CLAUSEWITZ - ON WAR - II. THEORY OF WAR - Carl von Clausewitz (1873) - HQ Full Book - SECRETS OF POWER: Masters of Politics, Strategy & War

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Speaker 1 (00:00):
Karl Vaughan Klausowitz on War, eighteen seventy three, Book two
on the Theory of War, Chapter one branches of the
art of war. War in its literal meaning is fighting,
for fighting alone is the efficient principle in the manifold
activity which in a wide sense is called war. But

(00:20):
fighting is a trial of strength of the moral and
physical forces by means of the latter. That the moral
cannot be omitted is evident of itself, For the condition
of the mind has always the most decisive influence on
the forces employed in war. The necessity of fighting very
soon led men to special inventions to turn the advantage
in it in their own favor. In consequence of these

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the mode of fighting has undergone great alterations, But in
whatever way it is conducted, its conception remains unaltered, and
fighting is that which constitutes war. The inventions have been
from the first weapons and equipments for the individual combatants.
These have to be provided and the use of them
learnt before the war begins. They are made suitable to

(01:03):
the nature of the fighting, consequently are ruled by it.
But plainly the activity engaged in these appliances is a
different thing from the fight itself. It is only the
preparation for the combat, not the conduct of the same.
That arming and equipping are not essential to the conception
of fighting is plain because mere wrestling is also fighting.

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Fighting has determined everything appertaining to arms and equipment, and
these in turn modify the mode of fighting. There is
therefore a reciprocity of action between the two. Nevertheless, the
fight itself remains still an entirely special activity, more particularly
because it moves in an entirely special element, namely in

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the element of danger. If then there is anywhere a
necessity for drawing a line between two different activities, it
is here. And in order to see clearly the importance
of this idea, we need only just to call to
mind how often eminent personal fitness in one field has
turned out nothing but the most useless pedantry in the other.
It is also in no way difficult to separate in

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idea the one activity from the other if we look
at the combatant forces fully armed and equipped as a
given means, the profitable use of which requires nothing more
than a knowledge of their general results. The art of
war is, therefore, in its proper sense, the art of
making use of the given means in fighting, and we
cannot give it a better name than the conduct of war.

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On the other hand, in a wider sense, all activities
which have their existence on account of war. Therefore, the
whole creation of troops, that is, levying them, arming, equipping,
and exercising them, belong to the art of war. To
make a sound theory, it is most essential to separate
these two activities. For it is easy to see that
if every act of war is to begin with the

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preparation of military forces and to presuppose forces so organized
as a primary condition for conducting war, that theory will
only be applicable in the few cases to which the
force available happens to be exactly suited. If, on the
other hand, we wish to have a theory which shall
suit most cases and will not be wholly useless in

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any case, it must be founded on those means which
are in most general use, and in respect to these,
only on the actual results springing from them. The conduct
of war is therefore the formation and conduct of the fighting.
If this fighting was a single act, there would be
no necessity for any further subdivision. But the fight is
composed of a greater or less number of single acts

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complete in themselves, which we call combats, as we have
shown in the first chapter of the first book, and
which form new units. From this arises the totally different activities,
that of the formation and conduct of these single combats
in themselves, and the combination of them with one another
with a view to the ultimate object of the war.
The first is called tactics, the other strategy. This division

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into tactics and strategy is now in almost general use,
and every one knows tolerably well under which head to
place any single fact, without knowing very distinctly the grounds
on which the classification is founded. But when such divisions
are blindly adhered to in practice, they must have some
deep route. We have searched for this route, and we

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might say that it is just the usage of the
majority which has brought us to it. On the other hand,
we look upon the arbitrary unnatural definitions of these conceptions
sought to be established by some writers, as not in
accordance with the general usage of the terms. According to
our classification. Therefore, tactics is the theory of the use

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of military forces in combat. Strategy is the theory of
the use of combats for the object of the war.
The way in which the conception of a single or
independent combat is more closely determined the conditions to which
this unit is attached. We shall only be able to
explain clearly when we consider the combat. We must content

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ourselves for them present with saying that in relation to space, therefore,
in combats taking place at the same time, the unit
reaches just as far as personal command reaches. But in
regard to time, and therefore, in relation to combats which
follow each other in close succession, it reaches to the
moment when the crisis which takes place in every combat

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is entirely past that doubtful cases may occur, cases, for instance,
in which several combats may perhaps be regarded also as
a single one, will not overthrow the ground of distinction
we have adopted, for the same is the case with
all grounds of distinction of real things, which are differentiated
by a gradually diminishing scale. There may therefore certainly be

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acts of activity in war which, without any alteration in
the point of view, may just as well be counted
strategic as tactical. For example, very extended positions resembling a
chain of posts. The preparations for the passage of a
river at several points, and sea classification reaches and covers
only the use of the military force. But now there

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are in war a number of activities which are subservient
to it, and still are quite different from it, sometimes
closely allied, sometimes less near in their affinity. All these
activities relate to the maintenance of the military force in
the same way as its creation and training precede its use,
So its maintenance is always a necessary condition. But strictly viewed,

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all activities thus connected with it are always to be
regarded only as preparations for fighting. They are certainly nothing
more than activities which are very close to the action,
so that they run through the hostile act alternate in
importance with the use of the forces. We have therefore
a right to exclude them, as well as the other
preparatory activities, from the art of war in its restricted sense,

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from the conduct of war properly so called, And we
are obliged to do so if we would comply with
the first principle of all theory, the elimination of all
heterogeneous elements, who would include in the real conduct of
war the whole litany of subsistence and administration, because it
is admitted to stand in constant reciprocal action with the
use of the troops, but is something essentially different from it.

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We have said in the third chapter of our first
book that as the fight or combat is the only
directly effective activity, therefore the threads of all others, as
they end in it, are included in it. By this
we meant to say that to all others an object
was thereby appointed, which, in accordance with the laws peculiar
to themselves, they must seek to attain. Here we must

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go a little closer into this subject. The subjects which
constitute the activities outside of the combat are of various kinds.
The one part belongs in one respect to the combat itself,
is identical with it, whilst it serves in another respect
for the maintenance of the military force. The other part
belongs purely to the subsistence, and has only, in consequence

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of the reciprocal action, a limited influence on the combats
by its results. The subjects which in one respect belong
to the fighting itself are marches, camps, and cantonments, for
they suppose so many different situations of troops, and where
troops are supposed there the idea of the combat must
always be present. The other subjects which only belong to

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the maintenance are subsistence, care of the sick, the supply
and repair of arms and equipment. Marches are quite identical
with the use of the troops. The act of marching
in the combat, generally called maneuvering, certainly does not necessarily
include the use of weapons, but it is so completely
and necessarily combined with it that it forms an integral

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part of that which we call a combat. But the
march outside the combat is nothing but the execution of
a strategic measure. By the strategic plan is settled when,
where and with what forces a battle is to be delivered,
and to carry that into execution, the march is the
only means. The march outside of the combat is therefore

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an instrument of strategy, but not on that account exclusively
a subject of strategy, For as the armed force which
executes it may be involved in a possible combat at
any moment. Therefore, its execution stands also under tactical as
well as strategic rules. If we prescribe to a column
its route on a particular side of a river or
of a branch of a mountain, then that is a

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strategic measure, for it contains the intention of fighting on
that particular side of the hill or river in preference
to the other in case a combat should be necessary
during the march. But if a column, instead of following
the road through a valley, marches along the parallel ridge
of heights, or for the convenience of marching, divides itself
into several columns, then these are tactical arrangements, for they

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relate to the manner in which we shall use the
troops in the anticipated combat. The particular order of march
is in constant relation with readiness for combat, is therefore
tactical in its nature, for it is nothing more than
the first or preliminary position for the battle which may
possibly take place. As the march is the instrument by
which strategy apportions its active elements the combats, but these

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last often only appear by their results, and not in
the details of their real course, it could not fail
to happen that in theory the instrument has often been
substituted for the efficient principle. Thus we hear of a decisive,
skillful march, allusion being thereby made to those combat combinations
to which these marches lad This substitution of ideas is

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too natural in conceaseness of expression, too desirable to call
for alteration. But still it is only a condensed chain
of ideas in regard to which we must never omit
to bear in mind the full meaning. If we would
avoid falling into error, we fall into an error of
this description. If we attribute to strategical combinations a power
independent of tactical results. We read of marches and maneuvers

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combined the object attained, and at the same time not
a word about combat, from which the conclusion is drawn
that there are means in war of conquering an enemy
without fighting. The prolific nature of this error we cannot
show until hereafter. But although a march can be regarded
absolutely as an integral part of the combat, still there
are in its certain relations which do not belong to

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the combat, and therefore are neither tactical nor strategic. To
these belong all arrangements which concern only the accommodation of
the troops, the construction of bridges, roads, and sea. These
are only conditions. Under many circumstances, they are in very
close connection and may almost identify themselves with the troops,

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as in building a bridge and presence of the enemy.
But in themselves they are always extraneous activities, the theory
of which does not form part of the theory of
the conduct of war. Camps, by which we mean every
disposition of troops in concentrated therefore in battle order, in
contradistinction to cantonments or quarters, are a state of rest

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therefore of restoration. But they are at the same time
allay so the strategic appointment of a battle on the
spot chosen, and by the manner in which they are
taken up, they contain the fundamental lines of the battle,
a condition from which every defensive battle starts. They are
therefore essential parts of both strategy and tactics. Cantonments take
the place of camps for the better refreshment of the troops.

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They are, therefore, like camps, strategic subjects as regards position,
and extent tactical subjects as regards internal organization, with a
view to readiness to fight. The occupation of camps and cantonments,
no doubt, usually combines with the recuperation of the troops
another object. Also, for example, the covering a district of country,

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the holding a position, but it can very well be
only the first. We remind our readers that strategy may
follow a great diversity of objects, For everything which appears
an advantage may be the object of a combat, and
the preservation of the instrument with which war is made
must necessarily very often become the object of its partial combinations.

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If therefore, in such a case strategy ministers only to
the maintenance of the troops, we are not, on that
account out of the field of strategy, for we are
still engaged with the use of the military force, because
every disposition of that force, upon any point whatever of
the theater of war, is such a use. But if
the maintenance of the troops in camp or quarters calls

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forth activities which are no employment of the armed force,
such as the construction of huts, pitching of tents, subsistence
and sanitary services in camps or quarters, then such belong
neither to strategy, nor tactics, even intrenchments, the sight and
preparation of which are plainly part of the order of battle. Therefore,
tactical subjects do not belong to the theory of the

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conduct of war, so far as respects the execution of
their construction. The knowledge and skill required for such work, being,
in point of fact, qualities inherent in the nature of
an organized army. The theory of the combat takes them
for granted amongst the subjects which belong to the mere
keeping up of an armed force. Because none of the
parts are identified with the combat, the vittling of the

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troops themselves comes first, as it must be done almost
daily and for each individual. Thus it is that it
completely permeates military action in the parts constituting strategy. We
say parts constituting strategy, because during a battle, the subsistence
of troops will rarely have any influence in modifying the plan,
although the thing is conceivable enough. The care for the

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subsistence of the troops comes therefore into reciprocal action, chiefly
with strategy, and there is nothing more common than for
the leading strategic features of a campaign and war to
be traced out in connection with a view to this supply.
But however frequent and however important these views of supply
may be, the subsistence of the troops always remains a
completely different activity from the use of the troops, and

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the former has only an influence on the latter by
its results. The other branches of administrative activity which we
have mentioned, stand much farther apart from the use of
the troops. The care of sick and wounded, highly important
as it is for the good of an army, directly
affects it only in a small portion of the individuals
composing it, and therefore has only a weak and indirect

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influence upon the use of the rest. The completing and
replacing articles of arms and equipment, except so far as
by the organism of the forces it constitutes a continuous
activity inherent in them, takes place only periodically, and therefore
seldom affects strategic plans. We must, however, here guard ourselves
against a mistake. In certain cases, these subjects may be

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really of decisive importance. The distance of hospitals and depots
of munitions may very easily be imagined as the sole
cause of very important strategic decisions. We do not wish
either to contest that point or to throw it into
the shade. But we are at present occupied not with
the particular facts of a concrete case, but with abstract

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and our assertion therefore is that such an influence is
too rare to give the theory of sanitary measures and the
supply of munitions and arms, and importance in the theory
of the conduct of war, such as to make it
worthwhile to include in the theory of the conduct of
war the consideration of the different ways and systems which
the above theories may furnish, in the same way as
is certainly necessary in regard to vittling troops. If we

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have clearly understood the results of our reflections, then the
activities belonging to war divide themselves into two principal classes,
into such as are only preparations for war, and into
the war itself. This division must therefore also be made
in theory. The knowledge and applications of skill in the
preparations for war are engaged in the creation, discipline, and

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maintenance of all the military forces. What general names should
be given to them we do not enter into. But
we see that artillery, fortification, elementary tactics as they are called,
the whole organization in nis administration of the various armed forces,
and all such things are included. But the theory of
war itself occupies itself with the use of these prepared

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means for the object of the war. It needs, of
the first only the results that is the knowledge of
the principal properties of the means taken in hand for use.
This we call the art of war in a limited sense,
or theory of the conduct of war, or theory of
the employment of armed forces, all of them denoting for
us the same thing. The present theory will therefore treat

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the combat as the real contest, marches, camps, and cantonments
as circumstances which are more or less identical with it.
The subsistence of the troops will only come into consideration,
like other given circumstances in respect of its results, not
as an activity belonging to the combat. The art of war,
thus viewed in its limited sense, divides itself again into

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tactics and strategy. The former occupies itself with the form
of the separate combat, the latter with its use. Both
connect themselves with the circumstances of marches, camps, cantonments only
through the combat, and these circumstances are tactical or strategic
according as they relate to the form or to the
signification of the battle. No doubt, there will be many

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readers who will consider superfluous this careful separation of two
things lying so close together as tactics and strategy because
it has no direct effect on the conduct itself of war.
We admit, certainly that it would be pedantry to look
for direct effects on the field of battle from a
theoretical distinction. But the first business of every theory is

