Our 2025 Geopolitical Power Draft

Episode Transcript
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Jacob Shapiro (00:03):
Hello listeners.
Welcome to another episodeof Geopolitical Cousins.
Marco and I are back at it.
Uh, if you are looking for thegeopolitical power draft, that is gonna
happen in the backend of the podcast.
We spend the first 40, 45 minutes orso talking about some things happening
in the world, the Middle East,India, Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine, uh,
and then in the latter half of thepodcast we do a geopolitical draft.

(00:25):
We're picking the most powerful countriesin the world over the next 30 years.
We need your input.
We didn't finish the draft.
We're probably gonna have, we'll completethe draft and have some, uh, some feedback
on it and argue about different placementsand things like that in the next one.
So, um, if you have any questions,comments, concerns, you can email
me at jacob@jacobshapiro.com.
For now, we need to get a, anemail address just for the podcast
itself, but in the meantime, if yousend an email there, it will get

(00:47):
to both me and Marco, I promise.
Um, otherwise.
Uh, hope you are allstaying well out there.
Enjoy cousins.
We'll see you soon.
Alright, cousin, before we start, um, Ithink we have to start with the travesty
that is geopolitical analysts being forcedto fly commercial in this day and age.

(01:10):
I think when we look back 50, 70 yearsfrom now, it would be like NBA players,
you know, today they wouldn't flycommercial at all, but you know, they used
to have to go on buses and things likethat, all of which is a wind up to say why
has the nation of gutter not provided anairplane for you and I to fly around the
world and give our geopolitical briefings?
I mean, like, I think we'rejust as important as President
Trump, don't you think?

Marko (01:31):
I would, I would, I would say in many ways, perhaps we're more important.
I mean, first of all, we both, uh,pride ourselves in our objectivity.
I am a nihilist, bathed in aloofindifference and therefore if you want
me to say nice things about you, youshould provide me with a plane as well.
Although I guess that would like.
Take away that aloof indifference.

Yeah.
You see, I'm the opposite side of this.
Like I'm a, I'm like a true Socraticstudent here, which is I will
continue to say bad things about you.
And because I say these bad thingsabout you, I deserve all of the things
that you're supposed to give me.
So you Cutter should give me this planebecause I will be a truth teller and
tell you about how you're just a random,

Marko (02:10):
what's just another plane.
Come on.
You know, like you have, by theway, uh, no country in the world has
more oversupply than Qatar, and Isay that, uh, because they've built
too many stadiums, too many officebuildings, too much of l and g supply.
There's literally too much of everything.
So just give us an office buildingand an airplane, and I think

(02:32):
that, you know, we'll, we'llbring the demand to the region.
There you go.
Yeah, exactly.
By the way, can I, canI go off for a second?
Can I go off?
Please

go.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
So that's why we have a podcast.

Marko (02:45):
That's right.
Yeah.
I'll link this whole hand wringingover, uh, the United States
of America accepting a gift.
Like, first and foremost,let's be very clear.
Is it a gift to President Trump?
I mean, no, it's not, it'snot his personal plane.
It's a gift to America.
Well,

it, it will be in four years.
His personal plane.

Marko (03:06):
Will it?

Yeah.
It, it reverts to the TrumpFoundation after Trump leaves office.

Marko (03:11):
Oh, okay.
Well, I was about to go off andnow I have nothing to, okay.
Yeah.
And,

and prob probably the, probably the Trump Presidential Library
will be built in Doha for all I know.
It seems like a good place to put Zens.
No,

Marko (03:22):
listen, uh, I mean, I agree.
I agree.
We are.
The hay rigging is appropriate.
Okay.

I don't know.
I, I I think it's still,uh, not inappropriate.
I mean, it, it's, um, yeah, I'm,I'm just double checking myself,
but what were you going to say?

Marko (03:44):
Well, I mean, I was gonna say like, you know, countries do
accept gifts from other countries,and it's perfectly appropriate.
I mean, it can be a favor, itcan be a diplomatic favor, it
can be a, a, a material gift.
It's, it's not inappropriate fora country to try to curry favor
with another one with a gift.
That's perfectly fine.

(04:04):
Uh, the United States of America hasdonated billions, hundreds of billions
of dollars worth of weapons to its alliesaround the world through either vendor
financing or simply through grants.
Um, you know, there was like ahelicopter, uh, gift to the Philippines,
so they wouldn't buy, I thinkRussian ones like this does happen.

(04:24):
So, uh, but if it's gonnarevert to a President Trump's
personal plane, then hmm.
More difficult to defend.

Yeah.
So, so I, I, I'm gladI double check myself.
So, a, b, C News, this is the originalreport and, you know, a, b, c News,
who knows May, and they're, they'reciting sources who have, uh, you
know, a window into the agreement.
But so the idea is that Trump, the Trumpadministration will accept the Boeing 7
47 jumbo jet, which can be used in mediaas Air Force One until shortly before he
leaves office, at which time ownershipof the plane will be transferred to the

(04:55):
Trump Presidential Library Foundation.
Sources familiar with the proposedarrangement, told a, b, c news.
Um, but I, I was gonna double down here.
Like I, I'm, um, 'cause even, like evenmy, uh, my evil nemes twin nemesis, Ben
Shapiro was out there being like, okay,president Trump, like this is not okay.
And I don't get the pearl clutchinglike, okay, so grab him by the pussy.

(05:18):
Didn't matter to you.
And January 6th didn't matter to you.
And all of the odious andgross and corrupt things
that happen in all politics.
I think Trump is just a littlemore open about it than most.
But like all the gross thingsthat happen, this is the one.
This is the one where, oh my God,like this is absolutely unacceptable
that you're accepting this planeto be used for a couple of years.
Yeah, and Trump knows it.

(05:39):
Like he has the measure of hisbase because his base is gonna look
at this and be like, he's a boss.
He got the Middle Eastern guysto give him a fucking plane.
That's awesome.
I also wanna play, and that was my initialreaction too, while the Democrats are
like, aha, proof that he's truly evil,this will be the thing that convinces
the US electorate that he's really bad.
Like my God guys.
Come on.
Well,

Marko (05:57):
you know, first of all, I think we just have to get you and Ben on
the show and call it the Shapiros.
That's it.
That's like, that's like,why are you here with me?
I'm, I'm, I'm a nobody.
You should be with Ben,first and foremost.
That would be amazing.
Second of all, I think what's interestingabout this is that it reveals a level
of discrimination, and quite frankly,not like racism, but Islamophobia.

(06:19):
So it's basically okay if there'sgraft, but if it comes from Qatar,
which you know, like supposedly supportsterrorism, which it really doesn't.
I mean, it's offered a forum fornegotiations and for peace for a number
of different, uh, you know, parties.
It doesn't like, and by the way,who does the finance terrorism?
Come on.

(06:39):
Give him a break.
But when it's cut, they'regiving you a plane.
Yeah, but

like the head, they have the headquarters of Hama.
I mean, you know, it's a little,

Marko (06:46):
you know,

like, I, I get you, but on the spec, like it's a spectrum.
Okay.
It, it's a spectrum, but they're alittle more, they're a little more on
the terrorism spectrum than others.
See, I, I just lost my plane privileges.

Marko (06:56):
You, you definitely lost your plane, but please note Doha.
I still keep my plain privileges.
Look, here's the point though.
Like, I think what, whatdifferentiates this from like, uh,
the crypto coins or everything else?
I think what differentiate isdifferentiates it is that in the mind
of many Indian American public, itcomes from a Middle Eastern country.

(07:19):
Uh, that's on the spectrumof supporting or hosting.
Some odious actors and I think that that'skind of, uh, interesting to me that that
was what triggered the, uh, criticismfrom both the left and the right.

Yeah.
I mean, you know, also CENTCOM is likebased in gutter, so it's like, uh, like
the US military is also there, there too.
Everybody's there together.
Um, well we could go on for a long timehere, but I think this is a good way
maybe to back in Marco jokes aside tosome serious stuff to talk about before
we get into the main reason people arehere, which is another geopolitical draft.
Um, and I think there's a couple waysto skin this cat, but you know, I

(07:56):
think we were prescient to talk aboutthe Middle East and the last podcast
and there has been some developmentthere, um, in the past couple of days.
Uh, prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahufrom Israel, basically saying that
Israel is willing to go alone to defenditself after the US Houthis deal.
Um.
Sources suggesting from the WhiteHouse that President Trump is
frustrated with Netanyahu, like,insert Biden into that sentence.

(08:18):
And it could have been exactly the same.
Um, and there's also, I, I've been verystruck by, you know, the Trump visit and
this huge visit to Saudi Arabia whereyou just were like, Sam Altman is there.
And, um, CEO of Nvidia is there.
The United States, um, just yesterdayannounced that it was getting
rid of some export controls on AIchips and imposing completely new

(08:40):
restrictions on Huawei's AI chips.
You've got people telling localmedia aha, while investors are gonna
have to choose between a Chineseled AI world and a US AI led world.
And I was also just struck, like Isaw a picture of Trump standing with
all these world leaders and then allthese Saudi shakes and all of these
like tech bros and things like that.
And I'm like.
There is such cognitive dissonance for mebecause like who in geopolitics could have

(09:04):
predicted in the year of our Lord 2025,that the most powerful people in the world
would gather in the middle of the Arabiandesert and pay homage to the Saudi Arabian
King in order to make the decisions thatwill decide the future of technology and
AI and all these other different things.
Like it doesn't, like something doesnot compute there, seeing like the
CEO of Nvidia, like, and Sam Altmanlike trying to like ingratiate

(09:28):
themselves to Prince Mohammad binSalman and Trump standing next to him.
Like all that was missing was TobyKeith, uh, may he rest in peace coming
back to like do a, a another conconcert from the Dead for the audience.
So take that whatever direction you want.
But I, I have some dissonancethis morning about all this.

Marko (09:45):
So first of all, I just wanna say that that was a really
prescient, uh, podcast thatyou and I did together, right?
So like, first of all, I thinkyou called the American Pope.
I think that was the same one right?

That was, that was the previous one.
So we're on a roll.
Oh, my roll.
We're like two, two.
Oh, my bad.
We're good.
Yeah.

Marko (10:01):
Okay, cool.
So you called, uh, the Ameri, uh,the American Pope, which was awesome.
This is why you should belistening to this podcast.
I mean, like, who else would've done that?
And then the second thing is that in theother broadcast, uh, episode we talked
about like, Bibi is playing with fire.
Donald Trump is not pro-ISIS Israel.
And what's beautiful about that statementis that I made everybody mad right now.

(10:24):
Right?
If you're on the right, you'relike, no, he is, you know, he
moved the capital to Jerusalem.
I'm like, eh, likenobody cares about that.
Guys.
Like, uh, people who careabout that don't matter.
Lemme just put it that way on both sides.
Sorry.
And then the second thing is like,obviously if you're on the left and
liberal, you're like, of course he does.
He let Israel do whatever they want.

