Mega Edition: The OIG Report Into The Death And Circumstances Of Epstein's Death (Part 8) (11/26/25)
November 27, 2025 • 28 mins
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report into Jeffrey Epstein’s death delivers a blistering indictment of systemic failures at the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and his holding facility. It documents a litany of procedural violations: Epstein’s cellmate was removed and never replaced despite explicit policy, surveillance cameras in his unit were malfunctioning or not recording, and the staff responsible for required 30-minute checks on Epstein didn’t perform them. Instead, employees falsified records indicating those rounds were completed, and in reality Epstein was alone and unchecked for hours before his death. These aren’t isolated mistakes—they’re classic symptoms of institutional collapse and neglect at a time when every safeguard should have been activated.
Beyond the immediate night of his death, the report underscores a deeper rot: long-standing staffing shortages, indifferent supervision, and a culture that tolerated policy breaches without accountability. The OIG identifies that the same deficiencies had been raised in prior reports about the BOP, yet were never effectively addressed. By allowing one of the most high-profile detainees in the nation to slip through the cracks under such glaring conditions, the BOP didn’t just fail Epstein—they failed the public trust and all the victims who sought justice.
to contact me:
bobbycapucci@protonmail.com
source:
2 3 - 0 8 5 (justice.gov)
Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.
Beyond the immediate night of his death, the report underscores a deeper rot: long-standing staffing shortages, indifferent supervision, and a culture that tolerated policy breaches without accountability. The OIG identifies that the same deficiencies had been raised in prior reports about the BOP, yet were never effectively addressed. By allowing one of the most high-profile detainees in the nation to slip through the cracks under such glaring conditions, the BOP didn’t just fail Epstein—they failed the public trust and all the victims who sought justice.
to contact me:
bobbycapucci@protonmail.com
source:
2 3 - 0 8 5 (justice.gov)
Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-epstein-chronicles--5003294/support.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
One and welcome back to the program. In this episode,
we're going to continue taking a look at the OIG
report into the circumstances surrounding the death of Jeffrey Epstein.
Section A. Mcc new York staff failed to ensure that
(00:20):
Epstein had a cell mate on August ninth, as instructed
by the Psychology Department on July thirtieth. On July thirtieth,
twenty nineteen, the mcc new York Psychology Department sent an
email to over seventy BOP staff members stating that Epstein
needs to be housed with an appropriate cell mate. The
(00:42):
psychology departments directive that Epstein have an appropriate cell mate
arose out of the events that occurred on July twenty third,
twenty nineteen, when Epstein was found lying on the floor
of his cell with a piece of orange cloth around
his neck. Epstein. At the time, Inmate one told mcc
(01:03):
new York staff that Epstein had tried to hang himself
and another inmate housed on the same shoe tier at
the same time, Inmate two, corroborated several aspects of inmate
one's account. Epstein's account of what had occurred varied. Epstein
initially told mcc new York staff that he thought his
(01:23):
cellmate had tried to kill him, but thereafter he repeatedly
said he did not know what had occurred. Epstein later
asked two different mcc new York staff members if he
could be housed with the same cell mate Epstein initially
accused of having tried to harm him. As a result
of this incident, Epstein was placed on suicide watch and
(01:46):
then psychological observation consistent with the psychology departments directive. The
Captain and the Shoe Lieutenant each told the OIG that
they verbally informed Shoe staff of Epstein's cellmate requirement. These
and other witnesses said staff members regularly assigned to the
Shoe knew that Epstein needed to have a cell mate. However,
(02:09):
despite the Psychology departments widely disseminated July thirtieth email instruction
and the subsequent verbal direction provided by the Captain and
the Shoe Lieutenant, Epstein was left without a cell mate.
On August ninth, less than twenty four hours later, Epstein
died by suicide. One. Failure to make required notifications regarding
(02:33):
the need to assign Epstein a cell mate, the OIG's
investigation and review revealed that on August ninth, twenty nineteen,
mcc new York staff assigned to the Shoe failed to
notify their superiors that Epstein's cell mate in May three
had been transferred out of mcc new York and therefore
(02:54):
Epstein needed to be assigned a new cell mate. The
failure to make these require notifications and the supervisor's failure
to properly supervise the Shoe staff discussed further below, resulted
in Epstein being housed without a cellmate at the time
of his death, which was contrary to the Psychology Departments
(03:15):
directive issued just ten days earlier. BOP standards of conduct
require that employees obey the orders of their superiors at
all times. Mcc new York post orders for the Shoe require,
among other things, that all Shoe officers maintain a log
of pertinent information regarding inmate activity, detailing time, persons involved,
(03:40):
if pertinent, and the event which must be logged into truscope. Importantly,
the Shoe post orders clarify that they are not intended
to describe in detail all of the officer's responsibilities. Good
judgment and common sense are expected in all situations not
covered in these post orders. On August ninth, the day
(04:03):
Watch Shoe Officer in Charge, the Evening Watch Shoe Officer
in Charge, and CO. Tobnoel were each assigned to the
MCC New York Shoe as their permanent quarterly assigned post
and served as the Shoe Officer in charge during their
respective shifts. The OIG investigation found that of these employees
(04:25):
knew that Epstein was required to have a cellmate at
all times per the Psychology Departments directive. The OIG further
found on August ninth, the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge,
the Evening Watch Shoe Officer in Charge, and Noel each
became aware at various times during their respective shifts that
(04:46):
