Episode Transcript
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Jacob Smulian (00:03):
Hello
Geopolitical cousin Land.
It is producer Jacob,Marco and Jacob Shapiro.
Only have time for a short podtoday, and so they squeeze in
some hot takes on the Middle East.
They talk about BurkinaFaso's social media presence.
And then take a deep dive into Marco'snew concept of geopolitical tightening.
(00:25):
And then try to figure out ifmultipolarity is a good thing or
a bad thing for global stability.
That's it.
Let's get into it.
Jacob Shapiro (00:41):
All right, listeners, uh,
Marco and I usually have the luxury of
relaxing for a two hour conversation,but we've got, we've got a tight
57 minutes 'cause I've gotta run.
So we are gonna absolutelyblow your minds.
There's no time for foreplay,there's no time for jokes, there's
no time for basketball, even thoughthe Knicks are up two oh oh my God.
We, we've gotta get straight into it.
I will integrate Jason Tatummetaphors throughout this though.
'cause you might remember Marcolast year on a podcast with you.
(01:04):
I said there was nochance that Jason Tatum.
Was good enough to lead ateam to the NBA championship.
I think in retrospect,that was the correct call.
It was just everybody else was so shitty.
Anyway, we're not supposed to do that.
So anyway, why don't we start here.
Um, there's been a lot of weird stuff inthe Middle East the past couple of days.
Um, I. Kind of started with actuallysomething you sent me with RFK Junior
(01:25):
and Nancy Pelosi, both raging atKing Abdullah the second of Jordan.
Also, star Trek's most famousExtra, made an appearance in
the Star Trek Voyager for you.
Star Trek nerds out there.
And apparently the, the issue isthat King Abdullah said that he would
accept 2000 till children from Gazawho had cancer and other illnesses.
Um, he's only taken in 44 now.
(01:45):
He's slow playing it.
And Jordan says that the king is slowplaying it because he is not sure
they're gonna be able to return to Gaza.
I don't know who wouldwanna return to Gaza.
There's nothing left of it,but we can get into that later.
And Kennedy and Pelosi are taking thisas a personal affront and a betrayal.
We can get into that, um, later.
Then earlier this week.
The Houthis struck Israel with a missile.
Um, this was not yourgarden variety missile.
(02:06):
It got past missile defense.
It made a huge crater near the TelAviv airport, shut down flights
in and out of Israel for a while.
So it got the Israeli's attention.
Israel went back and hit them.
In the meantime, uh, apparentlyDonald Trump had a call.
With the Houthis and agreed that theUnited States would stop bombing them
as long as the Houthis stopped bombingshipping to which the Houthis, and I
(02:27):
mean, we're, we're, we have to take this,you know, at face value from the source.
But according to Mr.
Trump, the Houthis said, cool, we'rejust gonna keep bombing Israel.
And Trump was cool with that.
Uh, there was no objection fromthe United States that the Houthis
were gonna keep on with Israel aslong as they stopped bombing ships.
Um, I, some of the quotes here aboutthe Houthis are also incredible.
Trump's saying that he had a goodoutcome, they had a great capacity,
(02:48):
withstand punishment, uh, quote.
You could say there'sa lot of bravery there.
It's amazing what they took.
End quote, um, Israeli Prime Minister ofBenjamin Netanyahu has come out and said,
fine, the Israelis will defend themselvesalone against the Houthis, if they must,
if the United States is not on their side.
Um, and then amidst all of this,Israel also in the last week
or two, has been talking about.
(03:09):
Basically just annexing the Gaza Strip.
There have also been rumors and variousreports that the United States has
agreed to administer the region ona temporary basis until the Israelis
or some other group of countriesor whatever else can take it over.
Like there's a lot that is unclearhere and in the background.
Iran and the United States continueto have negotiations, and Marco
Papich has been running around theMiddle East briefing clients and
(03:32):
learning things from the ground up.
Marco, where should we start?
Marko Papic (03:37):
Uh, well, I mean, I, I
thought that was, uh, you know, I, I
think one of the interesting things thatTrump does is that he actually gives
props to, you know, America's rivals.
And it's very old school.
It's medieval.
You know, um, and I think that he had,this isn't the first time he's done it.
He actually did that to Iranafter the, uh, killing of general
(04:01):
Soleimani Iran retaliated.
And President Trump said,okay, I respect that.
I consider this matter over actually VicePresident Harris is, you know, brought
that up in the debates, if you remember.
And she actually accused him ofbeing callous and glib about,
uh, American servicemen being,you know, put in harms ma away.
Um.
(04:21):
You know, I think it's appropriategiven that the world is multipolar
and you can't, uh, enforce some sortof a unipolar normative hegemony.
So you've got to, you know,recognize the reality.
But what's interesting to me is justhow quickly apparently the deal was
struck between the US and the Houthis,and what's not clear to me, but I lean
(04:43):
towards the view that President Trump.
And the Houthis actually agreedthat they would not target American
vessels and American shipping.
It didn't seem to me like theHouthis said that they would like
stop targeting all shipping, but I.
You know, I guess that's yet to beconfirmed or, you know, seen in reality.
(05:05):
So, um, it does seem to me likethe US is, you know, effectively
just pursuing its own interests.
