UAP-Congress Bombshells Pt2/3: Mellon - Space Radar, McConnell-Whistleblowers are scared - Lehto Files - Investigating UAPs

Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:02):
Think alright, are your folks the next part of this
UH panels discussion bullball national security.

Speaker 2 (00:19):
Before we began, I would like to share something with you.

Speaker 3 (00:23):
This has not been planned sound.

Speaker 4 (00:25):
Can they just receive permission to share this with you
this morning? And the reason why I put I shared
you this with you now is because I think it's
important and relevant to this next conversation with these two individuals.

Speaker 3 (00:41):
In order to oh shooting, sorry.

Speaker 2 (00:43):
Guys, very relevant to this conversation.

Speaker 3 (00:46):
Followed me around, what'd you guys seem like find national security?

Speaker 4 (00:49):
A lot pilots there, men and women in uniform were
like words for US combat the whole sector out there.

Speaker 3 (00:57):
About behind the scenes. I can't hear what he's saying.
I can't read. Let's either talking about national security.

Speaker 5 (01:03):
Phonograph called it was taken in twenty twenty one over
the Four Corners region an altitude of props from in
twenty one thousand feet by a private pilot outside of
the aircraft.

Speaker 2 (01:14):
And this is a photo or do a copy for
commerce to see. It was taken by a UH of
all the the information on the camera and.

Speaker 4 (01:21):
They just received permission today to show this vie. It
is a narticular object, and you look at the shadow
being cast. It is significantly large. It's an altitude of
twenty one thousand feet.

Speaker 3 (01:35):
Okay, so that looks like that. TikTok?

Speaker 2 (01:39):
Now, why is this important? Past this round?

Speaker 3 (01:43):
A turn out the volume.

Speaker 2 (01:47):
The copy of your g purple, your finshed as wealthy
pass sung down to.

Speaker 4 (01:51):
Them is taken from a Similian pilot.

Speaker 2 (01:55):
Right, not a clear system, not an infrared.

Speaker 4 (01:58):
System, but an average person with an average camera at
twenty one thousand feet.

Speaker 3 (02:04):
And twenty one thousand feet with a camera.

Speaker 4 (02:06):
Potentially there's anywhere between six hundred for a thousand feet
A guy under it is a littarticular object and it
is silver. Now, uh, I cannot vouch for the veracity
of this photograph if I didn't take it. But this
is an example of one of many, many, many incidents
involving commercial and private pilots.

Speaker 2 (02:29):
And guess what they don't know where to report it.
Guess what?

Speaker 4 (02:33):
Congress has no idea that this has happened on a
regular basis.

Speaker 2 (02:40):
That's a problem. And why is this relevant? Because right
now you're gonna hear from two speakers all the tradition
to the mini moment.

Speaker 4 (02:47):
Who uh who are experts in national security and have
been following.

Speaker 6 (02:52):
This topping for some time.

Speaker 3 (02:54):
So he said he can't vouch for the veracity of
me to mister Chris.

Speaker 4 (02:59):
Mellan first and foremost, uh, Chris Mellon is a uh
uh prom of former boss's boss and boss's boss. He
was a senior staff director from I'm mistaken uh here
in the Senate at the time with uh Bill Cohen,
Senator Bill Cohen.

Speaker 2 (03:17):
And then later we went to the Department of Defense
and became.

Speaker 7 (03:21):
The person, uh what you might call the under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence, the position before there was a
daste the deput Assistant Secretary of percentage, where basically Chris
was responsible for all the intelligence.

Speaker 2 (03:33):
Equities globally, yes, globally for the Department.

Speaker 4 (03:37):
Of Defense, right anything from human operations to special access
programs and everything else.

Speaker 2 (03:47):
Chris veni spearhead in.

Speaker 4 (03:50):
Public engagement, getting the academic community, the scientific community, everybody,
intelligence community all to apply their efforts and time and
talent and resources to this.

Speaker 2 (04:06):
Very real rome. The next individual is it's recurrent common
former senior military.

Speaker 4 (04:15):
Officer as well, and it's very senior staffer on the
Senate subside for the Senate Armament Services Committee, who was
instrumental in helping get doctor Eric Davis to provide classified
briefings to certain.

Speaker 2 (04:29):
Members of Congress.

Speaker 4 (04:30):
I won't say that's not my place to say. Kirk
has been in shadows for a very long time, and
he has been extremely effective in getting this topic at
the highest to the attention of the highest levels of
our government, and that to include other.

Speaker 2 (04:47):
Administrations of wealth, not just this one and the one
before the one before that as well. So with that said,
there's a whole lot market go again. I can spend
probably half.

Speaker 4 (04:57):
An hour going over their academic vita and their accomplishments,
but rather what I'd like to do is spend some
of that time instead and allowing them to have a
discussion with you here today some questions. I think Chris
Mellan first has as presentation you'd like to provide.

Speaker 2 (05:11):
So I'm going to go to the floor to Chrismel please.

Speaker 6 (05:14):
Uh welcomore department your pants.

Speaker 2 (05:23):
Would you like to present? Yeah, maybe I'll come up
the projectable party. Mm. Thank you good for that.

Speaker 8 (05:30):
Uh overly uh kind of introduction and uh my thanks
to the to the Congressman for taking time out of
their busy schedules.

Speaker 2 (05:39):
And peter with us. Yeah, for the criminals contributed, especially
Jordan's flowers.

Speaker 9 (05:45):
Uh.

Speaker 8 (05:46):
I just returned from UH South America uh OR for
about four weeks, and UH promise I would not work
at anything related to UAP the whole time, and UH
gut back here and made a quick turn a little
into the weather.

Speaker 2 (06:03):
It wouldn't have a briefing if it wasn't for Jordan
and in his assistance.

Speaker 8 (06:10):
What I want to talk about is I don't think
the public is aware of the extent of our airspace
vulnerabilities and failures, and the degree to which they've already
been exploited and are being exploited today, and the challenge
that we face in trying to sort this out. I

(06:32):
also want to pivot a little bit based on earlier conversations.
I wasn't going to get into this so much, but
doctor Lowe talked about spending a billion dollars or so
to ad all these sensors the correct information. One of
my career frustrations in the intelligence community has been that

(06:54):
we have incredible sensors that are far more than a dollars,
and we have a great many of them, and they
air collect the information today which is directly impertinent to
this topic. But that information is not reaching Congress. It's
not reaching the scientific community.

Speaker 2 (07:16):
Yeah.

Speaker 8 (07:16):
Uh in many cases, I don't think it's reaching the Arrow,
which is the office that Congress established to study and
evaluate this phenomenon.

Speaker 2 (07:26):
So we could have the first slide place U the
system you're gonna do their port. Yeah.

Speaker 8 (07:32):
So here's just a little overview of UH topics of
an a touchdown. Which is the word shocking I think is
UH is not an exaggeration or hyperbal in this case.

Speaker 9 (07:44):
Uh.

Speaker 2 (07:44):
We really are effectively naked from an airfen standpoint when
it comes to these drones.

Speaker 8 (07:51):
I'll talk and provide your specific examples to illustrate that.

Speaker 10 (07:56):
UH and UAPU And if you get here, Okay, this
is a fortune.

Speaker 2 (08:08):
You don't have this right in front of you.

Speaker 8 (08:09):
But this is a map of the displays, roughly the
coverage provided by something called the solid state phased array
radar system. These are reportedly the most powerful emitters on
the planet. If there are other civilizations in nearby solar systems,

(08:31):
they're more likely to detect these emitters than probably anything
else on our planet. How many UAP would you guess
they have detected in say, the last twenty years, that
have been reported the era.

Speaker 2 (08:49):
Zero zero zero?

Speaker 8 (08:53):
How is it possible the most powerful radar have they
writing about these for years?

Speaker 2 (08:58):
By the way, fecklessly, this is not a new point.
You're training in Congress. There's somebody in Congress to listen
to this and pay attention. For years a hurdle will
testify to that.

Speaker 8 (09:09):
Your observices communities like keep going up there and had
every years say guys, how come this that never get
texts any EU A and B?

Speaker 2 (09:16):
How is that possible? These are the most powerful there's
on the planet. And look at the area they cover.

Speaker 8 (09:22):
And oh, by the way, when you look at the
area they cover, we keep having reports over and over
again from tactical systems, from ship's plane at aircraft in
the area is covered by these radar.

Speaker 11 (09:39):
So as ships, planes flown by uh mister Ryan here
and his naval ad or colleagues and others are reporting
UAE UAP constantly in these areas.

Speaker 2 (09:54):
But somehow these systems never see to.

Speaker 8 (09:57):
See a up ever, how is that possible? And how
about nobody's asking about that? Is this a Chinese balloon
situation where all we need to do is tweet the
filters and low and behold.

Speaker 2 (10:13):
We're going to bring it the focus something, which is.

Speaker 8 (10:17):
If drones are nothing else, they're a vital, absolutely.

Speaker 2 (10:21):
Vital air security syniviens.

Speaker 8 (10:26):
We know that in Russia Ukraine today drones are causing
more casualties and killing more people than any other weapons system.

