ALEXANDER THE GREAT - 1. THE BACKGROUND: The Rise of Macedonian Power - J. F. C. Fuller

The Generalship of Alexander the Great by J. F. C. Fuller - Chapter 1. THE BACKGROUND: The Rise of Macedonian Power - HQ Full Book.

J. F. C. Fuller’s The Generalship of Alexander the Great is a seminal work that meticulously examines the military genius of Alexander III of Macedon, one of history’s most celebrated conquerors. In Chapter 1, titled “The Background,” Fuller sets the stage for Alexander’s meteoric rise by exploring the political, social, and military landscape of Greece and Macedon in the 4th century BCE. This chapter provides a comprehensive foundation for understanding the conditions that shaped Alexander’s world and the legacy he inherited from his father, Philip II. Fuller’s analysis is both scholarly and engaging, weaving together historical events, philosophical influences, and strategic developments to contextualize Alexander’s achievements. Below is a description of this chapter, including short summaries of each subchapter.  

Overview of Chapter 1: The Background
Chapter 1 serves as a historical prelude, detailing the fragmented state of Greece, the decline of its city-states, and the rise of Macedon under Philip II. Fuller argues that Alexander’s success was not solely a product of his own brilliance but also the culmination of historical forces and reforms that preceded him. The chapter traces the decay of Greek autonomy, the intellectual currents that sought to unify the Hellenic world, and Philip’s transformative leadership, which laid the groundwork for Alexander’s empire. By examining key events such as the Sacred Wars and the Congress of Corinth, Fuller illustrates how Macedon emerged as a dominant power, setting the stage for Alexander’s conquests. The chapter is rich in historical detail, offering readers a nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics that enabled Alexander’s extraordinary career.  

Subchapter Descriptions:   

Decay of the City-States  
This subchapter explores the decline of the Greek city-states, which had once been the pinnacle of political and cultural achievement. Fuller describes how, by the 4th century BCE, the city-states, including Athens and Sparta, were weakened by incessant warfare, economic instability, and internal strife. The Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE) had exhausted their resources and fractured their unity, leaving them vulnerable to external influence. Fuller highlights the shift from independent polis governance to a more chaotic landscape where rivalries and alliances destabilized the region. This decay created a power vacuum that Macedon, under Philip II, would exploit, setting the stage for a new era of centralized authority.    

Reforms of the Philosophers  
Here, Fuller examines the intellectual responses to Greece’s political fragmentation, focusing on the contributions of philosophers like Plato and Aristotle. These thinkers proposed reforms to address the city-states’ decline, advocating for stronger governance and unity. Plato’s Republic envisioned an ideal state led by philosopher-kings, while Aristotle, who later tutored Alexander, emphasized practical governance and the study of politics. Fuller notes that these philosophical ideas influenced the broader Hellenic world, fostering a desire for a unified Greece capable of resisting external threats, such as Persia. This subchapter underscores the interplay between philosophy and politics, which shaped the ideological context of Alexander’s era.  

Philip II of Macedon  
This section introduces Philip II, Alexander’s father, as a pivotal figure in transforming Macedon from a peripheral kingdom into a dominant power. Fuller details Philip’s military and diplomatic innovations, including the creation of the Macedonian phalanx, a highly disciplined infantry formation, and his strategic use of alliances and marriages. Philip’s reforms strengthened Macedon’s economy, military, and political cohesion, enabling him to exert influence over Greece. Fuller portrays Philip as a visionary leader whose ambition to unite Greece under Macedonian hegemony provided Alexander with the tools and opportunities to pursue his conquests. This subchapter emphasizes Philip’s foundational role in Alexander’s success.  

Amphipolis and the First Sacred War  
Fuller analyzes Philip’s early expansionist moves, focusing on the capture of Amphipolis (357 BCE) and his involvement in the First Sacred War (356–346 BCE). Amphipolis, a strategically vital city, gave Macedon control over valuable resources and access to the Aegean Sea. The First Sacred War, centered on control of the Delphic Oracle, allowed Philip to intervene in Greek affairs, positioning himself as a defender of religious sanctity. Fuller highlights how these events showcased Philip’s cunning diplomacy and military prowess, consolidating his influence in northern Greece and setting a precedent for Macedonian intervention in Greek conflicts.

Episode Transcript

Speaker 1 (00:00):
The generalship of Alexander the Great by J. F. C. Fuller,
Part one, the Record one the background decay of the
city states when, as is conjectured, those tribes of Indo
European stock to become known to history as the Greeks
percolated into the mountain tangle of the Balkans to settle

(00:21):
in its more fertile valleys. They formed pockets of agricultural communities,
each cut off from the other. At first, each tribal
group of villages was congregated closely around its leaders, stockade, stronghold,
or akropolis, but later, to enhance their protection, the villages
were walled in and together with the acropolis became a
fortified town. Thus originated the city state or polis, each

(00:44):
a minute nation in which citizenship was commonly based on
descent from the original conquerors. The citizens possessed all real property,
exercised all political rights, and performed all military duties. The
key to society throughout the Heroic age was the tribe
and its clans, separate by men, by tribes, by clans,
says Nestor to Agamemnon, that clan may bear aid to

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clan and tribe to tribe. Each city was a sovereign
power with its own king, laws, army, and gods, and
each citizen owed allegiance to his city and to no other.
The exceptions to this general rule were four regions, each
roughly a geographical unit, the kingdoms of Sparta and Argos,
which together occupied a considerable part of the Peloponnese, the

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Attic Peninsula, in which Athens absorbed its little city kingdoms,
and Biotia, where the city states, though not absorbed, fell
under the leadership of Thebes. The political institutions of Homeric
times show that the king, as leader of his tribe,
was guided by a council of his chiefs, and that
his decisions were brought before the assembly or gathering of

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the folk for ratification. The king was chief priest, chief judge,
and supreme war lord. He claimed descent from the gods,
and was protected by a bodyguard of his companions, as
in after times Danish and Saxon kings were by their
house girls. The political life of the Greek cities was
one of nearly endless intercity war or of civil discord

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stasis within their walls. Plato points out that these intercity
wars were largely caused by overpopulation, at times relieved by emigration.
It was a life of restless ambitions, personal jealousies, party factions,
and endless cattle rating. Maritime commercial rivals were in a
state of constant war. In the seventh century BC, the

