MACHIAVELLI’S PRINCE: The Ultimate Playbook for Power - Niccolo Machiavelli - HQ Full Book - SECRETS OF POWER: Masters of Politics, Strategy & War

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Speaker 1 (00:00):
Nikol Machiavelli The Prince Introduction niccol Machiavelli to Lorenzo the Magnificent,
son of Piero de Medici. It is customary for those
who wish to gain the favor of a prince to
endeavor to do so by offering him gifts of those
things which they hold most precious or in which they
know him to take a special delight. In this way,

(00:22):
princes are often presented with horses, arms, cloth of gold, gems,
and such like ornaments worthy of their grandeur. In my desire, however,
to offer to Your Highness some humble testimony of my devotion,
I have been unable to find among my possessions anything
which I hold so dear or esteem so highly as
that knowledge of the deeds of great men, which I

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have acquired through a long experience of modern events and
a constant study of the past. The results of my
long observations and reflections are recorded in the little volume
which I now offer to your Highness. And although I
deem this work unworthy of your Highness's notice, yet my
confidence and your humanity assures me that you will accept it,
knowing that it is not in my power to offer

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you a greater gift than that of enabling you to
understand in the shortest possible time all those things which
I have learned through danger and suffering in the course
of many years. I have not sought to adorn my
work with long phrases, or high sounding words, or any
of those allurements and ornaments with which many writers seek
to embellish their books, as I desire no honor for
my work, but such as its truth and the gravity

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of its subject may justly deserve. Nor will it, I trust,
be deemed presumptuous on the part of a man of
humble and obscure condition to attempt to discuss and criticize
the government of princes. For in the same way that
landscape painters station themselves in the valleys in order to
draw mountains or elevated ground, and ascend an eminence in
order to get a good view of the plains, so

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it is necessary to be a prince to be able
to know thoroughly the nature of a people, And to
know the nature of princes, one must be one of them. Populace.
May I trust, therefore, that your Highness will accept this
little gift in the spirit in which it is offered,
and if your Highness will deign to peruse it, you
will recognize in it my ardent desire that you may

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attain to that grandeur which fortune in your own merits
pressage for you. And should your Highness gaze down from
the summit of that eminence towards this humble spot, you
will recognize the great and unmerited sufferings inflicted on me
by a cruel fate the Prince. Chapter one, The various
kinds of government and the ways by which they are established.

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All states and dominions which hold or have held sway
over mankind are either republics or monarchies. Monarchies are either
hereditary ones in which the rulers have been for many
years of the same family, or else they are those
of recent foundation. The newly founded ones are either entirely new,
as was Milan to Francesco's Fortsa, or else they are,

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as it were, new members grafted on to the hereditary
possessions of the prince that annexes them, as is the
Kingdom of Naples to the King of Spain. The dominions
thus acquired have either been previously accustomed to the rule
of another prince or else have been free states, and
they are annexed either by force of arms of the
prince or of others, or else fall to him by

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good fortune or merit. Chapter two of Hereditary Monarchies. I
will not here speak of republics, having already treated of
them fully in another place. I will deal only with monarchies,
and will show how the various kinds described above can
be governed and maintained. In the first place, in hereditary

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states accustomed to the reigning family, the difficulty of maintaining
them is far less than in new monarchies, for it
is sufficient not to exceed the ancestral usages and to
accommodate one's self to accidental circumstances. In this way, such
a prince, if of ordinary ability, will always be able
to maintain his position unless some very exceptional and excessive

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force deprives him of it. And even if he be
thus deprived of it on d slightest misfortune happening to
the new occupier, he will be able to regain it.
We have in Italy the example of the Duke of Ferrara,
who is able to withstand the assaults of the Venetians
in the year eighty four and of Pope Julius in
the year ten, for no other reason than because of

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the antiquity of his family in that dominion. Inasmuch as
the legitimate prince has less cause and less necessity to
give offense, it is only natural that he should be
more loved, and if no extraordinary vices make him hate it,
it is only reasonable for his subjects to be naturally
attached to him, the memories and causes of innovations being
forgotten in the long period over which his rule has existed.

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Whereas one change always leaves the way prepared for the
introduction of another Chapter three of mixed monarchies. But it
is in the new monarchy that difficulties really exist. Firstly,
if it is not entirely new, but a member, as
it were, of a mixed state. Its disorders spring at
first from a natural vitural difficulty, which exists in all

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new dominions, because men change masters willingly, hoping to better themselves,
and this belief makes them take arms against their rulers
in which they are deceived, as experience shows them that
they have gone from bad to worse. This is the
result of another very natural cause, which is the necessary
harm inflicted on those over whom the prince obtains dominion,

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both by his soldiers and by an infinite number of
other injuries unavoidably caused by his occupation. Thus you find
enemies in all those whom you have injured by occupying
that dominion, And you cannot maintain the friendship of those
who have helped you to obtain this possession, as you
will not be able to fulfill their expectations, nor can
you use strong measures with them, being under an obligation

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to them. For which reason, however strong your armies may be,
you will always need the favor of the inhabitants to
take possession of a province. It was from these causes
that Luis the twelfth of France, though able to occupy
Milan without trouble, immediately lost it, and the forces of
Ludovico alone were sufficient to take it from him the

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first time, for the inhabitants, who had willingly opened their
gates to him, finding themselves deluded in the hopes they
had cherished, and not obtaining those benefits that they had anticipated,
could not bear the vexatious rule of their new prince.
It is indeed true that after reconquering the rebel territories,
they are not so easily lost again, for the ruler
is now, by the fact of the rebellion less averse

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to secure his position by punishing offenders, investigating any suspicious circumstances,
and strengthening himself in weak places. So that although the
mere appearance of such a person as Duke Ludovico on
the frontier was sufficient to cause France to lose Milan
the first time, to make her lose her grip of
it the second time was only possible when all the
world was against her, and after her enemies had been

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defeated and driven out of Italy, which was the result
of the causes above mentioned. Nevertheless, it was taken from
her both the first and the second time. The general
causes of the first loss have been already discussed. It
remains now to be seen what were the causes of
the second loss, and by what means France could have
avoided it, or what measures might have been taken by

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another ruler in that position which were not taken by
the King of France. Be it observed therefore, that those
states which on annexation are united to a previously existing
state may or may not be of the same nationality
and language. If they are, it is very easy to
hold them, especially if they are not accustomed to freedom,

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and to possess them securely. It suffices that the family
of the princes which formerly govern them be extinct. For
the rest their old condition not being disturbed, and there
being no dissimilarity of customs, the people settled down quietly
under their new rulers, as is seen in the case
of Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony and Normandy, which have been so

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long united to France. And although there may be some
slight differences of language, the customs of the people are
nevertheless similar, and they can get along wealthy together. And
whoever obtains possession of them and wishes to retain them,
must bear in mind two things, the one that the
blood of their old rulers is extinct, the other to
make no alteration either in their laws or in their taxes.

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In this way, they will in a very short space
of time become united with their old possessions and form
one state. But when dominions are acquired in a province
differing in language, laws and customs, the difficulties to be
overcome are great, and it requires good fortune as well
as great industry to retain them. One of the best
and most certain means of doing so would be for

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the new ruler to take up his residence in them.
This would render their possession more secure and durable. It
is what the Turk has done in Greece, in spite
of all the other measures taken by him to hold
that state. It would not have been possible to retain
it had he not gone to live there. Being on
the spot, disorders can be seen as they arise, and
can quickly be remedied, but living at a distance, they

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are only heard of when they get beyond remedy. Besides which,
the province is not despoiled by your officials. The subjects
are pleased with the easy accessibility of their prince, and
wishing to be loyal, they have more reason to love him,
and should they be otherwise, they will have greater cause
to fear him. Any external power who wishes to assail

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that state will be less disposed to do so, so
that as long as he resides there, he will be
very hard to dispossess. The other in better remedy is
to plant colonies in one or two of those places.
Which form, as it were, the keys of the land.
For it is necessary either to do this or to
maintain a large force of armed men. The colonies will
cost the prince little. With little or no expense on

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his part, he can send and maintain them. He only
injures those whose lands and houses are taken to give
to the new inhabitants, and these form but a small
proportion of the state. And those who are injured, remaining
poor and scattered, can never do any harm to him.
And all the others are, on the one hand, not
injured and therefore easily pacified, and on the other are

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fearful of offending, lest they should be treated like those
who have been dispossessed of their property. To conclude these
colonies cost nothing, are more faithful and give less offense.
And the injured parties, being poor and scattered, are unable
to do mischief. As I have shown, For it must
be noted that men must either be caressed or else annihilated.

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They will revenge themselves for small injuries, but cannot do
so for great ones. The injury, therefore, that we do
to a man must be such that we need not
fear his vengeance, but by maintaining a garrison instead of colonists,
one will spend much more and consume in guarding it
all the revenues of that state, so that the acquisition
will result in a loss, besides giving much greater offense,

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since it injures every one in that state, with the
quartering of the army on it, which, being an inconvenience
felt asterisk gastrisk. By all every one becomes an enemy.
And these are enemies which can do mischief, as though beaten,
they remain in their own homes. In every way, therefore,
a garrison is as useless as colonies are useful. Further,

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the ruler of a foreign province, as described, should make
himself the leader and defender of his less powerful neighbors,
and endeavor to weaken the stronger ones, and take care
that his possessions are not entered by some foreigner not
less powerful than himself, who will always intervene at the
request of those who are discontented, either through ambition or fear,
as was seen when the Tolly invited the Romans into Greece,

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and in whatever province they entered, it was always at
their request of the inhabitants. And the rule is that
when a powerful foreigner enters a province, all the less
powerful inhabitants become his adherents, moved by the envy they
bear to those ruling over them, so much so that
with regard to these minor potentates, he has no trouble
whatever in winning them over, for they willingly join forces

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with the state that he has acquired. He has merely
to be careful that they do not assume too much
power and a thortority, and he can easily, with his
own forces and their favor, put down those that are
powerful and remain in everything the arbiter of that province,
And he who does not govern well in this way
will soon lose what he has acquired, and while he
holds it will meet with infinite difficulty and trouble. The Romans,

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in the provinces they took always followed this policy. They
established colonies, flattered the less powerful without increasing their strength,
put down the most powerful, and did not allow foreign
rulers to obtain influence in them. I will let the
single province of Greece suffice as an example. They made
friends with the Achii and the Etolei. The Kingdom of

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Macedonia was cast down and Antiochus driven out. Nor did
they allow the merits of the Achii or the Etolei
to gain them any increase of territory. Nor did the
persuasions of Philip induce them to befriend him without lowering him.
Nor could the power of Antiochus make them consent to
allow him to hold any state in that province. For
the Romans did in this case what all ww wise

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princes should do, who look not only at present dangers,
but also at future ones, and diligently guard against them.
For being foreseen, they can easily be remedied, but if
one waits till they are at hand, the medicine is
no longer in time, as the malady has become incurable.
It happening with this as with those hectic fevers spoken
of by doctors, which at their beginning are easy to

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cure but difficult to recognize, but in course of time,
when they have not at first been recognized and treated,
become easy to recognize and difficult to cure. Thus it
happens in matters of state, for knowing afar off which
it is only given to a prudent man to do.
The evils that are brewing, they are easily cured. But

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when for want of such knowledge they are allowed to
grow so that every one can recognize them, there is
no longer any remedy to be found. However, the Romans,
observing these disorders, while yet remote, were always able to
find a remedy, and never allowed them to proceed in
order to avoid a war, for they knew that war
was not to be avoided, and could be deferred only

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to the advantage of the other side. They therefore declared
war against Philip and Antiochus in Greece, so as not
to have to fight them in Italy. Though they might
at the time have avoided either, this they did not
choose to do, never caring to do that which is
now every day to be heard in the mouths of
our wise men, to enjoy the benefits of time, but
preferring those of their own virtue and prudence, for time

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brings with it all things, and may produce indifferently either
good or evil. But let us return to France and
examine whether she did any of these things. And I
will speak not of Charles, but of Lewis, as the
one whose proceedings can be better seen, as he held
possession in Italy for a longer time. You will then
see that he did the opposite of all those things

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which must be done to keep possession of a foreign state.
King Lewis was called into Italy by the ambition of
the Venetians, who wished, by his coming to gain half
of Lombardy. I will not blame the king for coming,
nor for the part he took because wishing to plant
his foot in Italy and not having friends in the country.
On the contrary, the conduct of King Charles having caused

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all doors to be closed to him, he was forced
to accept what friendships he could find, and his schemes
would have quickly been successful if he had made no
mistakes in his other proceedings. The king, then, having acquired Lombardy,
regained immediately the reputation lost by Charles Genoa yielded. The
Florentines became his friends. The Marquis of Manchua, the Dukes

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of Ferrara and Bentivogli, the Lady of Furli, the lords
of Fianza, Pesaro, Rhymeni, Camerino and Piambino, the inhabitants of Lucca,
of Pisa and of Siena, all approached him with offers
of friendship. The Venetians might then have seen the effects
of their temerity. How to gain a few lands in Lombardy,
they had made the king ruler over two thirds of Italy.

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Consider how little difficulty the king would have had in
maintaining his reputation in Italy if he had observed the
rules above given, and he kept a firm and sure
hold over all those friends of his, who, being many
in number and weak and fearful one of the Church
another of the Venetians, were always obliged to hold fast
to him, and by whose aid he could easily make
sure of any who were still great. But he was

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hardly in Milan before he did exactly the opposite, by
giving aid to Pope Alexander to occupy the Romagna. Nor
did he perceive that in taking this course he weakened
himself by casting off his friends and those who had
placed themselves at his disposal, and strengthened the Church by
adding to the spiritual power which gives it such authority

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further temporal powers. And having made the first mistake, he
was obliged to follow it up, whilst to put a
stop to the ambition of Alexander and prevent him becoming
ruler of Tuscany, he was forced to come to Italy, and,
not content with having increased the power of the Church
and lost his friends, he now desiring the kingdom of Naples,

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divided it with the King of Spain, And where he
alone was the arbiter of Italy, he now brought in
a companion, so that the ambitious of that province, who
were dissatisfied with him might have some one else to
appeal to. And where he might have left in that
kingdom a king tributary to him, he dispossessed him in
order to bring in another who was capable of driving
him out. The desire to acquire possessions is a very

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natural and ordinary thing, and when those men do it
who can do so successfully, they are always praised and
not blamed. But when they cannot, and yet want to
do so at all costs, they make a mistake deserving
of great blame. If France, therefore, with her own forces,
could have taken Naples, she ought to have done so.
If she could not, she ought not to have divided it.

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And if the partition of Lombardy with the Venetians is
to be excused as having been the means of allowing
the French king to set foot in Italy. This other
partition deserves blame. Not having the excuse of necessity. Lewis
had thus made these five mistakes. He had crushed the
smaller powers, increased the power in Italy of one ruler,
brought into the land a very powerful foreigner, and he

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had not come to live there himself, nor had he
established any colonies. Still, these mistakes might, if he had lived,
not have injured him, had he not made the sixth,
that of taking the state from the Venetians. For if
he had not strengthened the church and brought the Spaniards
into Italy, it would have been right and necessary to
humble them. Having once taken those measures, he ought never

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to have consented to their ruin, because had the Venetians
been strong, it would have kept the others from making
attempts on Lombardy, partly because the Venetians would not have
consented to any measures by which they did not get
it for themselves, and partly because the others would not
have wanted to take it from France to give it
to Venice, and would not have had the courage to attack.