Speaker 2 (10:35):
Right, So this is.

Speaker 8 (10:38):
Utterly transformed warfare as we know it. Here's a multi
billion dollar system, it's up and running. This is the
successor to the old ballistic missile early Morning system. So
its primary function is the detectialistic missiles coming over.

Speaker 2 (10:55):
The poles from Russia or China or from mark Korea
and to developed interset solutions.

Speaker 8 (11:01):
But it also has mission or detective sea launch cruise
missiles and bombers.

Speaker 2 (11:06):
And so forth.

Speaker 3 (11:07):
That's TEX and then several possibilities.

Speaker 2 (11:12):
Either we've spent millions of dollars on.

Speaker 8 (11:15):
A system that's not performing as it should be, or uh,
it just you know, maybe needs some some tweaks and
the filters to expand the range of things that reports
on a you.

Speaker 2 (11:29):
Know, one of the challenges with these systems is to.

Speaker 8 (11:31):
Avoid clire right because they're so powerful, they've fit so.

Speaker 2 (11:34):
Much, they've got to filter it downs to.

Speaker 8 (11:37):
What's being displayed is reasonable and appropriate to the mission.

Speaker 2 (11:42):
It could be a problem of that sort, or it's.

Speaker 8 (11:46):
Simply so highly classified that the information is not re generow.

Speaker 2 (11:52):
I favor the latter. I think that's what's going on.
And I think if Congress were to poke herd on.

Speaker 8 (12:00):
This, maybe get an inspector general to look at these
possible options.

Speaker 2 (12:05):
Or otherwise look into this, they they would get some answers.

Speaker 12 (12:10):
Gist question, is that data from that system being archived?

Speaker 2 (12:16):
I believe so.

Speaker 8 (12:17):
I don't know how far back they go and how
how that's a great question. I don't know how far
back he goes.

Speaker 3 (12:23):
He said, it's the data artcut.

Speaker 8 (12:25):
One of the things is so when you approach Nora
out about this or the Air Force and you start
asking about this data and.

Speaker 2 (12:32):
What are they see so right now my understanding is by.

Speaker 8 (12:35):
The way that they don't even tell Arrow, which whose
director is supposedly appeared for everything, they don't.

Speaker 2 (12:44):
Even tell him when they.

Speaker 8 (12:45):
Scramble fighter aircraft to conduct intercepts. So they're regularly scrambling
fighter aircraft.

Speaker 2 (12:52):
I've talked to an interview on television, a NORAH.

Speaker 8 (12:56):
Head officer told an account of walking into Shine Mountain
where he for duty, and everybody was standing on their
feet looking at the big screen, and there was a
UAP coming down from the arket on the East coast.

Speaker 2 (13:11):
The United States, and the commander in.

Speaker 8 (13:14):
Chief of NORIA I said the quote I want that then,
and everybody said yes, sir, and they were launching everything
we have on the East coast. Couldn't get near it,
couldn't get a radar lock. It disappeared out over in
the southern Atlantic.

Speaker 2 (13:31):
Is that the only time that ever happened? That's the
one time.

Speaker 8 (13:36):
That this NORAAD officer gave this account from the nineteen nineties,
when the system was much less capable than it is today,
and when we're seeing fewer things than we are today
and fewer intrusions.

Speaker 2 (13:49):
Over the street the airspace. I rather about it.

Speaker 8 (13:53):
This is, by the way, only one of the number
of multi billion dollar systems.

Speaker 2 (14:00):
They're already deployed.

Speaker 8 (14:02):
They're collecting data that bears directly on this topic.

Speaker 2 (14:06):
It don't seem to be reporting anything to aero.

Speaker 8 (14:10):
So the aero issue to report when your last EMPORI,
they said.

Speaker 2 (14:14):
We don't have anything. I haven't seen any.

Speaker 8 (14:17):
UAP in space, But there were a think forty instances
in which ground basementporders like civilian airline pilots reported things far.

Speaker 2 (14:27):
Above of beyonda they called the Carmen line in.

Speaker 8 (14:30):
One hundred thousand feet, which is what they considered outer
space for these purposes. Now, there's another system called the
ground based electro Optical deep space or ANILINE system, which
is a rate of cameras or putting the globe that
does nothing.

Speaker 2 (14:47):
But they're at the night sky all night long.

Speaker 8 (14:52):
How come those systems didn't detect what these pilots they're
talking about. They're looking up saying I saw these bright
lights moving, et cetera, et cetera.

Speaker 2 (15:02):
Well, there's one.

Speaker 8 (15:03):
Of these cameras on top of one of our highest
piece of y and it does nothing but stare at
the night sky, that same night sky all night long.
Did it miss that was at at cloudy night? If
any of those cameras ever collected one of these instants
they said there were forty, I would think somebody ought

(15:25):
to take an inventory and say, we want to know
which of these surveillance systems is reporting UAP and.

Speaker 2 (15:35):
Which or not, and what specifically are they're reporting? Take
an inventory again, is.

Speaker 8 (15:41):
There is esthetic probable failure with these systems? The taxpayers
spending billions.

Speaker 2 (15:47):
Of dollars, I would think we would want to know that. Now,
interesting with regard to the GI system.

Speaker 8 (15:54):
On one occasion at a colleague who is visiting for
a sort of team to oversight a purpose many years ago,
and I said, why you're there, why don't you ask
them if they ever seen it being strained. I didn't
want to say flying saucer, but that's what I was
alluded to, and he knew what I was talking about,

(16:16):
so he asked the question, and sure enough, this the
month before, on that one occasion when the question was asked,
they had indeed collected a photographic imagery of it was
the four or five objects moving through the nice sky
information traveling parallel to the Earth's surface. I don't know

(16:38):
that the question has ever been asked since that was
probably twenty years ago. I find it part of believe
that in all that time that they haven't collected anything
relevant to this question.

Speaker 2 (16:52):
And I don't understand why that data is not getting error.
And I don't know if anyone has.

Speaker 8 (16:58):
Again has even got a checklist to make sure that
when Congress issued.

Speaker 2 (17:03):
This directive and said going to there's a reporting requirement.
Now everybody needs to report this stuff. It needs to
go to the.

Speaker 8 (17:10):
Air Force, it needs to filter down through the commands.
Is anything coming back up from these system.

Speaker 2 (17:16):
Do these people even know they're supposed.

Speaker 8 (17:18):
To report and is there any reporting of that kind
going on? There's another system called the Space based Infrared System,
multi billion dollar system. This is again in the unclassified domain.
What I'm talking about here.

Speaker 2 (17:34):
There's quite a bit additionally that is paid for by
the tag pay of this pertinent.

Speaker 8 (17:41):
It's a very robut system with satellites and multiple orbits,
highly elliptical orbits, geospatial orbits, very high precision. It's looking
for infrared a heat kinds of events.

Speaker 2 (17:57):
As far as I.

Speaker 8 (17:58):
Know, they have decades reported to eros zero UAPs. Okay,
maybe nothing happened, maybe they haven't seen.

Speaker 2 (18:10):
Anything, but it does make you wonder.

Speaker 8 (18:12):
In this case is particularly strange since we know there
are does if not hundreds of uap as it's happening
within the areas that this system is supposed to rewrite
and coverage.

Speaker 3 (18:28):
For example, that's a great point. I mean, if you
just remember back to kirkpatrick Pants briefing right when he said,
here's all the UEP we're seeing it. They're mainly round
orb spheres and they're just littered with it right right
within the radar regions covered by all of our national

(18:49):
defense radars that Chris Mellen's talking about. John Ramirez brought
this up, you know, so how can they not be
seeing any of these things? And my biggest still question
is why will no one ask about the nimits or
gimbal like Ryan Graves, is there is it secret? Do
we really have like gimbal drones? And that's why they

(19:09):
don't want to bring it up? But there's no way
we have the tic tac they said, you know, did
someone come up and say, oh, by the way, that's ours.
Is that why they don't ask about it? I mean,
and then just say it's ours? Like fine, Like wouldn't
that do what you want for the military? I mean,

(19:33):
wouldn't that improve America's power? Wouldn't people be more scared of?
You know, I don't doesn't make any sense. What about nimts,
what about gimbal? It's obviously something obviously it's going on
I mean, it's obvious.

Speaker 2 (19:50):
Gamble inoson is it.

Speaker 8 (19:52):
It occurred, excuse me, almost directly in front of the
radar and Buel Air Force Base right off the coast,
and this.

Speaker 2 (20:01):
Went on for about a week or so, and you had.

Speaker 8 (20:05):
Objects to sending from sixty thousand feet and back up.
So I don't think anyone could say, well, they were
so small, they were so close to the water.

Speaker 2 (20:14):
It wasn't what they range of the radar.

Speaker 8 (20:16):
These things were a very high altitudes and this was
going on on a sustained basis.

Speaker 2 (20:24):
So my suspicion is now.

Speaker 8 (20:26):
I understand that that data could be highly classified.

Speaker 2 (20:30):
I could understand why it might not.

Speaker 8 (20:32):
Be the Polity's domain. What I can't understand is why
ARROW does not seem.

