Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
Welcome to a new session from the team behind the
Upwardly Mobile API and Apps Security Podcast. I'm George and
I'm Sky. Okay, So, if you're out there listening and
you're an engineer, maybe working with iOS, Android, perhaps even HarmonyOS,
or maybe you're managing traffic via flutter react.
Speaker 2 (00:15):
Native, basically, if you rely on those big edge security infrastructure.
Speaker 1 (00:19):
Exactly, then you are absolutely the person we need to
talk to today. We're impacting some pretty critical news, that's right.
Speaker 2 (00:25):
We're focusing today on that really consequential security incident that
just came out, the F five big IP breach.
Speaker 1 (00:33):
Right, And this isn't just another CVE announcement, is it.
Speaker 3 (00:36):
No, not at all.
Speaker 2 (00:37):
If you manage traffic heading to your mobile app end
points and you're using an F five device, well this
is andatory listening, urgent analysis.
Speaker 1 (00:45):
Really. So we've gone through the documents you shared, yeah,
you know, the SIZA alerts, F five statements security analyses.
Our goal here is simple, cut through the noise, unpack
the actual technical risks, and maybe most importantly, outline the immediate,
like non the good sociable actions you need to take
right now to protect those endpoints.
Speaker 3 (01:04):
Okay, so let's set the scene a bit.
Speaker 2 (01:06):
What's really striking here is the audacity, the persistence.
Speaker 3 (01:10):
Maybe, Yeah, this wasn't quick.
Speaker 2 (01:12):
It was a long term intrusion, they think, at least
twelve months before detection and carried out by a very
sophisticated actor, likely Nation State.
Speaker 1 (01:19):
Twelve months. Wow, just sitting inside a major vendors development
environment for a whole year undetected.
Speaker 3 (01:27):
Huh. Kind of redefines perimeter failure, doesn't it.
Speaker 1 (01:30):
It really does.
Speaker 2 (01:31):
The suspected group is UNC five two two one. They
use the specific malware toolkit called Brickstorm.
Speaker 1 (01:37):
Okay, so UNC five two two one is the who,
Brickstorm is the how got it exactly?
Speaker 2 (01:42):
And their target wasn't just you know, random corporate stuff.
It was F five's internal development environments for a big IP,
the engineering.
Speaker 1 (01:49):
Knowledge right and big IP that sits right at the
edge securing APIs for huge companies governments, which makes this
incredibly serious.
Speaker 2 (01:59):
So serious that SISA, that's the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency.
Speaker 3 (02:04):
They issued an emergency.
Speaker 1 (02:05):
Director an emergency directive.
Speaker 2 (02:07):
Yeah, that signals unacceptable risk. Basically the government saying stop everything,
fix this now. Because of where Big IP sits and here's.
Speaker 1 (02:16):
Where for me it gets really yeah, well scary. The
biggest risk isn't necessarily an active exploit found yesterday. It's
about what the attackers stole. And you could argue that's
actually worse than finding one zero day because they didn't
just find a crack. They walked off with the blueprints.
Speaker 3 (02:34):
Yeah, that's a good way to put it.
Speaker 2 (02:35):
We can break down what they took into like three
main categories, all bad news for mobile API security. Okay,
First up, they exfiltrated parts of the proprietary source code
for bigip the code itself, code itself now F five
and the auditors they confirmed no malicious code was injected
into the pipeline. So supply chain integrity seems.
Speaker 3 (02:55):
Okay, which is, you know, a small relief, small comfort.
Speaker 2 (02:57):
Yeah, but having that source code it lets the adversary
do deep, long term analysis, look for flaws F five
doesn't even know about yet potential backdoors. It's a huge
strategic win for them.
Speaker 1 (03:08):
Okay, that's bad, But you said three categories. What's worse
than the source code?
Speaker 2 (03:12):
Well, maybe the most immediately dangerous theft was the internal
documentation they.
Speaker 1 (03:16):
Grabbed, not just the code, but how it works, and
where it's weak exactly.
Speaker 2 (03:23):
They got into F five's internal knowledge systems. CISA called
it a virtual roadmap of unpublished security flaws zero days.
F five was already working on fixing, so FI.
Speaker 1 (03:34):
Knew about vulnerabilities, was maybe scheduling patches, and the attackers
grabbed that list precisely.
Speaker 2 (03:41):
They basically have the answers before the test. They know
the weak spot's F five itself identified, but hadn't told
the public about yet.
Speaker 1 (03:48):
Okay, that explains the imminent threat warning from CISA.
