January 7, 2026 • 22 mins
On the Thursday, January 8, 2026 edition of The Armstrong & Getty Extra Large Podcast...
The Eurasia Group's Ian Bremmer joins Jack & Joe to talk about his annual Top Risk List for '26.
- Risk #8: A-I eats its users...
- Risk #2: China & the US take different tacts on energy...
- Risk #7: China's Deflation Trap...
- Risk #4: Europe Under Siege...
- Risk #5: Russia's Second Front...
- The future of Africa
- And finally--Risk #1--US political revolution...including Ian's comparison between Trump & FDR.
- What happens after Trump?
Stupid Should Hurt: https://www.armstrongandgetty.com/
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
Be afraid, be very afraid. But of what what are
the top risks for twenty twenty six? It's Armstrong, you
Getty extra.
Speaker 2 (00:09):
Large because four hours simply.
Speaker 1 (00:14):
This is Armstrong and Getty extra large. Well, this is
always fun. We look forward to it like a kid
looks forward to Christmas. Talking to Ian Bremmer, president of
the Eurasia Group, about the top risks of the year
in twenty twenty six looks to be Harry. Indeed, welcome
I and how are you hey?
Speaker 2 (00:32):
Good to talk to you, guys, happen to here?
Speaker 3 (00:34):
First of all, to Joe, I like this list too,
but you look forward to it like you did as
a kid to Christmas.
Speaker 1 (00:39):
That seems a little weird. It's marketing hyperbole.
Speaker 3 (00:42):
Secondly, before we get into the Listy and I was
going to ask you about Nicole.
Speaker 2 (00:45):
All the time, and you know and love fossil fuels
in this country.
Speaker 1 (00:49):
So yeah, it's not beyond me, with a couple of
drinks in me to beat up them all Santa, out
of resentment for you know, my disappointments.
Speaker 3 (00:56):
Before we get to the very cerebral list, I've wanted
to ask somebody about this. They do this on Network
television all the time, and I saw it happen to
you a couple of times where they tease you and
you're sitting on a couch or in a green room
or something like that, and they say, come it to
the next segment, we'll have Ian Bremmer, and then they
put the camera on you. Is that as uncomfortable as
it looks like? Am I supposed to smile or wave
or give a thumbs up? Or what am I supposed
(01:17):
to do here?
Speaker 2 (01:18):
It was most recent on CBS Morning News with you know,
Gail and Company, and it was a shockingly long tease.
And when I say shockingly long tease, I mean there
was no fluffing involved in this, right, It's just me
looking down the can and I don't know. I mean,
I gave it my best stare. I mean I thought
(01:39):
it was. I don't know if you guys were turned on.
Speaker 1 (01:42):
No, it's tough. It's a tough situation. I don't know
what you're supposed to do, but you handle riki Arkad.
Speaker 2 (01:48):
Yeah.
Speaker 1 (01:48):
TV people are good at that. We're we're ugly audio guys,
and so occasionally though we've been in TV settings where
they say, all right, say that line. Then smile, hold it,
hold it, hold it, and we're like, and you know it,
the smile turns into a grimace, turns I'm weird. You know,
I've taken a blow to the head expression. But yeah, exactlyway.
Speaker 3 (02:09):
So we are super into AI stuff around here. So
my first question off the bat about risk eight AI
eats its users. I was just reading Bloomberg's prediction that
companies mostly are still going to be all in on AI.
How do you feel it's going to play out this year.
Speaker 2 (02:25):
I believe they will be all in on AI, but
there's going to be a lot more pressure to commercialize it,
to make money, to provide returns to all these shareholders
with enormous amounts of money they're being spent on these
large language models only getting more complex with more data,
more chips requirements, more energy requirements. And I think that's
fine for a lot of companies that are doing business
(02:45):
to business, that are doing industrial purposes, defense purposes. But
for the companies that are selling AI to consumers, they're
going to need to make profit any way they can,
and that means testing these things real time on society,
on us, on our kids, And I think that's actually
(03:05):
quite a dangerous risk for our political system and for
our mental well being.
Speaker 3 (03:11):
Well, I noticed we talked about this right before the
end of the year, open Altman announcing that they're going
to like focus on the chat GPT, the thing that
people kind of like and not so much to get into,
you know, artificial general intelligence as much.
Speaker 1 (03:25):
So that's what you're talking about.
Speaker 2 (03:27):
It is, And you know, we all know that social media,
when they decided they need to start making a profit,
it became a much less community oriented, much more addiction
and engagement oriented. Well, AI is a hell of a
lot more capable at programming us, at changing our behavior,
making us believe that we're talking to people when actually
(03:49):
we're talking to things that have no affect and are
just trying to get the outcomes they want it wants
out of us. There are people like that in society.
We call them so sociopaths. We don't want to be
around them, right, And yet when it comes to AI,
we're like, hey, go for it, train it on us,
and that that just seems like it is not destined
(04:11):
to go well, especially because the race is so well funded,
it's so fast, and it's not effectively regulated at all.
Because we all just want to win. We just want
to We think it's so amazing. We want this to
go faster and faster. And I do get the fact that,
you know, whenever we talk about government involvement, we also
talk about red tape, and we talk about entrepreneurs not
(04:34):
being able to do the things they're great at. But
here we are talking about public safety and we should care.
We care about that with vaccines, we test those first.
We care about it with GMO foods. But somehow when
it involves like actually programming our minds, it no longer matters.