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Both if any one urges that King Lewis yielded the
Romagna to Alexander and the kingdom to Spain in order
to avoid war. I reply with the reasons already given
that one ought never to allow a disorder to take
place in order to avoid war. For war is not
thereby avoided, but only deferred to your disadvantage. And if
others alleged the promise given by the king to the

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Pope to undertake that enterprise for him in return for
the dissolution of his marriage and for the cardinalship of Rohan,
I reply with what I shall say later on about
the faith of princes and how it is to be observed.
Thus King Louis lost Lombardy through not observing any of
those conditions which have been observed by others who have
taken provinces and wished to retain them. Nor is this

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any miracle, but very reasonable and natural. I spoke of
this matter with Cardinal Rohan at Nonce, when Valentine, as
cheseray Borgia, son of Pope Alexander was commonly called, was
occupying the Romagna. For on Cardinal Rohan saying to me
that the Italians did not understand war. I replied that
the French did not understand politics, for if they did,

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they would never allow the Church to become so great.
An experience shows us that the greatness in Italy of
the Church and also of Spain have been called caused
by France, and her ruin has proceeded from them, from
which may be drawn a general rule which never or
very rarely fails, that whoever is the cause of another
becoming powerful, is ruined himself, for that power is produced

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by him, either through craft or force, and both of
these are suspected by the one that has become powerful.
Chapter four. Why the Kingdom of Darius occupied by Alexander
did not rebel against the successors of the latter after
his death? Considering the difficulties there are in holding a
newly acquired state, some may wonder how it came to

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pass that Alexander the Great became master of Asia in
a few years, and had hardly occupied it when he died,
from which it might be supposed that the whole state
would have rebelled. However, his successors maintained themselves in possession,
and had no further difficulty in doing so than those
which arose among themselves from their own ambitions. I reply

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that the kingdoms known to history have been governed in
two ways, either by a prince nce and his servants, who,
as ministers, by his grace and permission, assist in governing
the realm, or by a prince and by barons, who
hold their positions not by favor of the ruler, but
by antiquity of blood. Such barons have states and subjects
of their own, who recognize them as their lords, and

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are naturally attached to them. In those states which are
governed by a prince and his servants, the prince possesses
more authority because there is no one in the state
regarded as a superior besides himself, and if others are
abated as merely as ministers and officials of the prince,
and no one regards them with any special affection. Examples
of these two kinds of government in our own time

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are the Turk and the King of France. All the
Turkish monarchy is governed by one ruler. The others are
his servants, and dividing his kingdom into santiacates, he sends
to them various administrators and changes or recalls them at
his pleasure. But the King of France is surrounded by
a large number of ancient nobles, w reckonized as such

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by their subjects and loved by them. They have their
prerogatives which the king cannot deprive them of without danger
to himself. Whoever now considers these two states will see
that it would be difficult to acquire the state of
the Turk, but having conquered it, it would be very
easy to hold it. The causes of the difficulty of
occupying the Turkish Kingdom are that the invader could not

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be invited by princes of that kingdom, nor hope to
facilitate his enterprise by the rebellion of those around him,
as will be evident from reasons given above, Because being
all slaves and bound, it will be more difficult to
corrupt them, and even if they were corrupted, little effect
could be hoped for, as they would not be able
to carry the people with them. For the reasons mentioned therefore,

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whoever assaults the Turk must be prepared to meet his
united forces, and must rely more on his own strength
than on the disorders of others. But having once conquered
him and beaten him in battle, so that he can
no longer raise armies nothing else is to be feared
except the family of the prince, and if this is extinguished,
there is no longer any one to be feared, the

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others having no credit with the people, and as the
victor before the victory could place no hope in them,
so he need not fear them afterwards. The contrary is
the case in kingdoms governed like that of France, because
it is easy to enter them by winning over some
baron of the kingdom, there being always some malcontents and
those desiring innovations, These can, for the reason stated open

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the way to you and facilitate victory. But afterwards, if
you wish to keep possession, infinite difficulties arise, both from
those who have aided you and from those you have oppressed.
Nor is it sufficient to extinguish the family of the prince,
for there remain those nobles who will make themselves the
head of new changes, and being neither able to content
them nor exterminate them, you will lose the state whenever

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an occasion arises. Now, if you will consider what was
the nature of the government of Darius, you will find
it similar to the kingdom of the Turk. And therefore
Alexander had first to completely overthrow it and seize the country,
after which Victory Darius being dead, the state remained secure
to Alexander for the reasons discussed above, and his successors,

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had they remained united, might have enjoyed it in peace.
Nor did any tumults arise in the kingdom, except those
fomented by themselves. But it is impossible to possess with
such ease. Countries constituted like France. Hence arose the frequent
rebellions of Spain, France, and Greece against the Romans, owing
to the numerous principalities which existed in those states. For

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as long as the memory of these lasted, the Romans
were always uncertain of their possessions. But when the memory
of these principalities had been extinguished, they became, with the
power and duration of the empire, secure possessions. And afterwards
the latter could, when fighting among themselves, draw each one
with him a portion of these provinces according to the

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authority he had established there. And these provinces, when the
family of their ancient princes was extinct, recognized no other
rulers but the Romans. Considering these things, therefore, let no
one be surprised at the facility with which Alexander could
hold Asia, and at the difficulties that others have had
in holding acquired possessions, like Pearis and many others. As

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this was not caused by the greater or smaller ability
of the conqueror, but depended on the dissimilarity of the conditions.
Chapter five The way to govern cities or dominions that,
previous to being occupied lived under their own laws. When
those states which have been acquired are accustomed to live
at liberty under their own laws, there are three ways

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of holding them. The first is to ruin them. The
second is to go and live there in person. The
third is to allow them to live under their own laws,
taking tribute of them, and creating there within the country
a state composed of a few who will keep it
friendly to you, because this state, being created by the Prince,
knows that it can not exist without his friendship and protection,

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and will do all it can to keep them. And
a city used to liberty can be more easily held
by means of its citizens than in any other way,
if you wish to preserve it. There is the example
of the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held Athens
and Thebes by creating within them a state of a
few people. Nevertheless, they lost them. The Romans, in order

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to hold Capua, Carthage and Namancha, destroyed them, but did
not lose them. They wanted to hold Greece in almost
the same way as the Spartans held it, leaving it
free and under its own laws, but they did not succeed,
so that they were compelled to destroy many cities in
that province in order to keep it, because in truth,
there is no sure method of holding them except by

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ruining them. And whoever becomes the ruler of a free
city and does not destroy it can expect to be
destroyed by it, for it can always find a motive
for rebellion in the name of liberty and of its
ancient usages, which are forgotten neither by lapse of time
nor by benefits received. And whatever one does or provides,
so long as the inhabitants are not separated or dispersed,

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they do not forget that name and those usages, but
appeal to them at once in every emergency, as did
Pisa after being so many years held in servitude by
the Florentines, but when cities or provinces have been accustomed
to live under a prince, and the family of that
prince is extinguished, being on the one hand used to obey,

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and on the other not having their old prince, they
cannot unite in choosing one from among themselves, and they
do not know how to live in freedom, so that
they are slower to take arms, and a prince can
win them over with greater facility and establish himself securely.
But in republics there is greater life, greater hatred, and
more desire for vengeance. They do not and cannot cast

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aside the memory of their ancient liberty, so that the
surest way is either to destroy them or reside in them.
Chapter six of new dominions which have been acquired by
one's own arms and powers. Let no one marvel if
in speaking of new dominions, both as to prince and state,
I bring forward very exalted instances. For his men walk

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almost always in the paths trodden by others, proceeding in
their actions by imitation, and not being always able to
follow others exactly, nor attain to the excellence of those
they imitate. A prudent man should always follow in the
path trodden by great men, and imitate those who are
most excellent, so that if he does not attain to
their greatness at any rate, he will get some tinge

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of it. He will do like prudent archers, who, when
the place they wish to hit is too far off,
knowing how far their bow will carry, aim at a
spot much higher than the one they wish to hit,
not in order to reach this height with their arrow,
but by help of this high aim to hit the
spot they wish to. I say then, that in new
dominions where there is a new prince, it is more

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or less easy to hold them according to the greater
or lesser ability of him who acquires them. And as
the fact of a private individual jewel becoming a prince
presupposes either great ability or good fortune, it would appear
that either of these things would mitigate in part many difficulties. Nevertheless,
those who have been wanting as regards good fortune have
maintained themselves best. The matter is also facilitated by the

(29:17):
prince being obliged to reside personally in his territory, having
no others but to come to Those who have become
princes through their own merits and not by fortune. I
regard as the greatest Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and such like.
And although one should not speak of Moses, he having
merely carried out what was ordered him by God, still

(29:39):
he deserves admiration, if only for that grace which made
him worthy to speak with God. But regarding Cyrus and
others who have acquired or founded kingdoms, they will all
be found worthy of admiration. And if their particular actions
and methods are examined, they will not appear very different
from those of Moses, although he had so great a master.

(30:00):
In examining their life and deeds, it will be seen
that they owed nothing to fortune, but the opportunity which
gave them matter to be shaped into the form that
they thought fit. And without that opportunity their powers would
have been wasted, and without their powers, the opportunity would
have come in vain. It was thus necessary that Moses
should find the people of Israel slaves in Egypt and
oppressed by the Egyptians, so that they were disposed to

(30:22):
follow him in order to escape from their servitude. It
was necessary that Romulus should be unable to remain in Alba,
and should have been exposed at his birth, in order
that he might become King of Rome and founder of
that nation. It was necessary that Cyrus should find the
Persians discontented with the empire of the Meds, and the
Meeds weak and effeminate. Through long peace Theseus could not

(30:45):
have showed his abilities if he had not found the
Athenians dispersed. These opportunities therefore gave these men their chance,
and their own great qualities enabled them to profit by them,
so as to ennoble their country and augment its fortunes.
Those who, by heroic means such as these become princes
obtain their dominions with difficulty, but retain them easily. And

(31:07):
the difficulties which they have in acquiring their dominions arise
in part from the new rules and regulations that they
have to introduce in order to establish their position securely.
It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult
to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more
dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things.

(31:27):
For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit
by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all
those who would profit by the new order, This lukewarmness
arising partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the
laws in their favor, and partly from the incredulity of mankind,
who do not truly believe in anything new until they
have had actual experience of it. Thus it arises that

(31:49):
on every opportunity for attacking the reformer, his opponents do
so with the zeal of partisans. The others only defend
him half heartedly, so that between them he runs great danger.
It is necessary, however, in order to investigate thoroughly this question,
to examine whether these innovators are independent or whether they
depend upon others, that is to say, whether in order

(32:11):
to carry out their designs they have to entreat or
are able to force. In the first case, they invariably
succeed ill and accomplish nothing. But when they can depend
on their own strength and are able to use force,
they rarely fail. Thus it comes about that all armed
prophets have conquered, and unarmed ones failed. For besides what
has been already said, the character of people varies, and

(32:34):
it is easy to persuade them of a thing, but
difficult to keep them in that persuasion. And so it
is necessary to order things so that when they no
longer believe, they can be made to believe by force.
Moses Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus would not have been able
to make their institutions observed for so long had they
been disarmed, as happened in our own time to Fra.

(32:56):
Girolamo Savonarola, who failed entirely in his new rules when
the multitude began to disbelieve in him, and he had
no means of holding fast those who had believed, nor
of compelling the unbelievers to believe. Therefore, such men as
these have great difficulty in making their way, and all
their dangers are met on the road, and must be
overcome by their own abilities. But when once they have

(33:18):
overcome them, and have begun to be held in veneration,
and have suppressed those who envied them, they remained powerful
and secure, honored and happy. To the high examples given,
I will add a lesser one, which, however, is to
be compared in some measure with them, and will serve
as an instance of all such cases, that of Jeron
of Syracuse, who from a private individual became Prince of

(33:40):
Syricusa without other aid from fortune beyond the opportunity for
the Syracusans, being oppressed, elected him as their captain, from
which by merit he was made prince. While still in
private life his virtues were such that it was written
of him that he lacked nothing to reign but the kingdom.
He abolished the old militia, raised a new one, abandoned

(34:02):
his old friendships, and formed new ones. And as he
had thus friends and soldiers of his own, he was
able on this foundation to build securely, so that while
he had great trouble in acquiring his position, he had
little in maintaining it Chapter seven of New Dominions acquired
by the power of others or by fortune, Those who

(34:22):
rise from private citizens to be princes merely by fortune
have little trouble in rising, but very much in maintaining
their position. They meet with no difficulties on the way
as they fly over them, but all their difficulties arise
when they are established. Such are they who are granted
a state, either for money or by favor of him
who grants it, as happened to many in Greece, in

(34:44):
the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, who were
created princes by Darius in order to hold these places
for his security and glory. Such were also those emperors who,
from private citizens became emperors by bribing the army. Such
as these depend absolutely on the good will and fortune
of those who have raised them, both of which are
extremely inconstant and unstable. They neither know how to nor

(35:08):
are in a position to maintain their rank. For unless
he be a man of great genius, it is not
likely that one who has always lived in a private
position should know how to command. And they are unable
to command because they possess no forces which will be
friendly and faithful to them. Moreover, states quickly founded, like
all other things which are born and grow rapidly, cannot

(35:29):
have deep roots, so that the first storm destroys them, unless,
as already said, the man who thus becomes a prince
is of such great genius as to be able to
take immediate steps for maintaining what fortune has thrown into
his lap, and lay afterwards those foundations which others make
before becoming princes. With regard to these two methods of
becoming a prince by ability or by good fortune, I

(35:52):
will here adduce two examples which have taken place within
our memory, Those of Francesco's Fortza and Chaeseray borgau Cesco,
by appropriate means and through great abilities from citizen became
Duke of Milan, And what he had attained after a
thousand difficulties, he maintained with little trouble. On the other hand,
chesare Borgia, commonly called Duke Valentine, acquired the state through

(36:16):
the fortune of his father, and by the same means
lost it. And that although every measure was adopted by him,
in everything done that a prudent and capable man could do,
to establish himself firmly in that state that the arms,
in the favors of others, had given him. For as
we have said, he who does not lay his foundations beforehand,
may by great abilities do so afterwards, although with great

(36:37):
trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If
then one considers the progress made by the Duke, it
will be seen how firm were the foundations he had
laid to his future power, which I do not think
it superfluous to examine, as I know of no better
precepts for a new prince to follow than the example
of his actions. And if his measures were not successful,

(36:58):
it was through no fault of his own, but only
by the most extraordinary malignity of fortune. In wishing to
aggrandize the Duke, his son Alexander the sixth, had to
meet very great difficulties, both present in future. In the
first place, he saw no way of making him ruler
of any state that was not a possession of the Church,

(37:19):
and in attempting to take that of the Church, he
knew that the Duke of Milan and the Venetians would
not consent, because Fienza and Rhymany were already under the
protection of the Venetians. He saw moreover that the arms
of Italy, especially of those who might have served him,
were in the hands of those who would fear the
greatness of the Pope, and therefore he could not depend

(37:40):
upon them, being all under the Orsines and Colanas and
their adherents. It was therefore necessary to disturb the existing
condition and bring about disorders in the states of Italy
in order to obtain secure mastery over a part of them.
This was easy, for he found the Venetians, who actuated
by other motives, had invited the French into Italy, which

(38:01):
he not only did not oppose, but facilitated by dissolving
the marriage of King Louis. The King came thus into
Italy with the aid of the Venetians and the consent
of Alexander, and had hardly arrived at Milan before the
Pope obtained troops from him for his enterprise in the Romagna,
which he carried out by means of the reputation of
the King. The Duke, having thus obtained the Romagna and

(38:23):
defeated the Colanas, was hindered in maintaining it and proceeding
further by two things, the one his forces, of which
he doubted the fidelity, the other the will of France.
That is to say, he feared lest the arms of
the Orsinia, of which he had availed himself, should fail him,
and not only hinder him in obtaining more, but take
from him what he had already conquered. And he also

(38:44):
feared that the King might do the same. He had
evidence of this as regards the Orsini, when after taking
Fianza he assaulted Bologna and observed their backwardness in the assault,
And as regards the King, he perceived his designs when,
after taking the Duke of Urbino he attacked Tuscany, and
the King made him desist from that enterprise, whereupon the

(39:05):
Duke decided to depend no longer on the fortunes and
arms of others. The first thing he did was to
weaken the parties of the Orsines and Klanas in Rome,
by gaining all their adherents, who were gentlemen, and making
them followers of himself, by granting them large pensions and
appointing them to commands and offices according to their rank,
so that their attachment to their parties was extinguished in

(39:26):
a few months and entirely concentrated on the Duke. After
this he awaited an opportunity for crushing the Orsines, having
dispersed the adherents of the Kolana family, and when the
opportunity arrived, he made good use of it. For the Orsini,
seeing at length that the greatness of the Duke and
of the Church meant their own ruin, convoked a diet
at Maggion in the Perugino. Hence sprang the rebellion of

(39:50):
Urbino and the tumults in Romagna, and infinite dangers to
the Duke, who overcame them all with the help of
the French, and having regained his reputation, neither trusting France
nor or other foreign forces. In order not to have
to oppose them, he had recourse to stratagem. He dissembled
his aims so well that the Orsini, through the mediation
of Senior Pavlo, made their peace with him, which the

(40:12):
Duke spared no efforts to make secure, presenting them with robes,
money and horses, so that in their simplicity they were
induced to come to Sinegaglia and fell into his hands.
Having thus suppressed these leaders and made their partisans his friends,
the Duke had laid a very good foundation to his power,
having all the Romagna with the Duchy of Urbino, and

(40:32):
having gained the favor of the inhabitants, who began to
feel the benefit of his rule. And as this part
is worthy of note and of imitation by others, I
will not omit mention of it. When he took the Romagna,
it had previously been governed by weak rulers who had
rather despoiled their subjects than governed them, and given them
more cause for disunion than for union, so that the

(40:54):
province was a prey to robbery, assaults, and every kind
of disorder. He therefore judged it necessary to give them
a good government in order to make them peaceful and
obedient to his rule. For this purpose he appointed Messer
Ramiro di Borco, a cruel and able man to whom
he gave the fullest authority. This man, in a short time,

(41:16):
was highly successful in rendering the country orderly in united
Whereupon the Duke, not deeming such excessive authority expedient lest
it should become hateful, appointed a civil court of justice
in the middle of the province, under an excellent president,
to which each city appointed its own advocate. And as
he knew that the harshness of the past had engendered
some amount of hatred, in order to purge the minds

(41:38):
of the people and to win them over completely, he
resolved to show that if any cruelty had taken place,
it was not by his orders, but through the harsh
disposition of his minister, And, taking him on some pretext,
he had him placed one morning in the public square
at Cecina, cut in half, with a piece of wood
and blood stained knife by his side. The ferocity of

(42:00):
this spectacle caused the people both satisfaction and amazement. But
to return to where we left off, the Duke, being
now powerful and partly secured against present perils. Being armed himself,
and having in a great measure put down those neighbouring
forces which might injure him, had now to get the
respect of France if he wished to proceed with his acquisitions.

