CLAUSEWITZ - ON WAR - III. STRATEGY IN GENERAL - Carl von Clausewitz (1873) - HQ Full Book - SECRETS OF POWER: Masters of Politics, Strategy & War

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Speaker 1 (00:00):
Karl Vaughan Klausowitz on War Book three of Strategy in General,
Chapter one Strategy. In the second chapter of the second book,
strategy has been defined as the employment of the battle
as the means towards the attainment of the object of
the war. Properly speaking, it has to do with nothing

(00:21):
but the battle, But its theory must include in this
consideration the instrument of this real activity, the armed force
in itself and in its principal relations. For the battle
is fought by it and shows its effects upon it.
In turn, it must be well acquainted with the battle
itself as far as relates to its possible results and
those mental and moral powers which are the most important

(00:43):
in the use of the same strategy is the employment
of the battle to gain the end of the war.
It must therefore give an aim to the whole military action,
which must be in accordance with the object of the war.
In other words, strategy forms the plan of the war,
and to this end it links together a series of
acts which are to lead to the final decision. That

(01:03):
is to say, it makes the plans for the separate
campaigns and regulates the combats to be fought in each
As these are all things which, to a great extent
can only be determined on conjectures, some of which turn
out incorrect, while a number of other arrangements pertaining to
details cannot be made at all beforehand. It follows as
a matter of course, that strategy must go with the

(01:25):
army to the field in order to arrange particulars on
the spot and to make the modifications in the general
plan which incessantly become necessary in war. Strategy can therefore
never take its hand from the work for a moment.
That this, however, has not always been the view taken,
is evident from the former custom of keeping strategy in
the cabinet and not with the army. Thing only allowable

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if the cabinet is so near to the army that
it can be taken for the chief headquarters of the army.
Theory will therefore attend on strategy in the determination of
its plans, or, as we may more properly say, it
will throw a light on things in themselves and on
their relations to each other, and bring out prominently the
little that there is of principle or rule. If we

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recall to mind from the first chapter, how many things
of the highest importance war touches upon we may conceive
that a consideration of all requires a rare grasp of mind.
A prince or general who knows exactly how to organize
his war according to his object and means, who does
neither too little nor too much, gives by that the
greatest proof of his genius. But the effects of this

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talent are exhibited not so much by the invention of
new modes of action, which might strike the eye immediately
as in the successful final result of the whole it
is the exact fulfillment of silent suppositions. It is the
noiseless harmony of the whole action which we should admire,
and which only makes itself known in the total result.
Inquirer who, tracing back from the final result, does not

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perceive the signs of that harmony is one who is
apt to seek for genius where it is not and
where it cannot be found. The means and forms which
strategy uses are in fact so extremely simple, so well
known by their constant repetition, that it only appears ridiculous
to sound common sense when it hears critics so frequently
speaking of them with high flown emphasis. Turning a flank

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which has been done a thousand times is regarded here
as a proof of the most brilliant genius. There is
a proof of the most profound penetration. Indeed, even of
the most comprehensive knowledge. Can there be in the BookWorld
more absurd productions? Asterisk asterisk. This paragraph refers to the
works of Lloyd Buloh, indeed to all the eighteenth century

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writers from whose influence we in England are not even
yet free dot d. It is still more ridiculous if,
in addition to this we reflect that the same critic,
in accordance with prevalent opinion, excludes all moral forces from theory,
and will not allow it to be concerned with anything
but the material forces, so that all must be confined

(04:00):
to a few mathematical relations of equilibrium and preponderance of
time and space, and a few lines and angles. If
it were nothing more than this, then out of such
a miserable business, there would not be a scientific problem
for even a schoolboy. But let us admit there is
no question here about scientific formulas and problems. The relations

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of material things are all very simple. The right comprehension
of the moral forces which come into play is more
difficult still, even in respect to them. It is only
in the highest branches of strategy that moral complications and
a great diversity of quantities and relations are to be
looked for only at that point where strategy borders on
political science, or rather where the two become one, and there,

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as we have before observed, they have more influence on them.
How much and how little is to be done than
on the form of execution, where the latter is the
principal question. As in the single acts, both great and small,
in war, the moral quantities are already reduced to a
very small number. Thus, then in strategy everything is very simple,

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but not on that account very easy. Once it is
determined from the relations of the state what should and
may be done by war, then the way to it
is easy to find. But to follow that way straightforward.
To carry out the plan without being obliged to deviate
from it a thousand times by a thousand varying influences,
requires besides great strength of character, great clearness and steadiness

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of mind. And out of a thousand men who are remarkable,
some for mind, others for penetration, others again for boldness
or strength of will, perhaps not one will combine in
himself all those qualities which are required to raise a
man above mediocrity in the career of a general. It
may sound strange, but for all who know war in

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this respect, it is a fact beyond doubt that much
more strength of will is required to make an important
decision in strategy than in tactics. In the latter we
are hurried on with the moment a command or feels
himself borne along in a strong current against which he
durst not contend without the most destructive consequences. He suppresses
the rising fears and boldly ventures further. In strategy, where

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all goes on at a slower rate, there is more
room allowed for our own apprehensions than those of others,
for objections and remonstrances. Consequently, also for unseasonable regrets. And
as we do not see things in strategy as we
do at least half of them in tactics with the
living eye, but everything must be conjectured and assumed, the
convictions produced are less powerful. The consequence is that most generals,

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when they should act, remain stuck fast in bewildering doubts. Now,
let us cast a glance at history upon Frederick the
Great's campaign of seventeen sixty, celebrated for its fine marches
and maneuvers, a perfect masterpiece of strategic skill. As critics
tell us, is there really anything to drive us out
of our wits with admiration in the King's first trying

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to turn Dawn's right flank than his left, then again
his right, And see are we to see profound wisdom
in this? Know that we cannot, if we are to
decide naturally and without affectation. What we rather admire above
all is the sagacity of the king in this respect,
that while pursuing a great object with very limited means,

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he undertook nothing beyond his powers and just enough to
gain his object. This sagacity of the general is visible
not only in this campaign, but throughout all the three
wars of the Great King. To bring Siletia into the
safe harbor of a well guaranteed peace was his object.
At the head of a small state which was like

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other states in most things, and only ahead of them
in some branches of administration, he could not be in Alexander,
and as Charles the twelfth he would only like him
have broken his head. We find, therefore, in the whole
of his conduct of war, a controlled power, always well
balanced and never wanting, an energy which in the most

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critical moments rises to astonishing deeds, and the next moment
oscillates quietly on again, in subordination to the play of
the most subtle political influences. Neither vanity, thirst for glory,
nor vengeance could make him deviate from his course, and
this course alone it is which brought him to a
fortunate termination of the contest. These few words do but

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scant justice to this phase of the genius of the
great general. The eyes must be fixed carefully on the
extraordinary issue of the struggle, and the causes which brought
about that issue must be traced out, in order thoroughly
to understand that nothing but the King's penetrating act brought
him safely out of all his dangers. This is one
feature in this great commander which we admire in the

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campaign of seventeen sixty and in all others, but in
this especially, because in none did he keep the balance,
even against such a superior hostile force, with such a
small sacrifice. Another feature relates to the difficulty of execution.
Marches to turn a flank right or left are easily combined.
The idea of keeping a small force always well concentrated,

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to be able to meet the enemy on equal terms
at any point. To multiply a force by rapid movement
is as easily conceived as expressed. The mere contrivance in
these points, therefore, cannot excite our admiration. And with respect
to such simple things, there is nothing further than to
admit that they are simple. But let a general try
to do these things like Frederick the Great. Long afterwards,

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authors who were eye witnesses have spoken of the danger,
indeed of the imprudence of the King's camps, And doubtless
at the time he pitched them, the danger appeared three
times as great as afterwards. It was the same with
his marches. Under the eyes, nay often under the cannon
of the enemy's army, these camps were taken up. These

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marches made not from want of prudence, but because in
dawn system, in his mode of drawing up his army,
in the responsibility which pressed upon him, and in his character,
Frederick found that security which justified his camps and marches.
But it required the king's boldness, determination, and strength of
will to see things in this light and not to

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be led astray. And intimidated by the danger of which
thirty years after people still wrote and spoke. Few generals
in this situation would have believed these simple strategic means
to be practicable. Again, another difficulty in execution lay in
this that the King's army in this campaign was constantly
in motion. Twice it marched by wretched cross roads from

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the Elba into Silesia in rear of dawn and pursued
by Lassie beginning of July beginning of August. It required
to be always ready for battle, and its marches had
to be organized with a degree of skill, which necessarily
called forth a proportionate amount of exertion. Although attended and
delayed by thousands of wagons, still its subsistence was extremely difficult.

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In Silesia, for eight days before the Battle of Lenitz,
it had constantly to march, defiling alternately right and left
in front of the enemy. This costs great fatigue and
entails great privations. Is it to be supposed that all
this could have been done without producing great friction in
the machine? Can the mind of a commander elaborate such

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movements with the same ease as the hand of a
land surveyor uses the astrolabe. Does not the sight of
the sufferings of their hungry, thirsty comrades pierce the hearts
of the commander in his generals a thousand times, must
not the murmurs and doubts which these cause reach his ear?
Has an ordinary man the courage to demand such sacrifices,

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and would not such efforts most certainly demoralize the army,
break up the bands of discipline, and in short, undermine
its military virtue if firm reliance on the greatness and
infallibility of the commander did not compensate for all here
therefore it is that we should pay respect. It is
these miracles of execution which we should admire. But it

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is impossible to realize all this in its full force
without a foretaste of it by experience. He who only
knows war from books or the drill ground cannot realize
the whole effect of this counterpoise in action. We beg him, therefore,
to accept from us, on faith and trust, all that
he is unable to supply from any personal experiences of
his own. This illustration is intended to give more clearness

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to the course of our ideas, and in closing this chapter,
we will only briefly observe that in our exposition of strategy,
we shall describe those separate subjects which appear to us
the most important, whether of a moral or material nature.
Then proceed from the simple to the complex, and conclude
with the inner connection of the whole act of war,
in other words, with the plan for a war or

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campaign observation in an earlier manuscript of the second book
are the following passages endorsed by the author himself, to
be used for the first chapter of the second Book,
the projected revision of that chapter not having been made.
The passages referred to who are introduced here in full.
By the mere assemblage of armed forces at a particular point,

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a battle there becomes possible, but does not always take place.
Is that possibility now to be regarded as a reality
and therefore an effective thing? Certainly it is so by
its results, And these effects, whatever they may be, can
never fail. One. Possible combats are, on account of their results,
to be looked upon as real ones. If a detachment

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is sent away to cut off the retreat of a
flying enemy, and the enemy surrenders in consequence without further resistance,
still it is through the combat which is offered to
him by this detachment sent after him, that he is
brought to his decision. If a part of our army
occupies an enemy's province which was undefended, and thus deprives
the enemy of very considerable means of keeping up the

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strength of his army, it is entirely through the battle
which our detached body gives the enemy to expect, in
case he seeks to recover the lost province, that we
remain in possession of the same. In both cases, therefore,
the mere possibility of a battle has produced results, and
is therefore to be classed amongst actual events. Suppose that

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in these cases the enemy has opposed our troops with
other superior in force, and thus forced oars to give
up their object without a combat, then certainly our plan
has failed. But the battle which we offered at either
of those points has not, on that account been without effect,
for it attracted the enemy's forces to that point. And
in case our whole undertaking has done us harm, it

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cannot be said that these positions, these possible battles, have
been attended with no results. Their effects, then, are similar
to those of a lost battle. In this manner. We
see that the destruction of the enemy's military forces, the
overthrow of the enemy's power, is only to be done
through the effect of a battle, whether it be that
it actually takes place, or that it is merely offered

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and not accepted. Two twofold object of the combat. But
these effects are of two kinds, direct and indirect. They
are of the latter if other things intrude themselves and
become the object of the combat. Things which cannot be
regarded as the destruction of enemy's force, but only leading
up to it, certainly by a circuitous road, but with

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so much the greater effect. The possession of provinces, towns, fortresses, roads, bridges, magazines,
and sea may be the immediate object of a battle,
but never the ultimate one. Things of this description can
never be looked upon otherwise than as means of gaining
greater superiority, so as at last to offer battle to

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the enemy in such a way that it will be
impossible for him to accept it. Therefore, all these things
must only be regarded as intermediate links, steps, as it were,
leading up to the effectual principle, but never as that
principle itself. Three example, in eighteen fourteen. By the capture
of Buonaparte's capital, the object of the war was attained.