Speaker 1 (04:50):
Wow, I'm glad to hear you say that. We're big
fans of Peter Bergosi' around here, who's written extensively about
the effects of technology and social media on kids especially,
And I just think giving super powers to the sort
of technology we've already decided is absolutely pathological, especially for youngsters,
(05:11):
seems incredibly dangerous. But there it is on your list
of you know, risks.
Speaker 2 (05:15):
Yeah, and it's also showing up in risk number two
in a very different way that I was.
Speaker 1 (05:20):
Just about to ask about that. Yeah, I hit it.
Speaker 2 (05:22):
Yeah, Well, because here you've got the Americans doubling down
on being the strongest petron state in the world, thirteen
point five million barrels a day of oil production, plus
you know Venezuela, and that the largest oil reserves proven
in the world, all of which is great for American
power in the United States is refusing to keep investing
(05:43):
in solar and wind and batteries and all the things
that are getting much cheaper in terms of energy because
those are woke climate energies. Well, the Chinese aren't particularly woke,
but they do know that they need as much energy
as possible, and they are investing massive in the electric stack,
and they're becoming an electro state while we're a petro state.
(06:05):
The only problem is the electro state is becoming a
lot cheaper at producing electricity every year. So we're going
out there selling twentieth century oil, gas and coal to
countries and they're going out there selling twenty first century
energy infrastructure to countries. And who's going to be better
at powering the AI Who's going to be better at
(06:27):
feeding their people? And the answer is the Chinese. That's
not a position the Americans should be in.
Speaker 1 (06:31):
You mentioned the term the electric stack. Help us understand
that what is that?
Speaker 2 (06:36):
It's everything that is necessary to produce huge amounts of
electricity that is powering our economy. So again, it's nuclear,
it's wind, it's solar, its batteries, and it's all the
infrastructure and the critical minerals that go into that and
the supply chain, the processing all around the world. The
Chinese have been investing in that assiduously for decades now,
(06:58):
in the United States has not. That's when Trump met
with Shijinping. There was such a concern about critical minerals
because the Chinese were capable of shutting them off to
the US and therefore shutting down American corporations and factories.
Speaker 3 (07:13):
That story that came out right before the end of
the year, with China building that just ginormous. The world's
never seen anything like it. Ability to produce electricity got
a lot of attention.
Speaker 2 (07:25):
That's right, so much more than the Americans are actually
bringing to market every year, and that's not something that
the US is prepared politically to actually compete with at
this point.
Speaker 3 (07:35):
So then how does that fit in with Risk seven
China's deflation trap? I mean, can they continue to make
these kind of decisions with their economy and the situation
it's in.
Speaker 2 (07:46):
Yeah, the ordering of the risks is meant in terms
of impact, likelihood and imminence, So seven is a lot
lower than two. And the issue here is not that
deflation doesn't matter. They've had ten quarters of deflation sequentially.
That's a lot, and they don't have consumer demand and
they got massive corporate debt and they're not really willing
(08:07):
to make the stimulus bet to change that. So what's
happening is China is exporting their problems. They're manufacturing an
enormous amount, very cheaply involution the competition is the way
that's called domestically, and that's created a one trillion dollar
surplus that they've exported all over the world in twenty
twenty five. That number will go up in twenty twenty six.
(08:28):
So it will cause some backlash and that will undermine
China's position with some countries, even as they have all
these cheap goods and cheap energy that countries will want.
But it is a much lower order risk that the
Chinese are capable of both managing and kicking down the
road than the US versus China energy risk, which is
a lot bigger at stakes and a lot more gent.
Speaker 1 (08:50):
So just for your edifit case. Yeah, Well, it's interesting
that China is both undeniably an awesome power and a
highly highly troubled economy in society at the same time.
But both are true. So I know some of your
risks are pretty Trump US politics oriented, but we talk
(09:14):
about those so much. We were kind of excited to
talk to you about the things we talk about a
little less, if that's okay with you. I mean, for instance,
Europe under siege and Russia's second front, boy, the state
of Europe. We could go on and on about that.
What do you see as risks there?
Speaker 2 (09:33):
Well, you've got to bring Trump in and the United
short States in here, because it turns out that the
Europeans for decades had been making a big bet that
the United States would continue to support collective security in
the Transatlantic space, would continue to support free trade, rule
of law, and the promotion of democracy. And of course
(09:54):
the United States is not doing that, and Trump is
not the driver of it, but he is certainly a symptom.
He as a benefit sherry, and he's an accelerant and
that is causing a massive problem for Europe. Number one,
because Trump no longer wants to support Ukraine. He's having
the Europeans spend all the money doing it, and you know,
to Trump's credit, frankly, taxpayers are no longer paying for that.
But also the Greenland situation also Trump's saying he doesn't
(10:19):
want a strong EU. He wants to support the eurosceptic
parties that want to bring the Europeans apart, like the
AfD in Germany and the National Rally in France and
Reform Party FORAGE in the UK. And all of that
is happening after the Europeans have not sent on defense.
They don't have high productivity, they don't have the tech companies,
(10:40):
they're not really growing. So they've got a great social
contract that takes care of the people, but they can't
afford it, and they matter less to the United States
than they used to. So the Americans go into Venezuela
and they take out Maduro, and the Europeans are all
privately saying, oh my god, this is legal, this is
better of love. But what do they do publicly? They
don't say that they we're monitoring the situation because they
don't actually have the power to do very much about it.