(42:21):
For he knew that the king, who had lately discovered
his error, would not give him any help. He began
therefore to seek fresh alliances and to vacillate with France.
In the expedition that the French made towards the Kingdom
of Naples against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. His
intention was to assure himself of them, which he would
soon have succeeded in doing if Alexander had lived. These

(42:45):
were the measures taken by him with regard to the present.
As to the future, he feared that a new successor
to the Church might not be friendly to him, and
might seek to deprive him of what Alexander had given him,
and he sought to provide against this in four ways. Firstly,
by destroying all who were of the blood of those
ruling families which he had despoiled, in order to deprive

(43:07):
the pope of any opportunity. Secondly, by gaining the friendship
of the Roman nobles, so that he might throw them hold,
as it were, the Pope in Czech Thirdly by obtaining
as great a hold on the College as he could. Fourthly,
by acquiring such power before the Pope died as to
be able to resist alone the first onslaught. Of these

(43:28):
four things, he had, at the death of Alexander accomplished three,
and the fourth he had almost accomplished four. Of the
dispossessed rulers, he killed as many as he could lay
hands on, and very few escaped. He had gained to
his party the Roman nobles, and he had a great
share in the College. As to new possessions, he designed
to become lord of Tuscany, and already possessed Perugia and Piambino,

(43:51):
and had assumed the protectorate over Pisa. And as he
had no longer to fear the French, for the French
had been deprived of the Kingdom of Naples by the
Spaniards in such a way that both parties were obliged
to buy his friendship, he seized Pisa. After this Lucca
and Siena had once yielded, partly through envy of the Florentines,
and partly through fear. The Florentines had no resources, so

(44:14):
that had he succeeded as he had done before, in
the very year that Alexander died, he would have gained
such strength and renown as to be able to maintain
himself without depending on the fortunes or strength of others,
but solely by his own power and ability. But Alexander
died five years after he had first drawn his sword.
He left him with the state of Romagna only firmly established,

(44:37):
and all the other schemes in mid air, between two
very powerful and hostile armies, and suffering from a fatal illness.
But the valor and ability of the Duke were such,
and he knew so well how to win over men
or vanquish them, And so strong were the foundations that
he had laid in this short time, that if he
had not had those two armies upon him, or else

(44:57):
had been in good health, he would have survived every difficulty.
And that his foundations where good, is seen from the
fact that the Romagna waited for him more than a
month in Rome. Although half dead, he remained secure. And
although the Balioni, Vitelli and Orsini entered Rome, they found
no followers against him. He was able, if not to

(45:18):
make pope whom he wished, at any rate, to prevent
a pope being created whom he did not wish. But
if at the death of Alexander he had been well,
everything would have been easy. And he told me on
the day that Pope Julius too was created, that he
had thought of everything which might happen on the death
of his father, and provided against everything, except that he

(45:39):
had never thought that at his father's death he would
be dying himself. Reviewing thus all the actions of the Duke,
I find nothing to blame. On the contrary, I feel bound,
as I have done, to hold him up as an
example to be imitated by all who, by fortune and
with the arms of others, have risen to power. For
with his great courage and high ambition, he could not

(46:00):
have acted otherwise, and his designs were only frustrated by
the short life of Alexander and his own illness. Whoever
therefore deems it necessary in his new principality to secure
himself against enemies, to gain friends, to conquer by force
or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the
people followed, and reverenced by the soldiers, to destroy those

(46:22):
who can and may injure him. Introduce innovations into old customs,
to be severe and kind, magnanimous and liberal, suppress the
old militia, create a new one, maintain a friendship of
kings and princes in such a way that they are
glad to benefit him and fear to injure him. Such
a one can find no better example than the actions

(46:42):
of this man. The only thing he can be accused
of is that in the creation of Julius two, he
made a bad choice. For, as has been said, not
being able to choose his own pope, he could still
prevent any one being made pope. And he ought never
to have permitted any of those cardinals to be raised
to the papacy whom he had injured, or who in

(47:02):
pope would stand in fear of him, For men commit
injuries either through fear or through hate. Those whom he
had injured were, among others, San Pietro, ad Vincula, Colana,
San Giorgio and Escanio. All the others, if assumed to
the pontificate, would have had to fear him, except Rohan
and the Spaniards, the latter through their relationship and obligations

(47:25):
to him, the former from his great power being related
to the King of France. For these reasons, the Duke got,
above all things to have created a Spaniard pope. And
if unable to, then he should have consented to Rohan
being appointed, and not San Pietro at Vincula. And whoever
thinks that in high personages new benefits cause old offenses
to be forgotten, makes a great mistake. The Duke therefore

(47:50):
aired in this choice, and it was the cause of
his ultimate ruin Chapter eight of those who have attained
the position of prince by villany. But as there are
still two ways of becoming prince which cannot be attributed entirely,
either to fortune or to ability, they must not be
passed over, although one of them could be more fully
discussed if we were treating of republics. These are when

(48:13):
one becomes prince by some nefarious or villainous means, or
when a private citizen becomes the prince of his country
through the favor of his fellow citizens. And in speaking
of the former means, I will give two examples, one ancient,
the other modern, without entering further into the merits of
this method, as I judge them to be sufficient for
any one obliged to imitate them. Agathocles the Sicilian rose

(48:38):
not only from private life, but from the lowest and
most abject position to be king of Syracuse. The son
of a potter, he led a life of the utmost
wickedness through all the stages of his fortune. Nevertheless, his
wickedness was accompanied by such vigor of mind and body, that,
having joined the militia, he rose through all its grades
to be Praetor of Syracuse. Having been appointed to this position,

(49:02):
and having decided to become prince and to hold with
violence and without the support of others, that which had
been granted him, and having imparted his design to Hamilcar
the Carthaginian, who with his armies was fighting in Sicily,
he called together one morning the people and Senate of Syracuse,
as if he had to deliberate on matters of importance
to the republic, and that a given signal had all

(49:23):
the senators and the richest men of the people killed
by his soldiers. After their death, he occupied and held
rule over the city without any civil disorders, and although
he was twice beaten by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged.
He was able not only to defend the city, but
leaving a portion of his forces for its defense. With
the remainder, he invaded Africa and in a short time

(49:46):
liberated Syracuse from the siege, and brought the Carthaginians to
great extremities, so that they were obliged to come to
terms with him and remain contented with the possession of Africa,
leaving Sicily to Agathocles. Whoever considers there therefore the actions
and qualities of this man will see few, if any,
things which can be attributed to fortune. For as above stated,

(50:07):
it was not by the favor of any person, but
through the grades of the militia, which he had gained
with a thousand hardships and perils, that he arrived at
the position of prince, which he afterwards maintained by so
many courageous and perilous expedients. It cannot be called a
virtue to kill one's fellow citizens, betray one's friends, be
without faith, without pity, and without religion, by which methods

(50:31):
one may indeed gain an empire, but not glory. For
if the virtues of Agathocles in braving and overcoming perils,
and his greatness of soul in supporting and surmounting obstacles
be considered, one sees no reason for holding him inferior
to any of the most renowned captains. Nevertheless, his barbarous
cruelty and inhumanity, together with his countless atrocities, do not

(50:54):
permit of his being named among the most famous men.
We cannot attribute to fortune or marior that which he
achieved without either. In our own times, during the reign
of Alexander the sixth, Oliverado du Fermo had been left
a young boy under the care of his maternal uncle,
Giovanni Fogliani, who brought him up and sent him in
early youth to fight under Paolo Vitelle in order that

(51:17):
he might, under that discipline, obtain a good military position.
On the death of Paolo, he fought under his brother Vitelozzo,
and in a very short time, being of great intelligence
and active in mind and body, he became one of
the leaders of his troops. But deeming it serval to
be under others, he resolved with the help of some

(51:37):
citizens of Fermo who preferred servitude to the liberty of
their country, and with the favor of the Vitellies to
occupy Fermo. He therefore wrote to Giovanni Fogliani, how, having
been for many years away from home, he wished to
come to see him and his city, and in some
measure to revisit his estates. And as he had only
labored to gain honor in order that his fellow citizen

(52:00):
might see that he had not spent his time in vain,
he wished to come honorably, accompanied by one hundred horsemen,
his friends and followers, and prayed him that he would
be pleased to order that he should be received with
honor by the citizens of Fermo, by which he would
honor not only him Oliverado, but also himself, as he
had been his pupil. Giovanni did not fail in any

(52:21):
duty towards his nephew. He caused him to be honorably
received by the people of Fermo and lodged him in
his own houses. After waiting some days to arrange all
that was necessary to his villainous projects, Oliverado invited Giovanni
Fogliani and all the principal men of Fermo to a
grand banquet. After the dinner and the entertainments usual at

(52:42):
such feasts, Oliverado artfully introduced certain important matters of discussion,
speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and of his
son Chaserat, and of their enterprises, to which discourses Giovanni
and others having replied, he all at once rose, saying
that these matters should to be spoken of in a
more secret place, and withdrew into a room, where Giovanni

(53:04):
and the other citizens followed him. They were no sooner
seated than soldiers rushed out of hiding places and killed
Giovanni and all the others. After which massacre, Oliverado mounted
his horse, rode through the town, and besieged the chief
magistrate in his palace, so that through fear they were
obliged to obey him and form a government, of which

(53:24):
he made himself prince, and all those being dead, who,
if discontented, could injure him. He fortified himself with new
orders civil and military, in such a way that within
the year that he held the principality, he was not
only safe himself in the city of Fermo, but had
become formidable to all his neighbors, and his overthrow would
have been difficult, like that of Agathocles if he had

(53:47):
not allowed himself to be deceived by cheserae Borgia when
he besieged the Orsines and Vitellies at Sinegaglia, as already related,
where he also was taken one year after the parricide
he had committed and strangled together with Vitelazzo, who had
been his teacher, in ability and atrocity. Some may wonder
how it came about that Agathocles and others like him, could,

(54:10):
after infinite treachery and cruelty, live secure for many years
in their country, and defend themselves from external enemies without
being conspired against by their subjects, although many others have,
through their cruelty, been unable to maintain their position in
times of peace, not to speak of the uncertain times
of war. I believe this arises from the cruelties being

(54:30):
used well or badly. Well used may be called those,
if it is permissible to use the word well, of evil,
which are committed once for the need of securing one's self,
and which afterwards are not persisted in, but are exchanged
for measures as useful to the subjects as possible. Cruelties
ill used are those which, although at first view increase

(54:51):
rather than diminish with time. Those who follow the former
method may remedy in some measure their condition both with
God and Man, as did again Ethocles, as to the others,
it is impossible for them to maintain themselves. Whence it
is to be noted that in taking a state, the
conqueror must arrange to commit all his cruelties at once,

(55:12):
so as not to have to recur to them every day,
and so as to be able, by not making fresh changes,
to reassure people and win them over by benefiting them.
Whoever acts otherwise, either through timidity or bad counsels, is
always obliged to stand with knife in hand, and can
never depend on his subjects, because they, through continually fresh injuries,

(55:33):
are unable to depend upon him. For injuries should be
done altogether, so that, being less tasted, they will give
less offense. Benefits should be granted little by little, so
that they may be better enjoyed. And above all, a
prince must live with his subjects in such a way
that no accident should make him change it for good
or evil. For necessity arising in adverse times, you are

(55:56):
not in time with severity, and the good that you
do does not profit you, as it is judged to
be forced, and you will derive no benefit whatever from it.
Chapter nine of the civic principality. But we now come
to the case where a citizen becomes prince not through
crime or intolerable violence, but by the favor of his

(56:16):
fellow citizens, which may be called a civic principality. To
arrive at this position depends not entirely on worth or
entirely on fortune, but rather on cunning assisted by fortune.
One attains it by help of popular favor, or by
the favor of the aristocracy. For in every city these
two opposite parties are to be found, arising from the

(56:38):
desire of the populace to avoid the oppression of the great,
and the desire of the great to command and oppress
the people. And from these two opposing interests arises in
the city one of three effects, either absolute government, liberty,
or license. The former is created either by the populace
or the nobility, depending on the relative opportunities of the

(56:59):
two parties. For when the nobility see that they are
unable to resist the people, they unite in creating one
of their number prints so as to be able to
carry out their own designs under the shadow of his authority.
The populace, on the other hand, when unable to resist
the nobility, endeavor to create a prince in order to
be protected by his authority. He who becomes prince by

(57:20):
help of the nobility has greater difficulty in maintaining his
power than he who is raised by the populace, for
he is surrounded by those who think themselves his equals,
and is thus unable to direct or command as he pleases.
But one who is raised to the leadership by popular
favor finds himself alone and has no one or very
few who are not ready to obey him. Besides which,

(57:42):
it is impossible to satisfy the nobility by fair dealing
and without inflicting injury on others, whereas it is very
easy to satisfy the mass of the people in this way,
for the aim of the people is more honest than
that of the nobility, the latter desiring to oppress, and
the former merely to avoid a PRIs. It must also
be added that the prince can never insure himself against

(58:04):
a hostile populace on account of their number, but he
can against the hostility of the great, as they are
but few. The worst that a prince has to expect
from a hostile people is to be abandoned. But from
hostile nobles he has to fear not only abandonment, but
their active opposition. And as they are more far seeing
and more cunning, they are always in time to save
themselves and take sides with the one whom they expect

(58:27):
will conquer. The prince is moreover obliged to live always
with the same people, but he can easily do without
the same nobility, being able to make and unmake them
at any time, and increase their position, to deprive them
of it as he pleases. And to throw further light
on this part, I would say that the nobles are
to be considered in two different manners. That is, they

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are either to be ruled so as to make them
entirely depend on your fortunes, or else not. Those that
are thus bound to you and are not rapacious must
be honored and loved. Those who are not must be
considered in two ways. They either do this through pucillanimity
in natural want of courage, and in this case you
ought to make use of them, and especially such as
are of good counsel, so that they may honor you

(59:11):
in prosperity and in adversity. You have not to fear them.
But when they are not bound to you of set
purpose and for ambitious ends, it is a sign that
they think more of themselves than of you. And from
such men the Prince must guard himself and look upon
them as secret enemies who will help to ruin him
when in adversity. One, however, who becomes prince by favor

(59:32):
of the populace must maintain its friendship, which he will
find easy, the people asking nothing but not to be oppressed.
But one who, against the people's wishes, becomes prince by
favor of the nobles, should above all endeavor to gain
the favor of the people. This will be easy to
him if he protects them. And as men who receive
good from those they expected evil from feel under a

(59:55):
greater obligation to their benefactor, so the subject populace will
become even better dispose towards him than if he had
become prince through their favor. The prince can win their
favor in many ways, which very according to circumstances, for
which no certain rule can be given, and will therefore
be passed over. I will only say in conclusion that

(01:00:16):
it is necessary for a prince to possess the friendship
of the people, otherwise he has no resource in times
of adversity. Nabis, prince of the Spartans, sustained a siege
by the whole of Greece in a victorious Roman army,
and defended against them his country and maintained his own position.
It sufficed when the danger arose for him to make

(01:00:36):
sure of a few which would not have been enough
if the populace had been hostile to him. And let
no one oppose my opinion in this by quoting the
trite proverb he who builds on the people builds on mud,
because that is true when a private citizen relies upon
the people and persuades himself that they will liberate him
if he is oppressed by enemies or by the magistrates.

(01:00:56):
In this case he might often find himself deceived, as
happened in Rome to the Grachai and in Florence to
Messer Giorgio Scali. But when it is a prince who
founds himself on this basis, one who can command and
is a man of courage, and does not get frightened
in adversity and does not neglect other preparations. And one
who by his own courage and measures animates the mass

(01:01:18):
of the people, he will not find himself deceived by them,
and he will find that he has laid his foundations well. Usually,
these principalities are in danger when the prince, from the
position of a civil ruler, changes to an absolute one.
For these princes either command themselves or by means of magistrates.
In the latter case, their position is weaker and more dangerous,

(01:01:39):
for they are at the mercy of those citizens who
are appointed magistrates, who can, especially in times of adversity,
with great facility, deprive them of their position, either by
acting against them or by not obeying them. The prince
is not in time, in such dangers to assume absolute authority,
for the citizens and subjects, who are accustomed to take

(01:01:59):
their or or from the magistrates, are not ready in
these emergencies to obey his and he will always, in
doubtful times lack men whom he can rely on. Such
a prince cannot base himself on what he sees in
quiet times when the citizens have need of the state,
for then every one is full of promises, and each
one is ready to die for him when death is
far off. But in adversity, when the state has need

(01:02:22):
of citizens, then he will find but few. And this
experience is the more dangerous in that it can only
be had once. Therefore, a wise prince will seek means
by which his subjects will always, and in every possible
condition of things, have need of his government, and then
they will always be faithful to him. Chapter ten, How

(01:02:43):
the strength of all states should be measured. In examining
the character of these principalities, it is necessary to consider
another point, namely, whether the prince has such a position
as to be able in case of need to maintain
himself alone, or whether he has always need of the
protection of others. The better to explain this, I would
say that I consider those capable of maintaining themselves alone,

(01:03:06):
who can, through abundance of men or money, put together
a sufficient army and hold the field against any one
who assails them, and I consider to have need of
others those who cannot take the field against their enemies,
but are obliged to take refuge within their walls and
stand on the defensive. We have already discussed the former case,
and will speak in future of it as occasion arises.