(10:45):
And the truth is that DonaldTrump is pro Donald Trump.
I think if you support Donald Trumpand you give him a lot of benefit of
the doubt he's pro-America, if youare a little bit more nihilist than
maybe objective, you're just sayinglike, look, he's pro Donald Trump.
And the problem with Benjamin Netanyahu isthat his domestic constraints are forcing
him to be extremely aggressive againstPalestinians, whether in GA and West Bank.

(11:07):
And Donald Trump wantspeace and equilibrium.
And so, yeah, like this is whatwe talked about last podcast.
I really don't haveanything to add to that.
Bibi is playing with fire if he thinksthat, you know, uh, the Israel lobby
in the United States of America.
If he thinks that his relationship withTrump, if he thinks that some idiotic

(11:31):
notion of American long-term strategicinterests in backing Israel are going to
save him and his relationship with theUnited States, he is absolutely wrong.
And this could go sideways, very badlyfor Israel over the next 12 months.
Uh, so that's the first thing I think.
I mean, you don't wanna, you wanna picka fight with the US president, like
whoever you are, it's just, it's notsomething you want to do, but especially

(11:55):
if you're a country of 10 million,you know, like why would you do that?

Yeah.
I I, before we move on to the Saudi Arabiastuff, 'cause I really do want to get your
take on that, 'cause you've been thereand, and you've been ahead of this on
me and have a different view than I do.
Um, I think you're right about, um,Netanyahu and I, I wanna make two points.
The first is that I think Netanyahu wasguilty of what a lot of foreign leaders
are, and even some policy makers inthe United States, which is thinking
of President Trump as a useful idiot.

(12:20):
And I think he's many things, buthe's not gonna be your monkey.
You're not gonna pull the strings.
And I think it was in Trump's interestin the first term, and you also
had Kushner very deeply inside theadministration to where, and you know,
Trump had made promises about Iran.
Israel was gonna be a partnerthere, like Israel was useful to
him and that was all useful tohis base and he pushed it forward.
And I think I. My hunch is thatNetanyahu thought, oh, I have

(12:41):
this good standing relationship.
I'm just gonna say nice things.
I'm gonna be the one that's in his corner.
You might remember Israel was likeone of the first countries to say
zero tariffs, like, we're good.
Like please no tariffs.
And then the Israelis were shockedwhen they were on the penguin tariff
list because they thought thatthey had headed it off at the past.
Um, so to your point, like PresidentTrump cares for better and for worse
about President Trump, and so he willdo whatever is in his interest and

(13:02):
he's not a moron as much as peoplemay want to think he's a moron.
Howard Lutnick, I think the discussionabout whether he's a moron is
actually a much more pertinent one.
The second thing though, and I, and I wantto tie this in before you take, take it.
Before we get to Saudi Arabia, says,I wonder if there's a little bit of a
metaphor here also on what's happenedwith India and Pakistan because
the last time we spoke, India andPakistan were going back and forth.

(13:24):
Things were ratcheting up.
You and I were both gettingquestions on Twitter.
Thank you.
Or X or whatever.
Thank everyone for asking you.
What do you guys think about thisas an investment perspective?
Is it World War II or things spiralingoutta control and then we have a
ceasefire, but we have the UnitedStates and President Trump in particular
claiming credit for the ceasefire andnot really taking a Proin Indian stance.
Like Narendra.

(13:44):
Modi's not happy about the waythat the US has intervened here.
He didn't even say that the US haddone anything as part of the ceasefire
in his official comments yesterday.
And it, it was a lot of, what aboutis like, Trump's quote was basically
like, stop trading bombs, trade the nicethings that you make with each other.
Can't you guys get along?
Rather than being like, no, India has aright to defend itself against terrorism.
India is the rightful holder of Kashmir.

(14:06):
India is all the thingsthat India wants to be.
So I wonder like, you know, we can talkabout Israel until we're blue in the face.
It's honestly not thatgeopolitically important in the end.
But I think the same thing just happenedwith India, which is India and Ra.
Modi thought, Hey, Trump is in our corner,so if we have to go after Pakistan or
Kashmir these other things, they'regonna support us a hundred percent.
JD Vance was just here, probably toldus something like that, and yet you get

(14:28):
this little breakout of war and Trumpis like, please stop bombing each other.
I don't want any of this.
I'm not gonna support you.
I just want you guys to stopbombing each other and I wanna take
credit for it 'cause I'm buildingmy resume for a Nobel Peace Prize.
Okay.
Sorry, you go.

Marko (14:41):
I have nothing to add to what you said.
I think that, uh, this goes back to theargument we had, not argument, but the,
the point I made in the last, uh, episodewhere I said that, you know, you can,
you can compare American geopoliticalbenevolence influence, uh, to QE to

(15:01):
just want the liquidity in the markets,which creates distortions and libria.
And the United States of Americais withdrawing that benevolence.
It's changing its outlook.
It's acting like the most powerfulcountry in a world, in a multipolar world.
It's not acting as a providerof hegemonic stability.
Um, and President Trump said somethingyesterday that quite frankly is the

(15:24):
most profound statement by any Americanlegislator legislature on foreign
policy, maybe this entire century,if not even since World War ii.
Um.
Hillary Clinton famously said,America doesn't recognize fears
of influence, which as I joke,is like a ridiculous statement.
It's like, okay, cool.

(15:45):
Um, what does that mean?
You know?
But what President Trump said isthe diametrically opposite of that,
which is, and I'm gonna quote it, is,it is God's job to sit in judgment.
It is my job to defend America.
I will never hesitate to wield Americanpower to defend the United States.

(16:05):
But the point is that it's actuallya really like profound statement.
Uh, the US is not going to judge.
It's not going to be makingmoralistic, normative, moralistic,
or normative calls or claims.
It's not gonna pursue a moralisticor normative foreign policy.

(16:26):
It's going to focus onthe American interests.
And I think that in a way thatis far easier for the rest of the
world to deal with because it'scleaner, it's more objective, and it
doesn't change with who's in charge.
You know, presumably, unless ofcourse somebody replaces President
Trump who says, no, no, no,actually we will sit in judgment.
Um, so I thought that was very importantin dovetail with everything you're saying.

(16:47):
I mean, that is thechange that's happened.
And so that's why President Trumpis open to making deals and being
a peacemaker in an objective way.
In a way.
Um, so it's going to rankle.
It's going to rankle and it's going tofrustrate a lot of countries that thoughts
that they were morally superior, thatthey were on the right side of history,

(17:09):
that they were, uh, fighting with Americaagainst evil and tyranny around the world.
You know, that's who's gonna rankle.
But I think from a just purely.
Objective perspective.
It's also going to make it easier forthe US to actually act as a peacemaker
and create libria around the world.
Not a popular take, especiallywith a lot of our listeners who

(17:30):
lean more progressive and liberal.
But in a multipolar world, I thinkit's very dangerous for the United
States to pursue normative judgmentcalls because it doesn't have the
wanton power to effectively prosecute.
Moral judgment.

Yeah, I, um, I, you, I wanna say that you're right about
the macro, but wrong about the microhere, but, so this was something else
I wanted to juxtapose the, the, themeetings in Saudi Arabia and all these
pictures that have been creating thisdissonance for me at the same time
and much less covered, but covered.
I'm not, I don't wanna saythat nobody is covering this.
Um, the, um, the Clac summit.

(18:09):
So the community of LatinAmerican, Caribbean states is
happening in China right now.
And, um.
One of the things that ChinesePresident Xi Jinping said in his
opening address to the Clac Summitwas China's and the countries of
Latin America and the Caribbean areimportant members of the global South.
Independence is our glorious tradition.
Development and revitalization,our natural right and fairness
and justice are common pursuit.

(18:31):
And as part of that, presidentXi has opened up a new $66
billion Yuan credit line.
That's about $9 billion.
Has talked about all the different sourcesof funding that he wants to do there.
Uh, president Lula from Brazilhad some very strong things to say
about President Trump, basicallylashing out at everybody else on
planet Earth that China is the one.

(18:53):
That has been treated like an enemy,except it's the one that is quote,
behaving like an example of a country thatis trying to do business with countries
which have been forgotten by others.
End quote.
So like more shots firedat the United States.
So while you have Trump and scent andthe Nvidia CEO and all, and you know,
Mohammad bin Salman sitting therein, in Saudi Arabia and announcing
all these investments and plans andmultipolarity and great deep things,

(19:16):
you ironically have Xi Jinping takingup the mantle of, I won't call it
liberalism, but using some of thevocabulary of lib liberalism, using China
to say, we will be the force for good.
We will be the force fordevelopment for a better future.
And by the way, all these countriesthat are in America's backyard that
America has ignored, they're offgallivanting around the Arabian desert.

(19:37):
Uh, you, Brazil, you Chile, you Columbia.
Come to China, take our yuancredit, swap lines, trade with us.
We're interested in closer relations.
The, the juxtapositioncouldn't be sharper to me.

Marko (19:48):
Yeah.
But I, I don't think that you're correctin that it's a moral normative play.
It's merely saying like, we will helpyou with your economic development.
So in other words, president Xi invitedLatin American leaders to basically
make the same pitch as President Trumpis making in the Middle East, which
is that look work with us and we willbring economic development to you.

(20:12):
We're not gonna bring normative,moralistic, you know, policies.
We're not going to give you a lecture.
We will give you a loan.
And I think that that's, so it kindof dovetails with what I'm saying.
I think it's, China's always done whatyou just described, I think over the
past 20 years at least, uh, with abelt and road initiative with, um, I.

(20:35):
Rebuilding supply chains around the world.
I think it's the US that's catchingup to Chinese foreign policy.
In other words, both sides arekind of pursuing the same thing.
By the way, I apologize for my dog.
I dunno what's going on, butyou know, hopefully he's not
gonna tear someone apart.
I'm,

I'm sure he's keeping you safe and I'm, I'm so glad
to have a real disagreement withyou because I think you're wrong.
Um, I think that, um.
China is, is not saying what you'resaying, which is, yes, it's about economic
development, but it's economic economicdevelopment that is driven by openness.
They are making a normative claim thatthe way to growth is no trade barriers.

(21:11):
The way to growth is China needs to beable to import commodities from Latin
America for as cheaply as possible.
And in return you get accessto the Chinese market.
And if you raise protections againstthese commodities, if you raise tariffs
because the United States told youto do so, if you say bad things about
China, or if you embrace Taiwan, uh,you know, some of these countries, the

(21:32):
countries that are remaining in the worldthat still recognize Taiwan over the
United States, most of them in, uh, uh,Latin America, really Central America.
And those have been sortof falling by the wayside.
So Xi Jinping is, he's saying, no,we are the country of openness.
We want free trade.
We want everything to gotogether, and we have these needs.
And if you get these needs, like you'llget access to the Chinese market, you'll,

(21:52):
you'll get your things going forward.
And, and as for Trump, like, um.
I don't know, like you're saying, like,I, I hear you in, in, in trying to make
something out of that speech, and I, Isaw, I saw that speech making the rounds
and about defending, um, the UnitedStates, but it's a particular view of
the United States, and it's about closingthe United States off to some countries.
I mean, he's picking a battlewith China in the long term.

