November 26, 2025 • 17 mins
In the case Doe 1 et al. v. Government of the United States Virgin Islands et al., No. 1:23-cv-10301-AS, defendant Cecile de Jongh filed a reply in support of her motion to dismiss and/or strike the plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint. In her reply, de Jongh argues that the plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient to establish a legal claim against her. She contends that the complaint lacks specific factual allegations linking her to the alleged misconduct and fails to meet the required legal standards for the claims asserted. De Jongh also asserts that certain portions of the complaint are irrelevant or prejudicial and should be stricken from the record. She requests that the court dismiss the claims against her or, alternatively, strike the specified portions of the complaint.
to contact me:
bobbycapucci@protonmail.com
source:
gov.uscourts.nysd.610915.160.0.pdf
Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.
to contact me:
bobbycapucci@protonmail.com
source:
gov.uscourts.nysd.610915.160.0.pdf
Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
What's up everyone, and welcome to the Epstein Chronicles. While
the vast majority of the people who cover Epstein continue
to talk about bs and nonsense, We're going to continue
to dive into things that matter on this podcast and today.
That means we're going to start taking a look at
Cecile Dejong's reply and support of motion to dismiss and
(00:23):
or strike the lawsuit brought against her by the Epstein
survivors as part of the overall lawsuit into the United
States Virgin Islands. So let's dive in case number twenty
three Dash CV DASH one zero three zero one DASH
as Jane does verse Government of the United States Virgin Islands.
(00:45):
Cecil Dejong's reply and support of motion to dismiss and
or strike settlements release claims. Release claims cannot be brought
in a lawsuit. Plaintiff's claims against Cecil DeJong have been released,
this lawsuit cannot continue as to her, this legal principle
is clear and nothing in plaintiffs eighty three page opposition
(01:06):
provides a reason to sidestep at all all six plaintiffs
executed releases with Jeffrey Epstein's estate, including release of all
claims or causes of action arising from mister Epstein's conduct
against any entities or individuals who are, or who have
ever been engaged by, employed by, or worked in any
capacity for Jeffrey Epstein and the Epstein Estate ECF Number one,
(01:31):
twenty five and five at one. This includes Miss DeJong,
and to make things clearer, this cord has already ruled
that these releases bar a suit just like this one
in Benski versus Endyke twenty four DH CV DASH twelve
oh four AS twenty twenty four WL thirty six seventy
six eight nineteen SDNY August fifth, twenty twenty four, finding
(01:55):
that language and a release just like the one in
this case barred a plaintiff's claim against individuals who work
for Jeffrey Epstein. But if to any law to support
their position, plaintiff's claim they need more facts, specifically around
whether Miss DeJong was employed by mister Epstein, even though
the second amended complaint itself alleges that Miss DeJong has
(02:16):
confirmed that she was employed by mister Epstein from two
thousand to twenty nineteen Cecile de Jong Declaration ECF number one,
twenty two and twenty three this factual question ultimately doesn't matter,
because again, the release covers anyone who worked for mister
Epstein in any capacity release at one. But plaintiff's remarkable
(02:38):
willingness to abandon their own factual pleadings show just how
out of straws they are to grasp on this issue.
Though the court doesn't need to reach the other issues
in Miss Dejong's motion to dismiss because the releases are dispositive,
Plaintiffs's remaining arguments against dismissal of their claims against her
fair no better. There's no legal or factual basis to
(03:00):
support a claim that Miss Dejong's brother in law's apartment
in her place of abode. Under New York law, it's
plaintiff's burden to prove that she was served. Miss DeJong
has submitted a declaration five months ago, robutting their process
servers claim that she authorized service. Plaintiffs contend that Miss
DeJong has only raised a question of fact on this
(03:21):
issue ECF Number one forty eight one at thirty eight,
but plaintiffs have offered no facts supporting their bald assertion
that she was personally served. There's no reason to believe
time spent in discovery would yield any relevant additional facts.
