November 25, 2025 • 19 mins
In the case Does 1-6 vs. Gov. John de Jongh, Jr., et al., the defense counsel for Gov. John de Jongh, Jr. submitted a supplemental briefing in compliance with the court’s order to address topics discussed during a prior conference and highlight relevant cases or arguments raised by both parties. While primarily focusing on venue-related arguments, the defendant also joins and incorporates the arguments made by co-defendants in their respective submissions. The defense reiterates its position that the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) should be dismissed based on prior arguments made by the defendant and co-defendants.
Should the SAC not be dismissed, including for reasons of improper venue, the defense asserts that the case should be transferred to the District of the Virgin Islands (D.V.I.), where it would be more appropriately handled.
to contact me:
bobbycapucci@protonmail.com
source:
gov.uscourts.nysd.610915.178.0.pdf
Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.
Should the SAC not be dismissed, including for reasons of improper venue, the defense asserts that the case should be transferred to the District of the Virgin Islands (D.V.I.), where it would be more appropriately handled.
to contact me:
bobbycapucci@protonmail.com
source:
gov.uscourts.nysd.610915.178.0.pdf
Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
What's up everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
So we've been focusing a little bit on the Diddy situation,
but don't think for a minute that I haven't been
paying attention to what's going on down in the US
Virgin Islands as a lawsuit continues to make its way
through the system. And today we have a letter from
(00:21):
Jean de Jong's lawyers address to Judge Submaranian. So let's
just dive right in and let's see what John Dejeong
has to say for himself. Case number one twenty three
DASH CV DASH one zero three zero one. Dear Judge Submaranian,
(00:42):
we represent defendant, Governor John Dejeong, Junior, and we submit
this supplemental briefing on topic discussed at the conference pursuant
to this Court's order and to highlight particular cases or arguments,
including those made at the conference by a plaintiff's council.
We also join in and in corporate the other arguments
made by the code defendants in their respective letter submissions.
(01:06):
While Jean DeJong JDJ has elected to focus here primarily
on venue arguments, JDJ still maintains that the second amended
complaint should be dismissed for the reasons argued by JDJ
and other defendants. If it is not dismissed, including for
improper venue, the case should be transferred to the District
of the Virgin Islands one plaintiffs inadequate responses to venue questions.
(01:32):
This case should be dismissed or transferred because plaintiffs file
this case in the wrong venue US Code twenty eight
section fourteen oh six A thirteen ninety one B, and
this court lacks jurisdiction US Code twenty eight section sixteen
thirty one. Even if venue is proper in the SDNY,
the case should still be transferred pursuant to US Code
(01:52):
twenty eight section fourteen oh four A. The court addressed
the venue issues at the hearing, asking plaintiff's council, mister Murson,
let me ask you a practical question. You could avoid
all of these personal jurisdiction issues simply by filing this
case in the US Virgin Islands or by consenting to
transfer to the US Virgin Islands. Is there a reason
(02:12):
why you don't want to do that. The court appears
to have determined that the first part of the two
part test under US Code twenty eight, Section fourteen oh
four is satisfied the case might have been brought in
the transfer revenue the USVII Franswais versus BAC Servicing twenty
fourteen WL one three eight three two six zero at
(02:34):
one SDNY twenty fourteen. Mister Merson did not dispute that
the case might have been brought in the USVII either. Instead,
mister Merson responded claiming there's a whole bunch of reasons
why plaintiffs didn't file in the USVII, but in fact
that bunch of reasons does not support venue in the
SDNY A conclusiory statements about fear of the DVII. Mister
(02:58):
Merson's lead argument was a k pclusiony assertion that all
plaintiffs are afraid to go back to the DVII. Mister Merson,
the main reason is we have clients who are afraid
to go back to the US Virgin Islands and litigate
their case there. First, Mister Merson's conclusiory statements that the
plaintiffs are afraid to go back to the USVII is
not evidence. See big Vision verse ei DuPont d no.