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The political divisions which had their roots in Paris came
into active operation, and an enormous split left the power
of the emperor to collapse of itself. Nevertheless, the point
of view from which we must look at all this
is that through these causes the forces and defensive means
of Buonaparte were suddenly very much diminished. The superiority of
the Allies therefore, just in the same measure, increased, and

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any further resistance then became impossible. It was this impossibility
which produced the peace with France. If we suppose the
forces of the Allies at that moment diminished to a
like extent through external causes, if the superiority vanishes, then
at the same time vanishes also all the effect and
importance of the taking of Paris. We have gone through

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this chain of argument in order to show that this
is the natural and only true view of the thing
from which it derives its importance. It leads always back
to the question, what, at any given moment of the
war or campaign will be the price ppable result of
the great or small combats which the two sides might
offer to each other. In the consideration of a plan
for a campaign, this question only is decisive as to

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the measures which are to be taken all through from
the very commencement. For when this view is not taken,
then a false value is given to other things. If
we do not accustom ourselves to look upon war and
the single campaigns in a war as a chain which
is all composed of battles strung together, one of which
always brings on another. If we adopt the idea that

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the taking of a certain geographical point, the occupation of
an undefended province, is in itself anything, then we are
very likely to regard it as an acquisition which we
may retain. And if we look at it so and
not as a term in the whole series of events,
we do not ask ourselves whether this possession may not
lead to greater disadvantages hereafter. How often we find this

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mistake recurring in military history. We might say that, just
just as in commerce, the merchant cannot set apart and
place in security gains from one single transaction by itself,
so in war a single advantage cannot be separated from
the result of the whole just as the former must
always operate with the whole bulk of his means, just
so in war only the sum total will decide on

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the advantage or disadvantage of each item. If the mind's
eye is always directed upon the series of combats, so
far as they can be seen beforehand, then it is
always looking in the right direction, and thereby the motion
of the force acquires that rapidity, that is to say,
willing and doing, acquire that energy which is suitable to
the matter, and which is not to be thwarted or

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turned aside by extraneous influences asterisk. The whole of this
chapter is directed against the theories of the Austrian staff
in eighteen fourteen. It may be taken as the foundation
of the modern teaching of the Prussian General staff. See
especially Vaughan Caamer dot Ed. Chapter two. Elements of Strategy.

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The causes which condition the use of the combat in
strategy may be easily divided into elements of different kinds,
such as the moral, physical, mathematical, geographical, and statistical elements.
The first class includes all that can be called forth
by moral qualities and effects. To the second belong the
whole mass of the military force. Its organization, the proportion

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of the three arms and c and c. To the third,
the angle of the lines of operation, the concentric and
eccentric movements, in as far as their geometrical nature has
any value in the calculation. To the fourth, the influences
of country, such as commanding points, hills, rivers, woods, roads,
and c and c. Lastly, to the fifth all the

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means of supply. The separation of these things once for
all in the mind does good in giving clearness and
helping us to estimate at once at a higher or
lower value the different classes as we pass onwardss for
in considering them separately, many lose of themselves their borrowed importance.
One feels, for instance, quite plainly that the value of

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a base of operations, even if we look at nothing
in it, but its relative position to the line of operations,
depends much less in that simple form, on the geometrical
element of the angle which they form with one another,
than on the nature of the roads and the country
through which they pass. But to treat upon strategy according
to these elements would be the most unfortunate idea that

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could be conceived, For these elements are generally manifold and
intimately connected with each other. In every single operation of war,
we should lose ourselves in the most soulless analysis, and
as if in a horrid dream, we should be forever
trying in vain to build up an arch to connect
this base of abstractions with facts belonging to the real world.

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Heaven preserve every theorist from such an undertaking. We shall
keep to the world of things in their totality, and
not pursue our analysis further than is necessary from time
to time to give distinctness to the idea which we
wish to impart, and which has come to us not
by a speculative investigation, but through the impression made by
the realities of war in their entirety. Chapter three. Moral Forces.

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We must return again to this subject, which is touched
upon in the third chapter of the second book. Because
the moral forces are amongst the most important subjects in war.
They form the spirit which permeates the whole being of war.
These forces fasten themselves soonest and with the greatest affinity,
on to the will which puts in motion and guides

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the whole mass of powers, uniting with it, as it were,
in one stream. Because this is a moral force itself. Unfortunately,
they will escape from all book analysis, for they will
neither be brought into numbers nor into classes, and require
to be both seen and felt. The spirit and other
moral qualities which animate an army, a general, or government's

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public opinion in provinces in which a war is raging,
the moral effect of a victory or of a defeat,
are things which in themselves vary very much in their nature,
and which, also, according as they stand with regard to
our object in our relations, may have an influence in
different ways. Although little or nothing can be said about
these things in books, still they belong to the theory

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of the art of war as much as everything else
which constitutes war. For I must here once more repeat
that it is a miserable philosophy if, according to the
old plan, we establish rules and principles wholly regardless of
all moral forces, and then as soon as these forces
make their appearance, we begin to count exceptions which we
thereby establish, as it were, theoretically, that is, make into rules,

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or if we resort to an appeal to genius, which
is above all rules, thus giving out by implication not
only that rules were only made for fools, but also
that they themselves are no better than folly, even if
the theory of the art of war does no more
in reality than call these things to remembrance, showing the
necessity of allowing to the moral forces their full value

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and of always taking them into consideration. By so doing,
it extends its borders over the region of immaterial forces,
and by establishing that point of view, condemns beforehand everyone
who would endeavor to justify himself before its judgment seat
by the mere physical relations of forces. Further out of
regard to all other so called rules, theory cannot banish

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the moral forces beyond its frontier, because the effects of
the physical forces and the moral are completely fused and
are not to be decomposed like a metal alloy by
a chemical process. In every rule relating to the physical forces,
theory must present to the mind at the same time
the share which the moral powers will have in it.
If it would not be led to categorical propositions at

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one time too timid and contracted, at another too dogmatical
and wide. Even the most matter of fact theories have,
without knowing it, strayed over into this moral kingdom. For
as as an example, the effects of a victory cannot
in any way be explained without taking into consideration the
moral impressions. And therefore the most of the subjects which

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we shall go through in this book are composed half
of physical half of moral causes and effects. And we
might say the physical are almost no more than the
wooden handle, whilst the moral are the noble metal, the real, bright,
polished weapon. The value of the moral powers and their
frequently incredible influence, are best exemplified by history, and this

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is the most generous and the purest nourishment which the
mind of the general can extract from it. Dot At
the same time, it is to be observed that it
is less demonstrations, critical examinations, and learn treatises than sentiments,
general impressions, and single flashing sparks of truth, which yield
the seeds of knowledge that are to fertilize the mind.

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We might go through the most important moral phenomena in war,
and with all the care of a diligent professor, try
what we could impart about each, either good or bad.
But as in such a method one slides too much
into the commonplace and trite, whilst real mind quickly makes
its escape. In analysis, the end is that one gets
imperceptibly to the relation of things which everybody knows. We prefer, therefore,

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to remain here more than usually incomplete and rhapsodical content,
to have drawn attention to the importance of the subject
in a general way, and to have pointed out the
spirit in which the views given in this book have
been conceived. Chapter four. The chief moral powers. These are
the talents of the commander, the military virtue of the army,

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its national feeling. Which of these is the most important?
No one can tell in a general way, for it
is very difficult to say anything in general of their strength,
and still more difficult to compare the strength of one
with that of another. The best plan is not to
undervalue any of them, a fault which human judgment is
prone to, sometimes on one side, sometimes on another, in

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its whimsical oscillations. It is better to satisfy ourselves of
the undeniable efficacy of these three things by sufficient evidence
from history. It is true, however, that in modern times,
the armies of European states have arrived very much at
a par as regards discipline and fitness for service, and
that the conduct of war has as philosophers would say

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naturally developed itself thereby become a method common, as it were,
to all armies, so that even from commanders there is
nothing further to be expected in the way of application
of special means of art in the limited sense, such
as Frederic the Second's oblique order. Hence, it cannot be
denied that, as matters now stand, greater scope is afforded

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for the influence of national spirit and habituation of an
army to war. A long piece may again alter all
this written shortly after the Great Napoleonic campaigns. The national
spirit of an army, enthusiasm, fanatical zeal, faith, opinion, displays
itself most in warfare, where every one down to the

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common soldier, is left to himself. On this account, a
mountainous country is the best campaigning ground for popular levees.
Expertness of an army through training, and that well tempered
courage which holds the ranks together as if they had
been cast in a mold, show their superiority in an
open country. The talent of a general has most room

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to display itself in a closely intersected, undulating country. In mountains,
he has too little command over the separate parts, and
the direction of all is beyond his powers. In open plains,
it is simple and does not exceed those powers. According
to these undeniable elective affinities, plans should be regulated. Chapter five.

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Military virtue of an army. This is distinguished from mere bravery,
and still more from enthusiasm for the business of war.
The first is certainly a necessary constituent part of it,
but in the same way as bravery, which is a
natural gift in some manner, may arise in a soldier
as a part of an army from habit and custom.
So with him it must also have a different direction

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from that which it has with others. It must lose
that impulse to unbridled activity and exercise of force, which
is its characteristic in the individual, and submit itself to
demands of a higher kind, to obedience, order, rule, and method.
Enthusiasm for the profession gives life and greater fire to
the military virtue of an army, but does not necessarily

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constitute a part of it. War is a special business,
and however general its relations may be. And even if
all the male population of a country capable of bearing
arms exercise this calling, still it always continues to be
different and separate from the other pursuits which occupy the
life of mandot, To be imbued with a sense of
the spirit and nature of this business, to make use of,

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to rouse to assimilate into the system the powers which
should be active in it, To penetrate completely into the
nature of the business, with the under standing through exercise,
to gain confidence and expertness in it, to be completely
given up to it, to pass out of the man
into the part which it is assigned to us to
play in war, that is, the military virtue of an

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army in the individual. However much pains may be taken
to combine the soldier and the citizen in one and
the same individual, whatever may be done to nationalize wars,
and however much we may imagine times have changed since
the days of the old Condotieri, never will it be
possible to do away with the individuality of the business.
And if that cannot be done, then those who belong

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to it, as long as they belong to it, will
always look upon themselves as a kind of guilt in
the regulations, laws, and customs in which the spirit of
war by preference finds its expression. And so it is
in fact even with the most decided inclination to look
at war from the highest point of view. It would

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be very wrong to look down upon this corporate spirit
as spree de corps, which may and should exist more
or less in every army. This corporate spirit forms the
bond of union between the natural forces which are active
in that which we have called military virtue. The crystals
of military virtue have a greater affinity for the spirit
of a corporate body than for anything else. An army

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which preserves its usual formations under the heaviest fire, which
is never shaken by imaginary fears, and in the face
of real danger, disputes the ground inch by inch, which
proud in the feeling of its victories, never loses its
sense of obedience, its respect, foreign confidence in its leaders,
even under the depressing effects of defeat. An army with

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all its physical powers, inured to privations and fatigue by exercise,
like the muscles of an athlete. An army which looks
upon all its toils as the means to victory, not
as a curse, which hovers over its standards, and which
is always reminded of its duties and virtues by the
short Catechism of one idea, namely the honor of its arms.

