Mega Edition: The OIG Report Into The Death And Circumstances Of Epstein's Death (Part 6) (11/26/25)
November 26, 2025 • 24 mins
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report into Jeffrey Epstein’s death delivers a blistering indictment of systemic failures at the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and his holding facility. It documents a litany of procedural violations: Epstein’s cellmate was removed and never replaced despite explicit policy, surveillance cameras in his unit were malfunctioning or not recording, and the staff responsible for required 30-minute checks on Epstein didn’t perform them. Instead, employees falsified records indicating those rounds were completed, and in reality Epstein was alone and unchecked for hours before his death. These aren’t isolated mistakes—they’re classic symptoms of institutional collapse and neglect at a time when every safeguard should have been activated.
Beyond the immediate night of his death, the report underscores a deeper rot: long-standing staffing shortages, indifferent supervision, and a culture that tolerated policy breaches without accountability. The OIG identifies that the same deficiencies had been raised in prior reports about the BOP, yet were never effectively addressed. By allowing one of the most high-profile detainees in the nation to slip through the cracks under such glaring conditions, the BOP didn’t just fail Epstein—they failed the public trust and all the victims who sought justice.
to contact me:
bobbycapucci@protonmail.com
source:
2 3 - 0 8 5 (justice.gov)
Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.
Beyond the immediate night of his death, the report underscores a deeper rot: long-standing staffing shortages, indifferent supervision, and a culture that tolerated policy breaches without accountability. The OIG identifies that the same deficiencies had been raised in prior reports about the BOP, yet were never effectively addressed. By allowing one of the most high-profile detainees in the nation to slip through the cracks under such glaring conditions, the BOP didn’t just fail Epstein—they failed the public trust and all the victims who sought justice.
to contact me:
bobbycapucci@protonmail.com
source:
2 3 - 0 8 5 (justice.gov)
Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
In this episode, we're picking right up where we left
off in the last episode, talking about the OIG's report
into the circumstances surrounding Jeffrey Epstein's death. Part D failure
to assign Epstein a new cellmate on August ninth, Section
(00:24):
one Daywatch staff actions on August ninth, the Shoe Lieutenant
told the OIG that he worked at MCC New York
on August eighth, twenty nineteen, from approximately six a m.
Until approximately two pm, and that he was off on
August ninth, twenty nineteen. The Shoe Lieutenant, who shift ended
(00:46):
over an hour before the USMS sent the second email
regarding in May three's impending transfer, told the OIG that
he was not aware that in May three was scheduled
to be transferred out of MCC New York, and therefore
he did not notify the captain that Epstein would require
a new cell mate. According to the Shoe Lieutenant, as
(01:07):
soon as the Shoe staff learned that in May three
would be transferred, they should have notified a lieutenant on duty,
the day Watch Operations Lieutenant, and the day Watch Activities
lieutenant told the OIG on August ninth, twenty nineteen, they
had oversight of the shoe from approximately six am until
two pm due to their position descriptions and because of
(01:30):
the shoe lieutenant's absence. According to the mcc New York
staff roster on August ninth, twenty nineteen, Shoe Officer number
one was listed as Senior Officer Specialist number five, although
Shoe Officer number one is typically the officer in charge.
Another senior Officer specialist told the OIG that in actuality
(01:53):
he was the day watch shoe officer in charge on
August ninth from approximately six am until two pm. The
day watch shoe officer in charge said that since he
had the most experienced and seniority, he was considered by
everyone to be the shoe officer in charge, which the
shoe lieutenant confirmed. The day watch shoe officer in charge
(02:14):
told the OIG that he knew that Epstein had to
have a cell mate. He said that as a general practice,
every inmate who was transferred from suicide watch and or
psychological observation to the shoe is placed with the cell mate.
He also confirmed that the shoe lieutenant also instructed him
that Epstein was to be housed with a cell mate
(02:35):
at all times. According to the day Watch Shoe Officer
in charge, between July thirtieth and August ninth, twenty nineteen,
he told other mcc new York staff members who worked
in the Shoe of Epstein's cellmate requirement, and further stated
that everyone who worked in the Shoe should have known
that Epstein was required to have a cell mate due
(02:57):
to their knowledge, training, and experiens. The day Watch Shoe
Officer in charge confirmed that on the morning of August ninth,
twenty nineteen, the Shoe staff received an inmate call out
list that listed in May three as WAB, which he explained,
meant that in May three was being removed from mcc
(03:18):
new York. He told the OIG that sometime between eight
am and nine am, he escorted Epstein to the Shoe
to the attorney conference room for Epstein's daily legal visit,
during which time Epstein joked around with him. The day
Watch Shoe Officer in charge said that he and Epstein
were accompanied by CO one who was escorting in May
(03:40):
three to receiving and discharge. The day Watch Shoe Officer
in charge and co One both told the OIG that
in May three was escorted to Receiving and discharge with
all of his belongings, and both said that during the escort,
the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge informed Epso that
(04:00):
he would be assigned a new cellmate due to in
May three's departure and the requirement that Epstein have a cellmate.