And I think that, uh, most countries inthe Middle East, uh, already knew that.
In fact, one of the interestingthings that I did found out while
I was in, uh, Saudi Arabia was thatfor many Saudis, it was really after.
Various drones attacked theirinfrastructure, energy, infrastructure,
(05:29):
um, that Saudi Arabia took seriously.
Uh, this idea that Americans wouldn't bethere to actually prevent any conflict
with Iran, and therefore they went ahead.
And made their own detant, I don'twanna call it a peace deal 'cause it's
not Iran and Saudi Arabia are alwaysgonna be rivals and they're all always
gonna look at each other as skew.
(05:50):
But, uh, it was interesting that thatwas, that was the narrative that, uh,
was very prevalent in Saudi Arabia.
It was like an obvious thing, like Yes.
I mean, once we realized that Irancan strike in inside Saudi Arabia,
you know, relatively, uh, with littlecosts from the American perspective, we
decided to make our own deal with them.
Jacob Shapiro (06:10):
Huh?
You, you were right.
Uh, so President Trump himself,he, here's the quote from him.
They said, please don't bomb us anymore,and we're not going to attack your ships.
End quote.
Um, but then most of the media is coveringit as the houthis agreeing to stop
interrupting important shipping lanes.
So I don't know how we got to that leap.
(06:30):
Um, sort of in the media there,I'm also fairly certain that, uh,
the Houthis did not call PresidentTrump and say, please don't bomb us.
But, but that's neither here.
And nor there.
Um, well, let me just, let me cookon Israel for a second, uh, for
all three of our Israeli listenersand Yes, yes, I'm gonna do that.
The thing I hate the most in the world,a guy with the last name Shapiro, is
gonna tell you about Israeli geopolitics.
(06:52):
Um,
Marko Papic (06:53):
but, and I, and the
guy with the name Papi, is just
going to sidestep that land bind.
Elegantly.
Yeah.
And let you fall right on it.
No,
Jacob Shapiro (07:02):
I jump on it.
Oh, by the way though, I mean, you know,in our last podcast, Marco, it was the
Jew who read the Vatican correctly.
You thought the next Popewas coming from Asia.
I said, no, I think he's comingfrom somewhere more traditional.
You nailed
Marko Papic (07:13):
it.
Jacob Shapiro (07:13):
The Jew.
The Jew won.
Nile is zero.
But here I'm probably gonnagive up the victory right here.
Oof.
Yes.
Marko Papic (07:19):
Well, you know what?
That's just gonna launch a, asteady stream of new conspiracies
that Jews also run the Vatican.
Uh,
Jacob Shapiro (07:27):
what's,
that's a conspiracy.
Conspiracy implies lack of truth.
Um, so,
oh, I'm gonna get in trouble.
So when it comes to Israel,though, I think Benjamin Netanyahu.
Um, is an incredible domestic politicianand he has survived for as long as he
has by creating this Iranian boogeyman.
And I think long term in Israel's grandstrategy, it's the exact wrong thing to
(07:49):
do because the long term threat to Israelis not from Iran, from a Shiite Persian
country that is many thousands of milesor however much it is away from Israel.
It's from.
Local Sunni Arabs and from Turkey, andthose forces have been sort of gaining
in power, gaining in wealth aroundIsrael, even as some of them, like the
Saudis are batting their eyelashes at it.
And Netanyahu continuesto hammer on the Houthis.
(08:12):
The other thing that Netanyahu didwas he completely tripled down in
his relationship with Donald Trump.
Thought that Donald Trump was gonnalook out for Israeli interests, thought
that, you know, he had the measure ofthe man, and that was a miscalculation.
Huge.
He didn't have the measure of the man.
I have been saying for years thatthe United States would jettison
Israeli interest just as soon it wasas it was in US interest to do so.
(08:33):
And that would've been Biden, it would'vebeen Harris, it would've been Trump.
It would've been anybody.
There was nobody who was gonnahave that ironclad commitment.
I. With Israel, and I don't care thatJared Kushner's in the background, like
it's just, it's just not gonna work.
And Israel long term, if it's thinkingabout its future, it really needs to start
thinking about a world in which it doesn'thave, um, sort of unqualified US support.
It needs to think about threats thatare much closer to home, whether that's
(08:55):
Turkey, in its navy, in its backyard,or going after their natural gas
interests or, uh, you know, the breakingup of trees with Egypt and Jordan
or real insurgency in the West Bank.
Because the Palestinians realizethey have nothing less left to lose.
Like it's a very difficult positionthat Israel has put itself in.
And I, I think from just a grandstrategy point of view, it's short-term
(09:16):
politics is affecting Israel'slong-term strategic interests.
And this should be a big warningsign to Israeli strategic decision
makers, security officials, theyprobably won't listen to it 'cause
they're all obsessed with, youknow, the Iranian nuclear weapon.
And I get it, I get whyyou're obsessed with that.
But there are much bigger fish tofry closer to home, and I don't
think anything's gonna change.
And, and that's just the way that it's.
And, and ramp.
Marko Papic (09:37):
No.
I mean, I wish there was somethingto disagree with you on, but I think
you're a hundred percent I, I don'tknow whether I said it on the podcast
or whether I said it to my clients inmeetings, but I think that it's incredibly
naive to triple down on Donald Trump.