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to clear up conceptions and ideas which have been jumbled
together and we may say entangled and confused. And only
when a right understanding is established as to names and
conceptions can we hope to progress with clearness and facility,
and be certain that author and reader will always see
things from the same point of view. Tactics and strategy

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are too activetities mutually permeating each other in time and
space at the same time, essentially different activities, the inner
laws and mutual relations of which cannot be intelligible at
all to the mind. Until a clear conception of the
nature of each activity is established. He to whom all
this is nothing must either repudiate all theoretical consideration, or

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his understanding has not as yet been pained by the
confused and perplexing ideas resting on no fixed point of view,
leading to no satisfactory result, sometimes dull, sometimes fantastic, sometimes
floating in vague generalities which we are often obliged to
hear and read on the conduct of war, owing to
the spirit of scientific investigation having hitherto been little directed

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to these subjects. Chapter two, on the theory of War One.
The first conception of the art of war was merely
the preparation of the armed forces, formerly by the term
art of war or science of war. Nothing was understood
but the totality of those branches of knowledge and those
appliances of skill occupied with material things. The pattern and

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preparation in the mode of using arms, the construction of
fortifications and entrenchments, the organism of an army and the
mechanism of its movements were the subject of these branches
of knowledge and skill above referred to, and the end
and aim of them all was the establishment of an
armed force fit for use in war. All this concerned
merely things belonging to the material world, and a one

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sided activity only, And it was in fact nothing but
an activity advancing by gradations from the lower occupations to
a finer kind of mechanical art. The relation of all
this to war itself was very much the same as
the relation of the art of the sword cutler to
the art of using the sword. The employment in a
moment of danger and in a state of constant reciprocal

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action of the particular energies of mind and spirit in
the direction proposed to them was not yet even mooted. Two.
True war first appears in the art of sieges. In
the art of seas pages, we first perceived a certain
degree of guidance of the combat, something of the action
of the intellectual faculties upon the material forces placed under
their control, but generally only so far that it very

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soon embodied itself again in new material forms, such as approaches, trenches,
counter approaches, batteries and sea. And every step which this
action of the higher faculties took was marked by some
such result. It was only the thread that was required
on which to string these material inventions in order, as

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the intellect can hardly manifest itself in this kind of
war except in such things. So therefore nearly all that
was necessary was done in that way. Three. Then tactics
tried to find its way in the same direction. Afterwards,
tactics attempted to give to the mechanism of its joints
the character of a general disposition built upon the peculiar

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properties of the instrument, which character leads indeed to the
battle field, but instead of leading to the free activity
of mind, leads to an army made like an automaton
by its rigid formations and orders of battle, which, movable
only by the word of command, is intended to unwind
its activities like a piece of clockwork. Four, The real
conduct of war only made its appearance incidentally and incognito.

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The conduct of war properly so called, that is, a
use of the prepared means adapted to the most special requirements,
was not considered as any suitable subject for theory, but
one which should be left to natural talents alone. By degrees,
as war passed from the hand to hand encounters of
the Middle Ages into a more regular and systematic form,

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stray reflections on this point also forced themselves into men's minds,
but they mostly appeared only incidentally in memoirs and narratives,
and in a certain measuring cognito. Five, reflections on military
events brought about the want of a theory. As contemplation
on war continually increased and its history every day assumed

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more of a critical character, the urgent want appeared of
the support of fixed maxims and rules, in order that,
in the controversies naturally arising about military events, the war
of opinions might be brought to some one point. This
world of opinions, which neither revolved on any central pivot
nor according to any appreciable laws, could not but be
very distasteful to people's minds. Six endeavors to establish a

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positive theory. There arose therefore, an endeavor to establish maxims, rules,
and even systems for the conduct of war. By this,
the attainment of a positive object was proposed without taking
into view the endless difficulties which the conduct of war presents.
In that respect, the conduct of war, as we have shown,

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has no definite limits in any direction, while every system
has the circumscribing nature of a synthesis, from which results
in irreconcilable opposition between such a theory and practice. Seven.
Limitation to material obort. Writers on theory felt the difficulty
of the subject soon enough, and thought themselves entitled to

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get rid of it by directing their maxims and systems
only upon material things and a one sided activity. Their
aim was to reach results, as in a science for
the preparation for war, entirely certain and positive, and therefore
only to take into consideration that which could be made
matter of calculation. Eight superiority of numbers. The superiority in

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numbers being a material condition, it was chosen from amongst
all the factors required to produce victory, because it could
be brought under mathematical laws through combinations of time and space.
It was thought possible to leave out of sight all
other circumstances by supposing them to be equal on each side,
and therefore to neutralize one another. This would have been

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very well if it had been done to gain a
preliminary knowledge of this one factor according to its relations,
but to make it a rule forever to consider superiority
of numbers as the the sole law. To see the
whole secret of the art of war in the formula
in a certain time at a certain point to bring
up superior masses was a restriction overruled by the force
of realities. Nine Vittling of troops by one theoretical school,

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and attempt was made to systematize another material element, also
by making the subsistence of troops according to a previously
established organism of the army. The supreme legislator in the
Higher conduct of war. In this way, certainly they arrived
at definite figures, but at figures which rested on a
number of arbitrary calculations, and which therefore could not stand

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the test of practical application. Base, an ingenious author tried
to concentrate in a single conception, that of a base,
a whole host of objects, amongst which sundry relations, even
with immaterial forces, found their way in as well. The
list comprised the subsistence of the troops, the keeping them

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complete in numbers and equipment, the security of communications with
the home country. Lastly, the security of retreat in case
it became necessary. And first of all, he proposed to
substitute this conception of a base for all these things,
then for the base itself to substitute its own length extent,
and last of all, to substitute the angle formed by

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the army with this base. All this was done merely
to obtain a pure geometrical result, utterly useless. This last
is in fact unavoidable if we reflect that none of
these substitutions could be made without violating truth and leaving
out some of the things contained in the original conception.
The idea of a base is a real necessity for strategy,

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and to have conceived it is meritorious. But to make
such a use of it as we have depicted is
completely inadmissible and could not but lead to partial conclusions
which have forced these theorists into a direction opposed to
common sense, namely to a belief in the decisive effect
of the enveloping form of attack. Eleven interior lines. As

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a reaction against this false direction, another geometrical principle, that
of the so called interior lines, was then elevated to
the throne. Although this principle rests on a sound foundation,
on the truth that the combat is the only effectual
means in war, still it is just on account of
its purely geometrical nature, nothing but another case of one

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sided theory, which can never gain ascendency in the real world. Twelve.
All these attempts are open to objection. All these attempts
at theory are only to be considered in their analytical
part as progress in the province of truth. But in
their synthetical part, in their precepts and rules, they are
quite unserviceable. They strive after determinate quantities, whilst in war

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all is undetermined and the calculation has always to be
made with varying quantities. They direct the attention only upon
material forces, while the whole military action is penetrated throughout
by intelligent forces and their effects. They only pay regard
to activity on one side, whilst war is a constant
state of reciprocal action, the effects of which are mutual. Thirteen.

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As a rule, they exclude genius all that was not
attainable by such miserable philosophy. The offspring of partial views
lay outside the precincts of science, and was the field
of genius, which raises itself above rules. Pity the warrior
who is contented to crawl about in this beggardom of
rules which are too bad for genius, over which it

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can set itself superior, over which it can perchance make merry.
What genius does must be the best of all rules,
and theory cannot do better than to show how and why.
It is so. Pity the theory, which sets itself in
opposition to the mind. It cannot repair this contradiction by
any humility, and the humbler it is so much, the

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sooner will ridicule and contempt drive it out of real life. Fourteen.
The difficulty of theory. As soon as moral quantities come
into consideration, every theory becomes infinitely more difficult from the
moment that it touches on the province of moral quantities.
Architecture in painting know quite well what they are about.
As long as they have only to do with matter,

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there is no dispute about mechanical or optical construction. But
as soon as the moral activities begin their work, as
soon as moral impressions and feelings are produced, the whole
set of rules dissolves into vague ideas. The science of
medicine is chiefly engaged with bodily phenomena. Only its business
is with the animal organism, which, liable to perpetual change,

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is never exactly the same for two moments. This makes
its practice very difficult, and places the judgment of the
physician above his science. But how much more difficult is
the case if a moral effect is added, and how
much higher must replace the physician of the mind. Fifteen
The moral quantities must not be excluded in war. But

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now the activity in war or is never directed solely
against matter. It is always, at the same time directed
against the intelligent force which gives life to this matter,
and to separate the two from each other is impossible.
But the intelligent forces are only visible to the inner eye,
and this is different in each person, and often different
in the same person at different times. As danger is

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the general element in which everything moves in war, it
is also chiefly by courage, the feeling of one's own power,
that the judgment is differently influenced. It is, to a
certain extent the crystalline lens through which all appearances pass
before reaching the understanding. And yet we cannot doubt that
these things acquire a certain objective value simply through experience.

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Every one knows the moral effect of a surprise of
an attack in flank career. Every one thinks less of
the enemy's courage as soon as he turns his back,
and ventures much more in pursuit than one pursued. Every
One judges of the enemy's general by his reputed talents,
by his age and experience, and shapes his course accordingly.

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Every One casts a scrutinizing glance at the spirit and
feeling of his own and the enemy's troops. All these
and similar effects in the province of the moral nature
of man, have established themselves by experience are perpetually recurring,
and therefore warrant our reckoning them as real quantities of
their kind. What could we do with any theory which

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should leave them out of consideration? Certainly, experience is an
indispensable title for these truths. With psychological and philosophical sophistries,
no theory, no general should meddle Sixteen principal difficulty of
a theory for the conduct of war. In order to
comprehend clearly the difficulty of the proposition which is contained

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in a theory for the conduct of war, and thence
to deduce the necessary characteristics of such a theory, we
must take a closer view of the chief particulars which
make up the nature of activity in war. Seventeen. First
speciality dot Moral forces and their effects. Hostile feeling. The
first of these specialties consists in the moral forces and effects.

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The combat is in its origin the expression of hostile feeling.
But in our great combats, which we call wars, the
hostile feeling frequently resolves itself into merely a hostile view,
and there is usually no innate hostile feeling residing an
individual against individual. Nevertheless, the combat never passes off without
such feelings being brought into activity. National hatred, which is

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seldom wanting in our wars, is a substitute for personal
hostility in the breast of individual opposed to individual. But
where this also is wanting, and at first no animosity
of feeling subsists, a hostile feeling is kindled by the
combat itself. For an act of violence which any one
commits upon us by order of his superior will excite

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in us a desire to retaliate and be revenged on
him sooner than on the superior power at whose command
the act was done. This is human or animal. If
we will still it is so, we are very apt
to regard the combat in theory as an abstract trial
of strength, without any participation on the part of the feelings.
And that is one of the thousand errors which theorists

(33:20):
deliberately commit, because they do not see its consequences. Besides
that excitation of feelings naturally arising from the combat itself,
there are others also which do not essentially belong to it,
but which, on account of their relationship, easily unite with it. Ambition,
love of power, enthusiasm of every kind, and sea and

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see eighteen. The impressions of danger courage. Finally, the combat
begets the element of danger, in which all the activities
of war must live and move, like the bird in
the air or the fish in the water. But the
influences of danger all pass into the feelings, either direct,

(34:00):
that is, instinctively, or through the medium of the understanding.
The effect in the first case would be a desire
to escape from the danger, and if that cannot be done,
fright and anxiety. If this effect does not take place,
then it is courage, which is a counterpoise to that instinct.
Courage is, however, by no means an act of the understanding,

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but likewise a feeling like fear. The latter looks to
the physical preservation, courage to the moral preservation. Courage then
is a nobler instinct. But because it is so, it
will not allow itself to be used as a lifeless
instrument which produces its effects exactly according to prescribed measure.
Courage is therefore no mere counterpoise to danger in order

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to neutralize the latter in its effects, but a peculiar
power in itself nineteen extent of the influence of danger.
But to estimate exactly the influence of danger upon the
principal actors in war, We must not limit its sphere
to the physical danger of the moment. It dominates over
the actor, not only by threatening him, but also by

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threatening all entrusted to him, not only at the moment
in which it is actually present, but also through the
imagination at all other moments which have a connection with
the present. Lastly, not only directly by itself, but also
indirectly by the responsibility, which makes it bear with tenfold
weight on the mind of the chief actor, who could
advise or resolve upon a great battle without feeling his

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mind more or less wrought up or perplexed by the
danger and responsibility which such a great act of decision
carries in itself. We may say that action in war,
in so far as it is real action not a
mere condition, is never out of the sphere of danger
twenty other powers of feeling. If we look upon these

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affections which are excited by hostility and danger as peculiarly
belonging to war, we do not therefore exclude from it
all there's accompanying man in his life's journey. They will
also find room here. Frequently enough. Certainly, we may say
that many a petty action of the passions is silenced
in this serious business of life. But that holds good

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only in respect to those acting in a lower sphere,
who hurried on from one state of danger and exertion
to another, lose sight of the rest of the things
of life, become and used to deceit, because it is
of no avail with death, and so attained to that
soldierly simplicity of character, which has always been the best
representative of the military profession in higher regions. It is otherwise,

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for the higher a man's rank, the more he must
look around him. Then arise interests on every side, and
a manifold activity of the passions of good and bad,
envy and generosity, pride and humility, fierceness and tenderness, all
may appear as active powers in this great drama. Twenty one.
Peculiarity of mind. The peculiar characteristics of mind and the

(36:59):
chief actor, as well as those of the feelings a
high importance. From an imaginative, flighty, inexperienced head, and from
a calm, sagacious understanding, different things are to be expected. Two.
From the diversity in mental individualities arises the diversity of
ways leading to the end. It is this great diversity

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in mental individuality, the influence of which is to be
supposed as chiefly felt in the higher ranks, because it
increases as we progress upwards, which chiefly produces the diversity
of ways leading to the end noticed by us in
the first book, and which gives to the play of
probabilities and chance such an unequal share in determining the
course of events. Three. Second peculiarity dot living reaction. The

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second peculiarity in war is the living reaction and the
reciprocal action resulting therefrom We do not here speak of
the difficulty of estimating that reaction, for that is included
in the difficulty before mentioned of treating the moral powers
as quantities. But of this that reciprocal action, by its nature,
opposes anything like a regular plan. The effect which any

(38:10):
measure produces upon the enemy is the most distinct of
all the data which action affords. But every theory must
keep to classes or groups of phenomena, and can never
take up the really individual case in itself, that must
everywhere be left to judgment and talent. It is therefore
natural that in a business such as war, which in
its plan built upon general circumstances is so often thwarted

(38:33):
by unexpected and singular accidents, more must generally be left
to talent, and less use can be made of a
theoretical guide than in any other. Twenty four Third peculiarity
dot uncertainty of all data. Lastly, the great uncertainty of
all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all
action must, to a certain extent be planned in a

(38:56):
mere twilight, which, in addition, not unfrequently, like the effect
of a fog or moonshine, gives to things exaggerated dimensions
and an unnatural appearance. What this feeble light leaves indistinct
to the sight talent must discover or must be left
to chance. It is therefore, again talent or the favor
of fortune, on which reliance must be placed for want

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of objective knowledge. Twenty five Positive theory is impossible with
materials of this kind. We can only say to ourselves
that it is a sheer impossibility to construct for the
art of war a theory which, like a scaffolding, shall
insure to the chief actor an external support on all sides.
In all those cases in which he is thrown upon

(39:39):
his talent, he would find himself away from this scaffolding
of theory and in opposition to it. And however many
sided it might be framed, the same result would ensue
of which we spoke when we said that talent and
genius act beyond the law, and theory is in opposition
to reality. Twenty six means left by which a theory
is possible. The difficulties are not everywhere equally great. Two

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means present themselves of getting out of this difficulty. In
the first place, what we have said of the nature
of military action in general does not apply in the
same manner to the action of every one, whatever may
be his standing. In the lower ranks. The spirit of
self sacrifice is called more into request. But the difficulties
which the understanding and judgment meet with are infinitely less.