Plaintiffs likewise offer only speculation that discovery may uncover relevant
(03:42):
facts on other grounds for dismissal, including personal, jurisdiction, venue,
and immunity. Plaintiffs need more than speculation, which is insufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss For these reasons and
all those stated in the other defendant's motions and replies
and support their of in which Miss de Jong also joins,
plaintiff's claims against her must be dismissed. A plaintiff's claims
(04:07):
are barred by release. Again, Plaintiffs all executed broad releases
with Epstein's estate that included release all claims or cause
of action arising from mister Epstein's conduct against any entities
or individuals who or have ever been employed by, or
worked in any capacity for Jeffrey E. Epstein and or
the Epstein Estate. Release at one, Rule twelve B six
(04:30):
and courts in this district make it clear that claims
that are barred by release should be dismissed. Plaintiff's arguments
that their releases don't bar their claims against Miss DeJong
are unavailing, and this court has confirmed this much. Just
three weeks ago, this court held a virtually identical release
between another of mister Epstein's alleged victims and mister Epstein's
(04:52):
estate barred that alleged victims claim. In Benski, one of
the plaintiffs had executed a release that exactly like the
release here, included any and all claims or causes of
action that arise from acts of sexual abuse by mister Epstein,
and released any entities or individuals who have or who
have ever worked in any capacity for mister Epstein twenty
(05:16):
four CV. Dashed twelve oh four. The court found that
the release barred claims against mister Epstein's lawyer and accountant,
and rejected all of plaintiff's arguments to the contrary, holding
that the claims were squarely covered by the release. While
Judge Raykoff had found in Doe versus Deutsche Bank six
seventy one DOT supp that a similar release did not
(05:38):
bar claims against J. P. Morgan and Deutsche Bank, Judge
Rakoff's holding relied on specific Carvo language applicable to financial institutions,
and therefore it did not apply to releases of individuals
who worked for mister Epstein. The release validly included claims
unknown at the time of release, including any claims that
(05:58):
may have been revived later under the New York Adult
Survivors Act and amendments to the Victim's Protection Law, and
there were valid considerations for release. Plaintiff's opposition repeats these
rejected arguments, stating they wish to preserve them for appeal
Opposition at seventy nine, but Benski and the law relies
(06:19):
on make clear that these arguments fail. Plaintiffs contend that
discovery is warranted because the release would not cover claims
against her when she was acting as the first Lady
and after she left Epstein's employ opposition at seventy eight.
Plaintiffs also argue that there is no incontrovertible evidence that
Epstein owned and or controlled other financial trust company or
(06:42):
a Southern trust company just defend and say so, and
therefore discovery is needed to determine if the jong was
employed by an Epstein entity as defined by the release
opposition at seventy seven. Like the release in Benski, it's
clear that the release covers claims against releases in any capacity,
so discovery is not warranted on this issue, but This
(07:04):
argument as applied to Miss DeJong is particularly confounding, since
the facts on which plaintiffs claim discovery is warranted aren't
defendants say so their allegations in plaintiffs' own pleadings the
ESSAC alleges that Miss DeJong worked for the Financial Trust
Company and or Southern Trust Company from two thousand to
twenty nineteen, entities in which Jeffrey Epstein conducted business. Nothing
(07:29):
in the SAC alleges anything occurring outside that nineteen year timeframe. Moreover,
the public record of mister Epstein's ownership and control of
these entities is clear. To argue that discovery may be
needed on whether Financial Trust Company or Southern Trust Company
employees like Miss DeJong may be included in release is frivolous.
(07:52):
Plaintiff's unjustifiable attempt to dodge their own release must be
put to an end, and their claims against Miss DeJong
must be dismissed. Be plaintiffs failed to serve Miss de Jong,
Plaintiffs contend that service was proper because Miss Dejong's brother
in law's address up was place of abode under the statute.
Opposition at thirty eight citing and y cpl R three
(08:14):
zero eight at four. In support of that argument, they
rely on one an affid David from Siue Cortina, whose
company Plaintiff's council apparently engaged to trace an attempt to
serve Miss DeJong. Miss Cortina states that her searches on
Miss DeJong, which she doesn't include in her affid David,
indicated that Miss DeJong provided her brother in law's address
(08:37):
to credit reporting agencies and other similar agencies that require
your date of birth and social Security number. It's unclear
whether or what extent these entities require illegal residence, which
is the only relevant question here. Two several New York
cases for the opposition that the usual place of abode
need to be the primary residence. While this may be
(08:59):
the case case, none of these cases go so far
as to hold that a relative's home whose address one
may have occasionally reported to credit reporting agencies, utility companies,
and other similar agencies that require your date of birth
and social security number make that address a usual place
of abode. Plaintiff's bizarrely also argue that service was proper
(09:22):
because Miss DeJong does not assert that she has never
stayed at the apartment for a reasonable period of time,
or called it home for months. If plaintiffs have reason
to believe Miss DeJong resided at her brother in law's
apartment for a reasonable period of time a term on
tether to anything in the statute or in the cases
they site, or that she called at home for months,
(09:44):
then it's plaintiff's burden to profer evidence of that much.
