15 - Rough Riders by Theodore Roosevelt

Join Theodore Roosevelt as he recounts his thrilling experiences with The Rough Riders, the legendary 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry formed in 1898 for the Spanish-American War. As Lt. Colonel and second-in-command, Roosevelt vividly portrays the brave men and their spirited horses, the challenges they faced, and the fierce battles they fought in Cuba. He paints a picture of soldiers forged from the rugged wilderness, accustomed to the wild and the unpredictable. With a passion for adventure and an eagerness for action, these “grim hunters of the mountains” were ready to face any foe. Roosevelt’s account is a stirring tribute to their courage and camaraderie, making it a compelling listen for history enthusiasts.

Episode Transcript

Speaker 1 (00:00):
Section fifteen of the Rough Writers by Theodore Roosevelt. This
LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by William
Peck the pendix see the Round Robin Letter. The following
is the report of the Associated Press correspondent of the
Round Robin incident. It is literally true in every detail.

(00:23):
I was present when he was handed both letters. He
was present while they were being written. Santiago de Cuba,
August third, delayed in transmission. Summoned by Major General Shafter,
A meeting was held here this morning at headquarters and
in the presence of every commanding and medical officer of
the Fifth Army Corps. General Shafter read a cable message

(00:46):
from Secretary Alger ordering him on the recommendation of Surgeon
General Sternberg to move the army into the interior to
Saint Louis, where it is healthier. As a result of
the conference, General Shafter will insist upon the immediate withdrawal
of the Army north. As an explanation of the situation,
the following letter from Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, commanding the first

(01:09):
Cavalry to General Shafter, was handed by the latter to
the correspondent of the Associated press for publication. Major General
shafter Sir. In the meeting of the General and medical
officers called by you at the Palace this morning, we
were all, as you know, unanimous in our views of
what should be done with the army. To keep us here,

(01:31):
in the opinion of every officer commanding a division or
a brigade will simply involve the destruction of thousands. There
is no possible reason for not shipping practically the entire
command north at once. Yellow fever cases are very few
in the Cavalry Division, where I command one of the
two brigades, and not one true case of yellow fever

(01:52):
has occurred in this division, except among the men sent
to the hospital at Siboney, where they have I believe,
contracted it. But in this division there have been fifteen
hundred cases of malarial fever. Hardly a man has yet
died from it. But the whole command is so weakened
and shattered as to be ripe for dying like rotten
sheep when a real yellow fever epidemic instead of a

(02:15):
fake epidemic like the present one, strikes us, as it
is bound to do if we stay here at the
height of the sickness, season August and the beginning of September.
Quarantine against malarial fever is much like quarantining against a toothache.
All of us are certain that as soon as the
authorities of Washington fully appreciate the condition of the army,

(02:36):
we shall be sent home. If we are kept here,
it will, in all human possibility, mean an appalling disaster.
For the surgeons here estimate that over half the army,
if kept here during the sickly season, will die. This
is not only terrible from the standpoint of the individual
lives loss, but it means ruin from the standpoint of
military efficiency of the flower of the American Army. For

(02:59):
a great bulk of the regulars are here with you.
The sick list, large, though it is exceeding four thousand affords,
but a faint index of the debilitation of the army.
Not twenty percent are fit for active work. Six weeks
on the North Main coast, for instance, or elsewhere where
the yellow fever germ cannot possibly propagate, would make us

(03:20):
all as fit as fighting cocks, as able as we
are eager to take a leading part in the great
campaign against Havana in the fall, even if we are
not allowed to try Puerto Rico. We can be moved
north if moved at once, with absolute safety to the country,
although of course it would have been infinitely better if
we have been moved north or at to Puerto Rico

(03:41):
two weeks ago. If there were any object in keeping
us here, we would face yellow fever with as much
indifference as we face bullets. But there is no object.
The four immune regiments ordered here are sufficient to garrison
the city and surrounding towns, and there is absolutely nothing
for us to do here has not been since the

(04:01):
city surrendered. It is impossible to move into the interior.
Every shifting of camp doubles the sick rate in our
present weakened condition, And anyhow, the interior is rather worse
than the coast. As I have found by actual reconnaissance,
our present camps are as healthy as any camps at
this end of the island can be. I write only

(04:22):
because I cannot see our men, who have fought so bravely,
and who have endured extreme hardship and danger so uncomplainingly,
go to destruction without striving so far as lies in
me to avert a doom as fearful as it is
unnecessary and undeserved yours respectfully, Theodore Roosevelt, Colonel commanding Second
Cavalry Brigade. After Colonel Roosevelt had taken the initiative, all

(04:47):
the American general officers united in a round robin addressed
to General Shafter. It reads, we, the undersigned officers commanding
the various brigades, divisions, etc. Of the Army of Occupation
in Cuba, are of the unanimous opinion that this army
should be at once taken out of the island of
Cuba and sent to some point on the northern sea

(05:07):
coasts of the United States that can be done without
danger to the people of the United States. That yellow
fever in the army at present is not epidemic, that
there are only a few sporadic cases, but that the
army is disabled by malarial fever to the extent that
its efficiency is destroyed, and that it is in a
condition to be practically entirely destroyed by an epidemic of

(05:28):
yellow fever, which is sure to come in the near future.
We know from the reports of competent officers and from
personal observations, that the army is unable to move into
the interior, and that there are no facilities for such
a move if attempted, and that it could not be
attempted until too late. Moreover, the best medical authorities of
the island say that with our present equipment we could

(05:50):
not live in the interior during the rainy season without
losses from malarial fever, which is almost as deadly as
yellow fever. This army must be moved at once or
parrot as the army can be safely moved now. The
person's responsible for preventing such a move will be responsible
for the unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives. Our

(06:10):
opinions are the result of careful personal observation, and they
are also based on the unanimous opinion of our medical
officers with the Army, who understand the situation absolutely. J.
Ford Kent Major General Volunteers commanding First Division, Fifth Corps. J. C. Bates,
Major General, Volunteers commanding Provisional Division aDNA. R. Chaffee, Major

(06:34):
General commanding third Brigade, Second Division. Samuel S. Sumner, Brigadier General,
volunteers commanding First Brigade Cavalry. Will Ludlow, Brigadier General Volunteers
commanding first Brigade, Second Division, Adlbert Ames Brigadier General Volunteers
commanding third Brigade, First Division. Leonard Wood, Brigadier General, Volunteers

(06:59):
commanding the City of Santiago. Theodore Roosevelt, Colonel commanding second
Cavalry Brigade. Major M. W. Wood, the chief surgeon of
the First Division, said the army must be moved north,
adding with emphasis, or it will be unable to move itself.
General Ames has sent the following cable message to Washington.

(07:21):
Charles H. Allen, Assistant Secretary of the Navy. This army
is incapable because of sickness of marching anywhere except to
the transports. If it is ever to return to the
United States, it must do so at once. End of appendix.
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