(22:14):
There's something normative about pickingChina as this adversary, although of
course tariffs have gone away now.
So he's like sort of capitulated.
I don't know, but I, I, the, the onlything I'm trying to say is I think
there is something normative aboutChina being the force for openness,
trade openness, and the United Statessaying, no, it's a protectionist world.
There are spheres of influence.
If you, if you, if we don't likeyou, you don't get our ships.

(22:35):
And if you're a company that does badthings, like we're gonna sanction you.
Whereas China doesn't want any of that.
But I think push back if you want.

Marko (22:41):
No, I, I mean, I would just say I think we need to wait like six,
12 months to see where, uh, you know,the trade conflict settles, right?
Because if it settles with America,basically just getting some deals and
ultimately trade continuing, I think then.
We're at the same, you know,nothing really changed.
So I think we just needto see where it settles.

(23:02):
Uh, but yeah, no, it's, it's veryinteresting and I think that, uh, uh,
going back to your original point,you know about, you know, your shock,
that like Saudi Arabia is at theepicenter of a lot of these things.
What I would say is, so to, to take theother side of that, you know, I've been
going to Saudi Arabia for 10 years.
Uh, I grew up part of mylife in the Middle East.
And so, um, been on the groundin Saudi Arabia since probably

(23:26):
2014, uh, once a year except forCovid and a subsequent couple of
years when nobody really traveled.
But, uh, no country has changed moreon the planet than Saudi Arabia.
And I compare what's going onthere to the Maji restoration.
Like that's how profound I think it is.
Uh, I think Saudi Arabia has been besetby a lot of, uh, existential risks

(23:49):
over the last five years, 10 years.
I. And, uh, I think that theirpivot is 180 degree turn.
And the reason that they're able to do the180 degree turn, and this is where I think
Western analysts and just commentators,I think what they don't realize is
how, uh, you know, how absolutelyunnecessary, not, not unnecessary, but

(24:11):
how arbitrary the conservative tiltin Saudi Arabia was in 1979, Saudi
Arabia had very low state capacity.
What does state capacity mean?
It like ability to, like collectrevenue, build an army, defend
itself, pursue a foreign policy.
In 1979, Saudi Arabia hadreally no state capacity.

(24:33):
Um, it had existed as a modernstate for like 15 years at
that point, quite frankly.
And so in 19 79, 2 things happenedthat really threatened the
very existence of this country.
One was the Islamic Revolutionin neighboring Iran.
It brought a dramatic shift to the region.
And the other ones was the attack on theGrand Mosque in 1979 in Riyadh, um, which

(24:59):
Saudi Arabia couldn't resolve by itself.
It had to bring in Frenchintelligence and French special
forces to liberate the Grand Mosque.
So these two things accelerated SaudiArabia stern towards conservatism.
This idea that there's some sort of awahabi link with the origin of Saudi
Arabia, that would be like sayingAmericans have a link with Puritanism.

(25:21):
You know what I mean?
Like relax, like the alliancebetween the wahabi in the bin South
family is freaking 300 years old.
What happened was in 1979, theleadership in Saudi Arabia had to
fight against like this global threat,which suddenly shows up in Mecca.
And so they make a decision, whichultimately was a wrong one, uh, to,

(25:45):
you know, effectively make a dealwith, uh, religious conservative.
Part of society.
Um, and, uh, they spend the next 30years building state capacity thanks
to massive oil wealth and material.
Wealth is the foundationof geopolitical power.
And nowhere can you really seethat more than in Saudi Arabia.
They become more competent in defendingtheir interests abroad and at home.

(26:09):
And I think that the turn in SaudiArabia over the last five, uh,
five, 10 years is really a productof that buildup of state capacity.
Saudi Arabia does not have to havethis alliance, uh, anymore with, uh,
social and religious conservatives.
And so it's discarded them massively.
And I think that nobody understandsjust how thorough this discarding is.

(26:32):
And also I think most people don'tunderstand how arbitrary and non
culturally correct or religiously correctthe alliance was in the first place.
Uh, so yeah, I will, I willsay that Saudi Arabia by 2050.
Will be more or asliberal as Israel in 2050.
There's my profound and uh,controversial statement.

(26:55):
I think this is an inexorable move and Ithink that, um, it's the reason why Saudi
Arabia has become a factor of stability.
I mean, you've got Iranian andIsraeli cruise Miss cells flying over
Saudi Arabia, and it hasn't impactedthe country at all economically
from an investment perspective.
I mean, what's impacting the country moreis price of oil as it always is, right?

(27:17):
So this isn't, this isn't some argumentyou should go and buy Saudi stocks.
That's not what I'm saying.
I. I'm just saying that you shouldprobably get on a plane and go to Saudi
Arabia and see what I'm talking about.
But even when people do that, the problemis that if they don't have the frame of
reference or if they haven't been visitingSaudi Arabia, they don't have the data
points in which to actually understandjust how profound, uh, the changes happen.

(27:41):
I.

Yeah, there's two different things in, in what you're saying.
And by the way, you might be right aboutthat controversial take with Israel.
'cause Israel's rapidly movingin a reactionary direction.
So Saudi Arabia moves this way andIsrael moves the opposite direction they
might meet in the middle of somewhere.
Such is life.
Such is life.
But, um, you know, there's the pointon Saudi Arabia and then there's the
larger point that even if you're right,and I, I'm not sure, like I'll take the

(28:03):
opposite side of that, like the ideathat they're gonna transform oil wealth
into a glittering liberal democracyin the heart of the Middle East, or
glittering liberal constitutionalmonarchy, whatever you wanna call it.
I don't know, like, okay, Dutch disease isno longer real then if they were able to
take the oil wealth and change centuriesof entrenched interests and all these
other things, I, I would take the otherside of it, but fine, leave that aside.

(28:23):
Um, it still doesn't make sense to methat the most powerful people in the
world, or some of the most powerfulpeople in the world are going to, to
Saudi Arabia to make these decisions.
That this is the epicenter ofwhere things are happening.
Because even if I granteverything that you just said.
How is the future of like AI andthings like that being announced
in, in this country right now?
Like, why is President, president Trump?

(28:44):
Well, to be so drawn to it ratherthan some of the other places in the
world that are more geographicallyand geopolitically significant?

Marko (28:50):
So actually, uh, the future of AI will definitely
not be decided by Saudi Arabia.
I mean, it's, I think, uh, the regionis why they're all there, you know?
And look, capital is important.
Material wealth is thefoundation of geopolitical power.
It's not demographics, it's not geography.
Oh my God, for god's sakes.
You know, the United Kingdom,what's its population?

(29:12):
Okay, what's its geography?
What's its climate?
What are their natural resources?
None.
None, none, none.
And yet it conquered the entire planet.
The empire ne the sun neversat on the British empire.
So the reason I say this is becausethere's a concentration of wealth and
capital, and there's a tabula rasaapproach to innovation in these countries.

(29:33):
UAE, Oman, Qatar.
Uh, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, thetabula rasa is very important.
This idea that you can havelike basically a blank slate.
You have capital, let'sdo something with it.
Now Saudi Arabia is actuallynot taking the tech approach.
To be clear, you're not.

(29:53):
This is the first time that I'veactually really seen like emphasis on
tech bros in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia isdoing, I think what's very intelligent.
They basically fired order McKinseyconsultants 'cause they realized
that they're taking them for a ride.
Well done and they've startdone and they're called

well done.
And now, and now please callthe geopolitical cousins and
get us, get us the plane.

Marko (30:14):
We could do it.
Yeah.
Uh, otherwise Qatar will, andyou know how that goes, like
can you really be behind cut?
Like yeah, let's make a pin war.
Who's gonna give us a planeWatch when a plane gets delivered
on my street in Santa Monica.
Like that will be awkward.
You know?
Um, I. I'll get a ticket for sure.
But look, what I'm trying to sayis that Saudi Arabia's actually
adopted industrialization.

(30:34):
They're focusing on actually kindof dirty, like, you know, they're
trying to employ 22 million Saudis.
So they're much differentfrom the other countries.
They're actually a real country.
Mm-hmm.
With like social stratification.
Not every Saudi is amillionaire, you know?
Uh, and this is something alot of people don't understand.
It's a country that needs aservice sector, industrial

(30:55):
sector, and they're doing itvery, very correctly, I would say.
But yes.
Are they gonna get de link from oil price?
No, it's gonna take time.
Or maybe never happen, but UAE.
However, Jacob, I would say think aboutthat country as a country that does have
some advantages when it comes to ai.
Okay.
What are they, well, first of all,what's the biggest downside risk to ai?

(31:18):
It's job losses.
I mean, we all know this.
Well, guess who doesn't care at all?

I, I thought, wait.
I thought the biggest risk of AIwas that it would decide we're all
stupid and take over and kill us.

Marko (31:29):
I mean, fine, fine, but in the process it would lead

to job loss.
We would lose jobs in that scenario too.

Marko (31:36):
Well, I mean, I think, I think, look, go it pretty clear,
the biggest risk to AI is that itsdeployment will be slowed down by
vent vested interests of unions.
You know, like people say, look, oh noman, all the truckers will lose their job.
Well, but will they, or will we saysomething like, trucks can be driverless,

(31:58):
but there has to be human supervisionso that 3 million American men who work
in transportation don't lose their job.
See, that's something thatSaudi Arabia doesn't have.
Uh, sorry, not Saudi Arabia.
UAE does not have a problem with.
One of the interesting advantagesthat United Arab Emirates has is that
their biggest sort of social problem,socioeconomic problem, national

(32:19):
security problem, is that they haveto rely on expats for everything.
From accountants to doctors,to nurses, to hotel staff, to
Uber drivers to housekeepers.
And wouldn't it be great ifyou didn't have to do that?
And so what are the vested interests?
What vested interests exist in UAEthat will prevent the deployment of ai?

(32:41):
And the answer is kind of fewerthan exist in the rest of the world.
And so I would say that thereis an interesting link there.
But overall all I would say isthat I think that the Middle East
is moving in the right direction.
I think it's gonna become a financialcapital for global south flows.
So south to south connectivity, I thinkwhat Abu Dhabi is doing with financial

(33:01):
like capital is really interesting.
And I think what Saudi Arabia isdoing with its industrialization
is interesting too.
Too many Westerners overindex on the line nail 'em.
Hero projects, you know, likeYeah, I think, I think that's

the dis the, the dismemberment of Khashoggi.