I. So he moved the embassy to Jerusalem.
Whoop d Do you know, like,okay, that means nothing.
(09:58):
I, I would disagree with one thing.
I think it would be very difficultfor Joe Biden or Vice President
Harris, uh, to turn on Israel.
I. I think that they would'vebeen accused immediately by
the Republicans of being weak.
Donald Trump can do it in a second.
And by the way, Donald Trump canpretty much do anything he wants,
and there's very little criticismhe will receive, um, from I would
(10:22):
argue a majority of Americans.
And so this is, this is a big one.
This is, this is where Ithink, um, you know, president
Trump has a mix, I think of.
Pretty solid instinct on us.
Interest at times.
At times, particularlytactically, maybe long term no.
But tactically, yes.
(10:42):
And second of all, you know, DonaldTrump's interests are what's good for
Donald Trump and continued conflictin the Middle East is not, I. He
has branded himself very powerfully.
This is important.
Part of his brand is someone who canget deals done and more importantly,
create geopolitical, equilibrium,equilibrium around the world.
(11:02):
And I think Israel is making a,a, you know, a very big mistake
by continuing the Gaza operation.
Uh, and I don't mean that froma operational perspective or
tactical perspective of like, let'sfind hostages and destroy Hamas.
You know, that's all fine and good,and Israel could do whatever they want.
I understand that, but it's more froma perspective of like, is that aligned
(11:23):
with President Trump's interests?
And they should probablyfall in that line.
I. If they want to continueto receive his support.
And I think this Houthis dealis a great example of that.
I mean, like the Houthis attacked TelAviv airport either right after the deal
was struck, or while President Trumpwas, you know, phoning the Houthis.
And uh, and there was no, andthere has been like no comment
(11:44):
from the United States on that.
And that should be a really, that shouldsend very cold sweat down the spine
of anyone in Netanyahu's government.
Jacob Shapiro (11:55):
Yeah.
What about, what about, uh, kingAbdullah and, and Jordan and RFK
Jr? I'll, I'll let you cook on that.
Marko Papic (12:01):
Well, no, I mean,
that's, that's also aligned with
your view, which is, I mean, again,maybe where I would disagree with
you is a little bit on Turkey.
You know, I, I don't see why.
You know, I think Turkey has interest indesigns on Iraq and Syria and Lebanon, but
I also don't think that Turkey in any way,shape, or form has ever, you know, um,
(12:21):
considered or thought or even fantasizedor dreamed or had a nightmare about, uh,
Israel not having the right to exist.
So that's where I thinkI disagree with you.
I think Turkey and Israel can coexist.
They can be rivals, they can be evenenemies, but it's not an existential risk.
(12:42):
I I, I don't see why Turkeywould have that kind of a, you
know, confrontation with Israel.
Jacob Shapiro (12:47):
May, maybe it's not an
existential risk, and maybe that's like
the outlier scenario, but it is certainlya geopolitical imperative for Turkey.
Once it, it has to have controlof the Levant first and of,
you know, uh, Iraq and all.
And it has to subdue, uh, anythreat from Persia or whatever.
But eventually, um, the Neo Ottomans.
Have to have, what is today, Israel, likeOttoman Palestine was taken, like, it
(13:09):
wasn't a Palestinian state that the, theJews took, uh, Ottoman Palestine from it.
It was the Ottoman Empire that they,they inserted themselves and then the
British Empire that held it afterwards.
And if you are, if you have imperialambitions in the region, that the
area that is Israel or Palestine orwhatever you wanna call it, based on
your politics, has always been importantfor those types of regional powers that
are thinking about connecting MiddleEast, Eurasia, all these other things.
(13:31):
So.
Marko Papic (13:31):
I think it's tough.
I think it's tough for them to repeat.
You know, I, I don't think waterwill flow down the same channels, you
know, 200 years later, but it's okay.
We can disagree on that.
I mean, ultimately, uh, it doesn't to,to me that's like step two, step three,
and we can debate it at some other time.
But to me, I would say thebiggest threat is, um, collapse
(13:53):
of states that have treaties.
You, you framed it like Egyptand Jordan one day decide they
don't want to tear up the.
Treaties that they have with Israel.
Um, and I would say that thatcould happen because those states
collapse due to Israeli actions.
Now, that's less likely to happen withEgypt because it's such a large country
and an influx of Palestinian refugees intoEgypt I think is relatively manageable.
(14:16):
And it's uh, you know, it's basicallyrun by the military and so on and so on.
But what's happening in Jordanis I think, very concerning.
And this is, uh, this is wherethe west can really be callous.
Like if we had a TikTok camera, Iwould ask for you to like, shine
it on me, because here's a countrythat's done nothing but like
right by the west, by its allies.
(14:38):
It's, uh, it's stable monarchy,uh, you know, king Abdullah is
doing the best job he can do.
Um, it's a country where Palestinian,uh, Palestinians either descendants
of refugees or refugees themselves,uh, form a very large majority.
It's a country where the PLO.
At one time in its, uh, in itssort of rambunctious youth when
(15:02):
they had their hair down andthey were smoking cigarettes and.