(03:22):
Moor's one F dot supp three D two twenty four
two fifty five N thirty six, SDNY twenty fourteen, noting
the lack of any evidence in the record supporting a
party's allegations other than Council's conclusiory assertions at oral argument,
which of course is not evidence. LCM twenty two, verse
(03:43):
Curtis Simmons Betting twenty twenty one, WL nine one eight
seven five four SDNY twenty twenty one. Statements at oral
arguments are not evidence. Second, the plaintiff's apprehension about litigating
in a forum where she was injured cannot categorically render
the forum and proper, especially because the citis of the
incident is normally the basis of the venue. In Paigic
(04:06):
versus Choice Hotels International, the plaintiff brought claims related to
sexual assault against the defendant, who sought a venue transfer
pursuant to us CO twenty eight Section fourteen oh four A.
The plaintiff and the conclusiony assertion that San Juan, Puerto
Rico is not the proper forum for this matter twenty
nineteen w L one three two three four one oh
(04:28):
five at three Southern District, Florida, twenty nineteen and in
response to defendants analysis of the public and private factors
under section fourteen oh four A, plaintiff merely stated she
suffered severe physical and emotional trauma at the hands of
defendants in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and so should not
be forced to litigate in Puerto Rico. The district Court
(04:50):
concluded that in short, plaintiff fell to aid the court
in any other respect in explaining why a transfer of
venue should not be granted. Similarly, in Montante versus La Hood,
the district court granted the defendant's motion to transfer venue
pursuing the US Code twenty eight Section fourteen oh four A.
The plaintiff opposed, stating that she feared emotional and physical
(05:13):
harm from an unknown public that may disagree with her.
Case twenty thirteen w. L. One two one eight four
to one four nine at four and two, Southern District
of California, twenty thirteen. However, because plaintiff did not explain
why she feared such harm in the transferree diistrict, the
court did not afford strong weight to plaintiff's contention. Mister
(05:35):
Merson's lead argument against transfer is his conclusiony assertion in
open Court that the plaintiff's all fear of returning to
the USVII, this statement is not evidence and not a
sufficient ground for opposing a venue transfer. B Everything did
not happen in New York. Mister Myerson stated that the
second reason plaintiffs chose not the file in the SDNY
(05:58):
was that with respect to Epstein, everything has happened to
New York. Where was Epstein? Where did Epstein live? Where
was he supposed to stand trial? Later, mister Meerson repeated,
everything has happened to New York. At another point, mister
Merson qualified his position somewhat, asserting everything occurred in New
York except the actual sexual abuse tr At fifty one,
(06:20):
apparently admitting no alleged sexual abuse occurred in New York.
Plaintiff's position at oral argument is directly refuted by plaintiff's
own opposition and the sac itself. In the opposition, the
plaintiff concedes that the immunity afforded to Epstein also occurred
in the USVII ecf at one forty eight through and
(06:41):
one at ten emphasis added. Taken together, the plaintiff concedes
that the abuse and the acts of many, mostly John
Doe defendants conferred immunity on Epstein all in the USVII,
but the SAC itself ultimately conflicts with councils in court
statements and their own opposition. The SAC alleges substantial conduct
(07:02):
exclusively in the USVII. For example, the defendants John Doe's
one through one hundred constitute ninety two percent of the
one hundred and eight defendants. Everything the SAC alleges the
John Doe defendants did necessarily occurred only in the USVII.
This is because the SAC alleges their conduct as USVII
(07:23):
customs agents and or officers at fifty one USVII air
traffic controllers and employees of the USVII Airport baggage check agent,
employees of the USVII, employees of the USVII and USVII
Coast Guard Agents. There are many other examples of substantial
conduct in addition to the sex abuse alleged to have
(07:43):
occurred exclusively in the USVII. For example, SAC one twenty
six alleges no sexual assault, but instead alleges Jane Doe
three and Epstein's substantial interactions with unidentified USVI officials in
the USVII to procure travel documents in the USVII. The
SAC alleges that US Customs officials on the USVII never
(08:07):
examined either the passport or luggage of anyone arriving on
Epstein's private jet. USVI officials directed law enforcement officers, airport personnel,
customs officials, and any other government employees to extend any
courtesy or assistance to Abstein and as affluent customers and
guests as part of their official duties. Sac At one
(08:28):
seventy three. All of these things happened only in the USVII.