Marko (33:20):
I mean, well, yeah, but that happened like how many years ago.
And also, let's not forget theUnited States of it happened,

it happened after 2014,

Marko (33:29):
but the United States of America killed a Jazeera journalists in Iraq.
Okay,

sure.
I mean, I, I don't know that,but if you say that, sure.
That doesn't to defeat the point.
No, it's,

Marko (33:39):
it's a fact.
United States of America shot amissile into Al Jazeera headquarters
in Baghdad or somewhere in Iraq.
Okay.

If you say so, fine.
The Saudi, the Saudis are stilldismembering journalists, like in,
in, during this time p period, thatthey've embraced liberalization.

Marko (33:54):
Well, the plural, the plural is, is awkward in that statement, right?
Yeah.
Number one, the plural is, is awkward.
And the second thing is, you know,uh, Moham bins actually accepted.
That that happens and that thatwas the fault of the state.
Think about that for a second.

(34:15):
When the United States of America killedseveral journalists for Al Jazeera during
the Iraqi counterinsurgency, it waslike, oops, sorry, like raw building.
Like, oh, okay.
All, all, all I would say is that, youknow, uh, if the worst that Saudi Arabia
has done is the death of one singlejournalist, I would say like, let's not

(34:37):
start comparing the ledger on crimesagainst journalism of other countries.
Yeah.
We

can also, we can also talk about the support, like the soft support
of Jihadist Group, blah, blah, blah, blah.
But yes, I, I'd say your point, but that

Marko (34:50):
Okay.
But we should talk about that becauseI would say the transformation
of Saudi Arabia is based on that.
It is not the soft support, it's thehard support for SUNY Islamists mm-hmm.
That caused what you wouldcall an intelligence a, uh.
Wait, I forgot the term backlash.

(35:11):
Hmm.

Yeah, that works.
I think, I think that'swhat you're trying to say.

Marko (35:13):
Yeah, that's what, no, there's a, there's a different term though,
but anyways, by brain thought.
But yeah, that's exactly why they'vetransformed the country, because the
country has clearly realized thatthey were the ones that were gonna
actually hurt the most because oftheir support for Sunni Islamists.
And I think that the moment whenthat really came home to roost
to Saudi Arabia was when Baghdadiproclaimed the caliphate out of Mosul.

(35:35):
Yeah.
You know, because caliphatedoesn't mean that you're gonna
go to Rome or Paris or New York.
It means you need Mecca.
And I think that was the moment whenSaudi Arabia, it was precisely because
of its overt support for Sunni Islamism,that it has changed today so profound.
So, and yes, it's not gonna be a smoothsailing, it's not gonna be a straight

(35:57):
line, and you have all sorts of, you know,you are always gonna have empirical data
points to prove that it isn't workingor that there's like illiberalism.
But I think that, again, you gottago to Saudi Arabia physically,
I think, to see the changes.
Otherwise, you know, isjust not gonna stick.

Yeah, I, I'm reminded of, um, early House of Cards when
House of Cards was actually good,where Remy is running around lobbying
things like that, and Frank Underwoodturns to the camera and is like,
Remy mistakes money with power.
Um, and I had that runningthrough my head when you were
talking about material wealth.
And I also have the fact that dueto low oil prices, Saudi Arabia's
already hit its budget deficit targetfor the year and we're on, we're

(36:38):
not even halfway through the year.
Well, that's fine, fine.
Now they have big coffersand all these other things.
Like I get that they have materialwealth, but it can't go there.
But I think that, um, the, the pointswe were making about the UAE and the
power of city states relative to bigstates, it actually plays very well
into our power geopolitical draft.
But before I hand over the mcduties to you, I think we should
spend literally max two minutes,30 seconds on what's going on.

(37:01):
A little update on Russia, Ukraine.
'cause there's supposed to benegotiations in Istanbul tomorrow.
Will they happen?
Won't they happen?
Is there a ceasefire?
Is there not a ceasefire?
So give me your 60 seconds andmaybe I'll do 60 seconds and
then let's get to the fun part.

Marko (37:16):
Uh, well, I think that we're getting to a point where, I mean, it's
pretty clear that just like BenjaminNetanyahu, uh, Vladimir Putin is
risking drawing the ire of Donald Trump.
You know, and again, this is where liberalcritics of President Trump are gonna
have to eat a lot of crow because he wassupposed to be pro-Russian, you know?

(37:37):
Well, mm. Doesn't look like it.
And if Putin makes a mistake here,like if I was Putin's advisor, I'd be
like, listen bro, you gotta cut yourlosses and proclaim victory ASAP.
Now I know what the problem for Putin is.
He hasn't conquered themyet, which is part of, right.
So he needs to bring all of Donbashome or else a lot of right wing

(37:58):
nationalist bloggers are gonnalike, you know, go after him.
He just needs to cut his losses, sharpenthe bone, saw since you're obsessed
with that point, and start puttingsome of those bloggers, uh, in jail.
Because the truth is you'regonna have to swallow a deal.
You're gonna have to swallow a deal,uh, that maybe some nationalist right

(38:21):
wing lunatics in Russia don't like.
But you know what, whocares about borders?
Don, I'll tell you who,who does not give a fuck?

Yeah, that nihilist, Jay Trump does not kill that.
That.
Nihilist Colon is really wafting today.
The only thing I want to add towhat you were saying is that I don't
know if it was intentional or not.
I don't have the receipts to prove itone way or another, but I did put myself
out there when the Zelensky Oval Officeincident happened and said, I think
actually Zelensky got the better of that.
I think he actually understood themoment better than anybody else.

(38:53):
And I think that's true today becauselike what was the first things that
Zelensky said when the US was talkingabout peace negotiations and Istanbul?
He said, I'll be there assoon as Putin is there.
Like he has been Yes sir.Every step of the way.
And he's also gotten theEuropeans squarely in his corner
because they're afraid of thebig Donald in the White House.
'cause you've had Macron, Germany bothcome out and say, if Russia does not show

(39:14):
up to the summit, additional sanctionsfor Russia, we're gonna get tougher.
So I think Zelensky actually likepushed back against Trump a little bit.
Got the Europeans on board.
Looks like he's the one that's actuallyplaying ball in the aftermath, whereas
Putin is now the one sitting there.
But he wasn't though, likenot quite figuring it out.

Marko (39:27):
I think.
I think you, you, yes, that's correct.
But he wasn't playing ball and he wasobsessed with normative value statements.
Remember when Zelensky, I think, yeah,

I think, I think that was for the cameras.
I think that was all about, oh, ifI position myself here correctly, if
I show myself pushing back againstTrump, I get support at home.
I get support from the Europeans.
I don't really care.
I just wanna make sure thateverybody's on my side.
And you remember when Trump, you were theone who brought this up, that Trump turns
to the TV and says, wasn't that good tv?
I think Zelensky knewthat was good TV too.

(39:57):
And I think he used that net meetingto shore up some domestic support
home, get the Europeans freaked outso that they would support him more.
And now like he walked it back.
So when negotiations got a littlefurther down the road, he's the one
that's meeting Trump in the back.
Well, that's important.
Yeah.
He's the one who's saying, I willshow up in Istanbul immediately.
You tell me where, when, how high tojump, how many rare earth minerals Fine.

(40:18):
And it's Putin is now theone that looks recalcitrant.
I think he played it right.

Marko (40:22):
I mean, I don't think Zelensky played five D chess.
I think I have a more of anOccam's raise view on this.
You know, and it's fine.
We, we disagree, but like, I thinkhe walked in there intoxicated
with the normative moralisticbullshit of the Biden administration
that elevated him into a saint.
And he was shocked, shocked bydenialism of the Trump administration

(40:45):
when Trump basically said, look,you're both the same to me.
You know?
And uh, but to his credit and where we doagree is that he is smart enough to know.
Oh.
Oh, okay.
Oh, okay.
So that's what you want.
You want me to show?
I'm willing to negotiate.
Alright.

(41:06):
Balls in Putin's court then.
And look, I mean, again, I thinkthat the big risk for both Netanyahu
and Putin is to assume is toread New York Times, you know.
Don't read mainstream media andbecome intoxicated with this view
that Trump is somehow pro your side.

(41:27):
You better start dancing when he playsthe tune or else you're gonna feel
the full wrath of the US And if us andEurope get on the same page and they
get those secondary sanctions on, on, onRussia, I think that's kind of game over.

Yeah.
Alright.
We have 45 minutes todo a geopolitical draft.
Take the mic away, my friend.

Marko (41:49):
Alright, cool.
So, uh, this is gonna be onthe title of the podcast.
So if you sort of, uh, expected this, uh,you know, you might have fast forwarded
through the first 45 minutes or not,but what Jacob and I are gonna do is
we're going to pick 10 countries each.
So it's from one to 20, and we'regonna try to make a case for,
you know, what are the 20 mostpowerful countries in the world.

(42:11):
And of course, since our Lordand Savior is Bill Simmons
of the, uh, bill Simmons podcast network.
And the ringer.
He has this thing for basketball, whichis the, I think, trade value draft, right?
Jacob

trade value column.
Yeah, it's a trade value column, but yes.
Yeah.

Marko (42:29):
Yeah.
So basically what what he does is, uh,he picks players not based of just their
skill or their abilities today, butit's their progression in the future
relative to how much they're paid.
Right?
So some rookie who looks like VictorMbma, who is an absolute freak of
nature in the San Antonio Spurs,he's obviously top two, right?

(42:53):
Because he is seven foot 12or whatever the hell he is.
He's incredible.
And he's on a rookie contract.
So what we wanna do is wewanna do the same thing.
We wanna think about thenext, uh, I think 30 years.
Jacob.
Let's, let's look, look at, that's fine.
Yeah.
Like, so not a hundred year time horizon.
'cause that's insane.
We don't know what technologiesare gonna be out there.
We wanna really focus on thenext 30 year time horizon.

(43:14):
And we wanna think about countriesthat are, um, going to be, you know.
The most powerful country geopolitically.
Now, in terms of what, um, what sortof rubrics we're gonna use, what
sort of, um, variables, what sort ofattributes one would use for this?
We're gonna probably havedifferent views on this.

(43:36):
So, uh, there's something calleda National Capability Index.
It was created by the Correlatesof War Project in 1963.
Um, this is an extremely outdatedway to measure geopolitical power.
It has things like military personnel,like how many men with weapons,
you have iron and steel production.

(43:58):
Um, it has, uh, although, you know,somebody like Donald Trump might
be overindexed on this since he'sobsessed about iron and steel, but
it's a very Cold War era index.
You can go and you can take a look at it.
Um, the political scientistwho created it back during the,
uh, cold War was David Singer.
He was the founder.
He's a political scientist,university of Michigan.