Speaker 2 (20:38):
To be aware of this data I think exist, and.

Speaker 8 (20:40):
Why the appropriate congressional committees do not seem to be
aware of the form of this Do I realistically expect
the new way to happen because I'm raising this year
because I've been doing this.

Speaker 2 (20:54):
For years, But what the heck, we're here, that might
as well try.

Speaker 8 (21:00):
Fine, let's go on to the next size.

Speaker 2 (21:05):
So we have.

Speaker 8 (21:09):
An incredible series of events that have been happening.

Speaker 2 (21:13):
I wrote an article a year ago.

Speaker 8 (21:16):
To this month called Who's operating the drones plaguing the
US Military? And it did actually get read by a
producer for sixty Minutes who subsequently did a piece which
featured several four star officers who.

Speaker 2 (21:36):
In fact confirmed what I was discussing in alleging in
the article.

Speaker 8 (21:43):
With regard to the events that occurred a Landley Air
cors based at.

Speaker 2 (21:47):
Elsbury is truly shocking.

Speaker 8 (21:50):
Here's the Air Combat Command which is supposed to be
protecting these gentlemen in this institution where we're sitting and
Apple Hill in the White House and the US government,
and they can't protect the road airspace, they have to
move our cutting edge. You have twenty two fighters squad

(22:13):
into a Navy base from the Air Force base.

Speaker 2 (22:17):
And this is going on for I forget how long.

Speaker 8 (22:21):
It was a couple of weeks roughly, and we're talking
about strange craft right lights during over this base making
it unsafe to fly the night after night after night.

Speaker 3 (22:41):
But that's just research dones, right, I mean, it's just
just research trouns, research truns next.

Speaker 8 (22:52):
And to this day we have no idea where they
were coming from.

Speaker 2 (22:55):
We got other capabilities, we got who.

Speaker 8 (22:58):
Was controlling them, and that remains true not just for
that base in that incident, but for numerous other basis.

Speaker 2 (23:06):
So the first incident and the war zone is a
great source for people instudents. Topic violated to.

Speaker 8 (23:13):
Rhythm reboarding twenty eighteen. In Guam, we've installed a one
point five billion dollars anti.

Speaker 2 (23:22):
Ballistic missile system.

Speaker 8 (23:25):
And these brightly lit small crafts show up.

Speaker 2 (23:30):
They go right to the bad missile battery and they're.

Speaker 8 (23:34):
Shining bright lights down eye like you're photographing. And this
happens two nights in a row. So back in twenty eighteen,
it wasn't as apparent as it is now. But obviously
those drums could have been weaponized. They could have easily
taken that battery out and viscerated the ballistic missile defense

(23:56):
on our leading facility of the Pacific. Not to mention
the fact I just went to that uh to Google
maps this morning to check that air base, and that
air base, like Langley Am some of the others, has
very few hardened shelters, So those multi hundred million dollar
aircraft that are on the runway could easily be destroyed

(24:21):
by drones. They're casting what a few thousand bucks? Okay,
that's how vulnerable we are.

Speaker 2 (24:32):
Then in twenty nineteen, we began to.

Speaker 8 (24:35):
See this activity off the coast of the United States
in California, And I'll read a little uh excerpt from
one of those reports. Mm USS Paul Hamilton observed for
uas with the closest point of approach approximately two hundred
yards off the bow port and starboard beams. Do they

(24:58):
have a uh on time stationed to approximately two hours
and twenty minutes.

Speaker 2 (25:05):
So if you if you have.

Speaker 8 (25:07):
Children and you have thrones at home, you know that
they usually are have a maximum time of about twenty minutes.
Because these were in station for two hours and twenty minutes,
sixty eighty miles off the shore and not apparent where
they couldn't be launched.

Speaker 2 (25:24):
From what their total dwell time was.

Speaker 8 (25:28):
The anti UAS systems on the ship were ineffective.

Speaker 2 (25:33):
In bringing them down.

Speaker 8 (25:35):
The first uas spotted by lookouts had two forty observed
with a single white light.

Speaker 2 (25:42):
They wanted to report others within five hundred yards. When
you bring four.

Speaker 8 (25:48):
And a half with four white lights and the froshing
red light, they're not trying to be slide. They're not
trying to be clandestine. Approximately two hundred yards above the
ship again the new ring right around the ship, back
into forth, up and down. They went to the bridge
of the ship with a powerful search light or photographic device.

(26:11):
So they actually have had pieces where they go right
up to the bridge.

Speaker 2 (26:15):
And the ship and shine a bright light in on
the captain of the senior group.

Speaker 8 (26:20):
That's how overt and provocativeness is, and that apparently reflects
their degree of pampa, is that we can't in your
south to them and bring them down.

Speaker 3 (26:32):
Where exactly why would you do that? Why would you
be avert if you're trying to monitor You know, if
you listen to Matthew Brown only he gets the image
of the Russian surface vessels. It's from a submersible hidden right,
it's not out flying right up to it shining a light.
And that sounds exactly like what happened to Eric Delgado,

(26:57):
if you remember, that's one of my most popular interviews.
Amazing story. And the light came down. He was flying
commercial aircraft and it shined a light right through the cockpit,
like the super bright light he said, went right through
the cockpit down the plane Why would you have lights
on these things? It doesn't make any sense.

Speaker 2 (27:14):
Whatever it is is operate.

Speaker 8 (27:16):
That same year, we began to see them around you
their power plants in.

Speaker 2 (27:20):
Twenty twenty, very strange situation out west.

Speaker 8 (27:27):
This went on not just for weeks, this went on
for months. In one of the least densely populated.

Speaker 2 (27:35):
Is a slide that kind of shows I think maybe
it's back.

Speaker 8 (27:37):
It's pretty substruct a further reason we're talking the Beast year. Yeah,
eastern Colorado and western Oklahoma, so we're talking about farmland.

Speaker 2 (27:49):
I drove out less of those team last winter and
drove kind of through the area.

Speaker 8 (27:54):
It is incredibly sparsely populated.

Speaker 2 (27:58):
There is there is very, very very.

Speaker 8 (28:02):
Little there, and yet these drones were operating in groups, clusters,
as many as forty.

Speaker 2 (28:08):
Drones at a time.

Speaker 8 (28:10):
They formed AH this was so extensive and there was
so much eventual furor raised among the Andrews and farmers
that they formed a task force involving the FBI, Department
of Old in Security, local Wineforcement. They deployed a special

(28:30):
plane and the Governor of California.

Speaker 2 (28:33):
Authorized that had sensors on it. And this continued to occur,
and we never found out where is things were coming from,
who was operating them.

Speaker 8 (28:43):
I called a sheriff there and spoke to him about it.
He told me a fascinating story.

Speaker 2 (28:48):
He said he was actually thefty sheriff. But the sheriff
was also witnessed.

Speaker 8 (28:53):
They responded to a call and there were a group
of these lights over this farm, and uh, a brighter
light came in a larger light and the smaller lights
went inside of it, and it took.

Speaker 2 (29:07):
Off in the extreme velocity.

Speaker 8 (29:10):
And passed almost directly over the sheriff and the deputy.

Speaker 2 (29:16):
And he told me, I've never seen anything move that fast.
He's also in the military reserves, h this individual. So
in that report, by the way, it's research, do you
called it a mothership? Uh, it's not just the story
that I happened to hear.

Speaker 8 (29:33):
If you look at the documentation from their for Software
Special Investigation, the FBI is a work you'll see the
ritten documentation from other businesses that refers to a mothership.
So this is actually well documented, very strange, and very concerning.

(29:54):
You don't know what it is in operating in our
aerospace and discontinues often in militarily sensitive areas.

Speaker 2 (30:02):
They know twenty twenty.

Speaker 8 (30:04):
Three Arizona test ranges. You've heard about Langley, but we
do a lot of flying in the Southwest. Flying conditions
are great. It's a terrific place for the Air Force.
We have where Air Force Base is there, and some
of the strange things we're seeing in the number and
the rating frequency of wisiness is happening is extraordinary. So

(30:30):
this includes Now, if your average drone is restricted to
a flight of four hundred and fifty feet.

Speaker 2 (30:38):
We've got they have thirty five and have twenty two. Well,
in this case is at thirty five, they're.

Speaker 8 (30:44):
Encountering drones at fifteen thousand feet, seventeen thousand feet, thirty
five thousand feet going five hundred miles per hour.

Speaker 3 (30:57):
So that's amazing, right, because that's why gimbals so awesome.
It's at twenty five thousand feet and if you look
like but the highest helicopter ever I think went to
forty thousand feet and it was specifically designed for that,
or maybe landing on everest is a big deal, right,
twenty thousand feet helicopters have serious issues in highlitude environments.

