July 31, 2025 • 34 mins
In this episode we sit down with Jonathan Spyer, director of Middle East research at the Middle East Forum, joins us to offer a comprehensive analysis of the ongoing situation in Syria. Recently visiting the region, Spyer brings firsthand knowledge and valuable perspectives on the complex dynamics at play. In this candid discussion, we delve into the root causes of the conflict, the shifting alliances, and the current state of Syrian politics. Spyer also sheds light on the international involvement and its impact on the region's future. This in-depth conversation provides an essential understanding of how Syria arrived at its present situation and where it might be headed in the years to come.
Hosted by Yuval Barnea.
Edited and produced by Shifra Jacobs and Yuval Barnea.
Hosted by Yuval Barnea.
Edited and produced by Shifra Jacobs and Yuval Barnea.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
This is jPOS sits down with and In this episode,
we sit down with Jonathan Spire, a journalist, senior researcher
at the Middle East Forum and one of Israel's foremost
experts on Syria.
Speaker 2 (00:12):
Given recent events in Syria, there's no one we'd rather
talk to than Jonathan Spier, director of research at the
Middle East Forum, an Israeli journalist who has most recently
been to Syria in April.
Speaker 3 (00:22):
Jonathan, thank you for being here, Thank you for inviting me.
Speaker 2 (00:24):
We wanted to bring you into the studio to tell
us a little bit about what's going on. You're probably
the most up to date personal what's happening in Syria.
You've been to Syria more recently than a lot of Israelis.
You were there in April. How about let's but first, actually,
let's hear a little bit of background from you about
who you are and where you come from.
Speaker 4 (00:45):
Oh sure, well, yeah, so I'm a journalist and Middle
East analyst, and I've been focusing on I guess the
area to Israel's north, I mean, meeting Lebanon and especially Syria,
and then also raq to degree of the last well
getting on for twenty years now and I've worked and
traveled extensively in Syria over the last thirteen years. The
(01:08):
first time when I went in there was the beginning
of the civil war, so it was in very early
twenty twelve, and I covered the civil war from all
fronts in a certain sense, has to say, also embedding
with the rebellion and also with the Asaid regime, and
also with the Kurdish forces in the east, and also
(01:29):
interviewing Isis people in southern Turkey not in their area
of control. So I means I covered the country quite extensively,
and also up until the fall of Asset and also
subsequently as I've reported from inside the country twice now
since the fall of as So.
Speaker 2 (01:45):
Let's talk a little bit about the Druze. It's been
a relatively quiet area of the war. If I remember,
there were protests there in twenty twelve, but it never
really seemed to get hot. Could you tell us a
little bit about why that is and how it lasted?
Speaker 4 (02:00):
Yeah, sure, I Mean the thing is that the Drews,
as is well known, tend to mainly and understandably be
concerned with their own preservation on their own lands, that's
really and then they sort of I think derive their
political strategy and their relationship with states and with other
communities from that basic need. And what that means is
that they will tend to try, as best they can
(02:23):
often to stay neutral if it serves their purposes in
fights going on between other communities, and they think I
think it became very apparent to the Drews early on
with regard to the Syrian rebellion that this was a
Sunni Islamist rebellion and that therefore the Drews had very
little to look for in terms of supporting it, because
it wasn't necessarily going to make their lives any better
(02:45):
than their lives under the of course, very oppressive regimes were.
And as a result, what the Drews kind of did
was they developed their own a number of their own militias.
And then what they said to the Assad regime maybe
in a certain way comparable to what the Kurdish community
is in Syria did as they said to esid Resum, Look,
we're not going to fight you, and we're not going
to fight against the rebellion against you either, And what
(03:07):
we want to do is to be able to police
our own communities and keep our own communities safe, and
to some degree that Assaid regime was okay with that,
because the Asaid regime had a chronic shortage of manpower
pretty much throughout the civil war, so if it could
sort of remove parts of the country from the battlefield,
it would then enable it to use its own limited
manpower in a more effective way. So that was kind
(03:29):
of the proposal that the Druze community, so it's made
to the Assaid regime. The Acid regum largely accepted that,
and as a result of that, Sueda province managed for
most of the civil war to stay outside of the
most intense action.
Speaker 2 (03:42):
I think anyone that remembers the fall of a Sad
remembers just this sudden southern military uprising in Swedo and Dara,
and that would have seemed shocking to anyone who didn't
really know that these militias existed and had been beingly
semi autonomous policing their areas. Could you, like, were these
(04:06):
people the same are the people that are fighting right
now in Sweden the same people that were involved in
this autonomous policing?
Speaker 4 (04:13):
Yeah, very much so. I mean these are existing and
well known military and political formations such as for example,
the Sueda military Council which is connected to Hikmatal history,
and also the original Al Karama or Men of Dignity,
which is connected to asal Balus or that family in
(04:33):
that area. So yeah, these are existing quantities, existing and
known formations. I want to just add something also with
regard to what you were saying before. It's worth noting
actually that the militias from Dara Province in the south
were actually the first to arrive into Damascus as the
regime was falling.
Speaker 3 (04:49):
US.
Speaker 4 (04:49):
It's quite interesting that they actually arrived before HTS arrived,
but of course HTS is bigger and more powerful militias,
so once they arrived into the vacuum left by the
disappearance of US regime, they then took over. But it's
notable that those militias in Dara also fought sort of
quite hard and long against us A regimes. And of
course it's worth remembering that the rebellion against US that
(05:10):
back in twenty eleven started in Dana province. It started
in southwest Syria, so this is also a point to
notes as well.
Speaker 2 (05:16):
I think if I remember correctly, when Dara was liberated,
there were these huge celebrations, people were saying, Wow, we've
you know, liberated the birthplace of the Revolutions. But these
are two names you mentioned, Hikumantel Hisri and Lethablus. Could
you tell us a little bit more about them. I'm
sure they're disagreement. I don't want to say they're different politically,
(05:37):
but I'm sure their disagreement has some sort of element.
Speaker 3 (05:41):
So what's really the difference between these.
Speaker 4 (05:43):
Two Yeah, I mean, I mean our history is a
spiritual leader of the Druids, and in a certain sense,
there's a difference in the sense that when people talk
about our history's militias, it's a bit of a simplification,
because our history is not a military commander. He's not
somebody who's sort of commanding forces in the field. But
he had militias that are associated with him or loyal
to him through the Suede Military Council. And so this
(06:05):
is that situation. Whereas later Bullus is a much younger man,
and he is actually the son of the creator of
Little Karama, as to say, the creator of the Men
of Dignity militia, and his father was killed was killed
in the course of the civil war. So these are
these are sort of you know, differing power and patronage
structures in the Jews community. They do also have I
(06:26):
would say, a notable difference in outlook with regard to
the emergent regime of HTS, in the sense that our
history has been much more determined to secure decentralization and
federalism in Syria and for the Drewis community and Ballas
has been more associated with a view which you know,
(06:47):
is trying to reach compromise with the new government rather
than take a stand against it.
Speaker 2 (06:52):
I don't want to put them in too small political box,
but can we say that in one sense Hisri's faction
are more the autonomists and blasisfaction are more the centralists,
and or is his reactually looking to split off and
form a Druz state.
Speaker 4 (07:11):
No, he hasn't spoken in those times, but that's because
I think in many ways they probably want the same thing,
which is they want maximum decentralization and maximum local control
for the DRUS. And then I think probably they differ
in terms of what is achievable. That's the point. So
I think if you were to talk to Lethobollasis people
and say, well, would you like a very very decentralized
(07:31):
and federalized Syria in which the Drews have maximum control
of their areas. Of course they'd say yes, and how
history wants that as well. But the issue is just
what they regard to be achievable. And the issue I
think is also to some degree with regard to Israel,
or Israel comes into this equation, factors into this equation
in the sense that depending on what you regard to
(07:51):
be achievable or not will also to some degree determine
the attitude you take. So israelly action, because if you
think that a great deal of decentralization is achievable and
that the government in Damascus and the regime in Damascus
is is weak, let's say, then you might take a
different attitude towards his joie Okay, well, then it's a
good thing that is rather attacking, because that helps pile
pressure on the regime in Damascus. And if you, on
(08:12):
the other hand, say, yeah, no, this is courting disaster
from the Drew's point of view, because the Drews are
not that strong. So if they go all out on
supporting a foreign military action and or sort of holding
fast against the regime in Damascus. They stand, you know,
a couple of months down the line, or maybe even
sooner to face a kind of furious retribution from the
government and its supporters which could cost the Drews community heavily.