(44:19):
You can download it online.
China's actually number one on this, andI think that it's because it's outdated.
You know, it looks at demographicsin a very one-to-one basis.
Uh, in my own research, I'vecreated something, um, that I
call the Geopolitical Power Index.
And it, uh, looks at, uh, alittle bit of different four
variables, uh, on population.

(44:40):
Uh, I adapt the original population,me measure by penalizing countries with
large dependency ratios, so old to youth.
Um, and so, uh, I make make theargument that it's not just the
size of your population, it'salso the demographic, uh, pyramid.
Uh, the second is globaleconomic relevance.
So the original index reallyfailed to capture a relevance

(45:02):
for the global economy.
So there was no globalist future.
So what I look at is contributionto the global final demand.
The more an economy imports, I argue thegreater its bargaining power in terms
of trade vis-a-vis geopolitical rivals.
So what matters to me isimports as percent of uh, GDP.

(45:23):
And then for the military, Idon't really look at things
like, uh, maned wood weapons.
I look at whether you havetechnological cap capacity.
Uh, so I have this quantitative measure.
There's a couple of other things as well,r and d. Um, I look at that as well.
That's part of the index.
I'm not actually going to use this index.
I'm gonna deviate from it becausewe're thinking about the future.

(45:44):
But I'm just saying that there's aquantitative basis for some of my picks.
Did you wanna say anythingbefore we start, Jacob?

Yeah.
Yeah.
I do wanna say something about, uh,before we start, and by you and I,
we haven't talked about this when Iwas still at GPF with George, we, uh,
when we were trying to sell GPF forto institutions for subscriptions,
we created the GPI, the GeopoliticalPower Index, which I have not gone back
to since I left, uh, George in 2019.
But we did a similar, uh, sort ofexercise, so that's really funny.

(46:11):
Um, I was actually, I, I, I'm actuallyreminded of something that, um,
I, I don't know if Roger trained,trained you, Marco, but when I was
a, an intern at, at Stratford, Rogerwas the one who was like overseeing
Roger Baker development program.
He's still

Marko (46:24):
a Stratford, I believe.
Roger.

Yep.
He is.
He is.
Uh, don't take this the wrong way,Roger, queen of the ashes, if you will.
Um.
So, uh, a little Game of Thrones,denars, storm born reference there.
So, but, um, he, I, I remember manyof the things that Roger taught, and
Roger's been on my podcast too, so ifyou wanna know who Roger Baker is, he
doesn't have a big, um, he does nothave a big following, I don't think.

(46:46):
'cause he never really wanted that.
But in some ways he like trained.
He was the one actually traininga lot of us in the brass tacks,
but he always told me, geopoliticsis not a science, it's an art.
Agreed.
It's more like agreed making potterythan it is about, you know, figuring out
statistics and quantitative measures.
And I've always remembered that.
It was always super helpful for me whengoing into really quantitative spaces
and having the confidence to be like,okay, like, great, you have statistics.

(47:07):
I also have statistics, likeI have a very nice index here.
I can make the index say whatever I want.
I can find a chart or a piece ofdata that will support any viewpoint.
In the end, the more important thing isto qualitatively say, what do I think?
This is gonna happen.
And so when I think about power, for meit boils down to really one key question.
Can this country make you dosomething you don't wanna do?

(47:28):
And to the extent that a countrycan do that to you, I will add
checks in in the power basis.
So it's not like I'm justthrowing darts at the wall here.
Then we have to think about thingslike, like you said, population.
I think nuclear weapons isa really tough one here.
And one I really struggled with, isit all the nuclear countries first
and then non-nuclear countries?
Below are are, if you're like a middlingnuclear power, like in Israel or a

(47:49):
Pakistan, okay, you have nukes, but doesthat mean you're more powerful than in
Japan who doesn't technically have nukesbut has all these other, like that was
one thing that I really struggled with.
But yeah, for me it's all about wecan have all these indicators, we can
look at all these different things,but comes back to the question, can
this country make another countrydo something that it doesn't wanna
do more than other countries?
And that was my ultimate sort of rubric.

Marko (48:10):
Uh, brilliant.
And I absolutely agree with you.
It's not a science at all.
So I wanna just start off by sayingthat yes, I have a quantitative index
and I'm gonna deviate from it quitesignificantly, just to be clear.
Um, yeah, that's it.
Um, I, I

do too, and I will, and I will deviate from it.
Everybody has aquantitative index and chat.
GPT probably has quantitative indisease better than any of ours.
But the thing that will keep usrelevant for the next 30 years
is like, it's not that easy.
Like, that's what keeps us in business.

Marko (48:37):
Well, yeah, and, and I think the point is like, let's, let's really
think about some non-linearity here.
Like, uh, given the technology andgiven where we're going, you know,
what are some of the countries that Ithink are going to be, uh, interesting
Now, nuclear power is interesting.
I think it's absolutely critical.
Um, I, I would answer thatquestion to you, Jacob, by saying
that there are countries outthere that are nuclear powers.

(48:59):
You know, like Japan, let's not joke here.
If Japan wants a nuclearweapon, it's, it has one.
Yeah.
The other one that, that I thinkis interesting is population.
Uh, I think that you will noticethat I will, uh, completely and
utterly dismiss demographics.
I think that, I think that weare way too obsessed with it.
Um, probably because anyone can downloaddata from the UN and then be an expert.

(49:23):
And the truth is that we're getting aton of innovation in AI and automation
that literally makes humans irrelevant.
And so not irrelevant, butlike I. Population size.
And I still hear this nonsense aboutRussia not being able to feel the
military 'cause his population isdeclining or China having a problem

(49:44):
'cause it has not enough men.
What are people talking about Jacob?
We're not fighting warswith millions of men.
Right?
Like

I'll, I'll be, I'll be less diplomatic than you are.
Peter Zhan is talking aboutthings on his YouTube channel in
order to get clicks and listen.
And also if you wanna talk aboutdemographics, you can go read the fourth
turning or whatever else, which I famouslytake shots at whenever I have the chance.

Marko (50:04):
And, and for good reason.
I mean, look, India supposedlyhas great demographics.
Really.
I think I used this on this podcastbefore, like India, there was recently
a Indian railways like job application.
For like 900 a job openings,2 million people applied.
Like it's more difficult to get ajob in Indian railways than to get
into Harvard, uh, Northern Africa.

(50:26):
The countries of Northern Africathat started Arab Spring had gorgeous
population pyramids for God's sakes.
You know, just having a lotof young people doesn't mean
that you're gonna be fine.
In fact, in many ways you're not gonnabe fine because you have too many
young people that you can't employ.
So anyways,

yeah, no, and thing I would just to make the point the
most in India's gdp, d per capita,you'll see that in my, is just
above that of the Republic of Congo.
So like, population can be a curse ifyou have too much and you're not wealthy
enough to spread the wealth around.
Yes.
Go on.
Sorry.

Marko (50:57):
Yeah, yeah.
No, so I'm just saying like, youwill see that in my, uh, deviation.
I, I think given technology and given thatdemographics is a, a double-edged sword.
Think of it as a double-edged sword.
Mm-hmm.
It can cut both ways.
Alright, so let's start, I'm gonnastart this time around because, um, you
know, I've spent a lot of this, uh, uh,podcast relationship with you, Jacob,
uh, kind of bashing the idea of American,uh, unipolarity and hegemony and, uh,

(51:23):
you know, I've been talking about themultipolar world longer than Xi Jinping
and Vladimir Putin, for God's sakes.
You know, so I'm gonna startoff by picking the United
States of America as number one.
Of course.
I think, you know, I think we allagree, um, and this is very important
for those who listen to this.
America is not a hegemon.
It does not have preponderance of power.
It cannot force you to do things witha phone call, as it did famously in

(51:47):
the Sue crisis is 19 56, 57, I believe.
Uh, but it's still the mostpowerful country in the world.
And I wanna, this is about the next30 years, and I just think that,
um, I. Not to be glib, but in thisparticular case, I think it does
help that geography is what it is.
Uh, to give Peter Zion the point, youknow, it is surrounded by two oceans.

(52:09):
That is absolutely correct, andit's really far from everywhere.
Um, technology is narrowingthat geographical gap,
cybersecurity, other issues.
Obviously we all agree with that, buthe has a lot of natural resources, and
most importantly, even at its darkestmoments, it does rediscover itself.
That is kind of the beauty of theAmerican Democratic experiment.

(52:31):
Uh, many people who are losing theirmind about Donald Trump today should
just read more about 1971, honestly, andsee how dark that period of time was.
Or just watch some moviesthat were made in that period.
I mean, they're all dark and rainyand depressed and everybody's sad and,
you know, like doesn't wear deodorantand like, you know, just lots of like.

(52:52):
Bad cars and dark, dark themes.
And so what I would say is that, yeah,I would pick United States of America.
I don't even think we'd reallytalk about it, but US is the most
powerful country in the world.
Uh, it's head and shouldersabove everyone else.
And as I always say, thatdoesn't make you a hegemon.
To be a hegemon.
To be unipolar, you have to behead, shoulder, torso, hips.

(53:13):
That's not the case anymore.
Yeah.
But it may be in the future.

Yeah.
Yeah, I, I'm with you.
I, I, it's not just that the UnitedStates can't do things, uh, make people
do things with a phone call anymore.
I mean, we talked about theHouthis at the very beginning.
Apparently the Houthis shot down drones.
They got close to shooting down an F 35,if you believe some of the reporting.
So like part of the, the sea changein, in, you know, us, uh, posture
towards the Houthis was about not evenbeing able to do what, you know, the

(53:37):
US did to the Houthis under, or excuseme, not to the Houthis, but to a, an
Iranian threat to Persian Gulf shippingin the late 19, I believe it was.
Was that Reagan or Bush?
I can't remember which one itwas, but the late Reagan 1980s.
But to your point, operat,I als I also praying.
Yeah.
So sorry, praying Mantis.
Yeah.
But I also had the US number one, even,even though I say all the things that
you do, um, and I, my guess is thatour first two picks will be the same

(53:59):
and then things might get interesting.
Um, but my second pick isgonna be, um, I'll, I'll take
China number two on the board.
Um, I think that's also pretty clear.
Um, and I think the greatest threatto our multipolar thesis, and I say
that all the time, is that it we'rereally headed towards another bipolar
world where it's the US on the oneside and China on the other side.
Um, China has huge problems.