Running around hijacking planes,tried to overtake King Abdullah's
father King, uh, in, uh, 1971, wherethe United States effectively had to
bring in the pa, uh, the Pakistanisto save the Hashemite kingdom.
So this is a country with ahistory of problems between the
(15:25):
monarchy and the Palestinians.
I think King Gah has really,uh, worked on fixing that.
He is married to a very eloquent,very, uh, I think, uh, you know.
Well-spoken Palestinian himself.
Um, so he's tried to create thiskind of syncretic culture, but
the, that makes it more difficultfor him to ignore what's going on.
(15:45):
And over the past, you know,18 months, I would say.
Did the delta, the change in tone.
From the monarchy of Jordan is probablythe most severe when it comes to
Israel out of any country in the world.
You know, people talk about Europeansnot sending weapons to Israel anymore.
(16:05):
Like that's, that'sneither here nor there.
The real change in attitude andtone is from Jordan, and I think
King Abdullah is basically tellingthe world like, Hey guys, like.
I can't hold back the dam any longer.
And if, uh, you know, if Israel AnnexesGaza, I think that's, you know, uh,
perhaps neither here nor there, butI think the biggest problem is what
(16:26):
happens to the Po Palestinians, theWest Bank, and if they start coming
across the border to Jordan, Ithink that Israeli threat perception
is going to diametrically change.
Israel has not had to guard itseastern borders, which are massive.
It hasn't had to deal with them in over.
You know, 30 years, it hasn't hadto really worry about them at all.
(16:48):
And so I think that this isan existential risk to Israel.
I believe that the pers, the preservationof the Hashemite monarchy dynasty in
Aman is more important to, honestly,Israeli continued existence then.
I mean, anything in the world.
(17:10):
And yet they're treating it so callouslybecause you're completely right.
Benjamin Netanyahu is perhaps one ofthe greatest domestic politicians in
the world, but I think that he hasabsolutely no interest in what happens
to his own country 24 months after today.
Jacob Shapiro (17:30):
Can't argue there.
All right, let, let's move on from that.
I'm sorry, I'm,
Marko Papic (17:34):
I know we're short on time,
but I just wanna say Nancy Pelosi and RFK.
What the hell do they evenknow about this region?
I mean, they're blaming king of thisis the hypocrisy that I, I just, I, I'm
like 2000 children in Amman hospitals.
The third richest country onthe planet has the gall I.
(17:58):
To criticize Jordan for nottaking 2006 kids from Gaza.
What?
There's no space in Americanhospitals like, are you kidding me?
This is a country oflike 12 million people.
You know, I mean, like it is shockingthat they would've publicly voiced this.
And anyone who's watching this andhates Trump and the Republicans or
(18:20):
hates Democrats, uh, and you know,Joe Biden, please for the love of God,
realize they're kind of all morons.
You know, the Nancy Pelosi andRFK can be on the same page.
And that page is quite frankly, like.
I mean it, it's embarrassing forthe United States of America to be
putting that kind of pressure on acountry that's trying to balance.
(18:43):
I. Incredibly difficultpolitics and geopolitics.
So, you know, God bless Jordan.
Obviously I'm biased.
I spent four years of my life thereas a kid, and I think it's an awesome
country and I think that, uh, they'redoing the best in a very, very
difficult region to balance all sortsof different, very difficult landmines.
Um, so.
I think it's embarrassing what, uh,Nancy Pelosi and RFK said, they're
(19:06):
basically accusing, you know, kingAbdullah of reneging on his promise
to bring sick children into Ahman.
But it's not that simple, you know?
And if, and if, if they understoodthat, they would just, you know, swallow
the bullet and say, you know what?
United States of America will takethem, because it's become a very
difficult thing for King Abdullah too.
To, to act on.
Jacob Shapiro (19:27):
Yeah.
It's, it's tone deaf and I, I alsoappreciate Jordan, just from an
intellectual perspective, because onpaper, if you just look at all the things
that like make up Jordan and all thechallenges they've had, that country
should not exist geopolitically, I.
Like it doesn't make sense.
The fact that the hash miteshave held on as long as they
have doesn't make any sense.
It's actually a, a nice piece, a niceslice of humble pie for geopolitical
(19:48):
analysts, because everythingthat I know about geopolitics
tells me that Jordan should havecollapsed during the Arab Spring.
And the fact that they're still, they'restill alive and kicking after taking
all the Syrian refugees after everythingwith the Palestinians, after Isis on
his borders with the rock, Saudi, allthese things, sorry, lemme go further.
Marko Papic (20:02):
Can I interrupt
you and go further that country?
Jacob Shapiro (20:05):
Please, please, please.
In
Marko Papic (20:05):
that country may
very well in some sort of parallel
universe be a bastion of terrorism.
I mean, you have all these refugeesfrom all these conflicts, uh, vast
majority of them with a bone to pickwith Israel, and yet it's been nothing
but an absolute oasis of stability.
(20:26):
And there's many reasons for that.
I think that obviously the Hashemite Markyhas done a great job and King Abdullah
has followed in the footsteps of his dad.
But I would also say that ithas to do a lot with the Bedwin
culture that they've adopted.
The ability to sort of, you know,listen to everyone, you know, try to be.
Try to take a cold showerbefore making any big decisions.