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The field of occurrences is more confined. Ends and means
are fewer in number, data more distinct, mostly also contained
in the actually visible. But the higher we ascend, the
more the difficulties increase, until in the commander in chief
they reach their climax, so that with him almost everything
must be left to genius. Further, according to a division

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of the subject in agreement with its nature, the difficulties
are not everywhere the same, but diminish the more results
manifest themselves in the material world, and increase the more
they pass into the moral and become motives which influence
the will. Therefore, it is easier to determine by theoretical
rules the order and conduct of a battle than the

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use to be made of the battle itself. Yonder, physical
weapons clash with each other, and although mind is not
wanting therein, matter must have its rights. But in the
effects to be produced by battles, when the material results
become motives, we have only to do with the moral nature.
In a word, it is easier to make a theory
for tactics than for strategy. Twenty seven. Theory must be

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of the nature of observation, not of doctrine. The second
opening for the possibility of a theory lies in a
point of view that it does not necessarily require to
be a direction for action. As a general rule, whenever
an activity is for the most part occupied with the
same objects over and over again, with the same ends
and means, although there may be trifling alterations and a

(41:56):
corresponding number of varieties of combination, such things are capable
of becoming a subjective study for the reasoning faculties. But
such study is just the most essential part of every theory,
and has a peculiar title to that name. It is
an analytical investigation of the subject that leads to an
exact knowledge, and, if brought to bear on the results

(42:17):
of experience, which in our case would be military history,
to a thorough familiarity with it. The nearer theory attains
the latter object, so much the more it passes over
from the objective form of knowledge into the subjective one
of skill in action, And so much the more therefore
it will prove itself effective when circumstances allow of no

(42:37):
other decision but that of personal talents. It will show
its effects in that talent itself. If theory investigates the
subjects which constitute war, if it separates more distinctly that
which at first sight seems amalgamated, If it explains fully
the properties of the means, if it shows their probable effects,
if it makes evident the nature of objects. If it

(42:58):
brings to bear all over the field of war the
light of essentially critical investigation, then it has fulfilled the
chief duties of its province. It becomes then a guide
to him who wishes to make himself acquainted with war
from books. It lights up the whole road for him,
facilitates his progress, educates his judgment, and shields him from error.
If a man of expertness spends half his life in

(43:20):
the endeavor to clear up an obscure subject thoroughly, he
will probably know more about it than a person who
seeks to master it in a short time. Theory is
instituted that each person in succession may not have to
go through the same labor of clearing the ground and
toiling through his subject, but may find the thing in
order and light admitted on it. It should educate the

(43:41):
mind of the future leader in war, or rather guide
him in his self instruction, but not accompany him to
the field of battle, just as a sensible tutor forms
and enlightens the opening mind of a youth, without therefore
keeping him in leading strings all through his life. If
maxims and rules result of themselves from the considerations which
theory institutes, if the truth accretes itself into that form

(44:03):
of crystal, then theory will not oppose this natural law
of the mind. It will rather, if the arch ends
in such a keystone bring it prominently out. But so
does this only in order to satisfy the philosophical law
of reason, in order to show distinctly the point to
which the lines all converge, not in order to form
out of it an algebraical formula for use upon the battlefield.

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For even these maxims and rules serve more to determine
in the reflecting mind the leading outline of its habitual
movements than as landmarks indicating to it the way in
the act of execution. Eight. By this point of view,
theory becomes possible and ceases to be in contradiction to practice.
Taking this point of view, there is a possibility afforded

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of a satisfactory that is, of a useful theory of
the conduct of war never coming into opposition with the reality,
and it will only depend on rational treatment to bring
it so far into harmony with action. Between theory and practice,
there shall no longer be that absurd difference which an
unreasonable theory in defiance of common sense has often produced,

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but which just as often narrow mindedness and ignorance have
used as a pretext for giving way to their natural incapacity.
Twenty nine. Theory therefore considers the nature of ends and means.
Ends and means in tactics. Theory has therefore to consider
the nature of the means and ends in tactics. The

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means are the disciplined armed forces which are to carry
on the contest. The object is victory. The precise definition
of this conception can be better explained hereafter. In the
consideration of the combat. Here we content ourselves by denoting
the retirement of the enemy from the field of battle
as the sign of victory. By means of this victory,

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strategy gains the object for which it appointed the combat,
and which constitutes its special signification. This signification as certainly
some influence on the nature of the victory. A victory
which is intended to weaken the enemy's armed forces is
a different thing from one which is designed only to
put us in possession of a position. The signification of

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a combat may therefore have a sensible influence on the
preparation and conduct of it. Consequently, will be also a
subject of consideration in tactics. Thirty circumstances which always attend
the application of the means, as there are certain circumstances
which attend the combat throughout and have more or less
influence upon its result. Therefore, these must be taken into

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consideration in the application of the armed forces. These circumstances
are the locality of the combat ground, the time of day,
and the weather. Thirty one locality, The locality which we
prefer leaving for solution under the head of country and ground,
might strictly speaking, be without any influence at all if

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the combat took place on a completely level and uncorre
cultivated plain. In a country of steps, such a case
may occur, but in the cultivated countries of Europe it
is almost an imaginary idea. Therefore, a combat between civilized
nations in which country and ground have no influence is
hardly conceivable. Thirty two time of day. The time of

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day influences the combat by the difference between day and night,
but the influence naturally extends further than merely to the
limits of these divisions. As every combat has a certain duration,
and great battles last for several hours. In the preparations
for a great battle, it makes an essential difference whether
it begins in the morning or the evening. At the

(47:42):
same time, certainly, many battles may be fought in which
the question of the time of day is quite immaterial,
and in the generality of cases its influence is only trifling.
Thirty three Weather Still more rarely has the weather any
decisive influence, and it is mostly only by fought ugs
that it plays a part. Thirty four End and means

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in strategy. Strategy has in the first instance only the victory,
that is, the tactical result as a means to its object,
and ultimately those things which lead directly to peace. The
application of its means to this object is at the
same time attended by circumstances which have an influence. Thereon
more or less thirty five circumstances which attend the application

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of the means of strategy. These circumstances are country and ground,
the former including the territory in inhabitants of the whole
theater of war. Next, the time of the day and
the time of the year, as well lastly the weather,
particularly any unusual state of the same severe frost and sea.
Thirty six. These form new means. By bringing these things

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into combination with the results of a combat. Strategy gives
this result, and therefore the combat a special signification placed
before it a particular object. But when this object is
not that which leads directly to peace, therefore a subordinate one.
It is only to be looked upon as a means,
And therefore in strategy we may look upon the results

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of combats or victories in all their different significations as means.
The conquest of a position is such a result of
a combat applied to ground. But not only are the
different combats with special objects to be considered as means,
but also every higher aim which we may have in
view in the combination of battles directed on a common

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object is to be regarded as a means. A winter
campaign is a combination of this kind applied to the season.
There remain, therefore as objects only those things which may
be supposed as leading directly to peace. Theory investigates all
these ends and means according to the nature of their
effects and their mutual relations. Thirty seven. Strategy deduces only

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from experience the ends and means means to be examined.
The first question is how does strategy arrive at a
complete list of these things? If there is to be
a philosophical inquiry leading to an absolute result, it would
become entangled in all those difficulties which the logical necessity
of the conduct of war and its theory exclude. It

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therefore turns to experience and directs its attention on those
combinations which military history can furnish. In this manner, no doubt,
nothing more than a limited theory can be obtained which
only suits circumstances such as are presented in history. But
this incompleteness is unavoidable, because in any case theory must

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either have deduced from or have compared with history what
it advances with respect to things. Besides, this, incompleteness in
every case is more theoretical than real. One great advantage
of this method is that theory cannot lose itself in
abstruse disquisitions, subtleties, and chimeras, but must always remain practical.

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Thirty eight How far the analysis of the means should
be carried? Another question is how far should theory go
in its analysis of the means? Evidently only so far
as the elements in a separate form present themselves for consideration.
In practice, the range and effect of different weapons is
very important to tactics their construction. Although these effects result

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from it is a matter of indifference, for the conduct
of war is not making powder and cannon out of
a given quantity of charcoal, sulfur and saltpetry of copper
and tin. The given quantities for the conduct of war
are arms in a finished state and their effects. Strategy
makes use of maps without troubling itself about triangulations. It

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does not inquire how the country is subdivided into departments
and provinces, and how the people are educated and governed
in order to attain the best military results. But it
takes things as it finds them in the community of
European states and observes were very different conditions have a
notable influence on war. Thirty nine. Great simplification of the

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knowledge required that in this manner the number of subjects
for theory is much simplified, and the knowledge requisite for
the conduct of war much reduced, is easy to perceive
the very great mass of knowledge and appliances of skill
which minister to the action of war in general, and
which are necessary before an army fully equipped can take

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the field, unite in a few great results before they
are able to reach in actual war, the final goal
of their activity. Just as the streams of a country
unite themselves in rivers before they fall into the sea.
Only those activities emptying themselves directly into the sea of
war have to be studied by him who is to
conduct its operations. Forty This explains the rapid growth of

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great generals, and why a general is not a man
of learning. This result of our considerations is in fact
so necessary that any other would have made us distrustful
of their accuracy. Only thus is explained how so often
men have made their appearance with great success in war,
and indeed in the higher ranks, even in supreme command,

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whose pursuits have been previously of a totally different nature. Indeed,
how as a rule, the most distinguished generals have never
risen from the very learned or really erudite class of officers,
but have been mostly men who, from the circumstances of
their position, could not have attained to any great amount
of knowledge. On that account, those who have considered it
necessary or even beneficial to commence the education of a

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future general by instruction in all details have always been
ridiculed as absurd pedants. It would be easy to show
the injurious tendency of such a course, because the human
mind is trained by the knowledge imparted to it and
the direction given to its ideas. Only what is great
can make it great. The little can only make it
little if the mind itself does not reject it as

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something repugnant. Forty one former contradictions because this simplier city
of knowledge requisite in war was not attended to, but
that knowledge was always jumbled up with the whole impedimenta
of subordinate sciences and arts. Therefore, the palpable opposition to
the events of real life which resulted could not be
solved otherwise than by ascribing it all to genius, which

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requires no theory, and for which no theory could be prescribed.
Forty two. On this account, all use of knowledge was denied,
and everything ascribed to natural talents. People with whom common
sense had the upper hand felt sensible of the immense
distance remaining to be filled up between a genius of
the highest order and a learned pedant, and they became

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in a manner free thinkers, rejected all belief in theory,
and affirmed the conduct of war to be a natural
function of man, which he performs more or less well
according as he has brought with him into the world
more or less talent. In that direction, it cannot be
denied that these were nearer to the truth than those
who placed a value on false knowledge. At the same time,

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it may easily be seen that such a view is
its ans but an exaggeration. No activity of the human
understanding is possible without a certain stock of ideas. But
these are, for the greater part at least not innate,
but acquired and constitute his knowledge. The only question, therefore,
is of what kind should these ideas be? And we

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think we have answered it if we say that they
should be directed on those things which man has directly
to deal within war forty three. The knowledge must be
made suitable to the position inside this field itself of
military activity. The knowledge required must be different according to
the station of the commander. It will be directed on
smaller and more circumscribed objects if he holds an inferior

(55:42):
upon greater and more comprehensive ones if he holds a
higher situation. There are field marshals who would not have
shown at the head of a cavalry regiment, and vice versa.
Forty four. The knowledge in war is very simple, but
not at the same time very easy. And although the
knowledge in war is simple, that is to say, directed

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to so few subjects and taking up those only in
their final results. The art of execution is not on
that account easy. Of the difficulties to which activity in
war is subject generally, we have already spoken in the
first book. We here omit those things which can only
be overcome by courage, and maintain also that the activity
of mind is only simple and easy in inferior stations,

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but increases in difficulty with increase of rank, and in
the highest position, in that of commander in chief is
to be reckoned among the most difficult which there is
for the human mind. Set five of the nature of
this knowledge. The commander of an army neither requires to
be a learned explorer of history, nor a publicist. But
he must be well versed in the higher affairs of state.