In his interview with the OIG, CO One confirmed this
conversation between the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge and Epstein,
but he did not provide any additional information regarding notifications
(04:20):
made either by him or the day Watch Shoe Officer
in charge. The day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge told
the OIG that when he and the CO one left
the Shoe with Epstein and in May three, both the
day Watch Operations Lieutenant and the day Watch Activities Lieutenant
should have been physically present in the Lieutenant's office and
(04:42):
should have seen that in May three was departing the
institution when they passed the office. The day Watch Shoe
Officer in Charge said that while he did not expect
in May three to return to mcc New York, there
had been times when inmates had been escorted to receiving
in discharge and as an expected removal, only to be
(05:02):
returned to the shoe later the same day due to
unforeseen circumstances. According to the day watch Shoe officer in charge,
he did not select a new cell mate for Epstein
because he was not certain that in May three had
been discharged from the institution, although he assumed that in
May three would not return to the shoe. The day
(05:23):
watch Shoe officer in charge told the OIG that when
his shift ended at approximately two pm, he informed the
evening watch Shoe officer in charge and Senior Officer Specialist
five that if in May three did not return to
the shoe, Epstein would need a new cell mate. Upon
Epstein's return from his attorney visit, the day watch shoe
(05:46):
officer in charge said he specifically recalled telling the evening
watch shoe officer in charge, in the presence of a
senior Officer Specialist five, make sure this guy gets a bunkie,
to which the Evening Shoe watch officer in charge replied,
all right.
Speaker 2 (06:02):
The day watch Shoe officer in charge.
Speaker 1 (06:04):
Said that at some point that day it was likely
that he also informed the day Watch Operations Lieutenant but
he could not specifically recall if he had done so.
The day Watch Shoe officer in charge told the OIG
that a replacement cell mate should have been identified as
soon as it was confirmed that in May three had
(06:25):
left the institution. He said a new cellmate could have
been reassigned before the four PM shoe count if it
was known that in May three was not coming back,
but the Shoe staff members had until Epstein returned from
his attorney visit to assigned Epstein a new cellmate. According
to the day Watch Shoe officer in charge, Shoe staff
(06:46):
definitely should have realized that in May three was not returning,
both during the four PM count and when Epstein returned
from his attorney visit later that evening. The day Watch
Shoe officer in charge told the OIG that at Ebstein's
daily routine was that he would be with his attorneys
in the attorney conference room until approximately eight pm, so
(07:07):
Shoe personnel had time to make a new cellmate assignment.
He had all Shoe staff members share the responsibility to
find a replacement cell mate, and that anyone assigned to
the Shoe could have found another inmate to replace in
May three. However, he also said that due to Epstein's
high profile, the Shoe personnel should have asked a lieutenant
(07:29):
to contact the psychology department to see which inmate should
have been placed with Epstein. On August twelfth, twenty nineteen,
following Epstein's death, the day watch Shoe Officer in charge
wrote a memorandum to the wardens dating on Friday, August ninth,
twenty nineteen, at approximately one fifty pm. Iss the day
(07:51):
Watch Shoe Officer in Charge passed on to the oncoming
staff members the evening Watch Shoe Officer in Charge and
President Shift staff Senior Officer Specialist five in CO two
that in May three was going wab Ie with all
of his belongings and possibly he may not return. Also
(08:11):
that inmate Epstein number seven sixty three one eight DASH
zero five to four will be needing a cell mate
upon arrival from his attorney visit. The day watch Shoe
Officer in charge departed the Shoe at approximately two PM
and worked an overtime shift as a driver for mcc
New York. He stated that he did not follow up
(08:32):
with the Shoe staff to verify that Epstein had been
assigned another cell mate mcc new York staff with responsibility
for oversight and staffing of the Shoe during the day watch,
including the Warden Associate Warden I, the Captain, the Shoe Lieutenant,
the day Watch Operations Lieutenant, the day Watch Activities Lieutenant,
(08:53):
and the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge, told the
OIG that they all knew Epstein was required to have
a cell mate pursuant to the Psychology Department's determination. They
also confirmed that everyone who regularly worked in the Shoe
knew of this requirement, and that it was the responsibility
of all Shoe staff to notify a supervisor upon learning
(09:15):
that Epstein needed to be assigned the new cellmate due
to Inmate three's transfer to another prison.
Speaker 2 (09:22):
The day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge and CO.
Speaker 1 (09:24):
One, however, were the only two mcc new York staff
members working the day watch on August ninth, twenty nineteen,
who told the OIG that they were aware of Inmate
three's transfer and the need to assign Epstein a new cellmate.
CO one's immediate superior, the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge,
was already aware of the need to assign Epstein a
(09:47):
new cellmate, while the day Watch Shoe Officer in charge
told the OIG that he made a number of notifications.