(08:33):
So I think to a great extent the differences are
of tactics rather than over vision with regard to these groups.
Speaker 2 (08:39):
Is there also we see this in a lot of
these kind of conflicts. Is there also a personal element
between history and Blues or their factions. I seem to
remember there was some sort of reporting about Belus's father's
to whom being destroyed, and a few other incidents like this.
Speaker 3 (08:58):
Is that an accurate way to look at it?
Speaker 4 (09:00):
Certainly there is, you know, there are personal differences, and
there has been a great deal which is also visible
online of sort of personal criticism, let's say, and even
in the case of our history from some abuse as well.
Speaker 3 (09:13):
You know.
Speaker 4 (09:13):
So, yeah, things have reached quite heated levels. And of course, yeah,
these are personal sense that these are powerful families, These
are powerful individuals with extensive patronage networks within their particular communities.
Speaker 2 (09:25):
I think that's something that a lot of the people
watching and listening will not really experience that this level
of political patronage where your patrons can dislike each other
and it can lead to, you know, actual animosity between
their followers.
Speaker 3 (09:40):
So let's talk maybe a little bit about.
Speaker 2 (09:45):
How shocked were you to see this as soon as
the internal security the Syrian internal security forces left Souada
to then see sort of sort of a response from
the Druid militias of targeting bedo in civilians. Was that
a shocking Should we have been jocked at that or
(10:07):
was that sort of expected?
Speaker 3 (10:08):
Well?
Speaker 4 (10:09):
Not really, I mean I think that the point is
that the notion that there's a clear division actually between
better in tribal fighters and into the general security service
or other elements of the Shara government is to some
degree false, or I think it is false. Actually, the
Syrian government makes use of bedouin tribal militias, and it
also turns betterin tribal fighters or commanders into official representatives
(10:33):
of the emergent security forces simply by rebadging them. And
we were seeing that in terms of some of the
forces that were heading into Sweeda in recent days. So
for example, if I can take one example, one individual
which is very representative I think of what is going on.
The individual is called Mohammad al Jassim, or better known
as Abu AMShah, who is the commander of something now
(10:54):
which is now called the sixty second Division of the
Syrian National Army.
Speaker 3 (10:58):
Bab.
Speaker 4 (10:59):
I'm sure in this this is a Bedouin tribal. I
mean it comes from a Bedouin tribe. But the thing
is that this is a person who was a militia
leader actually in the northwest of the country for most
of the civil war, and was engaged in some really
dreadful atrocities. I personally reported on those, and actually I
wrote about them. I broke that story to the Jerusalem Post.
And if there was real concern about humanitarianis whoes as
(11:20):
maybe some people like to pretend there is, general because
and this should have been a huge story, I wrote
about the disappearance of thousands, around eight thousand Syrians into
a private prison system maintained by this Abbu AMShah and
his militias, the Sultan Sorto Manshah militia in close alliance
with the Turks. So what we're seeing here is not
(11:40):
militias over here and the kind of official security forces over there.
What we're seeing is there is a generalized Sunni Islamist
effort and it is gathered around the government of in Damascus.
But the government in Damascus does not exercise complete control
of all of the militias that engage in its name.
We saw this, for example, graphically demonstrated in the events
(12:02):
in the western coastal area of Syria back in March,
when there was widespread massacres of Aloi populations after something
which was triggered it does seem by an attack by
Aloi forces loyal to the deposed dictator Bashar Assad on
a military checkpoint, but was then what happened was then
(12:22):
Sharah and the government gave a kind of general call
to their malitias to head west, and then what happened
was huge massacres took place, because that's what these guys do.
Anybody who knows about Abu AMShah and his pattern of
behavior should not be surprised that there are atrocities against
civilians when that guy gets involved, because that's what he does,
did demonstrably so and with a rich publicly available record
(12:44):
of that kind of activity. So that's what's been going
on I think in Sweda in recent days. And then
certainly they have been here, and there were there have
been instances, certainly of Dru's retribution of fighters engaged on
behalf of history or others who've committed atrocities too. But
I don't think we should be getting into a kind
of both side narrative here or whatever, because actually that's
not what's going on. What's going on is that an
(13:04):
emergent Sunni Islamist power is trying to impose itself on
a minority community in a very brutal way, and then
that minority community is responding, and there is already a
pattern of behavior eight months into the Sharlow government of
this kind of activity. It began or first instance was
with the Alois in the coastal area, as we said
in March. Then there was instances with the Druz in
(13:28):
March and April, and now here we are it's the
third occasion already that this kind of thing has taking place.
Speaker 3 (13:32):
Wow, we're not even a year into the regime. Wow.
Speaker 2 (13:38):
So let's talk a little bit about Syria's other major minority,
the Kurds. Although we should say that the SDF in
the north it's not a fully Kurdish government.
Speaker 3 (13:52):
They don't claim to be a Kurdish government.
Speaker 2 (13:53):
They claim to be sort of a non ethnic government,
but it's effectively run by the Kurds. How is this
going to impact them? What should we expect to see?
Is there going to be a lot of changes, because
I know that they've the SDF have been quite reluctant
to hand over their weapons and to disarm.
Speaker 3 (14:11):
They're not so interested in a centralized Syria.
Speaker 4 (14:15):
Yeah. Well, first of all, as you know, there is
a kind of diplomatic process underway between the leaders of
what they call the Autonomous Administration of North East Syria,
but essentially the commanders of STF, the Syrian Democratic Forces
and representatives of Shada's government. And if I'm not mistaken,
this week or actually next week, there is due to
be a meeting in Paris between I think General Muslim Abdi,
(14:36):
who is the commander of SDF, and Asadala Shaibarni, who
is the foreign minister of the government in Damascus. I
think those are the two representatives that are due to meet.
There was a meeting a couple of weeks ago in
Damascus which was extremely unsuccessful, and this was something which
the meeting broken by Tom Barratt, the United States Envoyd Assyria,
and of course United States Ambassador to Turkey as well.
(14:58):
And the meeting ended in disarray, I think is the
diplomatic term one would use, because they it was clear
there was no possibility for agreement. And Tom Barrett interestingly
then publicly stated afterwards quite heavy criticism of SDF, where
he was saying, well, the SDF is stalling and their
needs they need to get moving. We're not going to
(15:18):
stick around forever. We're not going to babysit this forever.
So they need to make a deal with Damascus, and
reiterated the American position of support for a strong centralized
government in Damascus. By the way, I find this support
to be baffling and ill advised, but supported is that's
the position the Americans are taking. So what's happening essentially
is that the Syrian Democratic Forces, who as you mentioned,
(15:41):
control a large part of territory. They control still around
thirty percent actually of the territory of Syria. They essentially
control Syria east of the Euphrates River. This force is
being if I can put it kind of bluntly, they're
being kind of railroaded into making a deal that they
don't want to make with HTS, and they are I think,
quite determined to stop that, and the events in Sueder
(16:04):
of recent days have made them much more determined, I think,
to try to take a hard line with regard to
Damascus and try to resist the pressure to surrender to Damascus,
because I think what they believe, and maybe with a
degree of justification, is that if they give up their
ability to defend themselves autonomously, they are likely to face
(16:26):
a similar fate, maybe even just a few months down
the line, as that currently being suffered by the Alois
and the Druze. And let me just make one more
point when I say currently being suffered, because these incidents
are not really sufficiently covered by media, it's important to
understand that Alois in the western coast that are, for example,
it's not that they had a bad experience back in
March and now everything's become normal. So they had a
(16:47):
bad experience to experience massacres, and now what they are
experiencing is daily an extensive harassment of their communities undefended
by the so called security forces of the Mascus, up
to and including, for example, the word I spread. Abduction
and disappearance of young Aloi women been carried out by
it appears, Sunny Islamist forces.