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Such an army is imbued with the true u military spirit.
Soldiers may fight bravely like the Vendeans and do great
things like the Swiss, the Americans or Spaniards without displaying
this military virtue. A commander may also be successful at
the head of standing armies like Eugene and Marlborough without
enjoying the benefit of its assistance. We must not therefore

(31:22):
say that a successful war without it cannot be imagined,
and we draw a special attention to that point in
order the more to individualize the conception which is here
brought forward, that the idea may not dissolve into a generalization,
and that it may not be thought that military virtue
is in the end everything. It is not so. Military

(31:42):
virtue in an army is a definite moral power, which
may be supposed wanting, and the influence of which may
therefore be estimated, like any instrument, the power of which
may be calculated. Having thus characterized it, we proceed to
consider what can be predicated of its influence, and what
are the means of gaining it assistance. Military virtue is,

(32:03):
for the parts, what the genius of the commander is
for the whole. The general can only guide the whole,
not each separate part. And where he cannot guide the part,
their military virtue must be its leader. A general is
chosen by the reputation of his superior talents the chief
leaders of large masses after careful probation. But this probation

(32:23):
diminishes as we descend the scale of rank, and in
just the same measure we may reckon less and less
upon individual talents. But what is wanting in this respect?
Military virtue should supply the natural qualities of a warlike
people play just this part, bravery, aptitude, powers of endurance,
and enthusiasm. These properties may therefore supply the place of

(32:46):
military virtue, and vice versa, from which the following may
be deduced. One military virtue is a quality of standing
armies only, but they require it the most in national risings.
Its place is supplied by natural qualities, which develop themselves
there more rapidly. Two standing armies opposed to standing armies

(33:07):
can more easily dispense with it than a standing army
opposed to a national insurrection, for in that case the
troops are more scattered and the divisions left more to themselves.
But where an army can be kept concentrated, the genius
of the general takes a greater place and supplies what
is wanting in the spirit of the army. Therefore, generally,

(33:28):
military virtue becomes more necessary the more the theater of
operations and other circumstances make the war complicated and cause
the forces to be scattered. From these truths, the only
lesson to be derived is this that if an army
is deficient in this quality, every endeavor should be made
to simplify the operations of the war as much as possible,

(33:49):
or to introduce double efficiency in the organization of the
army in some other respect, and not to expect from
the mere name of a standing army that which only
the veritable thing itself can give. The military virtue of
an army is therefore one of the most important moral
powers in war, And where it is wanting, we either
see its place supplied by one of the others, such

(34:10):
as the great superiority of generalship or popular enthusiasm, or
we find the results not commensurate with the exertions made.
Dot how much that is great, this spirit, this sterling
worth of an army, this refining of or into the
polished metal has already done. We see in the history
of the Macedonians under Alexander, the Roman legions under Caesar,

(34:32):
the Spanish infantry under Alexander Farnese, the Swedes under Gustavus
Adolphus and Charles the Twelfth, the Prussians under Frederick the Great,
and the French under Buonaparte. We must purposely shut our
eyes against all historical proof if we do not admit
that the astonishing successes of these generals, and their greatness
in situations of extreme difficulty, were only possible with armies

(34:55):
possessing this virtue. This spirit can only be generated from
two sources, and only by these two conjointly. The first
is a succession of campaigns and great victories. The other
is an activity of the army, carried sometimes to the
highest pitch. Only by these does the soldier learn to
know his powers. The more a general is in the

(35:17):
habit of demanding from his troops, the surer he will
be that his demands will be answered. The soldier is
as proud of overcoming toil as he is of surmounting danger. Therefore,
it is only in the soil of incessant activity and
exertion that the germ will thrive, but also only in
the sunshine of victory. Once it becomes a strong tree,

(35:38):
it will stand against the fiercest storms of misfortune and defeat,
and even against the indolent inactivity of peace, at least
for a time. It can therefore only be created in
war and under great generals, But no doubt it may
last at least for several generations, even under generals of
moderate capacity, and through considerable periods of peace. With this

(36:00):
generous and noble spirit of union in a line of
veteran troops covered with scars and thoroughly inured to war,
we must not compare the self esteem and vanity of
a standing army held together merely by the glue of
service regulations and a drill book. A certain plotting, earnestness,
and strict discipline may keep up military virtue for a
long time, but can never create it. These things therefore

(36:22):
have a certain value, but must not be overrated. Order smartness,
good will, also, a certain degree of pride and high
feeling are qualities of an army formed in time of peace,
which are to be prized, but cannot stand alone. The
whole retains the whole, and as with glass too quickly cooled,
a single crack breaks the whole mass. Above all, the

(36:45):
highest spirit in the world changes only too easily at
the first check into depression, and one might say, into
a kind of rotomantative alarm. The French Savvic put that
such an army can only achieve something through its leader,
never by itself. It must be led with double caution, until,
by degrees in victory and hardships, the strength grows into

(37:06):
the full armour. Beware, then, of confusing the spirit of
an army with its temper. Chapter six Boldness. The place
and part which boldness takes in the dynamic system of powers,
where it stands opposed to foresight and prudence, has been
stated in the chapter on the certainty of the result,
in order thereby to show that theory has no right

(37:27):
to restrict it by virtue of its legislative power. But
this noble impulse with which the human soul raises itself
above the most formidable dangers, is to be regarded as
an active principle, peculiarly belonging to war. In fact, in
what branch of human activity should boldness have a right
of citizenship, if not in war. From the transport driver

(37:49):
in the drummer up to the general it is the
noblest of virtues, the true steel, which gives the weapon
its edge, and brilliancy let Us admit, in fact it
has in war even its own prerogative. Over and above
the result of the calculation of space, time, and quantity,
we must allow a certain percentage which boldness derives from
the weakness of others. Whenever it gains the mastery, it

(38:13):
is therefore virtually a creative power. This is not difficult
to demonstrate philosophically. As often as boldness encounters hesitation, the
probability of the result is of necessity in its favor,
because the very state of hesitation implies a loss of
equilibrium already. It is only when it encounters cautious foresight,

(38:34):
which we may say is just as bold at all events,
just as strong and powerful as itself, that it is
at a disadvantage. Such cases, however, rarely occur. Out of
the whole multitude of prudent men in the world. The
great majority are so from timidity. Amongst large masses, boldness
is a force, the special cultivation of which can never

(38:56):
be to the detriment of other forces. Because the great
mass is bound to a higher will by the framework
in joints of the order of battle and of the service,
and therefore is guided by an intelligent power which is extraneous.
Boldness is therefore here only like a spring, held down
until its action is required. The higher the rank, the
more necessary it is that boldness should be accompanied by

(39:18):
a reflective mind, that it may not be a mere
blind outburst of passion to no purpose. For with increase
of rank it becomes always less a matter of self
sacrifice and more a matter of the preservation of others
and the good of the whole, Where regulations of the service,
as a kind of second nature prescribe for the masses.
Reflection must be the guide of the general, and in

(39:39):
his case individual boldness in action may easily become a fault. Still,
at the same time it is a fine failing, and
must not be looked at in the same light as
any other happy the army in which an untimely boldness
frequently manifests itself, it is an exuberant growth which shows
a rich soil. Even foolhardiediness. That is, boldness without an

(40:01):
object is not to be despised. In point of fact,
it is the same energy of feeling, only exercised as
a kind of passion, without any cooperation of the intelligent faculties.
It is only when it strikes at the root of obedience,
when it treats with contempt the orders of superior authority,
that it must be repressed as a dangerous evil, not
on its own account, but on account of the act

(40:23):
of disobedience. For there is nothing in war which is
of greater importance than obedience. The reader will readily agree
with us that, supposing an equal degree of discernment to
be forthcoming in a certain number of cases, a thousand
times as many of them will end in disaster through
over anxiety as through boldness. One would suppose it natural

(40:43):
that the interposition of a reasonable object should stimulate boldness,
and therefore lessen its intrinsic merit. And yet the reverse
is the case. In reality. The intervention of lucid thought
or the general supremacy of mind, deprives the emotional forces
of a great part of their power. On that account,
boldness becomes of rarer occurrence the higher we ascend the

(41:04):
scale of rank. For whether the discernment and the understanding
due or do not increase with these ranks. Still, the commanders,
in their several stations, as they rise, are pressed upon
more and more severely by objective things, by relations and
claims from without, so that they become the more perplexed,
the lower the degree of their individual intelligence. This, so

(41:25):
far as regards war, is the chief foundation of the
truth of the French proverb telbrill o secondes eclipse o premier.
Such shines in the second, which is eclipsed in the first.
Almost all the generals who are represented in history as
merely having attained to mediocrity and as wanting in decision
when in supreme command, are men celebrated in their antecedent

(41:47):
career for their boldness and decision Bullyu, benedek, bazane, buller, melas,
mac et cetera. In those motives to bold action which
arise from the pressure of necessity, we must make a distinction.
Necessity has its degrees of intensity if it lies near
at hand. If the person acting is, in the pursuit

(42:08):
of his object, driven into great dangers in order to
escape others equally great, then we can only admire his resolution,
which still has also its value If a young man,
to show his skill in horsemanship, leaps across a deep cleft,
then he is bold. If he makes the same leap
pursued by a troop of head chopping janissaries, he is
only resolute. But the farther off the necessity from the

(42:30):
point of action, the greater the number of relations intervening
which the mind has to traverse in order to realize them.
By so much the less does necessity take from boldness
in action. If Frederick the Great in the year seventeen
fifty six saw that war was inevitable, and that he
could only escape destruction by being beforehand with his enemies,

(42:50):
it became necessary for him to commence the war himself.
But at the same time it was certainly very bold,
for few men in his position would have made up
their minds to do so. Although strategy is only the
province of generals in chief or commanders in the higher positions,
still boldness in all the other branches of an army
is as little a matter of indifference to it as
their other military virtues. With an army belonging to a

(43:14):
bold race, and in which the spirit of boldness has
been always nourished, very different things may be undertaken than
with one in which this virtue is unknown. For that
reason we have considered it in connection with an army.
But our subject is specially the boldness of the general,
And yet we have not much to say about it,
after having described this military virtue in a general way

(43:35):
to the best of our ability. The higher we rise
in a position of command, the more of the mind,
understanding and penetration predominate in activity. The more therefore is boldness,
which is a property of the feelings kept in subjection.
And for that reason we find it so rarely in
the highest positions. But then so much the more should
it be admired. Boldness directed by an overruling intelli leigence

(44:00):
is the stamp of the hero. This boldness does not
consist in venturing directly against the nature of things, in
a downright contempt of the laws of probability. But if
a choice is once made in the rigorous adherence to
that higher calculation which genius the tact of judgment has
gone over with the speed of lightning, the more boldness
lends wings to the mind and the discernment, so much

(44:23):
the farther they will reach in their flight, so much
the more comprehensive will be the view, the more exact
the result, but certainly always only in the sense that
with greater objects, greater dangers are connected. The ordinary man,
not to speak of the weak and irresolute, arrives at
an exact result, so far as such is possible without
ocular demonstration. At most, after diligent reflection in his chamber,

(44:46):
at a distance from danger and responsibility. Let danger and
responsibility draw close round him in every direction, than he
loses the power of comprehensive vision. And if he retains
this in any measure by the influence of others, still
he will use his power of decision, because in that
point no one can help him. We think then that
it is impossible to imagine a distinguished general without boldness.

(45:09):
That is to say, that no man can become one
who is not born with this power of the soul,
and we therefore look upon it as the first requisite
for such a career. How much of this inborn power,
developed and moderated through education in the circumstances of life,
is left when the man has attained a high position
is the second question. The greater this power still is,

(45:31):
the stronger will genius be on the wing, the higher
will be its flight. The risks become always greater, but
the purpose grows with them. Whether its lines proceed out
of and get their direction from a distant necessity, or
whether they converge to the keystone of a building which
ambition has planned. Whether Frederick or Alexander acts is much
the same as regards the critical view. If the one

(45:54):
excites the imagination more because it is bolder, the other
pleases the understanding most because it has in it more
absolute necessity. We have still to advert to one very
important circumstance. The spirit of boldness can exist in an
army either because it is in the people or because
it has been generated in a successful war conducted by

(46:15):
able generals. In the latter case, it must of course
be dispensed with at the commencement. Now in our days,
there is hardly any other means of educating the spirit
of a people in this respect, except by war, and
that two under bold generals. By it alone can that
effeminacy of feeling be counteracted, that propensity to seek for

(46:35):
the enjoyment of comfort, which cause degeneracy in a people
rising in prosperity and immersed in an extremely busy commerce.
A nation can hope to have a strong position in
the political world only if its character and practice in
actual war mutually support each other in constant reciprocal action.
Chapter seven, Perseverance, the reader expects to hear of angles

(46:58):
and lines, and finds instead of these citizens of the
scientific world, only people out of common life, such as
he meets with every day in the street. And yet
the author cannot make up his mind to become a
hair's breadth more mathematical than the subject seems to him
to require. And he is not alarmed at the surprise
which the reader may show. In war, more than anywhere

(47:19):
else in the world, things happened differently to what we
had expected, and looked differently when near to what they
did at a distance, with what serenity, the architect can
watch his work gradually rising and growing into his plan.
The doctor, although much more at the mercy of mysterious
agencies and chances than the architect, still knows enough of
the forms and effects of his means. In war, on

(47:43):
the other hand, the commander of an immense whole finds
himself in a constant whirlpool of false and true information,
of mistakes committed through fear, through negligence, through precipitation of
contraventions of his authority, either from mistaken or correct motives,
from ill will, true or false sense of duty, indolence,
or exhaustion of accidents which no mortal could have foreseen.