(01:03:29):
In the second case, there is nothing to be said
except to encourage such a prince to provision and fortify
his own town, and not to trouble about the country.
And whoever has strongly fortified his town, and as regards
the government of his subjects, has proceeded as we have
already described and will further relate, will be attacked with
great reluctance, For men are always averse to enterprises in

(01:03:50):
which they foresee difficulties, and it can never appear easy
to attack one who has his town well guarded and
is not hated by the people. The cities of Germany
are extremely liberal, have little surrounding country, and obey the
Emperor when they choose, and they do not fear him
or any other potentate that they have about them. They
are fortified in such a manner that every one thinks

(01:04:12):
that to reduce them would be tedious and difficult, for
they all have the necessary moats and bastions, sufficient artillery,
and always keep in the public storehouses food and drink
and fuel for one year, beyond which to keep the
lower classes satisfied and without loss to the public, they
have always enough means to give them work for one year.
In these employments which form the nerve and life of

(01:04:34):
the town, and in the industries by which the lower
classes live, military exercises are still held in reputation, and
many regulations are in force for maintaining them. A prince, therefore,
who possesses a strong city and does not make himself hated,
cannot be assaulted, and if he were to be so,
the assailant would be obliged to retire shamefully. For so

(01:04:56):
many things change that it is almost impossible for anyone
to hold the field for a year with his army's idol.
And to those who urge that the people, having their
possessions outside and seeing them burnt, will not have patience,
and the long siege and self interest will make them
forget their prince, I reply that a powerful and courageous
prince will always overcome those difficulties by now raising the

(01:05:19):
hopes of his subjects that the evils will not last long,
now impressing them with fear of the enemy's cruelty, now
by dexterously assuring himself of those who appear too bold,
Besides which the enemy would naturally burn and ruin the
country on first arriving, and in the time when men's
minds are still hot and eager to defend themselves, and
therefore the prince has still less to fear, for after

(01:05:41):
some days, when people have cooled down, the damage is done,
the evil has been suffered, and there is no remedy,
so that they are the more ready to unite with
their prince, as it appears that he is under an
obligation to them, their houses having been burnt and there
possessions ruined in his defense. It is then the nature
of men to be as much bound by the benefits

(01:06:02):
that they confer as by those they receive, from which
it follows that everything considered, a prudent prince will not
find it difficult to uphold the courage of his subjects,
both at the commencement and during a state of siege,
if he possesses provisions and means to defend himself. Chapter
eleven of Ecclesiastical Principalities. It now remains to us only

(01:06:25):
to speak of ecclesiastical principalities with regard to which the
difficulties lie wholly before they are possessed. They are acquired
either by ability or by fortune, but are maintained without either,
for they are sustained by the ancient religious customs, which
are so powerful and of such quality, that they keep
their princes in power in whatever manner they proceed and live.

(01:06:47):
These alone have a state without defending it, have subjects
without governing them, and the states not being defended are
not taken from them. The subjects not being governed do
not disturb themselves, and neither think of nor or are
capable of alienating themselves from them. Only these principalities therefore
are secure and happy. But as they are upheld by

(01:07:09):
higher causes which the human mind cannot attain to, I
will abstain from speaking of them, for being exalted and
maintained by God, it would be the work of a
presumptuous and foolish man to discuss them. However, I might
be asked how it has come about that the Church
has reached such great temporal power, When previous to Alexander
the sixth, the Italian potentates, and not merely the really

(01:07:32):
powerful ones, but every lord re Baron, however insignificant, held
it in slight esteem as regards temporal power, whereas now
it is dreaded by a King of France, whom it
has been able to drive out of Italy and has
also been able to ruin the Venetians. Therefore, although this
is well known, I do not think it superfluous to
call it to mind. Before Charles, King of France, came

(01:07:56):
into Italy, this country was under the rule of the Pope,
the Venetians, the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan,
and the Florentines. These potentates had to have two chief cares,
one that no foreigner should enter Italy by force of arms,
the other that none of the existing governments should extend
its dominions. Those chiefly to be watched were the Pope

(01:08:18):
and the Venetians. To keep back the Venetians required the
ruin of all the others, as in the defense of Ferrara,
and to keep down the Pope they made use of
the Roman barons. These were divided into two factions, the
Orsines and the Colanis. And as there was constant quarreling
between them, and they were constantly under arms before the

(01:08:38):
eyes of the Pope, they kept the papacy weak and infirm.
And although there arose now and then a resolute pope
like Sextus, yet his fortune or ability was never able
to liberate him from these evils. The shortness of their
life was the reason of this, for in the course
of ten years, which as a general rule a pope lived,
he had great difficulty in so pressing even one of

(01:09:01):
the factions. And if, for example, a pope had almost
put down the Kolanas, a new pope would succeed who
was hostile to the Orsines, which caused the Klanis to
spring up again, and he was not in time to
suppress them. This caused the temporal power of the pope
to be of little esteem in Italy. Then arose Alexander
the Sixth, who, of all the pontiffs who have ever reigned,

(01:09:24):
best showed how a pope might prevail both by money
and by force. With Duke Valentine as his instrument, and
on the occasion of the French invasion, he did all
that I have previously described in speaking of the actions
of the Duke. And although his object was to aggrandize
not the church but the Duke, what he did resulted
in the aggrandizement of the Church, which, after the death

(01:09:46):
of the Duke became the heir of his labors. Then
came Pope Julius, who found the Church powerful, possessing all Romagna,
all the Roman barons suppressed, and the factions destroyed by
the severity of Alexander. He also found the way open
for accumulating wealth in ways never used before the time
of Alexander. These measures were not only followed by Julius,

(01:10:10):
but increased. He resolved to gain Bologna, put down the Venetians,
and drive the French from Italy. In all which enterprises
he was successful. He merits the greater praise, as he
did everything to increase the power of the Church, and
not of any private person. He also kept the Orsinian
Koalana parties in the conditions in which he found them,

(01:10:30):
and although there were some leaders among them who might
have made changes, there were two things that kept them steady.
One the greatness of the Church, which they dreaded. The
other the fact that they had no cardinals, who are
the origin of the tumults among them. For these parties
are never at rest when they have cardinals. For these
stir up the parties both within Rome and outside, and

(01:10:51):
the barons are forced to defend them. Thus, from the
ambitions of prelates arise the discords and tumults among the barons.
Hiss Holiness. Pope Leo the tenth therefore has found the
Pontificate in a very powerful condition, from which it is
hoped that, as those popes made it great by force
of armies, so he, through his goodness and infinite other virtues,

(01:11:12):
will make it both great and venerated. Chapter twelve, the
different kinds of militia and mercenary soldiers. Having now discussed
fully the qualities of these principalities of which I propose
to treat, and partially considered the causes of their prosperity
or failure, and having also showed the methods by which
many have sought to obtain such states, it now remains

(01:11:35):
for me to treat generally of the methods of attack
and defense that can be used in each of them.
We have said already how necessary it is for a
prince to have his foundations good, otherwise he is certain
to be ruined. The chief foundations of all states, whether new, old,
or mixed, are good laws and good arms. And as

(01:11:55):
there cannot be good laws where there are not good arms,
and where there are good arms, their sh sh be
good laws. I will not now discuss the laws, but
will speak of the arms. I say therefore, that the
arms by which a prince defends his possessions are either
his own, or else mercenaries or auxiliaries, or mixed. The
mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous, and if any

(01:12:19):
one keeps his state based on the arms of mercenaries,
he will never stand firm or sure. As they are disunited, ambitious,
without discipline, faithless, bold amongst friends, cowardly amongst enemies. They
have no fear of God and keep no faith with men.
Ruin is only deferred as long as the assault is postponed.

(01:12:39):
In peace, you are despoiled by them, and in war
by the enemy. The cause of this is that they
have no love or other motive to keep them in
the field beyond a trifling wage, which is not enough
to make them ready to die for you. They are
quite willing to be your soldiers so long as you
do not make war, but when war comes, it is
either fly or be off. I ought to have little

(01:13:01):
trouble in proving this, since the ruin of Italy is
now caused by nothing else but through her having relied
for many years on mercenary arms. These were somewhat improved
in a few cases, and appeared courageous among themselves, but
when the foreigner came, they showed their worthlessness. Thus it
came about that King Charles of France was allowed to

(01:13:21):
take Italy without the slightest trouble. And those who said
that it was owing to our sins spoke the truth.
But it was not the sins that they believed, but
those that I have related. And as it was the
sins of princes, they too have suffered the punishment. I
will explain more fully the defects of these arms. Mercenary
captains are either very capable men or not. If they are,

(01:13:44):
you cannot rely upon them, for they will always aspire
to their own greatness, either by oppressing you their master,
or by oppressing others against your intentions. But if the
captain is not an able man, he will generally ruin you.
And if it is replied to them that whoever has
armed forces will do the same, whether these are mercenary

(01:14:04):
or not, I would reply that, as armies are to
be used either by a prince or by a republic,
the prince must go in person to take the position
of captain, and the republic must send its own citizens.
If the one cent turns out incompetent, it must change him,
and if capable, keep him by law from going beyond
the proper limits. And it is seen by experience that

(01:14:26):
only princes and armed republics make very great progress, whereas
mercenary forces do nothing but damage. And also an armed
republic submits less easily to the rule of one of
its citizens than a republic armed by foreign forces. Rome
and Sparta were for many centuries well armed and free.
The Swiss are well armed and enjoy great freedom. As

(01:14:48):
an example of mercenary armies in antiquity, there are the Carthaginians,
who were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the termination
of the First War with the Romans, even while they
still had their own citizens as captains. Philip of Macedon
was made captain of their forces by the Thebans after
the death of Epaminandus, and after gaining the victory, he

(01:15:08):
deprived them of liberty. The Milanese, on the death of
Duke Philip, hired Francesco Sporza against the Venetians, who, having
overcome the enemy at Caravajo, allied himself with them to
oppress the Milanese his employers. The father of this Fortza,
being a soldier in the service of the Queen Giovanna
of Naples, left her suddenly unarmed, by which she was compelled,

(01:15:31):
in order not to lose the kingdom, to throw herself
into the arms of the King of Aragon. And if
the Venetians and Florentines have in times passed increased their
dominions by means of such forces, and their captains have
not made themselves princes, but have defended them, I replied
that the Florentines in this case have been favored by chance,
for of the capable leaders whom they might have feared,

(01:15:52):
some did not conquer, some met with opposition, and others
directed their ambition elsewhere. The one who did not conquer
was Sir John Hawkwood, whose fidelity could not be known
as he was not victorious. But every one will admit
that had he conquered the Florentines would have been at
his mercy. Sporza had always the Brekssky against him, they

(01:16:15):
being constantly at enmity. Francesco directed his ambition towards Lombardy Bracho,
against the Church and the Kingdom of Naples. But let
us look at what followed. A short time ago, the
Florentines appointed Paolo Vitelli their captain, a man of great
prudence who had risen from a private station to the
highest reputation if he had taken peace, and no one

(01:16:37):
can deny that it was highly important for the Florentines
to retain his friendship, because had he become the soldier
of their enemies, they would have had no means of
opposing him, and in order to retain him, they would
have been obliged to obey him. As to the Venetians,
if one considers the progress they made, it will be
seen that they acted surely and gloriously so long as
they made war with their own forces. That it was

(01:17:00):
before they commenced their enterprises on land that they fought
courageously with their own gentlemen and armed populace. But when
they began to fight on land, they abandoned this virtue
and began to follow the Italian custom. And at the
commencement of their land conquests, they had not much to
fear from their captains, their land possessions not being very
large and their reputation being great, but as their possessions increased,

(01:17:23):
as they did under Carmagnola, they had an example of
their mistake. Foreseeing that he was very powerful after he
had defeated the Duke of Milan, and knowing, on the
other hand, that he was not enterprising in warfare, they
considered that they would not make any more conquests with him,
and they neither would nor could dismiss him for fear
of losing what they had already gained. They were therefore obliged,

(01:17:46):
in order to make sure of him, to have him killed.
They then had for Captains Bartolommeo de Bergamo, Roberto de
San Severino, Count Deep Pittolliano, and such like, from whom
they had to fear loss instead of gain, as happened
subsequently at Vila, where in one day they lost what
they had laboriously gained in eight hundred years. For with

(01:18:06):
these forces, only slow and trifling acquisitions are made, but
sudden and miraculous losses. And as I have cited these
examples from Italy, which has now for many years been
governed by mercenary forces, I will now deal more largely
with them, so that, having seen their origin and progress,
they can be better remedied. You must understand that in

(01:18:27):
these latter times, as soon as the Empire began to
be repudiated in Italy and a pope to gain greater
reputation in temporal matters, Italy was divided into many states.
Many of the principal cities took up arms against their nobles,
who favored by the Emperor had held them in subjection,
and the Church encouraged this in order to increase its
temporal power. In many other cities, one of the inhabitants

(01:18:51):
became prince. Thus, Italy having fallen almost entirely into the
hands of the Church and a few republics, and the
priests and other citizens, not being accustomed to bear arms,
they began to hire foreigners as soldiers. The first to
bring reputation for this kind of militia was Alberigo di Como,
a native of Romagna. The discipline of this man produced,

(01:19:13):
among others, Bracco and Sporza, who were in their day
the arbiters of Italy. After these came all those others
who up to the present day have commanded the armies
of Italy, and the result of their prowess has been
that Italy has been overrun by Charles, preyed on by
Lewis tyrannized over by Ferrando, and insulted by the Swiss.
The system adopted by them was in the first place,

(01:19:36):
to increase their own reputation by discrediting the infantry. They
did this because, as they had no country and lived
on their earnings, a few foot soldiers did not augment
their reputation, and they could not maintain a large number.
And therefore they restricted themselves almost entirely to cavalry, by which,
with a smaller number, they were well paid and honored.

(01:19:57):
They reduced things to such a state that in an
army of twenty thousand soldiers there were not two thousand foot.
They had also used every means to spare themselves and
the soldiers any hardship or fear, by not killing each
other in their encounters, but taking prisoners without a blow.
They made no attacks on fortifications by night, and those
in the fortifications did not attack the tents at night.

(01:20:20):
They made no stockades on ditches round their camps, and
did not take the field in winter. All these things
were permitted by their military rules and adopted, as we
have said, to avoid trouble and danger. So that they
have reduced Italy to slaverying degradation, Chapter thirteen of Auxiliary
mixed and native troops. Auxiliary forces, which are the other

(01:20:44):
kind of useless forces, are when one calls on a
potentate to come and aid one with his troops, as
was done in recent times by Julius, who, seeing the
wretched failure of his mercenary forces in his Ferrara enterprise,
had recourse to auxiliaries and arranged with Ferrando, King of Spain,
that he should help him with his armies. These forces

(01:21:05):
may be good in themselves, but they are always dangerous
for those who borrow them, for if they lose, you
are defeated, and if they conquer you remain their prisoner.
And although ancient history is full of examples of this,
I will not depart from the example of Pope Julius II,
which is still fresh. Nothing could be less prudent than
the course he adopted. For wishing to take Ferrara, he

(01:21:27):
put himself entirely into the power of a foreigner. But
by good fortune there arose a third cause which prevented
him reaping the effects of his bad choice, For when
his auxiliaries were beaten at Ravenna, the Swiss rose up
and drove back the victors, against all expectation of himself
or others, so that he was not taken prisoner by
the enemy which had fled, nor by his own auxiliaries.