Epstein's cellmate in May three had been transferred from the
institution with all of his belongings, a status known to
all MCC New York staff members is meaning the inmate
was being permanently trans Txford out of the institution. Specifically,
the OIG investigation found that on the morning of August ninth,
(05:07):
the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge NC one, who
was also assigned to the Shoe Review the MCC New
York Daily call Out List, a document that identifies all
inmates who were leaving their house units each day, which
listed in May three as being scheduled to depart mcc
New York with all of his belongings. At approximately eight
(05:30):
thirty am, CO one escorted Inmate three from the Shoe
two receiving and discharge to be transferred out of the institution,
and the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge escort at
Ebstein from the Shoe to the Attorney Conference Room for
his daily meeting with his attorneys. During this escort, the
(05:52):
day watch Shoe Officer in Charge and CO one discussed
the need to assign Epstein with a new cellmate due
to Inmate three's trans The day watch Shoe Officer in
Charge told the OIG and stated in a memorandum that
he prepared following Epstein's death, that he notified his relief
the evening watch Shoe Officer in charge of the need
(06:14):
to assign Epstein a new cellmate, and that he likely
notified an unspecified lieutenant. However, the OIG did not credit
the day Watch Shoe Officer in charge his account because
no other witnesses or evidence confirmed that he had in
fact passed on information regarding Epstein's need for a new cellmate,
(06:36):
either to a supervisor or to his relief. The OIG
investigation also found that during the next shift in the
mcc New York Shoe, both the evening watch Shoe officer
in charge and Noel became aware that Epstein was without
a cell mate. The evening watch Shoe officer in charge
told the OIG that when he escorted Epstein back to
(06:59):
his cell after Epstein's telephone call, he saw that in
May three was not there, and then he, Noel, and
the material handler discussed the need for Epstein to have
a new cellmate. The evening watch Shoe officer in charge
also told the OIG that he notified an unspecified supervisor. However,
(07:20):
other witnesses did not corroborate his account. Noel told the
OIG that she was unaware of both that Epstein needed
to have a cell mate and that Inmate three had
been removed from the institution. Noel told the OIG that
she went to Ebstein's cell at approximately ten PM, a
(07:40):
time of day when all inmates were secured in their cells,
and may have plugged in Epstein's medical device forum. The
OIG did not credit Noel's statements that she did not
know that Epstein needed a cell mat or that in
May three had been removed from the shoe based on
contradictory witness statements, including her own regarding shoe STAPs, knowledge
(08:04):
of Epstein's cellmate requirements, and Inmate three's transfer out of
the shoe, The OIG investigation concluded that on August ninth,
twenty nineteen, the day Watch Shoe Officer in charge, the
Evening Watch Shoe officer in charge, and no well Feld
to notify a supervisor as required after Epstein's cellmate was
(08:27):
permanently removed from the MCC new York Shoe, which constituted
in a violation of BOP standards of conduct. Additionally, they're
in action violated mcc new York Shoe post orders because
none of these individuals documented the fact that Epstein needed
a new cell mate as required. Finally, all of these
(08:50):
officers failed to exercise good judgment and common sense as
required by the shoe post orders by not immediately undertaking
steps through their chain of command to ensure that a
high profile inmate who had been released from Suicide Watch
and Psychological Observation ten days earlier had an appropriate cell mate.
(09:12):
Section two failure to adequately supervise Shoe's staff. The OIG
also found that mcc new York's supervisory personnel failed to
effectively perform their duties, which contributed to the fact that
Epstein was housed without a cellmate at the time of
his death. Rather than passively relying on a notification from subordinates.
(09:36):
Supervisory personnel also had an obligation under federal regulations to
put forth honest effort in the performance of their duties,
which included supervision of SHOE personnel. The OIG's investigation revealed
that the Captain and the day Watch Operations Lieutenant, the
day Watch Activities Lieutenant, the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant, in
(10:00):
the Morning's Watch Operations Lieutenant, among other mcc new York staff,
received an email from the US Marshall Service USMS on
August eighth, twenty nineteen, notifying them that inmate three was
scheduled to be transferred to another facility the following day.
If any of these supervisors had read the email attachment,
(10:24):
they would have known of the need to assign Epstein
a new cellmate. Instead, many of these individuals told the
OIG that they believed that Inmate three had gone to
court on August ninth, and they were unaware that he
would not return and Epstein needed a new cell mate.
The Shoe lieutenant shift on August eighth ended over in
(10:45):
an hour before the USMS sent the email notification, and
he was not working on August ninth. In his absence,
the day Watch Operations Lieutenant, the day Watch Activities Lieutenant,
the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant, and the Morning Watch Operations
Lieutenant had oversight of the Shoe during their respective shifts,
(11:07):
and the Captain had oversight over all of the lieutenants.
The OIG found that the failure of these individuals to
adequately supervise Shoe staff and ensure that a high profile
inmate who had recently been on suicide watch and psychological
observation had an appropriate cellmate constituted a job performance failure
(11:31):
Part three failure to have a contingency plan for the
assigning of Epstein a cellmate. Additionally, the OIG found that
the warden's failure to have a backup cell mate assignment
for Epstein constituted poor judgment. The evening Watch Shoe Officer
in charge told the OIG that although he knew that
(11:52):
Epstein needed to be assigned another cell mate, SHOE staff
coundnot just put anyone in the cell with Epstein the war,
and confirmed this in his OIG interview when he explained
that he and BP executive leadership selected inmate three as
Epstein cellmate following the events of July twenty three, twenty nineteen.