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He must know and be able to judge correctly of
traditional tendencies, interests at stake, the immediate questions at issue,
and the characters of leading persons. He need not be
a close observd of men, a sharp dissector of human character.
But he must know the character, the feelings, the habits,
the peculiar faults and inclinations of those whom he is

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to command. He need not understand anything about the make
of a carriage or the harness of a battery horse.
But he must know how to calculate exactly the march
of a column under different circumstances, according to the time
it requires. These are matters the knowledge of which cannot
be forced out by an apparatus of scientific formula and machinery.

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They are only to be gained by the exercise of
an accurate judgment in the observation of things and of men,
aided by a special talent for the apprehension of both.
The necessary knowledge for a high position in military action
is therefore distinguished by this that by observation, therefore by
study and reflection. It is only to be attained through
a special talent, which, as an intellectual instinct, understands how

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to extract from the phenomena of life only the essence
or spirit, as bees do the honey from the flowers.
And that is it is also to be gained by
experience of life, as well as by study and reflection.
Life will never bring forth a Newton or an Oiler
by its rich teachings, but it may bring forth great
calculators in war, such as Conde or Frederick. It is

(58:15):
therefore not necessary that in order to vindicate the intellectual
dignity of military activity, we should resort to untruth and
silly pedantry. There never has been a great and distinguished
commander of contracted mind. But very numerous are the instances
of men who, after serving with the greatest distinction in
inferior positions, remained below mediocrity in the highest from insufficiency

(58:38):
of intellectual capacity. That even amongst those holding the post
of commander in chief there may be a difference according
to the degree of their plenitude of power is a
matter of course. Forty six. Science must become art. Now
we have yet to consider one condition which is more
necessary for the knowledge of the conduct of war than

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for any other, which is that it must pass completely
into the mind, and almost completely cease to be something objective.
In almost all other arts and occupations of life, the
active agent can make use of truths which he has
only learnt once, and in the spirit and sense of
which he no longer lives, and which he extracts from
dusty books. Even truths which he has in hand and

(59:20):
uses daily, may continue something external to himself. If the
architect takes up a pen to settle the strength of
a peer by a complicated calculation. The truth found as
a result is no emanation from his own mind. He
had first to find the data with labor, and then
to submit these to an operation of the mind, the
rule for which he did not discover, the necessity of

(59:41):
which he is perhaps at the moment only partly conscious of,
but which he applies for the most part, as if
by mechanical dexterity. But it is never so. In war.
The moral reaction, the ever changeful form of things, makes
it necessary for the chief actor to carry in himself
the whole mental appera stat of his knowledge, that anywhere

(01:00:02):
and at every post be he may be capable of
giving the requisite decision from himself. Knowledge must, by this
complete assimilation with his own mind and life be converted
into real power. This is the reason why everything seems
so easy with men distinguished in war, and why everything
is ascribed to natural talent. We say natural talent in

(01:00:23):
order thereby to distinguish it from that which is formed
and matured by observation and study. We think that by
these reflections we have explained the problem of a theory
of the conduct of war and pointed out the way
to its solution. Of the two fields into which we
have divided the conduct of war, tactics and strategy. The
theory of the latter contains, unquestionably, as before observed, the

(01:00:47):
greatest difficulties, because the first is almost limited to a
circumscribed field of objects, but the latter, in the direction
of objects leading directly to peace, opens to itself an
unlimited field of possibilities, since for the most part the
commander in chief has only to keep these objects steadily
in view. Therefore, the part of strategy in which he

(01:01:07):
moves is also that which is particularly subject to this difficulty. Theory, therefore,
especially where it comprehends the highest services, will stop much
sooner in strategy than in tactics. At the simple consideration
of things and content itself to assist the commander to
that insight into things, which blended with his whole thought,
makes his course easier and surer, never forces him into

(01:01:30):
opposition with himself in order to obey an objective truth.
Chapter three, Art or science of war. One usage still unsettled.
Power and knowledge science when mere knowing, art when doing
is the object. The choice between these terms seems to
be still unsettled, and no one seems to know rightly

(01:01:53):
on what grounds it should be decided. And yet the
thing is simple. We have already said elsewhere that knowing
is something different from doing. The two are so different
that they should not easily be mistaken the one for
the other. That doing cannot properly stand in any book,
And therefore also art should never be the title of
a book. But because we have once accustomed ourselves to

(01:02:16):
combine in conception under the name of theory of art
or simply art, the branches of knowledge, which may be
separately pure sciences necessary for the practice of an art,
therefore it is consistent to continue this ground of distinction,
and to call everything art when the object is to
carry out that doing, being able, as for example, art
of building, science when merely knowledge is the object, as

(01:02:40):
science of mathematics of astronomy. That in every art certain
complete sciences may be included, is intelligible of itself and
should not perplex us. But still it is worth observing
that there is also no science without a mixture of art.
In mathematics, for instance, the use of figures and of
algebra is an art, but that is only one amongst

(01:03:02):
many instances. The reason is that, however, plain and palpable.
The difference is between knowledge and power in the composite
results of human knowledge. Yet it is difficult to trace
out their line of separation in man himself. Two difficulty
of separating perception from judgment art of war. All thinking

(01:03:23):
is indeed art. Where the logician draws the line where
the premises stop, which are the result of cognition, where
judgment begins, their art begins. But more than this, even
the perception of the mind is judgment again, and consequently art,
and at last even the perception by the senses as well.
In a word, if it is impossible to imagine a

(01:03:45):
human being possessing merely the faculty of cognition devoid of judgment,
or the reverse, so also art and science can never
be completely separated from each other. The more these subtle
elements of light embody themselves in the outward forms of
the world, so much the more separate appear their domains.
And now, once more, where the object is creation and production,

(01:04:07):
there is the province of art. Where the object is
investigation and knowledge, science holds swayedt After all this, it
results of itself that it is more fitting to say
art of war than science of war. So much for this,
because we cannot do without these conceptions. But now we
come forward with the assertion that war is neither an
art nor a science in the real signification, and that

(01:04:29):
it is just the setting out from that starting point
of ideas which has led to a wrong direction being taken,
which has caused war to be put on a par
with other arts and sciences, and has led to a
number of erroneous analogies. This has indeed been felt before now,
and on that account it was maintained that war is
a handicraft, but there was more loss than gained by that,

(01:04:50):
for a handicraft is only an inferior art, and as
such is also subject to definite and rigid laws. In reality,
the art of war did go on for some time
in the spirit of a handicraft, we allude to the
times of the Condottieri. But then it received that direction
not from intrinsic but from external causes, and military history
shows how little it was at that time in accordance

(01:05:12):
with the nature of the thing. Three. War is part
of the intercourse of the human race. We say, therefore,
war belongs not to the province of arts and sciences,
but to the province of social life. It is a
conflict of great interests, which is settled by bloodshed, and
only in that is it different from others. It would

(01:05:32):
be better, instead of comparing it with any art, to
liken it to business competition, which is also a conflict
of human interests and activities. And it is still more
like state policy, which again, on its part, may be
looked upon as a kind of business competition on a
great scale. Besides state policy is the womb in which
war is developed, in which its outlines lie hidden in

(01:05:55):
a rudimentary state, like the qualities of living creatures in
their germs Asterisk four difference. The essential difference consists in
this that war is no activity of the will, which
exerts itself upon inanimate matter like the mechanical arts, or
upon a living but still passive and yielding subject like

(01:06:16):
the human mind and the human feelings in the ideal arts,
but against a living and reacting force. How little the
categories of arts and sciences are applicable to such an
activity strikes us at once, and we can understand at
the same time how that constant seeking and striving after
laws like those which may be developed out of the
dead material world could not but lead to constant errors.

(01:06:38):
And yet it is just the mechanical arts that some
people would imitate in the art of war. The imitation
of the ideal arts was quite out of the question,
because these themselves dispense too much with laws and rules,
and those hitherto tried, always acknowledged as insufficient and one sided,
are perpetually undermined and washed away by the current of opinions, feelings,

(01:06:59):
and customs. Whether such a conflict of the living as
takes place and is settled in war is subject to
general laws, and whether these are capable of indicating a
useful line of action, will be partly investigated in this book.
But so much is evident in itself that this, like
every other subject, which does not surpass our powers of understanding,

(01:07:21):
may be lighted up and be made more or less
plain in its inner relations by an inquiring mind. And
that alone is sufficient to realize the idea of a theory.
Chapter four Methodicism. In order to explain ourselves clearly as
to the conception of method and method of action, which
plays such an important part in war, we must be

(01:07:42):
allowed to cast a hasty glance at the logical hierarchy
through which, as through regularly constituted official functionaries, the world
of action is governed. Law in the widest sense, strictly
applying to perception as well as action, has plainly something
subjective and arbitrary in its literal meaning, and expresses just
that on which we and those things external to us

(01:08:03):
are dependent. As a subject of cognition, law is the
relation of things and their effects to one another as
a subject of the will. It is a motive of action,
and is then equivalent to command or prohibition. Principle is
likewise such a law for action, except that it has
not the formal definite meaning, but is only the spirit
and sense of law. In order to leave the judgment

(01:08:25):
more freedom of application when the diversity of the real
world cannot be laid hold of under the definite form
of a law, as the judgment must of itself suggest
the cases in which the principle is not applicable. The
latter therefore becomes, in that way a real aid or
guiding star for the person acting. Principle is objective when
it is the result of objective truth, and consequently of

(01:08:47):
equal value for all men. It is subjective, and then
generally called maxim if there are subjective relations in it,
and if it therefore has a certain value only for
the person himself who makes it. Rule is frequently taken
in the sense of law, and then means the same
as principle. For we say no rule without exceptions, but
we do not say no law without exceptions, a sign

(01:09:10):
that with rule we retain to ourselves more freedom of application.
In another meaning, rule is the means used of discerning
a recondite truth in a particular sign lying close at hand,
in order to attach to this particular sign the law
of action directed upon the whole truth of this kind.
Are all the rules of games of play, all abridged processes.

(01:09:31):
In mathematics and c directions and instructions are determinations of
action which have an influence upon a number of minor
circumstances too numerous and unimportant for general laws. Lastly, method
mode of acting is an always recurring proceeding selected out
of several possible ones. And methodicism methodismus is that which

(01:09:53):
is determined by methods instead of by general principles or
particular prescriptions. By this, the cases which a placed under
such methods must necessarily be supposed alike in their essential parts.
As they cannot all be this, then the point is
that at least as many as possible should be in
other words, that methods should be calculated on the most

(01:10:13):
probable cases. Methodicism is therefore not founded on determined particular premises,
but on the average probability of cases one with another,
and its ultimate tendency is to set up an average truth,
the constant and uniform application of which soon acquires something
of the nature of a mechanical appliance, which in the
end does that which is right, almost unwittingly. The conception

(01:10:36):
of law in relation to perception is not necessary for
the conduct of war, because the complex phenomena of war
are not so regular, and the regular are not so
complex that we should gain anything more by this conception
than by the simple truth. And whereas simple conception and
language is sufficient to resort to the complex becomes affected

(01:10:56):
and pedantic. The conception of law in relation into action
cannot be used in the theory of the conduct of war, because,
owing to the variableness and diversity of the phenomena, there
is in it no determination of such a general nature
as to deserve the name of law. But principles, rules
prescriptions and methods are conceptions indispensable to a theory of

(01:11:17):
the conduct of war in so far as that theory
leads to positive doctrines, because in doctrines the truth can
only crystallize itself in such forms as tactics is the
branch of the conduct of war in which theory can
attain the nearest to positive doctrine. Therefore, these conceptions will
appear in it most frequently. Not to use cavalry against

(01:11:39):
unbroken infantry, except in some case of special emergency, only
to use firearms within effective range in the combat, to
spare the forces as much as possible for the final struggle.
These are tactical principles. None of them can be applied
absolutely in every case, but they must always be present
to the mind of the chief in order that the
benefit of the truth contained in them may not be

(01:12:01):
lost in cases where that truth can be of advantage.
If from the unusual cooking by an enemy's camp, his
movement is inferred, if the intentional exposure of troops in
a combat indicates a false attack, then this way of
discerning the truth is called rule, because from a single
visible circumstance that conclusion is drawn, which corresponds with the same.