(54:21):
It has structural economic problems.
It has hundreds of millions of, youknow, impoverished peasants that
need to enjoy enrichment that thecoastal cities have enjoyed thus far.
Um, it has resource constraints, so it,for the first time in Chinese history,
it can't feed its own population.
It has to go out and import, you know,food and energy and capital and technology
and all these other different things.
So there's lots of different challengesthat China has, but, uh, you know,

(54:45):
don't put me in the category of anyof these people who have been, you
know, your Gordon Changs or your PeterHans who have been predicting the
imminent collapse of China for decades.
Which is to your point, like, you know,if you, if you're worried about the
United States, go back, watch the 1970s,could say the same thing about China.
Go back to like the um.
The cultural revolution, or go back tothe, the famines that Mao caused with

(55:05):
some of his, uh, disastrous policies.
Even go back to the demographicdecline that people were predicting
for China in the 1980s, 1990s.
This is the country in theworld that makes things.
It's the manufacturing heart of the world.
All of that expertise,all of that human capital.
Um, it's positioned geographically likeit's going to be here for the long haul.
Uh, maybe it's not the ChineseCommunist Party, like it could be a

(55:27):
soft sort of revolution and some, someother sort of regime gets ushered in.
Like, I'm not wedded to it beingnecessarily the current regime.
I think it will be the current regime,but I'm not currently wedded to that.
But I don't think we're gonna go backto like a warring states period where
the different regions of China willbe fighting each other and different
regions around, or different countriesaround it will go take points.
Like I think China is very clearly thenumber two and probably, you know, 30

(55:49):
years from now, probably nipping onthe heels of, of US power as, as being
the first in that multipolar world.

Marko (55:56):
I think the technological innovation that's happening
in China is endogenous today.
It's not copied anymore.
I think that was the nineties.
That was the early two thousands.
They are now creatingnew innovative things.
And so, and you know, by the way,it's not just military dual use stuff.
It's like stuff like paymentsystems here in America.
I mean, I still write physicalchecks, you know, like, and, and I

(56:21):
remember, uh, uh, my good friend whoworked with me, um, at my previous
job, he would always like joke.
He was like, he had to write a check'cause he lived here in Santa Monica.
He was like, what is this?
You guys don't have likeinstant payment solutions.
Like, this is America, you know?
So, uh, I agree with you.
I think China is second.
This is the one of those wheredemographics is real problem.
You know, like, yes.

(56:43):
Chinese demographics are not great.
The problem is that it could stall theirGDP per capita, but it could also actually
help maintain some upward trajectory.
If GDP continues to grow at even athree to 5% pace as the per capita part
narrows, your wealth could actually Yeah,

just to keep it And, and I'm glad you say that 'cause because I
have two rejoinder to the demographic,uh, argument on China if you think
the demographic argument is operative.
Okay, but then Japan is gonna collapsefirst and so is South Korea and
so are a bunch of European states.
So it doesn't make sense to sayChina's got the bad demographics, but
all these others are gonna be okay.
No.
Like these other countries aregonna hit the, the bug that are
gonna hit the windshield first.

(57:23):
The other thing is that China hashundreds of millions of people, I
already referenced them, who areimpoverished living in the interior.
So most countries don't have hundredsof millions of people that they could
bring into the middle class to increaseconsumption and things like that.
So are you gonna get a baby boomin China over the next 10 years?
No.
But if you could redistribute incometo those hundreds of millions of poor
people and have them buying made inChina, air conditioners and everything

(57:46):
else, then you get the equivalent ofthat consumption boost as a result.
So if they handle the macro correctly,it's not like Japan has an interior where
it can go find 200 million poor peoplethat it can get to consume things like
most countries don't have that relevance.
And the other thing I wanna sayhere is that demographics, you said
it's a double-edged sword, it'salso a static present indicator.

(58:06):
Like, you know, we're fighting linearity.
You have, we have no clue whatdecisions Chinese families are gonna
make and how many babies they'regonna have 15 and 20 years from now.
If the Chinese government comes out andsays, there is now a three child policy.
Maybe they'll have a huge demographicboom, 20 years from now, maybe
the Chinese people will get moreoptimistic and start having more kids
may, you know, there's a whole bunchof different opportunities there.

(58:27):
So I think we can point to demographics assaying this is a big issue and it requires
focusing on everything from roboticsto internet of things, to enriching
the interior of China, et cetera.
But the idea that we're gonna projectthe decisions that a billion people
are gonna make about how many childrenthey're gonna have, like, I don't
have the hubris to, to make that call.
And I think we've seen that, youknow, there are ways around it and

(58:49):
more ways around it for China thanthere are for other countries.
Okay.
Sorry.

Marko (58:53):
No, it's all good.
Okay, so, uh, I'm gonna dosomething now that's unfair.
I'm gonna take basically 1, 2, 3,4, 5, 5 countries off the board.

I was wondering.
Okay, go ahead.

Marko (59:09):
I'm gonna take the EMU five.
So this is the top five countriesin the European Monetary Union.
Uh, just let's call it Western Europe.
Uh, I don't wanna call it the EU 'causeit's not, uh, that will be also unfair.
So I'm gonna take Germany, France,Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands.
Off the board.
We are talking about the next 30 years.

(59:29):
I believe, I conviction viewthat Europe will become a
confederation, not a federation.
United States of Europe will never happen.
If that is your mark of success,then you will disagree with me.
But I do think there arealternatives to a federal union,
and one of them is Switzerland.
You know, it's, it's a confederation.
Um, the first iteration of theUnited States of America, the

(59:52):
articles of Confederation wasgoing to be something similar.
Uh, obviously the United Statesat the time was a very weak, weak
country, afraid that the UnitedKingdom would come back, which it did.
And so it needed a federal entity.
Instead of a confederal.
I don't think Europe needs that.
Um, several things thatare going for Europe.
First demographics again.

(01:00:13):
Everybody thinks Europehas terrible demographics.
This is false, and no,not because of Syria.
Asylum seekers, for God's sake,stop watching YouTube videos.
Europe is fine because ithas one of the greatest.
Western Europe has one of thegreatest heists in geopolitics.
It's called the EU labor market.

(01:00:33):
It allows somebody from Poland,Bulgaria, Romania, to move to any
place in the EU and get a job,which means that Western Europe gets
educated, ready to work familiesto just show up and start working.
Now, the problem was that UnitedKingdom stole most of these immigrants
because Eastern Europeans speak English.

(01:00:53):
They don't speak French or German.
But now that the UK has decided topull out a revolver and shoot itself
in the foot and depart the EU preciselybecause of this one advantage.
Um, it can have fun trying tofind immigrants somewhere else.
Western Europe doesn't.
It has ready-made, educated,hardworking eastern Europeans to suck

(01:01:16):
like a vampire from Eastern Europe.
So if you wanna pick Poland, if youwanna pick an Eastern European country,
just beware that they are going tostruggle to keep their demographics,
which are already bad, stable.
Uh, so that takes care of theusual reason people hate in
Europe, which is demographics.
The other one is technology.
Yes, China is obviously challenging,uh, European manufacturing, but one

(01:01:40):
of the things I would never discountis German ability to reinvent itself.
Germany reinvented itself numerous times.
It's not gonna de industrialize.
Uh, there's a lot of mythologicaltechnological innovation that
only Germany has and uh, soI'm gonna pick Western Europe.
I think that the reason theworld will remain multipolar.
Is because what?
Because Donald Trump has bestowedupon Europe and also Vladimir Putin,

(01:02:04):
a reason to finally integrate.
As we talked before, youknow Jacob, I don't think
countries are born out of love.
I think countries are born out of fear.
And finally, I think Europeans havesufficient fear to integrate further.
So I'm picking Western Europe.

Jacob Shapiro (01:02:22):
I mean, you gotta have a little bit of both.
You gotta have love of one's own, andyou do have to have, uh, fear of what
somebody else might do to your own.
In some sense, fear might actuallybe the secondary because you're
afraid of what somebody might do tothe people that you truly do love.
So I think I would take themore romantic, uh, sense there.
I want you to know, uh, I was reallystruggling with what to do with
Europe and I, I disciplined myselfby saying I can't pick a block.

(01:02:42):
I, I have to have a single country.
And if, um, I would've hadFrance as my number three.
Oh, wow.
My number three choice wasFrance, just by itself.

Marko (01:02:51):
Wow.

Trade value.
So like,

Marko (01:02:52):
this is one of those you're buying low.
Well done, well done.
Okay.
Well then well buying

low, they've got nukes, they've got the military, they've got
the, but you know, you, you've taken them.
But I just want listeners to know, like,even, even without the other four Wow.
Like I would've had France number three.
Wow.
Soft power and

Marko (01:03:06):
wow.
I, I mean, I feel somuch, listen, just to.
Yes, I kind of cheated, but thisis about the next 30 years and
I have a high conviction viewthat I'm picking for the future.
They will integrate further.
And the other thing I wouldsay is it makes it more fun.
'cause like you pick France,I pick Germany, then we pick
Spain in Italy at some point.
Come on.
Like me, you know, let's go.
No, and it's right.

No, and and cheating would've been taking
the EU 27, which you didn't do.
You took the EMU fiveand said, confederation.
Strong word.
It's this block that you'resaying that it's, you're not like
extrapolating linearly from here.
So I think you're totally good.
But I just wanted to say that if,if we had kept going just country
basis, like I would've, France evenby itself would've been my number
three, which I think would've beena little controversial with those.
Off the board though, this iswhere it starts to get really

(01:03:50):
interesting, like beyond these blocks.
Like, okay, what's next?
And I know, is it nukes versus this thing?

Marko (01:03:55):
So you get the first pick of the non-obvious.
I, although, I don't know,I think it's pretty obvious.
And I, I know you Jacob, I thinkI know who you're gonna pick.
But go ahead.

You think you do?
Okay.
I, I'm taking Turkey.

Marko (01:04:06):
Oh, boom.
Nevermind.

It's nevermind.
All right.
Harrison,

Marko (01:04:11):
Nico Harrison.

I don't think it's the Nico Harrison move of the draft at all.
'cause precisely to your point, ifWestern Europe does unify a little bit
more like that, if Russian power recedesover the next 30 years as I expect it to,
if China and some of these other powersdo have problems, Iran is gonna spend
the next 30 years trying to catch up.
Who is the country at the center of thisMiddle East that you're talking about?
Who is the one who's gonna have the Navythat actually controls access to the

(01:04:39):
Mediterranean and to the Persian Gulf?
Who is the one that is alreadystealing market share from the
Europeans on manufacturing?
Who is going to dominatethe Black Sea Basin and your
Balkan homelands in the future?
This is Turkey.
This is not any other country.
This is the rise of the Neo OttomanEmpire over the next 30 years.
Probably the strongest militaryin NATO outside of the us.

(01:04:59):
Like maybe France has something tosay because of nukes, but if you're
just thinking about military spendingand capability and deployments and
things like that, I'll take the newOttoman Empire at the heart of the
Mediterranean in this multipolar world.
'cause this Mediterranean powers dovery well when they're controlling these
trading lanes at the center of the world.