Speaker 2 (17:06):
This situation is really reminiscent to me of the Kurdish
Kurds in Iraq in the nineteen nineties after the First
Golf War, when they were sort of reluctant to hand
over any autonomy or military power back to Irac. I mean,
rightly so, do we see any proposals like this in
(17:28):
Syria to give the Kurds their autonomy and to let
them have more freedom and control over their own affairs.
Speaker 4 (17:37):
The problem is that there is no such proposals, no government,
and of course the United States government here is the
important one. The French also have, by the way, close
relationship with the SDF, and SDF people are much more
happy right now with the stance that the French have
been taken because the French are not the power broker
of the United States and no. I think it's been
really notable that after all, this partnership which existed between
(18:00):
the US and its allies on the one hand and
the Syrian Curtish forces on the other, which is now
in place for more than a decade, has been a
very successful partnership in the sense that it was this
partnership which destroyed the Islamic state so called caliphate back
in the period twenty fourteen to twenty nineteen. So, you know,
America doesn't always do or the West doesn't always do
(18:21):
proxy warfare all that successfully in the Middle East, and
the alliance with the Syrian Curds is an instance where
the West has done it well. Identified a partner, began
to work with them, got the result they wanted, the
defeat and destruction of the enemy. But it's very notable
that this partnership has never gone hand in hand with
a sort of diplomatic partnership. Actually, the Western Americans have
(18:42):
been very consistent on this, I mean in their you know,
in their favor if one can say it's a good
policy or a bad policy. But it hasn't been an
ambiguous policy. They've said to the Syrian Curds throughout you know,
we're united with you militarily to fight against ISIS. We're
not uniting with you politically to bring about a long
term or ton for the Curds in Syria. And as
is now very clear with the close i would say
(19:04):
correlation between American and Turkish positions visa Visyria, the United
States has come out for a strong centralized Syria without federalism,
without autonomous zones for minority communities, and that is currently
the American position, and I guess it will be until
we see it change, if it changes.
Speaker 2 (19:20):
Has there been any discussion amongst the SDF about why
there hasn't been any Israeli intervention to help them? I mean,
we intervene so quickly to help the DRUS, but we've
as far as I know, never intervened helped the Kurds.
Do they ever ask that is there any issue there?
Speaker 4 (19:40):
Well, there hasn't been intervention for the Syrian Codes. But
on the other hand, the Syrian Codes have not yet
faced the prospect of the destruction of their autonomous area.
That's to say right now, you know, with by the way,
let's remind us so still the presence of around nine
hundred United States Service Members on Syrians or in alliance
with SDF, they're more than capable right now, both diplomatically
(20:01):
and militarily, of kind of holding their own Even if
there were to be a situation in which they were
to be militarily threatened, I don't think they would be
sort of anger against Israel in the sense that Israel
has never proposed or pledged to defend the Syrian Kurdish areas.
My senses from what I hear that there are contacts
(20:22):
behind the scenes between the Government of Israel, Israeli authorities
and the SDF leadership. I don't know where that's going
or how strong that is. I very much doubt that
there will be anything like a sort of, you know,
pact of defense in which his early forces it's really
air power will be used to defend the Syrian because
I mean, I wouldn't completely rule it out. There are
various scenarios in which it becomes imaginable, but right now
(20:46):
at least it looks very unlikely. The other thing to
remember is that you know, there's not there is no
political alliance or political relationship between SDF and as well
beyond channels of communication as far as I'm aware, So
I don't think there will be expectations in that God
either way.
Speaker 3 (21:00):
And people are aware.
Speaker 4 (21:01):
I think everybody who knows the region and this particular
area in a serious way are aware of the very
deep and complex and long standing relations between Israel and
the Drews people. Also, because of the powerful role in
Israeli society played by Israeli Drews in the security forces,
in the political system, so there's nothing really comparable to
(21:22):
that with regard to the Syrian Curds. So I think
nobody would be surprised at the different nature of the relationship.
And the other thing to remember is that geographically, of course,
the Drews are very close to the border, the Kurds
are out there east of the Euphrates.
Speaker 2 (21:35):
Has there ever been any sort of alliance between the
Drews and the Kurds. They're sort of I'm imagining, not
because they're sort of separated by the length of Syria,
but maybe has there anything historically been between them?
Speaker 3 (21:48):
Have they ever worked together?
Speaker 4 (21:50):
They don't have a, as you say, a geographical link
between the communities. The other thing to remember is that
the Syrian Kurdish leadership is a very particular type of
leadership which is not really paralleled in the Drewze context,
by which I mean that the Drew's leadership we were
discussing earlier is a kind of traditional and religious and
(22:10):
spiritual leadership of those communities. And this is one thing
whereas of course the Kurds are different. The Syrian Courdish
leadership is avowedly secular and I would say left of
center in its political orientation.
Speaker 3 (22:25):
It is.
Speaker 4 (22:27):
Supports or it believes in that ideology of the PKK
of Kurdish Workers Party. It says that it's not connected
organizationally to the PKK, which of course is now disbanding
itself anyway, but it has that sort of outlook, so
it's a very different thing. I mean, if we think of,
for example, the role of women fighters, which has kind
of become a kind of flagship, a banner, so to speak,
(22:50):
for the Syrian Curds, and it's indicative of a much
broader outlook, which is a kind of very secular and
modernist stout looking that way, whereas the Drews leadership, you know,
is traditional, lists tribal, is spiritual, So there isn't a
natural point of contact between the two leaderships in a
certain way. There also isn't geographical link. At the same time,
(23:10):
I think that you know, certainly the curve to be
watching carefully what's been going on in Sweden in recent days.
I assume there are there is some kind of communication
also between early leaderships. There has been some rumors also,
actually it's not really confirmed, but rumors that there were
some initiative to invite SDF forces into the area in
order to sort of police there and help keep things quiet.
(23:30):
But that's not something which has been confirmed, but it's
been out there online in some discussions in recent days.
Speaker 2 (23:35):
Okay, so let's move on to how this is going
to impact israel I. Think that's something that our viewers
and listeners are really interested in, and that's probably their
biggest concern is how this is going to affect Israel.
How is Israel and the average Israeli going to be
affected by us being intervening in Syria?
Speaker 3 (23:52):
Are we going to be dragged into a longer conflict. Yeah.
Speaker 4 (23:54):
First of all, it's worth remembering that the Israeli intervention
on behalf of the trus the first time that Israel
has intervened on behalf of the Drews. That's to say,
also back in April, when there was a similar but
smaller scale situation, is Well then also intervened. Israeli airper
then also targeted Syrian government forces or forces associated with them.
(24:17):
So this isn't the first time, but it's the largest
scale intervention, and I would say it's notable. Certainly, it's notable.
That Israel didn't just strike against Syrian government forces making
their way down to a Sueder, but it also hits
out of the Defense ministry and close to the presidential
palace in Damasculus itself. So clearly as Well was wanted
to send a very very strong message to the Syrian government.
(24:39):
Now what exactly was that message or is that message? Firstly,
I think of course it is to say, well, don't
act against the Syrian Druis, and if you do, then
we will defend them. But there's something broader than that.
I think it's not only about altruism above the Drews. Again,
I'm not ruling that out because I think that maybe
international audiences are not quite aware of how strong the
Drews are as a voice inside Israeli society where they
(25:01):
can say, well, you know, we need you to defend
our fellow drus, and Israeli authorities will respond often. But
it's not only about that. It's about a broader intention,
I would say, and this broader intention derives from a
broader analysis of what's going on in Syria. The broader intention,
I think, is to preserve a demilitarized zone close to Israel.
Israel's border. What does a demilitarized zone mean. Does it
(25:22):
mean that nobody carrying a gun on behalf of the
Damascus authorities is allowed close to the border. No, it
doesn't mean that, but it does mean that, for example,
heavy armored forces or artillery and in general, maybe forces
associated with the Syrian Defense Ministry rather than the Interior
Ministry will not be permitted to deploy close to the border.