(11:01):
And that's a big problem for your world.
Speaker 1 (11:06):
And Russia's second front is your risk number five? What's
that all about?
Speaker 2 (11:11):
Well, the fact that all of this is happening while
the Russians see that the Americans are not willing to
hit them hard, They're willing to hit the Ukrainians hard
because the Ukrainians are weaker. That's the best way to
get the Ukrainians to capitulate and end the war in
Trump's view, Well, Russia sees that they know they don't
have to stop, and that gives them more space to
(11:32):
escalate in their backyard. The way Trump is escalating in
his backyard, Well, what does that mean. It doesn't mean
tanks into Poland, but how about weather balloons into Lithuania?
How a drones into Poland and Romania. How about Russian
ships dragging anchor and destroying fiber optic cables in the
North Sea. How about all the money they're spending on
all these people inside the frontline NATO countries to engage
(11:55):
in espionage and destruction of critical infrastructure and even assassination attempts,
as we saw against the CEO of the largest German
defense company last year. Russians are escalating that and that
is a hybrid war that NATO frontline states will increasingly
respond to and it's a lot more dangerous for the
world than the war going on, which is largely contained
(12:15):
at this point between Russian and Ukraine.
Speaker 3 (12:17):
Well, a lot of those things you just described, drone
or parachute or whatever, could certainly be described as attacks
if you wanted to, And then an attack on one
is an attack on all. With the NATO countries, do
you think that holds if one of these countries is
attacked by Russia, would we honor that Article five?
Speaker 2 (12:42):
I think that the Europeans are unconvinced that it would.
I think that it is a very big difference between
sending in a whole bunch of tanks and invading a
country and doing all the stuff that we just talked about,
which are clearly attacks. But it's harder to say that
you're at war. And the Russians are very aware of that.
(13:03):
You saw that the Danish Prime Minister just in the
last twenty four hours said that if Greenland is invaded
by the US, that would be the end of NATO. Well, sure,
but Greenland is not going to be invaded by the
United States. They're not going to send in the airborne.
What they're going to do is affect local elections and
spend a bunch of money, and some of it'll be
over it, some of it'll be covert, some of the public,
(13:24):
some of it'll be private sectors. On'll be the Trump family,
that kind of stuff. And is that going to destroy NATO?
How do you respond to that? I mean, this is
the playbook, right, is this gray war that is, you know,
sort of under the surface. It's not sending an American
bombers and that's a lot harder responding to Ian.
Speaker 1 (13:45):
My final question for what it's worth is I was
reading a bit of Risk number ten, the water Weapon,
which was interesting, and I was looking at the chart
of the most you know, water starved places on Earth,
and that included, of course, large swaths of Africa. I
was a little surprised that there wasn't more emphasis on Africa,
as it is so big, so populous, There's so much
(14:07):
wealth there, much of it untapped, and so much instability.
What's your quick take on Africa going forward?
Speaker 2 (14:14):
The big piece there was the Sahel because that's where
you see isis like organizations becoming a lot more powerful,
The so called Coup Belt of Africa, where a swath
right across north Central Africa, all these countries that have
had coups and have no effective governance whatsoever, and a
lot of Islamic radicalism is emerging and no resources to
(14:34):
speak of. There are certainly parts of Africa that have
a lot more money, but they are really tech sparked.
They are electricity starved, and those are the tools that
you need to unlock the human capital of a billion
people and make them participate in the global economy. So
we've got to electrify Africa and then we have to
get these people access to new tools, to new technologies,
and that is happening much more slowly than it needs to.
Speaker 3 (14:57):
So before we let Ian Bremmer go, we got to
ask you about number one, obviously, US political revolution.
Speaker 1 (15:02):
What are you talking about there?
Speaker 2 (15:05):
I'm saying that you've got a president that believes that
the political system was weaponized against him by the Democrats
in the US, that that's why you had unprecedented two
impeachments and all of these felony charges and convictions and
even an assassination attempt to And whether or not you
agree with that, he believes his supporters believe that that
(15:28):
means that with urgency they must weaponize this US system
against the Democrats, the administrative state, the power ministries like
the Department of Justice and the FBI, and and the
checks and balances on the president. And I expect that
Trump will not succeed in this revolution, but he is
certainly trying his best, and that is leading to significant
(15:50):
norms and institutional checks being broken pretty much every day.
Since the United States is the most powerful country in
the world, that kind of political turmoril eternally, especially because
it'll have long term consequences in the United States and globally,
has to be your top risk.
Speaker 1 (16:06):
I really enjoyed your comparison of Trump with FDR, another
great norms breaker in American history. That was thought provoking.
Speaker 2 (16:14):
I thought it was important because he's the most revolutionary
president in history. So you look at okay, well who
did more? And you know, FDR tried to break norms
and he failed. His big efforts to go outside the system,
the effort to pack the court from nine to fifteen,
he couldn't do. The effort to purge the Democratic Party
(16:34):
of all those that weren't loyal to him, he failed
at and he ultimately had to get the New Deal
and the expansion of the executive He had to do
that through the legislative process, and so there were dramatic
transformations of how powerful the US government was. But the
checks and balances actually became stronger, not weaker after FDR.
In the case of Trump, of course, it's very, very
(16:57):
different from that. Everything he has focused on is an
effort to ensure that the presidency operates above checks and
balances and above rule of law.