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poet Archillicus described the freebooter's life at sea in my
spear as needed bread in my spear as the wine
of Asthmirus, and I lie upon my spear as I drink.
Because the citizens lived for war, they had no time
for peaceful occupations, which were relegated to serfs, slaves and
medics aliens. The division between the citizen soldier and the

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agricultural labor formed two main classes, the nobles and the peasants,
and the struggle between them became the decisive problem in
city politics after the eighth century BC, as republics replaced
the vanishing clan monarchies, there emerged from the class struggle.
The forms of government commonly identified with the Greek city
states aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny, and a point to

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note is that, with the exception of Sparta, where a
dual monarchy was adopted, no Hellenic city developed a stable
form of government. There were no bonds between the cities
except the common language and the great athletic festivals, held
under religious auspices and opened to all Hellings. Of these,
the most noted were the Olympic Games, founded traditionally in

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the eighth century BC and held every fourth year in
honour of Olympian Zeus, and the Pithian Games, in honor
of Apollo of Delphi, which early in the sixth century BC,
were placed under the management of the Amphictionic Council. Only
the dire threat to all city states by the Persians
under Xerxes four hundred eighty five to four hundred and
sixty five BC, which was brought to naught at Salamis

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and Plataea in four eighty and four seventy nine b C,
produced some semblance of common patriotism and caused the rise
of the Athenian Empire with its Periclean dream of union.
In the Peloponnesian War four hundred thirty one to four
hundred four b C, that empire was destroyed and its
policy of union failed because, as Sir Ernest Barker points out,

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both Athens and her allies equally trammeled by the thought
of the city state could not arise to the conception
of a great non civic state united in a common citizenship,
because her citizenship meant and could only mean, Athenian birth
and a full participation in Athenian local life and ways
and temper. On their side, they could not have accepted
the gift if it had been offered, because their citizenship

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of their cities meant just as much to them. The
Peloponnesian War, which involved nearly all the city states, was
disastrous to Hellenic polity. By destroying the Athenian Empire, it
upset the balance of power between Greece and pur Persia,
and in three eighty six b C, the Sparta Persian
alliance caused the Shameful King's Peace or Peace of Antiosiitis,

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dictated to the Greek states by Artaxerxes II four hundred
and four three fifty eight BC. By its terms, the
Asiatic Greek cities in Cyprus were abandoned to Persia, the
leadership of Sparta within Greece was acknowledged, and any state
which did not accept the peace was to be compelled
by Persia to do so. Thus the Great King became

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the arbiter of Greece with the right of perpetual interference
equally momentous. This Thirty Years War of the Hellenic Age
sowed seeds of decay within the cities. Not only did
it ruin the agricultural industry of Attica and throw thousands
of her peasant farmers into the ranks of the unemployed,
but during the long struggle of the old militias, the

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backbone of the city system through constant service, became increasingly professionalized.
Although adventurous Greek soldiers and freebooters had hired themselves to
foreign princes long before the Persian invasion, and early greece
Greek tyrants had used mercenaries as bodyguards, not until the
Peloponnesian War did the opportunity arise for their employment on
a large scale. By the opening of the fourth century BC,

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the ordinary Greek citizen militias were so completely outclassed by
professional mercenaries that the latter became a typical feature in
Greek warfare. There were two results of this. The first
was that, as mercenaries were not bound by allegiance to
any city state, they sold their services to the highest bidder,
and so became the means whereby democracy could be violently
subdued by autocracy. The second was that their services became

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so eagerly sought after that in the fourth century most
of the Persian army infantry was composed of Greek mercenaries.
For his expedition against his elder brother Arti Xerxes too
in four o one b c. Cyrus the Younger recruited
some thirteen thousand Greek mercenaries, of whom more than half
were poverty stricken Arcadians and Achaeans. After his defeat at Kunaxa,

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the remnants of this army retired to the Troad under
Xenophon and turned professionals, and from them, writes Sir William
Tarn dates the growth in Greek history of a world
separate from the city state, the world of mercenaries. Fusidides
tells us that when the Peloponnesian War broke out, the
Athenian citizens were ever ready to brave danger and suffer
fatigue and privations for the glory of Athens. He makes

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the Corinthians say of them, their only idea of a
holiday is to do what the occasion demands, and to them,
laborious occupation is less of a misfortune than the peace
of a quiet life. To describe their character in a word,
one might truly say that they were born into the
world to take no rest themselves and give none to others.
But as the defense of the cities became more and

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more dependent upon mercenaries, the ordinary citizen felt military service
of burden. He became increasingly pacific and immersed himself in
industrial and professional pursuits in money making. So pronounced was
this change that, in order to guarantee a quorum at
the meetings of the Athenian Assembly, payment of each citizen
attending was introduced, and to maintain the unam employed tranquil

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they were given free seats at the theater. The city
was ceasing to be wright Sir Ernest Barker, a partnership
in high achievement and noble living. It was becoming a
commercial association for the distribution among its members of dividends
which they had not earned. Reforms of the philosophers. The
decline and morale of the city state, coupled with the

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devastation resulting from endless inter city warfare, shocked the Greek
conscience and was rendered vocal by the philosophers, whose speculations
like those of Voltaire, Russo, Kant and others. In eighteenth
century Europe initiated a period of enlightenment which did not reinvigorate,
but rotted what remained of the crumbling polity of the
city state. The more outstanding of these would be reformers

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were Socrates four hundred and sixty nine to three hundred
and ninety nine b C. Plato four hundred and twenty
nine to three hundred forty seven b C. And Aristotle
three hundred eighty four to three hundred and twenty two
b C. What these philosophers were unable to understand was
that the the problem was not the reform of the
constitution of the city in accordance with an ideal archetypal polus,

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but to expand the circumference of the city until it
included all the Hellenic states in Greece, and thereby to
create a Hellenic unity and brotherhood. Of Socrates, the earliest
in date of the three. All we know of him,
as he left nothing in writing, is what has been
recorded by Plato, Xenophon, and Aristophanes. He conceived that he

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had a heavenly mission to educate all and Sundry, and
Xenophon tells us that, like Joan of Arc, he was
directed by divine voices. His tedious dialectics of question and
answer must have confused the minds of many of his hearers,
and should Plato's dialogues represent his views correctly, then there
would seem to have been adequate reason why the conservative
Athenians looked upon him as a dangerous visionary and corruptor

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of youth. This becomes apparent when we turn to Plato's
Republican Laws, in which are described the socratic constitution of
the archetypal city state, the heavenly pattern toward which all
reforms were to be directed. The proposals made in these
books may be compared with a mixture of the ideas
of Calvin, Robespierre, Marx, and Lenin, and the whole summed

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up as transcendental Bolshevism, which must have been as repellent
to Athenian democrats of the fifth and fourth centuries b c.
As Marxian Bolshevism is to Western democrats today. In this supernal,
self contained, self sufficient, and self controlling city state, the
citizens were divided into two classes, the governors and the governed.