Marko (01:05:16):
Yeah, I think one of the things, uh, that's a knock on Turkey is, uh,
you know, complete and utter lackof, uh, endogenous energy production.
But I think technologicalinnovation is important.
There's nuclear power, there's,uh, alternatives, there's
all sorts of other things.
Uh, it's also, uh, and

there's a lot and, and there's an awful lot of gas offshore, and
the Black Sea Basin is also open to them.
So,

Marko (01:05:36):
and there's a awful lot of potential for Iraq to boost
its oil consumption if somebodybestows it with stability, which
is what you're getting at you.
No, no, no.
I, I think, but that's a knock.
You know, that's a knock on Turkey.
The other knock on Turkey wasalways like, domestic technological
innovation is kind of terrible andtrash, quite frankly, but not anymore.
We know the turkeys, for example,world Leader in Drone Technology.

(01:05:58):
Uh, everybody talks about Iran.
No, no, it's Turkey.
Russia just has access to theIranian drones, but those are trash.
Turkey has actually, um, you know,I follow military spending a lot
'cause I think it's a great indicator.
As I said, uh, it's, it's a sign ofgeopolitical power and Turkey, along
with South Korea, is one of the world'slargest, uh, movers up the, the chain.

(01:06:19):
So I think this is a surprising pick,but it's about the next 30 years.
And I think that, uh, you know, Irespect this, I respect this pick.
It's, it's got, I, I mean,how do I push back on it?
I mean, you know, I don'treally want to push back on it
because I think it's, it's cool.
It's a great pick.
And by the way, we didn't get a chanceto talk about PKK and the government.

(01:06:43):
Mm-hmm.
You know, uh, that's, that's a reallypositive development for Turkey from
a domestic stability perspective.
Yeah.
Yeah.
So, you know, it's

like, yeah, and, and, and, and Syria too.
Like it's the combo of the SDF basicallyagreeing to be part of the Syrian
state, the PKK laying down its arms,and you've got Syria at this Riyadh
summit or hanging out with SaudiArabia like President Trump, basically
accepting the Syrian government sayingyou need better ties with Israel.
Like all of this is going aaccording to plan to Turkey.
The less they can worry about the Kurds intheir backyard, the more they can project

(01:07:11):
power into the Black Sea, into NorthAfrica, down the horn, into the Balkans.
Like, I like the waythe map looks for them.
I think the biggest shot to the argumentis, um, Erdogan's power base and what
happens when Erdogan is no longer there.
And does Turkish politics revert tothis secular versus religious clash?
And like, does it get mired in thisown domestic politics inflation

(01:07:32):
trap that hap that has happened toTurkey several times over the past 40

Marko (01:07:35):
years.
But listen, listen, I think macroeconomicswe're picking for the 30 years, you know,
like eventually, eventually, macroeconomicpolicy tends to move towards, uh, sanity.
Uh, it just does and part of thereason is that voters go, go ahead.
Sorry.

No, no, no, no.
Sorry.
You, you finish it up.

Marko (01:07:52):
No, just voters.
Voters eventually learnwhat's stupid, you know?
So, um, but yeah, go ahead

and just to say, remember my ultimate indicator
was can this country make othercountries do what it wants them to do?
And I think by that metric, Turkeycan do lots of things, whether it's
with migrants, whether it's withclosing different sea lanes around
it, whether controlling things inthe Middle East, like I, I think that
Turkey has, has a lot going for there.
Okay.
Your pick.

Marko (01:08:16):
Okay.
So, uh, I mean, I wanna pick someone else,but I think we can't ignore this country.
Um, I thought you were gonnapick this one because I always
think of you as a Indian no file.
Mm-hmm.
Okay.
So I don't wanna let itslip beyond top five.
'cause first and foremost, we'regonna get so much hate mail.
There's a lot of people in India andI. You know, they're gonna, they're

(01:08:37):
gonna send us hate bail, and I justdon't wanna deal with it, number one.
Number two, it is like thelargest population in the world,
which is not like insignificant.
And also, even if there's some sortof an economic crisis because of its
demographics, which everybody just louds,is a positive, it is not a positive.
Um, I think that ultimately policyin India will strive towards

(01:08:58):
competence even if there's a crisis.
Uh, I worry about AIreplacing its service sector.
I think AI is going to impactIndia extremely negatively.
Um, a lot of its service sector is gearedtowards, um, the kind of technological
services that AI could re replace.
Uh, but what we're starting tosee is manufacturing start to

(01:09:20):
slowly, very slowly move to India.
And I do think that it, it will be acountry that can't really be ignored.
Um, so I'm gonna take it as fifth.
Now.
Please note it has fallen to fifth.
I think most people would'veclearly thought it's top three.
It's the best performing marketover the last five years.
I'm picking it because I think it cannotbe ignored over the next 30, 30 years.

(01:09:43):
I don't want us to be too controversial.
I think I'm playing the roleof Reow here saying you can't
ignore size, you know, come on.
Like, I think this is a seven footfive giant that can, uh, potentially
develop a three point shot.
And I just think we haveto give it, you know, that

Yeah.
Quantity has a quality all of its own.
But is it Victor Wema or is it Man Bowl?
Like It could, it could be either one.
There might be Rick.
There's a large Delta it,

Marko (01:10:10):
listen, I think it might be Rick Smith, you know, and Rick
Smiths took the Indiana Pacers tothe finals and he lost the six games
to one of the greatest teams ever.
But like, so, you know, like Ijust think that we would get too
fancy by dropping it below fifth.
I have somebody I like more.
Has a higher delta thanIndia over the next five.
Mm. But because you didn't take it,I had to take it, you know, I thought

(01:10:32):
you would take it at four and I, and

I had no, I had it at five.
Like I was really hanging and hawingbetween India and, and Turkey.
And, and I really, it came down tothat question of will this country make
other countries do what it wants to do?
And I think this is the thing thatIndia doesn't have, and you've seen
this with this India, Pakistan war.
It can't even get peopleon its side with Kashmir.
Um, India has so many internalproblems that it needs to flesh out.

(01:10:54):
And it might start, it might take 30years to do so, and in 30 year, like if
this has been a 50 year time horizon,it might have been a different question.
But if we're just thinking about 30and all the things India has to fix
that it hasn't fixed yet, and itsability to project power beyond the
subcontinent, like all plus there'sother things with climate change and
wa like all that stuff sort of saysto me, okay, like they're not gonna be

(01:11:14):
able to force people, um, to do things.
Um.
This, I hate, I hate havingto make this next pick.
'cause you're sort of caughtbetween the declining powers of
like your Russias and your UKs.
So they've got some of the fancythings that we would say are
good indicators for power today.
But will they really be there in 30 years?
Will they even exist in theircurrent form in 30 years?
But then you've got like your Brazils,which okay, like Dugal said, or Dugal

(01:11:40):
has reported to have said, I don't thinkhe actually said it, that Brazil is the
country of the future and always will be.
Yeah.
So I'll probably be picking Brazil 30years from now for the exact same reasons.
Um, and I, I even want, you know, Japanalso in that declining power maybe,
I don't know, is it sort of in there?
Um, just to say I really struggled.
And I think that ultimately if wego down to like forcing action, I,

(01:12:00):
I think I, I don't like this pick,but I think I'm picking Russia.
I think I have to have Russia there.
Wow.

Marko (01:12:06):
I'm surprised by that.

Yeah, I mean, I, I, I'm struggling, but I'm thinking
about they're the second biggestnuclear power in the world.
Um, they're gonna still beable to exert influence.
I, I don't feel great about thepick, so please, uh, tell me why.
I think that's more ofa Nico pick than Turkey.

Marko (01:12:22):
No, uh, uh, I would not have picked it.
I would've picked it inthe top, uh, 10, maybe 15.
But, uh, this is where I agree with, uh,our former colleague in Fi, Peter Zion.
I think they have a lot of problems.
Demographics is notnecessarily one of them.
Um, I think it's a very large country.
I think that it needs toconsolidate much, much more.
I think that this is the one country whereI do worry about, um, centrifugal forces.

(01:12:47):
Right.
Is that correct?
Like, you know Yep.
Kind of.
Mm-hmm.
Tearing the place apart.
Without strong leadership, I think you'regonna have, um, problems in the future.
I'm also, uh, concerned abouttechnological innovation.
I. Um, a lot of things that Russiansare very good at, like military
technology, other countries arestarting to nip at their heels.
Um, I think they need to have a periodof peace and security so they can

(01:13:10):
recenter on technological innovation,on education, things like that.
And that hasn't happened.
In fact, there's been a brain trainoutta Russia to places like Georgia
or Serbia or Armenia, and that's areally big problem for the country and
I don't like it for the next 30 years.
Um, so this isn't a puredemographic play at all.
Um, you know, we're willing todeviate from that, but yeah.

(01:13:33):
Uh, I've got, I've gotconcerns about Russia.
Um, so who am I gonna pick?
Um, so actually the country that comesnext on my list, I'm gonna skip it.
This is the quantitative one.
Mm-hmm.
And I'm gonna pick South Korea.
Hmm.
So South Korea may have the

interesting,

Marko (01:13:51):
yeah.
South Korea may have the worstdemographics in the world.
Um.
Facts.
But what I like about SouthKorea is a couple of things.
First of all, technologicalinnovation is clearly there.
Um, they are one of the world'sleaders in things that matter,
like chips, like semiconductors.
Um, they also do have an endogenousmilitary industry, and I've been noticing

(01:14:12):
more and more countries rely on SouthKorea, specifically in Southeast Asia.
Um, so that's something Japan doesn'treally have, not to the same extent as
South Korea, mainly for political reasons.
Um, they're effectively a nuclear power.
If they wanted to, boom, it's done.
Like don't worry about it.
Um, and I like the factthat they are, uh, fit.
I think the problem, the differencebetween Japan and South Korea,

(01:14:34):
obviously Japan has doubled thepopulation, larger economy and so on.
The thing is though, I think Japan'sgotten a little bit lazy and I, I, I say
that because I think that South Korea hasbeen in much more of a, uh, antagonistic.
I. National security environment,uh, and that's made them fitter.
They've been preparing for awar a lot longer than Japan has.

(01:14:57):
Um, I also find that it's, uh, youknow, soft power is interesting.
It's not part of my rubricat all, but I like it.
I like when countries have theability to make fun of themselves,
to create art that crosses cultures.
And no country has punched aboveSouth Korea's ability to do that.

(01:15:17):
I mean, South Korea has absolutelylike crushed soft power.
So, um, on all of those, I,I really like South Korea.
I think that innovation in robotics,automation and AI are going to allow
them to overcome that demographic burden.
And so, yeah, I absolutelylove South Korea.
I think that they're going to be,uh, one of the top 10 countries,

(01:15:39):
uh, in terms of geopolitics.
And so I actually picked them, uh, threespots above my quantitative, uh, number.
They're actually 10 already.

