, we may say,
the act itself recoils upon the perpetrator reacts upon him
with destructive tendency. The union of the two extremes, the
(28:34):
embodiment of a general idea in the form of direct reality,
and the elevation of a speciality into connection with universal
truth is brought to pass at first sight under the
conditions of an utter diversity of nature between the two
and an indifference of the one extreme towards the other.
The aims which the agent set before them are limited
(28:57):
and special, But it must be remarked that the agents
themselves are intelligent, thinking beings. The purport of their desires
is interwoven with general essential considerations of justice, good, duty,
et cetera. For mere desire volition, in its rough and
savage forms, falls not within the scene and sphere of
(29:19):
universal history. Those general considerations, which form at the same
time a norm for directing aims and actions, have determinate purport.
For such an abstraction as good for its own sake,
has no place in living reality. If men are to act,
(29:39):
they must not only intend the good, but must have
decided for themselves whether this or that particular thing is
a good. What special course of action, however, is good
or not, is determined as regards the ordinary contingencies of
private life by the laws and customs of a state,
and here no great difficulty is presented. Each individual has
(30:04):
his position. He knows on the whole what a just,
honorable course of conduct is as to ordinary private relations.
The assertion that it is difficult to choose the right
and good, the regarding it as the mark of an
exalted morality. To find difficulties and raise scruples on that
(30:25):
score may be set down to an evil or perverse will,
which seeks to evade duties not in themselves of a
perplexing nature, or at any rate, to an idly reflective
habit of mind. Where a feeble will affords no sufficient
exercise to the faculties, leaving them therefore to find occupation
(30:47):
within themselves and to expend themselves on moral self adulation.
It is quite otherwise with the comprehensive relations that history
has to do with. In this sphere are presented those
momentous collisions between existing acknowledged duties, laws, and rights, and
(31:07):
those contingencies which are adverse to this fixed system, which
assail and even destroy its foundations and existence, whose tenor
may nevertheless seem good on the large scale, advantageous, yes,
even indispensable and necessary. These contingencies realize themselves in history.
(31:30):
They involve a general principle of a different order from
that on which depends the permanence of a people or
a state. This principle is an essential phase in the
development of the creating idea of truth, striving and urging
towards consciousness of itself. Historical men world historical individuals are
(31:54):
those in whose aims such a general principle lies. Caesar
in danger of losing a position, not perhaps at that time,
of superiority, yet at least of equality with the others
who were at the head of the state, and of
succumbing to those who were just on the point of
becoming his enemies. Belongs essentially to this category. These enemies,
(32:21):
who were at the same time pursuing their personal aims,
had the form of the Constitution and the power conferred
by an appearance of justice on their side. Caesar was
contending for the maintenance of his position, honor, and safety,
and since the power of his opponents included the sovereignty
over the provinces of the Roman Empire, his victory secured
(32:45):
for him the conquest of that entire empire, and he
thus became, though, leaving the form of the constitution, the
autocrat of the state that which secured for him the
execution of a design which in the first instance was
of negative import. The autocracy of Rome was, however, at
(33:08):
the same time an independently necessary feature in the history
of Rome and of the world. It was not then
his private gain merely, but an unconscious impulse that occasioned
the accomplishment of that for which the time was ripe.
Such are all great historical men whose own particular aims
(33:30):
involve those large issues which are the will of the
world spirit. They may be called heroes inasmuch as they
have derived their purposes and their vocation not from the calm,
regular course of things, sanctioned by the existing order, but
from a concealed fount, one which has not attained to
(33:51):
phenomenal present existence, from that inner spirit still hidden beneath
the surface, which, impinging on the outer world, as on
a shell, bursts it in pieces, because it is another
kernel than that which belonged to the shell in question.
They are men, therefore, who appear to draw the impulse
(34:15):
of their life from themselves, and whose deeds have produced
a condition of things and a complex of historical relations,
which appear to be only their interest and their work.