(48:06):
In short, he is the victim of a hundred thousand impressions,
of which the most have been intimidating the fewest, and
encouraging tendency. By long experience in war, the tact is
acquired of readily appreciating the value of these incidents. High
courage and stability of character stand proof against them. As
the rock resists the beating of the waves. He who

(48:27):
would yield to these impressions would never carry out an undertaking,
and on that account, perseverance in the proposed object, as
long as there is no decided reason against it, is
a most necessary counterpoise. Further, there is hardly any celebrated
enterprise in war which was not achieved by endless exertion, pains,
and privations. And as here, the weakness of the physical

(48:49):
and moral man is ever disposed to yield only an
immense force of will, which manifests itself in perseverance admired
by present and future generations can conduct to our goal.
Chapter eight, Superiority of numbers. This is in tactics as
well as in strategy, the most general principle of victory,
and shall be examined by us first in its generality

(49:12):
for which we may be permitted the following exposition. Strategy
fixes the point where, the time when, and a numerical
force with which the battle is to be fought. By
this triple determination, it has therefore a very essential influence
on the issue of the combat. If tactics has fought
the battle, if the result is over, let it be

(49:32):
victory or defeat. Strategy makes such use of it as
can be made in accordance with the great object of
the war. This object is naturally often a very distant one.
Seldom does it lie quite close at hand. A series
of other objects subordinate themselves to it as means. These objects,
which are at the same time means to a higher purpose,

(49:54):
may be practically of various kinds. Even the ultimate aim
of the whole war may be a different one. In
every case, we shall make ourselves acquainted with these things
according as we come to know the separate objects which
they come in contact with, And it is not our
intention here to embrace the whole subject by a complete
enumeration of them, even if that were possible. We therefore

(50:16):
let the employment of the battle stand over for the present.
Even those things through which strategy has an influence on
the issue of the combat, inasmuch as it establishes the
same to a certain extent, decrees them are not so
simple that they can be embraced in one single view.
For as strategy appoints time, place, and force, it can

(50:36):
do so in practice in many ways, each of which
influences in a different manner the result of the combat,
as well as its consequences. Therefore, we shall only get
acquainted with this also by degrees, that is, through the
subjects which more closely determine the application. If we strip
the combat of all modifications which it may undergo according

(50:57):
to its immediate purpose and the circumstances from which it proceeds. Lastly,
if we set aside the valor of the troops, because
that is a given quantity, then there remains only the
bare conception of the combat, that is, a combat without form,
in which we distinguish nothing but the number of the combatants.
This number will therefore determine victory. Now from the number

(51:18):
of things above deducted to get to this point, it
is shown that the superiority in numbers in a battle
is only one of the factors employed to produce victory.
That therefore, so far from having with the superiority in
number obtained all or even only the principal thing, we
have perhaps got very little by it, according as the
other circumstances which co operate happen to vary. But this

(51:40):
superiority has degrees. It may be imagined as twofold, threefold,
or fourfold, and every one sees that by increasing in
this way, it must at last overpower everything else. In
such an aspect we grant that the superiority in numbers
is the most important factor in the result of a combat.
Only it must be sufficiently great to be a counterpoise

(52:02):
to all the other co operating circumstances. The direct result
of this is that the greatest possible number of troops
should be brought into action at the decisive point. Whether
the troops thus brought are sufficient or not, we have
then done in this respect all that our means allowed.
This is the first principle in strategy. Therefore, in general.

(52:23):
As now stated, it is just as well suited for
Greeks and Persians, or for Englishmen maratus as for French
and Germans. But we shall take a glance at our
relations in Europe as respects war in order to arrive
at some more definite idea on this subject. Here we
find armies much more alike in equipment, organization, and practical

(52:45):
skill of every kind. There only remains a difference in
the military virtue of armies and in the talent of generals,
which may fluctuate with time from side to side. If
we go through the military history of modern Europe, we
find no example of a marathon. Frederic the Great beat
eighty thousand Austrians at Luthen with about thirty thousand men,

(53:06):
and at Rosbach with twenty five thousand some fifty thousand allies.
These are, however, the only instances of victories gained against
an enemy double or more than double in numbers. Charles
the twelfth in the Battle of Narva, we cannot well quote,
for the Russians were at that time hardly to be
regarded as Europeans. Also, the principal circumstances even of the

(53:28):
battle are too little known Guinaparte had it Dresden one
hundred and twenty thousand against two hundred and twenty thousand. Therefore,
not the double at Colin. Frederic the Great did not
succeed with thirty thousand against fifty thousand Austrians. Neither did
Buonaparte in the desperate Battle of Leipzic, where he was
one hundred and sixty thousand strong against two hundred eighty thousand.

(53:51):
From this we may infer that it is very difficult
in the present state of Europe for the most talented
general to gain a victory over an enemy double his
life strength. Now, if we see double numbers prove such
a weight in the scale against the greatest generals, we
may be sure that in ordinary cases, in small as
well as great combats, an important superiority of numbers, but

(54:13):
which need not be over two to one, will be
sufficient to ensure the victory. However, disadvantageous other circumstances may be. Certainly,
we may imagine a defile which even tenfold would not
suffice to force. But in such a case it can
be no question of a battle at all. We think, therefore,
that under our conditions, as well as in all similar ones.

(54:36):
The superiority at the decisive point is a matter of
capital importance, and that this subject, in the generality of cases,
is decidedly the most important of all. The strength at
the decisive point depends on the absolute strength of the
army and on skill in making use of it. The
first rule is therefore to enter the field with an

(54:56):
army as strong as possible. This sounds very like a
common place, but still it is really not so. In
order to show that for a long time the strength
of forces was by no means regarded as a chief point,
we need only observe that in most and even in
the most detailed histories of the wars in the eighteenth century,
the strength of the armies is either not given at

(55:17):
all or only incidentally, and in no case is any
special value laid upon it. Tempelhoff, in his History of
the Seven Years War, is the earliest writer who gives
it regularly, but at the same time he does it
only very superficially. Even Massenbach, in his manifold Critical Observations
on the Prussian Campaigns of seventeen ninety three to ninety

(55:38):
four in the Voge, talks a great deal about hills
and valleys, roads and footpaths, but does not say a
syllable about mutual strength. Another proof lies in a wonderful
notion which haunted the heads of many critical historians, according
to which there was a certain size of an army
which was the best a normal strength, beyond which the
forces in excess were burdens rather than serviceable. Tempelhoff and

(56:03):
Montelembert are the first we recollect as examples, the first
in a passage of his first Part, page one forty eight,
the other in his correspondence relative to the Plan of
Operations of the Russians in seventeen fifty nine. Lastly, there
are a number of instances to be found in which
all the available forces were not really brought into the
battle the Prussians at Jena eighteen o six, Wellington at Waterloo,

(56:28):
or into the war, because the superiority of numbers was
not considered to have that importance which, in the nature
of things belongs to it. If we are thoroughly penetrated
with the conviction that with a considerable superiority of numbers
everything possible is to be effected, then it cannot fail
that this clear conviction reacts on the preparations for the
war so as to make us appear in the field

(56:49):
with as many troops as possible, and either to give
us ourselves the superiority, or at least to guard against
the enemy obtaining it. So much for what concerns the
absolute force with which the war is to be conducted.
The measure of this absolute force is determined by the government.
And although with this determination the real action of war commences,

(57:10):
and it forms an essential part of the strategy of
the war, still in most cases the general who is
to command these forces in the war must regard their
absolute strength as a given quantity, whether it be that
he has had no voice in fixing it, or that
circumstances prevented a sufficient expansion being given to it. There
remains nothing, therefore, where an absolute superiority is not attainable,

(57:33):
but to produce a relative one at the decisive point,
by making skillful use of what we have. The calculation
of space and time appears as the most essential thing
to this end, and this has caused its subject to
be regarded as one which embraces nearly the whole art
of using military forces. Indeed, some have gone so far
as to ascribe to great strategists and tacticians a mental

(57:56):
organ peculiarly adapted to this point. But the calculation of
time and space, although it lies universally at the foundation
of strategy, and is to a certain extent its daily bread,
is still neither the most difficult nor the most decisive one.
If we take an unprejudiced glance at military history, we
shall find that the instances in which mistakes in such

(58:17):
a calculation have proved the cause of serious losses are
very rare, at least in strategy. But if the conception
of a skillful combination of time and space is fully
to account for every instance of a resolute and active
commander beating several separate opponents with one and the same
army Frederick the Great Buonaparte, then we perplex ourselves unnecessarily

(58:38):
with conventional language. For the sake of clearness and the
profitable use of conceptions, it is necessary that things should
always be called by their right names, the right appreciation
of their opponents Dawn Schwarzenberg, the audacity to leave for
a short space of time a small force only before them,
energy in forced marches, boldness in suddenness attacks, the intensified

(59:01):
activity which great souls acquire in the moment of danger.
These are the grounds of such victories. And what have
these to do with the ability to make an exact
calculation of two such simple things as time and space.
But even this ricocheting play of forces, when the victories
at Rosbach and Montmorl give the impulse to victories at
Luthen and Monterroe, to which great generals on the defensive

(59:23):
have often trusted, is still, if we would be clear
and exact, only a rare occurrence in history. Much more frequently,
the relative superiority, that is, the skillful assemblage of superior
forces at the decisive point, has its foundation in the
right appreciation of those points, in the judicious direction, which
by that means has been given to the forces from

(59:44):
the very first, and in the resolution required to sacrifice
the unimportant to the advantage of the important, that is,
to keep the forces concentrated in an overpowering mass. In
this Frederick the Great and Bunaparte are particularly characteristic. We
think we have now allotted to the superiority in numbers
the importance which belongs to it. It is to be

(01:00:06):
regarded as the fundamental idea always to be aimed at
before all and as far as possible. But to regard
it on this account as a necessary condition of victory
would be a complete misconception of our exposition. In the
conclusion to be drawn from it, there lies nothing more
than the value which should attach to numerical strength in
the combat. If that strength is made as great as possible,

(01:00:28):
then the maxim is satisfied. A review of the total
relations must then decide whether or not the combat is
to be avoided for want of sufficient force. Chapter nine.
The surprise. From the subject of the foregoing chapter the
general endeavor to attain a relative superiority. There follows another endeavor,
which must consequently be just as general in its nature.

(01:00:50):
This is the surprise of the enemy. It lies more
or less at the foundation of all undertakings, for without it,
the preponderance at the decisive point is not properly conn
The surprise is therefore not only the means to the
attainment of numerical superiority, but it is also to be
regarded as a substantive principle in itself, on account of

(01:01:11):
its moral effect. When it is successful in a high
degree confusion and broken courage in the enemy's ranks are
the consequences, and of the degree to which these multiply
a success. There are examples enough, great and small. We
are not now speaking of the particular surprise which belongs
to the attack, but of the endeavor by measures generally

(01:01:32):
and especially by the distribution of forces to surprise the enemy,
which can be imagined just as well in the defensive,
and which in the tactical defense particularly is a chief point.
We say, surprise lies at the foundation of all undertakings,
without exception, only in very different degrees, according to the
nature of the undertaking in other circumstances. This difference indeed

(01:01:55):
originates in the properties or peculiarities of the army and
its commander, in those even of the government. Secrecy and
rapidity are the two factors in this product, and these
suppose in the government and the commander in chief great energy,
and on the part of the army a high sense
of military duty, with effeminacy and loose principles. It is

(01:02:15):
in vain to calculate upon a surprise, but so general,
indeed so indispensable as is this endeavor, and true as
it is that it is never wholly unproductive of effect. Still,
it is not the less true that it seldom succeeds
to a remarkable degree. And this follows from the nature
of the idea itself. We should form an erroneous conception

(01:02:36):
if we believe that by this means chiefly there is
much to be attained in war. In idea, it promises
a great deal. In the execution, it generally sticks fast
by the friction of the whole machine. In tactics, the
surprise is much more at home, for the very natural
reason that all times and spaces are on a smaller scale.
It will, therefore, in strategy be the more feasible in

(01:03:00):
proportion as the measures lie nearer to the province of tactics,
and more difficult the higher up they lie towards the
province of policy. The preparations for a war usually occupy
several months. The assembly of an army at its principal
positions requires generally the formation of depots and magazines, and
long marches, the object of which can be guessed soon enough.