Plaintiff instead speculates that Miss DeJong may have more frequently
traveled to New York because her child attended Skidmore College, which,
while in New York State, is nearly two hundred miles
from mister Dejong's brother's residence travel to Even staying at
(10:04):
a relative's home while visiting a child at college does
not make the relatives home a place of abode under
New York law. That would be absurd. Plaintiffs further contend
that Miss DeJong has raised a question of fact about
whether she authorized service, even if the residence was not
her place of abode, But in the interim five months,
(10:25):
plaintiffs have not sought or gathered any evidence to substantiate
their own process server as assertion that Miss Dejong's relative
doorman said she was authorized to accept service. It is
their burden to show that she was served, not Miss
Dejong's plaintiff failed to serve Miss DeJong, as New York
law requires, the complaint should be dismissed for this reason
(10:46):
as well. See Plaintiffs claim they're issuing Miss DeJong individually
while arguing she may have acted as an official. They
cannot have it both ways. Plaintiffs continue to speak from
both sides of their mouth on the immunity issue. In
the same section in which Plaintiff's right that Miss DeJong
is not an official, they're suing her as an individual.
(11:08):
They argue for a discovery to determine whether Miss de
Jong was acting as Epstein's employee or as first lady.
If plaintiffs are in fact only suing Miss DeJong in
her individual capacity, then discovery is irrelevant on the immunity issue.
And to the extent that plaintiffs are suing her in
her official capacity, nothing in their opposition supports an argument
(11:30):
that she isn't immune. They claim that the two cases
in Miss Dejong's motions contradict her position or are irrelevant,
but they don't explain any basis for this assertion Opposition
at eighty one. While the Court in nauove Vers. Obama
found it unnecessary to reach the issue. It strongly suggested
agreement with the DC Circuit that the first lady is immune. Again, then,
(11:56):
to the extent that plaintiffs allege that Miss DeJong acted
as a government, she is immune from suit D. There
is no personal jurisdiction Mister de Jong did not transact
business in New York. Plaintiff's opposition merely repeats their allegations
in the SAC that personal jurisdiction exists over Miss DeJong
(12:16):
and other defendants under Section three H two A one
because of one her and her other defendant's receipt of
payments from mister Epstein through New York bank accounts, and
two her own communications with mister Epstein while she worked
for him. As to the first, Miss DeJong joins the
other defendant's argument as to say why receipt of funds
(12:37):
via New York account doesn't constitute transaction of business in
New York. As to second, the opposition makes vague reference
to Miss DeJong regularly communicating with Epstein in New York,
but this is misleading. The SAC does not allege that
Miss DeJong was in New York for any of her
alleged communications with mister Abstein, nor does it allege that
(12:59):
mister Abstein was in New York when the communications occurred,
And none of the cases that they cite support that
a non resident transacts business in New York simply by
working outside New York for an individual who, from time
to time paid her or individual she knows through a
New York bank account. Moreover, to establish payments through New
(13:20):
York bank accounts as a basis for personal jurisdiction. Under
this provision of the Long Arm Statute, plaintiffs must allege
an actual, specific transaction through a specific account in the
course of bringing about the injuries on which the claims
are predicated. Plaintiffs didn't do that, they cannot then rely
on the bank accounts as a basis for personal jurisdiction. Two.
(13:45):
Miss DeJong did not commit a tortious act in New York.