Other witnesses cannot confirm that he passed on information regarding
Epstein's need or a new cell mate. The day Watch
Operations Lieutenant and the day Watch Activities Lieutenant both told
the OIG that they did not know in May three
(10:09):
had been transferred out of the facility, despite the fact
that both were recipients of the second email the USMS
sent out on August eight that included the information about
in May three's and pending transfer out of mcc New York.
On August ninth, rather, the day Watch Operations Lieutenant and
the day Watch Activities Lieutenant told the OIG that they
(10:32):
believed in May three had been removed from mcc New
York for a court appearance. The day Watch Activities Lieutenant
did not recall in May three departing the institution with
all of his belongings, or having any conversations with day
Watch Shoe Officer in charge or anyone else regarding Inmate
three's departure from mcc New York. According to the day
(10:55):
Watch Activities Lieutenant, he did not know that Epstein was
without a cell Other senior officials, including the Warden Associate
Warden I and the captain, were also unaware of Inmate
three's transfer and the need to assign Epstein a new
cell mate. These officials concurred that while all shoe staff
and supervisors were responsible for notifying a supervisor in the
(11:19):
chain of command of the need to assign Epstein a
new cellmate, the day watch shoe officer in charge bore
a primary responsibility for the notification because he was the
shoe officer in charge and one of the two people
who saw the Inmate three leave the facility with all
of his belongings. The Captain told the OIG that since
(11:40):
Epstein was in the attorney conference room all day, no
one may have even thought about it, and may have
only become aware when they put Epstein back in his
cell after his attorney visit that evening. The Captain said
as soon as the shoe staff became aware that Epstein
was without a cell mate, they should have notified the
evening watch Operations lieutenant. The Captain said that if he
(12:03):
had been informed, he would have taken immediate action to
ensure that Epstein was either assigned a new cell mate
or monitored until that assignment occurred. The Captain, however, was
one of the recipients of the USMS August eighth email
that notified members of mcc New York supervisory staff of
(12:23):
inmate three transfer to another facility. The warden and associate
warden did not receive this email. The warden told the
OIG that he was off duty on August ninth, twenty nineteen.
The warden said that in the event Epstein was without
a cell mate, the plan was to review the situation
and decide who should replace inmate three, but that no
(12:46):
inmate in the shoe was pre selected to replace in
May three if this event occurred. All right, So we're
going to wrap up this episode right here, and then
in the next episode we're going to pick up where
we left off, and and that's going to be with
section two Evening watch staff actions on August ninth. All
(13:06):
of the information that goes with the episode can be
found in the description box pig. What's up, everyone, and
welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode, we're
going to pick back up with the OIG report and
we're going to take a look at chapter six.
Speaker 2 (13:25):
So let's get started. Chapter six.
Speaker 1 (13:28):
The availability of limited recorded video evidence due to the
security camera recording system failure. In August twenty nineteen, the
Metropolitan Correctional Center located in New York, New York. MCC
New York had approximately one hundred and fifty video security
cameras no audio placed throughout the institution.
Speaker 2 (13:51):
The Office of the.
Speaker 1 (13:52):
Inspector General found that approximately eleven cameras were located in
and around the Special Unit housing unit where where Epstein
was confined at the time of his death on August tenth,
twenty nineteen, including one at the end of the l
tier where Epstein was housed that showed any movement in
or out of inmate cells and in the tiers hallway.
(14:15):
In addition to broadcasting live video, MCC New York had
a system that recorded the live video feeds. Following Epstein's death,
MCC New York officials and FBI investigators attempted to review
video recordings related to the incident and discovered that although
the security cameras were working and transmitting live video, recorded
(14:38):
video from most of the cameras in the Shoe area
was not available due to a malfunction of the video
recording system that had occurred on July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen,
including video from the camera at the end of EL Tier.
As a result, while the L tier video camera was
transmitting a live video feed on the night of August ninth,
(15:00):
twenty nineteen and the morning of August tenth, twenty nineteen,
the video was not being recorded. One of the cameras
that had available recordings from August ninth and tenth was
a camera located outside a housing unit adjacent to the shoe.
That camera captured video of a large part of the
common area of the shoe, including the shoe officer station
(15:24):
and portions of the stairways leading to the different shoe tiers,
including the L Tier. Thus, anyone entering or attempting to
enter the L Tier from the common area of the shoe,
including on August ninth and tenth, would have been picked
up by the video recorded by that camera. In addition,
the recording showed the shoe officer station, where the two
(15:45):
shoe staff were seated at a desk immediately outside the
entrance to the L Tier and diagonally across from Epstein's cell,
which was the first cell on the right hand side
of the L Tier. Section one back round round on
the security camera system at MCC new York. All video
surveillance from mcc new York's cameras was connected to a
(16:09):
DVR system. The DVR system had two data storage systems
that were labeled DVR one and DVR two, and each
consisted of sixteen hard drives used for storing digital recordings.