The alleged efforts to protect Ebstein procure as travel documents,
communications with non party customs, airport and other officials occurred
nearly entirely in the USVII, according to the SAC. The
SAC itself negates mister Mersan's assertion that everything has happened
(08:50):
in New York. Nearly everything occurred in the USVII. According
to the SAC, CEG Crinberg First Dow Chemical Company nine
forty six f DOT supp two D three twenty nine
three thirty one SDNY two thousand and seven transferring Venue,
after finding that most of the operative events at issue
(09:10):
took place in the transferree venue and concluding that it's
likely that most of the witnesses and documents are located there.
Collins Verus Aikman Corporation Secretary Litt. Four thirty eight Ft supp.
Two d three ninety two, three ninety five, three ninety seven,
SDNY two thousand and six. Transfer motion granted where numerous
(09:32):
party and non party witnesses resided in the transferree forum,
most relevant documents were located in the transferree forum, and
the transferre reforum is where the subject conduct alleged happened.
In this case, the ties to the USVII outweigh any
connection this litigation may have to New York see. Plaintiff's
(09:53):
council admits to forum shopping. The third reason mister Mrson
offered for why the plaintiffs filed in the SDNY and
instead of the DVII was that if the case is
bumped to the US Virgin Islands, the next thing you
are going to hear is that the cases should have
a twenty five thousand dollars limit under the Virgin Islands
Toward Act. So that is clearly inadequate compensation for my clients.
(10:15):
Mister Myersan admits to form shopping in the SDNY for
advantageous state law. However, mister Myerson is wrong on the
law that will apply. It's true that after a transfer
from an improper venue to a proper venue under section
fourteen oh six A, the transferre court applies its own
law as if the case had been originally filed there Ie,
(10:38):
the plaintiff does not get the benefit of form shopping
Grant vers Kia Motors twenty fourteen, WL six sixty eight
zero six eighty six, at two, citing GBJ versus East
Ohio Paving one thirty nine ft three d ten eighty
ten eighty five six Circuit nineteen ninety eight. If the
(10:59):
state law in them in which the action was originally
commenced is applied following a Section sixteen thirty one or
fourteen oh six transfer, the plaintiff would benefit from having
brought the action in an impermissible forum. Choquette vers San Felipo,
two thousand and one w. L one two six six
three zero five, at four. As the Sixth Circuit and
(11:21):
Martin Verse Stokes recognized, plaintiffs would thereby be encouraged to
file their actions in federal district court, where the state
law was most advantageous, regardless of whether that district court
was the proper forum. If venue is improper in the SDNY,
plaintiffs were never entitled to New York law to begin with,
they have lost nothing. In that event, plaintiffs would not
(11:44):
be harmed by the DVII applying USVII law. However, if
the court determines venue was proper in the SDNY but
transfers for convenience, a court receiving a matter from a
transfer of court under section fourteen oh four A applies
to the law of the transferer court. Kelly Brown versus
Winfrey twenty thirteen w L six five seven four nine
(12:06):
one eight at one, SDNY twenty fourteen. The plaintiff gets
the benefit of forum shopping Grant twenty fourteen six sixty
eight zero six eighty six at two. So if the
case is transferred, mister Merson's clients may still seek the
benefit of the New York law they perceive as more advantageous.
(12:27):
D Epstein and Wealthy Abuser Friends are not parties. While
the SAC alleges substantial conduct by Epstein and as wealthy
abuser friends, none of them are named as defendants. The
SAC fails to allege a sufficient nexus conspiracy or otherwise
between the name defendants in Epstein and his abuser friends.