Plaintiffs argue that Miss DeJong committed a tortious act within
New York, apparently based on a theory that she performed
work in furtherance of the sex trafficking enterprise during her
brief stay in New York in in twenty seventeen. Opposition
at twenty five and twenty six. Plaintiffs appear to base
(14:05):
this in part on a conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction
that it applies to the other defendants. Miss de Jong
also joins in the other defendant's argument as to why
personal jurisdiction does not exist on this basis. Plaintiffs other
basis for this theory appears to be that Miss DeJong
stayed in New York while recuperating from surgery, even though
(14:27):
she's provided documents confirming that she's performed during those stays
was minimal and administrative. Plaintiffs do not refute this. They
argue that discovery is warranted because it may show that
CDJ made multiple trips to New York and stayed for
extended periods, and or to verify whether the work was
(14:48):
indeed occasional during the two brief periods she was in
New York for medical reasons, this is not permissible. Plaintiffs
pled to fleeting visits to New York, which are not
legally sufficient for personal jurisdiction in any case. Courts in
this district have consistently held that it's not sufficient under
the long Arm Statute. Miss DeJong, for her part, provided
(15:10):
a sworn declaration and evidence making clear that those trips
were in no way connected with her work for mister Epstein. Yet, plaintiff,
after multiple opportunities to amend their complaint, and five months
after receiving this declaration from Miss DeJong, have responded with
no additional facts or evidence to substantiate a belief that
Miss DeJong committed any tortous act while she was recovering
(15:33):
from surgery in New York. They offered only speculations or
hopes that further connections to New York will come to
light in discovery, which is not sufficient. Federal jurisdiction cannot
be based on surmise or guesswork. That is exactly what
plaintiffs are seeking at this point, and the court should
not permit it. E Venue is improper. Venue is also
(15:57):
improper for reasons similar to those dooming plaintiff's personal jurisdiction arguments. Again,
plaintiffs have not alleged facts supporting that any of the
communications in the SAC took place when either Miss DeJong
or mister Epstein was in New York. Nothing in the
SAC alleges a substantial part of the events or emissions
(16:17):
giving rise to the claims occurred Miss de Jong further
adopts and incorporates by reference the arguments made by the
other defendants as to Venue f Plaintiff's allegations failed to
state of claim, while claims against Miss DeJong have been
released as discussed in Section Asupra, The allegations in the
SAC also failed to state a valid claim. Nothing in
(16:41):
Plaintiff's opposition is to the contrary. They've withdrawn the Racketeer,
Influence and Corrupt Organization's Act claims, and none of their
arguments as to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act are availing.
Miss de Jong joins in the other defendants submissions on
this issue g plaintiff's allegation that paragraphs one twenty three
(17:01):
and one twenty four should be stricken. Plaintiffs argue that
the allegations about Miss DeJong in paragraph one, twenty three
and twenty four should not be stricken because they are
relevant to our knowledge of sex trafficking venture. Miss DeJong
had no such knowledge. Regardless, none of the counts in
the SAC, including ones that specifically require knowledge as an element,
(17:24):
reference these allegations. These allegations appear included solely to demonstrate
Miss Dejong's willingness to violate applicable laws, which is not permissible. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, Cecial DeJong respectfully requests that the
claims against her be dismissed and Plaintiff's allegations in paragraphs
one twenty three and one twenty four be stricken. This
(17:47):
was signed by Amelia Schmidt and it was dated August
twenty six, twenty twenty four. All of the information that
goes with this episode can be found in the description box.
What's up everyone, and welcome to the Epstein Chronicles. While
the vast majority of the people who cover Epstein continue
to talk about bs and nonsense, We're going to continue
to dive into things that matter on this podcast and today.
That means we're going to start taking a look at
Cecile Dejong's reply and support of motion to dismiss and
(00:23):
or strike the lawsuit brought against her by the Epstein
survivors as part of the overall lawsuit into the United
States Virgin Islands. So let's dive in case number twenty
three Dash CV DASH one zero three zero one DASH
as Jane does verse Government of the United States Virgin Islands.
(00:45):
Cecil Dejong's reply and support of motion to dismiss and
or strike settlements release claims. Release claims cannot be brought
in a lawsuit. Plaintiff's claims against Cecil DeJong have been released,
this lawsuit cannot continue as to her, this legal principle
is clear and nothing in plaintiffs eighty three page opposition
(01:06):
provides a reason to sidestep at all all six plaintiffs
executed releases with Jeffrey Epstein's estate, including release of all
claims or causes of action arising from mister Epstein's conduct
against any entities or individuals who are, or who have
ever been engaged by, employed by, or worked in any
capacity for Jeffrey Epstein and the Epstein Estate ECF Number one,
(01:31):
twenty five and five at one. This includes Miss DeJong,
and to make things clearer, this cord has already ruled
that these releases bar a suit just like this one
in Benski versus Endyke twenty four DH CV DASH twelve
oh four AS twenty twenty four WL thirty six seventy
six eight nineteen SDNY August fifth, twenty twenty four, finding
(01:55):
that language and a release just like the one in
this case barred a plaintiff's claim against individuals who work
for Jeffrey Epstein. But if to any law to support
their position, plaintiff's claim they need more facts, specifically around
whether Miss DeJong was employed by mister Epstein, even though
the second amended complaint itself alleges that Miss DeJong has
(02:16):
confirmed that she was employed by mister Epstein from two
thousand to twenty nineteen Cecile de Jong Declaration ECF number one,
twenty two and twenty three this factual question ultimately doesn't matter,
because again, the release covers anyone who worked for mister
Epstein in any capacity release at one. But plaintiff's remarkable
(02:38):
willingness to abandon their own factual pleadings show just how
out of straws they are to grasp on this issue.