(01:03:22):
It therefore rarely happens that one state surprises another by
a war, or by the direction which it gives the
mass of its forces. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
when war turned very much upon sieges. It was a
frequent aim, and quite a peculiar and important chapter in
the art of war, to invest a strong place unexpectedly,
But even that only rarely succeeded. On the other hand,

(01:03:46):
with things which can be done in a day or two,
a surprise is much more conceivable, and therefore also it
is often not difficult thus to gain a march upon
the enemy, and thereby a position, a point of country,
a road, and see. But it is evident that what
surprise gains in this way in easy execution, it loses
in the efficacy, as the greater the efficacy, the greater

(01:04:09):
always the difficulty of execution. Whoever thinks that with such
surprises on a small scale he may connect great results,
as for example, the gain of a battle the capture
of an important magazine, believes in something which it is
certainly very possible to imagine, but for which there is
no warrant in history. For there are, upon the whole
very few instances where anything great has resulted from such surprises,

(01:04:33):
from which we may justly conclude that inherent difficulties lie
in the way of their success. Certainly, whoever would consult
history on such points must not depend on sundry battle
steeds of historical critics, on their wise dicta and self
complacent terminology, but look at facts with his own eyes.
There is, for instance, a certain day in the campaign

(01:04:55):
in Silesia seventeen sixty one, which in this respect has
attained aimed a kind of notoriety. It is the July
twenty second, on which Frederick the Great gained on Lauden
the march to Nossen near Nisa, by which, as is said,
the junction of the Austrian and Russian armies in Upper
Silesia became impossible, and therefore a period of four weeks

(01:05:17):
was gained by the king. Whoever reads over this occurrence
carefully in the principal histories and considers it impartially, will
in the march of the July twenty second never find
this importance. And generally, in the whole of the fashionable
logic on this subject he will see nothing but contradictions.
But in the proceedings of Laudon in this renowned period

(01:05:38):
of maneuvers much that is unaccountable. How could one with
a thirst for truth and clear conviction accept such historical
evidence When we promise ourselves great effects in a campaign.
From the principle of surprising, we think upon great activity,
rapid resolutions, and forced marches as the means of producing them,

(01:05:58):
but that these things, even when forthcoming in a very
high degree, will not always produce the desired effect. We
see in examples given by generals who may be allowed
to have had the greatest talent in the use of
these means, Frederick the Great and Buonaparte the first, when
he left Dresden so suddenly in July seventeen sixty, and
falling upon Lassie, then turned against Dresden, gained nothing by

(01:06:22):
the whole of that intermezzo, but rather placed his affairs
in a condition notably worse, as the fortress Glats fell.
In the meantime in eighteen thirteen, Buonaparte turned suddenly from
Dresden twice against Blucher, to say nothing of his incursion
into Bohemia from Upper Lusatia, and both times without in
the least attaining his object. They were blows in the

(01:06:43):
air which only cost him time and force, and might
have placed him in a dangerous position in Dresden. Therefore,
even in this field, a surprise does not necessarily meet
with great success. Through the mere activity, energy and resolution
of the commander. It must be favored by others sols circumstances.
But we by no means deny that there can be success.

(01:07:05):
We only connect with it a necessity of favorable circumstances,
which certainly do not occur very frequently, and which the
commander can seldom bring about himself. Just those two generals
afford each a striking illustration of this. We take first
Buonaparte in his famous enterprise against Blucher's army in February
eighteen fourteen, when it was separated from the Grand Army

(01:07:28):
and descending the Marne. It would not be easy to
find a two days march to surprise the enemy productive
of greater results than this. Blucher's army, extended over a
distance of three days march, was beaten in detail and
suffered a loss nearly equal to that of defeat in
a great battle. This was completely the effect of a surprise,

(01:07:48):
for if Blucher had thought of such a near possibility
of an attack from Buona, party would have organized his
march quite differently. To this mistake of Blucher's. The result
is to be attributed Bunaparte did not know all these circumstances,
and so there was a piece of good fortune that
mixed itself up in his favor. Blucher believed his march
to be covered by Pollen's Cossacks, but these had been

(01:08:11):
withdrawn without warning to him by the Grand Army headquarters
under Schwarzenberg. It is the same with the Battle of
Leignitz seventeen sixty. Frederick the Great gained this fine victory
through altering during the night a position which he had
just before taken up. Laudon was through this completely surprised
and lost seventy pieces of artillery and ten thousand men.

(01:08:34):
Although Frederick the Great had at this time adopted the
principle of moving backwards and forwards in order to make
a battle impossible or at least to disconcert the enemy's plans,
still the alteration of position on the night of the
fourteen to fifteen was not made exactly with that intention, but,
as the King himself says, because the position of the
fourteenth did not please him. Here therefore also chance was

(01:08:57):
hard at work. Without this happy conjunction of the attack
and the change of position in the night, and the
difficult nature of the country. The result would not have
been the same. Also, in the higher and highest province
of strategy, there are some instances of surprises fruitful in results.
We shall only cite the brilliant marches of the Great
Elector against the Swedes from Franconia to Pomerania and from

(01:09:19):
the Mark Brandenburg to the Prigal in seventeen fifty seven,
and the celebrated passage of the Alps by Buonaparte eighteen hundred.
In the latter case, an army gave up its whole
theater of war by a capitulation, and in seventeen fifty
seven another army was very near giving up its theater
of war and itself as well. Lastly, as an instance

(01:09:41):
of a war wholly unexpected, we may bring forward the
invasion of Silesia by Frederick the Great, Great and powerful.
Are here the results everywhere. But such events are not
common in history, if we do not confuse with them
cases in which a state for want of activity in
energy Saxony seventeen fifty six and Russia eighteen twelve, has

(01:10:01):
not completed its preparations in time. Now there still remains
an observation which concerns the essence of the thing a
surprise can only be effected by that party which gives
the law to the other, and he who is in
the right gives the law. If we surprise the adversary
by a wrong measure, then instead of reaping good results,

(01:10:21):
we may have to bear a sound blow in return.
In any case, the adversary need not trouble himself much
about our surprise. He has, in our mistake the means
of turning off the evil. As the offensive includes in
itself much more positive action than the defensive. So the
surprise is certainly more in its place with the assailant,
but by no means invariably, as we shall hereafter see,

(01:10:44):
mutual surprises by the offensive and defensive may therefore meet,
and then that one will have the advantage who has
hit the nail on the head the best. So should
it be. But practical life does not keep to this
line so exactly, and that for a very simple reason.
The moral effects which attend a surprise often convert the
worst case into a good one for the side they favor,

(01:11:06):
and do not allow the other to make any regular determination.
We have here in view, more than anywhere else, not
only the chief commander, but each single one, because a
surprise has the effect, in particular of greatly loosening unity,
so that the individuality of each separate leader easily comes
to light. Much depends here on the general relation in

(01:11:26):
which the two parties stand to each other. If the
one side, through a general moral superiority, can intimidate and
outdo the other, then he can make use of the
surprise with more success, and even reap good fruit where
properly he should come to Ruin Chapter ten, Stratagem. Stratagem
implies a concealed intention, and therefore is opposed to straightforward

(01:11:49):
dealing in the same way as wit is the opposite
of direct proof. It has therefore nothing in common with
means of persuasion, of self interest, of force, but a
great deal to do with deceit, because that likewise conceals
its object. It is itself a deceit as well when
it is done. But still it differs from what is
commonly called deceit in this respect that there is no

(01:12:11):
direct breach of word. The deceiver, by Stratagem, leaves it
to the person himself whom he is deceiving, to commit
the errors of understanding, which, at last, flowing into one
result suddenly change the nature of things in his eyes.
We may therefore say, as nit is a sleight of
hand with ideas and conceptions, so stratagem is a sleight
of hand with actions. At first sight, it appears as

(01:12:34):
if strategy had not improperly derived its name from stratagem,
and that with all the real and apparent changes which
the whole character of war has undergone since the time
of the Greeks, this term still points to its real nature.
If we leave to tactics the actual delivery of the
blow the battle itself, and look upon strategy as the
art of using this means with skill, then, besides the

(01:12:56):
forces of the character, such as burning ambition, which always
presses like a spring, a strong will which hardly bends,
and sea and c there seems no subjective quality so
suited to guide and inspire strategic activity as stratagem. The
general tendency to surprise treated of in the foregoing chapter
points to this conclusion. For there is a degree of stratagem,

(01:13:18):
be it ever so small, which lies at the foundation
of every attempt to surprise. But however much we feel
a desire to see the actors in war outdo each
other in hidden activity, readiness, and stratagem. Still, we must
admit that these qualities show themselves but little in history,
and have rarely been able to work their way to
the surface from amongst the mass of relations and circumstances.

(01:13:41):
The explanation of this is obvious, and it is almost
identical with the subject matter of the preceding chapter. Strategy
knows no other activity than the regulating of combat with
the measures which relate to it. It has no concern,
like ordinary life with transactions which consist merely of words, words,
that is, in expressions, declarations, and c But these which

(01:14:06):
are very inexpensive are chiefly the means with which the
wily one takes in those he practices upon that which
there is like it in war. Plans and orders given
merely as make believers false reports sent on purpose to
the enemy is usually of so little effect in the
strategic field that it is only resorted to in particular
cases which offer of themselves. Therefore cannot be regarded as

(01:14:29):
spontaneous action which emanates from the leader. But such measures
as carrying out the arrangements for a battle, so far
as to impose upon the enemy, require a considerable expenditure
of time and power. Of course, the greater the impression
to be made, the greater the expenditure in these respects,
And as this is usually not given for the purpose,

(01:14:50):
very few demonstrations so called in strategy, effect the object
for which they are designed. In fact, it is dangerous
to detach large forces for any life length of time
merely for a trick, because there is always the risk
of its being done in vain. And then these forces
are wanted at the decisive point. The chief actor in
war is always thoroughly sensible of this sober truth, and

(01:15:13):
therefore he has no desire to play at tricks of agility.
The bitter earnestness of necessity presses so fully into direct
action that there is no room for that game. In
a word, the pieces on the strategical chessboard want that mobility,
which is the element of stratagem and subtility. The conclusion
which we draw is that a correct and penetrating eye

(01:15:35):
is a more necessary, more useful quality for a general
than craftiness, although that also does no harm if it
does not exist at the expense of necessary qualities of
the heart, which is only too often the case. But
the weaker the forces become which are under the command
of strategy so much the more they become adapted for Stratagem,
so that to the quite feeble and little, for whom

(01:15:56):
no prudence, no sagacity, is any longer sufficient. At the
point where all art seems to forsake him, Stratagem offers
itself as a last resource. The more helpless his situation,
the more everything presses towards one single desperate blow, the
more readily Stratagem comes to the aid of his boldness.
Let loose from all further calculations. Freed from all concern

(01:16:19):
for the future, Boldness and Stratagem intensify each other and
thus collect at one point an infinitesimal glimmering of hope
into a single ray, which may likewise serve to kindle
a flame. Chapter eleven, Assembly of Forces in Space. The
best strategy is always to be very strong, first generally,
then at the decisive point. Therefore, apart from the energy

(01:16:43):
which creates the army, a work which is not always
done by the general, there is no more imperative and
no simpler law for strategy than to keep the forces
concentrated dot No portion is to be separated from the
main body unless called away by some urgent necessity. On
this maxim we stand and look upon it as a
guide to be depended upon. What are the reasonable grounds

(01:17:05):
on which a detachment of forces may be made? We
shall learn by degrees. Then we shall also see that
this principle cannot have the same general effects in every war,
but that these are different according to the means and end.
It seems incredible, and yet it has happened a hundred
times that troops have been divided and separated merely through
a mysterious feeling of conventional manner, without any clear perception

(01:17:28):
of the reason. If the concentration of the whole force
is acknowledged as the norm, and every division and separation
as an exception which must be justified, then not only
will that folly be completely avoided, but also many an
erroneous ground for separating troops will be barred Admission Chapter twelve,
Assembly of Forces. In time. We have here to deal

(01:17:50):
with a conception which in real life diffuses many kinds
of illusory light. A clear definition and development of the
idea is therefore necessary, and we hope to be allowed
a short analysis. War is the shock of two opposing
forces in collision with each other, from which it follows,
as a matter of course, that the stronger not only
destroys the other, but carries it forward with it in

(01:18:13):
its movement. This fundamentally admits of no successive action of powers,
but makes the simultaneous application of all forces intended for
the shock appear as a primordial law of war. So
it is in reality, but only so far as the
struggle resembles also in practice a mechanical shock. But when
it consists in a lasting mutual action of destructive forces,

(01:18:35):
then we can certainly imagine a successive action of forces.
This is the case in tactics, principally because firearms form
the basis of all tactics, but also for other reasons
as well. If in a fire combat, one thousand men
are opposed to five hundred, then the gross loss is
calculated from the amount of the enemy's force and our

(01:18:55):
own one thousand men fire twice as many shots as
five hundred. More shots will take effect on the one
thousand than on the five hundred, because it is assumed
that they stand in closer order than the other. If
we were to suppose the number of hits to be double,
then the losses on each side would be equal. From
the five hundred, there would be, for example, two hundred