Roughly half of mcc new York security cameras were assigned
to record to DVR one and the other half were
assigned to record to DVR two. Cameras assigned to DVR
(16:33):
one only recorded to the DVR one hard drives, and
cameras assigned to DVR two only recorded to the DVR
two hard drives. Therefore, if DVR one crashed, no video
from the DVR two assigned cameras could be retrieved from
DVR one, and vice versa. The OIG's investigation revealed the
(16:54):
history of camera problems at MCC new York. In August
twenty nineteen, the electro technician was the only such technician
at MCC new York. The electronics technician told the OIG
that when he began to work at mcc new York
in twenty sixteen, he found that the facility's security camera
(17:14):
system needed to be upgraded. According to the electronics technician,
the system had not properly been maintained prior to his arrival,
The hard drives in the DVRs frequently malfunctioned and needed
to be replaced, and the overall system was outdated, in
part because the cameras were analog and not digital. The
(17:35):
electronics technician told the OIG that throughout his tenure at
mcc new York, the camera system was subject to frequently
recurring failures, particularly with the respect.
Speaker 2 (17:47):
To the DVR hard drives.
Speaker 1 (17:49):
The warden, who assumes his responsibilities at mcc new York
in May of twenty eighteen, told the OIG he was
generally aware that there were problems with the security GUS
camera system throughout the institution. He further stated that efforts
were undertaken to determine which cameras were working and which
needed to be fixed, and that mcc new York officials
(18:12):
intended to ultimately seek funding to replace the entire system.
Federal Bureau of Prisons records reflect that on September sixth,
twenty eighteen, the warden submitted a memorandum to the BP's
Northeast Regional Director to request eight hundred thousand dollars in
funding to replace the entire camera system. The memorandum identified
(18:36):
an estimated project start date of December one, twenty eighteen,
and an estimated completion date of February ninth, twenty nineteen.
The BOP approved the funding request, and on September twenty first,
twenty eighteen, a contract in the amount of six hundred
ninety eight thousand, one hundred eight dollars and ninety nine
(18:56):
cents was awarded to Company one to provide various equipment
for the project and associated labor. On September twenty fourth,
twenty eighteen, a separate contract in the amount of thirty
four thousand, eighty nine dollars and twenty eight cents was
awarded to Company two to provide a sorted networking, equipment
(19:16):
and wiring needed to install the camera system. As the
camera upgrade project was beginning, BOP officials recognized that mcc
new York's mechanical, electrical, and plumbing systems were also in
need of major repairs. Mcc new York did not have
enough qualified technicians on staff to complete both the camera
(19:38):
installation and other repairs needed at the facility, so beginning
the week of March seventeenth, twenty nineteen, the GOP's Northeast
Regional Office arranged for technicians from the BP institutions to
conduct temporary duty assignments at MCC New York to perform
the work. During the course of the TDY rotatetions, work
(20:01):
was not consistently conducted on the camera upgrades because sometimes
TDY staff assigned to the project were used to cover
shortages at MCC New York's custody posts, and sometimes there
were not enough TDY volunteers who possess the skills required
to do the camera work. At the time of Epstein's
(20:21):
death on August tenth, twenty nineteen, the camera system upgrade
had not been completed. Immediately following Epstein's death, Company one
officials arrived at MCC New York and installed the new
recording system within a couple of days, and recording functionality
was restored using the existing cameras. The majority of the
(20:42):
new cameras did not arrive to the facility until October
twenty nineteen, and they were installed in stages as the
wiring work was conducted. According to the electronics technician, as
of August twenty twenty one, when the MCC closed the
wiring work had still not been fully completed. Part two
(21:04):
Discovery of security camera system recording issues in August of
twenty nineteen. Part A discovery on August eighth of the
DVR two failure that occurred on July twenty ninth. According
to forensic analysis conducted by the FBI after Epstein's death,
disc failures occurred in MCC New York's DVR two system
(21:26):
on July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen, which resulted in the
system being unable to record. According to BOP records and
OIG interviews, the BOP did not learn about the failure
until August eight, twenty nineteen, when the Special Investigative Services
Lieutenant and Dissociate ward I attempted to review recorded surveillance
(21:49):
video for a matter unrelated to Epstein. The SIS lieutenant
told the OIG she discovered that no recorded video was
available for several of the institution's cameras, so she reported
the matter to the communications office, and the electronics technician
arrived to assess the problem sometime before his shift was
(22:11):
scheduled to end. The electronics technician told the OIG that
he found that roughly half of the institutions approximately one
hundred and fifty cameras which were assigned to record to
DVR two were displaying a live video but were not recording.