Such individuals had no consciousness of the general idea they
were unfolding while prosecuting those aims of theirs. On the contrary,
(34:38):
they were practical political men, but at the same time
they were thinking men who had an insight into the
requirements of the time. What was ripe for development. This
was the very truth for their age, for their world,
the species next in order, so to speak, and which
(34:58):
was already formed the womb of time. It was theirs
to know this nascent principle, the necessary, directly sequent step
in progress which their world was to take. To make
this their aim and to expend their energy in promoting it.
(35:19):
World historical men, the heroes of an epoch, must therefore
be recognized as its clear sighted ones. Their deeds their
words are the best of that time. Great men have
formed purposes to satisfy themselves, not others. Whatever prudent designs
(35:39):
and counsels they might have learned from others would be
the more limited and inconsistent features in their career. For
it was they who best understood affairs from whom others
learned and approved, or at least acquiesced in their policy.
For that spirit which had taken this fresh a step
(36:00):
in history is the inmost soul of all individuals, but
in a state of unconsciousness, which the great men in
question aroused. Their fellows. Therefore follow these sole leaders, for
they feel the irresistible power of their own inner spirit
(36:21):
thus embodied. If we go on to cast a look
at the fate of these world historical persons, whose vocation
it was to be the agents of the world spirit,
we shall find it to have been no happy one.
They attained no calm enjoyment. Their whole life was labor
and trouble. Their whole nature was nought else but their
(36:44):
master passion. When their object is attained, they fall off
like empty holes from the colonel. They die early, like Alexander.
They are murdered like Caesar, transported to Saint Helena, like Napoleon.
This fearful consolation, that historical men have not enjoyed what
(37:06):
is called happiness, and of which only private life, and
this may be passed under very various external circumstances, is capable.
This consolation those may draw from history who stand in
need of it, And it is craved by envy, vexed
at what is great and transcendent, striving therefore to depreciate
(37:28):
it and to find some flaw in it. Thus, in
modern times it has been demonstrated ad nauseum that princes
are generally unhappy on their thrones, in consideration of which
the possession of a throne is tolerated, and men acquiesce
in the fact that not themselves, but the personages in
question are its occupants. The free man, we may observe,
(37:54):
is not envious, but gladly recognizes what is great and exalted,
and rejoice that it exists. It is in the light
of those common elements which constitute the interest and therefore
the passions of individuals, that these historical men are to
be regarded. They are great men because they willed and
(38:18):
accomplished something great, not a mere fancy, a mere intention,
but that which met the case and fell in with
the needs of the age. This mode of considering them
also excludes the so called psychological view, which, serving the
purpose of envy, most effectually contrives so to refer all
(38:42):
actions to the heart, to bring them under such a
subject of aspect as that their authors appear to have
done everything under the impulse of some passion, mean or grand,
some morbid craving, and on account of these passions and
cravings to have been not moral men, Alexander of Macedon
(39:05):
partly subdued Greece and then Asia. Therefore he was possessed
by a morbid craving for conquest. He is alleged to
have acted from a craving for fame for conquest, and
the proof that these were the impelling motives is that
he did that which resulted in fame. What pedagogue has
(39:29):
not demonstrated of Alexander the Great of Julius Caesar that
they were instigated by such passions and were consequently immoral men.
Whence the conclusion immediately follows that he, the pedagogue, is
a better man than they, because he has not such passions,
a proof of which lies in the fact that he
(39:49):
does not conquer Asia, vanquish Darius and Porus. But while
he enjoys life himself, lets others enjoy it too. These
psychologists are particularly fond of contemplating those peculiarities of great
historical figures which appertain to them. As private persons. Man
(40:12):
must eat and drink, he sustains relations to his friends,
and acquaintances he has, passing impulses and abolitions of temper.
No man is a hero to his valet de champs
is a well known proverb I have added and Guta
repeated it ten years later, But not because the former
(40:35):
is no hero, but because the latter is a valet.