(01:19:15):
disabled and out of the body of one thousand. Likewise
the same. Now, if the five hundred had kept another
body of equal number quite out of fire, then both
sides would have eight hundred effective men. But of these
on the one side there would be five hundred men,
quite fresh fully supplied with ammunition and in their full vigor.
On the other side only eight hundred, all alike, shaken

(01:19:36):
in their order, in want of sufficient ammunition, and weakened
in physical force. The assumption that the one thousand men,
merely on account of their greater number, would lose twice
as many as five hundred would have lost in their
place is certainly not correct. Therefore, the greater loss which
the side suffers that has placed the half of its
force in reserve must be regarded as a disadvantage in

(01:19:57):
that original formation. Further, it must be admitted that in
the generality of cases, the one thousand men would have
the advantage at the first commencement of being able to
drive their opponent out of his position and force him
to a retrograde movement. Now, whether these two advantages are
a counterpoise to the disadvantage of finding ourselves with eight
hundred men to a certain extent disorganeesed by the combat

(01:20:20):
opposed to an enemy who is not materially weaker in
numbers and who has five hundred quite fresh troops, is
one that cannot be decided by pursuing an analysis. Further,
we must here rely upon experience, and there will scarcely
be an officer experienced in war who will, not, in
the generality of cases, assign the advantage to that side
which has the fresh troops. In this way it becomes

(01:20:43):
evident how the employment of too many forces in combat
may be disadvantageous. For whatever advantages the superiority may give
in the first moment, we may have to pay dearly
for in the next. But this danger only endures as
long as the disorder, the state of confusion and weakness lasts,
in a word, up to the crisis which every combat
brings with it, even for the conqueror. Within the duration

(01:21:06):
of this relaxed state of exhaustion, the appearance of a
proportionate number of fresh troops is decisive. But when this
disordering effect of victory stops, and therefore only the moral
superiority remains, which every victory gives. Then it is no
longer possible for fresh troops to restore the combat. They
would only be carried along in the general movement. A

(01:21:27):
beaten army cannot be brought back to victory a day
after by means of a strong reserve. Here we find
ourselves at the source of a highly material difference between
tactics and strategy. The tactical results, the results within the
four corners of the battle and before its close, lie
for the most part within the limits of that period

(01:21:47):
of disorder and weakness. But the strategic result, that is
to say, the result of the total combat of the
victories realized, let them be small or great, lies completely
beyond outside of that period. It is only when the
results of partial combats have bound themselves together into an
independent whole that the strategic result appears. But then the

(01:22:09):
state of crisis is over. The forces have resumed their
original form and are now only weakened to the extent
of those actually destroyed, placed, or to combat. The consequence
of this difference is that tactics can make a continued
use of forces. Strategy only a simultaneous one. If I cannot,
in tactics decide all by the first success, if I

(01:22:32):
have to fear the next moment, it follows of itself
that I employ only so much of my force for
the success of the first moment as appears sufficient for
that object, and keep the rest beyond the reach of
fire or conflict of any kind, in order to be
able to oppose fresh troops to fresh or with such
to overcome those that are exhausted. But it is not so.
In strategy. Partly, as we have just shown, it has

(01:22:56):
not so much reason to fear a reaction after a
success realized, because as with that success, the crisis stops. Partly,
all the forces strategically employed are not necessarily weakened, only
so much of them as have been tactically in conflict
with the enemy's force that is engaged in partial combat
are weakened by it. Consequently, only so much as was

(01:23:17):
unavoidably necessary, but by no means all which was strategically
in conflict with the enemy, unless tactics has expended them unnecessarily,
core which on account of the general superiority in numbers,
have either been little or not at all engaged, whose
presence alone has assisted in the result, are after the
decision the same as they were before, and for new enterprises,

(01:23:38):
as efficient as if they had been entirely inactive. How
greatly such corps which thus constitute our excess may contribute
to the total success is evident in itself. Indeed, it
is not difficult to see how they may even diminish
considerably the loss of the forces engaged in tactical conflict
on our side. If, therefore, in strategy the laws does

(01:24:00):
not increase with the number of the troops employed, but
is often diminished by it, and if, as a natural consequence,
the decision in our favor is by that means the
more certain, then it follows naturally that in strategy we
can never employ too many forces, and consequently also that
they must be applied simultaneously to the immediate purpose. But

(01:24:21):
we must vindicate this proposition upon another ground. We have
hitherto only spoken of the combat itself. It is the
real activity in war. But men, time, and space, which
appear as the elements of this activity, must at the
same time be kept in view, and the results of
their influence brought into consideration. Also Fatigue, exertion and privation

(01:24:44):
constitute in war a special principle of destruction, not essentially
belonging to contest, but more or less inseparably bound up
with it, and certainly one which especially belongs to strategy.
They no doubt exist in tactics as well, and perhaps
there in the highest degree. But as the duration of
the tactical acts is shorter, therefore the small effects of

(01:25:04):
exertion and privation on them can come but little into consideration.
But in strategy, on the other hand, where time and
space are on a larger scale, their influence is not
only always very considerable, but often quite decisive. It is
not at all uncommon for a victorious army to lose
many more by sickness than on the field of battle. If, therefore,

(01:25:28):
we look at this sphere of destruction in strategy in
the same manner as we have considered that of fire
in close combat in tactics, then we may well imagine
that everything which comes within its vortex will, at the
end of the campaign or of any other strategic period,
be reduced to a state of weakness, which makes the
arrival of a fresh force decisive. We might therefore conclude

(01:25:49):
that there is a motive in the one case as
well as the other, to strive for the first success
with as few forces as possible, in order to keep
up this fresh force for the last. In order to
estimate it exactly. This conclusion, which in many cases in
practice will have a great appearance of truth, we must
direct our attention to the separate ideas which it contains.

(01:26:10):
In the first place, we must not confuse the notion
of reinforcement with that of fresh and used troops. There
are few campaigns at the end of which an increase
of force is not earnestly desired by the conqueror as
well as the conquered, and indeed should appear decisive. But
that is not the point here. For that increase of
force could not be necessary if the force had been

(01:26:31):
so much larger at the first. But it would be
contrary to all experience to suppose that an army coming
fresh into the field is to be esteemed higher in
point of moral value than an army already in the field,
just as a tactical reserve is more to be esteemed
than a body of troops which has been already severely
handled in the fight, just as much as an unfortunate

(01:26:52):
campaign lowers the courage and moral powers of an army.
A successful one raises these elements in their value in
the general liegeoity of cases. Therefore, these influences are compensated,
and then there remains over and above as clear gained
the habituation to war. We should, besides, look more here
to successful than to unsuccessful campaigns, because when the greater

(01:27:14):
probability of the latter may be seen beforehand, without doubt,
forces are wanted, and therefore the reserving a portion for
future use is out of the question. This point being settled,
then the question is do the losses which a force
sustains through fatigues and privations increase in proportion to the
size of the force, as is the case in a combat,

(01:27:36):
And to that we answer no. The fatigues of war
result in a great measure from the dangers with which
every moment of the act of war is more or
less impregnated. To encounter these dangers at all points, to
proceed onwards with security in the execution of one's plans
gives employment to a multitude of agencies which make up
the tactical and strategic service of the army. This service

(01:28:00):
is more difficult the weaker an army is and easier
as its numerical superiority over that of the enemy increases.
Who can doubt this? A campaign against a much weaker
enemy will therefore cost smaller efforts than against one just
as strong or stronger. So much for the fatigues. It
is somewhat different with the privations. They consist chiefly of

(01:28:23):
two things, the want of food and the want of
shelter for the troops, either in quarters or in suitable camps.
Both these wants will no doubt be greater in proportion
as the number of men on one spot is greater,
but does not the superiority in force afford also the
best means of spreading out and finding more room, and
therefore more means of subsistence and shelter. If Buonaparte, in

(01:28:46):
his invasion of Russia in eighteen twelve, concentrated his army
in great masses upon one single road in a manner
never heard of before, and thus caused privations equally unparalleled,
we must ascribe it to his maxim that it is
impossible to be too strong at the decisive point. Whether
in this instance he did not strain the principle too
far is a question which would be out of place here.

(01:29:09):
But it is certain that if he had made a
point of avoiding the distress which was by that means
brought about, he had only to advance on a greater
breadth of front. Room was not wanted for the purpose
in Russia, and in very few cases can it be wanted. Therefore,
from this no ground can be deduced to prove that
the simultaneous employment of very superior forces must produce greater weakening.

(01:29:32):
But now supposing that, in spite of the general relief
afforded by setting apart a portion of the army, wind
and weather and the toils of war had produced a
diminution even on the part which, as a spare force,
had been reserved for later use, still we must take
a comprehensive general view of the whole, and therefore ask
will this diminution of force suffice to counterbalance the gain

(01:29:52):
in forces, which we, through our superiority in numbers, may
be able to make in more ways than one. But
there there still remains a most important point to be noticed.
In a partial combat, the force required to obtain a
great result can be approximately estimated without much difficulty, and
consequently we can form an idea of what is superfluous

(01:30:15):
in strategy. This may be said to be impossible because
the strategic result has no such well defined object and
no such circumscribed limits as the tactical. Thus, what can
be looked upon in tactics as an excess of power
must be regarded in strategy as a means to give
expansion to success if opportunity offers for it. With the
magnitude of the success, the gain in force increases at

(01:30:38):
the same time, and in this way the superiority of
numbers may soon reach a point which the most careful
economy of forces could never have attained. By means of
his enormous numerical superiority. Buonaparte was enabled to reach Moscow
in eighteen twelve and to take that central capital. Had he,
by means of this superiority, succeeded in completely defeating the

(01:30:59):
Russian army, he would in all probability have concluded a
peace in Moscow, which in any other way was much
less attainable. This example is used to explain the idea,
not to prove it, which would require a circumstantial demonstration,
for which this is not the place. All these reflections
bear merely upon the idea of a successive employment of forces,

(01:31:22):
and not upon the conception of a reserve properly so called,
which they no doubt come in contact with throughout, but which,
as we shall see in the following chapter, is connected
with some other considerations. What we desire to establish here
is that if in tactics the military force, through the
mere duration of actual employment suffers a diminution of power,

(01:31:43):
if time therefore appears as a factor in the result,
this is not the case in strategy in a material degree.
The destructive effects which are also produced upon the forces
in strategy by time are partly diminished through their mass,
partly made good in other ways. And therefore in strategy
it cannot be an object to make time an ally

(01:32:03):
on its own account by bringing troops successively into action,
we say, on its own account for the influence which time,
on account of other circumstances which it brings about but
which are different from itself, can have, indeed must necessarily
have for one of the two parties. Is quite another thing,
is anything but indifferent or unimportant, and will be the

(01:32:25):
subject of consideration hereafter. The rule which we have been
seeking to set forth is therefore that all forces which
are available and destined for a strategic object should be
simultaneously applied to it, and this application will be so
much the more complete, the more everything is compressed into
one act and into one movement. But still there is

(01:32:45):
in strategy a renewal of effort and a persistent action, which,
as a chief, means towards the ultimate success. Is more
particularly not to be overlooked. It is the continual development
of new forces. This is also the subject of another check,
and we only refer to it here in order to
prevent the reader from having something in view of which
we have not been speaking. We now turn to a

(01:33:07):
subject very closely connected with our present considerations, which must
be settled before full light can be thrown on the whole.
We mean the strategic reserve. Chapter thirteen. Strategic reserve. A
reserve has two objects which are very distinct from each other, namely,
first the prolongation and renewal of the combat, and secondly

(01:33:29):
for use in case of unforeseen events. The first object
implies the utility of a successive application of forces, and
on that account cannot occur in strategy cases in which
a corps is sent to succor a point which is
supposed to be about to fall, are plainly to be
placed in a category of the second object, as the
resistance which has to be offered here could not have

(01:33:51):
been sufficiently foreseen. But a corps which is destined expressly
to prolong the combat, and with that object in view,
is placed in rear, would be only a court placed
out of reach of fire, but under the command and
at the disposition of the general commanding in the action,
and accordingly would be a tactical and not a strategic reserve.
But the necessity for a force ready for unforeseen events

(01:34:13):
may also take place in strategy, and consequently there may
also be a strategic reserve, but only where unforeseen events
are imaginable. In tactics, where the enemy's measures are generally
first ascertained by direct sight, and where they may be
concealed by every wood, every fold of undulating ground, we
must naturally always be alive more or less to the

(01:34:36):
possibility of unforeseen events, in order to strengthen subsequently those
points which appear too weak, and in fact to modify
generally the disposition of our troops so as to make
it correspond better to that of the enemy. Such cases
must also happen in strategy, because the strategic act is
directly linked to the tactical in strategy. Also, many a