The electronics technician told the OIG that before Epstein's death,
(22:33):
no one was specifically tasked with ensuring that the video
from the cameras was being recorded. The electronics technician said
that he therefore did not perform any daily checks to
ensure that the video is being recorded. The warden indicated
that SIS staff are usually responsible for checking the system
(22:53):
for recording functionality and reporting any problems to the communications office. However,
the SIS lieutenant told the OIG that it was her
belief that the electronics technician should have been checking the
system daily to ensure it was recording. The OIG found
that there are no BOP policies that specifically state that
(23:16):
institutional staff must perform periodic checks to ensure the camera
system is fully functional or that security camera systems have
the capacity to record. The facility manager told the OIG
that since Epstein's death, he now checks to ensure that
all cameras and the recording system are working on a
(23:38):
daily basis, and he subsequently provides a report about the
status of the system to the facilities, executive staff, the
SIS and electronics technicians. All right, folks, we're going to
end this episode right there, and then in the next
episode we're going to pick up with section B of
Chapter six and keep it moving. All of the information
(24:02):
that goes with the episode can be found in the
description box.
What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
In this episode, we're picking right up where we left
off in the last episode, talking about the OIG's report
into the circumstances surrounding Jeffrey Epstein's death. Part D failure
to assign Epstein a new cellmate on August ninth, Section
(00:24):
one Daywatch staff actions on August ninth, the Shoe Lieutenant
told the OIG that he worked at MCC New York
on August eighth, twenty nineteen, from approximately six a m.
Until approximately two pm, and that he was off on
August ninth, twenty nineteen. The Shoe Lieutenant, who shift ended
(00:46):
over an hour before the USMS sent the second email
regarding in May three's impending transfer, told the OIG that
he was not aware that in May three was scheduled
to be transferred out of MCC New York, and therefore
he did not notify the captain that Epstein would require
a new cell mate. According to the Shoe Lieutenant, as
(01:07):
soon as the Shoe staff learned that in May three
would be transferred, they should have notified a lieutenant on duty,
the day Watch Operations Lieutenant, and the day Watch Activities
lieutenant told the OIG on August ninth, twenty nineteen, they
had oversight of the shoe from approximately six am until
two pm due to their position descriptions and because of
(01:30):
the shoe lieutenant's absence. According to the mcc New York
staff roster on August ninth, twenty nineteen, Shoe Officer number
one was listed as Senior Officer Specialist number five, although
Shoe Officer number one is typically the officer in charge.
Another senior Officer specialist told the OIG that in actuality
(01:53):
he was the day watch shoe officer in charge on
August ninth from approximately six am until two pm. The
day watch shoe officer in charge said that since he
had the most experienced and seniority, he was considered by
everyone to be the shoe officer in charge, which the
shoe lieutenant confirmed. The day watch shoe officer in charge
(02:14):
told the OIG that he knew that Epstein had to
have a cell mate. He said that as a general practice,
every inmate who was transferred from suicide watch and or
psychological observation to the shoe is placed with the cell mate.
He also confirmed that the shoe lieutenant also instructed him
that Epstein was to be housed with a cell mate
(02:35):
at all times. According to the day Watch Shoe Officer
in charge, between July thirtieth and August ninth, twenty nineteen,
he told other mcc new York staff members who worked
in the Shoe of Epstein's cellmate requirement, and further stated
that everyone who worked in the Shoe should have known
that Epstein was required to have a cell mate due
(02:57):
to their knowledge, training, and experiens. The day Watch Shoe
Officer in charge confirmed that on the morning of August ninth,
twenty nineteen, the Shoe staff received an inmate call out
list that listed in May three as WAB, which he explained,
meant that in May three was being removed from mcc
(03:18):
new York. He told the OIG that sometime between eight
am and nine am, he escorted Epstein to the Shoe
to the attorney conference room for Epstein's daily legal visit,
during which time Epstein joked around with him. The day
Watch Shoe Officer in charge said that he and Epstein
were accompanied by CO one who was escorting in May
(03:40):
three to receiving and discharge. The day Watch Shoe Officer
in charge and co One both told the OIG that
in May three was escorted to Receiving and discharge with
all of his belongings, and both said that during the escort,
the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge informed Epso that
(04:00):
he would be assigned a new cellmate due to in
May three's departure and the requirement that Epstein have a cellmate.
In his interview with the OIG, CO One confirmed this
conversation between the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge and Epstein,
but he did not provide any additional information regarding notifications
(04:20):
made either by him or the day Watch Shoe Officer
in charge. The day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge told
the OIG that when he and the CO one left
the Shoe with Epstein and in May three, both the
day Watch Operations Lieutenant and the day Watch Activities Lieutenant
should have been physically present in the Lieutenant's office and
(04:42):
should have seen that in May three was departing the
institution when they passed the office. The day Watch Shoe
Officer in Charge said that while he did not expect
in May three to return to mcc New York, there
had been times when inmates had been escorted to receiving
in discharge and as an expected removal, only to be
(05:02):
returned to the shoe later the same day due to
unforeseen circumstances. According to the day watch Shoe officer in charge,
he did not select a new cell mate for Epstein
because he was not certain that in May three had
been discharged from the institution, although he assumed that in
May three would not return to the shoe. The day
(05:23):
watch Shoe officer in charge told the OIG that when
his shift ended at approximately two pm, he informed the
evening watch Shoe officer in charge and Senior Officer Specialist
five that if in May three did not return to
the shoe, Epstein would need a new cell mate. Upon
Epstein's return from his attorney visit, the day watch shoe
(05:46):
officer in charge said he specifically recalled telling the evening
watch shoe officer in charge, in the presence of a
senior Officer Specialist five, make sure this guy gets a bunkie,
to which the Evening Shoe watch officer in charge replied,
all right.