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The former, called guardians, were philosopher soldiers female as well
as male. The latter the proletariat, craftsmen and menial laborers,
who were disenfranchised so that they might devote all their
time to righteousness. The guardians were deprived of all property,
lived in common, fed at the public tables, possessed no money,

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and were supported by the proletariat. Their wives and children
were also held in common. The marriages were regulated. No
child knew his father or mother, and all this in
order that the state might be one family among the
common people. Nothing was left to the caprice of individuals.
Their marriages fixed between thirty and thirty five years of

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age for men, in between sixteen and twenty for girls,
were controlled by a board of women, so that the
population might be kept at a uniform level, and all
promiscuous unions were strictly forbidden. A Nocturnal Council was established
as a committee of public safety, as well as curators
of the law, a species of secret police whose task
was to hound down heretics. Spying was universal, and all

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wrongdoing reported to the authorities. Also we read he who
endeavored to second the authorities in their work of oppression
he is the great and perfect citizen. Other regulations were
that all foreign travel was forbidden to citizens under forty
years of age, and then only under license. On their return.
They shall explain to their juniors how inferior are the

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ways of other nations to the institutions of their own land.
Drinking of wine wash poets were forbidden to circulate any
verses that had not been censored by the curators. No
lending on usury was allowed, No internal currency was to
be exported, No citizen was to possess a private shrine
in his dwelling, and erroneous beliefs about God and the
unseen world were to be dealt with as crimes, and

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those who held them were prosecuted. Plato's aim was ruthless.
It was to make all men good, as he conceived goodness.
The end justified the means. The end was sovereign. The
state existed solely to convert each city into a divine
ant hill. Only when Plato considers the barbarians does he
recognize the existence of a common society of Greek states.

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I declare. He writes the Greek race to be akin
and related to themselves, but foreign an alien to the barbarians. Then,
when Greeks and Barbarians fight, we shall say that they
are natural enemies warring against one another, and this enmity
is to be called war. But when Greeks fight with Greeks,
we shall declare that naturally they are friends. They should
be beave to Barbarians, as Greeks now behave to one another.

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Aristotle is more moderate, a firm believer in Greek life
as embodied in the city state. He set out to
reform and not to revolutionize. He rejected Plato's communism as impracticable,
but nevertheless held that no citizen should be permitted to
exercise any mechanic employment or follow merchandise, as being ignoble
and destructive of virtue. Neither should they be husbandmen, that

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they may be at leisure and perform the duty they
owe to the state. Husbandmen should, by all means be slaves.
Like Plato, he considered that barbarians were natural slaves and rights.
It is proper for the Greeks to govern the barbarians
as if a barbarian and a slave were by nature one.
And what we gain in war is in a certain
degree and natural acquisition. For hunting is a part of

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it which it is necessary for us to employ against
wild beasts, and those men who, being intended by nature
for slavery, are unwilling to submit to it on which
occasion such a war is by nature just Neither Plato
nor Aristotle was cosmopolitan minded, and it was left to
Isocrates four hundred thirty six three thirty eight b c.

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An Athenian pamphleteer, to point the way toward a better
polity than that of the city state. In three eighty
b C. Probably a few years after Plato wrote his Republic, Isocrates,
who desired unity in politics though not in constitution, proclaimed
in his Panegyricus that the Greek world should seek unity
less in blood than in a common type of mind.

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He urged Athens and Sparta to lay aside their animosity
and make common cause against Persia. I am here to
advise you, he said, concerning war against barbarians and harmony
among ourselves. And it makes a nobler thing to fight
with him, the king of Persia, for his kingdom, than
to wrangle among ourselves for the leadership of Hellas we
cannot enjoy a sure peace unless we make war in

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common against the barbarians. Nor can Hellas be made of
one mind until we secure advantages from the same enemies,
i e. The Persians, and meet our parent garls in
the face of the same foes. These words fell upon
sterile soil, because he urged that the leadership against Persia
should go to Athens, and to this Sparta most emphatically
would not agree. Philip the second of Macedon. Once the

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king's peace had freed Sparta from complications in Asia, she
returned to her policy of establishing a hegemony over Greece.
In three seventy eight BC. This caused war with Thebes,
in which Thebes was supported by Athens, and desultory operations
followed until three seventy one BC, when a mutual agreement
was arrived at to discuss peace, but as the Spartans

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refused to agree that Thebes should represent the whole of Baeotia,
the Thebans decided to carry on the war single handed,
and had it not been for their commander if Paminandus,
undoubtedly they would have succumbed. He was a tactician of
genius and the first Greek general in history to grasp
the importance of concentrating superiority of force against a selected
point in the enemy's front. He realized that the Spartans

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were too conservative to change their traditional tactics, the success
of which depended on an advance in parallel order, all
spears of the phalanks striking the enemies front simultaneously, and
he devised a system of tactics which would prevent this
and throw the phalanx into confusion. It was the simplest
of ideas. Instead of drawing up his troops in line
parallel with the Spartan army, he formed them into oblique

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order to it, with his left leading and his right refused.
And on his left wing he massed a deep column
of troops which could meet shock by supershock and possess
sufficient reserve force to lap round the enemy's right wing
and drive it on to his center. In July three
seventy one BC, he used these tactics when he met
and decisively defeated the Spartan army and killed their leader,