(31:20):
If you look at all the engineering that was required
for the Mars helicopter, right, So, and that's just hovering,
not actually flying in a direction. So thirty five thousand
feet even twenty five thousand feet two hundred and fifty
knots for the gimbal is just miraculous. That's what I

(31:40):
keep saying, is that thing is without a doubt, a UAP,
there's nothing around it. That's why they never talk about it.
That's why Ero hasn't brought it up, is because they
have no answer. Their only answer to gimbal can possibly
be is we don't know what the fuck it is.
That's their only answer. And then they're going to say,
we have no evidence of non human intelligence, but we
don't know what gimble is and we don't know how

(32:01):
it could possibly possibly be. So what he's saying here
is thirty five thousand, five hundred knots. You have to
see some sort of propulsion from that thing, like there's
no other we don't understand, right, it has to have propulsion,
like thirty five thousand feet five hundred knots. That is
really fast. Five hundred knots is well passed supersonic at

(32:23):
that altitude, well passed that might even be mocked to. Yeah,
it's definitely SuperSonics. I mean to fly that fast. I
mean F twenty two can super cruise. It could probably
do it, could it could probably do that. Yeah, but
it's still putting out a shit ton of thrust.

Speaker 2 (32:46):
In restricted lot airspace.

Speaker 8 (32:49):
Meanwhile, in an adjason area, and I included in my
power point Breathing, you can find videos from their power
of Homeland Security.

Speaker 2 (32:59):
Nine of them.

Speaker 8 (33:00):
About some of the strange things that they're seeing on
the border, very very odd things.

Speaker 2 (33:07):
Now, this raises a little bit of an issue that
I've written about recently, also.

Speaker 8 (33:14):
With the hope that it might prove some assistance to
this task force, which is why isn't the Department of
Old Land Security can publish all these videos, but HERO
can't and DoD can't. There was a hearing before Congress
a few years ago mister Bray from the Navy, and

(33:34):
he said, I assure.

Speaker 2 (33:35):
You, I'm going to review these videos.

Speaker 8 (33:38):
And make sure that we get out to you at
the public everything we can.

Speaker 2 (33:45):
I think maybe.

Speaker 8 (33:46):
There's been one video in three years since then, when
I have looked into this and talked to people at
different parts of the federal government and eras where.

Speaker 2 (33:55):
They've basically said, nobody feels it's their job to turn
this over to the public.

Speaker 8 (34:02):
Nobody wants to make the effort to submit it from
public release. So back in twenty seventeen, I provided three
unclassified videos to The New York Times.

Speaker 2 (34:15):
You've all seen those gimbal flear go fast right. There
are a lot more like that.

Speaker 8 (34:22):
They just haven't been released because shortly after that, somebody
created a classification.

Speaker 2 (34:28):
Guy we submit said in.

Speaker 8 (34:31):
Contregations the executive word or a classification signed by the
President that anything essentially anything happy to do with the
up is now suddenly mystically classified because of my damage
ANA security.

Speaker 3 (34:48):
Even though I think about that, like, who, who the
fuck made that decision?

Speaker 2 (34:53):
Right?

Speaker 3 (34:53):
Who made that decision? The President says release it, Congress
says release it, but it's not really why, and we
don't know who it is, we don't know who signed it.
It's just a big joke, man. That's why I freaked out,
because I just saw how big a joke it is.

Speaker 8 (35:14):
So those three videos, the FBI, the Office of Special
Investigations there where was investigated confront the ware classified.

Speaker 2 (35:24):
Not only did they not damage nasal security, they helped
national security.

Speaker 8 (35:28):
They helped raise an awareness for the public and Congress
that we have the air a fance problem here. And
the scientific community is very eager to get more of
those kinds of videos because they want to train AI systems, they.

Speaker 2 (35:42):
Want to know what it is we're looking for, they want.

Speaker 8 (35:44):
To measure the signatures. There's a lot they can contribute
to this, but the bureaucracy is.

Speaker 2 (35:51):
Not respond and I think there I couldn't put a
number on it, but I.

Speaker 8 (35:57):
Believe that if someone were to devote that system and
force them to review that classification guide, if someone were
to establish some advocacy for taking that which is truly unclassified.
And admittedly absolutely there are many things videos that would.

Speaker 2 (36:18):
Be our approgram is classified.

Speaker 8 (36:20):
Not questioning that, what I am saying is that there
are others that fall into this camp that would add
value to the public, value in Congress, value to the
scientific community.

Speaker 2 (36:33):
And this is not an expensive proposition.

Speaker 8 (36:36):
It's just a matter of getting somebody to focus on
it and put these through the process.

Speaker 3 (36:45):
But they absolutely do not want that to happen because
you just said it's valuable, too valuable too. If they
release that information all of a sudden, we lose the value,
and the rest of the world, particularly our adversaries, gain
the value immediately. That's why they don't want to do it.

(37:05):
They know what these things are. At least they have
a good idea that they're not a threat. They knew
back in the fifties, right, And I.

Speaker 8 (37:15):
Think the public not only has a right to know,
I think it's beyond that. I think there's a there's
a utilitary function. There's great value in the public knowing
this information. Value to the scientific community in having this information.

(37:35):
I give the example sometimes of what happened.

Speaker 2 (37:38):
Was and I promise I'm to get off the stage
like real fast. So I'm starting.

Speaker 8 (37:43):
I'm starting to fall into my own stock here that
I get into. But this funding program, I have no doubt.
If they could have kept it secret, the CIA would
not have told you very equal Russians had a satellite
or yeah, and we wouldn't have had a space program
when we did. We wouldn't have gotten the we did

(38:07):
because the people with WE have gotten fired up. They said,
oh my god, this is not acceptable that the Russians
were ahead of us, and you need to have.

Speaker 2 (38:14):
In hires again.

Speaker 3 (38:15):
But the problem is we're going to find out that
they've been lying to us and gaslighting us for like
nine decades. That's what we're going to find out. Think
about that, then what will the public think? You already
at sixteen percent, public already does not trust the government

(38:36):
at all, and so it's going to come out. The
information is going to come out. There's like, look at
all these people, like they're not just going to quit
and now we have decentralized information. That's the thing. Before
they could they could clamp down, right, I'm sure, I'm
sure I've been censored without a doubt, without adult But

(39:00):
it doesn't matter. Like you're still getting the information, aren't you.
They can't climb down.

Speaker 2 (39:05):
It's actually and it was.

Speaker 8 (39:11):
You know it actually ironically we ended up collaborating with
the Russians in space and it actually helped from you
the facility some peaceful developments and relations eager.

Speaker 3 (39:22):
I think a better example is when when Portugal, I
live in Portugal, when they found out how to go
around the southern tip of Africa. I think this is
a better example. The way they did it is they
went way out west right, which you wouldn't think they
tried for hundreds of years, all the people in Europe
tried for hundreds, maybe thousands of years to just go

(39:44):
down the west coast of Africa. But it doesn't work,
just because the currents of the earth right the water
would push you back. You could not get it, and
anytime you tried to go in the land, you get killed.
So what did the Portuguese do? They went way out west,
almost all the way to Brazil, and that's how they
ended up in Brazil. That's why Brazil speaks Portuguese. Because
they found they go way out there, they get into

(40:06):
the southern currents and it whips them all the way
around the southern tip of Africa. That's how you do it.
You go way the opposite direction that you think will
ninety degrees from where you think, and that allows you
to go around. Of course, then they found out they
were They lost many people. It was extremely dangerous. But
there's no way in hell, there is no way in

(40:26):
God's Earth that they told their adversaries how to do that. Right.
They instantly became the richest country in Europe. Instantly. That
was their age of riches, right. They had amazing wealth,
amazing wealth, and they flaunted it like crazy, and that
burned them essentially, and they did horrible, horrible things in

(40:48):
India and the whole Indian Ocean, that whole area just
pillaged and raped and everything. But there's no way in
hell they would tell anyone. And if they told people
in the public, that would immediately get to their average
And so that's why they didn't tell anyone. That's why
Spain didn't know how to go it. That's why Spain
thought in fourteen ninety two right that they were had
reached India, it was just the fifteen hundreds. They went

(41:12):
around the southern coast, so late fourteen hundreds the same time.
So they did not freaking tell anybody. And that's the
same thing. Now, there's no way they are going to
give this information freely. And the reason is too valuable.
They're gaining something from it. They're using the tech they
have to be, they have to be, and they're trying
to solve it. And their argument is, well, we are

(41:33):
looking at it. We do have our best scientists looking
at it. But the problem is they're not making it
serious headway. And if they are, they're keeping it so secret,
super secret.

Speaker 2 (41:41):
Now that.

Speaker 3 (41:43):
It's all bottled up, right, the government's going to screw
it away. That's why you need commercial interests Like you
mentioned there, there are a lot.

Speaker 8 (41:50):
Of benefits along those lines that they put it prove,
but it's going to take some some.

Speaker 2 (42:00):
Effort, and uh, I'm the part of.

Speaker 8 (42:05):
Uh Congress, I think to compel this to happen, if
it's going to happen. So with that, I will close
and thank our congressional sponsors for taking an interest in
this and given us the opportunity to express our concerns
and uh share with Meda what we've learned thus.

Speaker 2 (42:28):
Far about this problem. Thinking good. Second question, just high
resolution or pay videos of UAP.

Speaker 12 (42:36):
Is this stuff that you know about from the stuff
that you've seen.

Speaker 8 (42:39):
Well, there's some stuff that I've seen and and uh
I've asked about in any thing. There is one video I've.