Speaker 2 (06:02):
The day watch Shoe officer in charge.
Speaker 1 (06:04):
Said that at some point that day it was likely
that he also informed the day Watch Operations Lieutenant but
he could not specifically recall if he had done so.
The day Watch Shoe officer in charge told the OIG
that a replacement cell mate should have been identified as
soon as it was confirmed that in May three had
(06:25):
left the institution. He said a new cellmate could have
been reassigned before the four PM shoe count if it
was known that in May three was not coming back,
but the Shoe staff members had until Epstein returned from
his attorney visit to assigned Epstein a new cellmate. According
to the day Watch Shoe officer in charge, Shoe staff
(06:46):
definitely should have realized that in May three was not returning,
both during the four PM count and when Epstein returned
from his attorney visit later that evening. The day Watch
Shoe officer in charge told the OIG that at Ebstein's
daily routine was that he would be with his attorneys
in the attorney conference room until approximately eight pm, so
(07:07):
Shoe personnel had time to make a new cellmate assignment.
He had all Shoe staff members share the responsibility to
find a replacement cell mate, and that anyone assigned to
the Shoe could have found another inmate to replace in
May three. However, he also said that due to Epstein's
high profile, the Shoe personnel should have asked a lieutenant
(07:29):
to contact the psychology department to see which inmate should
have been placed with Epstein. On August twelfth, twenty nineteen,
following Epstein's death, the day watch Shoe Officer in charge
wrote a memorandum to the wardens dating on Friday, August ninth,
twenty nineteen, at approximately one fifty pm. Iss the day
(07:51):
Watch Shoe Officer in Charge passed on to the oncoming
staff members the evening Watch Shoe Officer in Charge and
President Shift staff Senior Officer Specialist five in CO two
that in May three was going wab Ie with all
of his belongings and possibly he may not return. Also
(08:11):
that inmate Epstein number seven sixty three one eight DASH
zero five to four will be needing a cell mate
upon arrival from his attorney visit. The day watch Shoe
Officer in charge departed the Shoe at approximately two PM
and worked an overtime shift as a driver for mcc
New York. He stated that he did not follow up
(08:32):
with the Shoe staff to verify that Epstein had been
assigned another cell mate mcc new York staff with responsibility
for oversight and staffing of the Shoe during the day watch,
including the Warden Associate Warden I, the Captain, the Shoe Lieutenant,
the day Watch Operations Lieutenant, the day Watch Activities Lieutenant,
(08:53):
and the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge, told the
OIG that they all knew Epstein was required to have
a cell mate pursuant to the Psychology Department's determination. They
also confirmed that everyone who regularly worked in the Shoe
knew of this requirement, and that it was the responsibility
of all Shoe staff to notify a supervisor upon learning
(09:15):
that Epstein needed to be assigned the new cellmate due
to Inmate three's transfer to another prison.
Speaker 2 (09:22):
The day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge and CO.
Speaker 1 (09:24):
One, however, were the only two mcc new York staff
members working the day watch on August ninth, twenty nineteen,
who told the OIG that they were aware of Inmate
three's transfer and the need to assign Epstein a new cellmate.
CO one's immediate superior, the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge,
was already aware of the need to assign Epstein a
(09:47):
new cellmate, while the day Watch Shoe Officer in charge
told the OIG that he made a number of notifications.
Other witnesses cannot confirm that he passed on information regarding
Epstein's need or a new cell mate. The day Watch
Operations Lieutenant and the day Watch Activities Lieutenant both told
the OIG that they did not know in May three
(10:09):
had been transferred out of the facility, despite the fact
that both were recipients of the second email the USMS
sent out on August eight that included the information about
in May three's and pending transfer out of mcc New York.