So there's a lot of reasons for that.
(20:48):
And obviously the support of theUnited States has helped, uh, support
of Saudi Arabia as well at times.
Although King Hussein kind of madesome mistakes, specifically with
supporting Saddam a little bitduring the Gulf, the first Gulf War.
But the point that I'm making isyou're absolutely right, and it could
be even worse, not just not exist.
Israel cannot ask for an,honestly, a better neighbor.
(21:12):
And, and yet the actions of Israelisare in the long term imperiling.
That.
So if you are pro-Israeli, if youcare about Israel and its existence
in the long term, cast your eye acrossthe river Jordan, and take a moment
to consider what would happen ifJordan, um, you know, destabilized.
(21:35):
What's gonna happen then?
Israel's gonna take the East Bank,you know, I mean, I mean, yeah.
So anyways, that's, I'm,I'm, that's a ran today.
Jacob Shapiro (21:47):
Yeah.
Yeah.
I, I'm sure there are, uh, Zionistzealots who think that, but yeah,
let, let's not get too far down the
Marko Papic (21:52):
rabbit hole.
Now we, uh, do our, uh,first commercial read.
Uh, this, uh, podcast is sponsoredby, uh, Royal Jordanian visit Jordan.
I'm just kidding.
It's not at all.
Jacob Shapiro (22:04):
But this was, but,
but if anybody from Royal Jordanian
would like to talk about that,please, please email the podcast.
We would love to talk toyou Flights to New York
Marko Papic (22:10):
from Aman three times a week.
I actually have no idea.
Jacob Shapiro (22:14):
Uh, it's from what I
understand from friends who, uh, it might
be the worst airline in No, come on.
One.
One of the worst.
One of the worst.
Worst.
I'm sure you have
Marko Papic (22:23):
clearly not
flown Sub-Saharan air lights.
Jacob Shapiro (22:26):
Yeah, I was just gonna
say, which is a great segue to the
second thing I wanted to talk about.
I know you wanna talk aboutsocial media and branding.
But you were the one who sentme that you've been getting.
Pro Ibrahim Chore, I don't thinkI'm pronouncing that correctly.
Videos, um, on your YouTube algorithm,uh, this is the leader, dictator,
president General, whatever he wantsto call himself of Burkina Fasu.
(22:47):
Uh, probably most of our listeners,uh, I don't know, we have a lot
of nerds here, but so BurkinaFasu, landlock country in Africa.
Uh, borders on places like Mali.
Uh, yeah, Mali to thenorth, Ghana to the south.
Um, doesn't quite touch Nigeria hassome Niger, um, that's in there.
Um, also to the south is, um, ivory Coast.
(23:07):
Um, it's about in terms of population,the size of Florida, so landlocked
Florida in the middle of Africa.
Um, over 40% of the populationbelow the poverty line.
Um, agriculture is the primary sector.
It employs 80% of theworkforce producing 35% of GDP.
So we're basically inthe middle ages here.
Basically, peasants, uh, gold is theirbiggest export, roughly 70% of exports.
(23:28):
They also export some cottons, somezinc, some phosphates, some livestock.
I hope you're getting the pictureof what kind of country this is.
Um, they have a penant for coups.
Um, gosh, how many coups havethey had in recent years?
Uh, it's, uh.
19 66, 19 80, 19 82, 19 83, 1987. Twice in 2000, 2020, uh, 2022.
(23:51):
They also had failed coupsin 19 89, 20 15, 20 23.
Um, so, I mean, not exactlythe most stable place.
They actually did have a veryfamous leader named Thomas Sakara.
I was reading about him.
I didn't know about him until I was,uh, doing the background on this.
Marco, who was the 1983 successfulcoup guy, he got assassinated a
couple years later in coup of 1987.
Um, but was a really interesting guy.
(24:13):
Um, embarked on a nationwide literacycampaign, land re redistribution
to peasants, vaccinating BurkinaFaso's children, outlawing, polygamy,
and, uh, female general mutilation.
I mean, was a really, reallyinteresting guy and talked about
Burkina Fosso being the vanguard ofthe Third world again, assassinated
after like three or four years by hisfriend in the Burkina Fa military.
(24:33):
Amidst all that Ibrahimchore is now the dictator.
Uh, it seems to me that he has none of.
Those classically liberal, uh,policies of Thomas Sankara.
Uh, but he fancies himself a dictator.
He is cozying up with Russia.
He, uh, went to, I forget which countryhe was going to for an inauguration,
but he came with a sidearm strapped andlike gloves on, like has a whole like
(24:55):
thing for theatrics and things like that.
And Margo, you're getting pro videosof this guy on your YouTube algorithm.
So I hand it over to you.
What have you been watching that?
This is what you get on YouTube my friend.
Marko Papic (25:06):
So, uh, hopefully we can
get smooth to, uh, plug some of them,
you know, just to, uh, to have someof our listeners, uh, sample these.
So basically, I don't reallywanna talk about Burkina Faso.
Um, you know, it, it is a largegold producer in the world.
Gold prices are shooting up,so, you know, good for them.
That's, uh, drawing a lot of interestand chore has, uh, kicked out the French.
(25:30):
He's kind of cozied up withthe Russians, the Wagner group.