(01:34:59):
measure is first adopted in consequence of what is actually seen,
or in consequence of uncertain reports arriving from day to
day or even from hour to hour, and lastly from
the actual results of the combats. It is therefore an
essential condition of strategic command that, according to the degree
of uncertainty, forces must be kept in reserve against future

(01:35:20):
contingencies in the defensive generally, but particularly in the defense
of certain obstacles of ground like rivers, hills, et cetera.
Such contingencies, as is well known, happen constantly, but this
uncertainty diminishes in proportion as the strategic activity has less
of the tactical character, and ceases almost altogether in those

(01:35:41):
regions where it borders on politics. The direction in which
the enemy leads his columns to the combat can be
perceived by actual sight only where he intends to pass
a river is learned from a few preparations which are
made shortly before the line by which he proposes to
invade our country is usually announced by all the news
Before a pistol shot has been fired. The greater the

(01:36:04):
nature of the measure, the less it will take the
enemy by surprise. Time and space are so considerable, the
circumstances out of which the action proceed so public and
little susceptible of alteration, that the coming event is either
made known in good time or can be discovered with
reasonable certainty. On the other hand, the use of a
reserve in this province of strategy, even if one were available,

(01:36:27):
will always be less efficacious the more the measure has
a tendency towards being one of a general nature. We
have seen that the decision of a partial combat is
nothing in itself, but that all partial combats only find
their complete solution in the decision of the total combat.
But even this decision of the total combat has only
a relative meaning of many different gradations. According as the

(01:36:49):
force over which the victory has been gained forms a
more or less great and important part of the whole.
The lost battle of a corps may be repaired by
the victory of the army. Even the lost battle of
an army may not only be counterbalanced by the gain
of a more important one, but converted into a fortunate event.
The two days of Culm August twenty ninth and thirtieth,

(01:37:10):
eighteen thirteen, refers to the destruction of ven Dam's column,
which had been sent unsupported to intercept the retreat of
the Austrians and Prussians from Dresden, but was forgotten by Napoleon.
No one can doubt this. But it is just as
clear that the weight of each victory, the successful issue
of each total combat, is so much the more substantial,

(01:37:31):
the more important the part conquered, and that therefore the
possibility of repairing the loss by subsequent events diminishes in
the same proportion. In another place. We shall have to
examine this more in detail. It suffices for the present
to have drawn attention to the indubitable existence of this progression.
If we now add lastly to these two considerations, the

(01:37:51):
third which is that if the persistent use of forces
in tactics always shifts the great result to the end
of the whole act, law of the simultaneous use of
the forces in strategy, on the contrary, lets the principal result,
which need not be the final one, take place almost
always at the commencement of the great or whole act.
Then in these three results we have ground sufficient to find.

(01:38:13):
Strategic reserves always more superfluous, always more useless, always more dangerous,
the more general their destination. The point where the idea
of a strategic reserve begins to become inconsistent is not
difficult to determine. It lies in the supreme decision. Employment
must be given to all the forces within the space

(01:38:34):
of the supreme decision, and every reserve active force available
which is only intended for use after that decision is
opposed to common sense. If therefore, tactics has in its
reserves the means of not only meeting unforeseen dispositions on
the part of the enemy, but also of repairing that
which never can be foreseen the result of the combat,

(01:38:55):
should that be unfortunate. Strategy, on the other hand, must,
at least as far as relates to the capital result,
renounce the use of these means. As a rule, it
can only repair the losses sustained at one point by
advantages gained at another, in a few cases by moving
troops from one point to another. The idea of preparing
for such reverses by placing forces in reserve beforehand can

(01:39:17):
never be entertained in strategy. We have pointed out as
an absurdity, the idea of a strategic reserve which is
not to co operate in the capital result. And as
it is so beyond a doubt, we should not have
been led into such an analysis as we have made
in these two chapters, were it not that, in the
disguise of other ideas it looks like something better, and

(01:39:38):
frequently makes its appearance. One person sees in it the
acme of strategic sagacity and foresight. Another rejects it and
with it the idea of any reserve. Consequently, even of
a tactical one. This confusion of ideas is transferred to
real life, and if we would see a memorable instance
of it, we have only to call to mind that
Prussia in eighteen o six left or resus cserve of

(01:40:00):
twenty thousand men cantoned in the Mark under Prince Eugene
of Wurtemberg, which could not possibly reach the Sala in
time to be of any use, and that another force
of twenty five thousand men belonging to this power remained
in East and South Prussia, destined only to be put
on a war footing afterwards as a reserve. After these
examples we cannot be accused of having been fighting with windmills.

(01:40:23):
Chapter fourteen, Economy of Forces. The road of reason, as
we have said, seldom allows itself to be reduced to
a mathematical line by principles and opinions. There remains always
a certain margin. But it is the same in all
the practical arts of life. For the lines of beauty
there are no Absissian ordinates. Circles and ellipses are not

(01:40:47):
described by means of their algebraical formulae. The actor in war,
therefore soon finds he must trust himself to the delicate
tact of judgment, which, founded on natural quickness of perception
and educated by reflection, almost unconsciously seizes upon the right.
He soon finds that at one time he must simplify
the law by reducing it to some prominent characteristic points

(01:41:09):
which form his rules, that at another the adopted method
must become the staff on which he leans as one
of these simplified characteristic points. As a mental appliance, we
look upon the principle of watching continually over the co
operation of all forces, or in other words, of keeping
constantly in view that no part of them should ever
be idle. Whoever has forces where the enemy does not

(01:41:32):
give them sufficient employment. Whoever has part of his forces
on the march, that is, allows them to lie dead
while the enemies are fighting, he is a bad manager
of his forces. In this sense, there is a waste
of forces, which is even worse than their employment to
no purpose. If there must be action, then the first
point is that all parts act, because the most purposeless

(01:41:54):
activity still keeps employed and destroys a portion of the
enemy's force, whilst troops completely in active are for the
moment quite neutralized. Unmistakably, this idea is bound up with
the principles contained in the last three chapters. It is
the same truth, but seen from a somewhat more comprehensive
point of view, and condensed into a single conception. Chapter fifteen.

(01:42:17):
Geometrical element. The length to which the geometrical element or
form in the disposition of military force in war can
become a predominant principle. We see in the art of fortification,
where geometry looks after the great and the little. Also
in tactics it plays a great part. It is the
basis of elementary tactics, or of the theory of moving troops.

(01:42:38):
But in field fortification, as well as in the theory
of positions and of their attack, its angles and lines
ruled like law givers who have to decide the contest.
Many things here were at one time misapplied, and others
were mere fribbles. Still, however, in the tactics of the
present day, in which in every combat the aim is
to surround the enemy, the ge yometrical element has attained

(01:43:01):
anew a great importance in a very simple but constantly
recurring application. Nevertheless, in tactics, where all is more movable,
where the moral forces, individual traits, and chance are more
influential than in a war of sieges, the geometrical element
can never attain to the same degree of supremacy as
in the latter, But less still is its influence in strategy. Certainly,

(01:43:25):
here also form in the disposition of troops. The shape
of countries and states is of great importance, But the
geometrical element is not decisive as in fortification, and not
nearly so important as in tactics doot. The manner in
which this influence exhibits itself can only be shown by
degrees at those places where it makes its appearance and

(01:43:46):
deserves notice. Here we wish more to direct attention to
the difference which there is between tactics and strategy in
relation to it. In tactics, time and space quickly dwindle
to their absolute minimum. If a body of troops is
attacked in flank and rear by the enemy, it soon
gets to a point where retreat no longer remains. Such

(01:44:06):
a position is very close to an absolute impossibility of
continuing the fight. It must therefore extricate itself from it
or avoid getting into it. This gives to all combinations
aiming at this from the first commencement a great efficiency,
which chiefly consists in the disquietude which it causes the
enemy as to consequences. This is why the geometrical disposition

(01:44:28):
of the forces is such an important factor in the
tactical product. In strategy, this is only faintly reflected on
account of the greater space and time. We do not
fire from one theater of war upon another, and often
weeks and months must pass before a strategic movement designed
to surround the enemy can be executed. Further, the distances

(01:44:50):
are so great that the probability of hitting the right
point at last, even with the best arrangements, is but
small in strategy. Therefore the scope for such common nations,
that is, for those resting on the geometrical element, is
much smaller. And for the same reason, the effect of
an advantage, once actually gained at any point, is much greater.

(01:45:10):
Such advantage has time to bring all its effects to
maturity before it is disturbed or quite neutralized therein by
any counteracting apprehensions. We therefore do not hesitate to regard
as an established truth that in strategy more depends on
the number and the magnitude of the victorious combats than
on the form of the great lines by which they
are connected. A view just the reverse has been a

(01:45:34):
favorite theme of modern theory, because a greater importance was
supposed to be thus given to strategy, and as the
higher functions of the mind were seen in strategy, it
was thought by that means to ennoble war, and as
it was said through a new substitution of ideas to
make it more scientific. We hold it to be one
of the principal uses of a complete theory openly to

(01:45:55):
expose such vagaries, And as the geometrical element is the
fundamental idea from which theory usually proceeds, therefore we have
expressly brought out this point in Strong Relief Chapter sixteen,
on the suspension of the Act in war. If one
considers war as an act of mutual destruction, we must
of necessity imagine both parties as making some progress. But

(01:46:18):
at the same time, as regards the existing moment, we
must almost as necessarily, suppose the one party in a
state of expectation and only the other actually advancing. For
circumstances can never be actually the same on both sides
or continue, so in time a change must ensue, from
which it follows that the present moment is more favorable

(01:46:39):
to one side than the other. Now, if we suppose
that both commanders have a full knowledge of this circumstance,
then the one has a motive for action, which at
the same time is a motive for the other to wait. Therefore,
according to this it cannot be for the interest of
both at the same time to advance, nor can waiting
be for the interest of both at the same time.

(01:47:00):
This opposition of interest as regards the object is not
deduced here from the principle of general polarity, and therefore
is not an opposition to the argument in the fifth
chapter of the Second Book it depends on the fact
that here, in reality, the same thing is at once
an incentive or motive to both commanders, namely the probability
of improving or impairing their position by future action. But

(01:47:22):
even if we suppose the possibility of a perfect equality
of circumstances in this respect, or if we take into
account that through imperfect knowledge of their mutual position, such
an equality may appear to the two commanders to subsist,
still the difference of political objects does away with this
possibility of suspension. One of the parties must of necessity

(01:47:42):
be assumed politically to be the aggressor, because no war
could take place from defensive intentions on both sides. But
the aggressor has the positive object, the defender merely a
negative one to the first then belongs the positive action,
for it is only by that means that he can
attain the positive object. Therefore, in cases where both parties

(01:48:03):
are in precisely similar circumstances, the aggressor is called upon
to act by virtue of his positive object. Therefore, from
this point of view, a suspension in the act of warfare,
strictly speaking, is in contradiction with the nature of the
thing because two armies, being two incompatible elements, should destroy
one another unremittingly, just as fire and water can never

(01:48:26):
put themselves in equilibrium, but act and react upon one
another until one quite disappears. What would be said of
two wrestlers who remained clasped round each other for hours
without making a movement? Action in war, therefore, like that
of a clock which is wound up, should go on
running down in regular motion. But wild, as is the

(01:48:47):
nature of war, it still wears the chains of human weakness,
and the contradiction we see here viz. That man seeks
and creates dangers which he fears at the same time
will astonish no one. If we cast a glance at
military history in general, we find so much the opposite
of an incessant advance towards the aim, that standing still
and doing nothing is quite plainly the normal condition of

(01:49:09):
an army in the midst of war. Acting the exception.
This must almost raise a doubt as to the correctness
of our conception. But if military history leads to this conclusion,
when viewed in the mass, the latest series of campaigns
redeems our position. The War of the French Revolution shows
too plainly its reality, and only proves too clearly its necessity.