(12:14):
The Warden told the OIG that no inmates were pre
vetted to serve as Epstein cellmate if Inmate three left
mcc New York. The Northeast Regional Director, the Warden, and
the Captain all told the OIG that if Inmate three
had been removed as Epstein's cellmate, they would have had
to review a new list of potential cellmate candidates to
(12:38):
ensure that Epstein was housed with an appropriate inmate. This
selection process, which involved the multiple steps undertaken by high
level BOP management, would be difficult to accomplish in short
periods of time and ultimately may have impeded Shoe Officer's
ability to house Epstein with a cellmate on August ninth, nineteen.
(13:01):
Section four lack of candor BOP policy requires that during
the course of an official investigation employees are to cooperate
fully by providing all pertinent information that they might have.
Full cooperation requires truthfully responding to questions. As discussed above,
(13:21):
The day watch Shoe Officer in charge and the Evening
Watch Shoe Officer in charge told the OIG that they
notified supervisory personnel regarding the need to assign Epstein a
new cellmate. Based on a lack of corroborating evidence for
these assertions, the OIG found that they lacked candor in
their OIG interviews in violation of BOP policy. Similarly, the
(13:47):
OIG found that Noel lacked candor in violation of BOP
policy when she said she did not know that Epstein
needed a cellmate or that his then cellmate in May
three had been transferred out of SHU. The OIG also
found that the Morning Watch Operations lieutenant lacked candor in
(14:08):
her interview with the OIG and violation of BOP policy
when she said she was not aware that Epstein was
required to be housed with the cellmate. Her statement is
contradicted by the fact that she was one of the
mcc New York staff members who responded to the July
twenty third, twenty nineteen incident involving Epstein, which resulted in
(14:32):
him being placed on suicide watch and psychological observation. She
was a recipient of the psychology departments July thirtieth, twenty
nineteen email identifying the cellmate requirement and the statements of
multiple witnesses who told the OIG that Epstein's cellmate requirement
(14:52):
was widely disseminated verbally by mcc new York leadership. All right, folks,
we're gonna end this one here, and then in the
next episode we're going to be taking a look at
Part B. Mcc new York staff failed to conduct mandatory
rounds and inmate counts, resulting in Epstein being unobserved for
(15:12):
hours before his death. All of the information that goes
with the episode can be found in the description box. Well, well, welcome,
what's up everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
In this episode, we're going to pick back up with
the OIG report, and to do that, we're going to
(15:32):
look at Part B of chapter seven. So let's dive
right back. In Part B, mcc new York staff failed
to conduct mandatory rounds and inmate counts, resulting in Epstein
being unobserved for hours before his death. The OIG's investigation
(15:53):
and review revealed that on August ninth and tenth, twenty nineteen,
mcc new York Shoe staff didn't not conduct the mandatory
rounds and inmate counts during their shift in the shoe.
The failure to undertake these required measures to account for
inmate whereabouts and well being, and the supervisor's failure to
(16:14):
properly supervise the shoe staff as discussed further below, resulted
in Epstein being unobserved for hours before his death, which
compounded the failure of mcc new York staff to ensure
that Epstein had an appropriate cellmate one failure to conduct
rounds and inmate counts in the shoe. Federal regulations require
(16:39):
that employees use official time in an honest effort to
perform official duties. Additionally, BOP standards of conduct required that
employees conduct themselves in a manner that foster's respect for
the Bureau of Prisons, the Department of Justice, and the
US government, because in attention to duty intercorrectional environment can
(17:01):
result in escapes, assaults, and other incidents. BOP standards of
conduct also require employees to remain fully alert and attentive
during duty hours. BOP policy also requires continuous inmate accountability,
which is accomplished through rounds and inmate counts. Among other things,
(17:24):
Rounds and inmate counts enable staff to observe inmates and
ensure that they are safe and secure in their cells
and are in good health. BOP policy and mcc new
York Shoe post orders set out the requirements for these
inmate accountability measures, specifying that correctional staff must conduct rounds
(17:44):
on an irregular schedule at least twice each hour, no
more than forty minutes apart. BOP policy and mcc new
York Shoe post orders further specify that at least two
mcc New York Shoe staff members must get conduct inmate
counts at twelve am, three am, five am, four pm,
(18:05):
and ten pm daily, and also at ten am on
weekends and federal holidays. The OIG's investigation and review revealed
that an inmate in May four was internally transferred from
the Shoe to receiving in discharge at approximately three fifteen
pm on August ninth, twenty nineteen. However, this inmate transfer
(18:28):
was not documented until approximately twelve thirty five am on
August tenth, twenty nineteen. Based on this internal transfer, BOP
records and witness statements, the OIG determined that the four
PM and ten PM shoe inmate counts on August ninth
were aerinis. In addition, the OIG reviewed the available shoe
(18:51):
security camera video, which did not show CEOs walking up
or down the stairs leading to the various shoe tiers
during the count time, a process that is necessary to
conduct an accurate count of inmates. During their OIG interviews,
the evening Watt shoe officer in charge, the material handler
(19:11):
co Toven Noel, and material handler Michael Thomas each admitted
that they did not conduct all of the mandatory rounds
and inmate counts in the shoe on the evening of
August ninth, and in the morning of August tenth. Noel
told the OIG that she conducted the ten PM count
on August ninth. The OIG did not credit her statement
(19:34):
based on one its review of the shoe security camera video,
which reflects Noel walking up and down the stairs leading
to some but not all of the tears. Several minutes
after the shoe inmate count, had been called into the
control center. Two the ten pm councilate, which erroneousley included
the Shoe inmate four who had been internally transferred to
(19:56):
receiving and delivery, three other Bopie records, and four the
material Handler's statements to the OIG that no one conducted
the ten pm count because everyone was tired, instead of
performing the required duties to account for inmate whereabouts and
well being. The OIG found that officers assigned to the
(20:17):
Shoe on August ninth and tenth, including the material handler,
Noel and Thomas, primarily remained seated in the shoe officer's station,
sometimes without moving for a period of time, suggesting that
they were asleep, and conducted a variety of Internet searches
on mcc New York computers. Thomas also admitted to the
(20:38):
OIG that he dozed off for periods of time during
his shift. The OIG's analysis of the Shoe security camera
video revealed that after approximately ten forty pm, no coeo
entered Epstein's tier in the Shoe until just before six
thirty am, when Noel and Thomas began to serve breakfast
(20:59):
to the inmates. The OIG Investigation and Review concluded that
the Evening watch Shoe Officer in charge, the material Handler
Noel and Thomas failed to conduct the mandatory rounds and
inmate counts during their respective shifts in the mcc New
York Shoe on August ninth and tenth, twenty nineteen, and
(21:20):
that their actions constituted violations of five CFR Section two
six three five dot one zero one B five and
two six three five dot seven zero five A, BOP
Program Statements thirty four to twenty dot eleven and fifty
five hundred dot fourteen, and mcc New York Shoe post
(21:42):
Orders Section two, false statements and lack of candor. The
OIG's investigation and review found that on August ninth and tenth,
twenty nineteen, the Evening watch Shoe Officer in charge, the
material Handler Noel and Thomas made false statements when they
falsified BOP records by attesting that they had completed the
(22:04):
mandatory rounds and inmate counts when in fact they had not.