So there's geopolitical sort of sideissue here, but I wouldn't overstate it.
No one's gonna fight overBurkina Faso in his gold mines.
Like I bet you anythinggeopolitical YouTubers are
like all up in arms about that.
No, that's not gonna happen to me.
What's interesting about it is thatbasically I'm sitting out, I'm sitting,
(25:53):
uh, I think like, I don't know, somewheretrying to watch some NBA highlights.
You know, and one of these YouTubeshorts pops up and it's about,
it's a pro like video, so I clickon it 'cause I'm like, what?
Burkina Faso.
I haven't heard thatcountry in a long time.
And it's basically some, you know,chill dude who keeps pronouncing
(26:17):
the country's name as Burkina Facia.
Well, I mean, and he just goes, I'm not an
Jacob Shapiro (26:23):
expert.
May.
Maybe that's the rightway to pronounce it.
I don't actually, I don't think so,
Marko Papic (26:27):
but like he goes off about
how it's awesome and I'm like, whatever.
I don't understand where thisperson came from, but sure.
Going back to watching my Lakersget shredded by the Timberwolves
and then a couple of days later,boom, another one this time.
It's a cute girl.
You know, young Hip, like it wouldbe one of those videos for like how
(26:48):
to put on nice foundation beforethe makeup goes on and boom, she's
staring at a camera and talking aboutBurkina Faso and how TRO is awesome.
And then I realized like, waita minute, this guy is literally.
Like paying people around theworld to make these videos.
Like can we just stop for a second andacknowledge that Ibrahim tra dude with
(27:15):
a sidearm and white gloves and like he'sactually paying people around the world
or some PR agency to create these poorlyengineered yet organic videos about how
he's an awesome revolutionary leader.
I'm just like, wow, geopolitics is gone.
(27:36):
Like, no.
All I'm thinking about like, Jacob,you and I are gonna become like
absolute millionaires and here's whygeopolitics is gone like mainstream.
You know, just this guytr he's, he's on our side.
He's on our corner.
God bless him.
In fact, let me tell you something.
(27:57):
He has shown perseverance.
Fighting off the colonialFrench who wanted his minds.
I, I'm just kidding.
He actually hasn't paid me yet, soI can't really do the whole bit.
But the point is, it's insane.
Like social media has become ageopolitical battleground now.
I know a lot of people are gonna say,dude, that's always been the case.
(28:17):
Like, you know, Russiahas stole the election.
Like, no, no, no, no.
This is much more organic, muchmore low key, much more lowbrow,
and it's kind of awesome.
Jacob Shapiro (28:28):
You know, um,
he is the exact same age that
I am, so he's younger than you.
In some sense, we shouldview him as a competitor.
And maybe Marco, it shouldn'tbe you and I talking.
Maybe we should get some cute girl puttingon her foundation and then looking in
the camera and being like Multipolarityand Royal Jordanian Airlines.
What is the combination of thesethings and why should you listen
to Marco Papich and Jacob Shapiro?
(28:48):
Um.
But so, so, so he is younger than you?
Yes.
And I, I will say, I'll, I take that, I'lltake a little bit of the other side, which
is to say, this is obviously Russia ispushing this like the, like this has the
Kremlin's propaganda fingers all over it.
And why they're, maybethey're testing something out.
I don't know.
Like I don't think that Choriwas sitting there and was like,
haha, I will use you YouTube.
No disagree.
In order to
Marko Papic (29:09):
I disagree.
You disagree, Aaron?
Fine.
Go.
I disagree.
I think you nailed it.
And actually I noted his age.
I looked him up.
Yes.
He's like 37.
Right.
Jacob Shapiro (29:16):
He is 37.
There you go.
So
Marko Papic (29:18):
I noted that
and I was like, no man.
I bet you, I bet youhe's doing this himself.
Actually, he may not even like this.
There is a department right in his likecommunication administrator or something,
and he has literally hired the personto do this because he's 37, because he's
tech savvy, because he probably spendslike seven hours a day on YouTube.
(29:42):
This guy is literally payingpeople to do his branding and pr.
To what end?
I'm not really sure, but I, I forsure hope that he listens to us.
I will do a live show out ofBurkina Faso, like bring it.
Jacob Shapiro (29:59):
Do you know
what the capital, Burkina Faso?
Yes, it's
Marko Papic (30:02):
uga.
Uh, wait.
Jacob Shapiro (30:05):
Wow.
Something like that.
Okay.
I, yeah, I, I wasn't even gonna tryto pronounce it, but I see that.
I see that you have it there.
He also Is that, what is this?
Wait, wait.
How do you, you got
Marko Papic (30:12):
it, pronounce it.
Jacob Shapiro (30:13):
I don't
know how to pronounce it.
It's spelled O-O-U-A-G-A-D-O-U-G-O-U.
I think it's wa, yes.
Wagu.
It's got some French stuff in there.
Um, he's also got not an,not on an interesting past.
He studied geology and university.
He was part of an association ofassociation of Muslim students and a
Marxist association when he was in school.
Oh.
At the same time,
Marko Papic (30:31):
this guy is just hedging,
hedging, Islamist and Marxist.
You know, like he doesn't care.