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King Cleambrotus, at Leuctra in southern Biotia. This battle broke
the charm of Spartan prestige and ended Sparta's short lived
hegemony until three sixty two BC. Thebes had the chance
to do what both Athens and spar Barda had failed
to do, to weld the Greek city states into a
federated nation. She built a fleet and weakened Athens at sea,

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and under a Pamenandes and Pelopitus gained the leadership of Greece,
but her supremacy hung on the life of one man.
At Pamenandes, in the summer of three sixty two b C.
At Mantinia in Arcadia, he again defeated the Spartans with
the same tactics he had used at Leuctra, but the
Theban victory was the death blow to their supremacy, for

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toward the close of the Battle of Pamanans was killed,
the light that had guided the Thebans was extinguished. Their
power by land and sea collapsed. Thus three great city states, Athens,
Sparta and Thebes had each failed in turn to establish
a federated Hellenic world. In Hellas was ready to fall
before a conqueror from outside. His name was Philip of Macedon.

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Macedonia proper comprised the coastal plain along the Thermaic Gulf
Gulf of Thessalonica between the Haliacmen the Bistreisa an Axius vardar rivers.
According to Herodotus, a Dorian tribe known as the Mescedni
occupied this region, which was inhabited by Illyrian and Thracian tribes,
intermarried with them, became barbarized and ceased to be regarded

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as genuine Greeks by the Hellenes. They had a landed
aristocracy and a free peasantry, and were governed by a
primitive hereditary patriarchal monarchy, though the restrictions of the city
state were unknown to them. Their institutions were similar to
those which existed in Greece in the Heroic Age. They
were a turbulent and warlike people, and it was the

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exception for their kings to die in their beds. In
three sixty four b C. Perdicas three ascended the throne
of Macedon, and in three fifty nine b C. He
was defeated and slain by the Illyrians in one of
the frequent frontier wars. Because his son Amintus was an infant,
perdicas brother, Philip born in three eighty two b C.

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Was appointed regent. Perdica's death through Macedonia into turmoil. There
were five possible claimants to the throne, and the barbaric
Paonians and Illyrians at once ravaged the Macedonian frontiers. So
energetically did Philip deal with this desperate situation that soon
after he assumed the regency, the Macedonian army set Aminta's

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aside and acclaimed him king. When Philip was fifteen years old,
he had been sent to Thebes as a hostage, where,
according to Diodorus, he learned to appreciate Hellenic culture under
the tutorship of a Pythagorean in the household of a Paminandus.
More important, during his three years in Thebes, through his
acquaintance with a Paminandus and Pelopitus, he became grounded in

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the theban art of war. Philip was a man of
outstanding character, practical, long sighted, and unscrupulous. He was a
master diplomatist and an astute opportunist, to whom success justified everything.
He was recklessly brave, yet unlike so many brave generals,
he would at once set force aside, should he consider
that bribe or liberality or feigned friendship was more likely

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to secure his end. He possessed in marked degree the
gift of divining what was in his enemy's mind, and
when beaten in the field, would accept defeat and prepare
for victory. Throughout his life he never lost sight of
his aim to bring the whole of Greece under his dominion.
As Hogarth writes of him, fraud before force, but force
at the last was his principle of empire. After his death,

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his great opponent Demosthenes said, in the first place, he
was the despotic commander of his adherents, and in war
that is the most important of all advantages. Secondly, they
had their weapons constantly in their hands. Then he was
well provided with money. He did whatever he chose without
giving notice, by publishing decrees or deliberating in public, without

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fear of prosecution by informers and indictment for illegal measures.
He was responsible to nobody. He was the absolute autocrat,
commander and master of everybody and everything, and I his
chosen adversary. It is fair inquiry of what was I
master of nothing at all. Although we do not know

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what was in Philip's mind in the year three fifty
nine BC, when we look back on his reign, it
becomes apparent that from the start his intentions were to
master the Balkan Peninsula and simultaneously to introduce Greek culture
into Macedonia, so that his native land might be worthy
of his empire. He discerned, as history shows that, in
spite of the paucity of his means, because of their

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political limitations, no likely combination of city states could stand
against him. He also recognized that his people, who despised
the Hellenes, would never voluntarily adopt Hellenic ways, and that
he could not incorporate Greeks as he could Thracians and
Illyrians into his empire. Therefore, he adopted a formula of
association which would save the face of the city states

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and guarantee his supremacy over them. Because this would violate
the terms of the King's Peace of three eighty six
six BC and involve him in a conflict with Persia,
the association he had in mind was a combination of
all Hellenic states under the aegis of Macedonia in a
crusade against Persia. This, he considered, would arouse a feeling
of national patriotism and bind the Hellenes together in order

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to civilize Macedonia, looked upon by the Hellenes as a
barbarous country and to make her a respected head of
the association. He attracted many Greeks to his court and
compelled his courtiers and nobles to speak the Athenian language.
Two things were imperative. Athens was still the greatest naval
power in Greece, and were she to throw in her
lot with Persia, his hegemony would become impossible. She had

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to be neutralized. Also, he must win her goodwill, for
she was the center of Hellenic culture, and it was
by means of her culture that he hoped to cement
the fractions of his empire into one whole. Athens was
the kernel of his problem. The increasing use of mercenaries
during and following the Peloponnesian War undermine and the city
states by demilitarizing their citizens and by placing their security

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in the hands of men who owed no allegiance to
the cities. Another result of constant warfare was the creation
of a city plutocracy and proletariat antagonistic factions, which undermine
the unity of the city as a state. In Athens,
the effects of these changes, coupled with her democratic government,
are clearly described by Plato. In this city, there is

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no necessity to rule, even if you are capable of
ruling or to be ruled if you do not want
to be, or to be at war because the rest
of the city is, or when the rest of the
city is at peace, to observe peace, if you don't
wish to. If there is a law forbidding you to
be a magistrate or a judge, that is no reason
why you should not be both magistrate and judge, if
you have the mind to. This was his view of

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the democratic Athenian. Day after day he gratifies the pleasures
as they come, now fluting down the primrose path of wine,
now given over to teetotalism and banting. One day in
hard training, the next slacking and idling, and the third
playing the philosopher. Often he will take to politics, leap
to his feet and do or say whatever comes into