(01:49:32):
In these operations, and especially in the campaigns of Buonaparte,
the conduct of war attained to that unlimited degree of
energy which we have represented as the natural law of
the element. This degree is therefore possible, and if it
is possible, then it is necessary. How could any one,
in fact justify in the eyes of reason the expenditure

(01:49:53):
of forces in war if acting was not the object.
The baker only heats his oven if he has bred
to put into a The horse is only yoked to
the carriage. If we mean to drive, Why then make
the enormous effort of a war if we look for
nothing else by it but like efforts on the part
of the enemy. So much in justification of the general principle.
Now as to its modifications, as far as they lie

(01:50:16):
in the nature of the thing and are independent of
special cases, there are three causes to be noticed here,
which appear as innate counterpoises and prevent the over rapid
or uncontrollable movement of the wheel work. The first, which
produces a constant tendency to delay, and is thereby a
retarding principle, is the natural timidity and want of resolution

(01:50:37):
in the human mind, a kind of inertia in the
moral world, but which is produced not by attractive but
by repellent forces, that is to say, by dread of
danger and responsibility. In the burning element of war, ordinary
natures appear to become heavier. The impulsion given must therefore
be stronger and more frequently repeated. If the motion is
to be a continuous one. The mere idea of the

(01:51:00):
object for which arms have been taken up is seldom
sufficient to overcome this resistant force. And if a warlike,
enterprising spirit is not at the head, who feels himself
in war in his natural element as much as a
fish in the ocean, or if there is not the
pressure from above of some great responsibility, then standing still
will be the order of the day, and progress will

(01:51:20):
be the exception. The second cause is the imperfection of
human perception and judgment, which is greater in war than anywhere,
because a person hardly knows exactly his own position from
one moment to another, and can only conjecture on slight
grounds that of the enemy, which is purposely concealed. This
often gives rise to the case of both parties looking

(01:51:40):
upon one and the same object as advantageous for them,
while in reality the interest of one must preponderate. Thus,
then each may think he acts wisely by waiting another moment.
As we have already said in the fifth chapter of
the second book. The third cause, which catches hold like
a ratchet will in machinery from time to time, producing

(01:52:00):
a complete standstill, is the greater strength of the defensive form.
A may feel too weak to attack B, from which
it does not follow that B is strong enough for
an attack on A. The addition of strength which the
defensive gives is not merely lost by assuming the offensive,
but also passes to the enemy, just as figuratively expressed,

(01:52:21):
the difference of A plus B en a B is
equal to two B. Therefore, it may so happen that
both parties at one and the same time not only
feel themselves too weak to attack, but also are so
in reality. Thus, even in the midst of the act
of war itself, anxious sagacity, in the apprehension of too
great danger, find vantage ground by means of which they

(01:52:44):
can exert their power and tame the elementary impetuosity of war. However,
at the same time, these causes without an exaggeration of
their effect would hardly explain the long states of inactivity
which took place in military operations in former times in
wa wars undertaken about interests of no great importance, and
in which inactivity consumed nine tenths of the time that

(01:53:06):
the troops remained under arms. This feature in these wars
is to be traced principally to the influence which the
demands of the one party and the condition and feeling
of the other exercised over the conduct of the operations.
As has been already observed in the Chapter on the
Essence and Object of War, these things may obtain such
a preponderating influence as to make of war a half

(01:53:28):
and half affair. A war is often nothing more than
an armed neutrality, or a menacing attitude to support negotiations,
or an attempt to gain some small advantage by small
exertions and then to weight the tide of circumstances, or
a disagreeable treaty obligation which is fulfilled in the most
niggardly way possible. In all these cases in which the

(01:53:50):
impulse given by interest is slight and the principle of
hostility feeble, in which there is no desire to do much,
and also not much to dread from the enemy. In short,
where no powerful motives, press and drive cabinets will not
risk much in the game. Hence this tame mode of
carrying on war, in which the hostile spirit of real
war is laid in irons. The more war becomes in

(01:54:12):
this manner devitalized so much, the more its theory becomes
destitute of the necessary firm, pivots and buttresses. For its reasoning,
the necessary is constantly diminishing, the accidental constantly increasing. Nevertheless,
in this kind of warfare there is also a certain shrewdness. Indeed,
its action is perhaps more diversified and more extensive than

(01:54:33):
in the other hazard played with reeal ohs of gold
seems changed into a game of commerce with grotion. And
on this field where the conduct of war spins out
the time with a number of small flourishes, with skirmishes
at outposts, half in earnest, half in jest, with long
dispositions which end in nothing, With positions and marches which

(01:54:54):
afterwards are designated as skillful only because their infinitesimally small
causes are lost and common sense can make nothing of them.
Here on this very field, many theorists find the real
art of war at home. In these feints, parades, half
and quarter thrusts of former wars, they find the aim
of all theory, the supremacy of mind over matter. And

(01:55:15):
modern wars appear to them mere savage physticuffs from which
nothing is to be learnt, and which must be regarded
as mere retrograde steps towards barbarism. This opinion is as
frivolous as the objects to which it relates. Where great
forces and great passions are wanting, it is certainly easier
for a practiced dexterity to show its game. But is

(01:55:36):
then the command of great forces not in itself a
higher exercise of the intelligent faculties? Is then that kind
of conventional sword exercise not comprised in and belonging to
the other mode of conducting war? Does it not bear
the same relation to it as the motions upon a
ship to the motion of the ship itself? Truly, it
can take place only under the tacit condition that the

(01:55:59):
adversary does no better, and can we tell how long
he may choose to respect those conditions? Has not then
the French Revolution fallen upon us? In the midst of
the fancied security of our old system of war, and
driven us from Chalons to Moscow. And did not Frederick
the Great and like manner, surprise the Austrians, reposing in
their ancient habits of war, and make their monarchy tremble.

(01:56:22):
Woe to the cabinet, which, with a shilly Sholi policy
and a routine ridden military system, meets with an adversary who,
like the rude element, knows no other law than that
of his intrinsic force. Every deficiency in energy and exertion
is then a weight in the scales in favor of
the enemy. It is not so easy, then, to change

(01:56:43):
from the fencing posture into that of an athlete, and
a slight blow is often sufficient to knock down the whole.
The result of all the causes now adduced is that
the hostile action of a campaign does not progress by
a continuous but by an intermittent movement, and that therefore
between them separate bloody acts there is a period of
watching during which both parties fall into the defensive. And

(01:57:06):
also that usually a higher object causes the principle of
aggression to predominate on one side, and thus leaves it,
in general in an advancing position, by which then its
proceedings become modified in some degree. Chapter seventeen on the
character of modern war. The attention which must be paid
to the character of war as it is now made,

(01:57:27):
has a great influence upon all plans, especially on strategic ones,
since all methods formerly usual were upset by Buonaparte's luck
and boldness, and first rate powers almost wiped out at
a blow. Since the Spaniards, by their stubborn resistance, have
shown what the general arming of a nation and insurgent
measures on a great scale can effect in spite of

(01:57:48):
weakness and porousness of individual parts. Since Russia, by the
campaign of eighteen twelve, has taught us first that an
empire of great dimensions is not to be conquered, which
might have been easily known before. Secondly, that the probability
of final success does not in all cases diminish in
the same measure as battles, capitals and provinces are lost,

(01:58:11):
which was formerly an incontrovertible principle with all diplomatists, and
therefore made them always ready to enter at once into
some bad temporary peace. But that a nation is often
strongest in the heart of its country. If the enemy's
offensive power has exhausted itself, and with what enormous force
the defensive then springs over to the offensive further, since

(01:58:32):
Prussia eighteen thirteen has shown that sudden efforts may add
to an army sixfold by means of the militia, and
that this militia is just as fit for service abroad
as in its own country. Since all these events have
shown what an enormous factor the heart and sentiments of
a nation may be in the product of its political
and military strength. In fine, since governments have found out

(01:58:53):
all these additional aids, it is not to be expected
that they will let them lie idle in future wars,
whether it be that danger threatens their own existence or
that restless ambition drives them on. That a war which
is waged with the whole weight of the national power
on each side must be organized differently in principle to
those where everything is calculated according to the relations of

(01:59:15):
standing armies to each other. It is easy to perceive
standing armies once resembled fleets, the land forced the sea
force in their relations to the remainder of the state,
and from that the art of war on shore had
in it something of naval tactics, which it has now
quite lost. Chapter eighteen, Tension and rest the dynamic law

(01:59:36):
of war. We have seen in the sixteenth chapter of
this book how in most campaigns much more time used
to be spent in standing still in action than in activity. Now,
although as observed in the preceding chapter, we see quite
a different character in the present form of war. Still
it is certain that real action will always be interrupted,

(01:59:57):
more or less by long pauses, and this leads to
the the necessity of our examining more closely the nature
of these two phases of war. If there is a
suspension of action in war, that is, if neither party
will something positive, there is rest, and consequently equilibrium, but
certainly an equilibrium in the largest signification, in which not

(02:00:17):
only the moral and physical war forces, but all relations
and interests come into calculation. As soon as ever one
of the two parties proposes to himself a new positive
object and commences active steps towards it, even if it
is only by preparations, and as soon as the adversary
opposes this, there is a tension of powers. This lasts

(02:00:37):
until the decision takes place, that is, until one party
either gives up his object or the other has conceded
it to him. This decision, the foundation of which lies
always into combat combinations which are made on each side,
is followed by a movement in one or other direction.
When this movement has exhausted itself, either in the difficulties

(02:00:59):
which had to be mapped, in overcoming its own internal friction,
or through new resistant forces prepared by the acts of
the enemy, then either a state of rest takes place,
or a new tension with a decision and then a
new movement, in most cases in the opposite direction. This
speculative distinction between equilibrium, tension and motion is more essential

(02:01:20):
for practical action than may at first side appear. In
a state of rest and of equilibrium, a varied kind
of activity may prevail on one side that results from
opportunity and does not aim at a great alteration. Such
an activity may contain important combats, even pitched battles, but
yet it is still of quite a different nature and

(02:01:40):
on that account, generally different in its effects. If a
state of tension exists, the effects of the decision are
always greater, partly because a greater force of will and
a greater pressure of circumstances manifest themselves therein partly because
everything has been prepared and arranged for a great movement.
The decision in such cases resembles the effect of a

(02:02:01):
mine well closed and tamped, whilst an event in itself,
perhaps just as great in a state of rest, is
more or less like a mass of powder puffed away
in the open air. At the same time, as a
matter of course, the state of tension must be imagined
in different degrees of intensity, and it may therefore approach
gradually by many steps towards the state of rest, so

(02:02:22):
that at the last there is a very slight difference
between them. Now, the real use which we derive from
these reflections is the conclusion that every measure which is
taken during a state of tension is more important and
more prolific in results than the same measure could be
in a state of equilibrium, and that this importance increases
immensely in the highest degrees of tension. The Cannonade of

(02:02:44):
Valmi September twentieth, seventeen ninety two decided more than the
Battle of Hotchkirch October fourteenth, seventeen fifty eight in a
tract of country which the enemy abandons to us because
he cannot defend it. We can settle ourselves differently from
what we should do if the retreat of the enemy
was only made with the view to a decision under

(02:03:04):
more favorable circumstances. Again, a strategic attack in course of
execution a faulty position, a single false march, may be
decisive in its consequence, whilst in a state of equilibrium,
such errors must be of a very glaring kind, even
to excite the activity of the enemy in a general way.
Most bygone wars, as we have already said, consisted so

(02:03:28):
far as regards the greater part of the time in
this state of equilibrium, or at least in such short tensions,
with long intervals between them, and weak in their effects,
that the events to which they gave rise were seldom
great successes. Often they were theatrical exhibitions got up in
honor of a royal birthday Hotchkirch, often a mere satisfying

(02:03:48):
of the honor of the arms Kunersdorf or the personal
vanity of the commander Freiburg. That a commander should thoroughly
understand these states, that he should have the tact to
act in the spirit of them we hold to be
a great requisite, and we have had experience in the
campaign of eighteen o six how far it is sometimes wanting.
In that tremendous tension, when everything pressed on towards a

(02:04:11):
supreme decision, and that alone, with all its consequences, should
have occupied the whole soul of the commander. Measures were
proposed and even partly carried out, such as the reconnaissance
towards Franconia, which it the most might have given a
kind of gentle play of oscillation within a state of
equilibrium over these blundering schemes and views, absorbing the activity
of the army, the really necessary means which could alone

(02:04:34):
save were lost sight of. But this speculative distinction which
we have made is also necessary for our further progress
in the construction of our theory, because all that we
have to say on the relation of attack and defense,
and on the completion of this double sided act, concerns
the state of the crisis in which the forces are
placed during the tension and motion, And because all the

(02:04:55):
activity which can take place during the condition of equilibrium
can only be regarded and treated as a corollary for
that crisis is the real war, and this state of
equilibrium only its reflection.

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CLAUSEWITZ - ON WAR - III. STRATEGY IN GENERAL - Carl von Clausewitz (1873) - HQ Full Book

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.css-14f5ked{margin:0;word-break:break-word;display:-webkit-box;-webkit-box-orient:vertical;box-orient:vertical;-webkit-line-clamp:2;overflow:hidden;}CLAUSEWITZ - ON WAR - III. STRATEGY IN GENERAL - Carl von Clausewitz (1873) - HQ Full Book