Speaker 2 (42:45):
Seen that they're going to declassify, and I hope that happens.

Speaker 8 (42:54):
It wasn't for I wish it was fokay, it was
more like what you've seen, you know, is in for
read sensor gun camera video along the lines of what
the New York Times published in the Washington Post subsequently.

Speaker 2 (43:09):
Uh so it's that kind of uh video from that
sensor system. So do you oh yeah, yeah, yeah, and
now du by the way, we are at a point
now where.

Speaker 8 (43:22):
The hero has received uh somewhere in the neighborhood of
eighteen hundred military reports.

Speaker 2 (43:35):
Now eighteen hundred in just the last few years I had.
Some of those are iPhone videos, So I don't think
there's a big sources of that musician there. There's there's
a varaiya. Some are from you know, suff you get
a best buy and say orders ownership with the video
camera and that. Uh, there's gotta be a number in

(43:58):
that mix. Researching could be revealed.

Speaker 8 (44:02):
And beyond that, as I said, I think there's a
lot of high caliber sensor data. The American people have
already paid for the committee of these sensors. They're out there,
many of them, and they're collecting perun in data. Abby
is doctor Lowe has.

Speaker 2 (44:18):
Benefited from the data they had to do with the
re entry of the intercellar vehicle. There was a great
example of the taxpayer funding system. They contributed to science
in a very meaningful way. I'm here to tell you
I think there's a lot more of that kind of thing.

Speaker 8 (44:35):
They could be data available if someone did a thorough assessment.

Speaker 2 (44:40):
Of the sensor systems that we have and.

Speaker 8 (44:43):
What they're collecting, and took a hard look at the
classification issues. We also had a system that is preceded
once where we cleared for global warming and some scientists
to look at some classified data related that scientific problem set,
and that's conceivably another it has.

Speaker 2 (45:04):
There's problems with that because scientists want to be able
to publish the course.

Speaker 8 (45:08):
They want their colleagues to be able to see everything
possible about the sources.

Speaker 2 (45:12):
But there are a variety of opportunities I think we're missing.

Speaker 8 (45:16):
At the same time, during's a huge financial security issue here, and.

Speaker 2 (45:21):
We've got stuff in our skyes.

Speaker 8 (45:23):
Some of the can represent technological surprise that we need
to find out about it.

Speaker 2 (45:30):
And you've got these DAN systems that thirty five thousand.

Speaker 8 (45:34):
Feet that's a mile higher than top amount everest forty
five hundred miles an hour yeap in respect the military
their space, I would say, we've.

Speaker 2 (45:43):
Got a lot to work to.

Speaker 6 (45:55):
Christian h the.

Speaker 2 (45:56):
Justice or you don't have the advantage of height that
you do, so have to bring this arm set.

Speaker 4 (46:03):
I think Chris brings up a very good point and
the reason why I decided to share this photograph with you.

Speaker 2 (46:09):
Take them from a civilian pilot. Now is because the
same challenges.

Speaker 4 (46:15):
That are pilots from military publics are facing as to
where you report it, who's going to analyze it, what
do you do with the information? Multiply that for the
civilian aviation community, do they report to the FAA? Do
there reports more?

Speaker 2 (46:31):
Maybe the Air Force? The desiled organization? Who's responsible for
getting this information out? Again? Let me have that this
is not been embedded. This was taken by a civilian pilot.
But once again, you think this information would be.

Speaker 4 (46:45):
Important for somebody to look at or certainly some of
them government, certainly some of our representative that are sitting
here right these are over sense of the military installations.

Speaker 2 (46:57):
Whose are they?

Speaker 6 (46:58):
What are their capabilities?

Speaker 2 (46:59):
What are the intent?

Speaker 9 (47:00):
Right?

Speaker 4 (47:02):
But enough for me right now, let's let's let's go
on to uh our our second expert here, Uh mister
KIRKCT column you I counsaid here all day. Once again,
these these guests are just unbelievable. Correct, My question is
for you, and I'm gonna go off script here for
a minute. You have a deep expertise and experience with

(47:24):
the Center Armed Services Committee.

Speaker 2 (47:27):
What is right now?

Speaker 4 (47:28):
The greatest challenge you've seen for our Congress to tackle
this topic on behalf of.

Speaker 2 (47:36):
The American people.

Speaker 4 (47:37):
What is if you had to narra down there one
and one of three challenges, especially for our reps here
that are sitting with us here today so patiently, what
would be in your estimate the three.

Speaker 2 (47:50):
Greatest challenges facing Congress backing this topic.

Speaker 12 (47:54):
Well, I I I would uh speculate, I'm.

Speaker 6 (47:58):
Not on the linked in digital can you while you're
back there now, Okay, let's.

Speaker 8 (48:01):
Go on apart you do that one?

Speaker 2 (48:03):
What'll your life or another yet of that perfect.

Speaker 12 (48:08):
I certainly don't wanna uh speak for Congress.

Speaker 2 (48:11):
Uh you know I d I do.

Speaker 12 (48:12):
Wanna mention that I didn't serve thirty seven years.

Speaker 2 (48:16):
As a staff member on Capitol.

Speaker 9 (48:18):
Bill or a Center Down Services committee in both the
House and Center Intelligence committees.

Speaker 6 (48:23):
Uh, I was not in the military.

Speaker 2 (48:26):
Got that wrong?

Speaker 12 (48:27):
Uh, But uh so I've been up here in a
long time.

Speaker 2 (48:30):
But I have no uh uh voting colors you Uh,
I never have. Uh.

Speaker 9 (48:36):
I have tremendous respect for the institution, and I don't
uh intend to appeal sort of inside busy ball information.

Speaker 12 (48:46):
But uh you know what I.

Speaker 9 (48:48):
Would say is uh on a topic like this, My
sense is that Congress.

Speaker 6 (48:53):
Needs a lot of confidence to push really vigorously.

Speaker 9 (48:59):
And where are they gonna get that confidence that there
is an absolute.

Speaker 2 (49:04):
Assurance that there's some of ear reality here.

Speaker 9 (49:08):
And I think as much evidence as has been accumulated
in the public domain, uh over such a long period
of time, it is subject to uh.

Speaker 6 (49:19):
Uh it's a question and we all know how as
as perceived over the period decade.

Speaker 9 (49:27):
The key to this, in my opinion, is firsthand sources
who can testify to direct involvement in this so called
legacy program of UH crash retrievals.

Speaker 2 (49:40):
Of converse engineering.

Speaker 9 (49:43):
Unfortunately, UH, there are people out there I've I believe
from from many before us that uh are.

Speaker 12 (49:51):
Interested in coming forward and telling their story, but they are.

Speaker 2 (49:56):
Very much intimidated and frightened.

Speaker 12 (49:59):
Of doing that.

Speaker 6 (50:01):
Uh.

Speaker 9 (50:02):
They're afraid of of the consequences, including their own personal safety.

Speaker 6 (50:08):
Is what they relate their personal safety.

Speaker 2 (50:11):
Certainly their career, starting with their security.

Speaker 6 (50:14):
Clearances, which is the means that.

Speaker 9 (50:15):
They have to the may the living. And they have
observed UH some folks UH who have come forward not
to mention you to live and they rush and have
seen Uh.

Speaker 6 (50:29):
What those folks have gone through and most of them.

Speaker 12 (50:33):
Say, yeah, I'm not doing that. So I think we're
we're sort of in a a tough situation.

Speaker 6 (50:40):
It's almost like you know, Catch twenty two. We need
we need more uh more primary sources.

Speaker 9 (50:49):
Uh.

Speaker 12 (50:50):
But it's hard to get people with.

Speaker 9 (50:52):
That kind of uh, that kind of information to come
forward because of the of the fear of retaliation and we.

Speaker 2 (51:00):
Need a better wizard.

Speaker 3 (51:01):
Yeah, and basically take Barber comes out and it totally
gets hammered even by the community. It's just so ridiculous
that I still think these people need to come out.
I mean, what are you going to go to your deathbed?

Speaker 2 (51:17):
And I don't know, man, have some.

Speaker 3 (51:25):
Guts, man, have some integrity. I don't know, like Matthew
Brown Man, let's see it, dude, dude's legit man, David Crush,
these guys are legit. People are gonna come they know

(51:48):
it's bullshit. That's ridiculous, sir.

Speaker 9 (51:54):
That's something that I'm sure, as you know, always been
discussed in both the Senator.

Speaker 6 (51:58):
And how aren't you draw tell me something up?

Speaker 2 (52:01):
Really tired, as sir?

Speaker 6 (52:05):
So, Uh, what's the blow of protections is?

Speaker 9 (52:08):
Uh?

Speaker 12 (52:09):
And and you know, finding ways to even uh uh
uh compensate.

Speaker 6 (52:14):
Them if they do uh uh have uh negative uh.

Speaker 12 (52:18):
Consequences from coming forward uh and so forth.

Speaker 9 (52:22):
So I I certainly, uh, I certainly think this is uh,
this is a main a major, a major factor.