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his head. Or he conceives an admiration for a general
and his interests are in war, or for a man
of business and straightway, that is his line. Demosthenes is
equally scathing. He says, Formerly, when the people of Athens
had the courage to act and fight, they controlled the politicians. Now,
on the contrary, the politicians hold the purse strings and

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manage everything, while you, the people, robbed of nerve and sinew,
stripped of wealth and of allies, have sunk to the
level of lackeys and hangers on content. If the politicians
gratify you with a dole from the Theoric fund or
a procession at the Bodromia, and your manliness reaches its
climax when you add your thanks for what you own.
It was as much due to the political instability of Athens,

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which should have assumed the leadership of the Hellenes against Macedonia,
as to Philip's military genius that Fill was able to
implement his policy and achieve his aim. Democracy went down
before autocracy, because, like the Hydra, democracy was many headed
Amphipolis and the First Sacred War. Philip's masterly diplomacy between

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three fifty nine and three fifty seven BC proofs that
from the opening of his reign he took advantage of
the political discord within Athens, beset on all sides. He
first dealt with those claimants of his throne who were
within his reach, bought off the Peonians with a heavy bribe,
and then marched against the pretender Argaeus, who was supported
by a strong Athenian fleet and defeated him. Next to

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propitiate Athens and throw her off guard, he released without
ransom the Athenian prisoners he had captured, and at the
same time renounced his claim to Amphipolis, which his brother
Perdicas had occupied and garrisoned. He then reorganized the Macedonian
army and recruited it to a strength of six hundred
cavalry and ten thousand infantry, set out with it to
secure his northern and western frontiers, and in two swift campaigns,

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drove the Peonians and Ellyrians from Macedonia and reduced them
to temporary subjection. When Philip bought off the Athenians by
relinquishing his claim to Amphipolis, he simultaneously entered into a
secret pact with them. If they agreed that he should
seize Pidna a free city and not in their gift,
he would conquer Amphipolis for them. Foolishly, they stepped into

(26:22):
the trap. He had no intention of permanently relinquishing Amphipolis.
It guarded the gold mines of Mount Pangaeas, and their
bullion was essential for the financing of his projects. So
it came about that once he had settled with the
Peonians and Ellyrians. He marched against Amphipolis, in which before
his withdrawal of Perdicas garrison, he had taken the precaution

(26:42):
to plant a pro Macedonian faction a fifth column, which,
in spite of the brave resistance of the Amphipolitans, betrayed
the fortress to him. He then seized Pidna and Potadea,
and to persuade the Olynthians not to call Athens to
their aid, he handed Potodia over to them. Thus, by
means as dubious as they were masterful, he secured the

(27:03):
gold mines, which brought him a steady revenue of one
thousand talents yearly, gained the forests of Mount Pangaeus, which
supplied him with timber for his fleet, isolated Olynthus, which
he intended to devour at a later date, and with
the exception of Methwon, left the Athenians with no foothold
on the coast of the Thermaic Gulf. Also, in three

(27:23):
fifty seven b C. To propitiate Neoptolemus of Epyrus, and
thereby to secure the southwestern flank of Macedonia, he married
his daughter Olympius in the summer of three fifty six
b C. She presented him with a son, whom he
named Alexander. The Thebans had gained control of the amphictyone
during their brief hegemony, and to avenge themselves on the Phocians,

(27:45):
who had assisted the Spartans in the Leuctra campaign, they
passed through the council a threat that unless the Phocians,
then led by Philomelus, paid a crushing fine in penalty
for cultivating land near Delphi which was sacred to Apollo,
or would be declared on them. The Phocians refused to pay,
and in the autumn of three fifty five b C,
when the Thebans obtained a declaration of war from the Amphictiani, Philomelus,

(28:08):
supported by the good will of Athens, Sparta and Echaca,
in face of a coalition of Botia, Locris and Thessaly,
occupied Delphi, seized the treasure stored there and with it
raised a force of mercenaries. Thus opened the first Sacred
War of the fourth century, which, through Philip's astuteness, was
destined to win for him the balance of power in Greece.

(28:31):
Philomalus defeated the Thessalians, but was cut to pieces by
the Baeotians and succeeded by Animarchus. Philip was not idle,
with an eye on Thessaly. He took advantage of the
turmoil to foster the division existing among the Thessalians. Lycophron,
the Thessalian tyrant, appealed to Animarchus, who sent an army
under his brother Phelus to his help. When Philip defeated Phaelus,

(28:54):
Animarchus led his whole army to the support of Lycophron
and defeated Philip in two battles. Philip then withdrew to Macedonia,
as he said, like a ram to but the harder
next time. While Philip was out of the way, Animarchus
invaded Beotia in the spring of three hundred and fifty
two b C. But soon after was called back to
Thessaly to oppose Philip, who in the interval had persuaded

(29:17):
the Thessalians to abandon their mutual hostilities and to make
common cause with him against the temple robbers. A battle
followed in which Animarchus was defeated and killed. Philip then
occupied Faery and established his control over Thessaly. But when
in the summer of three fifty two b C. He
advanced on Thermopylae to seize the gateway into central Greece,

(29:38):
he found that the Athenians, at last aroused, had sent
out an expedition to hold it. Philip, who did not
wish to become directly involved with Athens, returned to Macedonia.
In the autumn, he set out for the Thracian coast
and fell ill. It was during this war that Philip's
great antagonist, Demosthenes three hundred eighty four to three hundred

(29:59):
twenty to b c. First appeared on the political stage.
An orator of remarkable eloquence, a tricky politician who twisted
facts to suit his ends, he was also an irascible
demagogue who, when aroused, smeared his opponents in the vilest ways.
He called his rival Escones, this monkey of melodrama, this
bunkin tragedy king, this pinchbeck orator, and to blacken him

(30:23):
in the eyes of the people, he declared that his
mother practiced daylight nuptials in an outhouse next door to Heroes.
The bone setter. On the other hand, he was a
great patriot and his faith in Athens as the champion
of freedom was unbounded. He looked upon Macedonia as a
land of barbarians. He was the advocate of civic autonomy
against Philip's autocracy. But although he lived in fourth century Athens,