Speaker 1 (17:06):
So this has got nothing to do with your risks.
Speaker 3 (17:08):
But I wonder what your thoughts are on it, because
I think about it a lot when Trump. I just
I was just doing the math the other day, and
my oldest son is going to be able to vote
in the twenty eight presidential election, and I can't believe that.
But when Trump leaves the scene, are we going to
go back to anything like the olden days?
Speaker 1 (17:25):
Or is this just our going to be this way
for a while.
Speaker 2 (17:30):
I don't think Trump is the cause of this. I
think he's a symptom. I think he's a beneficiary, and
I think he's clearly an accelerant. But if you look
at the demands from average Americans who thought that their
elites their leaders, not just in politics, but in media
and in corporates and banks and others, universities that they
(17:51):
were doing very well, but at their expense, and running
these forever wars on the backs of the poor and disenfranchised,
and engaging in foreign free trade and globalism, and exporting
labor on the backs of them, and letting in all
these immigrants on the backs of them. However much you do,
WO don't agree with those outcomes. These things have been
(18:12):
coming for decades and they've not been addressed. It's not
been a dressed by the Democrats effectively or the Republicans affective.
Speaker 3 (18:17):
I agree with you, and that's how you get Trump.
That's how you get Bernie. That's how you get the
Tea Party.
Speaker 1 (18:21):
A lot of that. I was going to say, it
hasn't been addressed in France or Germany either.
Speaker 2 (18:25):
They've been addressed badly in France and Germany too. At
least the United States, though it hasn't addressed it, and
the trust and legitimacy isn't there. At least you've had growth,
and growth helps, right if you're going to have a
poor social contract, at least if boats are rising, and
you know, but an affordability crisis makes it harder stagnant
(18:46):
wages makes it harder. And you know, the one thing
that Trump has been very popular, of course, is no
new wars. And here you talk about Iran, you talk
about Venezuela, and yes, bombs are flying, but that's not
what people. Americans aren't angry and bombs flying. American kids
love shooters, come on, that's what they spend all their
time doing. But they don't want you to send them
(19:07):
into the ship. And that is what Trump is not doing.
In fact, I think if the United States were required
to send troops to Venezuela, I bet he'd go the
Russian route and he'd send mercenaries because he really doesn't
want to send American men and women into harms.
Speaker 1 (19:23):
Way interesting, always stimulating. Ian Bremmer, President of Eurasia Group
Eurasia Group's Top Risks for twenty twenty six. Ian always
appreciate the timeless talk again.
Speaker 2 (19:33):
Soon that great talk to you guys, be good like.
Speaker 3 (19:35):
So that's interesting and I absolutely agree with him and
not the first people who have come up with this
that the Times you know called for Trump more than
he made the Times you know, and Bernie too. Bernie
fits into that obviously with a lot of the same
complaints and gripes, and if the Democratic Party hadn't intervened,
(19:57):
he would have been their nominee a couple of different times.
So it's not going to end with Trump leaving the scene.
But what I wonder is we have a people are
upset about the elites and the way things are working
and working class people and a lot of stuff. Now,
way do we have a giant economic crisis, which we
absolutely could.
Speaker 1 (20:18):
Have given our levels of spending beyond our means.
Speaker 3 (20:22):
I think it's inevitable, right, and the unsettled nature of
the world and everything like that, we hit a really
really tough economic point.
Speaker 1 (20:29):
Who knows where our politics go at that time? Right, right?
And I would argue that the Trump to your question
about whether we go back to the good old days?
Will know is the answer to that. And I know
you know that. But the Trump situation is so unique,
because Trump is so unique, These times are odd, they
(20:51):
are changing so quickly. JD. Vance will not be picture
the trumpiest, most loyal, obvious air apparent. It's probably JD.
I don't know. Steven Miller got help us and I
agree with him a lot, but uh, even JD. Vance
could not do Trump like Trump did Trump and get
(21:12):
the same reaction and or lack of reaction, the same cooperation,
the same opposition. It would just it would be different.
You know, the world keeps us spinning and changing.
Speaker 3 (21:22):
Yeah, I was trying to find God, I had this,
and I never got this on the air.
Speaker 2 (21:28):
Darn it.
Speaker 3 (21:29):
Gavin Newsom's post on New Year's Day, and it was
one hundred percent out of the Trump playbook.
Speaker 1 (21:37):
I'll get it on the radio show tomorrow.
Speaker 3 (21:39):
But it was basically Happy New Year to everybody except
the evil Maga Republicans who want to destroy you know.
It was it was it was trying to emulate Trump,
you know, the way Trump does that on Merry Christmas,
except for my you know.
Speaker 1 (21:53):
Awful enemies blah blah blah.
Speaker 3 (21:56):
And I thought, well, here's your answer to whether we're
not going back to the olden days?
Speaker 1 (22:00):
Are not.
Speaker 3 (22:01):
Gavin Newsome, the most likely person to be nominee at
least at this point for the Democrats, thinks that's the
way to get elected president is to be like Trump today.
Speaker 1 (22:10):
He does today, he does. I think when it goes out,
it'll be like wearing your disco where in nineteen eighty
when it's out. It's all the way out, and people
will be like, not only hey, that's the politics of
five years ago, they'll be pissed off that you continue,
you know, to use hope. You're right, I'm not sure.