(01:21:50):
Having conquered by other arms than theirs, the Florentines, being
totally disarmed, hired ten thousand frenchmen to attack Pisa, by
which measure they ran greater risk than at any period
of their struggles. The Emperor of Constantinople, to oppose his neighbors,
put ten thousand Turks into Greece, who after the war
would not go away again, which was the beginning of

(01:22:12):
the servitude of Greece to the infidels. Any One, therefore,
who wishes not to conquer, would do well to use
these forces, which are much more dangerous than mercenaries, as
with them ruin is complete, for they are all united
and owe obedience to others, whereas with mercenaries, when they
have conquered, it requires more time and a good opportunity

(01:22:33):
for them to injure you, as they do not form
a single body and have been engaged and paid by you.
Therefore a third party that you have made leader cannot
at once acquire enough authority to be able to injure you.
In a word, the greatest dangers with mercenaries lies in
their cowardice and reluctance to fight, But with auxiliaries the
danger lies in their courage. A wise prince therefore always

(01:22:58):
avoids these forces, and has reaqued course to his own,
and would prefer rather to lose with his own men
than conquer with the forces of others. Not deeming it
a true victory which is gained by foreign arms, I
never hesitate to cite the example of chaeserret Borgas and
his actions. This duke entered Romagna with auxiliary troops, leading
forces composed entirely of French soldiers, and with these he

(01:23:21):
took Imola and Forli, But as they seemed unsafe, he
had recourse to mercenaries and hired the Orsini and Vitelli. Afterwards,
finding these uncertain to handle, unfaithful and dangerous, he suppressed
them and relied upon his own men. And the difference
between these forces can be easily seen if one considers
the difference between the reputation of the Duke when he

(01:23:43):
had only the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli.
And when he had to rely on himself and his
own soldiers, his reputation will be found to have constantly increased,
and he was never so highly esteemed as when every
one saw that he was the sole master of his forces.
I do not wish to go away from recent Italian instances,
but I cannot omit Hiero of Syracuse, whom I have

(01:24:06):
already mentioned. This man, being as I said, made head
of the army by the Syracusans, immediately recognized the uselessness
of that mercenary militia, which was composed like our Italian
mercenary troops, and as he thought it unsafe either to
retain them or dismiss them, he had them cut in pieces,
and thenceforward made war with his own arms, and not

(01:24:26):
those of others. I would also call to mind a
figure out of the Old Testament, which well illustrates this point.
When David offered to Saul to go and fight with
the Phyllistine champion Goliath, Saul, to encourage him, armed him
with his own arms, which, when David had tried on,
he refused, saying that with them he could not fight
so well. He preferred therefore to face the enemy with

(01:24:49):
his own sling and knife. In short, the arms of
others either fall away from you, or overburden you, or
else impede you. Charles, the eighth father of King Lewis Excel,
having through good fortune and bravery liberated France from the English,
recognized this necessity of being armed with his own forces,
and established in his kingdom a system of men at

(01:25:11):
arms in the infantry. Afterwards, King Lewis his son abolished
the infantry and began to hire Swiss, which mistake, being
followed by others, is, as may now be seen, a
cause of danger to that kingdom. For by giving such
reputation to the Swiss, France has disheartened all her own troops,
the infantry having been abolished in the men at arms

(01:25:32):
being obliged to foreigners for assistance, for being accustomed to
fight with Swiss troops, they think they cannot conquer without them.
Whence it comes that the French are insufficiently strong to
oppose the Swiss, and without the aid of the Swiss
they will not venture against others. The armies of the
French are thus of a mixed kind, partly mercenary and

(01:25:52):
partly her own. Taken together, they are much better than
troops entirely composed of mercenaries or auxiliar, but much inferior
to national forces. Chapter fourteen. What the duties of a
prince are with regard to the militia. A prince should
therefore have no other aim or thought, nor take up

(01:26:13):
any other thing for his study, but war and its
order and discipline. For that is the only art that
is necessary to one who commands. And it is of
such virtue that it not only maintains those who are
born princes, but often enables men of private fortune to
attain to that rank. And one sees, on the other hand,
that when princes think more of luxury than of arms,

(01:26:34):
they lose their state. The chief cause which makes any
one lose it is the contempt of this art, and
the way to acquire it is to be well versed
in the same Francesco's Forza, through being well armed, became
from a private position Duke of Milan. His sons, through
wishing to avoid the fatigue and hardship of war from dukes,

(01:26:55):
became private persons. For among other evils caused by being disarmed,
it renders you contemptible, which is one of those disgraceful
things which a prince must guard against, as will be
explained later. Because there is no comparison whatever between an
armed man and a disarmed one. It is not reasonable
to suppose that one who is armed will obey willingly

(01:27:16):
one who is unarmed, or that any unarmed man will
remain safe among armed servants. For one being disdainful and
the other suspicious, it is not possible for them to
act well together. And yet a prince who is ignorant
of military matters, besides the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot
be esteemed by his soldiers, nor have confidence in them.

(01:27:39):
He ought, therefore, never to let his thoughts stray from
the exercise of war, and in peace he ought to
practice it more than in war, which he can do
in two ways, both by action and by study. As
to action, he must, besides keeping his men well disciplined
and exercised, engage continually in hunting, and thus accustom his
body to hardships, and on the other hand, learn the

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nature of the land, how the mountains rise, how the
valleys are disposed, where the plains lie, and understand the
nature of the rivers and swamps, And to this he
should devote great attention. This knowledge is useful in two ways.
In the first place, one learns to know one's country
and can the better see how to defend it. Then,

(01:28:22):
by means of the knowledge and experience gained in one locality,
one can easily understand any other that it may be
necessary to venture on. For the hills and valleys, plains
and rivers of Tuscany, for instance, have a certain resemblance
to those of other provinces, so that from a knowledge
of the country in one province, one can easily arrive
at a knowledge of others. And that prince who is

(01:28:44):
lacking in this skill is wanting in the first essentials
of a leader, for it is this which teaches how
to find the enemy, take up quarters, lead armies, arrange marches,
and occupy positions with advantage. Philippemon, Prince of the ACHIEI,
among other praises bestowed on him by writers, is lauded
because in times of peace he thought of nothing but

(01:29:04):
the methods of warfare. And when he was in the
country with his friends, he often stopped and asked them
if the enemy were on that hill? And we found
ourselves here with our army, which of us would have
the advantage. How could we safely approach him, maintaining our
order if we wished to retire? What ought we to
do if they retired? How should we follow them? And

(01:29:26):
he put before them, as they went along all the
cases that might happen to an army, heard their opinion,
gave his own, fortifying it by argument, so that through
these continued cogitations there could never happen any incident when
leading his armies for which he was not prepared. But
as to exercise for the mind, the Prince ought to
read history and study the actions of eminent men, See

(01:29:47):
how they acted in warfare, examine the causes of their
victories and losses, in order to imitate the former and
avoid the latter. And above all, do as some eminent
men have done in the past, who have imitated someone
who has been much praised and glorified, and have always
kept their deeds and actions before them. As they say,
Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar Alexander, and Scipio Cyrus.

(01:30:13):
And whoever reads the Life of Cyrus written by Xenophon,
will perceive in the Life of Scipio how gloriously he
imitated him. And how in chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality
Scipio conformed to those qualities of Cyrus described by Xenophon.
A wise prince should follow similar methods, and never remain
idle in peaceful times, but by industry makes such good

(01:30:37):
use of the time as may serve him in adversity,
so that when fortune changes she may find him prepared
to resist her blows Chapter fifteen. Of the things for
which men, and especially princes are praised or blamed, it
remains now to be seen what are the methods and
rules for a prince as regards his subjects and friends.

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And as I know that many have written of them,
I fear that my writing about it may be deemed presumptuous,
differing as I do, especially in this matter, from the
opinions of others, but my intention being to write something
of use to those who understand it. It appears to
me more proper to go to the real truth of
the matter than to its imagination. And many have imagined

(01:31:18):
republics and principalities which have never been seen or known
to exist in reality. For how we live is so
far removed from how we ought to live, that he
who abandons what is done for what ought to be done,
will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than
his preservation. A man who wishes to make a profession
of goodness in everything must necessarily come to grief among

(01:31:39):
so many who are not good. Therefore, it is necessary
for a prince who wishes to maintain himself to learn
how not to be good, and to use it and
not use it according to the necessity of the case.
Leaving on one side, then those things which concern only
an imaginary prince, and speaking of those that are real,
I state that all men, when spoken of, and especially princes,

(01:32:02):
who are placed at a greater height, are noted for
some of those qualities which bring them either praise or blame.
Thus one is considered liberal, another miserly, one, a free giver,
another rapacious, one cruel, another merciful, one, a breaker of
his word, another faithful, one effeminate and pusillanimous, another fierce
and high spirited, one humane, another proud, one, lascivious, another chaste,

(01:32:27):
one frank, another astute, one hard, another easy, one serious,
another frivolous, one religious, another incredulous, and so on. I
know that every one will admit that it would be
highly praiseworthy in a prince to possess all the above
named qualities that are reputed good. But as they cannot
all be possessed or observed, human conditions not permitting of it,

(01:32:50):
it is necessary that he should be prudent enough to
avoid the disgrace of those vices which would lose him
the state, and guard himself against those which will not
lose at him, if possible, but if not able to,
he can indulge them with less scruple. And yet he
must not mind incurring the disgrace of those vices, without
which it would be difficult to save the state. For

(01:33:10):
if one considers well, it will be found that some
things which seem virtues, would, if followed, lead to one's ruin,
and some others which appear vices, result, if followed, in
one's greater security in well being. Chapter sixteen of Liberality
and Niggardliness. Beginning now with the first qualities above named,

(01:33:31):
I say that it would be well to be considered liberal. Nevertheless,
liberality used in such a way that you are not feared,
will injure you, because if used virtuously and in the
proper way, it will not be known, and you will
not incur the disgrace of the contrary vice. But one
who wishes to obtain the reputation of liberality among men
must not omit every kind of sumptuous display, and to

(01:33:53):
such an extent that a prince of this character will
consume by such means all his resources, and will be
at last impelled if he wishes to maintain his name
for liberality, to impose heavy charges on his people, become
an extortioner, and do everything possible to obtain money. This
will make his subjects begin to hate him, and he
will be little esteemed, being poor, so that, having by

(01:34:15):
this liberality injured many and benefited but few, he will
feel the first little disturbance and be endangered by every accident.
If he recognizes this and wishes to change his system,
he incurs at once the charge of niggardliness. A prince, therefore,
not being able to exercise this virtue of liberality without risk,
if it is known, must not if he is prudent,

(01:34:37):
object to be called miserly. In course of time, he
will be thought more liberal when it is seen that,
by his parsimony his revenue is sufficient that he can
defend himself against those who make war on him and
undertake enterprises without burdening his people, so that he is
really liberal to all those from whom he does not take,
who are infinite in number, and niggardly to all to

(01:34:58):
whom he does not give, who are few. In our
times we have seen nothing great done except by those
who have been esteemed niggardly. The others have all been ruined.
Pope Julius, too, although he had made use of a
reputation for liberality in order to attain the papacy, did
not seek to retain it afterwards so that he might
be able to make war on the King of France.

(01:35:19):
And he earned on so many wars without imposing an
extraordinary tax, because his extra expenses were covered by the
parsimony he had so long practiced. The present King of Spain,
if he had been thought liberal, would not have engaged
in and won so many enterprises. For these reasons, a
prince must care little for the reputation of being a miser,

(01:35:40):
if he wishes to avoid robbing his subjects, if he
wishes to be able to defend himself, to not become
poor and contemptible, and not to be forced to become
rapacious this vice of niggardliness is one of those vices
which enable him to reign. If it is said that
Caesar attained the empire through liberality, and that many others
have reached the highest positions through being liberal or being

(01:36:02):
thought so, I would reply that you are either a
prince already or else on the way to become one.
In the first case, this liberality is harmful. In the second,
it is certainly necessary to be considered liberal. And Caesar
was one of those who wished to attain the mastery
over Rome. But if after attaining it he had lived
and had not moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed

(01:36:23):
that empire. And should any one reply that there have
been many princes who have done great things with their
armies who have been thought extremely liberal, I would answer
by saying that the prince may either spend his own
wealth and that of his subjects, or the wealth of others.
In the first case, he must be sparing, but in
the second he must not neglect to be very liberal.

(01:36:45):
This liberality is very necessary to a prince who marches
with his armies and lives by plunder, sacking, and extorting,
and is dealing with the wealth of others, for without
it he would not be followed by his soldiers. And
you may be very generous, indeed with war, but is
not the property of yourself or your subjects, as were Cyrus,
Caesar and Alexander. For spending the wealth of others will

(01:37:07):
not diminish your reputation, but increase it. Only spending your
own resources will injure you. There is nothing which destroys
itself so much as liberality, for by using it you
lose the power of using it, and become either poor
and despicable, or to escape poverty, rapacious and hated. And
of all things that a prince must guard against, the

(01:37:28):
most important are being despicable or hated, And liberality will
lead you to one or other of these conditions. It
is therefore wiser to have the name of a miser,
which produces disgrace without hatred, than to incur, of necessity,
the name of being rapacious, which produces both disgrace and hatred.
Chapter seventeen, of Cruelty and Clemency, and whether it is

(01:37:51):
better to be loved or feared, Proceeding to the other
qualities before named, I say that every prince must desire
to be considered merciful and not cruel. He must, however,
take care not to misuse this mercifulness. Cheserree Borjaw was
considered cruel, but his cruelty had settled the Romagna, united it,

(01:38:12):
and brought it peace and confidence. If this is considered
a benefit, it will be seen that he was really
much more merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid
the name of cruelty, allowed Pistoia to be destroyed. A
prince therefore must not mind incurring the charge of cruelty
for the purpose of keeping his subjects united and confident,

(01:38:33):
For with a very few examples, he will be more
merciful than those who, from excessive tenderness allow disorders to
arise from whence spring murders and rapin for these, as
a rule, injure the whole community, while the executions carried
out by the prince injure only one individual, and of
all princes, it is impossible for a new prince to

(01:38:53):
escape the name of cruel new states being always full
of dangers. Wherefore Virgil makes Dido a excuse the inhumanity
of her rule by its being new. Where she says
residential dura edi regni novita's metalia cogunt moleriri e late
finds custo turi. Nevertheless, he must be cautious in believing

(01:39:14):
and acting, and must not inspire fear of his own accord,
and must proceed in a temperate manner, with prudence and humanity,
so that too much confidence does not render him incautious,
and too much diffidence does not render him intolerant. From
this arises the question whether it is better to be
loved more than feared, or feared more than loved. The

(01:39:34):
reply is that one ought to be both feared and loved,
But as it is difficult for the two to go together,
it is much safer to be feared than loved if
one of the two has to be wanting. For it
may be said of men in general that they are ungrateful,
voluble dissemblers, anxious to avoid danger, and covetous of gain.
As long as you benefit them, they are entirely yours.

(01:39:57):
They offer you their blood, their goods, their life, and
their children, as I have before said, when the necessity
is remote, but when it approaches, they revolt, and the prince,
who has relied solely on their words, without making other
preparations is ruined for the friendship which is gained by
purchase and not through grandeur. Nobility of spirit is merited,

(01:40:18):
but is not secured, and at times is not to
be had. And men have less scrupled in offending one
who makes himself loved than one who makes himself feared.
For love is held by a chain of obligation, which men,
being selfish, is broken whenever it serves their purpose. But
fear is maintained by a dread of punishment which never fails. Still,

(01:40:39):
a prince should make himself feared in such a way that,
if he does not gain love, he at any rate
avoids hatred. For fear and the absence of hatred may
well go together, and will be always attained by one
who abstains from interfering with the property of his citizens
and subjects, or with their women, and when he is
obliged to take the life of any one, to do

(01:40:59):
so when there is a proper justification and manifest reason
for it. But above all he must abstain from taking
the property of others. For men forget more easily the
death of their father than the loss of their patrimony.
Then also pretexts for seizing property are never wanting, and
one who begins to live by rapid will always find
some reason for taking the goods of others, whereas causes

(01:41:21):
for taking life are rarer and more quickly destroyed. But
when the prince is with his army and has a
large number of soldiers under his control, then it is
extremely necessary that he should not mind being thought cruel,
for without this reputation he could not keep an army
united or disposed to any duty. Among the noteworthy actions
of Hannibal is numbered this that, although he had an

(01:41:43):
enormous army composed of men of all nations and fighting
in foreign countries, there never arose any dissension, either among
them or against the prince, either in good fortune or
in bad. This could not be due to anything but
his inhuman cruelty, which together with his infinite other virtues,
made him always venerated and terrible in the sight of
his soldiers, And without it his other virtues would not

(01:42:06):
have sufficed to produce that effect. Thoughtless writers admire on
the one hand his actions, and on the other blame
the principal cause of them, And that it is true
that his other virtues would not have sufficed may be
seen from the case of Scipio very rare, not only
in his own times, but in all times of which
memory remains. Whose armies rebelled against him in Spain, which

(01:42:28):
arose from nothing but his excessive kindness, which allowed more
license to the soldiers than was consonant with military discipline.
He was reproached with this in the Senate by Fabius Maximus,
who called him a corruptor of the Roman militia. The locrey,
having been destroyed by one of Scipio's officers, were not
revenged by him, nor was the insolence of that officer

(01:42:49):
punished simply by reason of his easy nature, so much
so that some one wishing to excuse him in the Senate,
said that there were many men who knew rather how
not to err, than how to curre the errors of others.
This disposition would in time have tarnished the fame and
glory of Scipio had he persevered in it under the Empire.
But living under the rule of the Senate, this harmful

(01:43:10):
quality was not only concealed, but became a glory to him.
I conclude, therefore, with regard to being feared and loved,
that men love at their own free will, but fear
at the will of the prince, And that a wise
prince must rely on what is in his power, and
not on what is in the power of others, and
he must only trouble himself to avoid incurring hatred. As

(01:43:31):
has been explained Chapter eighteen, in what way princes must
keep faith. How laudable it is for a prince to
keep good faith and live with integrity and not with astuteness.
Every one knows. Still the experience of our times shows
those princes to have done great things, who have had
little regard for good faith, and have been able by

(01:43:52):
astuteness to confuse men's brains, and who have ultimately overcome
those who have made loyalty their foundation. You must know, then,
that there are two methods of fighting, the one by law,
the other by force. The first method is that of men,
the second of beasts. But as the first method is
often insufficient, one must have recourse to the second. It

(01:44:14):
is therefore necessary to know well how to use both
the beast and the man. This was covertly taught to
princes by ancient writers who relate how Achilles and many
others of those princes were given to Chyron the centaur
to be brought up, who kept them under his discipline.
This system of having for teacher one who was half
beast and half man is meant to indicate that a
prince must know how to use both natures, and that

(01:44:37):
the one without the other is not durable. A prince,
being thus obliged to know well how to act as
a beast, must imitate the fox and the lion, for
the lion cannot protect himself from snares, and the fox
cannot defend himself from wolves. One must therefore be a
fox to recognize snares, and a lion to frighten wolves.