He takes off the hero's boots, assists him to bed,
knows that he prefers Champagne, et cetera. Historical personages waited
upon in historical literature by such psychological valets come poorly off.
(40:57):
They are brought down by these their attendants to a
level with or rather a few degrees below the level
of the morality of such exquisite discerners of spirits. The
thersites of Homer, who abuses the king's is a standing
figure for all times blows, that is, beating with a
(41:18):
solid cudgel. He does not get in every age, as
in the Homeric one. But his envy, his egotism, is
the thorn which he has to carry in his flesh,
and the undying worm that gnaws him is the tormenting
consideration that his excellent views and vituperations remain absolutely without
(41:41):
result in the world. But our satisfaction at the fate
of Thersitism also may have its sinister side. A world
historical individual is not so unwise as to indulge a
variety of wishes to divide his regards. He is devoted
(42:02):
to the one aim, regardless of all else. It is
even possible that such men may treat other great, even
sacred interests inconsiderately, conduct which is indeed obnoxious to moral reprehension.
But so mighty a form must trample down many an
(42:24):
innocent flower, crushed to pieces many an object in its path.
The special interest of passion is thus inseparable from the
active development of a general principle. For it is from
the special and determinate, and from its negation that the
universal results. Particularity contends with its like, and some loss
(42:50):
is involved in the issue. It is not the general
idea that is implicated in opposition and combat, and that
is exposed to danger. It remains in the background, untouched
and uninjured. This may be called the cunning of reason,
that it sets the passions to work for itself, while
(43:12):
that which develops its existence through such impulsion pays the
penalty and suffers loss, for it is phenomenal being that
is so treated, and of this part is of no value,
part is positive and real. The particular is, for the
(43:32):
most part, of too trifling value. As compared with the general.
Individuals are sacrificed and abandoned. The idea pays the penalty
of determinate existence and of corruptibility, not from itself but
from the passions of individuals. But though we might tolerate
(43:55):
the idea that individuals, their desires and the gratification of
them are thus sacrificed and their happiness given up to
the empire of chance to which it belongs, and that
as a general rule, individuals come under the category of
means to an ulterior end, there is one aspect of
human individuality which we should hesitate to regard in that
(44:18):
subordinate light, even in relation to the highest, since it
is absolutely no subordinate element, but exists in those individuals
as inherently eternal and divine I mean morality, ethics, religion.
Even when speaking of the realization of the great ideal
(44:41):
aim by means of individuals, the subjective element in them
their interest and that of their cravings and impulses, their
views and judgments, though exhibited as the merely formal side
of their existence was spoken of as having an infinite
right to be consulted. The first idea that presents itself
(45:06):
in speaking of means is that of something external to
the object, and having no share in the object itself,
but merely natural things. Even the commonest lifeless objects used
as means must be of such a kind as adapts
(45:26):
them to their purpose. They must possess something in common
with it. Human beings, least of all, sustain the bare
external relation of mere means to the great ideal aim.
Not only do they, in the very act of realizing it,
make it the occasion of satisfying personal desires whose purport
(45:49):
is diverse from that aim, but they share in that
ideal aim itself, and are for that very reason objects
of their own existence, not formally merely as the world
of living beings generally is, whose individual life is essentially
subordinate to that of man and is properly used up
(46:09):
as an instrument. Men, on the contrary, are objects of
existence to themselves, as regards the intrinsic import of the
aim in question. To this order belongs that in them
which we would exclude from the category of mere means. Morality, ethics, religion.