(30:46):
he thought and spoke as if it were still the
Athens of Pericles. In his unending duel with Philip, his
aim was to rouse the Athenians to face the danger,
and to induce them to raise a standing army, ready
to fight wherever needed. He thundered against them because they
would neither risk their skins in warn nor open their
purses to hire mercenaries to fight for them. In three

(31:07):
fifty one BC, he lashed them with these scathing words.
So you, if you hear of Philip and the Kursenes,
vote an expedition there. If at Thermopyla you vote one there.
If somewhere else you still keep pace with him. To
and fro you take your marching orders from him. You
have never formed any plan of campaign for yourselves, never

(31:27):
foreseen any event until you learn that something has happened
or is happening. So scandalous is our present system that
every general is tried two or three times for his
life in your courts, but not one of them dares
to risk death in battle against the enemy. Our business
is not to speculate on what the future may bring forth,
but to be certain that it will bring disaster unless
you face the facts and consent to do your duty. Meanwhile,

(31:52):
the sacred war meandered on. In three fifty b C.
The Thebans, now in financial straits, appeal to our Dexerxes
three three hundred fifty eight to three hundred thirty eight
b C for funds. He gladly responded and sent them
three hundred talents. Then, in the following year, the Olynthians,
although they had agreed not to ally themselves with the

(32:13):
Athenians apart from Philip, appealed to Athens, and Demosthenes urged
the Athenians to face up to Philip. The appeal was renewed,
an alliance with the Olynthians was agreed, and an inadequate
force sent to their aid. Next, apparently through the intrigues
of Philip, the Athenians got involved in Ubea. While they
were entangled their Philip moved on Olynthus, and in the

(32:35):
summer of three forty eight b C. The city was
betrayed to him by traders. He had planted within its
walls after this, so that he might tighten his grip
on Thrace before he plunged into central Greece. He professed
his desire for peace and expressed such friendly feelings toward
Athens that the Athenian Assembly welcomed his approach opened negotiations
with him, and in three forty six b C. On

(32:57):
the motion of Philicrates, an embassy was sent to Pella,
where it was graciously received by Philip. By the terms
of the Peace of Philocrates. It was agreed that Philip
should keep Amphipolis and that he should not interfere in
the Keursenes, but Cardia was to be excluded as a
Macedonian ally, and though the ambassadors were anxious to save
the Phocians, Philip set their plea aside as he had

(33:18):
made up his mind how to deal with them. The
embassy then returned to Athens and the terms were submitted
to the Assembly. As there was no alternative between their
acceptance and continuation of the war, peace was sworn by
the Athenians and their allies. The ambassadors were then sent
back to Pella to receive the odes of Philip and
his allies, and when they had been taken, they set

(33:40):
out on their return. But before they reached Athen's news
was received that Philip was at Thermopylie. The Assembly, little
perturbed by this, thanked Philip for the part he had played,
and called upon the Phocians to surrender the Temple of
Apollo to the Amphyctians and to lay down their arms.
No sooner was this request dispatched than the star artling
news came in that Philicus, in command of the Phocian

(34:03):
forces at Thermopyla, had surrendered the pass to Philip. This
threw Athens into panic, and for a third time, the
ambassadors hurried to Pella to propitiate Philip by every means possible.
It seems that either Philicus had exhausted his funds and
could no longer hold his mercenaries to their post, or,
more probable, Philip had bought him over. The fate of

(34:24):
the Phocians was determined by the Amphictionic Council. Their cities
were dismantled, they were ordered to pay back in yearly
installments the temple treasure they had seized, and their votes
in the Amphictyonic Council were transferred to Philip, who was
honored by being appointed to preside over the forthcoming Pithian
Games Isocrates pan Hellenic program. It was because the city

(34:45):
states were torn by factions and their foreign policies decided
by emotional assemblies, that Philip, supreme war lord and sole
conductor of foreign policy, raised Macedonia from an obscure barbaric
kingdom to be the leading power in Greece. In no
enormous was his achievement that, in the year of his triumph, Isocrates,
now ninety years of age, returned to the thesis of

(35:06):
his Panegyricus of three eighty b c. And in his
Philippus commended to Philip a pan Hellenic program. We are
fighting one another about trifles, he wrote to Philip, and
added that there was no other way for Hellas to
live in peace except by the determination of the leading
states to make up their mutual quarrels and carry the
war into Asia. Therefore, he continued, my intention is to

(35:29):
advise you to take the lead both in securing the
harmony of Hellas and in conducting the expedition against the Barbarians. II.
The Persians used persuasion towards the one and forced towards
the other. But those who would counsel or right ought
not to carry the war into the King's country until
someone has reconciled the Hellenes and made them desist from
their present folly. He urged Philip to pay no attention

(35:51):
to those who rave on the platforms i e. The orators,
and who regard peace, which is for the public advantage,
as a war against their own private interests, but instead
to act in a manner whereby you will both gain
the confidence of the Hellenes and inspire the barbarians with fear.
He suggested that if a reconciliation of Argos, Sparta, Thebes,

(36:11):
and Athens were brought about, the smaller states would be
compelled to follow suit. He scoffed at Persia's apparent strength
and wrote of the expedition of Cyrus and Clearchus, it
is agreed that they gained a complete victory over the
whole of the King's forces, as if they had fought
against the Persian women. And he reminded Philip that he
would be able to find all the soldiers he needed,

(36:32):
for such is the condition of Hellas that it is
easier to get together a larger and better force from
wanderers than from settled inhabitants. He appealed to Philip's racial
vanity by introducing Heracles. He accentuated his intellectual excellence and
pointed out that he was distinguished above all his predecessors
by his wisdom, honorable ambitions, and justice, rather than by

(36:53):
his strength endeavor. He wrote to become like him, and
he added there was no necessity for him to say
seek foreign examples, since he had won ready at hand
in his own family. Therefore, he urged him to make
himself like his ancestor in intellectual character, love of mankind,
and good will, such as he showed towards the Hellenes.