Speaker 2 (52:29):
Uh. I would just let you ask the next part.
I kind of them as I actually christ pretty sure.
But yeah, so there was Uh. I came preparing to
address that issue as wrong and the sorry yeah right.

Speaker 8 (52:45):
I came compared to contribute what I could to that
question as well. Uh, but the classified session was canceled.
I did due to the sensitivity of the themes.

Speaker 2 (52:59):
Of the individual and so forth.

Speaker 9 (53:04):
Uh.

Speaker 8 (53:06):
You know, I didn't think it was appropriate to those
ones I could do in an unclassified setting. If they
do reschedule at a classified setting, I think, uh, we're
gonna happy to try to provide.

Speaker 2 (53:19):
Some various some specifics.

Speaker 9 (53:21):
Uh.

Speaker 2 (53:21):
I published a signal message I.

Speaker 8 (53:25):
Received from a very senior government official. He described a
specific Secretary of the Air Force memorandum. He described a
specific recovery site. He described he gained the Air Force
gatekeeper for the program.

Speaker 3 (53:43):
As a protective Uh.

Speaker 2 (53:45):
Nobody than Congress was asking me to follow up on that.
I have all that information. You know, I was very
suare of what I could about that, But I don't
know that it would be definited or need a conclusion.

Speaker 8 (54:01):
But uh, I do think those needs do to the
you know, privacy concerns of the individuals and so forth.

Speaker 2 (54:07):
Obviously it's pert sense of it, so uh, I'm prepared
to try to help with that as again as well.

Speaker 8 (54:13):
But in this session I wanted to address uh uh.
Some of these other issues would be the classification.

Speaker 2 (54:21):
You ask you a general question to either of you,
what are the consequences?

Speaker 4 (54:24):
And in either or both of you can answer, what
are the consequences of Congress not taking action on this
topic from a national security perspective?

Speaker 12 (54:37):
Well, the you heard uh doctor uh R Davis.

Speaker 9 (54:43):
Expressing, okay expressing uh uh his understanding of uh the.

Speaker 2 (54:50):
State of affairs in this uh arena, which namely which which.

Speaker 12 (54:55):
Is that the program, the lancing program called that has
uh has UH has been sort of stalled that.

Speaker 9 (55:06):
We're not uh, we're not making the best use of
allegedly not making the best use of the best minds
in the country. The compartmentalization allegedly has prevented the kind
of coordination and uh collaboration between uh uh scientists to

(55:29):
really uh.

Speaker 12 (55:31):
You know, practice very difficulty instead of uh physics problem.

Speaker 6 (55:37):
And uh and the I'm sure that the security uh.

Speaker 9 (55:41):
Element uh that's had to be applied to this uh
to this uh activity has uh come with a lot
of costs in terms of uh effectively managing the management program.

Speaker 12 (55:54):
And it is alleged that this even extends uh within
the executive branch, that very senior uh leaders in.

Speaker 13 (56:02):
The executive branch are aware it is and are not uh,
you know, managing you know, so uh it it doesn't
it's not.

Speaker 2 (56:14):
A lead uh or a stretch to s to suppose that.

Speaker 9 (56:19):
We're hampering ourselves uh immensely by this continued m uh compartmentation.

Speaker 6 (56:29):
And certainly Congress.

Speaker 9 (56:30):
Does not know whether this activity is being managed appropriate.
We don't know if it's got the right level of resources,
it's got the right management structure, the right incentives.

Speaker 2 (56:43):
And so on and so forth.

Speaker 6 (56:46):
You know, we think our government can work pretty well
when we're when we're uh managing things according to.

Speaker 12 (56:52):
The to the rules, and uh so I I think
that this is uh to this is a.

Speaker 9 (57:00):
Uh detriment to national security the lack of oversight and
and an awareness.

Speaker 12 (57:07):
It's certainly possible to keep appropriately classifying.

Speaker 9 (57:11):
Things classified and still have the effect that oversight and management,
both in the executive branch and in.

Speaker 4 (57:19):
So speaking of UH of keeping UH national security and
and secrets classified, which.

Speaker 6 (57:27):
I completely agree with.

Speaker 2 (57:28):
There are very specific reasons.

Speaker 4 (57:29):
Why you want to keep certain aspects of this topic classified,
sources and methods, et cetera.

Speaker 2 (57:34):
Maybe certain capabilities. But let me ask this a question,
probably for for you, uh, mister Melvine, in your opinion,
what are the cartsvelment I've been trained well, because uh,
the fact I'm not learning to tie.

Speaker 4 (57:51):
You have to make up first one very many cuban PA,
two casual, and two lacks. So trying to try to
be more formal or crisp in your opinion, one of
the consequences of retroactively classifying information previously unclassified and are
you aware of any specific incidence of information or data

(58:15):
that was what's unclassified that is now classified.

Speaker 2 (58:20):
Well, as I mentioned earlier, I think there's piles of
that stuff, and I think there's so much of it it's.

Speaker 8 (58:28):
Kind of hard to engauge what the kinds ofquences are
because My understanding is that they adopted the classification guide
that's basically says anything and everything to do in UAP.

Speaker 2 (58:41):
Is classified. Therefore, now people have to read the executive word.
May not be aware the executive word.

Speaker 8 (58:48):
Says, when in doubt, you should err on the side
of going unclassified, it airs you're supposed to err on
the side of transparency and open to.

Speaker 2 (59:00):
The American people. And when we're talking about many of
these videos.

Speaker 8 (59:06):
If a F eighteen at we're already video was unclassified
in twenty seventeen, and we're not talking about denied area
or some other unusual exception, how could it be classified
two years.

Speaker 2 (59:22):
When you take the same video from the same system
in the same area two years later.

Speaker 14 (59:26):
Total, I don't get it, but that most like what
they did and it avoids is typically you know, I
argued seciously against it at the time.

Speaker 2 (59:36):
I knew some of the people involved, and trying to
make the.

Speaker 8 (59:40):
Argument to that guys, you wouldn't even be here, We
wouldn't be having a discussion if information had got into
the public domain.

Speaker 2 (59:50):
Via Congress and the press, and the only reason.

Speaker 8 (59:54):
That's why we made the progress we've made to data.
Now you want to drop a curtain and everything.

Speaker 2 (59:59):
M what do you you know what? I I don't
get it, so.

Speaker 8 (01:00:03):
I can't really gauge the the implications, but I do
think they're negative and I think is it.

Speaker 2 (01:00:09):
Is inappropriate, it's probably unlawful.

Speaker 9 (01:00:13):
Uh.

Speaker 4 (01:00:14):
My last question here before you move to a very
short break from the next panel. I wanna be res
uh respectful time of both the introgressional members and of
course are panelists as well.

Speaker 2 (01:00:26):
This next question goes to you, Kirk.

Speaker 4 (01:00:30):
You mentioned a little bit about whistle blowers, and I
know that from my understanding, and you don't have to talk.

Speaker 2 (01:00:36):
To anybody who you received classified briefings before on this
topic from specific subject matter.

Speaker 4 (01:00:41):
Expertss in your colleagues, what can Congress do, specifically members
such as Rebros and reprost Recluna their colleagues to better.

Speaker 15 (01:00:52):
Protect whistle blowers, to incentivize individuals to come forward and
provide a minimum unclassified information in.

Speaker 4 (01:01:03):
A way that they don't have to worry about retribution
to their careers and and perhaps much.

Speaker 2 (01:01:08):
Worse and classified information in the proper venue.

Speaker 4 (01:01:12):
What what can Congress do to to h help improve
that flow of information and minimize their reprisals if some
of us have had a face in the past.

Speaker 9 (01:01:25):
Uh lu I would uh I would first off like
to say that that uh there is a a an
option like people who do come forward and wanna talk
to UH committees in Congress don't have.

Speaker 2 (01:01:41):
To go public.

Speaker 12 (01:01:43):
They can and have uh come to the Armed.

Speaker 9 (01:01:48):
Services committees, the intelligence committees and uh uh in in
confidence on a classified basis, have related what.

Speaker 6 (01:01:59):
They know and what their experiences can uh. Yeah, the
members who have uh who.

Speaker 9 (01:02:08):
Perceived that kind of uh of uh uh stores and
accounts and and uh.

Speaker 12 (01:02:14):
Witness statements uh have protected.

Speaker 6 (01:02:17):
The identity of of such people and they have.

Speaker 12 (01:02:24):
They have their vibe and protected.

Speaker 9 (01:02:27):
The the the uh. The negative side of that is
that the members uh can't go around and tell their
colleagues uh uh what they what they have learned.

Speaker 12 (01:02:40):
Because that's uh that risks the identity of uh.

Speaker 6 (01:02:44):
People that have come forward and.

Speaker 9 (01:02:46):
The confidence and therefore it doesn't it doesn't empower members
to then uh uh proselytize and and get everyone uh
geared up.

Speaker 6 (01:02:58):
To really make the strong investigatory clush. But it is
an option for people to consider.

Speaker 3 (01:03:09):
I think it's a super powerful option. They can verify
their identity, they can verify who they are. Go to Congress.
If you are one of these people, go to Burlsson, man,
that dude is legit. Go to Tim Burchett. You know
he's going to protect you. Tell him you're involved. I mean,
Jake Mellon did that. And remember the senator said, hey,

(01:03:31):
how do you how do I get protection? They asked,
They asked Jake.