(01:44:57):
Those that wish to be only lions do not unders
stand this. Therefore, a prudent ruler ought not to keep
faith when by so doing it would be against his interest,
and when the reasons which made him bind himself no
longer exist. If men were all good, this precept would
not be a good one. But as they are bad
and would not observe their faith with you, so you

(01:45:18):
are not bound to keep faith with them. Nor are
legitimate grounds ever wanting to a prince to give color
to the non fulfillment of his promise of this one
could furnish an infinite number of modern examples and show
how many times peace has been broken, and how many
promises rendered worthless by the faithlessness of princes. And those
that have been best able to imitate the fox have

(01:45:40):
succeeded best. But it is necessary to be able to
disguise this character well, and to be a great feigner
and dissembler. And men are so simple and so ready
to obey present necessities, that one who deceives will always
find those who allow themselves to be deceived. I will
only mention one modern instance. Alexander the sixth did nothing

(01:46:02):
else but deceive men. He thought of nothing else and
found the way to do it. No man was ever
more able to give assurances or affirm things with stronger oaths,
and no man observed them less. However, he always succeeded
in his deceptions, as he knew well this side of
the world. It is not therefore necessary for a prince

(01:46:23):
to have all the above named qualities, but it is
very necessary to seem to have them. I would even
be bold to say that to possess them and to
always observe them is dangerous. But to appear to possess
them is useful. Thus it is well to seem pious, faithful, humane, religious, sincere,
and also to be so. But you must have the

(01:46:43):
mind so watchful that when it is needful to be otherwise,
you may be able to change to the opposite qualities.
And it must be understood that a prince, and especially
a new prince, cannot observe all those things which are
considered good in men, being often obliged in order to
maintain the state, to act against faith, against charity, against humanity,

(01:47:03):
and against religion. And therefore he must have a mind
disposed to adapt itself according to the wind, and as
the variations of fortune dictate, and as I said before,
not deviate from what is good if possible, but be
able to do evil if necessitated. A prince must take
great care that nothing goes out of his mouth which

(01:47:25):
is not full of the above named five qualities. And
to see and hear him, he should seem to be
all faith, all integrity, all humanity, and all religion. And
nothing is more necessary than to seem to have this
last quality. For men in general judge more by the
eyes than by the hands. For every one can see,
but very few have to feel. Everybody sees what you

(01:47:48):
appear to be, few feel what you are, and those
few will not dare to oppose themselves to the many
who have the majesty of the state to defend them.
And in the actions of men, and especially of princes,
from which which there is no appeal, the end is everything.
Let a prince therefore aim at living in maintaining state
the state the means will always be judged honorable and

(01:48:09):
praised by every one, For the vulgar is always taken
by appearances and the result of things, and the world
consists only of the vulgar, and the few find a
place when the many have nothing to rest upon. A
certain prince of the present time, whom it is well
not to name, never does anything but preach peace and
good faith. But he is really a great enemy to both,

(01:48:30):
and either of them, had he observed them, would have
lost him both state and reputation on many occasions. Chapter nineteen.
That we must avoid being despised and hated. But as
I have now spoken of the most important of the
qualities in question, I will now deal briefly with the
rest on the general principle that the prince must, as

(01:48:51):
already stated avoid those things which will make him hated
or despised. And whenever he succeeds in this, he will
have done his part, and will find no danger in
other vices. He will chiefly become hated, as I said,
by being rapacious and usurping the property in women of
his subjects, which he must abstain from doing. And whenever
one does not attack the property or honor of the

(01:49:13):
generality of men, they will live contented, and one will
only have to combat the ambition of a few who
can be easily held in check. In many ways. He
is rendered despicable by being thought changeable, frivolous, effeminate, timid,
and irresolute, which a prince must guard against as a
rock of danger, and manage so that his actions show grandeur,

(01:49:34):
high courage, seriousness and strength. And as to the government
of his subjects, let his sentence be irrevocable, and let
him adhere to his decisions, so that no one may
think of deceiving him or making him change. The prince
who creates such an opinion of himself gets a great reputation,
and it is very difficult to conspire against one who
has a great reputation and he will not easily be

(01:49:56):
attacked so long as it is known that he is
esteemed and reverenced by his head subjects. For a prince
must have two kinds of fear, one internal as regards
his subjects, one external as regards foreign powers. From the latter,
he can defend himself with good arms and good friends,
and he will always have good friends. If he has
good arms, and internal matters will always remain quiet if

(01:50:19):
they are not perturbed by conspiracy, and even if external
powers sought to foment one, if he has ruled and
lived as I have described, he will always, if he
stands firm, be able to sustain every shock, as I
have shown that Nobbies the Spartan did. But with regard
to the subjects, if not acted on from outside, it
is still to be feared lest they conspire in secret,

(01:50:40):
from which the prince may guard himself well by avoiding
hatred and contempt, and keeping the people satisfied with him,
which it is necessary to accomplish, as has been related
at length, and one of the most potent remedies that
a prince has against conspiracies is that of not being
hated or despised by the mass of the people. For
whoever conspires always believes that he will satisfy the people

(01:51:02):
by the death of their prince. But if he thought
to offend them by doing this, he would fear to
engage in such an undertaking. For the difficulties that conspirators
have to meet are infinite. Experience shows that there have
been very many conspiracies, but few have turned out well.
For whoever conspires cannot act alone and cannot find companions

(01:51:22):
except among those who are discontented. And as soon as
you have disclosed your intention to a malcontent, you give
him the means of satisfying himself, For by revealing it
he can hope to secure everything he wants to such
an extent that, seeing a certain gain by doing this,
and seeing on the other hand, only a doubtful one
and full of danger, he must either be a rare

(01:51:43):
friend to you or else a very bitter enemy to
the prince, if he keeps faith with you. And to
reduce the matter to narrow limits, I say that on
the side of the conspirator there is nothing but fear, jealousy, suspicion,
and dread of punishment, which frightens him. And on the
side of the prince. Since there is the majesty of government,
the laws, the protection of friends, and of the state

(01:52:04):
which guard him. When to these things are added the
good will of the people, it is impossible that any
one should have the temerity to conspire. For whereas generally
a conspirator has to fear before the execution of his plot,
in this case he must also fear afterwards, having the
people for an enemy when his crime is accomplished, and
thus not being able to hope for any refuge. Numberless

(01:52:28):
instances might be given of this, but I will content
myself with one which took place within the memory of
our fathers. Messer Annabel Bentivogli, Prince of Bologna, ancestor of
the present Messer Annabel was killed by the canchi who
conspired against him. He left no relations but Messer Giovanni,
who was then an infant. But after the murder, the

(01:52:49):
people rose up and killed all the canchi. This arose
from the popular good will that the house of Bentivogli
enjoyed at that time in Bologna, which was so great that,
as there is nobody left after the death of Annibale
who could govern the state, the bolognais hearing that there
was one of the Bentivogli family in Florence, who had
till then been thought the son of a blacksmith, came

(01:53:10):
to fetch him and gave him the government of the city,
and it was governed by him until Messer Giovanni was
old enough to assume the government. I conclude therefore, that
a prince need trouble little about conspiracies when the people
are well disposed, but when they are hostile and hold
him in hatred, then he must fear everything in everybody.
Well ordered states and wise princes have studied diligently not

(01:53:33):
to drive the nobles to desperation, and to satisfy the
populace and keep it contented, for this is one of
the most important matters that a prince has to deal with.
Among the kingdoms that are well ordered and governed in
our time is France, and there we find numberless good
institutions on which depend the liberty and security of the king.
Of these, the chief is the parliament and its authority,

(01:53:54):
because he who established that kingdom, knowing the ambition and
insolence of the great nobles, and deeming it necessary to
have a bid in their mouths to check them, and, knowing,
on the other hand, the hatred of the mass of
the people to the great based on fear, and wishing
to secure them, did not wish to make this the
special care of the king, to relieve him of the
dissatisfaction that he might incur among the nobles by favoring

(01:54:16):
the people, and among the people by favoring the nobles.
He therefore established a third judge, that, without direct charge
of the king, kept in check the great and favored
the lesser people. Nor could any better or more prudent
measure have been adopted, nor better precaution for the safety
of the king and the kingdom, from which another notable

(01:54:37):
rule can be drawn, that princes should let the carrying
out of unpopular duties devolve on others, and bestow favors themselves.
I conclude again by saying that a prince must esteem
his nobles, but not make himself hated by the populace.
It may perhaps seem to some that, considering the life
and death of many Roman emperors, that they are instances.

(01:54:58):
Contrary to my opinion, find that some who lived always
nobly and showed great strength of character, nevertheless lost the empire,
or were killed by their subjects who conspired against them.
Wishing to answer these objections, I will discuss the qualities
of some emperors, showing the cause of their ruin not
to be at variance with what I have stated. And
I will also partly consider the things to be noted

(01:55:20):
by whoever reads the deeds of these times. I will
content myself with taking all those emperors who succeeded to
the empire, from Marcus the Philosopher to Maximinus. These were Marcus, Commotus,
his son, prudonax Heliogablus, Alexander, and Maximinus. And the first
thing to note is that whereas other princes have only

(01:55:40):
to contend against the ambition of the great and the
insolence of the people, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty,
that of having to support the cruelty in avarice of
the soldiers, which was such a difficulty that it was
the cause of the ruin of many, it being difficult
to satisfy both the soldiers and the people. For the
people love tranquility, and therefore like princes who are pacific,

(01:56:02):
but the soldiers prefer a prince of military spirit who
is insolent, cruel, and rapacious. They wish him to exercise
these qualities on the people, so that they may get
double pay and give vent to their avarice and cruelty.
Thus it came about that those emperors, who, by nature
or art had not such a reputation as could keep
both parties in check, invariably were ruined, And the greater

(01:56:25):
number of them who were raised to the empire, being
new men, knowing the difficulties of these two opposite dispositions,
confined themselves to satisfying the soldiers, and thought little of
injuring the people. This choice was necessary, princes, not being
able to avoid being hated by some one, they must
first try not to be hated by the mass of
the people. If they cannot accomplish this, they must use

(01:56:48):
every means to escape the hatred of the most powerful parties.
And therefore these emperors, who, being new men, had need
of extraordinary favors, adhered to the soldiers more willingly than
to the people. Whether this, however, was of use to
them or not, depended on whether the prince knew how
to maintain his reputation with them. From these causes, it

(01:57:08):
resulted that Marcus Prudinax and Alexander, being all of modest life,
lovers of justice, enemies of cruelty, humane and benign, had
all a sad ending except Marcus. Marcus alone lived and
died in honor, because he succeeded to the empire by
hereditary right, and did not owe it either to the
soldiers or to the people. Besides which, possessing many virtues

(01:57:31):
which made him revered, he kept both parties in their
place as long as he lived, and was never either
hated or despised. But Pertinax was created emperor against the
will of the soldiers, who, being accustomed to live licentiously
under Commodus, could not put up with the honest life
to which Pertinax wished to limit them. So that, having
made himself hated, and to this contempt being added because

(01:57:53):
he was old, he was ruined at the very beginning
of his administration. Whence it may be seen that hatred
is gained as much by good works as by evil.
And therefore, as I said before, a prince who wishes
to maintain the state is often forced to do evil.
For when that party, whether populace, soldiery, or nobles, whichever
it be, that you consider necessary to you. For keeping

(01:58:15):
your position is corrupt, you must follow its humor and
satisfy it, and in that case good works will be
inimical to you. But let us come to Alexander, who
was of such goodness that, among other things for which
he is praised, it is said that in the fourteen
years that he reigned, no one was put to death
by him without a fair trial. Nevertheless, being considered a

(01:58:36):
feminate and a man who allowed himself to be ruled
by his mother, and having thus fallen into contempt, the
army conspired against him and killed him. Looking on the
other hand, at the qualities of Commodus Severus Antoninus, extremely
cruel and rapacious to satisfy the soldiers, there was no
injury which they would not inflict on the people, and

(01:58:57):
all except Severus ended badly. Severus, however, had such abilities
that by maintaining the soldiers friendly to him, he was
able to reign happily, although he oppressed the people, for
his virtues made him so admirable in the sight both
of the soldiers and the people that the latter were,
as it were, astonished and stupefied, while the former were

(01:59:18):
respectful and contented, as the deeds of this ruler were
great for a new prince, I will briefly show how
well he could use the qualities of the Fox and
the Lion, whose natures, as I said before, it is
necessary for a prince to imitate. Knowing the sloth of
the Emperor Julian, Severus, who was leader of the army
in Slavonia, persuaded the troops that it would be well

(01:59:40):
to go to Rome to avenge the death of Perdanax,
who had been slain by the Imperial Guard, and under
this pretext, without revealing his aspirations to the throne, marched
with his army to Rome and was in Italy before
his design was known. On his arrival in Rome, the
senate elected him emperor through fear, and Julian died. There

(02:00:00):
remained after this beginning two difficulties to be faced by
Severus before he could obtain the whole control of the empire.
One in Asia, where Nigrinus, head of the Asiatic armies,
had declared himself emperor. The other in the West from Albinus,
who also aspired to the empire, and as he judged
it dangerous to show himself hostile to both he decided

(02:00:21):
to attack Nigrinus and deceive Albinus, to whom he wrote that,
having been elected emperor by the senate, he wished to
share that dignity with him. He sent him the title
of Caesar, and by deliberation of the Senate he was
declared his colleague, all of which was accepted as true
by Albinus. But when Severus had defeated and killed Nigrinus
and pacified things in the east, he returned to Rome

(02:00:44):
and charged Albinus in the Senate with having, unmindful of
the benefits received from him, traitorously sought to assassinate him,
and stated that he was therefore obliged to go and
punish his ingratitude. He then went to France to meet him,
and there deprived him of both his position and his life.
Whoever examines in detail the actions of Severus will find

(02:01:05):
him to have been a very ferocious lion and an
extremely astute fox, and will see him to have been
feared and respected by all, and not hated by the army,
and will not be surprised that he, a new man,
should have been able to hold the empire so well,
since his great reputation defended him always from that hatred
that his rapacity might have produced in the people. But Antoninus,

(02:01:26):
his son, was also a man of great ability and
possessed qualities that rendered him admirable in the sight of
the people, and also made him popular with the soldiers,
for he was a military man, capable of enduring the
most extreme hardships, disdainful of delicate food and every other luxury,
which made him loved by all the armies. However, his
ferocity and cruelty were so great and unheard of, through

(02:01:49):
his having, after executing many private individuals, caused a large
part of the population of Rome and all that of
Alexandria to be killed, that he became hated by all
the world, and began to be feared by those about him,
to such an extent that he was finally killed by
a centurion in the midst of his army. Whence, it
is to be noted that this kind of death, which
proceeds from the deliberate action of a determined man, cannot

(02:02:12):
be avoided by princes, since any one who does not
fear death himself can inflict it. But a prince need
not fear much on this account, as such actions are
extremely rare he must only guard against committing any grave
injury to any one he makes use of or has
about him for his service, like Antoninus had done, having
caused the death with contumily of the brother of that centurion,

(02:02:34):
and also threatened him every day, although he still retained
him in his bodyguard, which was a foolish and dangerous
thing to do, as the fact proved. But let us
come to Commodus, who might easily have kept the empire,
having succeeded to it by heredity, being the son of Marcus,
and it would have sufficed for him to follow in
the steps of his father to have satisfied both the

(02:02:56):
people and the soldiers. But being of a cruel and
bestiald disposition, in order to be able to exercise his
rapacity on the people, he sought to amuse the soldiers
and render them licentious. On the other hand, by not
maintaining his dignity, by often descending into the theater to
fight with gladiators and committing other contemptible actions little worthy

(02:03:16):
of the imperial dignity, he became despicable in the eyes
of the soldiers, and being hated on the one hand
and despised on the other, he was conspired against and killed.
There remains to be described the character of Maximinus. He
was an extremely warlike man, and as the armies were
annoyed with the effeminacy of Alexander, which we have already

(02:03:38):
spoken of, he was after the death of the latter
elected emperor. He did not enjoy it for long, as
two things made him hated and despised, though one his
base origin, as he had been a shepherd in Thrace,
which was generally known and caused great disdain on all sides.
The other because he had, at the commencement of his rule,
deferred going to Rome to take possession of the imperial seat,

(02:04:00):
and had obtained a reputation for great cruelty, having, through
his prefects in Rome and other parts of the Empire,
committed many acts of cruelty. The whole world being thus
moved by indignation for the baseness of his blood, and
also by the hatred caused by fear of his ferocity.
He was conspired against, first by Africa, and afterwards by
the Senate and all the people of Rome and Italy.