Federal law provides that whoever in any matter within the
jurisdiction of the Executive Branch of the Government of the
United States, knowingly and willfully makes or uses any false
writing or document, knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious,
(22:27):
or fraudilent statement or entry has violated eighteen US Code
one zero zero, one A and three. As discussed above,
the OIG found that the Evening Watch Shoe officer in
charge the material handler Noel and Thomas, failed to conduct
all of the mandatory rounds and inmate counts as part
(22:50):
of each institutional inmate count BOP policy and mcc new
York Shoe post orders required two CEOs to conduct each
count and memorial the number of inmates in the shoe
on an official mcc New York forum often called the
count slip. On the count slip, both CEOs are required
(23:10):
to fill in the date and time the count had
been performed, write the total number of inmates physically present
in the unit counted, and then sign the count slip.
Once the CEOs complete and sign the count slips, the
count slips are then collected and delivered to the mcc
New York Control Center. Officers assigned to the control Center
(23:31):
are responsible for comparing the count slips from each housing
unit to the institution's overall inmate count. Cheet to ensure
that each inmate was accounted for. Now, Yeah, after all
the count slips have been collected from each housing unit
and the numbers on the count slips had been matched
to the institution's overall count sheet, could the institutional count
(23:54):
be deemed cleared or completed? The evening watch shoe officer
in charge the material reel handler, Noel and Thomas each
prepared and or signed a false count slip to create
the impression that they had fulfilled their inmate accountability responsibilities,
when in fact they had not. These individuals admitted to
(24:15):
the OIG that instead of performing their assigned duties, they
pre filled the count slips with a number of inmates
they believed were in the shoe based on what officers
from the previous shift had told them, and signed off
on the documents knowing that they were falsely attested to
having completed the counts. Additionally, Noel admitted to the OIG
(24:36):
that she had pre filled the official mcc New York
forms documenting the times of the thirty minute rounds, often
referred to as round sheets, and falsely attested to having
completed the rounds. Noel and Thomas were indicted by a
grand jury for their false certification of having conducted rounds
and counts. Subsequently, each entered into a deferred prosecution agreement
(25:01):
with the US Attorney's Office for the Southern District of
New York. The US Attorney's Office of the Southern District
of New York declined prosecution for the Evening watch Shoe
Officer in charge and the material Handler. The OIG investigation
has found that the Evening watch Shoe Officer in Charge,
the material Handler, Noel, and Thomas knowingly and willingly falsified
(25:25):
BOP records in violation of federal law by attesting that
they had completed the mandatory rounds and inmate counts on
the evening of August ninth, twenty nineteen and the morning
of August tenth, twenty nineteen. Additionally, as noted above, BOP
policy requires employees to cooperate fully with an official investigation
(25:48):
and truthfully respond to questions. The OIG found that Noel
lacked candor when she told the OIG that she had
conducted the ten PM count when the weight of evidence
indicates that at most she may have conducted around at
that time. Section three poor judgment regarding the use of
(26:08):
overtime The OIG's investigation and review revealed that on August ninth,
twenty nineteen, mcc New York supervisory staff requested that a
staff member fill in an overtime position within the Shoe,
which resulted in that staff member working three shifts back
to back, that is, twenty four hours straight. The collective
(26:30):
Bargaining Agreement between BOP and unions representing BOP employees provides
that ordinarily, the minimum time off between shifts will be
seven and one half hours and the minimum elapse time
of on days off will be fifty six hours, except
when the employee requests the change. The material handler told
(26:53):
the OIG that on August ninth, he reported for a
voluntary overtime shift from twelve am to eight am, and
then worked as regular eight am to four pm shift
in the warehouse. At some point during the day shift,
the day watch Operations Lieutenant, a higher ranking official, called
and asked the material handler if he could work over
(27:14):
time in the shoe, and he agreed. The material handler
told the OIG that he felt pressure to work the
third shift, which resulted in him working twenty four hours
straight from twelve am on August ninth through twelve am
on August tenth. As discussed previously, the material handler admitted
to the OIG that on the evening of August ninth,
(27:36):
during his third shift, which he worked in the shoe,
he did not conduct the mandatory in made counts in
rounds because he was too tired. The OIG investigation review
concluded the day Watch Operations Lieutenant exercise poor judgment when
he requested that the material handler work a third consecutive shift.