(22:30):
Well it might be the new kind is worse. I
don't know. But excuse I'm sorry. I got to concentrate
on this for a second. I'm entering my code using
my credit card. There you go, went through. Good. I
just bought a million acres in Greenland. So it's in
far northwest Greenland. I hear it's pretty this time here.
Good for you. Well, there you go. The risks for
(22:51):
twenty six. We'll see how it turns out. Be afraid,
be very afraid. Extra large
Be afraid, be very afraid. But of what what are
the top risks for twenty twenty six? It's Armstrong, you
Getty extra.
Speaker 2 (00:09):
Large because four hours simply.
Speaker 1 (00:14):
This is Armstrong and Getty extra large. Well, this is
always fun. We look forward to it like a kid
looks forward to Christmas. Talking to Ian Bremmer, president of
the Eurasia Group, about the top risks of the year
in twenty twenty six looks to be Harry. Indeed, welcome
I and how are you hey?
Speaker 2 (00:32):
Good to talk to you, guys, happen to here?
Speaker 3 (00:34):
First of all, to Joe, I like this list too,
but you look forward to it like you did as
a kid to Christmas.
Speaker 1 (00:39):
That seems a little weird. It's marketing hyperbole.
Speaker 3 (00:42):
Secondly, before we get into the Listy and I was
going to ask you about Nicole.
Speaker 2 (00:45):
All the time, and you know and love fossil fuels
in this country.
Speaker 1 (00:49):
So yeah, it's not beyond me, with a couple of
drinks in me to beat up them all Santa, out
of resentment for you know, my disappointments.
Speaker 3 (00:56):
Before we get to the very cerebral list, I've wanted
to ask somebody about this. They do this on Network
television all the time, and I saw it happen to
you a couple of times where they tease you and
you're sitting on a couch or in a green room
or something like that, and they say, come it to
the next segment, we'll have Ian Bremmer, and then they
put the camera on you. Is that as uncomfortable as
it looks like? Am I supposed to smile or wave
or give a thumbs up? Or what am I supposed
(01:17):
to do here?
Speaker 2 (01:18):
It was most recent on CBS Morning News with you know,
Gail and Company, and it was a shockingly long tease.
And when I say shockingly long tease, I mean there
was no fluffing involved in this, right, It's just me
looking down the can and I don't know. I mean,
I gave it my best stare. I mean I thought
(01:39):
it was. I don't know if you guys were turned on.
Speaker 1 (01:42):
No, it's tough. It's a tough situation. I don't know
what you're supposed to do, but you handle riki Arkad.
Speaker 2 (01:48):
Yeah.
Speaker 1 (01:48):
TV people are good at that. We're we're ugly audio guys,
and so occasionally though we've been in TV settings where
they say, all right, say that line. Then smile, hold it,
hold it, hold it, and we're like, and you know it,
the smile turns into a grimace, turns I'm weird. You know,
I've taken a blow to the head expression. But yeah, exactlyway.
Speaker 3 (02:09):
So we are super into AI stuff around here. So
my first question off the bat about risk eight AI
eats its users. I was just reading Bloomberg's prediction that
companies mostly are still going to be all in on AI.
How do you feel it's going to play out this year.
Speaker 2 (02:25):
I believe they will be all in on AI, but
there's going to be a lot more pressure to commercialize it,
to make money, to provide returns to all these shareholders
with enormous amounts of money they're being spent on these
large language models only getting more complex with more data,
more chips requirements, more energy requirements. And I think that's
fine for a lot of companies that are doing business
(02:45):
to business, that are doing industrial purposes, defense purposes. But
for the companies that are selling AI to consumers, they're
going to need to make profit any way they can,
and that means testing these things real time on society,
on us, on our kids, And I think that's actually
(03:05):
quite a dangerous risk for our political system and for
our mental well being.
Speaker 3 (03:11):
Well, I noticed we talked about this right before the
end of the year, open Altman announcing that they're going
to like focus on the chat GPT, the thing that
people kind of like and not so much to get into,
you know, artificial general intelligence as much.
Speaker 1 (03:25):
So that's what you're talking about.
Speaker 2 (03:27):
It is, And you know, we all know that social media,
when they decided they need to start making a profit,
it became a much less community oriented, much more addiction
and engagement oriented. Well, AI is a hell of a
lot more capable at programming us, at changing our behavior,
making us believe that we're talking to people when actually
(03:49):
we're talking to things that have no affect and are
just trying to get the outcomes they want it wants
out of us. There are people like that in society.
We call them so sociopaths. We don't want to be
around them, right, And yet when it comes to AI,
we're like, hey, go for it, train it on us,
and that that just seems like it is not destined
(04:11):
to go well, especially because the race is so well funded,
it's so fast, and it's not effectively regulated at all.
Because we all just want to win. We just want
to We think it's so amazing. We want this to
go faster and faster. And I do get the fact that,
you know, whenever we talk about government involvement, we also
talk about red tape, and we talk about entrepreneurs not
(04:34):
being able to do the things they're great at. But
here we are talking about public safety and we should care.
We care about that with vaccines, we test those first.
We care about it with GMO foods. But somehow when
it involves like actually programming our minds, it no longer matters.
Speaker 1 (04:50):
Wow, I'm glad to hear you say that. We're big
fans of Peter Bergosi' around here, who's written extensively about
the effects of technology and social media on kids especially,
And I just think giving super powers to the sort
of technology we've already decided is absolutely pathological, especially for youngsters,
(05:11):
seems incredibly dangerous. But there it is on your list
of you know, risks.