Speaker 9 (01:03:36):
So I would also say that we have a gentleman
here in the audience who has.

Speaker 6 (01:03:48):
Conducted a legal history of people who come forward to.

Speaker 12 (01:03:56):
Make classify statements.

Speaker 6 (01:03:59):
To Congress over a long period of time, and uh.

Speaker 9 (01:04:05):
He tells me that, uh he can't find an instance
where someone coming forward and giving a classified information to
Congress without sort of formal uh permission from.

Speaker 6 (01:04:17):
The executive branch.

Speaker 12 (01:04:19):
That there's never been.

Speaker 6 (01:04:20):
Uh. I I hope I'm getting this right. Who's never
been an indictment.

Speaker 9 (01:04:24):
Or much less a prosecution for doing that? Now, I
I certainly you know I'm not a lawyer, and I
certainly UH don't wanna encourage people to uh to sort
of break the rules as they see, uh as they
understand them and what they're bound to by agreements that.

Speaker 6 (01:04:43):
They signed HM.

Speaker 12 (01:04:45):
But it is at least something to think about.

Speaker 6 (01:04:50):
And uh and and potentially UH act up on that
obviously takes a.

Speaker 2 (01:04:55):
Lot of courage UH to do that. Yep, I just
like to it's a woldea non sector or are panels
coming to an end? And I didn't wanna make a
They're sure A concerned on you have toat is that
we have two different issues here.

Speaker 8 (01:05:10):
We have UAP objects that were observing UH in play
active around.

Speaker 2 (01:05:18):
Military concili cerve. We have an issue of possible recovery
or put materials.

Speaker 9 (01:05:24):
Uh.

Speaker 2 (01:05:25):
These two issues of.

Speaker 8 (01:05:26):
A public mind are funded. It's entirely possible that we
might not have recovered materials, but you mayp are very
real and here addressing and its acurging issue.

Speaker 2 (01:05:38):
And I have a concern that if that issue is not.

Speaker 8 (01:05:43):
In some way validated or addressed, it runs the risk
of discrediting the entire topic.

Speaker 2 (01:05:49):
And we've made enormous progress.

Speaker 8 (01:05:53):
Uh nothing happened essentially from the Google gage until twenty seventeen.

Speaker 2 (01:05:58):
UH And and I fear that if there isn't.

Speaker 8 (01:06:02):
Some uh effective way of addressing this, there will be
run the risk of a major setback.

Speaker 2 (01:06:10):
I don't know how secure hero it is in the
long room.

Speaker 8 (01:06:13):
Not seeing interest on the part of the chairman of
the committees that funded on your arm services and intelligence communities.

Speaker 2 (01:06:21):
They don't seem to.

Speaker 8 (01:06:22):
Be engaged or supportive at this point for defensive props.
So I think we're in somewhat tenuous ground hurt point.
I think it's probably in a better position to address
this than me. But I think that the second day
of balls.

Speaker 2 (01:06:36):
Mean if work confirm it and how do you manage that?
Who deals with that?

Speaker 8 (01:06:41):
It's such a transformational issue that it cannot be a
press release. It comes out from a you know, from
Congress on afternoon at uh Friday afternoon or something.

Speaker 2 (01:06:56):
It's a at literally cosmic issue that runs the risk
of how they uh are terrifying tens of billions of kids,
of millions of people.

Speaker 8 (01:07:08):
Right, So it's a very complext in related set of issues.
And uh, I I think we we and whoever are
in Congress and writing oversight of this. I really needs
to think through how to handle two of those things.
And uh Art Foundation obviously wants to help if we can,

(01:07:32):
but if I don't, UH, I think it's a tough
challenge for members who are very, very.

Speaker 2 (01:07:37):
Busy people with a lot on their place in the
complex moment. I'm I'm gonna make an exception. I'm gonna
continue as conversation cause there's a question I want to
ask her your important relating to with their.

Speaker 9 (01:07:48):
Expertise going er well, I I wanted to uh get
to the questions you actually asking about them with some
little protections and I'm uh, by no means.

Speaker 8 (01:07:58):
Uh an expert or even really conversant on the topic
of whistle lower protections.

Speaker 12 (01:08:06):
But you know, applying to common sense kind of standard.

Speaker 16 (01:08:12):
You know, you need to you need to have we.

Speaker 2 (01:08:16):
Need to have legislation that.

Speaker 6 (01:08:20):
That really is strong. You know, there's a.

Speaker 12 (01:08:24):
Long record of whistled lowers.

Speaker 9 (01:08:26):
Despite whistle lower protections in the law, they had.

Speaker 3 (01:08:31):
Retaliated begins and they Yeah, I had John Kiriaku on
the show. I mean, if you haven't watched that interview,
it didn't get many views, but it's unbelievable. I mean,
they were obviously torturing people, and the US literally wrote
the Geneva Conventions against Torture, and all those fucks in

(01:08:52):
the CIA knew that right, they knew the law of
arm conflict, like we knew the law of armed conflict, like,
and they still or just torturing people. It's ridiculous. And
he was the only one that spoke up, like he
thought someone else would speak up. He's like, surely someone
would speak up about this, and then no one did,

(01:09:14):
and no one did, and still no one did. So
he spoke up about it, and what did they do.
They literally put him in jail for two years on
just some bullshit trumped up charge like it was just
a total made up charge, like he and he explains
it in the interview. He was talking to a journalist
and the journalist said, oh, do you know this guy
John Deere and John Kiaku said, oh, I don't know.

(01:09:41):
I think he may have been at this desk when
I was there in Pakistan or something in two thousand
and nine. That's it, that's what he said. It never
went public, the journalist never published it, and they put
him in jail for two years because of that. And
the only reason they did that is because he was
talking about them torturing everybody. You know, it's just the

(01:10:02):
same thing's going on, and yeah, it's just ridiculous, Like
what are you going to be remembered for like you're
going to look back. Like some people don't get Like,
if you're not living your life to the fullest, then
what are you doing? Like what's the point, Like you're

(01:10:26):
on your deathbed, what are you gonna be happy about it?
I'm I'm glad I made that retirement. Like everybody works
so hard to get to their retirement and then and
then they're old and they end up dying.

Speaker 2 (01:10:35):
Right.

Speaker 3 (01:10:37):
I just don't get it, like Matthew Brown gets it,
Like the younger people will get it, Like it is
going to come out these people a bunch of cowards,
is what it comes down to. Like it's easy to
be the Special Forces guy. That's what I learned. Like
you look up and you're like, oh, special Forces, they're
so bad ass. It's easy to be the Air Force
pilot up twenty eight thousand feet right where they can't

(01:10:58):
shoot at me, job bombs on people. Yeah, okay, what
about the dude out in the street. It's just in uniform,
right and walking around in uniform and just hoping to
not get shot. Like that's the dude. It's hard to
be not the people in the CIA who are torturing
people and scared to show their faces. It's gonna come

(01:11:20):
out like.

Speaker 12 (01:11:24):
They lose their jobs, They lose their careers, and.

Speaker 6 (01:11:31):
With enough regularity that no one.

Speaker 12 (01:11:33):
Could blame people for not wanting to not wanting their business.

Speaker 9 (01:11:38):
So the legislation would need to be would need to
be very robust, and I think it would need to
include things like the restitution possibility of of of the
government making good on the loss of the loss of
their career, loss of security clearances.

Speaker 3 (01:11:58):
Like if it comes to think how much better we
would do, right if instead of using a billion dollars
for some new assets that heavy love could try and
find something. What if you just paid those whistleblowers a
billion dollars? Think of that, a billion dollars. All you
need is one hundred million, Like Ivy says, how much

(01:12:20):
information will we get? They should just put out a
freaking reward just to pay for information, like that's what
it should be.

Speaker 9 (01:12:31):
And and and making uh, you know, making sure that
that people are not going to, you know, suffer these consequences.

Speaker 6 (01:12:46):
Even though the law says they should.

Speaker 2 (01:12:48):
Never have.

Speaker 3 (01:12:50):
You got you got clean on the mass Obviously they
don't follow the low It.

Speaker 16 (01:12:53):
Tends to happen you know, so anyway, I I don't
know I thought to those So one last question I
always said it before you again bring the road real.

Speaker 2 (01:13:04):
Quick, but I'm gonna ask you very quickly.

Speaker 4 (01:13:06):
Let's try to if we tends big question to try
to keep the sixteen to preten and is you're both
es and and I think, uh, this is part of
the challenge of Congress faces. Okay, so you have we
all want to protect national security. How do you separate
protecting Blue Force technologies perhaps perhaps hypothetically.

Speaker 2 (01:13:27):
Gain from the insights of UAP recovery programs, but.

Speaker 4 (01:13:32):
At the same time leveling with the American people about
for reality, the fundamental reality that that we aim we
do not have a current understanding of everything in our
sky right or air US air demain awareness, but you
don't have a compete site. Make sure and too that
there may be technologies that are not from US and
that warrant further investigation. Again, but at the same time

(01:13:54):
protecting if we have any technologies hypothetically that have been.