On August ninth, rather, the day Watch Operations Lieutenant and
the day Watch Activities Lieutenant told the OIG that they
(10:32):
believed in May three had been removed from mcc New
York for a court appearance. The day Watch Activities Lieutenant
did not recall in May three departing the institution with
all of his belongings, or having any conversations with day
Watch Shoe Officer in charge or anyone else regarding Inmate
three's departure from mcc New York. According to the day
(10:55):
Watch Activities Lieutenant, he did not know that Epstein was
without a cell Other senior officials, including the Warden Associate
Warden I and the captain, were also unaware of Inmate
three's transfer and the need to assign Epstein a new
cell mate. These officials concurred that while all shoe staff
and supervisors were responsible for notifying a supervisor in the
(11:19):
chain of command of the need to assign Epstein a
new cellmate, the day watch shoe officer in charge bore
a primary responsibility for the notification because he was the
shoe officer in charge and one of the two people
who saw the Inmate three leave the facility with all
of his belongings. The Captain told the OIG that since
(11:40):
Epstein was in the attorney conference room all day, no
one may have even thought about it, and may have
only become aware when they put Epstein back in his
cell after his attorney visit that evening. The Captain said
as soon as the shoe staff became aware that Epstein
was without a cell mate, they should have notified the
evening watch Operations lieutenant. The Captain said that if he
(12:03):
had been informed, he would have taken immediate action to
ensure that Epstein was either assigned a new cell mate
or monitored until that assignment occurred. The Captain, however, was
one of the recipients of the USMS August eighth email
that notified members of mcc New York supervisory staff of
(12:23):
inmate three transfer to another facility. The warden and associate
warden did not receive this email. The warden told the
OIG that he was off duty on August ninth, twenty nineteen.
The warden said that in the event Epstein was without
a cell mate, the plan was to review the situation
and decide who should replace inmate three, but that no
(12:46):
inmate in the shoe was pre selected to replace in
May three if this event occurred. All right, So we're
going to wrap up this episode right here, and then
in the next episode we're going to pick up where
we left off, and and that's going to be with
section two Evening watch staff actions on August ninth. All
(13:06):
of the information that goes with the episode can be
found in the description box pig. What's up, everyone, and
welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode, we're
going to pick back up with the OIG report and
we're going to take a look at chapter six.
Speaker 2 (13:25):
So let's get started. Chapter six.
Speaker 1 (13:28):
The availability of limited recorded video evidence due to the
security camera recording system failure. In August twenty nineteen, the
Metropolitan Correctional Center located in New York, New York. MCC
New York had approximately one hundred and fifty video security
cameras no audio placed throughout the institution.
Speaker 2 (13:51):
The Office of the.
Speaker 1 (13:52):
Inspector General found that approximately eleven cameras were located in
and around the Special Unit housing unit where where Epstein
was confined at the time of his death on August tenth,
twenty nineteen, including one at the end of the l
tier where Epstein was housed that showed any movement in
or out of inmate cells and in the tiers hallway.
(14:15):
In addition to broadcasting live video, MCC New York had
a system that recorded the live video feeds. Following Epstein's death,
MCC New York officials and FBI investigators attempted to review
video recordings related to the incident and discovered that although
the security cameras were working and transmitting live video, recorded
(14:38):
video from most of the cameras in the Shoe area
was not available due to a malfunction of the video
recording system that had occurred on July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen,
including video from the camera at the end of EL Tier.
As a result, while the L tier video camera was
transmitting a live video feed on the night of August ninth,
(15:00):
twenty nineteen and the morning of August tenth, twenty nineteen,
the video was not being recorded. One of the cameras
that had available recordings from August ninth and tenth was
a camera located outside a housing unit adjacent to the shoe.
That camera captured video of a large part of the
common area of the shoe, including the shoe officer station
(15:24):
and portions of the stairways leading to the different shoe tiers,
including the L Tier. Thus, anyone entering or attempting to
enter the L Tier from the common area of the shoe,
including on August ninth and tenth, would have been picked
up by the video recorded by that camera. In addition,
the recording showed the shoe officer station, where the two
(15:45):
shoe staff were seated at a desk immediately outside the
entrance to the L Tier and diagonally across from Epstein's cell,
which was the first cell on the right hand side
of the L Tier. Section one back round round on
the security camera system at MCC new York. All video
surveillance from mcc new York's cameras was connected to a
(16:09):
DVR system. The DVR system had two data storage systems
that were labeled DVR one and DVR two, and each
consisted of sixteen hard drives used for storing digital recordings.
Roughly half of mcc new York security cameras were assigned
to record to DVR one and the other half were
assigned to record to DVR two. Cameras assigned to DVR
(16:33):
one only recorded to the DVR one hard drives, and
cameras assigned to DVR two only recorded to the DVR
two hard drives. Therefore, if DVR one crashed, no video
from the DVR two assigned cameras could be retrieved from
DVR one, and vice versa. The OIG's investigation revealed the
(16:54):
history of camera problems at MCC new York. In August
twenty nineteen, the electro technician was the only such technician
at MCC new York. The electronics technician told the OIG
that when he began to work at mcc new York
in twenty sixteen, he found that the facility's security camera
(17:14):
system needed to be upgraded. According to the electronics technician,
the system had not properly been maintained prior to his arrival,
The hard drives in the DVRs frequently malfunctioned and needed
to be replaced, and the overall system was outdated, in
part because the cameras were analog and not digital. The
(17:35):
electronics technician told the OIG that throughout his tenure at
mcc new York, the camera system was subject to frequently
recurring failures, particularly with the respect.