Speaker 2 (05:15):
Yeah, and it's also showing up in risk number two
in a very different way that I was.
Speaker 1 (05:20):
Just about to ask about that. Yeah, I hit it.
Speaker 2 (05:22):
Yeah, Well, because here you've got the Americans doubling down
on being the strongest petron state in the world, thirteen
point five million barrels a day of oil production, plus
you know Venezuela, and that the largest oil reserves proven
in the world, all of which is great for American
power in the United States is refusing to keep investing
(05:43):
in solar and wind and batteries and all the things
that are getting much cheaper in terms of energy because
those are woke climate energies. Well, the Chinese aren't particularly woke,
but they do know that they need as much energy
as possible, and they are investing massive in the electric stack,
and they're becoming an electro state while we're a petro state.
(06:05):
The only problem is the electro state is becoming a
lot cheaper at producing electricity every year. So we're going
out there selling twentieth century oil, gas and coal to
countries and they're going out there selling twenty first century
energy infrastructure to countries. And who's going to be better
at powering the AI Who's going to be better at
(06:27):
feeding their people? And the answer is the Chinese. That's
not a position the Americans should be in.
Speaker 1 (06:31):
You mentioned the term the electric stack. Help us understand
that what is that?
Speaker 2 (06:36):
It's everything that is necessary to produce huge amounts of
electricity that is powering our economy. So again, it's nuclear,
it's wind, it's solar, its batteries, and it's all the
infrastructure and the critical minerals that go into that and
the supply chain, the processing all around the world. The
Chinese have been investing in that assiduously for decades now,
(06:58):
in the United States has not. That's when Trump met
with Shijinping. There was such a concern about critical minerals
because the Chinese were capable of shutting them off to
the US and therefore shutting down American corporations and factories.
Speaker 3 (07:13):
That story that came out right before the end of
the year, with China building that just ginormous. The world's
never seen anything like it. Ability to produce electricity got
a lot of attention.
Speaker 2 (07:25):
That's right, so much more than the Americans are actually
bringing to market every year, and that's not something that
the US is prepared politically to actually compete with at
this point.
Speaker 3 (07:35):
So then how does that fit in with Risk seven
China's deflation trap? I mean, can they continue to make
these kind of decisions with their economy and the situation
it's in.
Speaker 2 (07:46):
Yeah, the ordering of the risks is meant in terms
of impact, likelihood and imminence, So seven is a lot
lower than two. And the issue here is not that
deflation doesn't matter. They've had ten quarters of deflation sequentially.
That's a lot, and they don't have consumer demand and
they got massive corporate debt and they're not really willing
(08:07):
to make the stimulus bet to change that. So what's
happening is China is exporting their problems. They're manufacturing an
enormous amount, very cheaply involution the competition is the way
that's called domestically, and that's created a one trillion dollar
surplus that they've exported all over the world in twenty
twenty five. That number will go up in twenty twenty six.
(08:28):
So it will cause some backlash and that will undermine
China's position with some countries, even as they have all
these cheap goods and cheap energy that countries will want.
But it is a much lower order risk that the
Chinese are capable of both managing and kicking down the
road than the US versus China energy risk, which is
a lot bigger at stakes and a lot more gent.
Speaker 1 (08:50):
So just for your edifit case. Yeah, Well, it's interesting
that China is both undeniably an awesome power and a
highly highly troubled economy in society at the same time.
But both are true. So I know some of your
risks are pretty Trump US politics oriented, but we talk
(09:14):
about those so much. We were kind of excited to
talk to you about the things we talk about a
little less, if that's okay with you. I mean, for instance,
Europe under siege and Russia's second front, boy, the state
of Europe. We could go on and on about that.
What do you see as risks there?
Speaker 2 (09:33):
Well, you've got to bring Trump in and the United
short States in here, because it turns out that the
Europeans for decades had been making a big bet that
the United States would continue to support collective security in
the Transatlantic space, would continue to support free trade, rule
of law, and the promotion of democracy. And of course
(09:54):
the United States is not doing that, and Trump is
not the driver of it, but he is certainly a symptom.
He as a benefit sherry, and he's an accelerant and
that is causing a massive problem for Europe. Number one,
because Trump no longer wants to support Ukraine. He's having
the Europeans spend all the money doing it, and you know,
to Trump's credit, frankly, taxpayers are no longer paying for that.
But also the Greenland situation also Trump's saying he doesn't
(10:19):
want a strong EU. He wants to support the eurosceptic
parties that want to bring the Europeans apart, like the
AfD in Germany and the National Rally in France and
Reform Party FORAGE in the UK. And all of that
is happening after the Europeans have not sent on defense.
They don't have high productivity, they don't have the tech companies,
(10:40):
they're not really growing. So they've got a great social
contract that takes care of the people, but they can't
afford it, and they matter less to the United States
than they used to. So the Americans go into Venezuela
and they take out Maduro, and the Europeans are all
privately saying, oh my god, this is legal, this is
better of love. But what do they do publicly? They
don't say that they we're monitoring the situation because they
don't actually have the power to do very much about it.
(11:01):
And that's a big problem for your world.
Speaker 1 (11:06):
And Russia's second front is your risk number five? What's
that all about?