I mean, no, this guy,well, his biggest challenge
Jacob Shapiro (30:41):
is the Jihadists,
like Burkina, FASU, Niger,
all these different countries.
I mean, this is like smuggling Centraland the Jihadists and all these others
are moving weapons and drugs and peoplethrough all these different things.
And the reason that he's in the positionthat he is and that you've had coups
in all of these different countries,and why they're also mad at the French
is because nobody could stop this andthey're dealing with massive insecurity.
And you're probably gonna have apopulation that is willing to trade.
(31:04):
You know, whatever the heck he wants todo, wearing gloves with his side arm.
If he gives them security, I don't know ifhe's gonna be able to give them security.
This is a tall task.
This is not, uh, this is not likebouquet le where he can just lock
them all up and then start, you know,uh, uh, harvest, uh, mining Bitcoin
with the powers from the volcano.
Like Burino FSU doesn't really havemuch that it can really go with, and
(31:24):
he's gonna have to really defeat theGI and listen and he's gonna survive.
So,
Marko Papic (31:28):
listen, listen.
So what if the gold bugs are rightand gold goes to 5,000, right?
Like, look, I just, I just wanna sayright away, uh, I Raheem, uh, sorry.
President Tro I, Marco Poppi, I was prettymuch the first to notice what you're doing
on social media and call it brilliant.
Uh, when you set up your Sovereign Wealthfund, I. You got your CIO right here.
(31:49):
Boom.
There you go.
Jacob Shapiro (31:51):
I don't think
gold going to 5,000 is gonna
make enough of a difference here.
I think you're overstating it.
It
Marko Papic (31:56):
probably, it probably won't.
It's actually, uh, look, it's a largecountry, as you said, the size of Florida.
Uh, lots of people.
Um, I think it's like 38million or something like that.
Um, and, uh, so yeah,uh, lots of challenges.
This isn't, uh.
This isn't an easycountry to run, actually.
What is the population?
Let's see here.
I don't think I got that
Jacob Shapiro (32:15):
right.
Think's like 0.3 23 million.
Marko Papic (32:16):
It is 23.
My bad.
Yeah, I just doubled.
Well, you know what?
I'm already thinking and I alreadytook Ghana, uh, for my future,
uh, president, so there you go.
I just combined it with Ghana.
But anyways, look, the point is, jokingaside, I think that it's fascinating.
Like I should not, my, myYouTube algorithm obviously
is trying to figure me out.
(32:37):
Knows I'm a basketball fanand I guess love geopolitics,
so he just like targeted me.
But I wonder if any other of ourlisteners were targeted with these
random videos of a random president.
Like, and, and to what end?
I don't know, but I do know thatgeopolitics is becoming far more
mainstream than just a bunch of nerds.
(32:59):
You know, IR nerds who like went tomodel United Nations in high school.
Jacob Shapiro (33:04):
Maybe one of our
listeners will tell us that there's
much a do here about nothing.
But there, you're not thefirst one to notice it.
I hate to burst your bubble,like in just the last month.
Oh.
The, the Economist had a profile of him.
The Council on Foreign Relations hada negative profile, like most of these
things being anti his policies andtalking about him as a pro-Russian
Force, anti French, anti the west.
That's not the point.
But did talk
Marko Papic (33:22):
about social media.
Jacob Shapiro (33:24):
Uh, they all, uh, not as
much that you, you have the social media
thing, but I'm just saying that like,they got in the economists' algorithm
and they got in the CFRs algorithmso that they're like focusing on this
guy, which there are tons of differentplaces all around the world where you
probably have leaders who would love tohave a profile in the Economist, even
if it's a negative one and they don't.
And this guy does.
So something is happening where heis like, he's winning, getting on
(33:46):
the radar of, of Western states andof English press to, to what end?
Like, like with you?
I'm not quite sure, but it's happening.
It's, it's interestingthat it's happening.
So, um, okay.
Um, that is segment number two.
Segment number three.
You wanted to talk aboutgeopolitical quantitative.
Quantitative titan.
Yeah, I have no idea whereyou're going with this.
(34:07):
Why don't you lead us off?
Marko Papic (34:09):
Alright.
Well, the, you know what, uh, two,so I've been traveling the world,
um, over the last three weeks.
So I did an around the world trip tovisit my clients and give some speeches.
It started with Hong Kong, Singapore,Abu Dhabi, Dubai, musket, Riyadh.
I'm actually recording this outof Vadu in Liechtenstein, um,
where I had some great fun withclients and, and, and good friends.
(34:32):
And, uh, it's interesting to methat nobody's really panicking.
You know, Americans are kind of panickingabout President Trump and the tariffs.
The rest of the world is not,they're not happy about it.
But I didn't get a sense of, youknow, that the rest of the world
thinks that the world is collapsing.
So that was, that was interesting.
I did not get askedabout a recession at all.
(34:55):
No, I got asked about
Jacob Shapiro (34:56):
because
we're already in one.
Sorry.
Marko Papic (34:58):
Yeah, no, and that's fine.
Like we, we, we might be already inone, but you know, it's like whatever.
Sure.
Whatever.
It'll be fine.
Uh, and maybe that's a signthat it won't be fine by the
way, and that's perfectly fine.
Um, I understand that.