And of course that is what was happening in the
(25:43):
contexts of Sueda. The defense Syrian Defense Ministry of the
Syrian Army was sending forces close to the border, and
Israel in the first instance acted against those forces, acted
against the tank con heading towards Sueda. They said, no,
we're not going to permit you to deploy those kind
of forces close to the border with Israel. So I
think there's an Israeli intention to maintain a demilitarized zone
in the in the area close to the border. And
(26:06):
then this derives from a broader analysis I think, which
here is Israel is favoring with regard to the Syrian situation,
which is not shared I think by either the Western
European countries or the United States. And this analysis says
that what's taking place is not the formation of a strong,
new centralized Syria, which can be a partner and a neighbor,
but rather what's taken place is that a jihadi Sunni
(26:27):
Islamist militia has seized power in Damascus is acting the
way that Sunni jihadi militias behave in terms of its
behavior towards minorities, will probably behave in that way towards
Israel as well if it gets the chance. And therefore
Israel is basically relating with an extreme caution and suspicion
towards this emergent regime of President Ahm Sharra and Hayatari
Roshan in Damascus.
Speaker 2 (26:48):
So we can say that because we've I think for
some people they might have been a little bit confused
as to whether the intervention was entirely on the basis
of Drew's outrage in Israel. But from what you're saying,
it seems that there is a wider strategic consideration, and
that as much as we like to think that public
protests is a large factor in strategic decision making, there's
(27:10):
often many other considerations.
Speaker 4 (27:13):
Yeah, if I can add to that, I mean there
was reports of meetings between the sides in the Azerbaijan
Bako Azebaijan in the days prior to what took place,
and certainly there have been some reports suggesting that Israel
was annoyed because because Israel thought it had made it clear.
It's really representative thought they've made it clear to the
representatves of Shara and Damascus that this would not be permitted,
(27:34):
and it seems that the authorities in Damascus either didn't
understand the messaging or thought that they would be able
to kind of push the envelope. I suppose it's right
insane and say, well, you know, yeah, you say we
can't do this, but actually, you know, we're close to
the Americans. The Americans seem to like because the Americans
seem to want to work with us, so hey, we
can just kind of do what we want. It's our country.
If we want to deploy soldiers close to the border,
(27:54):
we'll just kind of go ahead and do it. I
think Israel wanted to make it absolute clear. Yeah, well
that's not the way that it's going to be, or
a least is not going to readily and happily permit that.
Speaker 3 (28:03):
Do you think there's a danger that this could reignate
the civil war in Syria.
Speaker 4 (28:06):
I mean, I would be cautious, andhw I respond to
that in the following way. I think that we should
be clear that the notion that the underlying causes and
the Syrian issue that was raised, if I can put
it that way, in the course of the civil war
that caused the civil war, the notion that these issues
have now been resolved because a new government has come
(28:27):
into Mascus. It's a new dispensation, it's a new morning,
and all that's over. You know, we should be very
careful about drawing conclusions like that the basic problem or
problems of governance in Syria with regard to the sectarian
divides in the country, with regarding lots of ways to
the absence of a deeply shared sense of Syrian There
is a shared Syrian identity, but a deeply sense a
(28:50):
deeply shared sense of how Syria should be governed and
for whom it should be governed and who should dominate
the absence of a consensus and all that, all these
issues that led to the civil war in the first
place are still there. What's changed is that the people
in the driving seat have changed, as to say, for
you know, for more than half a century, people coming
from that quite small minority twelve percent minority of the
(29:11):
Alloi community in Syria are dominated the country. And now
in a certain sense of the situation has been normalized,
simply in the sense that the largest representatives of the
largest community, the sunny Muslim Arabic speakers of the country,
now dominate. But that doesn't resolve all the issues. That
doesn't mean to say that they then just everyone else
will now salute the flag and keep quiet. You know,
(29:34):
there's still lots to be contested, lots to be fought
over in terms of how Syria will be governed. And
I wouldn't rule out the possibility as again, as we've
now seen on no less than three occasions since December it,
twenty twenty four, that this could erupt into violence in
one context or another. If Syrian history is anything to
go by, political issues often get contested, so to speak,
(29:56):
also through armed action.
Speaker 2 (29:58):
And you sort of touched on this a little bit
saying that there are considerations, but do you think the
government it's perhaps just just chasing opportunism or just sort
of looking for opportunities where it can do things and.
Speaker 3 (30:14):
Did like.
Speaker 2 (30:16):
Was this merely that they saw that they had the
opportunity to maybe increase their influence in Syria and get
increased influence amongst the Druiz population in Syria or was
this something that they probably thought about for a while
to already intervene to help them or.
Speaker 4 (30:30):
The government of Israel. Yeah, but I mean, you know,
I think the one, how can I put this one
is maybe being a bit excessively optimistic in assuming that
there is a clear and coherent long term strategy on
the part of the Government of Israel. And I say
that kind of semi humorously but not entirely. You know,
one should not assume that clear strategic thinking has taken place.
Often what happens is that Israel tactically responds to situations,
(30:54):
and you know, to be fair, generally responds effectively tactically
to situations, but often in the absence of a properly
worked out long term strategy that characterizes i would say,
Israeli behavior and all kinds of regional files and other areas.
Is that taking place here or is there a more
fully worked out strategy. I think there is a fully
worked out analysis which is currently predominant in the Israeli
(31:16):
system as I mentioned earlier, which is the view that
the shadow government has currently constituted, is not bringing about stability,
is not in the way to bring you about stability
and good governance Sinceyria that it is. Rather, it appears
to be in the process of creating a kind of
repressive Sunni Islamist form of governance which is likely to
encounter resistance, which could then well lead to violence in
(31:38):
the country. I think that's the predominant analysis. I think
Israel is operating under those assumptions, and as I said,
I think that the desire to determine a to creating
guard a demilitarized zone across the border is clearly there.
Of course, Israeli forces are also deployed, as it's worth remembering,
into the demilitarized or the formerly demilitarized zon defined by
(32:00):
the separation of Forces agreement after the Yonkiporl war. So
there's a bunch of different pieces of Israeli behavior which
do or point in a particular direction, which are all
based I think, on a particular analysis. So in this
sense we shouldn't be surprised by the intervention on behalf
of the Druis, and we shouldn't be surprised if it
happens again. I wouldn't want to stress the following issue
(32:21):
or and for us, the following issue. This Israeli analysis
is not shared anither currently in either Western Europe or
the United States. That doesn't mean to say that it
won't be shared permanently. It reminds me a little bit
of the period immediately following the toppling of the Hosnymalbuuk
regime in Egypt back in twenty eleven twenty twelve, when
Israel from the very outset was absolutely skeptical and suspicious
(32:45):
at the prospect of Muslim Brotherhood governance in Egypt and
took a very hard line saying, now this is going
to be a problem. You shouldn't be thinking there's any
opportunity here. There is only threat. And for a considerable
period of time the then US administration of President Obama
and certainly the Western European countries as well, absolutely didn't
share them and said, no, we you know, the Muslim
Brotherhood can maybe be a partner. Let's give them a chance.
Let's wait and see, And within a year or two
(33:07):
everybody had more or less come over to Israel's side
when they realized what Muslim Brotherhood governors was actually going
to look like. And then nobody particularly mourned when the
Egyptian army stepped back in twenty thirteen and removed the
Muslim Brotherhood from power. So it's quite possible that we
were in a similar situation here at the moment. The
Western countries maybe in a kind of learning curve where
they they still have some illusions, and maybe six months
(33:28):
to a year down the line, if things continue the
way that they've currently appeared for the last eight months,
that also draw the conclusion that, you know, Sunni Islamist
and Jihadi governan sin Damascus is maybe not the ideal situation.
Speaker 2 (33:39):
Well, that's been very enlightening and I've definitely learned a
lot from here. Even with what I already knew, this
was very eye opening. Do you have any final words,
anything you want to say specifically about the situation that
you think people should be hearing.
Speaker 4 (33:53):
Well, only one thing I think we should bear in
mind is that in a certain sense, what happened in
the western coastal area with the Alois and what happened
and now what's happened there with the Jerus in the way,
there could be a kind of dress rehearsal for something
much bigger, which may be on the way east of
the Euphrates, which is that if the Kurdish, well armed
and well organized Kurdish forces that fought and one against Isis,
you know, are if they are subject to an attempt
(34:15):
to kind of railroad them into a forced acquiescence to
an emergence Sunni Islamist and Jihaddi regime in Damascus. That's
not something which they'll necessarily quietly acquiesce to. And that
means then that you know, further strife could be coming
down the line on an even potentially larger scale in Seria.