Speaker 2 (03:51):
Right, because if you have the specific flaw details and
the source code to see how it's implemented, you can
weaponize that incredibly quickly, much faster than normal zero dat development.
Speaker 1 (04:00):
And for those edge devices protecting potentially millions of mobile
API calls, that massively shrinks the time you have before
disaster strikes exponentially. Yeah, so source code, internal docs. What's
a third piece? How does this become personal for the
developer listening right now?
Speaker 2 (04:16):
That brings us to the third category, customer configuration data?
Speaker 1 (04:20):
Uh oh, it was apparently a small portion of files,
but highly sensitive things like network topologies, specific device configurations,
deployment details for select customers.
Speaker 2 (04:31):
Okay, so how does that tie directly to API security
for mobile apps?
Speaker 1 (04:35):
Well, think about it. If you're using F five for
API access management or load balancing or as a wave,
that stolen configu info could give attackers the exact map
to your specific setup.
Speaker 3 (04:48):
So they know how my particular system is configured.
Speaker 1 (04:50):
Potentially yes, for those select customers whose data was taken,
and that's crucial. It's not abstract anymore. It could reveal
how you manage credentials, maybe even ex bose hard coded
secrets or details about API access roles within the BIGIP itself.
Speaker 2 (05:05):
It's intelligence gathering for future attacks, targeted attacks.
Speaker 1 (05:08):
Exactly, which leads us to the big question, what do
we do like today?
Speaker 2 (05:13):
Right enough, analysis, action time. These devices are everywhere in
mobile infrastructure. What's step one?
Speaker 1 (05:18):
The absolute must do patching, mandatory patching, and it needs
to happen like yesterday or tonight at.
Speaker 2 (05:24):
The latest, regardless of whether you think your config data
was stolen.
Speaker 3 (05:27):
Absolutely regardless.
Speaker 2 (05:29):
F five dropped its quarterly security notification right alongside the
breach news. It addresses forty four new vulnerabilities across their products.
Speaker 3 (05:36):
This isn't just routine maintenance. It's critical and.
Speaker 1 (05:38):
Looking through those patches, Wow, some of the cvees really
highlight the risk if those zero day road maps get used.
We should probably give some specific examples. Yeah, definitely, Okay,
look at CVE twenty twenty five five three eight sixty eight.
That's rated eight point seven CVSS. It's an authentication bypass
in bgip's SCPSFDP.
Speaker 2 (05:58):
Right, if that gets exploited, unauthorized system access, game over
for that device, controlling your API traffic, Yeah, gobal control.
And then there were those high severity privileged escalation flaws
like in F five osac RAT at eight point eight.
Let's an authenticated user potentially get root access, so even if.
Speaker 1 (06:14):
They need initial access, once they're in, they can own the.
Speaker 2 (06:17):
Whole box completely. Combine that kind of flaw with the
stolen source code. An attacker knows exactly how to trigger it.
Patching that is absolute highest priority.
Speaker 1 (06:25):
And for mobile ads specifically, there was CVE twenty twenty
five six or zero one s team another eight point
seven SSLTLS metadata.
Speaker 3 (06:33):
Leakage mm hmm, that one's particularly nasty.
Speaker 1 (06:36):
Yeah, the source material mentioned a potential cookie leakage risk
link to this that sounds directly threatening to mobile user sessions.
Speaker 3 (06:44):
It is.
Speaker 2 (06:44):
It could expose parts of the encrypted traffic, maybe session details,
crypto info, stuff attackers could use for session hijacking or
even decryption attempts down the line.
Speaker 1 (06:54):
So if your F five terminates TLS for your mobile apps, yeah,
patch immediately, no question, no question at all.
Speaker 3 (07:00):
You can't risk a zero day hitting that.
Speaker 1 (07:02):
Okay, so patching is urgent number one priority, got it?
But what else? What operational hardening should engineers be doing
like this week?
Speaker 2 (07:10):
Right beyond patching, it's about deep operational hygiene. First, inventory
and isolation.
Speaker 1 (07:16):
No way, you have lock it down.
Speaker 2 (07:17):
Precisely, find every F five resource, hardware, virtual, whatever, and
immediately immediately isolate all management interfaces from the public Internet.
If attackers can reach that interface and they have confignoledge,
it's a huge target.
Speaker 1 (07:31):
Makes sense. What's next?
Speaker 2 (07:33):
Credentials change all default passwords and review any potentially exposed credentials.
Basic stuff, but absolutely critical after a breach involving configuration data,
they might know your bad.