Though the court doesn't need to reach the other issues
in Miss Dejong's motion to dismiss because the releases are dispositive,
Plaintiffs's remaining arguments against dismissal of their claims against her
fair no better. There's no legal or factual basis to
(03:00):
support a claim that Miss Dejong's brother in law's apartment
in her place of abode. Under New York law, it's
plaintiff's burden to prove that she was served. Miss DeJong
has submitted a declaration five months ago, robutting their process
servers claim that she authorized service. Plaintiffs contend that Miss
DeJong has only raised a question of fact on this
(03:21):
issue ECF Number one forty eight one at thirty eight,
but plaintiffs have offered no facts supporting their bald assertion
that she was personally served. There's no reason to believe
time spent in discovery would yield any relevant additional facts.
Plaintiffs likewise offer only speculation that discovery may uncover relevant
(03:42):
facts on other grounds for dismissal, including personal, jurisdiction, venue,
and immunity. Plaintiffs need more than speculation, which is insufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss For these reasons and
all those stated in the other defendant's motions and replies
and support their of in which Miss de Jong also joins,
plaintiff's claims against her must be dismissed. A plaintiff's claims
(04:07):
are barred by release. Again, Plaintiffs all executed broad releases
with Epstein's estate that included release all claims or cause
of action arising from mister Epstein's conduct against any entities
or individuals who or have ever been employed by, or
worked in any capacity for Jeffrey E. Epstein and or
the Epstein Estate. Release at one, Rule twelve B six
(04:30):
and courts in this district make it clear that claims
that are barred by release should be dismissed. Plaintiff's arguments
that their releases don't bar their claims against Miss DeJong
are unavailing, and this court has confirmed this much. Just
three weeks ago, this court held a virtually identical release
between another of mister Epstein's alleged victims and mister Epstein's
(04:52):
estate barred that alleged victims claim. In Benski, one of
the plaintiffs had executed a release that exactly like the
release here, included any and all claims or causes of
action that arise from acts of sexual abuse by mister Epstein,
and released any entities or individuals who have or who
have ever worked in any capacity for mister Epstein twenty
(05:16):
four CV. Dashed twelve oh four. The court found that
the release barred claims against mister Epstein's lawyer and accountant,
and rejected all of plaintiff's arguments to the contrary, holding
that the claims were squarely covered by the release. While
Judge Raykoff had found in Doe versus Deutsche Bank six
seventy one DOT supp that a similar release did not
(05:38):
bar claims against J. P. Morgan and Deutsche Bank, Judge
Rakoff's holding relied on specific Carvo language applicable to financial institutions,
and therefore it did not apply to releases of individuals
who worked for mister Epstein. The release validly included claims
unknown at the time of release, including any claims that
(05:58):
may have been revived later under the New York Adult
Survivors Act and amendments to the Victim's Protection Law, and
there were valid considerations for release. Plaintiff's opposition repeats these
rejected arguments, stating they wish to preserve them for appeal
Opposition at seventy nine, but Benski and the law relies
(06:19):
on make clear that these arguments fail. Plaintiffs contend that
discovery is warranted because the release would not cover claims
against her when she was acting as the first Lady
and after she left Epstein's employ opposition at seventy eight.
Plaintiffs also argue that there is no incontrovertible evidence that
Epstein owned and or controlled other financial trust company or
(06:42):
a Southern trust company just defend and say so, and
therefore discovery is needed to determine if the jong was
employed by an Epstein entity as defined by the release
opposition at seventy seven. Like the release in Benski, it's
clear that the release covers claims against releases in any capacity,
so discovery is not warranted on this issue, but This
(07:04):
argument as applied to Miss DeJong is particularly confounding, since
the facts on which plaintiffs claim discovery is warranted aren't
defendants say so their allegations in plaintiffs' own pleadings the
ESSAC alleges that Miss DeJong worked for the Financial Trust
Company and or Southern Trust Company from two thousand to
twenty nineteen, entities in which Jeffrey Epstein conducted business. Nothing
(07:29):
in the SAC alleges anything occurring outside that nineteen year timeframe. Moreover,
the public record of mister Epstein's ownership and control of
these entities is clear. To argue that discovery may be
needed on whether Financial Trust Company or Southern Trust Company
employees like Miss DeJong may be included in release is frivolous.