(02:04:23):
His own army also joined them, for besieging Aquileia and
finding it difficult to take they became enraged at his cruelty,
and seeing that he had so many enemies, they feared
him less and put him to death. I will not
speak of Heliogabalus, of Macrinus or Julian, who, being entirely contemptible,
were immediately suppressed. But I will come to the conclusion

(02:04:44):
of this discourse by saying that the princes of our
time have less difficulty than these of being obliged to
satisfy in an extraordinary degree their soldiers in their states.
For although they must have a certain consideration for them,
yet it is soon settled, for none of these princes
have armed means that are inextricably bound up with them
administration of the government and the rule of their provinces,

(02:05:05):
as were the armies of the Roman Empire. And therefore,
if it was then necessary to satisfy the soldiers rather
than the people, it was because the soldiers could do
more than the people. Now it is more necessary to
all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy
the people than the soldiers, for the people can do
more than the soldiers. I accept the Turk because he

(02:05:27):
always keeps about him twelve thousand infantry in fifteen thousand cavalry,
on which depend the security and strength of his kingdom,
and it is necessary for him to postpone every other
consideration of the people to keep them friendly. It is
the same with the kingdom of the Soldan, which being
entirely in the hands of the soldiers, he is bound
to keep their friendship, regardless of the people. And it

(02:05:49):
is to be noted that this state of the Souldan
is different from that of all other princes, being similar
to the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either a
hereditary kingdom or a new one, for the sons of
the day that a prince are not his heirs, but
he who is elected to that position by those who
have authority. And as this order is ancient, it cannot
be called a new kingdom, there being none of these

(02:06:10):
difficulties which exist in new ones, as although the prince
is new, the rules of that state are old and
arranged to receive him as if he were their hereditary lord.
But returning to our matter, I say that whoever studies
the preceding argument will see that either hatred or contempt
were the causes of the ruin of the emperors named
and will also observe how it came about that, some

(02:06:31):
of them acting in one way and some in another.
In both ways there were some who had a fortunate
and others an unfortunate ending. As Perninax and Alexander were
both new rulers, it was useless and injurious for them
to try and imitate Marcus, who was a hereditary prince.
And similarly with Kerikalla, Commtus and Maximinus, it was pernicious

(02:06:52):
for them to imitate Severus, as they had not sufficient
ability to follow in his footsteps. Thus, a new prince
cannot imitate the actions of Marcus in his dominions, nor
is it necessary for him to imitate those of Severus.
But he must take from Severest those portions that are
necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those that
are useful and glorious for conserving a state that is

(02:07:14):
already established and secure. Chapter twenty. Whether fortresses and other
things which princes often make are useful or injurious? Some princes,
in order to securely hold their possessions, have disarmed their subjects.
Some others have kept their subject lands divided into parts.
Others have fomented enmities against themselves. Others have endeavored to

(02:07:36):
win over those whom they suspected at the commencement of
their rule. Some have constructed fortresses, others have ruined and
destroyed them. And although one cannot pronounce a definite judgment
as to these things without going into the particulars of
the state to which such a deliberation is to be applied,
still I will speak in such a broad way as
the matter will permit of A new prince has never

(02:07:58):
been known to disarm his son subjects. On the contrary,
when he has found them disarmed, he has always armed them.
For by arming them, these arms become your own. Those
that you suspected become faithful, and those that were faithful
remain so, And from being merely subjects become your partisans.
And since all the subjects cannot be armed, when you
benefit those that you arm, you can deal more safely

(02:08:20):
with the others. And this different treatment that they notice
renders your men more obliged to you. The others will
excuse you, judging that those have necessarily greater merit, who
have greater danger and heavier duties. But when you disarm them,
you commence to offend them, and show that you distrust them,
either through cowardice or lack of confidence, and both of
these opinions generate hatred against you. And as you cannot

(02:08:44):
remain unarmed, you are obliged to resort to a mercenary militia,
of which we have already stated the value. And even
if it were good, it cannot be sufficient in number
to defend you against powerful enemies and suspected subjects. But
as I have said, a new prince in an the new
dominion always has his subjects armed. History is full of
such examples. But when a prince acquires a new state

(02:09:08):
as an addition to his old one, then it is
necessary to disarm that state, except those who, in acquiring
it have sided with you. And even these one must,
when time and opportunity serve, render weak and effeminate, and
arrange things so that all the arms of the new
state are in the hands of your own soldiers, who,
in your old state live near you. Our forefathers and

(02:09:28):
those who were esteemed wise, used to say that it
was necessary to hold Pistolia by means of factious and
Pisa with fortresses, And for this purpose they fomented differences
among their subjects in some town in order to possess
it more easily. This, in those days when Italy was
fairly divided, was doubtless well done, but does not seem
to me to be a good precept for the present time,

(02:09:51):
for I do not believe that the divisions thus created
ever do any good. On the contrary, it is certain
that when the enemy approaches, the cities thus divided will
be at once lost ust, for the weaker faction will
always side with the enemy, and the other will not
be able to stand. The Venetians actuated, I believe, by
the aforesaid motives, cherish the Gwelph and Gibbling factions in

(02:10:12):
the cities subject to them, And although they never allowed
them to come to bloodshed, they yet encouraged these differences
among them, so that the citizens, being occupied in their
own quarrels, might not act against them. This, however, did
not avail them anything, as was seen when after the
defeat of Vilah, a part of those subjects immediately took
courage and took from them the whole state. Such methods

(02:10:36):
besides argue weakness in a prince, for in a strong
government such dissensions will never be permitted. They are profitable
only in time of peace, as by means of them
it is easy to manage one's subjects, but when it
comes to war, the fallacy of such a policy is
at once shown without doubt. Princes become great when they

(02:10:56):
overcome difficulties in opposition, and therefore, fortune, especially when it
wants to render a new prince great, who has greater
need of gaining a great reputation than a hereditary prince,
raises up enemies and compels him to undertake wars against them,
so that he may have cause to overcome them, and
thus raise himself higher by means of that latter which
his enemies have brought him. There are many who think, therefore,

(02:11:19):
that a wise prince ought when he has the chance
to foment astuteles some enmity, so that by suppressing it
he will augment his greatness. Princes, and especially new ones,
have found more faith and more usefulness in those men whom,
at the beginning of their power they regarded with suspicion
than in those they at first confided in. Pandolpho Petrucci,

(02:11:40):
Prince of Siena, governed his state more by those whom
he suspected than by others. But of this we cannot
speak at large, as it varies according to the subject.
I will merely say that these men, who at the
beginning of a new government were enemies, if they are
of a kind to need support to maintain their position,
can be very easily gained by the Prince, and they
are the more compelled to serve him faithfully, as they

(02:12:02):
know they must, by their deeds cancel the bad opinion
previously held of them. And thus the Prince will always
derive greater help from them than from those who, serving
him with greater security, neglect his interest. And as the
matter requires it, I will not omit to remind a
prince who has newly taken a state with the secret
help of its inhabitants, that he must consider well the

(02:12:24):
motives that have induced those who have favored him to
do so, And if it is not natural affection for him,
but only because they were not contented with the state
as it was, he will have great trouble and difficulty
in maintaining their friendship, because it will be impossible for
him to content them. And on well examining the cause
of this in the examples drawn from ancient and modern times,

(02:12:44):
it will be seen that it is much easier to
gain the friendship of those men who were contented with
the previous condition, and were therefore at first enemies, than
that of those who, not being contented, became his friends
and helped him to occupy it. It has been the
custom of princes, in order to be able to hold
securely their state, to erect fortresses as a bridle and

(02:13:04):
bit to those who have designs against them, and in
order to have a secure refuge against a sudden assault.
I approve this method because it was anciently used. Nevertheless,
Messer Niko lo Vittelli has been seen in our own
time to destroy two fortresses in Cidadi Castello in order
to keep that state. G U I d Gubaldo, Duke

(02:13:26):
of Urbino, on returning to his dominions from which he
had been driven by chaseray Borga, raised to their foundations
all the fortresses of that province, and considered that without
them it would be more difficult for him to lose
again the state. The Bentivogli, in returning to Bologna, used
similar measures. Therefore, fortresses may or may not be useful

(02:13:47):
according to the times. If they do good in one
way they do harm in another. The question may be discussed. Thus,
a prince who fears his own people more than foreigners
ought to build fortresses. But he who has greater fear
year of foreigners than of his own people, ought to
do without them. The Castle of Milan, built by Francesco
s Fortsa, has given and will give more trouble to

(02:14:08):
the House of Sportsa than any other disorder in that state. Therefore,
the best fortress is to be found in the love
of the people. For although you may have fortresses, they
will not save you if you are hated by the people.
When once the people have taken arms against you, there
will never be lacking foreigners to assist them. In our times,
we do not see that they have profited any ruler

(02:14:30):
except the Countess of Forli on the death of her consort,
Count Girolamo. For she was thus enabled to escape the
popular rising and await help from Milan and recover the state,
the circumstances being then such that no foreigner could assist
the people. But afterwards they were of little use to
her when Cheserrey Borjaw attacked her, and the people, being
hostile to her, allied themselves with the foreigner, so that

(02:14:53):
then and before it would have been safer for her
not to be hated by the people than to have
the fortresses. Having considered these things, I would therefore praise
the one who erects fortresses and the one who does not,
and would blame anyone who, trusting in them, thinks little
of being hated by his people. Chapter twenty one, How
a prince must act in order to gain reputation. Nothing

(02:15:16):
causes a prince to be so much esteemed as great enterprises,
and setting a rare example, we have in our own
day Ferdinand, King of Aragon, at present King of Spain.
He may almost be termed a new prince, because from
a weak king he has become, for fame and glory
the first king in Christendom. And if you regard his actions,
you will find them all very great, in some of

(02:15:37):
them extraordinary. At the beginning of his reign he assailed Granada,
and that enterprise was the foundation of his state. At
first he did it leisurely and without fear of being
interfered with. He kept the minds of the barons of
Castile occupied in this enterprise, so that thinking only of
that war, they did not think of making innovations, and
he thus acquired reputation and power over them without them

(02:16:00):
being aware of it. He was able, with the money
of the church and the people to maintain his armies,
and by that long war lay the foundations of his
military power, which afterwards has made him famous. Besides this,
to be able to undertake greater enterprises, and always under
the pretext of religion, he had recourse to a pious cruelty,

(02:16:20):
driving out the moors from his kingdom and despoiling them.
No more admirable or rare example can be found. He
also attacked under the same pretext Africa, undertook his Italian enterprise,
and has lately attacked France, so that he has continually
contrived great things which have kept his subjects minds uncertain
and astonished and occupied in watching their result. And these

(02:16:44):
actions have arisen one out of the other, so that
they have left no time for men to settle down
and act against him. It is also very profitable for
a prince to give some rare examples of himself in
the internal administration, like those related of Messer Bernabo of Milan.
When it happens that some when one does something extraordinary,
either good or evil in civil life, and to take

(02:17:04):
a means of rewarding or punishing him, which will be
much talked about. And above all, a prince must endeavor
in every action to obtain fame for being great and excellent.
A prince is further esteemed when he is a true
friend or a true enemy, when that is, he declares
himself without reserve, in favor of some one against another.

(02:17:25):
This policy is always more useful than remaining neutral. For
if two neighboring powers come to blows, they are either
such that if one wins, you will have to fear
the victor, or else not. In either of these two cases,
it will be better for you to declare yourself openly
in make war, because in the first case, if you
do not declare yourself, you will fall a prey to

(02:17:46):
the victor, to the pleasure and satisfaction of the one
who has been defeated, and you will have no reason
nor anything to defend you, and nobody to receive you.
For whoever wins will not desire friends whom he suspects
and who do not help him when in try t
and whoever loses will not receive you, as you did
not take up arms to assist his cause. Antiochus went

(02:18:06):
to Greece, being sent by thee Toli to expel the Romans.
He sent orators to the Achii, who were friends of
the Romans, to encourage them to remain neutral. On the
other hand, the Romans persuaded them to take up arms
on their side. The matter was brought before the Council
of the Achii for deliberation, where the ambassador of Antiochus
sought to persuade them to remain neutral, to which the

(02:18:29):
Roman ambassador replied, as to what is said, that it
is best and most useful for your state not to
meddle in our war, nothing is further from the truth.
For if you do not meddle in it, you will become,
without any favor or any reputation, the prize of the victor.
And it will always happen that the one who is
not your friend will want you to remain neutral, and
the one who is your friend will require you to

(02:18:50):
declare yourself by taking arms. Irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers,
usually follow the way of neutrality and are mostly ruined
by it. But when the prince declares himself frankly in
favor of one side. If the one to whom you
adhere conquers, even if he is powerful, and you remain
at his discretion, he is under an obligation to you,

(02:19:11):
and friendship has been established. And men are never so
dishonest as to oppress you with such ingratitude. Moreover, victories
are never so prosperous that the victor does not need
to have some scruples, especially as to justice. But if
he to whom you adhere loses, you are sheltered by him,
and so long as he can, he will assist you.

(02:19:32):
You become the companion of a fortune which may rise again.
In the second case, when those who fight are such
that you have nothing to fear from the victor, it
is still more prudent on your part to adhere to one,
for you go to the ruin of one with the
help of him who ought to save him if he
were wise, And if he conquers, he rests at your discretion,
and it is impossible that he should not conquer with

(02:19:53):
your help. And here it should be noted that a
prince ought never to make common cause with one more
powerful than himself to injure another, unless necessity forces him
to it. As before said, for if he wins, you
rest at his discretion, and princes must avoid as much
as possible being at the discretion of others. The Venetians
united with France against the Duke of Milan, although they

(02:20:15):
could have avoided that union, and from it resulted their
own ruin. But when one cannot avoid it, as happened
to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain went with
their armies to attack Lombardy, then the prince ought to join.
For the above reasons. Let no state believe that it
can follow a secure policy. Rather, let it think that
all are doubtful. This is found in the nature of

(02:20:37):
things that one never tries to avoid one difficulty without
running into another. But prudence consists in being able to
know the nature of the difficulties and taking the least
harmful as good. A prince must also show himself a
lover of merit, and honor those who excel in every art. Moreover,
he must encourage his citizens to follow their callings quietly,

(02:20:58):
whether in commerce or agriculture, or any other trade that
men follow, so that this one shall not refrain from
improving his possessions through fear that they may be taken
from him, and that one from starting a trade for
fear of taxes. But he should offer rewards to whoever
does these things, and to whoever seeks in any way
to improve his city or state. Besides this, he ought,

(02:21:20):
at convenient seasons of the year to keep the people
occupied with festivals and spectacles. And as every city is
divided either into trades or into classes, he ought to
pay attention to all these things, mingle with them from
time to time, and give them an example of his
humanity in magnificence, always holding firm, however, the majesty of
his dignity, which must never be allowed to fan in

(02:21:42):
anything whatever Chapter twenty two of the Secretaries of Princes.
The choice of a prince's minister's is a matter of
no little importance. They are either good or not according
to the prudence of the prince. The first impression that
one gets of a ruler and a his brains is
from seeing the men that he has about him. When

(02:22:03):
they are competent and faithful, one can always consider him wise,
as he has been able to recognize their ability and
keep them faithful. But when they are the reverse, one
can always form an unfavorable opinion of him, because the
first mistake that he makes is in making this choice.
There was nobody who knew Messer Antonio de vinafro As
the minister of Pandolpho Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who did

(02:22:27):
not consider Pandolpho to be a very prudent man, having
him for his minister. There are three different kinds of brains.
The one understands things unassisted. The other understands things when
shown by others. The third understands neither alone nor with
the explanations of others. The first kind is most excellent,
the second also excellent, but the third useless. It is

(02:22:50):
therefore evident that if Pandolpho was not of the first kind,
he was at any rate of the second. For every
time that one has the judgment to know the good
and evil them, any one does or says, even if
he has no invention, Yet he recognizes the bad and
good works of his minister, and corrects the one and
supports the other, And the minister cannot hope to deceive him,
and therefore remains good for a prince to be able

(02:23:13):
to know a minister. There is this method which never fails.
When you see the minister think more of himself than
of you, and in all his actions seek his own profit.
Such a man will never be a good minister, and
you can never rely on him. For whoever has in
hand the state of another must never think of himself
but of the Prince, and not call to mind anything
but what relates to him. And on the other hand,

(02:23:37):
the Prince, in order to retain his fidelity, ought to
think of his minister, honoring and enriching him, doing him kindnesses,
and conferring on him honors, and giving him responsible tasks,
so that the great honors and riches bestowed on him
cause him not to desire other honors and riches, and
the tasks he has to fulfill make him fearful of changes,
knowing that he could not execute them without the Prince.