(46:31):
That is to say, man is an object of existence
in himself only in virtue of the divine, that is
in him, that which was designated at the outset as reason, which,
in view of its activity and power of self determination,
was called freedom. And we affirm, without entering at present
(46:54):
on the proof of the assertion, that religion, morality, et cetera,
have their foundation and source in that principle, and so
are essentially elevated above all alien necessity and chance. And
here we must remark that individuals, to the extent of
their freedom, are responsible for the deprivation and enfeeblement of
(47:17):
morals and religion. This is the seal of the absolute
and sublime destiny of man. That he knows what is
good and what is evil, that his destiny is his
veryability to will either good or evil. In one word,
that he is the subject of moral imputation, imputation not
(47:41):
only of evil but of good, and not only concerning
this or that particular matter and all that happens ab extra,
but also the good and evil attaching to his individual freedom.
The brute alone is simply innocent. It would, however, demand
(48:03):
an extensive explanation, as extensive as the analysis of moral
freedom itself to preclude or obviate all the misunderstandings which
the statement that what is called innocent imports the entire
unconsciousness of evil is wont to occasion. In contemplating the
(48:24):
fate which virtue, morality, even piety experience in history, we
must not fall into the litany of lamentations that the
good and pious, often or for the most part, fare
ill in the world, while the evil disposed and wicked prosper.
(48:44):
The term prosperity is used in a variety of meanings
riches outward honor and the like, But in speaking of
something which in and for itself constitutes an aim of existence,
that so called well well or ill faring of these
or those isolated individuals cannot be regarded as an essential
(49:06):
element in the rational order of the universe. With more
justice than happiness or a fortunate environment for individuals. It
is demanded of the grand aim of the world's existence,
that it should foster, nay involve, the execution and ratification
of good, moral, righteous purposes. What makes men morally discontented,
(49:32):
a discontent by the bye on which they somewhat pride
themselves is that they do not find the present adapted
to the realization of aims which they hold to be
right and just, more, especially in modern times, ideals of
political constitutions. They contrast unfavorably things as they are with
(49:53):
their idea of things as they ought to be. In
this case, it is not private interest nor passion that
desires gratification, but reason, justice, liberty, and equipped with this title,
the demand in question assumes a lofty bearing and readily
adopts a position not merely of discontent, but of open
(50:16):
revolt against the actual condition of the world. To estimate
such a feeling and such views aright, the demands insisted upon,
and the very dogmatic opinions asserted, must be examined. At
no time so much as in our own have such
general principles and notions been advanced, or with greater assurance
(50:41):
if in days gone by, History seems to present itself
as a struggle of passions. In our time, though displays
of passion are not wanting, it exhibits partly a predominance
of the struggle of notions, assuming the authority of principles,
partly that of passions and interests essentially subjective, but under
(51:03):
the mask of such higher sanctions. The pretensions thus contended
for as legitimate in the name of that which has
been stated as the ultimate aim of reason, pass accordingly
for absolute aims, to the same extent as religion, morals, ethics. Nothing,
(51:25):
as before remarked, is now more common than the complaint
that the ideals which imagination sets up are not realized,
that these glorious dreams are destroyed by cold actuality. These ideals, which,
in the voyage of life founder on the rocks of
hard reality, may be in the first instance only subjective
(51:48):
and belong to the idiosyncrasy of the individual imagining himself
the highest and wisest. Such do not properly belong to
this category. For the fancies which the individual, in his
isolation indulges cannot be the model for universal reality, just
as universal law is not designated for the units of
(52:12):
the mass. These, as such may in fact find their
interest decidedly thrust into the background. But by the term
ideal we also understand the ideal of reason, of the
good of the true Poets, as for example, Schiller, have
(52:35):
painted such ideals touchingly and with strong emotion, and with
the deeply melancholy conviction that they could not be realized.
In affirming, on the contrary that the universal reason does
realize itself, we have indeed nothing to do with the
individual as empirically regarded that admits of decrease of better
(53:01):
or worse, since here chance and speciality have received authority
from the idea to exercise their monstrous power. Much therefore,
in particular aspects of the grand phenomenon might be found
fault with this subjective fault finding, which however, only keeps
(53:23):
in view the individual and its deficiency without taking notice
of reason, pervading the whole is easy, and inasmuch as
it asserts an excellent intention with regard to the good
of the whole, and seems to result from a kindly heart,
it feels authorized to give itself errs and assume great consequence.