(07:52):
Plaintiff's unjustifiable attempt to dodge their own release must be
put to an end, and their claims against Miss DeJong
must be dismissed. Be plaintiffs failed to serve Miss de Jong,
Plaintiffs contend that service was proper because Miss Dejong's brother
in law's address up was place of abode under the statute.
Opposition at thirty eight citing and y cpl R three
(08:14):
zero eight at four. In support of that argument, they
rely on one an affid David from Siue Cortina, whose
company Plaintiff's council apparently engaged to trace an attempt to
serve Miss DeJong. Miss Cortina states that her searches on
Miss DeJong, which she doesn't include in her affid David,
indicated that Miss DeJong provided her brother in law's address
(08:37):
to credit reporting agencies and other similar agencies that require
your date of birth and social Security number. It's unclear
whether or what extent these entities require illegal residence, which
is the only relevant question here. Two several New York
cases for the opposition that the usual place of abode
need to be the primary residence. While this may be
(08:59):
the case case, none of these cases go so far
as to hold that a relative's home whose address one
may have occasionally reported to credit reporting agencies, utility companies,
and other similar agencies that require your date of birth
and social security number make that address a usual place
of abode. Plaintiff's bizarrely also argue that service was proper
(09:22):
because Miss DeJong does not assert that she has never
stayed at the apartment for a reasonable period of time,
or called it home for months. If plaintiffs have reason
to believe Miss DeJong resided at her brother in law's
apartment for a reasonable period of time a term on
tether to anything in the statute or in the cases
they site, or that she called at home for months,
(09:44):
then it's plaintiff's burden to profer evidence of that much.
Plaintiff instead speculates that Miss DeJong may have more frequently
traveled to New York because her child attended Skidmore College, which,
while in New York State, is nearly two hundred miles
from mister Dejong's brother's residence travel to Even staying at
(10:04):
a relative's home while visiting a child at college does
not make the relatives home a place of abode under
New York law. That would be absurd. Plaintiffs further contend
that Miss DeJong has raised a question of fact about
whether she authorized service, even if the residence was not
her place of abode, But in the interim five months,
(10:25):
plaintiffs have not sought or gathered any evidence to substantiate
their own process server as assertion that Miss Dejong's relative
doorman said she was authorized to accept service. It is
their burden to show that she was served, not Miss
Dejong's plaintiff failed to serve Miss DeJong, as New York
law requires, the complaint should be dismissed for this reason
(10:46):
as well. See Plaintiffs claim they're issuing Miss DeJong individually
while arguing she may have acted as an official. They
cannot have it both ways. Plaintiffs continue to speak from
both sides of their mouth on the immunity issue. In
the same section in which Plaintiff's right that Miss DeJong
is not an official, they're suing her as an individual.
(11:08):
They argue for a discovery to determine whether Miss de
Jong was acting as Epstein's employee or as first lady.
If plaintiffs are in fact only suing Miss DeJong in
her individual capacity, then discovery is irrelevant on the immunity issue.
And to the extent that plaintiffs are suing her in
her official capacity, nothing in their opposition supports an argument
(11:30):
that she isn't immune. They claim that the two cases
in Miss Dejong's motions contradict her position or are irrelevant,
but they don't explain any basis for this assertion Opposition
at eighty one. While the Court in nauove Vers. Obama
found it unnecessary to reach the issue. It strongly suggested
agreement with the DC Circuit that the first lady is immune. Again, then,
(11:56):
to the extent that plaintiffs allege that Miss DeJong acted
as a government, she is immune from suit D. There
is no personal jurisdiction Mister de Jong did not transact
business in New York. Plaintiff's opposition merely repeats their allegations
in the SAC that personal jurisdiction exists over Miss DeJong
(12:16):
and other defendants under Section three H two A one
because of one her and her other defendant's receipt of
payments from mister Epstein through New York bank accounts, and
two her own communications with mister Epstein while she worked
for him. As to the first, Miss DeJong joins the
other defendant's argument as to say why receipt of funds
(12:37):
via New York account doesn't constitute transaction of business in
New York. As to second, the opposition makes vague reference
to Miss DeJong regularly communicating with Epstein in New York,
but this is misleading. The SAC does not allege that
Miss DeJong was in New York for any of her
alleged communications with mister Abstein, nor does it allege that
(12:59):
mister Abstein was in New York when the communications occurred,
And none of the cases that they cite support that
a non resident transacts business in New York simply by
working outside New York for an individual who, from time
to time paid her or individual she knows through a
New York bank account. Moreover, to establish payments through New
(13:20):
York bank accounts as a basis for personal jurisdiction. Under
this provision of the Long Arm Statute, plaintiffs must allege
an actual, specific transaction through a specific account in the
course of bringing about the injuries on which the claims
are predicated. Plaintiffs didn't do that, they cannot then rely
on the bank accounts as a basis for personal jurisdiction. Two.