Amazing.
I think the other thing that they have ona 30 year time horizon is the potential
for reunification with the north.
Oh, I talked about Chinademographics and hundreds of
millions of people in the interior.
Wow.
Like, yeah.
South Korea as it is today,can't compete with Japan.
I'd take Japan today, but if you'rethinking about, oh, you reunify with the
north and and south on South Korea terms,and South Korea gets to use that labor

(01:16:07):
base to do all these other sorts of, okay.
Like now I'm, I'm listening.
I think it's a speculative play.
I think it, it's a, it's eithera hundred or, or maybe a zero.

Marko (01:16:15):
Yeah.
I mean, you're talking 80 millionpeople at that point, so that's,
that's a really good point.
All right.
Go ahead.
Number eight.

Alright.
Yeah.
'cause I have a hard stop in 11 minutes.
So May, should we do top 10, Marcoand do another 10, or should we
blitz through, uh, this next?
I think we can blitz through

Marko (01:16:28):
and then maybe we do, uh, take you think we can

blitz through?

Marko (01:16:30):
I think so.

Okay.
Well, I'm not leaving Brazil off the boardany longer, so I'll take Brazil here.
I will project that Brazil replaces theUnited States as a low cost producer
for a lot of the different agriculturalexports that are out there in the world.
I think from a food security basis,people will be looking towards Brazil.
I think Brazil has, um,a lot of innovation.
I mean, they're very early on inthis, but green shoots of innovation,

(01:16:52):
manufacturing capacity and also likethe United States oceans away from
enemies, has a, has a nice littlehemispheric and maybe dominate and push
back against the United States with,I'll, I'll take Brazil at this point.
Off the board.

Marko (01:17:03):
Alright, so my, my controversial, uh, pick that I'll be accused of being a
homer, uh, is gonna be number nine Canada.
Oh, how nice.
Yeah.
I like Canada because it's uh, good

for Canada.

Marko (01:17:17):
It's a hedge against the us quite frankly.
Um, any hiccup by the USwill be a benefit for Canada.
From a brain, uh, drain perspective,innovation, technology, um, it has
the most favorable actually geography,especially as climate change becomes more
of an issue over the next th 30 years.

(01:17:37):
If you believe in climatechange, then it's also a hedge
against that because its growing.
Seasons are going to expand.
Yes, forest fires will happen more, butyou know, this is about big picture stuff.
Um, also I think that thepopulation growth is shocking.
Immigration has been huge.
Uh, now there's beena backlash against it.
But, uh, as Canada builds outinfrastructure, you know, it has

(01:17:58):
an ability to basically accept anendless amount of human beings.
This is a country with one ofthe largest freshwater basins.
It can grow food for theentire planet if it wanted to.
Um, and it has, you know, all the kind ofgovernance issues, like, think of Canada
as almost like a superpower with, youjust have, it's a turnkey superpower.

(01:18:22):
It has everything you need.
From sort of the Westerndeveloper perspective, um, you
just need to put humans into it.
And so I think that Canadais going to be a top, top 10
player over the next 10 years,

was not in my top 20.
So you can have them, uh,which says everything.
Sorry, sorry.
Canada.
Um.
Coming in at number 10, whoI'll take off the board and
I'm gonna get shipped for this.
Uh, I will take Iran off the board now.
Wow.
Again, thinking on a 30 year timehorizon, a country that basically already
has nuclear weapons, uh, strategicaccess to the Persian Gulf, lots of

(01:18:58):
different oil resources, uh, history ofprojecting power into Central Asia, into
these other Shiite parts of the world.
Um, like maybe not your typical power,but if we're thinking about a country
that can make other countries do thingslike Iran has already shown, it can
be a focal point of decision makingeven in its poultry state right now.
What happens 30 years from now whenthere's a leadership transition,
when Iran is welcomed into thefamily of nations once again,

(01:19:21):
like, again, 30 year time horizon.
I think I'll take Iran as a majorplayer, um, in that part of the world.

Marko (01:19:27):
Alright, well, I think that, uh, what I'm gonna do now,
that's a great pick by the way.
I've, I've, I've always been very,uh, drawn to it as well, especially
if it, uh, um, moves away fromthe current system of governance.
I think, uh, you know.
I think that's a fair point.
I think it's gonna have tounleash the innovation and
entrepreneurship of its people.
And that requires it to discardits current system of government.

(01:19:50):
And if that happens, honestly this isgonna be the best pick of the draft.
Mm-hmm.
So at 10 Iran, great pick.
Um, the next one for me, uh, there'sa symbiotic gravitational pull, you
know, uh, and if you pick a Brazil, Ithink that I have to pick Argentina.

(01:20:10):
I think that Brazil andArgentina are going to advance.
I think what's happening in Argentinais a good example of your Iran analogy.
Argentina, you can think of it as havingdiscarded its status system of garment.
Obviously I am projecting thecurrent pace of Malay reforms
as continuing and benefiting.

(01:20:32):
And so I think that, uh, yeah, Ithink there will be innovation and
I think that there will be reform inArgentina, so I'm gonna pick them.
You'll love it.

Okay, uh, we've got seven minutes to do the last nine here.
I'm gonna get very controversial.
It's my first city state.
Um, I will take Singapore at number 12.
I'm thinking about the Strait of Malacca.
I'm thinking about material wealth.
I'm thinking about the abilityto project power with advances
in AI and things like that.
And there is no place in the worldthat is better suited to deploy AI

(01:21:03):
and all these different fancy thingsat scale than a city state with the
relative stability, material, wealth,and strategic location as Singapore.
So if we're thinking about whocan shape global trends and how
they can use that power, I thinkin multipolar eras we'll see the
return of very powerful city states.
And I think Singapore is the top one.
So I'm probably picking too high 'cause Iwanted them, but I wanted them, I needed,
I needed the crown jewel at number 12.

Marko (01:21:25):
Alright, so, uh, we'll definitely do a download of this in the next episode
'cause we're gonna do this very quickly.
Saudi Arabia is my 13 pick.
Now I am including in this, first ofall, Saudi Arabia is doing what Iran
should have done just 10 years earlier.
The second thing is I think thatwhen I see Saudi Arabia, I do
really mean the region as well.
So, um, no offense to anyone, uh,but I think Saudi Arabia is going

(01:21:48):
to harness the power of innovation,not just in Saudi Arabia, but also
in neighboring countries as well.
So I'm gonna pick that at 13.
Uh, and that includes some of the citystates that are around Saudi Arabia.
Mm-hmm.
You know, so that like, it'slike Saudi Arabia plus like three
Singapores, so I'm gonna take them 13.
Exactly.

It's probably a crime that we've left them to number 14.
'cause I don't think Japan isgonna collapse anytime soon.
So at this point I will bend the kneeto Japan and say, sorry we left you off.
Yes, you have lots of demographicissues and all these other things,
but if there's any country thatis gonna respond to the continued
growth of China, it's gonna be Japan.
And Japan is gonna be at thefront lines of doing that.
And they technologicallyall different sorts of ways.

(01:22:29):
Like they know how to exist in this world.
So I'll take them.

Marko (01:22:32):
Okay.
So I'm gonna take Ukraine 15.
Ooh, spicy.
Yeah, so I think the Ukraine isgoing to become a garrison state.
Garrison states do very well.
Western Germany, Taiwan, uh,South Korea, Japan in some sense,
Pakistan for a period of its time.

(01:22:52):
Um, so I think, yeah, Ukraine'sgonna be a garrison state.
It's gonna be armed to the teeth.
Your point that Russia is still six.
Okay, cool.
Well, the west is gonna have tostalk Ukraine with a lot of good
governance, anti-corruption,money, innovation, and so on.
So I, I like Ukraine and, and I almostfeel like I took it way too low here.
I think that it's a largecountry, it's in the West.

(01:23:14):
It's got a lot of naturalresources, not energy, but it's
gonna have to work on that.
Um, so yeah.
Now look, we have four minutesand we have to do five.
So here's what I'm gonna say.
Let's do second part of this next week.
Next, yeah.
If you agree.
That sounds good.
Uh, we've got top 15, uh, we got five moreand then maybe we can do some thoughts.

(01:23:35):
You know, for example, uh, Russiadidn't fall as much as it did.
Japan seems to have fallen more thanI think both of you and I. Like if I
took South Korea seventh, like, youknow, should Japan really be 14th?
Like I think there's a lot ofthings here that, that maybe
we can talk about next time.
Um, but yeah, that, that canbe part two of our trade value.

I think that sounds great.
And that also allows the listeners tosend us feedback about the initial list.
Like let's, so tell listeners, tell useither via email or via social media
how you think the draft went so farto maybe some of your alternate picks.
And then to your point, Marco, we canpick the last five and then sort of go
through and whether this was actuallya fruitful exercise or whether we
were just picking out of our butts.

Marko (01:24:21):
Alright.
Cool.
Well thank you Jacob.
Uh, I guess we'll do another one soon.

We've got three minutes.
Uh, anything you want quick60 seconds of NBA thoughts?
Uh, I don't think any expert outthere had, uh, Knick's, Pacers as,
uh, as the Eastern Conference Finals.
I, my, my, uh, my Knick's, uh,Timberwolves, uh, uh, pick is starting
to look a little, a little good looking.
Okay.

Marko (01:24:44):
No.
So, uh, my pick wastimber rolls versus, uh,
Boston.
Yeah.
Yeah.
So I looked really stupidon the timber rolls, right?
Like, I mean, that, that didn'tlook like it was gonna happen,
but what I think would be cool wasTimberwolves versus Nicks, you know?
And I just think that that's like sucha great finals, um, because Kat versus

(01:25:06):
Randall, like who won the trade, yeah.
I guess it's one of the first tradesthat actually really did work out
for both teams, like massively.
So, no, I, I, I thinkit's gonna be interesting.
Uh, YOIC needs help last night's gamewhere he just had a crazy stat line
that three pointer or like just, I mean.
It was just sad to see that.
Uh, but, uh, but yeah, um, all Iwould say is like, uh, don't write

(01:25:29):
off Denver yet, because it's gonna goback to game seven, I think in Okay.
C and then maybe, um, you know,we'll see the youth versus
experience that might work.
Uh, other than that, uh, you endedup being right about Tatum, but I
gotta say I don't feel good about it.

Oh, I, I, I don't want to be right if I'm right, if I'm right
this way, but I, I'm rooting for Yoic,but I think OKC, the, the smart money is
KC and that OKC has agree, has a measureof everyone and that, and that probably
going through the crucible of Denverhas now made them ready for what they
need to get the rest of the way, likeDenver needed to give them that test.
So,

Marko (01:26:05):
by the way, speaking of picking Canada too high mm-hmm.
Nobody's mentioned this narrative,but that OKC nuggets, um, series
is really Canada on full display.
Like the two most important players on theThunder are clearly obviously Canadian.
It's not Williams who's playingterrible, it's Dot and Shea.

(01:26:25):
And then of course, uh, Murray onNuggets can be the difference maker.
So I thought that was really interesting.
Uh, but yeah.
Cool.
Alright.

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