Speaker 2 (11:11):
Well, the fact that all of this is happening while
the Russians see that the Americans are not willing to
hit them hard, They're willing to hit the Ukrainians hard
because the Ukrainians are weaker. That's the best way to
get the Ukrainians to capitulate and end the war in
Trump's view, Well, Russia sees that they know they don't
have to stop, and that gives them more space to
(11:32):
escalate in their backyard. The way Trump is escalating in
his backyard, Well, what does that mean. It doesn't mean
tanks into Poland, but how about weather balloons into Lithuania?
How a drones into Poland and Romania. How about Russian
ships dragging anchor and destroying fiber optic cables in the
North Sea. How about all the money they're spending on
all these people inside the frontline NATO countries to engage
(11:55):
in espionage and destruction of critical infrastructure and even assassination attempts,
as we saw against the CEO of the largest German
defense company last year. Russians are escalating that and that
is a hybrid war that NATO frontline states will increasingly
respond to and it's a lot more dangerous for the
world than the war going on, which is largely contained
(12:15):
at this point between Russian and Ukraine.
Speaker 3 (12:17):
Well, a lot of those things you just described, drone
or parachute or whatever, could certainly be described as attacks
if you wanted to, And then an attack on one
is an attack on all. With the NATO countries, do
you think that holds if one of these countries is
attacked by Russia, would we honor that Article five?
Speaker 2 (12:42):
I think that the Europeans are unconvinced that it would.
I think that it is a very big difference between
sending in a whole bunch of tanks and invading a
country and doing all the stuff that we just talked about,
which are clearly attacks. But it's harder to say that
you're at war. And the Russians are very aware of that.
(13:03):
You saw that the Danish Prime Minister just in the
last twenty four hours said that if Greenland is invaded
by the US, that would be the end of NATO. Well, sure,
but Greenland is not going to be invaded by the
United States. They're not going to send in the airborne.
What they're going to do is affect local elections and
spend a bunch of money, and some of it'll be
over it, some of it'll be covert, some of the public,
(13:24):
some of it'll be private sectors. On'll be the Trump family,
that kind of stuff. And is that going to destroy NATO?
How do you respond to that? I mean, this is
the playbook, right, is this gray war that is, you know,
sort of under the surface. It's not sending an American
bombers and that's a lot harder responding to Ian.
Speaker 1 (13:45):
My final question for what it's worth is I was
reading a bit of Risk number ten, the water Weapon,
which was interesting, and I was looking at the chart
of the most you know, water starved places on Earth,
and that included, of course, large swaths of Africa. I
was a little surprised that there wasn't more emphasis on Africa,
as it is so big, so populous, There's so much
(14:07):
wealth there, much of it untapped, and so much instability.
What's your quick take on Africa going forward?
Speaker 2 (14:14):
The big piece there was the Sahel because that's where
you see isis like organizations becoming a lot more powerful,
The so called Coup Belt of Africa, where a swath
right across north Central Africa, all these countries that have
had coups and have no effective governance whatsoever, and a
lot of Islamic radicalism is emerging and no resources to
(14:34):
speak of. There are certainly parts of Africa that have
a lot more money, but they are really tech sparked.
They are electricity starved, and those are the tools that
you need to unlock the human capital of a billion
people and make them participate in the global economy. So
we've got to electrify Africa and then we have to
get these people access to new tools, to new technologies,
and that is happening much more slowly than it needs to.
Speaker 3 (14:57):
So before we let Ian Bremmer go, we got to
ask you about number one, obviously, US political revolution.
Speaker 1 (15:02):
What are you talking about there?
Speaker 2 (15:05):
I'm saying that you've got a president that believes that
the political system was weaponized against him by the Democrats
in the US, that that's why you had unprecedented two
impeachments and all of these felony charges and convictions and
even an assassination attempt to And whether or not you
agree with that, he believes his supporters believe that that
(15:28):
means that with urgency they must weaponize this US system
against the Democrats, the administrative state, the power ministries like
the Department of Justice and the FBI, and and the
checks and balances on the president. And I expect that
Trump will not succeed in this revolution, but he is
certainly trying his best, and that is leading to significant
(15:50):
norms and institutional checks being broken pretty much every day.
Since the United States is the most powerful country in
the world, that kind of political turmoril eternally, especially because
it'll have long term consequences in the United States and globally,
has to be your top risk.
Speaker 1 (16:06):
I really enjoyed your comparison of Trump with FDR, another
great norms breaker in American history. That was thought provoking.
Speaker 2 (16:14):
I thought it was important because he's the most revolutionary
president in history. So you look at okay, well who
did more? And you know, FDR tried to break norms
and he failed. His big efforts to go outside the system,
the effort to pack the court from nine to fifteen,
he couldn't do. The effort to purge the Democratic Party
(16:34):
of all those that weren't loyal to him, he failed
at and he ultimately had to get the New Deal
and the expansion of the executive He had to do
that through the legislative process, and so there were dramatic
transformations of how powerful the US government was. But the
checks and balances actually became stronger, not weaker after FDR.
In the case of Trump, of course, it's very, very
(16:57):
different from that. Everything he has focused on is an
effort to ensure that the presidency operates above checks and
balances and above rule of law.
Speaker 1 (17:06):
So this has got nothing to do with your risks.
Speaker 3 (17:08):
But I wonder what your thoughts are on it, because
I think about it a lot when Trump. I just
I was just doing the math the other day, and
my oldest son is going to be able to vote
in the twenty eight presidential election, and I can't believe that.
But when Trump leaves the scene, are we going to
go back to anything like the olden days?