Speaker 2 (17:47):
To the DVR hard drives.
Speaker 1 (17:49):
The warden, who assumes his responsibilities at mcc new York
in May of twenty eighteen, told the OIG he was
generally aware that there were problems with the security GUS
camera system throughout the institution. He further stated that efforts
were undertaken to determine which cameras were working and which
needed to be fixed, and that mcc new York officials
(18:12):
intended to ultimately seek funding to replace the entire system.
Federal Bureau of Prisons records reflect that on September sixth,
twenty eighteen, the warden submitted a memorandum to the BP's
Northeast Regional Director to request eight hundred thousand dollars in
funding to replace the entire camera system. The memorandum identified
(18:36):
an estimated project start date of December one, twenty eighteen,
and an estimated completion date of February ninth, twenty nineteen.
The BOP approved the funding request, and on September twenty first,
twenty eighteen, a contract in the amount of six hundred
ninety eight thousand, one hundred eight dollars and ninety nine
(18:56):
cents was awarded to Company one to provide various equipment
for the project and associated labor. On September twenty fourth,
twenty eighteen, a separate contract in the amount of thirty
four thousand, eighty nine dollars and twenty eight cents was
awarded to Company two to provide a sorted networking, equipment
(19:16):
and wiring needed to install the camera system. As the
camera upgrade project was beginning, BOP officials recognized that mcc
new York's mechanical, electrical, and plumbing systems were also in
need of major repairs. Mcc new York did not have
enough qualified technicians on staff to complete both the camera
(19:38):
installation and other repairs needed at the facility, so beginning
the week of March seventeenth, twenty nineteen, the GOP's Northeast
Regional Office arranged for technicians from the BP institutions to
conduct temporary duty assignments at MCC New York to perform
the work. During the course of the TDY rotatetions, work
(20:01):
was not consistently conducted on the camera upgrades because sometimes
TDY staff assigned to the project were used to cover
shortages at MCC New York's custody posts, and sometimes there
were not enough TDY volunteers who possess the skills required
to do the camera work. At the time of Epstein's
(20:21):
death on August tenth, twenty nineteen, the camera system upgrade
had not been completed. Immediately following Epstein's death, Company one
officials arrived at MCC New York and installed the new
recording system within a couple of days, and recording functionality
was restored using the existing cameras. The majority of the
(20:42):
new cameras did not arrive to the facility until October
twenty nineteen, and they were installed in stages as the
wiring work was conducted. According to the electronics technician, as
of August twenty twenty one, when the MCC closed the
wiring work had still not been fully completed. Part two
(21:04):
Discovery of security camera system recording issues in August of
twenty nineteen. Part A discovery on August eighth of the
DVR two failure that occurred on July twenty ninth. According
to forensic analysis conducted by the FBI after Epstein's death,
disc failures occurred in MCC New York's DVR two system
(21:26):
on July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen, which resulted in the
system being unable to record. According to BOP records and
OIG interviews, the BOP did not learn about the failure
until August eight, twenty nineteen, when the Special Investigative Services
Lieutenant and Dissociate ward I attempted to review recorded surveillance
(21:49):
video for a matter unrelated to Epstein. The SIS lieutenant
told the OIG she discovered that no recorded video was
available for several of the institution's cameras, so she reported
the matter to the communications office, and the electronics technician
arrived to assess the problem sometime before his shift was
(22:11):
scheduled to end. The electronics technician told the OIG that
he found that roughly half of the institutions approximately one
hundred and fifty cameras which were assigned to record to
DVR two were displaying a live video but were not recording.
The electronics technician told the OIG that before Epstein's death,
(22:33):
no one was specifically tasked with ensuring that the video
from the cameras was being recorded. The electronics technician said
that he therefore did not perform any daily checks to
ensure that the video is being recorded. The warden indicated
that SIS staff are usually responsible for checking the system
(22:53):
for recording functionality and reporting any problems to the communications office. However,
the SIS lieutenant told the OIG that it was her
belief that the electronics technician should have been checking the
system daily to ensure it was recording. The OIG found
that there are no BOP policies that specifically state that
(23:16):
institutional staff must perform periodic checks to ensure the camera
system is fully functional or that security camera systems have
the capacity to record. The facility manager told the OIG
that since Epstein's death, he now checks to ensure that
all cameras and the recording system are working on a
(23:38):
daily basis, and he subsequently provides a report about the
status of the system to the facilities, executive staff, the
SIS and electronics technicians. All right, folks, we're going to
end this episode right there, and then in the next
episode we're going to pick up with section B of
Chapter six and keep it moving. All of the information
(24:02):
that goes with the episode can be found in the
description box.
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