(13:45):
Miss DeJong did not commit a tortious act in New York.
Plaintiffs argue that Miss DeJong committed a tortious act within
New York, apparently based on a theory that she performed
work in furtherance of the sex trafficking enterprise during her
brief stay in New York in in twenty seventeen. Opposition
at twenty five and twenty six. Plaintiffs appear to base
(14:05):
this in part on a conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction
that it applies to the other defendants. Miss de Jong
also joins in the other defendant's argument as to why
personal jurisdiction does not exist on this basis. Plaintiffs other
basis for this theory appears to be that Miss DeJong
stayed in New York while recuperating from surgery, even though
(14:27):
she's provided documents confirming that she's performed during those stays
was minimal and administrative. Plaintiffs do not refute this. They
argue that discovery is warranted because it may show that
CDJ made multiple trips to New York and stayed for
extended periods, and or to verify whether the work was
(14:48):
indeed occasional during the two brief periods she was in
New York for medical reasons, this is not permissible. Plaintiffs
pled to fleeting visits to New York, which are not
legally sufficient for personal jurisdiction in any case. Courts in
this district have consistently held that it's not sufficient under
the long Arm Statute. Miss DeJong, for her part, provided
(15:10):
a sworn declaration and evidence making clear that those trips
were in no way connected with her work for mister Epstein. Yet, plaintiff,
after multiple opportunities to amend their complaint, and five months
after receiving this declaration from Miss DeJong, have responded with
no additional facts or evidence to substantiate a belief that
Miss DeJong committed any tortous act while she was recovering
(15:33):
from surgery in New York. They offered only speculations or
hopes that further connections to New York will come to
light in discovery, which is not sufficient. Federal jurisdiction cannot
be based on surmise or guesswork. That is exactly what
plaintiffs are seeking at this point, and the court should
not permit it. E Venue is improper. Venue is also
(15:57):
improper for reasons similar to those dooming plaintiff's personal jurisdiction arguments. Again,
plaintiffs have not alleged facts supporting that any of the
communications in the SAC took place when either Miss DeJong
or mister Epstein was in New York. Nothing in the
SAC alleges a substantial part of the events or emissions
(16:17):
giving rise to the claims occurred Miss de Jong further
adopts and incorporates by reference the arguments made by the
other defendants as to Venue f Plaintiff's allegations failed to
state of claim, while claims against Miss DeJong have been
released as discussed in Section Asupra, The allegations in the
SAC also failed to state a valid claim. Nothing in
(16:41):
Plaintiff's opposition is to the contrary. They've withdrawn the Racketeer,
Influence and Corrupt Organization's Act claims, and none of their
arguments as to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act are availing.
Miss de Jong joins in the other defendants submissions on
this issue g plaintiff's allegation that paragraphs one twenty three
(17:01):
and one twenty four should be stricken. Plaintiffs argue that
the allegations about Miss DeJong in paragraph one, twenty three
and twenty four should not be stricken because they are
relevant to our knowledge of sex trafficking venture. Miss DeJong
had no such knowledge. Regardless, none of the counts in
the SAC, including ones that specifically require knowledge as an element,
(17:24):
reference these allegations. These allegations appear included solely to demonstrate
Miss Dejong's willingness to violate applicable laws, which is not permissible. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, Cecial DeJong respectfully requests that the
claims against her be dismissed and Plaintiff's allegations in paragraphs
one twenty three and one twenty four be stricken. This
(17:47):
was signed by Amelia Schmidt and it was dated August
twenty six, twenty twenty four. All of the information that
goes with this episode can be found in the description box.
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