(01:12:22):
If it is a rule to attack the enemy with
renewed vigor as soon as he begins to limber up
his artillery in the combat, then on this particular fact
depends a course of action which is aimed at the
general situation of the enemy as inferred from the above fact, namely,
that he is about to give up the fight, that
he is commencing to draw off his troops, and is
neither capable of making a serious stand while thus drawing off,

(01:12:45):
nor of making his retreat gradually in good order. Regulations
and methods bring preparatory theories into the conduct of war
in so far as disciplined troops are inoculated with them
as active principles. The whole body of instructions for formations,
drill and field service are regulations and methods. In the
drill instructions, the first predominate. In the field service instructions,

(01:13:09):
the latter to these things, the real conduct of war
attaches itself. It takes them over therefore as given modes
of proceeding, and as such they must appear in the
theory of the conduct of war. But for those activities
retaining freedom in the employment of these forces. There cannot
be regulations, that is, definite instructions, because they would do

(01:13:30):
away with freedom of action. Methods, on the other hand,
as a general way of executing duties as they arise,
calculated as we have said, on an average of probability,
or as a dominating influence of principles and rules carried
through to application, may certainly appear in the theory of
the conduct of war, provided only they are not represented

(01:13:51):
as something different from what they are, not as the
absolute and necessary modes of action systems, but as the
best of general forms, which may be used as a
shorter weighs in place of a particular disposition for the
occasion at discretion. But the frequent application of methods will
be seen to be most essential and unavoidable in the
conduct of war. If we reflect how much action proceeds

(01:14:14):
on mere conjecture or in complete uncertainty because one side
is prevented from learning all the circumstances which influence the
dispositions of the other, or because even if these circumstances
which influence the decisions of the one were really known,
there is not owing to their extent in the dispositions
they would entail sufficient time for the other to carry

(01:14:35):
out all necessary counteracting measures, that therefore measures in war
must always be calculated on a certain number of possibilities.
If we reflect, how numberless are the trifling things belonging
to any single event, and which therefore should be taken
into account along with it, and that therefore there is
no other means to suppose the one counteracted by the other,
and to base our arrangements only upon what is of

(01:14:57):
a general nature improbable. If we reflect lastly that, owing
to the increasing number of officers as we descend, the
scale of rank less must be left to the true
discernment and ripe judgment of individuals the lower the sphere
of action, and that when we reach those ranks where
we can look for no other notions but those which
the regulations of the service and experience afford, we must

(01:15:19):
help them with the methodic forms bordering on those regulations.
This will serve both as a support to their judgment
and a barrier against those extravagant and erroneous views which
are so especially to be dreaded in a sphere where
experience is so costly. Besides this absolute need of method
in action, we must also acknowledge that it has a

(01:15:39):
positive advantage, which is that, through the constant repetition of
a formal exercise or readiness, precision and firmness is attained
in the movement of troops, which diminishes the natural friction
and makes the machine move easier. Method will therefore be
the more generally used, become the more indispensable, the farther
down the scale of rank the position of the active agent,

(01:16:01):
and on the other hand, its use will diminish upwards,
until in the highest position it quite disappears. For this reason,
it is more in its place in tactics than in strategy.
War in its highest aspects, consists not of an infinite
number of little events, the diversities in which compensate each other,
and which therefore, by a better or worse method, are

(01:16:22):
better or worse governed, but of separate, great decisive events,
which must be dealt with separately. It is not like
a field of stalks, which, without any regard to the
particular form of each stock, will be mowed better or
worse according as the mowing instrument is good or bad,
but rather as a group of large trees to which
the acts must be laid with judgment according to the

(01:16:44):
particular form and inclination of each separate trunk. How high
up in military activity the admissibility of method in action
reaches naturally determines itself not according to actual rank, but
according to things, And it affects the highest positions in
a less ten only because these positions have the most
comprehensive subjects of activity. A constant order of battle, a

(01:17:07):
constant formation of advanced guards and outposts, are methods by
which a general ties not only his subordinates hands, but
also his own. In certain cases, certainly they may have
been devised by himself, and may be applied by him
according to circumstances. But they may also be a subject
of theory in so far as they are based on
the general properties of troops and weapons. On the other hand,

(01:17:30):
any method by which definite plans for wars or campaigns
are to be given out, already made as if from
a machine, are absolutely worthless. As long as there exists
no theory which can be sustained, that is, no enlightened
treatise on the conduct of war. Method in action cannot
but encroach beyond its proper limits in high places. For
men employed in these spheres of activity have not always

(01:17:53):
had the opportunity of educating themselves through study and through
contact with the higher interests. In practicable and inconsistent disquisitions
of theorists and critics, they cannot find their way. Their
sound common sense rejects them, and as they bring with
them no knowledge but that derived from experience. Therefore, in
those cases which admit of and require a free individual treatment,

(01:18:15):
they readily make use of the means which experience gives them.
That is an imitation of the particular methods practiced by
great generals by which a method of action then arises
of itself. If we see Frederick the greats generals always
making their appearance in the so called oblique order of battle,
the generals of the French Revolution always using turning movements

(01:18:36):
with a long extended line of battle, and Buonaparte's lieutenants
rushing to the attack with the bloody energy of concentrated masses,
then we recognize in the recurrence of the mode of
proceeding evidently an adopted method, and see therefore that method
of action can reach up to regions bordering on the
highest Should an improved theory facilitate the study of the
conduct of war, form the mind and judgment of men

(01:18:59):
who are right to the highest commands. Then also method
in action will no longer reach so far, and so
much of it as is to be considered indispensable, will
then at least be formed from theory itself, and not
take place out of mere imitation. However, pre eminently a
great commander does things, there is always something subjective in
the way he does them, and if he has a

(01:19:20):
certain manner, a large share of his individuality is contained
in it, which does not always accord with the individuality
of the person who copies his manner. At the same time,
it would neither be possible nor write, to banish subjective
methodicism or manner completely from the conduct of war. It
is rather to be regarded as a manifestation of that
influence which the general character of a war has upon

(01:19:42):
its separate events, and to which satisfaction can only be
done in that way. If theory is not able to
foresee this general character and included in its considerations, what
is more natural than that the war of the French
Revolution had its own way of doing things, And what
theory could ever have included that them peculiar method? The
evil is only that such a manner originating in a

(01:20:04):
special case easily outlives itself because it continues whilst circumstances
imperceptibly change. This is what theory should prevent by lucid
and rational criticism. When in the year eighteen o six
the Prussian generals Prince Louis at Saalfeld Tansian on the
Dornburg near Jena, growerd Before and Rutcheled behind Cappellendorf, all

(01:20:26):
threw themselves into the open jaws of destruction in the
oblique order of Frederick the Great and managed to ruin
ho and Loah's army in a way that no army
was ever ruined, even on the field of battle. All
this was done through a manner which had outlived its day,
together with the most downright stupidity to which methodicism ever led.
Chapter five Criticism. The influence of theoretical principles upon real

(01:20:51):
life is produced more through criticism than through doctrine. For
his criticism is an application of abstract truth to real events. Therefore,
it not only brings truth of this description nearer to life,
but also accustoms the understanding more to such truths by
the constant repetition of their application. We therefore think it
necessary to fix the point of view for criticism next

(01:21:13):
to that for theory. From the simple narration of an
historical occurrence, which places events in chronological order, or at
most only touches on their more immediate causes, we separate
the critical. In this critical three different operations of the
mind may be observed. First, the historical investigation and determining

(01:21:33):
of doubtful facts. This is properly historical research and has
nothing in common with theory. Secondly, the tracing of effects
to causes. This is the real critical inquiry. It is
indispensable to theory, for everything which in theory is to
be established, supported, or even merely explained by experience can

(01:21:54):
only be settled in this way. Thirdly, the testing of
the means employed. This is criticism, properly speaking, in which
praise and censure is contained. This is where theory helps history,
or rather the teaching to be derived from it. In
these two last strictly critical parts of historical study. All

(01:22:14):
depends on tracing things to their primary elements, that is
to say, up to undoubted truths, and not as is
so often done, resting half way, that is, on some
arbitrary assumption or supposition as respects the tracing of effect
to cause, that is often attended with the insuperable difficulty
that the real causes are not known. In None of

(01:22:36):
the relations of life does this so frequently happen as
in war, where events are seldom fully known, and still
less motives as the latter have been perhaps purposely concealed
by the chief actor, or have been of such a
transient and accidental character that they have been lost for history.
For this reason, critical narration must generally proceed hand in

(01:22:56):
hand with historical investigation, and still such a want of
connection between cause and effect will often present itself that
it does not seem justifiable to consider effects as the
necessary results of known causes. Here therefore, voids must occur,
that is, historical results which cannot be made use of
for teaching. All that theory can demand is that the

(01:23:19):
investigation should be rigidly conducted up to that point and
their leave off without drawing conclusions. A real evil springs
up only if the known is made perforce to suffice
as an explanation of effects, and thus a false importance
is ascribed to it. Besides this difficulty, critical inquiry also
meets with another great and intrinsic one, which is that

(01:23:40):
the progress of events in war seldom proceeds from one
simple cause, but from several in common, and that it
therefore is not sufficient to follow up a series of
events to their origin in a candid and impartial spirit,
but that it is then also necessary to apportion to
each contributing cause it's due weight. This leads therefore to
a closer investigation of their nature, and thus a critical

(01:24:03):
investigation may lead into what is the proper field of theory.
The critical consideration, that is, the testing of the means,
leads to the question, which are the effects peculiar to
the means applied, and whether these effects were comprehended in
the plans of the person directing. The effects peculiar to
the means lead to the investigation of their nature, and

(01:24:24):
thus again into the field of theory. We have already
seen that in criticism all depends upon attaining to positive truth.
Therefore that we must not stop at arbitrary propositions which
are not allowed by others, and to which other perhaps
equally arbitrary assertions may again be opposed, so that there
is no end to pros and cons The whole is

(01:24:44):
without result and therefore without instruction. We have seen that
both the search for causes and the examination of means
lead into the field of theory, that is, into the
field of universal truth, which does not proceed solely from
the case immediately under exact. If there is a theory
which can be used, then the critical consideration will appeal

(01:25:05):
to the proofs they are afforded, and the examination may
there stop. But where no such theoretical truth is to
be found, the inquiry must be pushed up to the
original elements. If this necessity occurs often, it must lead
the historian, according to a common expression, into a labyrinth
of details. He then has his hands full, and it

(01:25:26):
is impossible for him to stop to give the requisite
attention everywhere. The consequence is that, in order to set
bounds to his investigation, he adopts some arbitrary assumptions, which,
if they do not appear so to him, do so
to others, as they are not evident in themselves or
capable of proof. A sound theory is therefore an essential
foundation for criticism, and it is impossible for it without

(01:25:50):
the assistance of a sensible theory to attain to that point.
At which it commences chiefly to be instructive. That is
where it becomes demonstration, both convincing in Sand's But it
would be a visionary hope to believe in the possibility
of a theory applicable to every abstract truth, leaving nothing
for criticism to do but to place the case under

(01:26:10):
its appropriate law. It would be ridiculous pedantry to lay
down as a rule for criticism that it must always
halt and turn round on reaching the boundaries of sacred theory.
The same spirit of analytical inquiry, which is the origin
of theory, must also guide the critic in his work,
and it can and must therefore happen that he strays
beyond the boundaries of the province of theory and elucidates

(01:26:32):
those points with which he is more particularly concerned. It
is more likely, on the contrary, that criticism would completely
fail in its object if it degenerated into a mechanical
application of theory. All positive results of theoretical inquiry, all principles, rules,
and methods, are the more wanting in generality in positive truth,

(01:26:53):
the more they become positive doctrine. They exist to offer
themselves for use as required, And it must all always
be left for judgment to decide whether they are suitable
or not. Such results of theory must never be used
in criticism as rules or norms for a standard, but
in the same way as the person acting should use them,
that is, merely as aids to judgment. If it is

(01:27:16):
an acknowledged principle in tactics that in the usual order
of battle, cavalry should be placed behind infantry, not in
line with it, still it would be folly on this
account to condemn every deviation from this principle. Criticism must
investigate the grounds of the deviation, and it is only
in case these are insufficient, that it has a right
to appeal to principles laid down in theory. If it

(01:27:38):
is further established in theory that a divided attack diminishes
the probability of success, still it would be just as
unreasonable whenever there is a divided attack and an unsuccessful
issue to regard the latter as the result of the former,
without further investigation into the connection between the two, as
where a divided attack is successful, to infer from it

(01:27:59):
the fire fallacy of that theoretical principle. The spirit of
investigation which belongs to criticism cannot allow either. Criticism therefore
supports itself chiefly on the results of the analytical investigation
of theory. What has been made out and determined by
theory does not require to be demonstrated over again by criticism,
and it is so determined by theory that criticism may

(01:28:22):
find it ready demonstrated. This office of criticism, of examining
the effect produced by certain causes, and whether a means
applied has answered its object, will be easy enough if
cause and effect, means and end are all near together.
If an army is surprised and therefore cannot make a
regular and intelligent use of its powers and resources, then

(01:28:44):
the effect of the surprise is not doubtful. Dot If
theory has determined that in a battle, the convergent form
of attack is calculated to produce greater but less certain results,
then the question is whether he who employs that convergent
form had in view chiefly that greatness of result as
his object. If so, the proper means were chosen. But
if by this form he intended to make the result

(01:29:06):
more certain, and that expectation was founded not on some
exceptional circumstances in this case, but on the general nature
of the convergent form, as has happened a hundred times,
then he mistook the nature of the means and committed
an error. Here the work of military investigation and criticism
is easy, and it will always be so, when confined
to the immediate effects and objects. This can be done

(01:29:30):
quite at option if we abstract the connection of the
parts with the whole and only look at things in
that relation. But in war, as generally in the world,
there is a connection between everything which belongs to a whole.
And therefore, however small a cause may be in itself,
its effects reached to the end of the act of warfare,
and modify or influence the final result in some degree,

(01:29:52):
let that degree be ever so small. In the same manner,
every means must be felt up to the ultimate object.
We can therefore trace the effects of a cause as
long as events are worth noticing. And in the same
way we must not stop at the testing of a
means for the immediate object, but test also this object
as a means to a higher one, and thus ascend

(01:30:13):
the series of facts in succession until we come to
one so absolutely necessary in its nature as to require
no examination or proof. In many cases, particularly in what
concerns great and decisive measures, the investigation must be carried
to the final aim, to that which leads immediately to peace.
It is evident that in thus ascending, at every new

(01:30:35):
station which we reach, a new point of view for
the judgment is attained, so that the same means which
appeared advisable at one station, when looked at from the
next above it may have to be rejected. The search
for the causes of events and the comparison of means
with ends must always go hand in hand in the
critical review of an act. For the investigation of causes

(01:30:55):
leads us first to the discovery of those things which
are worth examining. This following of the clue up and
down is attended with considerable difficulty. For the farther from
an event the cause lies which we are looking for,
the greater must be the number of other causes, which
must at the same time be kept in view and
allowed for in reference to the share which they have
in the course of events, and then eliminated. Because the

(01:31:18):
higher the importance of a fact, the greater will be
the number of separate forces and circumstances by which it
is conditioned. If we have unraveled the causes of a
battle being lost. We have certainly also ascertained a part
of the causes of the consequences which this defeat has
upon the whole war, but only a part, because the
effects of other causes, more or less according to circumstances,

(01:31:40):
will flow into the final result. The same multiplicity of
circumstances is presented also in the examination of the means,
the higher our point of view, for the higher the
object is situated, the greater must be the number of
means employed to reach it. The ultimate object of the
war is the object aimed at by all the armies simultaneously,

(01:32:01):
and it is therefore necessary that the consideration should embrace
all that each has done or could have done. It
is obvious that this may sometimes lead to a wide
field of inquiry in which it is easy to wander
and lose the way, and in which this difficulty prevails,
that a number of assumptions or suppositions must be made
about a variety of things which do not actually appear,

(01:32:21):
but which in all probability did take place, and therefore
cannot possibly be left out of consideration. When Buonaparte in
seventeen ninety seven asterisk at the head of the Army
of Italy advanced from the Tagliamento against the Archduke Charles.
He did so with a view to force that general
to a decisive action before the reinforcements expected from the

(01:32:44):
Rhine had reached him. If we look only at the
immediate object, the means were well chosen and justified by
the result. For the Archduke was so inferior in numbers
that he only made a show of resistance on the Tagliamento,
and when he saw his adversary so strong an resolute
yielded ground and left open the passages of the norcan Alps.