Speaker 2 (34:31):
Well, thank you for being here. It's been a pleasure
and I hope we'll see you again soon, hope.
Speaker 3 (34:37):
So thank you very much.
Speaker 1 (34:39):
This episode was hosted and produced by Yuval Barnaier. Editing
was done by u Val Barnaier and si For Jacobs.
For more information on jpo's podcasts, see the description of
this episode.
This is jPOS sits down with and In this episode,
we sit down with Jonathan Spire, a journalist, senior researcher
at the Middle East Forum and one of Israel's foremost
experts on Syria.
Speaker 2 (00:12):
Given recent events in Syria, there's no one we'd rather
talk to than Jonathan Spier, director of research at the
Middle East Forum, an Israeli journalist who has most recently
been to Syria in April.
Speaker 3 (00:22):
Jonathan, thank you for being here, Thank you for inviting me.
Speaker 2 (00:24):
We wanted to bring you into the studio to tell
us a little bit about what's going on. You're probably
the most up to date personal what's happening in Syria.
You've been to Syria more recently than a lot of Israelis.
You were there in April. How about let's but first, actually,
let's hear a little bit of background from you about
who you are and where you come from.
Speaker 4 (00:45):
Oh sure, well, yeah, so I'm a journalist and Middle
East analyst, and I've been focusing on I guess the
area to Israel's north, I mean, meeting Lebanon and especially Syria,
and then also raq to degree of the last well
getting on for twenty years now and I've worked and
traveled extensively in Syria over the last thirteen years. The
(01:08):
first time when I went in there was the beginning
of the civil war, so it was in very early
twenty twelve, and I covered the civil war from all
fronts in a certain sense, has to say, also embedding
with the rebellion and also with the Asaid regime, and
also with the Kurdish forces in the east, and also
(01:29):
interviewing Isis people in southern Turkey not in their area
of control. So I means I covered the country quite extensively,
and also up until the fall of Asset and also
subsequently as I've reported from inside the country twice now
since the fall of as So.
Speaker 2 (01:45):
Let's talk a little bit about the Druze. It's been
a relatively quiet area of the war. If I remember,
there were protests there in twenty twelve, but it never
really seemed to get hot. Could you tell us a
little bit about why that is and how it lasted?
Speaker 4 (02:00):
Yeah, sure, I Mean the thing is that the Drews,
as is well known, tend to mainly and understandably be
concerned with their own preservation on their own lands, that's
really and then they sort of I think derive their
political strategy and their relationship with states and with other
communities from that basic need. And what that means is
that they will tend to try, as best they can
(02:23):
often to stay neutral if it serves their purposes in
fights going on between other communities, and they think I
think it became very apparent to the Drews early on
with regard to the Syrian rebellion that this was a
Sunni Islamist rebellion and that therefore the Drews had very
little to look for in terms of supporting it, because
it wasn't necessarily going to make their lives any better
(02:45):
than their lives under the of course, very oppressive regimes were.
And as a result, what the Drews kind of did
was they developed their own a number of their own militias.
And then what they said to the Assad regime maybe
in a certain way comparable to what the Kurdish community
is in Syria did as they said to esid Resum, Look,
we're not going to fight you, and we're not going
to fight against the rebellion against you either, And what
(03:07):
we want to do is to be able to police
our own communities and keep our own communities safe, and
to some degree that Assaid regime was okay with that,
because the Asaid regime had a chronic shortage of manpower
pretty much throughout the civil war, so if it could
sort of remove parts of the country from the battlefield,
it would then enable it to use its own limited
manpower in a more effective way. So that was kind
(03:29):
of the proposal that the Druze community, so it's made
to the Assaid regime. The Acid regum largely accepted that,
and as a result of that, Sueda province managed for
most of the civil war to stay outside of the
most intense action.
Speaker 2 (03:42):
I think anyone that remembers the fall of a Sad
remembers just this sudden southern military uprising in Swedo and Dara,
and that would have seemed shocking to anyone who didn't
really know that these militias existed and had been beingly
semi autonomous policing their areas. Could you, like, were these
(04:06):
people the same are the people that are fighting right
now in Sweden the same people that were involved in
this autonomous policing?
Speaker 4 (04:13):
Yeah, very much so. I mean these are existing and
well known military and political formations such as for example,
the Sueda military Council which is connected to Hikmatal history,
and also the original Al Karama or Men of Dignity,
which is connected to asal Balus or that family in
(04:33):
that area. So yeah, these are existing quantities, existing and
known formations. I want to just add something also with
regard to what you were saying before. It's worth noting
actually that the militias from Dara Province in the south
were actually the first to arrive into Damascus as the
regime was falling.
Speaker 3 (04:49):
US.
Speaker 4 (04:49):
It's quite interesting that they actually arrived before HTS arrived,
but of course HTS is bigger and more powerful militias,
so once they arrived into the vacuum left by the
disappearance of US regime, they then took over. But it's
notable that those militias in Dara also fought sort of
quite hard and long against us A regimes. And of
course it's worth remembering that the rebellion against US that
(05:10):
back in twenty eleven started in Dana province. It started
in southwest Syria, so this is also a point to
notes as well.
Speaker 2 (05:16):
I think if I remember correctly, when Dara was liberated,
there were these huge celebrations, people were saying, Wow, we've
you know, liberated the birthplace of the Revolutions. But these
are two names you mentioned, Hikumantel Hisri and Lethablus. Could
you tell us a little bit more about them. I'm
sure they're disagreement. I don't want to say they're different politically,
(05:37):
but I'm sure their disagreement has some sort of element.
Speaker 3 (05:41):
So what's really the difference between these.
Speaker 4 (05:43):
Two Yeah, I mean, I mean our history is a
spiritual leader of the Druids, and in a certain sense,
there's a difference in the sense that when people talk
about our history's militias, it's a bit of a simplification,
because our history is not a military commander. He's not
somebody who's sort of commanding forces in the field. But
he had militias that are associated with him or loyal
to him through the Suede Military Council. And so this
(06:05):
is that situation. Whereas later Bullus is a much younger man,
and he is actually the son of the creator of
Little Karama, as to say, the creator of the Men
of Dignity militia, and his father was killed was killed
in the course of the civil war. So these are
these are sort of you know, differing power and patronage
structures in the Jews community. They do also have I
(06:26):
would say, a notable difference in outlook with regard to
the emergent regime of HTS, in the sense that our
history has been much more determined to secure decentralization and
federalism in Syria and for the Drewis community and Ballas
has been more associated with a view which you know,
(06:47):
is trying to reach compromise with the new government rather
than take a stand against it.
Speaker 2 (06:52):
I don't want to put them in too small political box,
but can we say that in one sense Hisri's faction
are more the autonomists and blasisfaction are more the centralists,
and or is his reactually looking to split off and
form a Druz state.
Speaker 4 (07:11):
No, he hasn't spoken in those times, but that's because
I think in many ways they probably want the same thing,
which is they want maximum decentralization and maximum local control
for the DRUS. And then I think probably they differ
in terms of what is achievable. That's the point. So
I think if you were to talk to Lethobollasis people
and say, well, would you like a very very decentralized
(07:31):
and federalized Syria in which the Drews have maximum control
of their areas. Of course they'd say yes, and how
history wants that as well. But the issue is just
what they regard to be achievable. And the issue I
think is also to some degree with regard to Israel,
or Israel comes into this equation, factors into this equation
in the sense that depending on what you regard to
(07:51):
be achievable or not will also to some degree determine
the attitude you take. So israelly action, because if you
think that a great deal of decentralization is achievable and
that the government in Damascus and the regime in Damascus
is is weak, let's say, then you might take a
different attitude towards his joie Okay, well, then it's a
good thing that is rather attacking, because that helps pile
pressure on the regime in Damascus. And if you, on
(08:12):
the other hand, say, yeah, no, this is courting disaster
from the Drew's point of view, because the Drews are
not that strong. So if they go all out on
supporting a foreign military action and or sort of holding
fast against the regime in Damascus. They stand, you know,
a couple of months down the line, or maybe even
sooner to face a kind of furious retribution from the
government and its supporters which could cost the Drews community heavily.
(08:33):
So I think to a great extent the differences are
of tactics rather than over vision with regard to these groups.