(27:56):
As the day Watch Operations Lieutenant, he had access to
the staff roster and the schedule, and therefore he should
have known that the material handler had already worked sixteen
straight hours. Additionally, the day Watch Operations Lieutenant's actions was
inconsistent with the collective bargaining Agreement and did not reflect
sound correctional judgment, as it would have been extremely difficult
(28:19):
for the material handler to have effectively performed as duties
during the third shift. All right, folks, we're going to
wrap it up here, and then in the next episode,
we're going to pick back up with section four of
Chapter seven, and that is clearing the ten PM institutional count.
Knowing that it was inaccurate. All of the information that
(28:42):
goes with this episode can be found in the description
box
One and welcome back to the program. In this episode,
we're going to continue taking a look at the OIG
report into the circumstances surrounding the death of Jeffrey Epstein.
Section A. Mcc new York staff failed to ensure that
(00:20):
Epstein had a cell mate on August ninth, as instructed
by the Psychology Department on July thirtieth. On July thirtieth,
twenty nineteen, the mcc new York Psychology Department sent an
email to over seventy BOP staff members stating that Epstein
needs to be housed with an appropriate cell mate. The
(00:42):
psychology departments directive that Epstein have an appropriate cell mate
arose out of the events that occurred on July twenty third,
twenty nineteen, when Epstein was found lying on the floor
of his cell with a piece of orange cloth around
his neck. Epstein. At the time, Inmate one told mcc
(01:03):
new York staff that Epstein had tried to hang himself
and another inmate housed on the same shoe tier at
the same time, Inmate two, corroborated several aspects of inmate
one's account. Epstein's account of what had occurred varied. Epstein
initially told mcc new York staff that he thought his
(01:23):
cellmate had tried to kill him, but thereafter he repeatedly
said he did not know what had occurred. Epstein later
asked two different mcc new York staff members if he
could be housed with the same cell mate Epstein initially
accused of having tried to harm him. As a result
of this incident, Epstein was placed on suicide watch and
(01:46):
then psychological observation consistent with the psychology departments directive. The
Captain and the Shoe Lieutenant each told the OIG that
they verbally informed Shoe staff of Epstein's cellmate requirement. These
and other witnesses said staff members regularly assigned to the
Shoe knew that Epstein needed to have a cell mate. However,
(02:09):
despite the Psychology departments widely disseminated July thirtieth email instruction
and the subsequent verbal direction provided by the Captain and
the Shoe Lieutenant, Epstein was left without a cell mate.
On August ninth, less than twenty four hours later, Epstein
died by suicide. One. Failure to make required notifications regarding
(02:33):
the need to assign Epstein a cell mate, the OIG's
investigation and review revealed that on August ninth, twenty nineteen,
mcc new York staff assigned to the Shoe failed to
notify their superiors that Epstein's cell mate in May three
had been transferred out of mcc new York and therefore
(02:54):
Epstein needed to be assigned a new cell mate. The
failure to make these require notifications and the supervisor's failure
to properly supervise the Shoe staff discussed further below, resulted
in Epstein being housed without a cellmate at the time
of his death, which was contrary to the Psychology Departments
(03:15):
directive issued just ten days earlier. BOP standards of conduct
require that employees obey the orders of their superiors at
all times. Mcc new York post orders for the Shoe require,
among other things, that all Shoe officers maintain a log
of pertinent information regarding inmate activity, detailing time, persons involved,
(03:40):
if pertinent, and the event which must be logged into truscope. Importantly,
the Shoe post orders clarify that they are not intended
to describe in detail all of the officer's responsibilities. Good
judgment and common sense are expected in all situations not
covered in these post orders. On August ninth, the day
(04:03):
Watch Shoe Officer in Charge, the Evening Watch Shoe Officer
in Charge, and CO. Tobnoel were each assigned to the
MCC New York Shoe as their permanent quarterly assigned post
and served as the Shoe Officer in charge during their
respective shifts. The OIG investigation found that of these employees
(04:25):
knew that Epstein was required to have a cellmate at
all times per the Psychology Departments directive. The OIG further
found on August ninth, the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge,
the Evening Watch Shoe Officer in Charge, and Noel each
became aware at various times during their respective shifts that
(04:46):
Epstein's cellmate in May three had been transferred from the
institution with all of his belongings, a status known to
all MCC New York staff members is meaning the inmate
was being permanently trans Txford out of the institution. Specifically,
the OIG investigation found that on the morning of August ninth,
(05:07):
the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge NC one, who
was also assigned to the Shoe Review the MCC New
York Daily call Out List, a document that identifies all
inmates who were leaving their house units each day, which
listed in May three as being scheduled to depart mcc
New York with all of his belongings. At approximately eight
(05:30):
thirty am, CO one escorted Inmate three from the Shoe
two receiving and discharge to be transferred out of the institution,
and the day Watch Shoe Officer in Charge escort at
Ebstein from the Shoe to the Attorney Conference Room for
his daily meeting with his attorneys. During this escort, the
(05:52):
day watch Shoe Officer in Charge and CO one discussed
the need to assign Epstein with a new cellmate due
to Inmate three's trans The day watch Shoe Officer in
Charge told the OIG and stated in a memorandum that
he prepared following Epstein's death, that he notified his relief