(01:33:05):
Now to what use could Buonaparte turn this fortunate event
to penetrate into the heart of the Austrian Empire itself,
to facilitate the advance of the Rhine armies under Moreau
and Hoche and open communication with them. This was the
view taken by Buonaparte, and from this point of view
he was right. But now if criticism places itself at

(01:33:27):
a higher point of view, namely that of the French directory,
which body could see and know that the armies on
the Rhine could not commence the campaign for six weeks
then the advance of Buonaparte over the Norcan Alps can
only be regarded as an extremely hazardous measure. For if
the Austrians had drawn largely on their Rhine armies to
reinforce their army in Styria so as to enable the

(01:33:48):
Archduke to fall upon the Army of Italy, not only
would that army have been routed, but the whole campaign lost.
This consideration, which attracted the serious attention of Buonaparte at
villic no doubt induced him to sign the Armistice of
Leo Ben with so much readiness. If criticism takes a
still higher position, and if it knows that the Austrians

(01:34:11):
had no reserves between the army of the Archduke Charles
and Vienna, then we see that Vienna became threatened by
the advance of the Army of Italy. Supposing that Buonaparte
knew that the capital was thus uncovered, and knew that
he still retained the same superiority in numbers over the
Archduke as he had in Styria, then his advance against
the heart of the Austrian states was no longer without purpose,

(01:34:33):
and its value depended on the value which the Austrians
might place on preserving their capital. If that was so
great that, rather than lose it, they would accept the
conditions of peace which Buonaparte was ready to offer them,
it became an object of the first importance to threaten Vienna.
If Buonaparte had any reason to know this, then criticism

(01:34:53):
may stop there. But if this point was only problematical,
then criticism must take a still higher position and ask
what would have followed if the Austrians had resolved to
abandon Vienna and retire farther into the vast dominions still
left to them. But it is easy to see that
this question cannot be answered without bringing into the consideration
the probable movements of the Rhine armies on both sides.

(01:35:16):
Through the decided superiority of numbers on the side of
the French one hundred thirty thousand to eighty thousand, there
could be little doubt of the result. But then next
arises the question what use would the Directory make of
a victory, Whether they would follow up their success to
the opposite frontiers of the Austrian monarchy, therefore to the
complete breaking up or overthrow of that power, or whether

(01:35:37):
they would be satisfied with the conquest of a considerable
portion to serve as a security for peace. The probable
result in each case must be estimated in order to
come to a conclusion as to the probable determination of
the directory. Supposing the result of these considerations to be
that the French forces were much too weak for the
complete subjugation of the Austrian monarchy, so that the attempt

(01:36:00):
might completely reverse the respective positions of the contending armies,
and that even the conquest and occupation of a considerable
district of country would place the French army in strategic
relations to which they were not equal, then that result
must naturally influence the estimate of the position of the
Army of Italy and compel it to lower its expectations.

(01:36:21):
And this, it was no doubt, which influenced Buonaparte, although
fully aware of the helpless condition of the Archduke, still
to sign the Peace of Campo Formio, which imposed no
greater sacrifices on the Austrians than the loss of provinces, which,
even if the campaign took the most favorable turn for them,
they could not have reconquered. But the French could not

(01:36:42):
have reckoned on even the moderate treaty of Campo Formio,
and therefore it could not have been their object in
making their bold advance if two considerations had not presented
themselves to their view, the first of which consisted in
a question what degree of value the Austrians would attach
to each of the above mentioned results, whether, notwithstanding the
probability of a satisfactory result in either of these cases,

(01:37:04):
would it be worth while to make them sacrifices inseparable
from a continuance of the war when they could be
spared those sacrifices by a piece on terms not too humiliating.
The second consideration is the question whether the Austrian government,
instead of seriously weighing the possible results of a resistance
pushed to extremities, would not prove completely disheartened by the

(01:37:26):
impression of their present reverses. The consideration which forms the
subject of the first is no idle piece of subtle argument,
but a consideration of such decidedly practical importance that it
comes up whenever the plan of pushing war to the
utmost extremity is mooted, and by its weight in most
cases restrains the execution of such plans. The second consideration

(01:37:48):
is of equal importance. For we do not make war
with an abstraction, but with a reality which we must
always keep in view. And we may be sure that
it was not overlooked by the bold Buonaparte. That is,
that he he was keenly alive to the terror which
the appearance of his sword inspired. It was reliance on
that which led him to Moscow. There it led him

(01:38:08):
into a scrape. The terror of him had been weakened
by the gigantic struggles in which he had been engaged
in the year seventeen ninety seven, it was still fresh,
and the secret of a resistance pushed to extremities had
not been discovered. Nevertheless, even in seventeen ninety seven, his
boldness might have led to a negative result if, as
already said, he had not, with a sort of presentiment,

(01:38:29):
avoided it by signing the moderate piece of Campo Formio.
We must now bring these considerations to a close. They
will suffice to show the wide sphere the diversity and
embarrassing nature of the subjects embraced in a critical examination
carried to the fullest extent, that is, to those measures
of a great and decisive class which must necessarily be included.

(01:38:51):
It follows from them that, besides a theoretical acquaintance with
the subject, natural talent must also have a great influence
on the value of critical excitations, for it rests chiefly
with the latter to throw the requisite light on the
interrelations of things, and to distinguish from amongst the endless
connections of events, those which are really essential. But talent

(01:39:12):
is also called into requisition. In another way, critical examination
is not merely the appreciation of those means which have
been actually employed, but also of all possible means, which
therefore must be suggested. In the first place, that is,
must be discovered, and the use of any particular means
is not fairly open to censure until a better is

(01:39:32):
pointed out. Now, however small the number of possible combinations
may be in most cases, still it must be admitted
that to point out those which have not been used
is not a mere analysis of actual things, but a
spontaneous creation which cannot be prescribed, and depends on the
fertility of genius. We are far from seeing a field

(01:39:52):
for great genius in a case which admits only of
the application of a few simple combinations, And we think
it exceedingly ridiculous to hold up, as is often done,
the turning of a position as an invention showing the
highest genius. Still, nevertheless, this creative self activity on the
part of the critic is necessary, and it is one
of the points which essentially determine the value of critical examination.

(01:40:16):
When Buonaparte on July thirtieth, seventeen ninety six, asterisk determined
to raise the siege of Mantua in order to march
with his whole force against the enemy, advancing in separate
columns to the relief of the place, and to beat them.
In detail, this appeared the surest way to the attainment
of brilliant victories. These victories actually followed and were afterwards

(01:40:39):
again repeated on a still more brilliant scale, on the
attempt to relieve the fortress being again renewed. We hear
only one opinion on these achievements, that of unmixed admiration.
At the same time, Buonaparte could not have adopted this
course on the July thirtieth without quite giving up the
idea of the siege of Mantua, because it was impossible

(01:40:59):
to save the siege train, and it could not be
replaced by another in this campaign. In fact, the siege
was converted into a blockade, and the town, which if
the siege had continued must have very shortly fallen, held
out for six months in spite of Buonaparte's victories in
the open field. Criticism has generally regarded this as an

(01:41:20):
evil that was unavoidable, because critics have not been able
to suggest any better course. Resistance to a relieving army
within lines of circumvallation had fallen into such disrepute and
contempt that it appears to have entirely escaped consideration as
a means. And yet in the reign of Louis the
fourteenth that measure was so often used with success that

(01:41:41):
we can only attribute to the force of fashion the
fact that one hundred years later it never occurred to
any one even to propose such a measure. If the
practicability of such a plan had ever been entertained for
a moment, a closer consideration of circumstances would have shown
that forty thousand of the best infantry in the world,
under bunipoors, behind strong lines of circumvallation round Mantua, had

(01:42:03):
so little to fear from the fifty thousand men coming
to the relief under worm, Sir, that it was very
unlikely that any attempt even would be made upon their lines.
We shall not seek here to establish this point, but
we believe enough has been said to show that this
means was one which had a right to a share
of consideration. Whether Buonaparte himself ever thought of such a

(01:42:24):
plan relieve undecided. Neither in his memoirs nor in other sources,
is there any trace to be found of his having
done so. In no critical works has it been touched upon,
the measure of being one which the mind had lost
sight of the merit of resuscitating. The idea of this
means is not great, for it suggests itself at once
to any one who breaks loose from the trammels of fashion. Still,

(01:42:47):
it is necessary that it should suggest itself, for us
to bring it into consideration and compare it with the
means which Buonaparte employed. Whatever may be the result of
the comparison, it is one which should not be omitted
by criticism. When Buonaparte in February eighteen fourteen Asterisk, after
gaining the battles at Etog's Champ Aubert and Montmorl left

(01:43:10):
Blucher's army, and, turning upon Schwartzenberg, beat his troops at Monterro.
In Mormon, every one was filled with admiration because Buonaparte,
by thus throwing his concentrated force first upon one opponent,
then upon another, made a brilliant use of the mistakes
which his adversaries had committed in dividing their forces. If
these brilliant strokes in different directions failed to save him,

(01:43:33):
it was generally considered to be no fault of his.
At least, no one has yet asked the question what
would have been the result if, instead of turning from
Blucher upon Schwartzenberg, he had tried another blow at Blucher
and pursued him to the Rhine. We are convinced that
it would have completely changed the course of the campaign,
and that the army of the Allies, instead of marching

(01:43:54):
to Paris, would have retired behind the Rhine. We do
not ask others to share ourviction, but no one who
understands the thing will doubt at the mere mention of
this alternative course, that it is one which should not
be overlooked in criticism. In this case, the means of
comparison lie much more on the surface than in the foregoing,
but they have been equally overlooked because one sided views

(01:44:17):
have prevailed, and there has been no freedom of judgment
from the necessity of pointing out a better means which
might have been used in place of those which are condemned.
Has arisen the form of criticism almost exclusively in use,
which contents itself with pointing out the better means without
demonstrating in what the superiority consists. The consequence is that

(01:44:37):
some are not convinced that others start up and do
the same thing, and that thus discussion arises, which is
without any fixed basis for the argument. Military literature abounds
with matter of this sort. The demonstration we require is
always necessary when the superiority of the means propounded is
not so evident as to leave no room for doubt,

(01:44:58):
and it consists in the exact domination of each of
the means on its own merits, and then of its
comparison with the object desired. When once the thing is
traced back to a simple truth, controversy must cease, or
at all events a new result is obtained. Whilst by
the other plan the pros and cons go on forever,
consuming each other. Should we, for example, not rest content

(01:45:21):
with assertion in the case before mentioned, and wish to
prove that the persistent pursuit of Blucher would have been
more advantageous than the turning on Schwarzenberg, We should support
the arguments on the following simple truths. One. In general,
it is more advantageous to continue our blows in one
and the same direction, because there is a loss of
time in striking in different directions, and at a point

(01:45:44):
where the moral power is already shaken by considerable losses,
there is the more reason to expect fresh successes. Therefore,
in that way, no part of the preponderance already gained
is left idle. Two because Blucher, although weaker than Schwarzenberg,
was on a account of his enterprising spirit, the more
important adversary. In him therefore lay the center of attraction

(01:46:06):
which drew the others along in the same direction. Three
because the losses which Blucher had sustained almost amounted to
a defeat, which gave Buonaparte such a preponderance over him
as to make his retreat to the Rhine almost certain,
and at the same time, no reserves of any consequence
awaited him there four, because there was no other result

(01:46:26):
which would be so terrific in its aspects, would appear
to the imagination in such gigantic proportions. An immense advantage
in dealing with a staff so weak and irresolute as
that of Schwarzenberg. Notoriously was at this time what had
happened to the Crown Prince of Wurtemberg at Montroe and
to Count Wittgenstein at Mormon. Prince Schwartzenberg must have known

(01:46:47):
well enough, but all the untoward events on Blucher's distant
and separate line from the Marne to the Rhine would
only reach him by the avalanche of rumor. The desperate
movements which Buonaparte made upon Vitry at the end of
March to see what the Allies would do if he
threatened to turn them strategically, were evidently done on the
principle of working on their fears. But it was done

(01:47:08):
under far different circumstances. In consequence of his defeat at
Leon and Arses, and because Blucher, with one hundred thousand men,
was then in communication with Schwarzenberg. There are people no
doubt who will not be convinced on these arguments. But
at all events, they cannot retort by saying that whilst
Buonaparte threatened Schwarzenburg's base by advancing to the Rhine, Schwarzenberg

(01:47:31):
at the same time threatened Buonaparte's communications with Paris. Because
we have shown by the reasons above, given that Schwarzenberg
would never have thought of marching on Paris. With respect
to the example quoted by us from the campaign of
seventeen ninety six, we should say Buonaparte looked upon the
plan he adopted as the surest means of beating the Austrians,

(01:47:51):
but admitting that it was so, still the object to
be attained was only an empty victory which could have
hardly any sensible influence on the fall of Manchu. The
way which we should have chosen, would, in our opinion,
have been much more certain to prevent the relief of Mantua.
But even if we place ourselves in the position of
the French general and assume that it was not so,

(01:48:12):
and look upon the certainty of success to have been less,
the question then amounts to a choice between a more
certain but less useful and therefore less important victory on
the one hand, and as somewhat less probable but far
more decisive and important victory on the other hand. Presented
in this form, boldness must have declared for the second solution,

(01:48:33):
which is the reverse of what took place when the
thing was only superficially viewed. Bonaparte certainly was anything but
deficient in boldness, and we may be sure that he
did not see the whole case and its consequences as
fully and clearly as we can at the present time. Naturally,
the critic in treating of the means must often appeal

(01:48:53):
to military history, as experience is of more value in
the art of war than all philosophical truth. But this
exemplification from history is subject to certain conditions, of which
we shall treat in a special chapter. And unfortunately these
conditions are so seldom regarded that reference to history generally
only serves to increase the confusion of ideas. We have

(01:49:15):
still a most important subject to consider, which is how
far criticism, in passing judgments on particular events is permitted
or in duty bound, to make use of its wider
view of things, and therefore also of that which is
shown by results or when and where it should leave
out of sight these things, in order to place itself
as far as possible in the exact position of the

(01:49:36):
chief actor. If criticism dispenses praise or censure, it should
seek to place itself as nearly as possible at the
same point of view as the person acting. That is
to say, to collect all he knew and all the
motives on which he acted, and on the other hand,
to leave out of the consideration all that the person
acting could not or did not know, and above all

(01:49:57):
the result. But this is it is only an object
to aim at which can never be reached. Because the
state of circumstances from which an event proceeded can never
be placed before the eye of the critic exactly as
it lay before the eye of the person acting. A
number of inferior circumstances which must have influenced the result
are completely lost to sight, and many a subjective motive

(01:50:20):
has never come to light. The latter can only be
learnt from the memoirs of the chief actor or from
his intimate friends, and in such memoirs things of this
kind are often treated of in a very desolatory manner
or purposely misrepresented. Criticism must therefore always forego much which
was present in the minds of those whose acts are criticized.