Speaker 2 (08:39):
Is there also we see this in a lot of
these kind of conflicts. Is there also a personal element
between history and Blues or their factions. I seem to
remember there was some sort of reporting about Belus's father's
to whom being destroyed, and a few other incidents like this.
Speaker 3 (08:58):
Is that an accurate way to look at it?
Speaker 4 (09:00):
Certainly there is, you know, there are personal differences, and
there has been a great deal which is also visible
online of sort of personal criticism, let's say, and even
in the case of our history from some abuse as well.
Speaker 3 (09:13):
You know.
Speaker 4 (09:13):
So, yeah, things have reached quite heated levels. And of course, yeah,
these are personal sense that these are powerful families, These
are powerful individuals with extensive patronage networks within their particular communities.
Speaker 2 (09:25):
I think that's something that a lot of the people
watching and listening will not really experience that this level
of political patronage where your patrons can dislike each other
and it can lead to, you know, actual animosity between
their followers.
Speaker 3 (09:40):
So let's talk maybe a little bit about.
Speaker 2 (09:45):
How shocked were you to see this as soon as
the internal security the Syrian internal security forces left Souada
to then see sort of sort of a response from
the Druid militias of targeting bedo in civilians. Was that
a shocking Should we have been jocked at that or
(10:07):
was that sort of expected?
Speaker 3 (10:08):
Well?
Speaker 4 (10:09):
Not really, I mean I think that the point is
that the notion that there's a clear division actually between
better in tribal fighters and into the general security service
or other elements of the Shara government is to some
degree false, or I think it is false. Actually, the
Syrian government makes use of bedouin tribal militias, and it
also turns betterin tribal fighters or commanders into official representatives
(10:33):
of the emergent security forces simply by rebadging them. And
we were seeing that in terms of some of the
forces that were heading into Sweeda in recent days. So
for example, if I can take one example, one individual
which is very representative I think of what is going on.
The individual is called Mohammad al Jassim, or better known
as Abu AMShah, who is the commander of something now
(10:54):
which is now called the sixty second Division of the
Syrian National Army.
Speaker 3 (10:58):
Bab.
Speaker 4 (10:59):
I'm sure in this this is a Bedouin tribal. I
mean it comes from a Bedouin tribe. But the thing
is that this is a person who was a militia
leader actually in the northwest of the country for most
of the civil war, and was engaged in some really
dreadful atrocities. I personally reported on those, and actually I
wrote about them. I broke that story to the Jerusalem Post.
And if there was real concern about humanitarianis whoes as
(11:20):
maybe some people like to pretend there is, general because
and this should have been a huge story, I wrote
about the disappearance of thousands, around eight thousand Syrians into
a private prison system maintained by this Abbu AMShah and
his militias, the Sultan Sorto Manshah militia in close alliance
with the Turks. So what we're seeing here is not
(11:40):
militias over here and the kind of official security forces over there.
What we're seeing is there is a generalized Sunni Islamist
effort and it is gathered around the government of in Damascus.
But the government in Damascus does not exercise complete control
of all of the militias that engage in its name.
We saw this, for example, graphically demonstrated in the events
(12:02):
in the western coastal area of Syria back in March,
when there was widespread massacres of Aloi populations after something
which was triggered it does seem by an attack by
Aloi forces loyal to the deposed dictator Bashar Assad on
a military checkpoint, but was then what happened was then
(12:22):
Sharah and the government gave a kind of general call
to their malitias to head west, and then what happened
was huge massacres took place, because that's what these guys do.
Anybody who knows about Abu AMShah and his pattern of
behavior should not be surprised that there are atrocities against
civilians when that guy gets involved, because that's what he does,
did demonstrably so and with a rich publicly available record
(12:44):
of that kind of activity. So that's what's been going
on I think in Sweda in recent days. And then
certainly they have been here, and there were there have
been instances, certainly of Dru's retribution of fighters engaged on
behalf of history or others who've committed atrocities too. But
I don't think we should be getting into a kind
of both side narrative here or whatever, because actually that's
not what's going on. What's going on is that an
(13:04):
emergent Sunni Islamist power is trying to impose itself on
a minority community in a very brutal way, and then
that minority community is responding, and there is already a
pattern of behavior eight months into the Sharlow government of
this kind of activity. It began or first instance was
with the Alois in the coastal area, as we said
in March. Then there was instances with the Druz in
(13:28):
March and April, and now here we are it's the
third occasion already that this kind of thing has taking place.
Speaker 3 (13:32):
Wow, we're not even a year into the regime. Wow.
Speaker 2 (13:38):
So let's talk a little bit about Syria's other major minority,
the Kurds. Although we should say that the SDF in
the north it's not a fully Kurdish government.
Speaker 3 (13:52):
They don't claim to be a Kurdish government.
Speaker 2 (13:53):
They claim to be sort of a non ethnic government,
but it's effectively run by the Kurds. How is this
going to impact them? What should we expect to see?
Is there going to be a lot of changes, because
I know that they've the SDF have been quite reluctant
to hand over their weapons and to disarm.
Speaker 3 (14:11):
They're not so interested in a centralized Syria.
Speaker 4 (14:15):
Yeah. Well, first of all, as you know, there is
a kind of diplomatic process underway between the leaders of
what they call the Autonomous Administration of North East Syria,
but essentially the commanders of STF, the Syrian Democratic Forces
and representatives of Shada's government. And if I'm not mistaken,
this week or actually next week, there is due to
be a meeting in Paris between I think General Muslim Abdi,
(14:36):
who is the commander of SDF, and Asadala Shaibarni, who
is the foreign minister of the government in Damascus. I
think those are the two representatives that are due to meet.
There was a meeting a couple of weeks ago in
Damascus which was extremely unsuccessful, and this was something which
the meeting broken by Tom Barratt, the United States Envoyd Assyria,
and of course United States Ambassador to Turkey as well.
(14:58):
And the meeting ended in disarray, I think is the
diplomatic term one would use, because they it was clear
there was no possibility for agreement. And Tom Barrett interestingly
then publicly stated afterwards quite heavy criticism of SDF, where
he was saying, well, the SDF is stalling and their
needs they need to get moving. We're not going to
(15:18):
stick around forever. We're not going to babysit this forever.
So they need to make a deal with Damascus, and
reiterated the American position of support for a strong centralized
government in Damascus. By the way, I find this support
to be baffling and ill advised, but supported is that's
the position the Americans are taking. So what's happening essentially
is that the Syrian Democratic Forces, who as you mentioned,
(15:41):
control a large part of territory. They control still around
thirty percent actually of the territory of Syria. They essentially
control Syria east of the Euphrates River. This force is
being if I can put it kind of bluntly, they're
being kind of railroaded into making a deal that they
don't want to make with HTS, and they are I think,
quite determined to stop that, and the events in Sueder
(16:04):
of recent days have made them much more determined, I think,
to try to take a hard line with regard to
Damascus and try to resist the pressure to surrender to Damascus,
because I think what they believe, and maybe with a
degree of justification, is that if they give up their
ability to defend themselves autonomously, they are likely to face
(16:26):
a similar fate, maybe even just a few months down
the line, as that currently being suffered by the Alois
and the Druze. And let me just make one more
point when I say currently being suffered, because these incidents
are not really sufficiently covered by media, it's important to
understand that Alois in the western coast that are, for example,
it's not that they had a bad experience back in
March and now everything's become normal. So they had a
(16:47):
bad experience to experience massacres, and now what they are
experiencing is daily an extensive harassment of their communities undefended
by the so called security forces of the Mascus, up
to and including, for example, the word I spread. Abduction
and disappearance of young Aloi women been carried out by
it appears, Sunny Islamist forces.
Speaker 2 (17:06):
This situation is really reminiscent to me of the Kurdish
Kurds in Iraq in the nineteen nineties after the First
Golf War, when they were sort of reluctant to hand
over any autonomy or military power back to Irac. I mean,
rightly so, do we see any proposals like this in
(17:28):
Syria to give the Kurds their autonomy and to let
them have more freedom and control over their own affairs.