(12:48):
Without this nexus, the plaintiffs cannot use non party conduct
as a jurisdictional hook upon JDJ and other named USVII
defendants if the sac does not allege a conspiracy. At best,
it alleges a conspiracy by non parties and not JDJ
or the name defendants. In the case e sexual abuse
(13:09):
is the most substantial part of the case. Mister Merson's
argument that everything occurred in New York except the actual
sexual abuse minimizes the fact that the alleged sexual abuse
is the most substantial part of the case. Gray versus
Acadia Healthcare four oh eight f DOT supp three D
twelve fifty twelve fifty five DNM twenty nineteen venue proper
(13:32):
in district where rape occurred. Gold Schmeade versus Brifel, twenty
eighteen w L six four three zero five four five
at four c D, California, twenty eighteen VENU proper where
sex harassment and assault occurred. Gerson versus Logan River Academy
twenty twenty WL four seven three one three four at
(13:53):
three Central District California, twenty twenty. Although plaintiff was kidnapped
from California and transported to Utah, each of her claims
stem from the alleged sexual child abuse that took place
at Logan's academy. Accordingly, the operative facts did not substantially
occur in the forum selected by plaintiff. Moreover, because plaintiff
(14:14):
was sexually abused in Utah, the subject matter of the
litigation is not substantially connected to California. Therefore, the Core
finds that plaintiff's choice of forum is diminished and is
entitled to only minimal consideration. Chesapeake Climate Action Network versus
Imperial Bank, twenty thirteen WL six zero five seven eight
(14:35):
two four AT two Northern District, California, twenty thirteen, noting
that deference to plaintiff's choice of forum is substantially reduced
where the forum lacks a significant connection to the activity
is alleged in the complaint, even if the plaintiff is
a resident of that forum. FSAC one hundred and seven Defendants,
(14:56):
Evidence and Incident Sights in the USVII. Each of the
one hundred and eight defendants, including John Doe's one through
one hundred, are potential witnesses, they are all located in
the USVII, save plasket. All their evidence and documents are
located in the USVII. Furthermore, the SAC identifies critical locations
(15:16):
in the USVII which may be the location of documents,
the subjects of inspection during discovery, or even a site
visit at trial. These include Cyril King Airport, Epstein's private Island,
Epstein's RedHook office. And Although it's likely that all relevant
documents can be transported from the state to state, at
(15:37):
least in some fashion for purposes of deciding transfer, the
fact that the documents are all currently located in Ohio
favors transfer to Ohio Royal Insurance versus US nine ninety
eight ft. Supp. Three fifty one, three fifty three and
fifty four SDNY nineteen ninety eight. While photos or videotapes
of the scene could be introduced at trial in any forum,
(16:00):
inspection of the site by the trier of fact could
only be accomplished if the case were tried in California
g Court in power to transfer even if no personal jurisdiction.
Even if this court determines it does not have personal
jurisdiction over the defendants, it may still transfer this case
to the DVII. This court has the power to transfer
(16:20):
this suit to a district where it might have been brought,
even though the court does not have personal jurisdiction over
the defendants. Two Sovereign immunity applies to Governor JDJ. JDJ
joins the GVII and other defendants sovereign immunity agreements. Territorial
sovereign immunity applies not only to the GVII, but also
(16:42):
to the individuals sued in their official capacities as territorial officials.
Three response to plaintiffs CPLR three zero two A one
personal jurisdiction argument. In their ten to four to twenty
four letter, plaintiffs continue to argue that receiving a single
payment in another state without maintaining a New York account
(17:03):
gives rise to jurisdiction. Again, this is not always true.
It can be true based on the nature of the
financial relationship. Plaintiff's site to the first Manhattan Energy one
Meyer one fifty A D three five twenty one. But
Meyer was designated in the escro agreement as the assigned
escrow agent, and he accepted the funds pursuant to the agreement.
(17:25):
This is very different from a defendant receiving payment from
Epstein that happens to come from a New York bank,
especially when it's simply not plausible that any defendant requested
money from a New York account. Four not plausible that
defendants requested money specifically from New York accounts. Plaintiffs argue
in their letter brief that requesting money from New York
(17:46):
accounts in exchange for unrestricted trafficking of New York women
with New York customers via a New York plane is
sufficient for personal jurisdiction. It is not plausible that defendants
requested money specifically from New York bank accounts, are knew
or cared from what state the money came. It's also
not plausible that defendants specifically knew that the customers were
(18:08):
New York customers or that the plane was a New
York plane. Indeed, the SAC itself alleges that conduct happened
in New York, Florida, USVII, and around the world SAC
three oh one through three five. The SAC also alleges
that the defendants sought access to money and influential people
from around the world and not just n Y. Plaintiff's
(18:30):
argument of targeted and y conduct in their letter brief
is directly contradicted by the allegations in the SAC. The
alleged payments and conclusiony statements are insufficient to show that
the defendants elicited money specifically from NY Bank accounts. Rosner
Versus Boc. Three forty nine Federal Appendix six thirty seven,
(18:51):
six thirty nine, Second Circuit, two thousand and nine, finding
a lack of factual allegations that point to actual knowledge
of the fraudulent source of the deposited money. Since the
bank's relationship with the perpetrators of the underlying fraud did
not extend beyond the banking relationship in Agapi of Litigation
seven seventy three Ft. Supp. Two d. Two ninety eight,
(19:13):
three seventeen Eastern District, twenty eleven, a banking relationship alone
is insufficient to show that the funds held that the
bank were obtained through fraudulent means. Defendant JDJ respectfully requests
that the SAC be dismissed or, in the alternative, transferred
to the District Court of the Virgin Island Saint Thomas Vicinity.