(02:23:59):
When prince and their ministers stand in this relation to
each other, they can rely the one upon the other.
When it is otherwise, the end is always injurious, either
for one or the other of them. Chapter twenty three.
How flatterers must be shunned. I must not omit an
important subject and a mistake which princes can with difficulty

(02:24:20):
avoid if they are not very prudent, or if they
do not make a good choice. And this is with
regard to flatterers, of which courts are full, because men
take such pleasure in their own things and deceive themselves
about them, that they can with difficulty guard against this plague.
And by wishing to guard against it, they run the
risk of becoming contemptible. Because there is no other way

(02:24:41):
of guarding oneself against flattery than by letting men understand
that they will not offend you by speaking the truth.
But when everyone can tell you the truth, you lose
their respect. A prudent prince must therefore take a third course,
by choosing in his state wise men, and giving these
alone full liberty to speak the truth to him, but
only of those things that he asks, and of nothing else.

(02:25:03):
But he must ask them about everything, and hear their opinion,
and afterwards deliberate by himself in his own way, and
in these councils, and with each of these men, comport himself,
so that every one may see that the more freely
he speaks, the more he will be acceptable. Outside these
he should listen to no one, go about the matter deliberately,
and be determined in his decisions. Whoever acts otherwise, either

(02:25:26):
acts precipitately through flattery or else, changes often through the
variety of opinions, from which it happens that he is
little esteemed. I will give a modern instance of this.
Pri Luca, a follower of Maximilian the present Emperor, speaking
of his majesty, said that he never took counsel with anybody,
and yet that he never did anything as he wished.

(02:25:47):
This arose from his following the contrary method to the aforesaid.
As the emperor is a secret man, he does not
communicate his designs to any one or take any one's advice.
But as on putting them into effect, they begin to
be known and discovered, they begin to be opposed by
those he has about him, and he is easily diverted
from his purpose. Hence, it comes to pass that what

(02:26:08):
he does one day, he undoes the next. No one
ever understands what he wishes or intends to do, and
no reliance is to be placed on his deliberations. A
prince therefore ought always to take counsel, but only when
he wishes, not when others wish. On the contrary, he
ought to discourage absolutely attempts to advise him, unless he
asks it. But he ought to be a great asker

(02:26:31):
and a patient hearer of the truth about those things
which he has inquired of. Indeed, if he finds that
any one has scruples in telling him the truth, he
should be angry. And since some think that a prince
who gains the reputation of being prudent is so considered
not by his nature but by the good counselors he
has about him, they are undoubtedly deceived. It is an

(02:26:51):
infallible rule that a prince who is not wise himself
cannot be well advised, unless, by chance he left himself
entirely in the hands of one man who ruled him
in everything, and happen to be a very prudent man.
In this case, he may doubtless be well governed, but
it would not last long, for that governor would in
a short time deprive him of the state. But by

(02:27:12):
taking council with many, a prince who is not wise
will never have united councils, and will not be able
to unite them for himself. The councilors will all think
of their own interests, and he will be unable either
to correct or to understand them. And it cannot be
otherwise for men will always be false to you, unless
they are compelled by necessity to be true. Therefore, it

(02:27:34):
must be concluded that wise counsels, from whoever they come,
must necessarily be due to the prudence of the prince,
and not the prudence of the prince. To the good
councils received Chapter twenty four. Why the princes of Italy
have lost their states. The before mentioned things, if prudently observed,
make a new prince seem ancient, and render him at

(02:27:56):
once more secure and firmer in the state than if
he had been established. Therefore, for a new prince is
much more observed in his actions than a hereditary one,
and when these are recognized as virtuous, he gains men more,
and they are more bound to him than if he
were of the ancient blood. For men are much more
taken by present than by past things, and when they

(02:28:17):
find themselves well off in the present, they enjoy it
and seek nothing more. On the contrary, they will do
all they can to defend him, so long as the
prince is not, in other things, wanting to himself. And
thus he will have the double glory of having founded
a new realm and adorned it, and fortified it with
good laws, good arms, good friends, and good examples, as

(02:28:38):
he will have double shame who is born a prince
and through want of prudence, has lost it. And if
one considers those rulers who have lost their position in
Italy in our days, such as the King of Naples,
the Duke of Milan, and others, one will find in
them first a common defect as to their arms. For
the reasons discussed at length. Then we observe that some

(02:28:58):
of them either had the people hostile to mek them,
or that if the people were friendly, they were not
able to make sure of the nobility. For without these defects,
states are not lost that have enough strength to be
able to keep an army in the field. Philip of Macedon,
not the father of Alexander the Great, but the one
who was conquered by Titus Quintius, did not possess a

(02:29:19):
great state compared to the greatness of Rome and Greece
which assailed him. But being a military man and one
who knew how to divert the people and make sure
of the great he was able to sustain the war
against them for many years, and if at length he
lost his power over several cities, he was still able
to keep his kingdom. Therefore, those of our princes who
had held their possessions for many years must not accuse

(02:29:42):
fortune for having lost them, but rather their own negligence
for having never, in quiet times, considered that things might change,
as it is a common fault of men not to
reckon on storms in fair weather. When adverse times came,
they only thought of fleeing from them instead of defending themselves,
and hoped that the people, enraged by the insolence of
the conquerors would recall them. This measure, when others are wanting,

(02:30:06):
is good, but it is very bad to have neglected
the other remedies for that one. For nobody would desire
to fall because he believed that he would then find
some one to pick him up. This may or may
not take place, and if it does, it is not
with safety to you, as that defense is known to
be cowardly and not to be depended on. And only
those defenses are good, certain, and durable, which depend only

(02:30:29):
on yourself and your own ability. Chapter twenty five. How
much fortune can do in human affairs, and how it
may be opposed. It is not unknown to me how
many have been, and are of opinion, that worldly events
are so governed by fortune and by God, that men cannot,
by their prudence change them, and that on the contrary,
there is no remedy whatever, And for this they may

(02:30:51):
judge it to be useless to toil much about them,
but let things be ruled by chance. This opinion has
been more believed in in our day, from the great
changes that have been seen, and are daily seen, beyond
every human conjecture. When I think about them, at times,
I am partly inclined to share this opinion. Nevertheless, that

(02:31:12):
our free will may not be altogether extinguished. I think
it may be true that fortune is the ruler of
half our actions, but that she allows the other half,
or a little less, to be governed by us. I
would compare her to an impetuous river, that, when turbulent,
inundates the plains, ruins trees and buildings, removes earth from
this side and places it on the other. Every One

(02:31:34):
flies before it, and everything yields to its fury without
being able to oppose it. And yet though it is
of such a kind, still, when it is quiet, men
can make provision against it by dams and banks, so
that when it rises, it will either go into a canal,
or its rush will not be so wild and dangerous.
It happens similarly with fortune, which shows her power where

(02:31:55):
no measures have been taken to resist her, and turns
her fury where she knows that no dams barriers have
been made to hold her. And if you regard Italy,
which has been the seat of these changes, and who
has given the impulse to them, you will see her
to be a country without dams or barriers of any kind.
If she had been protected by proper measures, like Germany,

(02:32:16):
Spain and France, this inundation would not have caused the
great changes that it has, or would not have happened
at all. This must suffice as regards opposition to fortune
in general. But limiting myself more to particular cases, I
would point out how one sees a certain prince to
day fortunate and tomorrow ruined, without seeing that he has

(02:32:37):
changed in character or otherwise. I believe this arises in
the first place from the causes that we have already
discussed at length. That is to say, because the prince
who bases himself entirely on fortune is ruined when fortune varies.
I also believe that he is happy whose mode of
preceding accords with the needs of the times, and similarly

(02:32:57):
he is unfortunate, whose mode of proceeding is a post
to the times. For one sees that men, in those
things which lead them to the aim that each one
has in view, namely glory and riches, proceed in various ways,
one with circumspection, another with impetuosity, one by violence, another
by cunning, one with patience, another with the reverse, and

(02:33:18):
each by these diverse ways may arrive at his aim.
One sees also two cautious men, one of whom succeeds
in his designs and the other not. And in the
same way, two men succeed equally by different methods, one
being cautious, the other impetuous, which arises only from the
nature of the times, which does or does not conform

(02:33:38):
to their method of proceeding. From this results, as I
have said, that two men acting differently attain the same effect,
and of two others acting in the same way, one
arrives at his good and not the other. From this
depend also the changes in fortune. For if it happens
that time and circumstances are favorable to one who acts

(02:33:58):
with caution and prudence, he will be successful, but if
time and circumstances change, he will be ruined, because he
does not change his mode of proceeding. No man is
found able to adapt himself to this, either because he
cannot deviate from that to which his nature disposes him,
or else because having always prospered by walking in one path,
he cannot persuade himself that it is well to leave it.

(02:34:20):
And therefore the cautious man, when it is time to act,
suddenly does not know how to do so, and is
consequently ruined. For if one could change one's nature with
time and circumstances, fortune would never change. Pope Julius, too,
acted impetuously in everything he did, and found the times
and conditions so in conformity with that mode of proceeding

(02:34:42):
that he always obtained a good result. Consider the first
war that he made against Bologna while Messer Giovanni Bentivogli
was still living. The Venetians were not pleased with it.
The King of Spain, likewise, France, had objections to this enterprise,
notwithstanding which with his fierce and in perpetuous disposition, he
engaged personally in the expedition this move caused both Spain

(02:35:06):
and the Venetians to halt and hesitate, the latter through fear,
the former through the desire to regain the entire kingdom
of Naples. On the other hand, he engaged with him
the King of France, because, seeing him make this move
and desiring his friendship in order to put down the Venetians,
that king judged that he could not refuse him his
troops without manifest injury. Thus Julius, by his impetuous move,

(02:35:29):
achieved what no other pontiff with the utmost human prudence
would have succeeded in doing. Because if he had waited
till all arrangements had been made and everything settled before
leaving Rome, as any other pontiff would have done, it
would never have taken place, for the King of France
would have found a thousand excuses, and the others would
have inspired him with a thousand fears. I will omit

(02:35:52):
his other actions, which were all of this kind, and
which all succeeded well, And the shortness of his life
did not suffer him to experience the contrary, For had
time succeeded in which it was necessary to act with caution,
his ruin would have resulted, for he would never have
deviated from these methods to which his nature disposed him.
I conclude then, that fortune varying in men remaining fixed

(02:36:13):
in their ways. They are successful so long as these
ways conform to each other, but when they are opposed
to each other, than they are unsuccessful. I certainly think
that it is better to be impetuous than cautious. For
fortune is a woman, and it is necessary, if you
wish to master her, to conquer her by force. And
it can be seen that she lets herself be overcome

(02:36:34):
by these rather than by those who proceed coldly. And therefore,
like a woman, she is a friend to the young,
because they are less cautious, fiercer, and master her with
greater audacity. Chapter twenty six Exhortation to liberate Italy from
the Barbarians. Having now considered all the things we have

(02:36:55):
spoken of, and thought within myself whether at present the
time was not propitious in Italy for a new prince,
and if there was not a state of things which
offered an opportunity to a prudent and capable man to
introduce a new system that would do honor to himself
and good to the mass of the people. It seems
to me that so many things concur to favor a
new ruler, that I do not know of any time

(02:37:16):
more fitting for such an enterprise. And if, as I said,
it was necessary in order that the power of Moses
should be displayed, that the people of Israel should be
slaves in Egypt, and to give scope for the greatness
and courage of Cyrus, that the Persians should be oppressed
by the Medes, and to illustrate the pre eminence of theseus,
that the Athenians should be dispersed, so at the present time,

(02:37:38):
in order that the might of an Italian genius might
be recognized. It was necessary that Italy should be reduced
to her present condition, and that she should be more
enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians, and
more scattered than the Athenians, without a head, without order, beaten, despoiled, lacerated,
and overrun, and that she should have suffered ruin of

(02:37:59):
every kind. And although before now a spirit has been
shown by some which gave hope that he might be
appointed by God for her redemption, yet at the highest
summit of his career he was thrown aside by fortune,
so that now almost lifeless, she awaits one who may
heal her wounds, and put a stop to the rapid
and pillaging of Lombardy, to the rapacity and extortion in

(02:38:20):
the kingdom and in Tuscany, and cure her of those
sores which have long been festering. Behold how she prays
God to send some one to redeem her from this
barbarous cruelty and insolence. Behold her ready and willing to
follow any standard, if only there be some one to
raise it. There is nothing now she can hope for
but that your illustrious house may place itself at the

(02:38:41):
head of this redemption, being by its power and fortune
so exalted, and being favored by God and the Church,
whose leadership it now occupies. Nor will this be very
difficult to you if you call to mind the actions
and lives of the men I have named. And although
those men were rare and marvelous, they were none the
less men, and had each of them less occasion than

(02:39:03):
the present. For their enterprise was not juster than this,
nor easier, Nor was God more their friend than he
is yours. Here is a just cause for that war
is just, which is necessary and those arms are merciful
where no hope exists save in them. Here is the
greatest willingness. Nor can there be great difficulty where there
is great willingness, provided that the measures are adopted of

(02:39:26):
those whom I have set before you as examples. Besides this,
unexampled wonders have been seen here performed by God. The
sea has been opened, a cloud has shown you the road,
the rock has given forth water, manna has rained, and
everything has contributed to your greatness. The remainder must be
done by you. God will not do everything in order

(02:39:47):
not to deprive us of free will and the portion
of the glory that falls to our lot. It is
no marvel that none of the before mentioned Italians have
done that which it is to be hoped your illustrious
house may do. And if, in so many revolutions in Italy,
and so many warlike operations, it always seems as if
the military capacity were extinct. This is because the ancient

(02:40:07):
methods were not good, and no one has arisen who
knew how to discover new ones. Nothing does so much
honor to a newly risen man than the new laws
and measures which he introduces. These things when they are
well based and have greatness in them, render him revered
and admired. And there is not lacking scope in Italy
for the introduction of every kind. Here there is great

(02:40:30):
virtue in the members, if it were not wanting in
them heads. Look how in duels and in councils of
a few, the Italians are superior in strength, dexterity, and intelligence.
But when it comes to armies they make a poor show,
which proceeds entirely from the weakness of the leaders. For
those that know are not obedient, and every one thinks

(02:40:51):
that he knows, there being hitherto nobody who has raised
himself so high both by valor and fortune, as to
make the others yield. Hence it comes about that in
all this time, in all the wars waged during the
last twenty years, whenever there has been an army entirely Italian,
it has always been a failure, as witness first Tarro,
than Alexandria, Capua, Genoa, Vila, Bologna and Mestri. If your

(02:41:16):
illustrious house therefore wishes to follow those great men who
redeem their countries, it is before all things necessary, as
the true foundation of every undertaking to provide yourself with
your own forces, for you cannot have more faithful, or
truer and better soldiers. And although each one of them
may be good, they will together become better when they

(02:41:37):
see themselves commanded by their prince and honored and supported
by him. It is therefore necessary to prepare such forces
in order to be able, with Italian prowess to defend
the country from foreigners. And although both the Swiss and
Spanish infantry are deemed terrible, nonetheless they each have their defects,
so that a third order might not only oppose them,

(02:41:58):
but be confident of overcoming them. For the Spaniards cannot
sustain the attack of cavalry, and the Swiss have to
fear infantry, which meets them with resolution equal to their own,
from which it has resulted, as will be seen by experience,
that the Spaniards cannot sustain the attack of French cavalry,
and the Swiss are overthrown by Spanish infantry. And although

(02:42:20):
a complete example of the latter has not been seen yet,
an instance was furnished in the Battle of Ravenna, where
the Spanish infantry attacked the German battalions which observed the
same order as the Swiss. The Spaniards, through their bodily agility,
in aided by their bucklers, had entered between and under
their pikes, and were in a position to attack them safely,

(02:42:40):
without the Germans being able to defend themselves. And if
the cavalry had not charged them, they would have utterly
destroyed them. Knowing therefore the defects of both these kinds
of infantry, a third kind can be created, which can
resist cavalry and need not fear infantry. And this will
be done not by the creation of armies, but by
a change of cists them. And these are the things which,

(02:43:02):
when newly introduced, give reputation and grandeur to a new prince.
This opportunity must not therefore be allowed to pass. For
letting Italy at length see her liberator, I cannot express
the love with which he would be received in all
those provinces which have suffered under these foreign invasions. With
what thirst for vengeance? With what steadfast faith? With what love?

(02:43:25):
With what grateful tears? What doors would be closed against him?
What people would refuse him obedience, what envy could oppose him,
What Italian would rebel against him? This barbarous domination stinks
in the nostrils of every one. May your illustrious house
therefore assume this task with that courage and those hopes

(02:43:47):
which are inspired by a just cause, so that under
its banner our fatherland may be raised up, and under
its auspices be verified that saying of petrarch Valor against
fell wrath will take up arms and be the combat
quickly sped. For sure, the ancient worth that in Italian's
stirs the heart is not yet dead. The end

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