(53:46):
It is easier to discover a deficiency in individuals in
states and in providence than to see their real import
and value. For in this merely negative fault finding, a
proud position is taken, one which overlooks the object without
having entered into it, without having comprehended its positive aspect.
(54:11):
Age generally makes men more tolerant. Youth is always discontented.
The tolerance of age is the result of the ripeness
of a judgment which, not merely as the result of indifference,
is satisfied even with what is inferior, but more deeply
taught by the grave experience of life, has been led
(54:33):
to perceive the substantial solid worth of the object in question.
The insight than to which, in contradistinction from those ideals
philosophy is to lead us, is that the real world
is as it ought to be, That the truly good,
(54:54):
the universal divine reason, is not a mere abstraction, but
a vital principle capable of realizing itself. This good, This reason,
in its most concrete form, is God. God governs the world.
(55:15):
The actual working of his government, the carrying out of
his plan, is the history of the world. This plan
philosophy strives to comprehend, for only that which has been
developed as the result of it possesses bonafide reality. That
which does not accord with it is negative, worthless existence.
(55:40):
Before the pure light of this divine idea, which is
no mere ideal, the phantom of a world whose events
are an incoherent concourse of fortuitous circumstances utterly vanishes. Philosophy
wishes to discover the substantial purport, the real side of
(56:02):
the divine idea, and to justify the so much despised
reality of things for reason is the comprehension of the
divine work. But as to what concerns the perversion, corruption,
and ruin of religious, ethical, and moral purposes and states
(56:22):
of society generally, it must be affirmed that in their
essence these are infinite and eternal, but that the forms
they assume may be of a limited order and consequently
belong to the domain of mere nature and be subject
to the sway of chance. They are therefore perishable and
(56:46):
exposed to decay and corruption. Religion and morality in the
same way as inherently universal essences, have the peculiarity of
being present in the individual soul in the full extent
of their idea, and therefore truly and really, although they
(57:08):
may not manifest themselves in it in extenso and are
not applied to fully developed relations. The religion, the morality
of a limited sphere of life, that of a shepherd
or a peasant, for example, in its intensive concentration and
(57:28):
limitation to a few perfectly simple relations of life, has
infinite worth. The same worth as the religion and morality
of extensive knowledge, and of an existence rich in the
compass of its relations and actions. This inner focus, this
simple region of the claims of subjective freedom, the home
(57:51):
of volition, resolution, and action. The abstract sphere of conscience,
that which comprises the response, visibility, and moral value of
the individual, remains untouched and is quite shut out from
the noisy din of the world's history, including not merely
(58:12):
external and temporal changes, but also those entailed by the
absolute necessity inseparable from the realization of the idea of
freedom itself. But as a general truth, this must be
regarded as settled that whatever in the world possesses claims
as noble and glorious has nevertheless a higher existence above it.
(58:38):
The claim of the world Spirit rises above all special claims.
These observations may suffice in reference to the means which
the World Spirit uses for realizing its idea. Stated simply
and abstractly, this meditation involves the activity of personal existences
(59:02):
in whom reason is present as their absolute, substantial being,
but a basis in the first instance still obscure and
unknown to them. But the subject becomes more complicated and
difficult when we regard individuals not merely in their aspect
(59:23):
of activity, but more concretely in conjunction with a particular
manifestation of that activity in their religion and morality, forms
of existence which are intimately connected with reason and share
in its absolute claims. Here the relation of mere means
(59:44):
to an end disappears, and the chief bearings of this
seeming difficulty in reference to the absolute aim of spirit
have been briefly considered end the essential DestinE of reason
Subsection two. What means Spirit uses in order to realize
(01:00:07):
its idea. This recording is in the public domain.
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