(19:34):
This was signed by Daniel Savalos and it was dated
October fourth, twenty twenty four. All of the information that
goes with this episode can be found in the description
box
What's up everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
So we've been focusing a little bit on the Diddy situation,
but don't think for a minute that I haven't been
paying attention to what's going on down in the US
Virgin Islands as a lawsuit continues to make its way
through the system. And today we have a letter from
(00:21):
Jean de Jong's lawyers address to Judge Submaranian. So let's
just dive right in and let's see what John Dejeong
has to say for himself. Case number one twenty three
DASH CV DASH one zero three zero one. Dear Judge Submaranian,
(00:42):
we represent defendant, Governor John Dejeong, Junior, and we submit
this supplemental briefing on topic discussed at the conference pursuant
to this Court's order and to highlight particular cases or arguments,
including those made at the conference by a plaintiff's council.
We also join in and in corporate the other arguments
made by the code defendants in their respective letter submissions.
(01:06):
While Jean DeJong JDJ has elected to focus here primarily
on venue arguments, JDJ still maintains that the second amended
complaint should be dismissed for the reasons argued by JDJ
and other defendants. If it is not dismissed, including for
improper venue, the case should be transferred to the District
of the Virgin Islands one plaintiffs inadequate responses to venue questions.
(01:32):
This case should be dismissed or transferred because plaintiffs file
this case in the wrong venue US Code twenty eight
section fourteen oh six A thirteen ninety one B, and
this court lacks jurisdiction US Code twenty eight section sixteen
thirty one. Even if venue is proper in the SDNY,
the case should still be transferred pursuant to US Code
(01:52):
twenty eight section fourteen oh four A. The court addressed
the venue issues at the hearing, asking plaintiff's council, mister Murson,
let me ask you a practical question. You could avoid
all of these personal jurisdiction issues simply by filing this
case in the US Virgin Islands or by consenting to
transfer to the US Virgin Islands. Is there a reason
(02:12):
why you don't want to do that. The court appears
to have determined that the first part of the two
part test under US Code twenty eight, Section fourteen oh
four is satisfied the case might have been brought in
the transfer revenue the USVII Franswais versus BAC Servicing twenty
fourteen WL one three eight three two six zero at
(02:34):
one SDNY twenty fourteen. Mister Merson did not dispute that
the case might have been brought in the USVII either. Instead,
mister Merson responded claiming there's a whole bunch of reasons
why plaintiffs didn't file in the USVII, but in fact
that bunch of reasons does not support venue in the
SDNY A conclusiory statements about fear of the DVII. Mister
(02:58):
Merson's lead argument was a k pclusiony assertion that all
plaintiffs are afraid to go back to the DVII. Mister Merson,
the main reason is we have clients who are afraid
to go back to the US Virgin Islands and litigate
their case there. First, Mister Merson's conclusiory statements that the
plaintiffs are afraid to go back to the USVII is
not evidence. See big Vision verse ei DuPont d no.
(03:22):
Moor's one F dot supp three D two twenty four
two fifty five N thirty six, SDNY twenty fourteen, noting
the lack of any evidence in the record supporting a
party's allegations other than Council's conclusiory assertions at oral argument,
which of course is not evidence. LCM twenty two, verse
(03:43):
Curtis Simmons Betting twenty twenty one, WL nine one eight
seven five four SDNY twenty twenty one. Statements at oral
arguments are not evidence. Second, the plaintiff's apprehension about litigating
in a forum where she was injured cannot categorically render
the forum and proper, especially because the citis of the
incident is normally the basis of the venue. In Paigic
(04:06):
versus Choice Hotels International, the plaintiff brought claims related to
sexual assault against the defendant, who sought a venue transfer
pursuant to us CO twenty eight Section fourteen oh four A.