(37:14):
He suggested that in order to conquer Persia, Philip should
first free the subjugated Ionic cities, promise them freedom, and
scatter the word broadcast in Asia, which, falling on the
soil of Hellas, has broken up our empire as well
as that of the Lacedaemonians. This done, he urged Philip
to destroy the whole kingdom, or, if not, to take

(37:34):
away from it as much territory as possible, to build
cities throughout the conquered territories and send thither as colonists,
those who are now wanderers from want of their daily bread,
and who harass all whom they meet. For if we
do not put a stop to their massing together by
providing them with sufficient to live upon, they will imperceptibly
become so numerous that they will be as great a

(37:55):
cause for alarm to the Hellenes as the barbarians. Form
communities out of them, and make these the boundaries of Hellas,
and set them in front of us like a bulwark.
He urged Philip to look upon the whole of Hellas
as his fatherland, in the same manner as had Heracles,
the father of his race. Finally, he counseled him to
rule with moderation, because harshness is equally grievous to those

(38:18):
who show it and to those who experience it. And
to bear in mind that although our bodies are mortal,
fame partakes of immortality, and those men of the greatest
renown are looked upon as demigods. Byzantium and the Second
Sacred War, no sooner were the Athenians free from more
than violent dissensions swept Athens. Philocrates was indicted for treason

(38:40):
and Demosthenes hurled charges of corruption against deskonies. Later, when
speaking on this period, Demosthenes accused Philip of playing off
one faction against the other. But what he failed to
understand was that it was he and his like who
were so largely responsible for the discord. By now, political
unrest had made every city in secure, and, as Park

(39:00):
points out, the presence of mercenaries and their readiness to
sell themselves for pay, facilitated every form of revolution. Philip
was thus aided in establishing pro Macedonian parties in the
cities hostile to him, an internal danger clearly mirrored by
Aeneas Tacticus, a contemporary writer. In his military Manual, more
than half of it is directed toward the prevention of

(39:21):
treachery and the forestalling of revolutions within a city. From
a present day point of view, it might aptly be
described as an anti Cold War text book. While the
Athenian orators hurled insulting epithets at each other, Philip spent
the three years following the peace and enforcing his will
on the tribes on his frontiers so that he might
be free. When the moment was opportune to concentrate everything

(39:41):
on his grand design. His greatest success was, however, in Thessaly.
There in three forty four b C, with the good
will of the Thessalians, he was appointed their tagis, or
ruler for life. This gave him the finest cavalry in Greece.
Once Thesily was his, he turned his attention to the
Thracian hinderland, and in this the Athenians rightly saw a

(40:04):
threat to their Hellespontine corn route. Further to secure it,
in three forty three BC, Athenian settlers were sent to
the Chersones, but soon after their arrival they quarreled with
the people of Cardia, a pro Macedonian city which was
expressly excluded from the Athenians by the Peace of Philocrates
in three forty one BC. Demosthenes, who was largely responsible

(40:26):
for the quarrel, in his third Philippic, launched a violent
verbal crusade against Philip, and what was more effective, he
visited Byzantium and won over its citizens. Philip was roused
by this demonstration of hostility and called upon Parandas and
byzantium nominal allies to help him, and when they refused,
he laid siege to Parandus. As this was a threat

(40:48):
to the Bosporus and consequently to Asia Minor, Artaxerxes ordered Arsides,
Satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, to support the Parentthans, and a
large force of mercenaries commanded by the atha Enian Apollodorus
was sent to their aid. Thus, Persia declared openly against Philip.
When he found Parnthus too hard a nut to crack,
Philip suddenly withdrew his troops and laid siege to Byzantium.

(41:11):
But because two Athenian squadrons were sent to its support,
he was unable to invest it on its seaward side,
and after a long siege, was compelled to abandon his
attempt to take it. To make good this loss of face,
he carried out a punitive expedition against the Scythian tribes
in the de Brugia, and early in three thirty nine
BC set out on his return to Macedonia. Philip had

(41:32):
not longed to wait for an opportunity to make good
as double failure in the Propontis, for on his way
home another sacred war broke out. This time the Locrians
of Amphissa were accused of cultivating lands sacred to Apollo.
At first, the Amphictionic council appealed to Thebes and Athens,
but when it failed to gain their supported, turn to
Philip and invited him to punish the Locrians. This was

(41:54):
such a god sent opportunity that more than one historian
has suspected the invitation was prompted by fire Philip himself.
He immediately answered the call, but instead of marching on Amphisa,
he occupied the ruined fortress of Aladia, which commanded the
main road into western Boeotia, and from their scent An embassy,
to propose to the Thebans a joint invasion of Attica.

(42:15):
When the news of Philip's occupation of Aladia reached Athens,
or citizens were so terrified that, on the advice of Demosthenes,
they sent a delegation to Thebes to offer a military
alliance against Philip. It was successful in its mission, and
a body of Athenian mercenaries under chairs was hurried forward
to reinforce the Thebans, who held the passes from Boeotia

(42:35):
into Phosis. Philip made no serious effort until the summer
of three thirty eight BC, when he carried out a
lightning campaign against Amphysa, defeated chairs and then seized Naupactus
Lepinteau on the Gulf of Corinth. As this advance threatened
the southern flank of the Allied army, it was withdrawn
from the passes and massed at Chyrenea. Philip then returned

(42:58):
to Aladia, advanced through the pass of Peripatamia, seven miles
south of Alladia, and probably on August second or September first,
he came up with his enemy. He had with him
thirty thousand foot in two thousand horse. What the Allied
strength was is unknown. In the Allied order of battle,
the Thebans were on the right, the lesser Allies in

(43:19):
the center, and the Athenians on the left. On the
Macedonian side, Philip took command of the right wing of
his army and allotted the left wing to his son Alexander,
now eighteen years of age. Little has been recorded of
the battle, but it would appear that Philip's tactics in
Idea at least resembled those of Luptra. We are told

(43:40):
that at first Philip deliberately gave way in order to
draw the Athenians forward of the Allied center, a maneuver
which so elated their general that he set out to
pursue Philip's wing. At the same time, Alexander violently attacked
the Theban wing, and after a fierce struggle, he burst
through it. Then Philip advanced, broke through the Athenians, wheeled