Speaker 1 (17:25):
Or is this just our going to be this way
for a while.
Speaker 2 (17:30):
I don't think Trump is the cause of this. I
think he's a symptom. I think he's a beneficiary, and
I think he's clearly an accelerant. But if you look
at the demands from average Americans who thought that their
elites their leaders, not just in politics, but in media
and in corporates and banks and others, universities that they
(17:51):
were doing very well, but at their expense, and running
these forever wars on the backs of the poor and disenfranchised,
and engaging in foreign free trade and globalism, and exporting
labor on the backs of them, and letting in all
these immigrants on the backs of them. However much you do,
WO don't agree with those outcomes. These things have been
(18:12):
coming for decades and they've not been addressed. It's not
been a dressed by the Democrats effectively or the Republicans affective.
Speaker 3 (18:17):
I agree with you, and that's how you get Trump.
That's how you get Bernie. That's how you get the
Tea Party.
Speaker 1 (18:21):
A lot of that. I was going to say, it
hasn't been addressed in France or Germany either.
Speaker 2 (18:25):
They've been addressed badly in France and Germany too. At
least the United States, though it hasn't addressed it, and
the trust and legitimacy isn't there. At least you've had growth,
and growth helps, right if you're going to have a
poor social contract, at least if boats are rising, and
you know, but an affordability crisis makes it harder stagnant
(18:46):
wages makes it harder. And you know, the one thing
that Trump has been very popular, of course, is no
new wars. And here you talk about Iran, you talk
about Venezuela, and yes, bombs are flying, but that's not
what people. Americans aren't angry and bombs flying. American kids
love shooters, come on, that's what they spend all their
time doing. But they don't want you to send them
(19:07):
into the ship. And that is what Trump is not doing.
In fact, I think if the United States were required
to send troops to Venezuela, I bet he'd go the
Russian route and he'd send mercenaries because he really doesn't
want to send American men and women into harms.
Speaker 1 (19:23):
Way interesting, always stimulating. Ian Bremmer, President of Eurasia Group
Eurasia Group's Top Risks for twenty twenty six. Ian always
appreciate the timeless talk again.
Speaker 2 (19:33):
Soon that great talk to you guys, be good like.
Speaker 3 (19:35):
So that's interesting and I absolutely agree with him and
not the first people who have come up with this
that the Times you know called for Trump more than
he made the Times you know, and Bernie too. Bernie
fits into that obviously with a lot of the same
complaints and gripes, and if the Democratic Party hadn't intervened,
(19:57):
he would have been their nominee a couple of different times.
So it's not going to end with Trump leaving the scene.
But what I wonder is we have a people are
upset about the elites and the way things are working
and working class people and a lot of stuff. Now,
way do we have a giant economic crisis, which we
absolutely could.
Speaker 1 (20:18):
Have given our levels of spending beyond our means.
Speaker 3 (20:22):
I think it's inevitable, right, and the unsettled nature of
the world and everything like that, we hit a really
really tough economic point.
Speaker 1 (20:29):
Who knows where our politics go at that time? Right, right?
And I would argue that the Trump to your question
about whether we go back to the good old days?
Will know is the answer to that. And I know
you know that. But the Trump situation is so unique,
because Trump is so unique, These times are odd, they
(20:51):
are changing so quickly. JD. Vance will not be picture
the trumpiest, most loyal, obvious air apparent. It's probably JD.
I don't know. Steven Miller got help us and I
agree with him a lot, but uh, even JD. Vance
could not do Trump like Trump did Trump and get
(21:12):
the same reaction and or lack of reaction, the same cooperation,
the same opposition. It would just it would be different.
You know, the world keeps us spinning and changing.
Speaker 3 (21:22):
Yeah, I was trying to find God, I had this,
and I never got this on the air.
Speaker 2 (21:28):
Darn it.
Speaker 3 (21:29):
Gavin Newsom's post on New Year's Day, and it was
one hundred percent out of the Trump playbook.
Speaker 1 (21:37):
I'll get it on the radio show tomorrow.
Speaker 3 (21:39):
But it was basically Happy New Year to everybody except
the evil Maga Republicans who want to destroy you know.
It was it was it was trying to emulate Trump,
you know, the way Trump does that on Merry Christmas,
except for my you know.
Speaker 1 (21:53):
Awful enemies blah blah blah.
Speaker 3 (21:56):
And I thought, well, here's your answer to whether we're
not going back to the olden days?
Speaker 1 (22:00):
Are not.
Speaker 3 (22:01):
Gavin Newsome, the most likely person to be nominee at
least at this point for the Democrats, thinks that's the
way to get elected president is to be like Trump today.
Speaker 1 (22:10):
He does today, he does. I think when it goes out,
it'll be like wearing your disco where in nineteen eighty
when it's out. It's all the way out, and people
will be like, not only hey, that's the politics of
five years ago, they'll be pissed off that you continue,
you know, to use hope. You're right, I'm not sure.
(22:30):
Well it might be the new kind is worse. I
don't know. But excuse I'm sorry. I got to concentrate
on this for a second. I'm entering my code using
my credit card. There you go, went through. Good. I
just bought a million acres in Greenland. So it's in
far northwest Greenland. I hear it's pretty this time here.
Good for you. Well, there you go. The risks for
(22:51):
twenty six. We'll see how it turns out. Be afraid,
be very afraid. Extra large
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Joe Getty
Jack Armstrong
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