Speaker 4 (17:37):
The problem is that there is no such proposals, no government,
and of course the United States government here is the
important one. The French also have, by the way, close
relationship with the SDF, and SDF people are much more
happy right now with the stance that the French have
been taken because the French are not the power broker
of the United States and no. I think it's been
really notable that after all, this partnership which existed between
(18:00):
the US and its allies on the one hand and
the Syrian Curtish forces on the other, which is now
in place for more than a decade, has been a
very successful partnership in the sense that it was this
partnership which destroyed the Islamic state so called caliphate back
in the period twenty fourteen to twenty nineteen. So, you know,
America doesn't always do or the West doesn't always do
(18:21):
proxy warfare all that successfully in the Middle East, and
the alliance with the Syrian Curds is an instance where
the West has done it well. Identified a partner, began
to work with them, got the result they wanted, the
defeat and destruction of the enemy. But it's very notable
that this partnership has never gone hand in hand with
a sort of diplomatic partnership. Actually, the Western Americans have
(18:42):
been very consistent on this, I mean in their you know,
in their favor if one can say it's a good
policy or a bad policy. But it hasn't been an
ambiguous policy. They've said to the Syrian Curds throughout you know,
we're united with you militarily to fight against ISIS. We're
not uniting with you politically to bring about a long
term or ton for the Curds in Syria. And as
is now very clear with the close i would say
(19:04):
correlation between American and Turkish positions visa Visyria, the United
States has come out for a strong centralized Syria without federalism,
without autonomous zones for minority communities, and that is currently
the American position, and I guess it will be until
we see it change, if it changes.
Speaker 2 (19:20):
Has there been any discussion amongst the SDF about why
there hasn't been any Israeli intervention to help them? I mean,
we intervene so quickly to help the DRUS, but we've
as far as I know, never intervened helped the Kurds.
Do they ever ask that is there any issue there?
Speaker 4 (19:40):
Well, there hasn't been intervention for the Syrian Codes. But
on the other hand, the Syrian Codes have not yet
faced the prospect of the destruction of their autonomous area.
That's to say right now, you know, with by the way,
let's remind us so still the presence of around nine
hundred United States Service Members on Syrians or in alliance
with SDF, they're more than capable right now, both diplomatically
(20:01):
and militarily, of kind of holding their own Even if
there were to be a situation in which they were
to be militarily threatened, I don't think they would be
sort of anger against Israel in the sense that Israel
has never proposed or pledged to defend the Syrian Kurdish areas.
My senses from what I hear that there are contacts
(20:22):
behind the scenes between the Government of Israel, Israeli authorities
and the SDF leadership. I don't know where that's going
or how strong that is. I very much doubt that
there will be anything like a sort of, you know,
pact of defense in which his early forces it's really
air power will be used to defend the Syrian because
I mean, I wouldn't completely rule it out. There are
various scenarios in which it becomes imaginable, but right now
(20:46):
at least it looks very unlikely. The other thing to
remember is that you know, there's not there is no
political alliance or political relationship between SDF and as well
beyond channels of communication as far as I'm aware, So
I don't think there will be expectations in that God
either way.
Speaker 3 (21:00):
And people are aware.
Speaker 4 (21:01):
I think everybody who knows the region and this particular
area in a serious way are aware of the very
deep and complex and long standing relations between Israel and
the Drews people. Also, because of the powerful role in
Israeli society played by Israeli Drews in the security forces,
in the political system, so there's nothing really comparable to
(21:22):
that with regard to the Syrian Curds. So I think
nobody would be surprised at the different nature of the relationship.
And the other thing to remember is that geographically, of course,
the Drews are very close to the border, the Kurds
are out there east of the Euphrates.
Speaker 2 (21:35):
Has there ever been any sort of alliance between the
Drews and the Kurds. They're sort of I'm imagining, not
because they're sort of separated by the length of Syria,
but maybe has there anything historically been between them?
Speaker 3 (21:48):
Have they ever worked together?
Speaker 4 (21:50):
They don't have a, as you say, a geographical link
between the communities. The other thing to remember is that
the Syrian Kurdish leadership is a very particular type of
leadership which is not really paralleled in the Drewze context,
by which I mean that the Drew's leadership we were
discussing earlier is a kind of traditional and religious and
(22:10):
spiritual leadership of those communities. And this is one thing
whereas of course the Kurds are different. The Syrian Courdish
leadership is avowedly secular and I would say left of
center in its political orientation.
Speaker 3 (22:25):
It is.
Speaker 4 (22:27):
Supports or it believes in that ideology of the PKK
of Kurdish Workers Party. It says that it's not connected
organizationally to the PKK, which of course is now disbanding
itself anyway, but it has that sort of outlook, so
it's a very different thing. I mean, if we think of,
for example, the role of women fighters, which has kind
of become a kind of flagship, a banner, so to speak,
(22:50):
for the Syrian Curds, and it's indicative of a much
broader outlook, which is a kind of very secular and
modernist stout looking that way, whereas the Drews leadership, you know,
is traditional, lists tribal, is spiritual, So there isn't a
natural point of contact between the two leaderships in a
certain way. There also isn't geographical link. At the same time,
(23:10):
I think that you know, certainly the curve to be
watching carefully what's been going on in Sweden in recent days.
I assume there are there is some kind of communication
also between early leaderships. There has been some rumors also,
actually it's not really confirmed, but rumors that there were
some initiative to invite SDF forces into the area in
order to sort of police there and help keep things quiet.
(23:30):
But that's not something which has been confirmed, but it's
been out there online in some discussions in recent days.
Speaker 2 (23:35):
Okay, so let's move on to how this is going
to impact israel I. Think that's something that our viewers
and listeners are really interested in, and that's probably their
biggest concern is how this is going to affect Israel.
How is Israel and the average Israeli going to be
affected by us being intervening in Syria?
Speaker 3 (23:52):
Are we going to be dragged into a longer conflict. Yeah.
Speaker 4 (23:54):
First of all, it's worth remembering that the Israeli intervention
on behalf of the trus the first time that Israel
has intervened on behalf of the Drews. That's to say,
also back in April, when there was a similar but
smaller scale situation, is Well then also intervened. Israeli airper
then also targeted Syrian government forces or forces associated with them.
(24:17):
So this isn't the first time, but it's the largest
scale intervention, and I would say it's notable. Certainly, it's notable.
That Israel didn't just strike against Syrian government forces making
their way down to a Sueder, but it also hits
out of the Defense ministry and close to the presidential
palace in Damasculus itself. So clearly as Well was wanted
to send a very very strong message to the Syrian government.
(24:39):
Now what exactly was that message or is that message? Firstly,
I think of course it is to say, well, don't
act against the Syrian Druis, and if you do, then
we will defend them. But there's something broader than that.
I think it's not only about altruism above the Drews. Again,
I'm not ruling that out because I think that maybe
international audiences are not quite aware of how strong the
Drews are as a voice inside Israeli society where they
(25:01):
can say, well, you know, we need you to defend
our fellow drus, and Israeli authorities will respond often. But
it's not only about that. It's about a broader intention,
I would say, and this broader intention derives from a
broader analysis of what's going on in Syria. The broader intention,
I think, is to preserve a demilitarized zone close to Israel.
Israel's border. What does a demilitarized zone mean. Does it
(25:22):
mean that nobody carrying a gun on behalf of the
Damascus authorities is allowed close to the border. No, it
doesn't mean that, but it does mean that, for example,
heavy armored forces or artillery and in general, maybe forces
associated with the Syrian Defense Ministry rather than the Interior
Ministry will not be permitted to deploy close to the border.
And of course that is what was happening in the
(25:43):
contexts of Sueda. The defense Syrian Defense Ministry of the
Syrian Army was sending forces close to the border, and
Israel in the first instance acted against those forces, acted
against the tank con heading towards Sueda. They said, no,
we're not going to permit you to deploy those kind
of forces close to the border with Israel. So I
think there's an Israeli intention to maintain a demilitarized zone
in the in the area close to the border. And
(26:06):
then this derives from a broader analysis I think, which
here is Israel is favoring with regard to the Syrian situation,
which is not shared I think by either the Western
European countries or the United States. And this analysis says
that what's taking place is not the formation of a strong,
new centralized Syria, which can be a partner and a neighbor,
but rather what's taken place is that a jihadi Sunni
(26:27):
Islamist militia has seized power in Damascus is acting the
way that Sunni jihadi militias behave in terms of its
behavior towards minorities, will probably behave in that way towards
Israel as well if it gets the chance. And therefore
Israel is basically relating with an extreme caution and suspicion
towards this emergent regime of President Ahm Sharra and Hayatari
Roshan in Damascus.