The plaintiff and the conclusiony assertion that San Juan, Puerto
Rico is not the proper forum for this matter twenty
nineteen w L one three two three four one oh
(04:28):
five at three Southern District, Florida, twenty nineteen and in
response to defendants analysis of the public and private factors
under section fourteen oh four A, plaintiff merely stated she
suffered severe physical and emotional trauma at the hands of
defendants in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and so should not
be forced to litigate in Puerto Rico. The district Court
(04:50):
concluded that in short, plaintiff fell to aid the court
in any other respect in explaining why a transfer of
venue should not be granted. Similarly, in Montante versus La Hood,
the district court granted the defendant's motion to transfer venue
pursuing the US Code twenty eight Section fourteen oh four A.
The plaintiff opposed, stating that she feared emotional and physical
(05:13):
harm from an unknown public that may disagree with her.
Case twenty thirteen w. L. One two one eight four
to one four nine at four and two, Southern District
of California, twenty thirteen. However, because plaintiff did not explain
why she feared such harm in the transferree diistrict, the
court did not afford strong weight to plaintiff's contention. Mister
(05:35):
Merson's lead argument against transfer is his conclusiony assertion in
open Court that the plaintiff's all fear of returning to
the USVII, this statement is not evidence and not a
sufficient ground for opposing a venue transfer. B Everything did
not happen in New York. Mister Myerson stated that the
second reason plaintiffs chose not the file in the SDNY
(05:58):
was that with respect to Epstein, everything has happened to
New York. Where was Epstein? Where did Epstein live? Where
was he supposed to stand trial? Later, mister Meerson repeated,
everything has happened to New York. At another point, mister
Merson qualified his position somewhat, asserting everything occurred in New
York except the actual sexual abuse tr At fifty one,
(06:20):
apparently admitting no alleged sexual abuse occurred in New York.
Plaintiff's position at oral argument is directly refuted by plaintiff's
own opposition and the sac itself. In the opposition, the
plaintiff concedes that the immunity afforded to Epstein also occurred
in the USVII ecf at one forty eight through and
(06:41):
one at ten emphasis added. Taken together, the plaintiff concedes
that the abuse and the acts of many, mostly John
Doe defendants conferred immunity on Epstein all in the USVII,
but the SAC itself ultimately conflicts with councils in court
statements and their own opposition. The SAC alleges substantial conduct
(07:02):
exclusively in the USVII. For example, the defendants John Doe's
one through one hundred constitute ninety two percent of the
one hundred and eight defendants. Everything the SAC alleges the
John Doe defendants did necessarily occurred only in the USVII.
This is because the SAC alleges their conduct as USVII
(07:23):
customs agents and or officers at fifty one USVII air
traffic controllers and employees of the USVII Airport baggage check agent,
employees of the USVII, employees of the USVII and USVII
Coast Guard Agents. There are many other examples of substantial
conduct in addition to the sex abuse alleged to have
(07:43):
occurred exclusively in the USVII. For example, SAC one twenty
six alleges no sexual assault, but instead alleges Jane Doe
three and Epstein's substantial interactions with unidentified USVI officials in
the USVII to procure travel documents in the USVII. The
SAC alleges that US Customs officials on the USVII never
(08:07):
examined either the passport or luggage of anyone arriving on
Epstein's private jet. USVI officials directed law enforcement officers, airport personnel,
customs officials, and any other government employees to extend any
courtesy or assistance to Abstein and as affluent customers and
guests as part of their official duties. Sac At one
(08:28):
seventy three. All of these things happened only in the USVII.
The alleged efforts to protect Ebstein procure as travel documents,
communications with non party customs, airport and other officials occurred
nearly entirely in the USVII, according to the SAC. The
SAC itself negates mister Mersan's assertion that everything has happened
(08:50):
in New York. Nearly everything occurred in the USVII. According
to the SAC, CEG Crinberg First Dow Chemical Company nine
forty six f DOT supp two D three twenty nine
three thirty one SDNY two thousand and seven transferring Venue,
after finding that most of the operative events at issue
(09:10):
took place in the transferree venue and concluding that it's
likely that most of the witnesses and documents are located there.
Collins Verus Aikman Corporation Secretary Litt. Four thirty eight Ft supp.
Two d three ninety two, three ninety five, three ninety seven,
SDNY two thousand and six. Transfer motion granted where numerous
(09:32):
party and non party witnesses resided in the transferree forum,
most relevant documents were located in the transferree forum, and
the transferre reforum is where the subject conduct alleged happened.