(01:50:42):
On the other hand, it is much more difficult to
leave out of sight that which criticism knows in excess.
This is only easy as regards accidental circumstances, that is,
circumstances which have been mixed up but are in no
way necessarily related. But it is very difficult, and in
fact can never be completely done with regard to things

(01:51:03):
really essential. Let us take first the result. If it
has not proceeded from accidental circumstances, it is almost impossible
that the knowledge of it should not have an effect
on the judgment passed on events which have preceded it.
For we see these things in the light of this result,
and it is to a certain extent by it that
we first become acquainted with them and appreciate them. Military history,

(01:51:27):
with all its events, is a source of instruction for
criticism itself, and it is only natural that criticism should
throw that light on things which it has itself obtained
from the consideration of the whole. If therefore, it might
wish in some cases to leave the result out of
the consideration, it would be impossible to do so completely.
But it is not only in relation to the result,

(01:51:48):
that is, with what takes place at the last, that
this embarrassment arises. The same occurs in relation to preceding events. Therefore,
with the data which furnish the motives to action, criticism
has before it, in most cases more information on this
point than the principle in the transaction. Now, it may
seem easy to dismiss from the consideration everything of this nature,

(01:52:11):
but it is not so easy as we may think.
The knowledge of preceding in concurrent events is founded not
only on certain information, but on a number of conjectures
and suppositions. Indeed, there is hardly any of the information
respecting things not purely accidental, which has not been preceded
by suppositions or conjectures destined to take the place of
certain information, in case such should never be supplied. Now,

(01:52:35):
is it conceivable that criticism in after times, which has
before it as facts all the preceding and concurrent circumstances,
should not allow itself to be thereby influenced When it
asks itself the question, what portion of the circumstances, which
at the moment of action were unknown, would it have
held to be probable. We maintain that in this case,
as in the case of the results, and for the

(01:52:57):
same reason, it is impossible to disregard yard all these
things completely. If therefore, the critic wishes to bestow praise
or blame upon any single act, he can only succeed
to a certain degree in placing himself in the position
of the person whose act he has under review. In
many cases he can do so sufficiently near for any
practical purpose. But in many instances it is the very reverse,

(01:53:21):
and this fact should never be overlooked. But it is
neither necessary nor desirable that criticism should completely identify itself
with the person acting in war. As in all matters
of skill, there is a certain natural aptitude required, which
is called talent. This may be great or small. In
the first case, it may easily be superior to that

(01:53:43):
of the critic. For what critic can pretend to the
skill of a Frederick or a Bunaparte. Therefore, if criticism
is not to abstain altogether from offering an opinion where
eminent talent is concerned, it must be allowed to make
use of the advantage which it is enlarged horizon affords
criticism must not therefore treat the solution of a problem

(01:54:04):
by a great general like a sum in arithmetic. It
is only through the results and through the exact coincidences
of events, that it can recognize with admiration how much
is due to the exercise of genius, and that it
first learns the essential combination which the glance of that
genius devised. But for every even the smallest act of genius,
it is necessary that criticism should take a higher point

(01:54:26):
of view, so that, having a command many objective grounds
of decision, it may be as little subjective as possible,
and that the critic may not take the limited scope
of his own mind as a standard. This elevated position
of criticism, its praise and blame, pronounced with a full
knowledge of all the circumstances, has in itself nothing which
hurts our feelings. It only does so if the critic

(01:54:49):
pushes himself forward and speaks in a tone as if
all the wisdom which he has obtained by an exhaustive
examination of the event under consideration were really his own talent.
Palpable as is this deception, it is one which people
may easily fall into through vanity, and one which is
naturally distasteful to others. It very often happens that, although

(01:55:10):
the critic has no such arrogant pretensions, they are imputed
to him by the reader because he has not expressly
disclaimed them, And then follows immediately a charge of a
want of the power of critical judgment. If therefore, a
critic points out an error made by a Frederick or
a Buonaparte, that does not mean that he who makes
the criticism would not have committed the same error. He

(01:55:30):
may even be ready to grant that had he been
in the place of these great generals, he might have
made much greater mistakes. He merely sees this error from
the chain of events, and he thinks that it should
not have escaped the sagacity of the general. This is
therefore an opinion formed through the connection of events, and
therefore through the result. But there is another quite different

(01:55:51):
effect of the result itself upon the judgment, that as
if it is used quite alone as an example for
or against the soundness of a measure, this may be
called judgment according to the result. Such a judgment appears
at first sight inadmissible, and yet it is not. When
Buonaparte marched to Moscow in eighteen twelve. All depended upon

(01:56:12):
whether the taking of the capital and the events which
preceded the capture would force the Emperor Alexander to make peace,
as he had been compelled to do after the Battle
of Friedland in eighteen o seven and the Emperor Francis
in eighteen o five and eighteen o nine after Austerlitz
and Vogram. For if Buonaparte did not obtain a piece
at Moscow, there was no alternative but to return, that is,

(01:56:35):
there was nothing for him but a strategic defeat. We
shall leave out of the question what he did to
get to Moscow, and whether in his advance he did
not miss many opportunities of bringing the Emperor Alexander to peace.
We shall also exclude all consideration of the disastrous circumstances
which attended his retreat, and which perhaps had their origin
in the general conduct of the campaign. Still the question

(01:56:58):
remains the same, For how however much more brilliant the
course of the campaign up to Moscow might have been,
still there was always an uncertainty whether the Emperor Alexander
would be intimidated into making peace. And then, even if
a retreat did not contain in itself the seeds of
such disasters as did in fact occur. Still, it could
never be anything else than a great strategic defeat. If

(01:57:20):
the Emperor Alexander agreed to a peace which was disadvantageous
to him, the campaign of eighteen twelve would have ranked
with those of Austerlitz, Friedland and Vogram. But these campaigns, also,
if they had not led to peace, would in all probability,
have ended in similar catastrophes. Whatever therefore, of genius, skill,

(01:57:41):
and energy the conqueror of the world applied to the task,
this last question, addressed to fate asterisk, remained always the same.
Shall we then discard the campaigns of eighteen o five,
eighteen o seven, eighteen o nine, and say, on account
of the campaign of eighteen n twelve that they were
acts of imprudence, that the results were against the nature

(01:58:03):
of things, and that in eighteen twelve strategic justice at
last found vent for itself in opposition to blind chance.
That would be an unwarrantable conclusion, a most arbitrary judgment,
a case only half proved, because no human eye can
trace the threat of the necessary connection of events up
to the determination of the conquered princes. Still less, can

(01:58:24):
we say the campaign of eighteen twelve merited the same
success as the others, and that the reason why it
turned out otherwise lies in something unnatural. For we cannot
regard the firmness of Alexander as something unpredictable. What can
be more natural than to say that in the years
eighteen o five, eighteen o seven, eighteen o nine, Buonaparte
judged his opponents correctly, and that in eighteen twelve he

(01:58:47):
aired in that point on the former occasions. Therefore he
was right in the latter wrong, And in both cases
we judge by the result. All action in war, as
we have already said, is directed unprobable, not uncertain results.
Whatever is wanting, in certainty must always be left to
fate or chance, call it which you will. We may

(01:59:10):
demand that what is so left should be as little
as possible, but only in relation to the particular case.
That is, as little as is possible in this one case.
But not that the case in which the least is
left to chance is always to be preferred. That would
be an enormous error. As follows from all our theoretical views,
there are cases in which the greatest daring is the

(01:59:32):
greatest wisdom. Now in everything which is left to chance
by the chief actor, his personal merit, and therefore his
responsibility as well, seems to be completely set aside. Nevertheless,
we cannot suppress an inward feeling of satisfaction. Whenever expectation
realizes itself, and if it disappoints us, our mind is dissatisfied.
And more than this of right and wrong should not

(01:59:54):
be meant by the judgment which we form from the
mere result, or rather that we find there. Nevertheless, it
cannot be denied that the satisfaction which our mind experiences
at success the pain caused by failure, proceed from a
sort of mysterious feeling we suppose between that success ascribed
to good fortune and the genius of the chief of
fine connecting thread invisible to the mind's eye, and the

(02:00:17):
supposition gives pleasure. What tends to confirm this idea is
that our sympathy increases becomes more decided, if the successes
and defeats of the principal actor are often repeated. Thus
it becomes intelligible how good luck in war assumes a
much nobler nature than good luck at play in general.
When a fortunate warrior does not otherwise lessen our interest

(02:00:40):
in his behalf, we have a pleasure in accompanying him
in his career criticism. Therefore, after having weighed all that
comes within the sphere of human reason and conviction, will
let the results speak for that part where the deep
mysterious relations are not disclosed in any visible form, and
will protect this silent sentence of a higher authority from
the noise of crude apearinions on the one hand, while

(02:01:01):
on the other it prevents the gross abuse which might
be made of this last tribunal. This verdict of the
result must therefore always bring forth that which human sagacity
cannot discover, And it will be chiefly as regards the
intellectual powers and operations, that it will be called into requisition,
partly because they can be estimated with the least certainty,
partly because their close connection with the will is favorable

(02:01:23):
to their exercising over it, an important influence. When fear
or bravery precipitates the decision, there is nothing objective intervening
between them for our consideration, and consequently, nothing by which
sagacity and calculation might have met the probable result. We
must now be allowed to make a few observations on
the instrument of criticism, that is, the language which it uses,

(02:01:46):
because that is, to a certain extent connected with the
action in war. For the critical examination is nothing more
than the deliberation which should precede action in war. We
therefore think it very essential that the language used in
criticism should have the same character as that which deliberation
in war must have, for otherwise it would cease to
be practical, and criticism could gain no admittance in actual life.

(02:02:10):
We have set in our observations on the theory of
the conduct of war that it should educate the mind
of the commander for war, or that its teaching should
guide his education. Also that it is not intended to
furnish him with positive doctrines and systems which he can
use like mental appliances. But if the construction of scientific
formulae is never required or even allowable, in war to

(02:02:31):
aid the decision on the case presented, if truth does
not appear there in a systematic shape, if it is
not found in an indirect way, but directly by the
natural perception of the mind, then it must be the
same also in a critical review. It is true as
we have seen that, wherever complete demonstration of the nature
of things would be too tedious, criticism must support itself

(02:02:52):
on those truths which theory has established on the point.
But just as in war, the actor obeys these theoretical
truths rather because his mind is imbued with them than
because he regards them as objective and flexible laws. So
criticism must also make use of them, not as an
external law or an algebraic formula, of which fresh proof
is not required each time they are applied, but it

(02:03:14):
must always throw a light on this proof itself, leaving
only to theory the more minute and circumstantial proof. Thus
it avoids a mysterious, unintelligible phraseology and makes its progress
in plain language, that is, with a clear and always
visible chain of ideas. Certainly this cannot always be completely attained,

(02:03:35):
but it must always be the aim in critical expositions.
Such expositions must use complicated forms of science as sparingly
as possible, and never resort to the construction of scientific
aids as of a truth apparatus of its own, but
always be guided by the natural and unbiased impressions of
the mind. But this pious endeavor, if we may use.