the evening watch Shoe Officer in charge of the need
(06:14):
to assign Epstein a new cellmate, and that he likely
notified an unspecified lieutenant. However, the OIG did not credit
the day Watch Shoe Officer in charge his account because
no other witnesses or evidence confirmed that he had in
fact passed on information regarding Epstein's need for a new cellmate,
(06:36):
either to a supervisor or to his relief. The OIG
investigation also found that during the next shift in the
mcc New York Shoe, both the evening watch Shoe officer
in charge and Noel became aware that Epstein was without
a cell mate. The evening watch Shoe officer in charge
told the OIG that when he escorted Epstein back to
(06:59):
his cell after Epstein's telephone call, he saw that in
May three was not there, and then he, Noel, and
the material handler discussed the need for Epstein to have
a new cellmate. The evening watch Shoe officer in charge
also told the OIG that he notified an unspecified supervisor. However,
(07:20):
other witnesses did not corroborate his account. Noel told the
OIG that she was unaware of both that Epstein needed
to have a cell mate and that Inmate three had
been removed from the institution. Noel told the OIG that
she went to Ebstein's cell at approximately ten PM, a
(07:40):
time of day when all inmates were secured in their cells,
and may have plugged in Epstein's medical device forum. The
OIG did not credit Noel's statements that she did not
know that Epstein needed a cell mat or that in
May three had been removed from the shoe based on
contradictory witness statements, including her own regarding shoe STAPs, knowledge
(08:04):
of Epstein's cellmate requirements, and Inmate three's transfer out of
the shoe, The OIG investigation concluded that on August ninth,
twenty nineteen, the day Watch Shoe Officer in charge, the
Evening Watch Shoe officer in charge, and no well Feld
to notify a supervisor as required after Epstein's cellmate was
(08:27):
permanently removed from the MCC new York Shoe, which constituted
in a violation of BOP standards of conduct. Additionally, they're
in action violated mcc new York Shoe post orders because
none of these individuals documented the fact that Epstein needed
a new cell mate as required. Finally, all of these
(08:50):
officers failed to exercise good judgment and common sense as
required by the shoe post orders by not immediately undertaking
steps through their chain of command to ensure that a
high profile inmate who had been released from Suicide Watch
and Psychological Observation ten days earlier had an appropriate cell mate.
(09:12):
Section two failure to adequately supervise Shoe's staff. The OIG
also found that mcc new York's supervisory personnel failed to
effectively perform their duties, which contributed to the fact that
Epstein was housed without a cellmate at the time of
his death. Rather than passively relying on a notification from subordinates.
(09:36):
Supervisory personnel also had an obligation under federal regulations to
put forth honest effort in the performance of their duties,
which included supervision of SHOE personnel. The OIG's investigation revealed
that the Captain and the day Watch Operations Lieutenant, the
day Watch Activities Lieutenant, the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant, in
(10:00):
the Morning's Watch Operations Lieutenant, among other mcc new York staff,
received an email from the US Marshall Service USMS on
August eighth, twenty nineteen, notifying them that inmate three was
scheduled to be transferred to another facility the following day.
If any of these supervisors had read the email attachment,
(10:24):
they would have known of the need to assign Epstein
a new cellmate. Instead, many of these individuals told the
OIG that they believed that Inmate three had gone to
court on August ninth, and they were unaware that he
would not return and Epstein needed a new cell mate.
The Shoe lieutenant shift on August eighth ended over in
(10:45):
an hour before the USMS sent the email notification, and
he was not working on August ninth. In his absence,
the day Watch Operations Lieutenant, the day Watch Activities Lieutenant,
the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant, and the Morning Watch Operations
Lieutenant had oversight of the Shoe during their respective shifts,
(11:07):
and the Captain had oversight over all of the lieutenants.
The OIG found that the failure of these individuals to
adequately supervise Shoe staff and ensure that a high profile
inmate who had recently been on suicide watch and psychological
observation had an appropriate cellmate constituted a job performance failure
(11:31):
Part three failure to have a contingency plan for the
assigning of Epstein a cellmate. Additionally, the OIG found that
the warden's failure to have a backup cell mate assignment
for Epstein constituted poor judgment. The evening Watch Shoe Officer
in charge told the OIG that although he knew that
(11:52):
Epstein needed to be assigned another cell mate, SHOE staff
coundnot just put anyone in the cell with Epstein the war,
and confirmed this in his OIG interview when he explained
that he and BP executive leadership selected inmate three as
Epstein cellmate following the events of July twenty three, twenty nineteen.
(12:14):
The Warden told the OIG that no inmates were pre
vetted to serve as Epstein cellmate if Inmate three left
mcc New York. The Northeast Regional Director, the Warden, and
the Captain all told the OIG that if Inmate three
had been removed as Epstein's cellmate, they would have had
to review a new list of potential cellmate candidates to
(12:38):
ensure that Epstein was housed with an appropriate inmate. This
selection process, which involved the multiple steps undertaken by high
level BOP management, would be difficult to accomplish in short
periods of time and ultimately may have impeded Shoe Officer's
ability to house Epstein with a cellmate on August ninth, nineteen.
(13:01):
Section four lack of candor BOP policy requires that during
the course of an official investigation employees are to cooperate
fully by providing all pertinent information that they might have.