In this case, the ties to the USVII outweigh any
connection this litigation may have to New York see. Plaintiff's
(09:53):
council admits to forum shopping. The third reason mister Mrson
offered for why the plaintiffs filed in the SDNY and
instead of the DVII was that if the case is
bumped to the US Virgin Islands, the next thing you
are going to hear is that the cases should have
a twenty five thousand dollars limit under the Virgin Islands
Toward Act. So that is clearly inadequate compensation for my clients.
(10:15):
Mister Myersan admits to form shopping in the SDNY for
advantageous state law. However, mister Myerson is wrong on the
law that will apply. It's true that after a transfer
from an improper venue to a proper venue under section
fourteen oh six A, the transferre court applies its own
law as if the case had been originally filed there Ie,
(10:38):
the plaintiff does not get the benefit of form shopping
Grant vers Kia Motors twenty fourteen, WL six sixty eight
zero six eighty six, at two, citing GBJ versus East
Ohio Paving one thirty nine ft three d ten eighty
ten eighty five six Circuit nineteen ninety eight. If the
(10:59):
state law in them in which the action was originally
commenced is applied following a Section sixteen thirty one or
fourteen oh six transfer, the plaintiff would benefit from having
brought the action in an impermissible forum. Choquette vers San Felipo,
two thousand and one w. L one two six six
three zero five, at four. As the Sixth Circuit and
(11:21):
Martin Verse Stokes recognized, plaintiffs would thereby be encouraged to
file their actions in federal district court, where the state
law was most advantageous, regardless of whether that district court
was the proper forum. If venue is improper in the SDNY,
plaintiffs were never entitled to New York law to begin with,
they have lost nothing. In that event, plaintiffs would not
(11:44):
be harmed by the DVII applying USVII law. However, if
the court determines venue was proper in the SDNY but
transfers for convenience, a court receiving a matter from a
transfer of court under section fourteen oh four A applies
to the law of the transferer court. Kelly Brown versus
Winfrey twenty thirteen w L six five seven four nine
(12:06):
one eight at one, SDNY twenty fourteen. The plaintiff gets
the benefit of forum shopping Grant twenty fourteen six sixty
eight zero six eighty six at two. So if the
case is transferred, mister Merson's clients may still seek the
benefit of the New York law they perceive as more advantageous.
(12:27):
D Epstein and Wealthy Abuser Friends are not parties. While
the SAC alleges substantial conduct by Epstein and as wealthy
abuser friends, none of them are named as defendants. The
SAC fails to allege a sufficient nexus conspiracy or otherwise
between the name defendants in Epstein and his abuser friends.
(12:48):
Without this nexus, the plaintiffs cannot use non party conduct
as a jurisdictional hook upon JDJ and other named USVII
defendants if the sac does not allege a conspiracy. At best,
it alleges a conspiracy by non parties and not JDJ
or the name defendants. In the case e sexual abuse
(13:09):
is the most substantial part of the case. Mister Merson's
argument that everything occurred in New York except the actual
sexual abuse minimizes the fact that the alleged sexual abuse
is the most substantial part of the case. Gray versus
Acadia Healthcare four oh eight f DOT supp three D
twelve fifty twelve fifty five DNM twenty nineteen venue proper
(13:32):
in district where rape occurred. Gold Schmeade versus Brifel, twenty
eighteen w L six four three zero five four five
at four c D, California, twenty eighteen VENU proper where
sex harassment and assault occurred. Gerson versus Logan River Academy
twenty twenty WL four seven three one three four at
(13:53):
three Central District California, twenty twenty. Although plaintiff was kidnapped
from California and transported to Utah, each of her claims
stem from the alleged sexual child abuse that took place
at Logan's academy. Accordingly, the operative facts did not substantially
occur in the forum selected by plaintiff. Moreover, because plaintiff
(14:14):
was sexually abused in Utah, the subject matter of the
litigation is not substantially connected to California. Therefore, the Core
finds that plaintiff's choice of forum is diminished and is
entitled to only minimal consideration. Chesapeake Climate Action Network versus
Imperial Bank, twenty thirteen WL six zero five seven eight
(14:35):
two four AT two Northern District, California, twenty thirteen, noting
that deference to plaintiff's choice of forum is substantially reduced
where the forum lacks a significant connection to the activity
is alleged in the complaint, even if the plaintiff is
a resident of that forum. FSAC one hundred and seven Defendants,
(14:56):
Evidence and Incident Sights in the USVII. Each of the
one hundred and eight defendants, including John Doe's one through
one hundred, are potential witnesses, they are all located in
the USVII, save plasket. All their evidence and documents are
located in the USVII. Furthermore, the SAC identifies critical locations
(15:16):
in the USVII which may be the location of documents,
the subjects of inspection during discovery, or even a site
visit at trial. These include Cyril King Airport, Epstein's private Island,
Epstein's RedHook office. And Although it's likely that all relevant
documents can be transported from the state to state, at
(15:37):
least in some fashion for purposes of deciding transfer, the
fact that the documents are all currently located in Ohio
favors transfer to Ohio Royal Insurance versus US nine ninety
eight ft. Supp. Three fifty one, three fifty three and
fifty four SDNY nineteen ninety eight. While photos or videotapes
of the scene could be introduced at trial in any forum,
(16:00):
inspection of the site by the trier of fact could
only be accomplished if the case were tried in California
g Court in power to transfer even if no personal jurisdiction.