(02:03:56):
The expression has unfortunately seldom hitherto presided over critical examinations.
The most of them have rather been emanations of a
species of vanity, a wish to make a display of ideas.
The first evil which we constantly stumble upon is a lame,
totally in admissible application of certain one sided systems as
of a formal code of laws. But it is never

(02:04:19):
difficult to show the one sidedness of such systems, and
this only requires to be done once to throw discredit
for ever on critical judgments which are based on them.
We have here to deal with a definite subject. And
as the number of possible systems, after all, can be
but small, therefore also they are themselves the lesser evil.
Much greater is the evil which lies in the pompous

(02:04:41):
retinue of technical terms, scientific expressions, and metaphors which these
systems carry in their train, and which, like a rabble,
like the baggage of an army broken away from its chief,
hang about in all directions. Any critic who has not
adopted a system, either because he has not found one
to please him, or because he has no not yet
been able to make himself master of one, will at

(02:05:02):
least occasionally make use of a piece of one, as
one would use a ruler to show the blunders committed
by a general. The most of them are incapable of
reasoning without using as a help here, and their some
shreds of scientific military theory. The smallest of these fragments,
consisting in mere scientific words and metaphors, are often nothing

(02:05:23):
more than ornamental flourishes of critical narration. Now it is
in the nature of things that all technical and scientific
expressions which belong to a system lose their propriety, if
they ever had any, as soon as they are distorted
and used as general axioms, or as small crystaline talismans,
which have more power of demonstration than simple speech. Thus

(02:05:44):
it has come to pass that our theoretical and critical books,
instead of being straightforward, intelligible dissertations in which the author
always knows at least what he says and the reader
what he reads, are brimfull of these technical terms, which
form dark points of interference where author and reader part company.
But frequently they are something worse, being nothing but hollow

(02:06:05):
shells without any kernel. The author himself has no clear
perception of what he means, contents himself with vague ideas which,
if expressed in plain language, would be unsatisfactory even to himself.
A third fault in criticism is the misuse of historical
examples and a display of great reading or learning. What

(02:06:26):
the history of the art of war is we have
already said, and we shall further explain our views on
examples and on military history in general in special chapters.
One fact, merely touched upon in a very cursory manner,
may be used to support the most opposite views, And
three or four such facts of the most heterogeneous description,
brought together out of the most distant lands in remote times,

(02:06:48):
and heaped up generally distract and bewilder the judgment and
understanding without demonstrating anything, For when exposed to the light,
they turn out to be only trumpery rubbish made use
of to show off the author learning. But what can
be gained for practical life by such obscure, partly false, confused,
arbitrary conceptions. So little is gained that theory on account

(02:07:11):
of them has always been a true antithesis of practice,
and frequently a subject of ridicule to those whose soldierly
qualities in the field are above question. But it is
impossible that this could have been the case if theory,
in simple language and by natural treatment of those things
which constitute the art of making war had merely sought
to establish just so much as admits of being established,

(02:07:33):
if avoiding all false pretensions and irrelevant display of scientific
forms and historical parallels, it had kept close to the
subject and gone hand in hand with those who must
conduct affairs in the field by their own natural genius.
Chapter six on examples. Examples from history make everything clear

(02:07:53):
and furnish the best description of proof in the empirical sciences.
This applies with more force to the arts of war
than to any other. General Scharnhorst, whose handbook is the
best ever written on actual war, pronounces historical examples to
be of the first importance, and makes an admirable use
of them himself. Had he survived the war in which

(02:08:15):
he fell, the fourth part of his revised Treatise on
Artillery would have given a still greater proof of the
observing and enlightened spirit in which he sifted matters of experience.
But such use of historical examples is rarely made by
theoretical writers. The way in which they more commonly make
use of them is rather calculated to leave the mind unsatisfied,

(02:08:35):
as well as to offend the understanding. We therefore think
it important to bring specially into view the use and
abuse of historical examples. Unquestionably, the branches of knowledge which
lie at the foundation of the art of war come
under the denomination of empirical sciences, for although they are
derived in a great measure from the nature of things,

(02:08:55):
still we can only learn this very nature itself, for
the most part, from experience. And besides that, the practical
application is modified by so many circumstances that the effects
can never be completely learned from the mere nature of
the means. The effects of gunpowder, that great agent in
our military activity, or only learnt by experience, and up

(02:09:16):
to this hour experiments are continually in progress in order
to investigate them more fully. That an iron ball to
which powder has given a velocity of one thousand feet
in a second smashes every living thing which it touches
in its course, is intelligible in itself. Experience is not
required to tell us that. But in producing this effect,
how many hundred circumstances are concerned, some of which can

(02:09:38):
only be learnt by experience. And the physical is not
the only effect which we have to study. It is
the moral which we are in search of, and that
can only be ascertained by experience, And there is no
other way of learning and appreciating it but by experience.
In the Middle Ages, when firearms were first invented, their effect,
owing to their rude make, was materially but trifling compared

(02:10:02):
to what it now is, but their effect morally was
much greater. One must have witnessed the firmness of one
of those masses taught and led by Buonaparte under the
heaviest and most unintermittent cannonade, in order to understand what
troops hardened by long practice in the field of danger
can do when by a career of victory they have
reached the noble principle of demanding from themselves their utmost efforts.

(02:10:25):
In pure conception, no one would believe it. On the
other hand, it is well known that there are troops
in the service of European powers at the present moment
who would easily be dispersed by a few cannon shots,
But no empirical science, consequently, also no theory of the
art of war can always corroborate its truths by historical proof,

(02:10:46):
it would also be in some measure difficult to support
experience by single facts. If any means is once found
efficacious in war, it is repeated, one nation copies another,
the thing becomes the fashion, and in this manner it
comes into use supported by experience, and takes its place
in theory, which contents itself with appealing to experience in

(02:11:08):
general in order to show its origin, but not as
a verification of its truth. But it is quite otherwise.
If experience is to be used in order to overthrow
some means in use, to confirm what is doubtful, or
introduce something new, then particular examples from history must be
quoted as proofs. Now, if we consider closely the use

(02:11:28):
of historical proofs for points of view, readily present themselves
for the purpose. First, they may be used merely as
an explanation of an idea. In every abstract consideration, it
is very easy to be misunderstood or not to be
intelligible at all. When an author is afraid of this,
an exemplification from history serves to throw the light which

(02:11:50):
is wanted on his idea and to ensure his being
intelligible to his reader. Secondly, it may serve as an
application of an idea, because by means of an example,
there is an opportunity of showing the action of those
minor circumstances which cannot all be comprehended and explained in
any general expression of an idea, For in that consists,

(02:12:10):
indeed the difference between theory and experience. Both these cases
belong to examples. Properly speaking, the two following belong to
historical proofs. Thirdly, historical fact may be referred to, particularly
in order to support what one has advanced. This is
in all cases sufficient if we have only to prove

(02:12:31):
the possibility of a fact or effect. Lastly, in the
fourth place, from the circumstantial detail of a historical event,
and by collecting together several of them, we may deduce
some theory which therefore has its true proof in this
testimony itself. For the first of these purposes, all that
is generally required is a cursory notice of the case,

(02:12:53):
as it is only used partially. Historical correctness is a
secondary consideration a case invented my it also serve the
purpose as well. Only historical ones are always to be preferred.
Because they bring the idea which they illustrate nearer to
practical life. The second use supposes a more circumstantial relation
of events, but historical authenticity is again of secondary importance,

(02:13:16):
And in respect to this point, the same is to
be said as in the first case. For the third purpose,
the mere quotation of an undoubted fact is generally sufficient.
If it is asserted that fortified positions may fulfill their
object under certain conditions, it is only necessary to mention
the position of Bunzelwitz in support of the assertion. But

(02:13:38):
if through the narrative of a case in history, an
abstract truth is to be demonstrated, then everything in the
case bearing on the demonstration must be analyzed in the
most searching and complete manner. It must, to a certain extent,
develop itself carefully before the eyes of the reader. The
less effectually this is done, the weaker will be the proof,
and the more necessary it will be to supply the

(02:14:00):
demonstrative proof which is wanting in a single case by
a number of cases. Because we have a right to
suppose that the more minute details which we are unable
to give neutralize each other in their effects. In a
certain number of cases, if we want to show, by example,
derived from experience, that cavalry are better placed behind than
in a line with infantry, that it is very hazardous

(02:14:21):
without a decided preponderance of numbers to attempt an enveloping
movement with widely separated columns, either on a field of
battle or in the theater of war, that is, either
tactically or strategically. Then in the first of these cases,
it would not be sufficient to specify some lost battles
in which the cavalry was on the flanks and some
gained in which the cavalry was in rear of the infantry.

(02:14:43):
And in the latter of these cases, it is not
sufficient to refer to the battles of Rivoli and Vogram,
to the attack of the Austrians on the theater of
war in Italy in seventeen ninety six, or of the
French upon the German theater of war in the same year.
The way in which these orders of battle or plans
of attack essentially contributed to disastrous issues in those particular

(02:15:04):
cases must be shown by closely tracing out circumstances and occurrences.
Then it will appear how far such forms or measures
are to be condemned, a point which it is very
necessary to show for a total condemnation would be inconsistent
with truth. It has been already said that when a
circumstantial detail of facts is impossible, the demonstrative power which

(02:15:26):
is deficient may to a certain extent be supplied by
the number of cases quoted. But this is a very
dangerous method of getting out of the difficulty, and one
which has been much abused. Instead of one well explained example,
three or four are just touched upon, and thus a
show is made of strong evidence. But there are matters
where a whole dozen of cases brought forward would prove nothing, if,

(02:15:49):
for instance, they are facts of frequent occurrence, and therefore
a dozen other cases with an opposite result might just
as easily be brought forward. If any one will instance
a dozen lost battles in which the side beaten attacked
in separate converging columns, we can instance a dozen that
have been gained in which the same order was adopted.
It is evident that in this way no result is

(02:16:11):
to be obtained. Upon carefully considering these different points, it
will be seen how easily examples may be misapplied. An
occurrence which instead of being carefully analyzed in all its
parts is superficially noticed. Is like an object seen at
a great distance, presenting the same appearance on each side,
and in which the details of its parts cannot be distinguished.

(02:16:35):
Such examples have, in reality serve to support the most
contradictory opinions. To some, Dawn's campaigns are models of prudence
and skill. To others, they are nothing but examples of
timidity and want of resolution. Gunaparte's passage across the Noric
Alps in seventeen ninety seven may be made to appear
the noblest resolution, but also as an act of sheer temerity.

(02:17:00):
Strategic defeat in eighteen twelve may be represented as the
consequence either of an excess or of a deficiency of energy.
All these opinions have been broached, and it is easy
to see that they might very well arise. Because each
person takes a different view of the connection of events.
At the same time, these antagonistic opinions cannot be reconciled

(02:17:21):
with each other, and therefore one of the two must
be wrong. Much as we are obliged to the worthy
few cures for the numerous examples introduced in his memoirs,
partly because a number of historical incidents have thus been
preserved which might otherwise have been lost, and partly because
he was one of the first to bring theoretical, that is,
abstract ideas into connection with the practical in war in

(02:17:43):
so far that the cases brought forward may be regarded
as intended to exemplify and confirm what is theoretically asserted.
Yet in the opinion of an impartial reader, he will
hardly be allowed to have attained the object he proposed
to himself, that of proving theoretical principles by historical examples.
For although he sometimes relates occurrences with great minuteness, still

(02:18:06):
he falls short, very often of showing that the deductions
draw necessarily proceed from the inner relations of these events.
Another evil which comes from the superficial notice of historical
events is that some readers are either wholly ignorant of
the events or cannot call them to remembrance sufficiently to
be able to grasp the author's meaning, so that there
is no alternative between either accepting blindly what is said

(02:18:29):
or remaining unconvinced. It is extremely difficult to put together
or unfold historical events before the eyes of a reader
in such a way as is necessary in order to
be able to use them as proofs. For the writer
very often wants the means and can neither afford the
time nor the requisite space. But we maintain that, when
the object is to establish a new or doubtful opinion,

(02:18:52):
one single example thoroughly analyzed is far more instructive than
ten which are superficially treated. The mischief of these superficial
representations is not that the writer puts his story forward
as a proof when it is only a false title,
but that he has not made himself properly acquainted with
the subject, and that from this sort of slovenly shallow

(02:19:12):
treatment of history, a hundred false views and attempts at
the construction of theories arise which would never have made
their appearance if the writer had looked upon it as
his duty to deduce from the strict connection of events
everything new which he brought to market and sought to
prove from history. When we are convinced of these difficulties
in the use of historical examples, and at the same

(02:19:34):
time of the necessity of making use of such examples,
then we shall also come to the conclusion that the
latest military history is naturally the best field from which
to draw them, inasmuch as it alone is sufficiently authentic
and detailed. In ancient times, circumstances connected with war, as
well as the method of carrying it on, were different.

(02:19:55):
Therefore its events are of less use to us, either
theoretically or practically. In addition to which military history, like
every other, naturally loses in the course of time, a
number of small traits and lineaments originally to be seen,
loses in color and life like a worn out or
darkened picture, so that perhaps at last only the large
masses and leading features remain, which thus acquire undue proportions.

(02:20:20):
If we look at the present state of warfare, we
should say that the wars since that of the Austrian
Succession are almost the only ones which, at least as
far as armament, have still a considerable similarity to the present,
and which, notwithstanding the many important changes which have taken place,
both great and small, are still capable of affording much instruction.

(02:20:41):
It is quite otherwise with the War of the Spanish Succession,
as the use of firearms had not then so far
advanced towards perfection and cavalry still continued the most important arm.
The farther we go back, the less useful becomes military history,
as it gets so much the more meager and barren
of detail. The most useless of all is that of

(02:21:02):
the old world. But this uselessness is not altogether absolute.
It relates only to those subjects which depend on a
knowledge of minute details, or on those things in which
the method of conducting war has changed. Although we know
very little about the tactics in the battles between the
Swiss and the Austrians, the Burgundians and French, still we

(02:21:23):
find in them unmistakable evidence that they were the first
in which the superiority of a good infantry over the
best cavalry was displayed. A general glance at the time
of the Condottieri teaches us how the whole method of
conducting war is dependent on the instrument used. For at
no period have the forces used in war had so
much the characteristics of a special instrument and been a

(02:21:44):
class so totally distinct from the rest of the national community.
The memorable way in which the Romans in the Second
Punic War attacked the Carthagman possessions in Spain and Africa,
while Hannibal still maintained himself in Italy. Is a most
instructive subject to study, as the general relations of the
states and armies concerned in this indirect act of defense

(02:22:04):
are sufficiently well known. But the more things descend into
particulars and deviate in character from the most general relations,
the less we can look for examples and lessons of
experience from very remote periods, for we have neither the
means of judging properly of corresponding events, nor can we
apply them to our completely different method of war. Unfortunately, however,

(02:22:26):
it has always been the fashion with historical writers to
talk about ancient times. We shall not say how far
vanity and Charlatanism may have had a share in this,
but in general we fail to discover any honest intention
and earnest endeavor to instruct and convince, and we can
therefore only look upon such quotations and references as embellishments
to fill up gaps and high defects. It would be

(02:22:50):
an immense service to teach the art of war entirely
by historical examples, as Fukiers proposed to do, but it
would be full work for the whole life of a man.
If we reflect that he who undertakes it must first
qualify himself for the task by a long personal experience
in actual war. Whoever, stirred by ambition undertakes such a task,

(02:23:10):
Let him prepare himself for his pious undertaking, as for
a long pilgrimage. Let him give up his time, spare
no sacrifice, fear no temporal rank or power, and rise
above all feelings of personal vanity, of false shame, in order,
according to the French Code, to speak the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

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