Full cooperation requires truthfully responding to questions. As discussed above,
(13:21):
The day watch Shoe Officer in charge and the Evening
Watch Shoe Officer in charge told the OIG that they
notified supervisory personnel regarding the need to assign Epstein a
new cellmate. Based on a lack of corroborating evidence for
these assertions, the OIG found that they lacked candor in
their OIG interviews in violation of BOP policy. Similarly, the
(13:47):
OIG found that Noel lacked candor in violation of BOP
policy when she said she did not know that Epstein
needed a cellmate or that his then cellmate in May
three had been transferred out of SHU. The OIG also
found that the Morning Watch Operations lieutenant lacked candor in
(14:08):
her interview with the OIG and violation of BOP policy
when she said she was not aware that Epstein was
required to be housed with the cellmate. Her statement is
contradicted by the fact that she was one of the
mcc New York staff members who responded to the July
twenty third, twenty nineteen incident involving Epstein, which resulted in
(14:32):
him being placed on suicide watch and psychological observation. She
was a recipient of the psychology departments July thirtieth, twenty
nineteen email identifying the cellmate requirement and the statements of
multiple witnesses who told the OIG that Epstein's cellmate requirement
(14:52):
was widely disseminated verbally by mcc new York leadership. All right, folks,
we're gonna end this one here, and then in the
next episode we're going to be taking a look at
Part B. Mcc new York staff failed to conduct mandatory
rounds and inmate counts, resulting in Epstein being unobserved for
(15:12):
hours before his death. All of the information that goes
with the episode can be found in the description box. Well, well, welcome,
what's up everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
In this episode, we're going to pick back up with
the OIG report, and to do that, we're going to
(15:32):
look at Part B of chapter seven. So let's dive
right back. In Part B, mcc new York staff failed
to conduct mandatory rounds and inmate counts, resulting in Epstein
being unobserved for hours before his death. The OIG's investigation
(15:53):
and review revealed that on August ninth and tenth, twenty nineteen,
mcc new York Shoe staff didn't not conduct the mandatory
rounds and inmate counts during their shift in the shoe.
The failure to undertake these required measures to account for
inmate whereabouts and well being, and the supervisor's failure to
(16:14):
properly supervise the shoe staff as discussed further below, resulted
in Epstein being unobserved for hours before his death, which
compounded the failure of mcc new York staff to ensure
that Epstein had an appropriate cellmate one failure to conduct
rounds and inmate counts in the shoe. Federal regulations require
(16:39):
that employees use official time in an honest effort to
perform official duties. Additionally, BOP standards of conduct required that
employees conduct themselves in a manner that foster's respect for
the Bureau of Prisons, the Department of Justice, and the
US government, because in attention to duty intercorrectional environment can
(17:01):
result in escapes, assaults, and other incidents. BOP standards of
conduct also require employees to remain fully alert and attentive
during duty hours. BOP policy also requires continuous inmate accountability,
which is accomplished through rounds and inmate counts. Among other things,
(17:24):
Rounds and inmate counts enable staff to observe inmates and
ensure that they are safe and secure in their cells
and are in good health. BOP policy and mcc new
York Shoe post orders set out the requirements for these
inmate accountability measures, specifying that correctional staff must conduct rounds
(17:44):
on an irregular schedule at least twice each hour, no
more than forty minutes apart. BOP policy and mcc new
York Shoe post orders further specify that at least two
mcc New York Shoe staff members must get conduct inmate
counts at twelve am, three am, five am, four pm,
(18:05):
and ten pm daily, and also at ten am on
weekends and federal holidays. The OIG's investigation and review revealed
that an inmate in May four was internally transferred from
the Shoe to receiving in discharge at approximately three fifteen
pm on August ninth, twenty nineteen. However, this inmate transfer
(18:28):
was not documented until approximately twelve thirty five am on
August tenth, twenty nineteen. Based on this internal transfer, BOP
records and witness statements, the OIG determined that the four
PM and ten PM shoe inmate counts on August ninth
were aerinis. In addition, the OIG reviewed the available shoe
(18:51):
security camera video, which did not show CEOs walking up
or down the stairs leading to the various shoe tiers
during the count time, a process that is necessary to
conduct an accurate count of inmates. During their OIG interviews,
the evening Watt shoe officer in charge, the material handler
(19:11):
co Toven Noel, and material handler Michael Thomas each admitted
that they did not conduct all of the mandatory rounds
and inmate counts in the shoe on the evening of
August ninth, and in the morning of August tenth. Noel
told the OIG that she conducted the ten PM count
on August ninth. The OIG did not credit her statement
(19:34):
based on one its review of the shoe security camera video,
which reflects Noel walking up and down the stairs leading
to some but not all of the tears. Several minutes
after the shoe inmate count, had been called into the
control center. Two the ten pm councilate, which erroneousley included
the Shoe inmate four who had been internally transferred to
(19:56):
receiving and delivery, three other Bopie records, and four the
material Handler's statements to the OIG that no one conducted
the ten pm count because everyone was tired, instead of
performing the required duties to account for inmate whereabouts and
well being. The OIG found that officers assigned to the
(20:17):
Shoe on August ninth and tenth, including the material handler,
Noel and Thomas, primarily remained seated in the shoe officer's station,
sometimes without moving for a period of time, suggesting that
they were asleep, and conducted a variety of Internet searches
on mcc New York computers. Thomas also admitted to the
(20:38):
OIG that he dozed off for periods of time during
his shift. The OIG's analysis of the Shoe security camera
video revealed that after approximately ten forty pm, no coeo
entered Epstein's tier in the Shoe until just before six
thirty am, when Noel and Thomas began to serve breakfast
(20:59):
to the inmates. The OIG Investigation and Review concluded that
the Evening watch Shoe Officer in charge, the material Handler
Noel and Thomas failed to conduct the mandatory rounds and
inmate counts during their respective shifts in the mcc New
York Shoe on August ninth and tenth, twenty nineteen, and
(21:20):
that their actions constituted violations of five CFR Section two
six three five dot one zero one B five and
two six three five dot seven zero five A, BOP
Program Statements thirty four to twenty dot eleven and fifty
five hundred dot fourteen, and mcc New York Shoe post
(21:42):
Orders Section two, false statements and lack of candor. The
OIG's investigation and review found that on August ninth and tenth,
twenty nineteen, the Evening watch Shoe Officer in charge, the
material Handler Noel and Thomas made false statements when they
falsified BOP records by attesting that they had completed the
(22:04):
mandatory rounds and inmate counts when in fact they had not.