Even if this court determines it does not have personal
jurisdiction over the defendants, it may still transfer this case
to the DVII. This court has the power to transfer
(16:20):
this suit to a district where it might have been brought,
even though the court does not have personal jurisdiction over
the defendants. Two Sovereign immunity applies to Governor JDJ. JDJ
joins the GVII and other defendants sovereign immunity agreements. Territorial
sovereign immunity applies not only to the GVII, but also
(16:42):
to the individuals sued in their official capacities as territorial officials.
Three response to plaintiffs CPLR three zero two A one
personal jurisdiction argument. In their ten to four to twenty
four letter, plaintiffs continue to argue that receiving a single
payment in another state without maintaining a New York account
(17:03):
gives rise to jurisdiction. Again, this is not always true.
It can be true based on the nature of the
financial relationship. Plaintiff's site to the first Manhattan Energy one
Meyer one fifty A D three five twenty one. But
Meyer was designated in the escro agreement as the assigned
escrow agent, and he accepted the funds pursuant to the agreement.
(17:25):
This is very different from a defendant receiving payment from
Epstein that happens to come from a New York bank,
especially when it's simply not plausible that any defendant requested
money from a New York account. Four not plausible that
defendants requested money specifically from New York accounts. Plaintiffs argue
in their letter brief that requesting money from New York
(17:46):
accounts in exchange for unrestricted trafficking of New York women
with New York customers via a New York plane is
sufficient for personal jurisdiction. It is not plausible that defendants
requested money specifically from New York bank accounts, are knew
or cared from what state the money came. It's also
not plausible that defendants specifically knew that the customers were
(18:08):
New York customers or that the plane was a New
York plane. Indeed, the SAC itself alleges that conduct happened
in New York, Florida, USVII, and around the world SAC
three oh one through three five. The SAC also alleges
that the defendants sought access to money and influential people
from around the world and not just n Y. Plaintiff's
(18:30):
argument of targeted and y conduct in their letter brief
is directly contradicted by the allegations in the SAC. The
alleged payments and conclusiony statements are insufficient to show that
the defendants elicited money specifically from NY Bank accounts. Rosner
Versus Boc. Three forty nine Federal Appendix six thirty seven,
(18:51):
six thirty nine, Second Circuit, two thousand and nine, finding
a lack of factual allegations that point to actual knowledge
of the fraudulent source of the deposited money. Since the
bank's relationship with the perpetrators of the underlying fraud did
not extend beyond the banking relationship in Agapi of Litigation
seven seventy three Ft. Supp. Two d. Two ninety eight,
(19:13):
three seventeen Eastern District, twenty eleven, a banking relationship alone
is insufficient to show that the funds held that the
bank were obtained through fraudulent means. Defendant JDJ respectfully requests
that the SAC be dismissed or, in the alternative, transferred
to the District Court of the Virgin Island Saint Thomas Vicinity.
(19:34):
This was signed by Daniel Savalos and it was dated
October fourth, twenty twenty four. All of the information that
goes with this episode can be found in the description
box
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