Speaker 2 (01:13:59):
Developed that's for fault.

Speaker 9 (01:14:02):
Well, Luke, you know, uh, we heard from doctor Davis
that and and many others who believe that we haven't made.

Speaker 2 (01:14:09):
Much progress uh in ins with respect to.

Speaker 9 (01:14:13):
Deciphering what the physics are behind uh in a job
in these craft that are coming here. Uh.

Speaker 12 (01:14:21):
At the same time, I mean, we don't really know
us that that's true.

Speaker 2 (01:14:24):
We haven't made progress.

Speaker 9 (01:14:26):
Maybe we make great environments and and that we have
stuff ourselves that that could be Uh, it couldn't be
pretty moralous, right, and certainly there can be uh, absolutely
vital reasons for protecting that kind of information. I Mean,

(01:14:47):
one thought that is, uh is across my mind is, uh,
you know, people say, you know, to the United States
government has been into this.

Speaker 6 (01:14:56):
Uh, why in the world would wouldn't the government have.

Speaker 12 (01:15:00):
Made these kinds of the technologies known for the betterment of.

Speaker 3 (01:15:03):
Our citizens and because they never had?

Speaker 12 (01:15:06):
And you know, one thought is like what if it
what if once you understand the science.

Speaker 6 (01:15:12):
What if the engineering?

Speaker 3 (01:15:14):
I know it's not that hard.

Speaker 6 (01:15:16):
Eric Davis thinks that we're going we're maybe.

Speaker 12 (01:15:18):
A thousand years from being able to do this, but
what if that's what if it's not true?

Speaker 6 (01:15:24):
Anyway?

Speaker 9 (01:15:24):
What either the government is on the horns of a dilemma,
like it's got energy sources.

Speaker 2 (01:15:30):
It might be an absolute boon to mankind, but it.

Speaker 12 (01:15:32):
Also is looking at the weaponization of that, and it's terrifying.

Speaker 6 (01:15:38):
And so you know, gee, is there a way that
you can exploit that for your own benefit militarily keeping
this uh, keeping this thing somehow this genie bottled up.

Speaker 3 (01:15:49):
You can't, That's what That's what I believe is you
can't because once you say that it's that it's real,
what they're going to realize is that our physics and
are understanding, our perspective is totally ft. And then once
you see that it's possible using this other manner. That's
why Tesla's work was all classified. I think the engineering
is not. The difficult part, right, is knowing that you're

(01:16:12):
totally eft. That it was difficult to go around the
southern tip of Africa, but it was impossible to go
along the coast. It was difficult to go out west,
but it was definitely possible right going along the coast,
right along the coast of Africa was impossible. So once
you had the information, then it was totally possible. All

(01:16:34):
of a sudden, Now Spain can get around the get
around the southern tip, so anyone could. That's why they
keep it. They can't. They can't release anything, because a
they'll look like total assholes for lying to us for
ninety years and keep it, keeping it secret at their
own power to gain power for their own nation. And

(01:16:54):
then at the same point they can't release as soon
as they release it, then that will that will let
everyone else know that it's possible and break break the seal.
You can't keep the genie in the bottle basically.

Speaker 12 (01:17:05):
Doesn't come into the hands of a of a North
Korean dictator.

Speaker 9 (01:17:12):
So, uh I, I don't have answers I uh lou,
I think, uh, I think you've got to deal with
this uh this range of uh of of possibilities. But
the first thing you gotta do is understand it like
we have to. We have to understand what the government knows.
And until we do, it's gonna be hard to develop

(01:17:33):
a rational strategy for managements.

Speaker 2 (01:17:38):
I don't know that's Christian. Uh I don't think I'll
I think you do manage it. I'll leave it that
I say too much of rage and had eager to
get off the stage and turn it over those and alright,
f three minutes, thank you very much.

Speaker 3 (01:18:06):
So that hearing was just amazing. I thought it was unbelievable.
I think I had it on. I have my mic
on mute the last several minutes, Rookie. I really enjoyed
this hearing setup. I thought this was amazing. There is
Ryan Graves out there, Keith Taylor. Remember Tim Burchett was
taking a selfie. I saw him taking a selfie and

(01:18:27):
Tim was taking a selfie with Keith. Chris is still
talking to this dude. I don't know if you guys
know who that guy is. I thought this hearing format
was amazing. You know the other one the hearing all
was at it was super hardcore. It was like high
high tension. Everybody recorded, you know, swearing oats. And then

(01:18:51):
it's time like he had all the political bs like
the Congress people coming in and a lot of them
asking really good questions. But then the political show voting
all the cameras. So I mean, I thought it was
great to get like exposure out there, but I think
this is so much better, like just super chill getting
the information out. Lou el Zondo's running it, man, how

(01:19:13):
awesome is that? Like Lou's asking all the questions, directing it.
Eric Davis just casually casually answering like, oh yeah, of
course we have craft unbelievable. So I really like the setup.
Can you imagine David Grush asking all those questions. So
we heard some great information, and I know I had

(01:19:36):
Mike on the show and it's going to be the
innovation panel, and so I actually have I have to go.
I have three kids and I need to take care
of them. It's a holiday here and my wife is
not here, and so it's already been over three hours.
But I really like this setup.

Speaker 9 (01:19:54):
Mike.

Speaker 3 (01:19:54):
What he's going to say is he's going to talk
about being part of the NASA Independent Study Team. What
he really wants is for NASA to go back and
look in the archived data and just do a systematic
search of all the data they have that is already public.
He's going to talk about that. And the second thing
he's going to say is the Aviation Safety Reporting System
that we should use that. And that's great because again

(01:20:17):
it can keep your name confidential, so you can be
anonymous and we can get like real serious data. But
I think highlight on this is there's tons of information
the US government surely knows, elements of the government know,
the military industrial complex knows what these things are. At
least that they're not a serious threat. They haven't been

(01:20:39):
for many years. If they don't know exactly what they are,
they don't know necessarily how they work. But that doesn't
mean you can't use the technology, right, And that's what
Jake Barber argued, is that they are using the technology.
They know how to use it, they don't know why
it works. Just like the same thing, like I could
fly a plane. I did fly the plane. I don't
know why the plane flies. You know, I know how
it flies technically, I know what this goes in there,

(01:21:01):
that goes there. These are all the systems. But we
don't know why electricity works. We don't know why gravity works.
We don't know why space time is a thing. Right,
we don't know why it can warp space. So I
think it's just a matter of time. Yeah, And we

(01:21:23):
talked about whistleblowers. I think that's super important. Like, imagine
if instead of spending one hundred million dollars for avi's program, right,
what if you spend one hundred million dollars just to
pay whistleblowers for information, like, think how much? Think how
much we would learn immediately if you just paid If
you had one hundred million dollars slush fund for whistleblowers
like that, should it be? It should be the Whistleblower

(01:21:44):
Disclosure Fund. And all we do is pay whistleblowers to
go to Congress, right, keep it classified. Congress can vet
them if you really want to find out. And so
I thought all these discussions were amazing. I can't wait
to see what is actually reported in the press. I
think this is perfect. I hope so many whistleblowers must
have watched this, right, people on the Legacy program have

(01:22:04):
to have watched this. So I think that's just amazing.
And look at John Kiraku, right, he was only one
whistleblower who was tough enough to actually do it. Everyone
around him, all the other people in the CIA, hopefully
I wasn't on mute when I went on that old tangent.
I may even three hours. Everyone around him did not

(01:22:27):
think it was something wrong, right, that they weren't doing
something wrong with torture, and meanwhile it was complete bs.
But he said right, he said that. Look, it made
me everything I am today. And if I went back
in time, I would not do anything different and I
would speak out about it. And I hope other people
see that. Other whistleblowers see that because like they talked about, oh,

(01:22:53):
their job, their career, all that stuff. Like I mean,
it's easy to say, right, I have a pension, you
know I don't. I don't live outlandishly. But I also
don't have to go and work. I've set it up
so I don't have to. But why do they stop

(01:23:14):
Like you're gonna die, It doesn't matter, It's all temporary.
Like what really matters is what you do when you
have your time here, That's what matters. So I mean,
if you're not living life to the fullest, then honestly,
what the fuck are you doing? That would be my question.

(01:23:34):
That is my tip. That is my tip. Thank you
for supporting me. This is the secret tip you get
is go and live life to the fullest. And that
means don't be scared to do what is required. Like
you are going to die, like it is just a
matter of time. Get over it. And you know, before

(01:23:54):
you were dead, everything was fine, like whatever, After you're dead,
everything will be fine. Like you know, pain is transitory,
like yeah, so anyway, peace,

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UAP-Congress Bombshells Pt2/3: Mellon - Space Radar, McConnell-Whistleblowers are scared

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.css-14f5ked{margin:0;word-break:break-word;display:-webkit-box;-webkit-box-orient:vertical;box-orient:vertical;-webkit-line-clamp:2;overflow:hidden;}UAP-Congress Bombshells Pt2/3: Mellon - Space Radar, McConnell-Whistleblowers are scared