Federal law provides that whoever in any matter within the
jurisdiction of the Executive Branch of the Government of the
United States, knowingly and willfully makes or uses any false
writing or document, knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious,
(22:27):
or fraudilent statement or entry has violated eighteen US Code
one zero zero, one A and three. As discussed above,
the OIG found that the Evening Watch Shoe officer in
charge the material handler Noel and Thomas, failed to conduct
all of the mandatory rounds and inmate counts as part
(22:50):
of each institutional inmate count BOP policy and mcc new
York Shoe post orders required two CEOs to conduct each
count and memorial the number of inmates in the shoe
on an official mcc New York forum often called the
count slip. On the count slip, both CEOs are required
(23:10):
to fill in the date and time the count had
been performed, write the total number of inmates physically present
in the unit counted, and then sign the count slip.
Once the CEOs complete and sign the count slips, the
count slips are then collected and delivered to the mcc
New York Control Center. Officers assigned to the control Center
(23:31):
are responsible for comparing the count slips from each housing
unit to the institution's overall inmate count. Cheet to ensure
that each inmate was accounted for. Now, Yeah, after all
the count slips have been collected from each housing unit
and the numbers on the count slips had been matched
to the institution's overall count sheet, could the institutional count
(23:54):
be deemed cleared or completed? The evening watch shoe officer
in charge the material reel handler, Noel and Thomas each
prepared and or signed a false count slip to create
the impression that they had fulfilled their inmate accountability responsibilities,
when in fact they had not. These individuals admitted to
(24:15):
the OIG that instead of performing their assigned duties, they
pre filled the count slips with a number of inmates
they believed were in the shoe based on what officers
from the previous shift had told them, and signed off
on the documents knowing that they were falsely attested to
having completed the counts. Additionally, Noel admitted to the OIG
(24:36):
that she had pre filled the official mcc New York
forms documenting the times of the thirty minute rounds, often
referred to as round sheets, and falsely attested to having
completed the rounds. Noel and Thomas were indicted by a
grand jury for their false certification of having conducted rounds
and counts. Subsequently, each entered into a deferred prosecution agreement
(25:01):
with the US Attorney's Office for the Southern District of
New York. The US Attorney's Office of the Southern District
of New York declined prosecution for the Evening watch Shoe
Officer in charge and the material Handler. The OIG investigation
has found that the Evening watch Shoe Officer in Charge,
the material Handler, Noel, and Thomas knowingly and willingly falsified
(25:25):
BOP records in violation of federal law by attesting that
they had completed the mandatory rounds and inmate counts on
the evening of August ninth, twenty nineteen and the morning
of August tenth, twenty nineteen. Additionally, as noted above, BOP
policy requires employees to cooperate fully with an official investigation
(25:48):
and truthfully respond to questions. The OIG found that Noel
lacked candor when she told the OIG that she had
conducted the ten PM count when the weight of evidence
indicates that at most she may have conducted around at
that time. Section three poor judgment regarding the use of
(26:08):
overtime The OIG's investigation and review revealed that on August ninth,
twenty nineteen, mcc New York supervisory staff requested that a
staff member fill in an overtime position within the Shoe,
which resulted in that staff member working three shifts back
to back, that is, twenty four hours straight. The collective
(26:30):
Bargaining Agreement between BOP and unions representing BOP employees provides
that ordinarily, the minimum time off between shifts will be
seven and one half hours and the minimum elapse time
of on days off will be fifty six hours, except
when the employee requests the change. The material handler told
(26:53):
the OIG that on August ninth, he reported for a
voluntary overtime shift from twelve am to eight am, and
then worked as regular eight am to four pm shift
in the warehouse. At some point during the day shift,
the day watch Operations Lieutenant, a higher ranking official, called
and asked the material handler if he could work over
(27:14):
time in the shoe, and he agreed. The material handler
told the OIG that he felt pressure to work the
third shift, which resulted in him working twenty four hours
straight from twelve am on August ninth through twelve am
on August tenth. As discussed previously, the material handler admitted
to the OIG that on the evening of August ninth,
(27:36):
during his third shift, which he worked in the shoe,
he did not conduct the mandatory in made counts in
rounds because he was too tired. The OIG investigation review
concluded the day Watch Operations Lieutenant exercise poor judgment when
he requested that the material handler work a third consecutive shift.
(27:56):
As the day Watch Operations Lieutenant, he had access to
the staff roster and the schedule, and therefore he should
have known that the material handler had already worked sixteen
straight hours. Additionally, the day Watch Operations Lieutenant's actions was
inconsistent with the collective bargaining Agreement and did not reflect
sound correctional judgment, as it would have been extremely difficult
(28:19):
for the material handler to have effectively performed as duties
during the third shift. All right, folks, we're going to
wrap it up here, and then in the next episode,
we're going to pick back up with section four of
Chapter seven, and that is clearing the ten PM institutional count.
Knowing that it was inaccurate. All of the information that
(28:42):
goes with this episode can be found in the description
box
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