Speaker 2 (26:48):
So we can say that because we've I think for
some people they might have been a little bit confused
as to whether the intervention was entirely on the basis
of Drew's outrage in Israel. But from what you're saying,
it seems that there is a wider strategic consideration, and
that as much as we like to think that public
protests is a large factor in strategic decision making, there's
(27:10):
often many other considerations.
Speaker 4 (27:13):
Yeah, if I can add to that, I mean there
was reports of meetings between the sides in the Azerbaijan
Bako Azebaijan in the days prior to what took place,
and certainly there have been some reports suggesting that Israel
was annoyed because because Israel thought it had made it clear.
It's really representative thought they've made it clear to the
representatves of Shara and Damascus that this would not be permitted,
(27:34):
and it seems that the authorities in Damascus either didn't
understand the messaging or thought that they would be able
to kind of push the envelope. I suppose it's right
insane and say, well, you know, yeah, you say we
can't do this, but actually, you know, we're close to
the Americans. The Americans seem to like because the Americans
seem to want to work with us, so hey, we
can just kind of do what we want. It's our country.
If we want to deploy soldiers close to the border,
(27:54):
we'll just kind of go ahead and do it. I
think Israel wanted to make it absolute clear. Yeah, well
that's not the way that it's going to be, or
a least is not going to readily and happily permit that.
Speaker 3 (28:03):
Do you think there's a danger that this could reignate
the civil war in Syria.
Speaker 4 (28:06):
I mean, I would be cautious, andhw I respond to
that in the following way. I think that we should
be clear that the notion that the underlying causes and
the Syrian issue that was raised, if I can put
it that way, in the course of the civil war
that caused the civil war, the notion that these issues
have now been resolved because a new government has come
(28:27):
into Mascus. It's a new dispensation, it's a new morning,
and all that's over. You know, we should be very
careful about drawing conclusions like that the basic problem or
problems of governance in Syria with regard to the sectarian
divides in the country, with regarding lots of ways to
the absence of a deeply shared sense of Syrian There
is a shared Syrian identity, but a deeply sense a
(28:50):
deeply shared sense of how Syria should be governed and
for whom it should be governed and who should dominate
the absence of a consensus and all that, all these
issues that led to the civil war in the first
place are still there. What's changed is that the people
in the driving seat have changed, as to say, for
you know, for more than half a century, people coming
from that quite small minority twelve percent minority of the
(29:11):
Alloi community in Syria are dominated the country. And now
in a certain sense of the situation has been normalized,
simply in the sense that the largest representatives of the
largest community, the sunny Muslim Arabic speakers of the country,
now dominate. But that doesn't resolve all the issues. That
doesn't mean to say that they then just everyone else
will now salute the flag and keep quiet. You know,
(29:34):
there's still lots to be contested, lots to be fought
over in terms of how Syria will be governed. And
I wouldn't rule out the possibility as again, as we've
now seen on no less than three occasions since December it,
twenty twenty four, that this could erupt into violence in
one context or another. If Syrian history is anything to
go by, political issues often get contested, so to speak,
(29:56):
also through armed action.
Speaker 2 (29:58):
And you sort of touched on this a little bit
saying that there are considerations, but do you think the
government it's perhaps just just chasing opportunism or just sort
of looking for opportunities where it can do things and.
Speaker 3 (30:14):
Did like.
Speaker 2 (30:16):
Was this merely that they saw that they had the
opportunity to maybe increase their influence in Syria and get
increased influence amongst the Druiz population in Syria or was
this something that they probably thought about for a while
to already intervene to help them or.
Speaker 4 (30:30):
The government of Israel. Yeah, but I mean, you know,
I think the one, how can I put this one
is maybe being a bit excessively optimistic in assuming that
there is a clear and coherent long term strategy on
the part of the Government of Israel. And I say
that kind of semi humorously but not entirely. You know,
one should not assume that clear strategic thinking has taken place.
Often what happens is that Israel tactically responds to situations,
(30:54):
and you know, to be fair, generally responds effectively tactically
to situations, but often in the absence of a properly
worked out long term strategy that characterizes i would say,
Israeli behavior and all kinds of regional files and other areas.
Is that taking place here or is there a more
fully worked out strategy. I think there is a fully
worked out analysis which is currently predominant in the Israeli
(31:16):
system as I mentioned earlier, which is the view that
the shadow government has currently constituted, is not bringing about stability,
is not in the way to bring you about stability
and good governance Sinceyria that it is. Rather, it appears
to be in the process of creating a kind of
repressive Sunni Islamist form of governance which is likely to
encounter resistance, which could then well lead to violence in
(31:38):
the country. I think that's the predominant analysis. I think
Israel is operating under those assumptions, and as I said,
I think that the desire to determine a to creating
guard a demilitarized zone across the border is clearly there.
Of course, Israeli forces are also deployed, as it's worth remembering,
into the demilitarized or the formerly demilitarized zon defined by
(32:00):
the separation of Forces agreement after the Yonkiporl war. So
there's a bunch of different pieces of Israeli behavior which
do or point in a particular direction, which are all
based I think, on a particular analysis. So in this
sense we shouldn't be surprised by the intervention on behalf
of the Druis, and we shouldn't be surprised if it
happens again. I wouldn't want to stress the following issue
(32:21):
or and for us, the following issue. This Israeli analysis
is not shared anither currently in either Western Europe or
the United States. That doesn't mean to say that it
won't be shared permanently. It reminds me a little bit
of the period immediately following the toppling of the Hosnymalbuuk
regime in Egypt back in twenty eleven twenty twelve, when
Israel from the very outset was absolutely skeptical and suspicious
(32:45):
at the prospect of Muslim Brotherhood governance in Egypt and
took a very hard line saying, now this is going
to be a problem. You shouldn't be thinking there's any
opportunity here. There is only threat. And for a considerable
period of time the then US administration of President Obama
and certainly the Western European countries as well, absolutely didn't
share them and said, no, we you know, the Muslim
Brotherhood can maybe be a partner. Let's give them a chance.
Let's wait and see, And within a year or two
(33:07):
everybody had more or less come over to Israel's side
when they realized what Muslim Brotherhood governors was actually going
to look like. And then nobody particularly mourned when the
Egyptian army stepped back in twenty thirteen and removed the
Muslim Brotherhood from power. So it's quite possible that we
were in a similar situation here at the moment. The
Western countries maybe in a kind of learning curve where
they they still have some illusions, and maybe six months
(33:28):
to a year down the line, if things continue the
way that they've currently appeared for the last eight months,
that also draw the conclusion that, you know, Sunni Islamist
and Jihadi governan sin Damascus is maybe not the ideal situation.
Speaker 2 (33:39):
Well, that's been very enlightening and I've definitely learned a
lot from here. Even with what I already knew, this
was very eye opening. Do you have any final words,
anything you want to say specifically about the situation that
you think people should be hearing.
Speaker 4 (33:53):
Well, only one thing I think we should bear in
mind is that in a certain sense, what happened in
the western coastal area with the Alois and what happened
and now what's happened there with the Jerus in the way,
there could be a kind of dress rehearsal for something
much bigger, which may be on the way east of
the Euphrates, which is that if the Kurdish, well armed
and well organized Kurdish forces that fought and one against Isis,
you know, are if they are subject to an attempt
(34:15):
to kind of railroad them into a forced acquiescence to
an emergence Sunni Islamist and Jihaddi regime in Damascus. That's
not something which they'll necessarily quietly acquiesce to. And that
means then that you know, further strife could be coming
down the line on an even potentially larger scale in Seria.
Speaker 2 (34:31):
Well, thank you for being here. It's been a pleasure
and I hope we'll see you again soon, hope.
Speaker 3 (34:37):
So thank you very much.
Speaker 1 (34:39):
This episode was hosted and produced by Yuval Barnaier. Editing
was done by u Val Barnaier and si For Jacobs.
For more information on jpo's podcasts, see the description of
this episode.
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