Speaker 1 (07:45):
Habits now good point and third.
Speaker 2 (07:48):
Life cycle management. Look at your inventory again, anything deprecated,
anything past end of support, replace it, replace it if
it's not getting patches, especially these patches. It's just an
open invitation for attackers using those stolen zero day details.
Speaker 1 (08:03):
Okay, patching hardening, that makes sense tactically, Yeah, but let
me push back a bit here. This breach, it shows
even major vendors can be compromised, right.
Speaker 3 (08:13):
Deeply, Yeah for sure.
Speaker 1 (08:14):
So is just patching and isolating interfaces enough or does
this specific incident fundamentally mean we have to shift architecture? Like,
is zero trust mandatory now because of this? Or is
that just you know, the buzzword trend.
Speaker 2 (08:27):
That's a really fair question, And I think the reason
many are saying zero trust is becoming mandatory now is
because this breach hits the core weakness of the traditional model.
Speaker 3 (08:36):
How So the perimeter model.
Speaker 2 (08:38):
Relies heavily on that edge device like the big IP.
If the vendor of the perimeter gets breached this badly,
the perimeter itself fails for potentially everyone using it. The
attacker's goal here wasn't just a quick hit. It was
long term.
Speaker 1 (08:54):
Access, remember right the persistence.
Speaker 2 (08:56):
So relying solely on that edge device, even perfectly patched,
feels insufficient when the attacker has the internal blueprints.
Speaker 1 (09:05):
Okay, so, how does zero trust specifically help mobile apps,
which are already kind of outside the traditional network.
Speaker 2 (09:11):
The key shift for mobile is connecting users directly to
the applications they need, not just dumping them onto the
network behind.
Speaker 1 (09:17):
The F five right, application level access not network access exactly.
Speaker 2 (09:20):
That eliminates lateral movement. If an attacker does compromise the
edge device, they can't just wander around your internal network
looking for other targets. Access is tightly scope to specific apps.
Speaker 1 (09:31):
And how do you achieve that practically?
Speaker 3 (09:32):
Well, a few key things.
Speaker 2 (09:34):
First, you minimize the attack surface. Use something like an
access broker to essentially unpublish your apps and those F
five devices from direct Internet exposure. If attackers can't see
the F five directly, it's much.
Speaker 3 (09:46):
Harder to hit.
Speaker 1 (09:47):
Makes sense hide the target.
Speaker 2 (09:48):
Then least privilege becomes absolutely critical, especially for mobile restrict
permissions tightly, super tightly based on identity, device posture context.
If an attacker or steals one credential, maybe via that
stolen config data, they still shouldn't be able to access everything.
Your API gateway or whatever enforces access should ensure they
(10:10):
only get the bare minimum needed for that one specific
task or app, not the whole network segment.
Speaker 1 (10:14):
So micro segmentation based on application need, not just.
Speaker 2 (10:17):
Networks on you got it, and you inspect all the
traffic trying to make that connection continuously verifying trust. That
helps stop zero days or malware even if they somehow
get past that initial F five Okay.
Speaker 1 (10:27):
So wrapping this up, this F five incident, it's a
huge wakeup call. Perimeter defenses are targets, high value targets,
and attackers getting internal docs source code that just puts
everything on fast forward. Exploitation happens quicker.
Speaker 2 (10:44):
Yeah, the timeline shrinks dramatically, So immediate patching, isolating those
management interfaces that's table stakes.
Speaker 1 (10:50):
Now, and strategically moving towards zero trust principles connecting users
to apps not networks, enforcing least privilege that sounds less
like a nice to have and more like a need
to do.
Speaker 2 (11:02):
It really feels like it's become a critical operational requirement now,
especially for mobile API security where the connections are already
coming from outside the traditional perimeter.
Speaker 1 (11:11):
Okay, final thought, Then, as people listening start their audits tonight,
F five said NGI and x code and cloud services
weren't hit in this incident, right, that was their statement,
but given the attackers. Specifically, when after source code and
vulnerability roadmaps for a big IP, what does that tell
us about vendor transparency about trusting any black box security
(11:32):
product managing critical traffic? Does this demand a rething of
how much we need to know about the tools we
rely on.
Speaker 2 (11:38):
That is a really important and probably uncomfortable question to
wrestle with going forward. It definitely challenges the traditional vendor
trust model.
Speaker 1 (11:47):
Something to think about while you're patching. This analysis was
created using information from human experts like us and assisted
by artificial intelligence to bring you the most relevant insights quickly.
Speaker 3 (11:58):
Stay safe out there until next time.