(44:00):
to his left, while Alexander wheeled to his right, and
between them they crushed the Allied center out of existence.
Panic seized the Allied army, among whose fugitives was Demosthenes.
The Battle of Chynaea was decisive on its fateful fields,
still marked by the mound beneath which lie the Macedonian dead,
was sounded, the death knell of the independent Polus. Athens

(44:23):
was rocked by panic when the news of the Allied
disaster was brought by fugitives, but the terror of her
citizens was unfounded, because Philip's projected war against Persia demanded
their good will and above all the support of their fleet.
Philip was lenient, not to say generous. His terms were
that he would guarantee not to invade Attica and would
leave to Athens her Aegean islands, but he required from

(44:46):
her the surrender of the Cursones, for which she would
receive Oropus, a Baeotian city. In compensation, the Athenian League
was to be dissolved and Athens was to become a
Macedonian ally. Further, to propitiate Athenes Athans, Philip released free
of ransom the Athenian prisoners he had captured, and sent
a delegation headed by Alexander and Parmenian to Athens, bearing

(45:08):
with them the ashes of the Athenian soldiers who had
fallen at Chynaea. This leniency so surprised the Athenians that,
in gratitude, they granted Attic citizenship to Philip and his
son and erected a statue of Philip in their agora.
But to Thebes, Philip showed little mercy. Her anti Macedonian
leaders were either executed or banished, her captured soldiers sold

(45:29):
into slavery. Her hegemony over Beeotia was annulled, and a
cadmea citadel of Thebes was occupied by a Macedonian garrison,
the Congress of Corinth for twenty years. Philip's primary aim
had been to extend his power over Greece, but unlike
so many conquerors, he was wise enough to understand that
unless he could win over the good will of the

(45:50):
conquered peoples, his empire would be no more than ephemeral.
In order to achieve this secondary aim, he struck a
compromise between his own policy of power and Isocrates Panelea program,
and to clothe his power in legal form, he called
on all the Greek states to send envoys to Corinth
to consult with him on his new order. All except
Sparta agreed to do so. At the close of three

(46:12):
thirty eight BC, the Congress of Corinth, the crowning achievement
of Philip's statecraft assembled. Its importance was indeed great, because
its decisions were to form the foundation of Alexander's relations
towards Greece. When the conference opened, Philip laid his proposals
before it, not in the form of a dictate, but
as a basis for general discussion. He adopted this tactful

(46:36):
course because he was anxious to win the sympathy of
the Greeks. The chief points agreed were an offensive and
defensive alliance in perpetuity was to be concluded between the
Greek states and Macedonia. The former were to be constituted
into an Hellenic League, represented by a synhedriord or Federal Council,
to which individual states were to be instructed to send

(46:58):
deputies in number according to their milligeary's strength. The sessions
of the Federal Council were to be held either at
Corinth or at the localities of the great pan Hellenic festivals.
The permanent business of the Council was to be entrusted
to a directorate of five members. Because Macedonia was not
a member of the League, Philip was to be excluded
from them. His position was to be that of Generalissimo

(47:20):
of the League forces, and as such he was to
be elected Hegemon for life. Each member of the League
was to be protected by the combined forces of the League.
Existing constitutions were to remain undisturbed, and no tribute was
to be exacted. The Federal Council was to act as
the supreme tribunal, empowered to take what action it thought
fit against a transgressor of the treaty, and should war

(47:43):
be declared, that Hegemen was to decide the contingents each
member should furnish and conduct the war on the part
of the League. Provisions for a universal peace were included
in the treaty. They were one piece between the League
and Philip was established by each member state binding itself
by oath not to attempt to overthrow the monarchy of

(48:03):
Philip or that of his descendants. Two internal peace between
states was secured by all members swearing to keep perpetual
peace between themselves. Piracy was forbidden them, and the freedom
and security of the sea were placed under the protection
of the League. Three internal peace within each state was
guaranteed by each member swearing that he would not subvert

(48:25):
the constitution of his state, and severe penalties were ordained
against any citizen who attempted to do so, or to
conspire with, or to take service with a foreign power
against the League or Philip. Thus, through philips statesmanship seldom
paralleled in history, all the Hellings in Greece except the
Spartans were united into a single Greek Federation. After the

(48:47):
unanimous adoption of the treaty, the envoys returned to their cities.
Elections were held in early in the summer of three
thirty seven b C. The Federal Council met at Corinth
for its first session. Philip then placed before it his
fire project war against Persia. Though in his own mind,
it may have been a war of aggrandizement. He knew
that such an aim would not appeal to the members

(49:08):
of the League, so he proclaimed it to be a
war of revenge to wipe out the crimes perpetrated by
Xerxes on the temples and sanctuaries of the Greek gods,
a religious war or crusade which he felt would unite
the Greeks in common cause. Nor was he mistaken. The
representatives voted for war and appointed Philip Supreme Commander with
unlimited powers. Philip then returned to Macedonia, and in the

(49:31):
spring of three thirty six b C. Sent across the
hellespont an advanced guard of ten thousand men under Parmenian
and Atlas, to establish a bridgehead in Asia and promote
the secession of the Asiatic Greeks from Persia. This was
his declaration of war. Fate decided that he should never
wage it. Seized by a passion for Cleopatra, the niece

(49:52):
of Adelas, he set Olympius aside and made Cleopatra his
lawful wife. As this endangered Alexander's claim into succession, a
violent family quarrel resulted Olympius retired to her brother Alexander
of Epirus, and possibly to rouse the Ollyrians against Philip,
Alexander went to Ellyria, as it would have been inexpedient

(50:13):
for Philip to leave on his flank at disaffected Epirus
and Ellyria. A family reconciliation was arranged through the mediation
of Demoratus of Corinth. Alexander then returned to Pella, and
Philip's daughter by Olympius, also named Cleopatra, was offered in
marriage to her uncle Alexander of Epirus. Then in Midsummer
three thirty six BC, when Philip attended her marriage, he

(50:37):
was stabbed to death by Pausanius, a young Macedonian noble
who had a personal grievance against Adolas, which Philip had
refused to inquire into. Others were involved in the plot,
and because of what had happened, suspicion fell on Olympius,
but whether she was privy to the assassination is unknown,
and it is generally held that Alexander was in no

(50:58):
way implicated, as his enemies declared him to be