But what was interesting to me was,first of all, everyone's already kind
of comfortable with this world, andI mentioned earlier Saudi Arabia.
(35:19):
You know, and I uh, mentioned basicallyhow after the up cake cur attack in 2019.
Saudi Arabia realized that it was, youknow, it, it was kind of on its own,
and so it had to make the deal withIran without American participation.
And then two things happenedover the past week or so.
(35:40):
First of all, we have India,Pakistan exchanging fires.
We talked about that last podcast.
And Vice President Shady Vancesaid very similar to President
Trump's comments in the Houthis.
He basically said like, look.
America wishes that these two countrieswould settle their differences peacefully,
and we certainly would hope thatthey do so, but it's not our fight.
(36:04):
So you've got JD Vance basicallysaying like, look, India and
Pakistan, like, God bless you both.
We hope that you figure it out.
And then President Trump sayinglike, well, we made a deal with the
Houthis, like everyone else have fun.
And so there are two waysto interpret this one.
Is this hegemonicstability thesis, you know?
This is why Unipolarity is so good.
(36:25):
Charles Kindleberger famouseconomic historian, wrote
about this in various books.
Um, this idea that the Hegemonprovides, uh, it solves the collective
action dilemma of the world byproviding global public goods such as
literally the freedom of navigation.
So the Houthis ex, uh, example being veryimportant because the US has effectively
(36:48):
just announced that it will no longer.
Provide a very expensiveglobal public good, which is
free seaborne transportation.
Like they, they will do sofor their own ships and so.
So the, the consensus view is basicallythat without hegemonic stability, you
have, you know, multipolar instability.
(37:10):
There is no more America ensuring thatthe rest of the world is going to be safe.
This is effectively the beginning ofthe end of the world as our former,
uh, colleague and, and good friendPeter Zion, you know, wrote his book.
But then.
I have a different way to interpretthis, especially when I look at what's
happened with Iran and Saudi Arabiamaking a, a, a very stable detant,
(37:31):
which has ensured that the IsraeliPalestinian conflict doesn't actually
spill over the rest of the Middle East.
I mean, yes, Iran and Israel Exchangemissile fire, but it hasn't spread
to the rest of the Middle East.
And in fact, the rest ofthe Middle East is quite.
Quite stable.
I just visited three countries inthe Persian Gulf and they're awesome.
(37:52):
There's absolutely nothing.
No, I mean, there's absolutelynothing going on there.
That's wrong.
It would be like saying West Germany andDenmark are unstable because the Iron
Curtain is next door during the Cold War.
Well, that wasn't the case.
Yes, iron Curtain countries behind it.
Were in a bad shape, but WestGermany was freaking awesome.
So what I'm saying is that.
(38:13):
Iran and Saudi Arabiaactually came to an agreement.
They had to sit down like adults.
They had to, they had to talk, theyhad to delineate their interests
and they had to resolve theirdifferences in, in a very frosty way.
No one's saying there'speace between them.
What I'm getting at is this, yes, youcan view American hegemony and provision
(38:35):
of all these public goods as a very.
Very stable, but at some point it can alsobecome like quantitative easing qe and,
and many people in finance know that witha central bank flooded the economy with
effectively cheap money with qe, it's.
It saved us from the greatfinancial crisis and it's aftermath.
(38:58):
Absolutely.
I'm definitely not one of those peoplewho shaked their little fist and angrily,
you know, because I was short for the nextfour years and got my face ripped off.
But at the same time, we all know thatit created distortions in the economy.
So, in other words, when, when a hegemonprovides stability, it does so in a way
(39:19):
that distorts reality and often countriesand regions and entire geographies
become addicted to that provisionof, you know, cheap geopolitical.
Um, stability.
You have vassal states thateffectively act with impunity because
(39:40):
they are supported by the hegemon.
You have rivals that feel slighted,that feel normatively and ideologically
opposed in an existential way wherethey cannot come to an agreement
and that creates instability.
So the Withdrawal Withdrawal of Americansupport or American oversight or American
(40:01):
Geopolitical qe, so that you know, infinancial terms would be quantitative
tightening, which by the way, the Fedhas been doing for several years and
everybody thought it would end humanity.
It hasn't at all.
Similarly.
The United States of Americawithdrawing its overarching
support may not create instability.
(40:22):
In fact, it may create stabilitybecause countries have to act
with each other, like adults.
They no longer, you know, countriesthat are American allies like Israel
or Ukraine or Taiwan, may not havethe blank check that they once had.
Which is not a bad thing.
It may force them to actually considertheir security and threat environment
(40:42):
and say, look, we don't have Americaat their back all the time, so we
should actually sit down with ourneighbors, with our rivals and create
a geopolitical equilibrium that iseffectively, you know, uh, more durable.
They can, they can withstand aDonald Trump, they can withstand
in the future a president, a OC.
And so that's, that's kind of mylesson over the last couple of weeks
(41:04):
that that's gotten me thinking thatmaybe we overstate how beneficial.
Hegemonic stability is,
Jacob Shapiro (41:14):
yeah, I think
I would, I think I would push
back or, or caveat in two ways.
I think you're right that I thinkyou're right for strong and developed
powers, because now stable balancesof power have to emerge rather than a
hegemon being responsible for everythingelse and people pushing against
the hegemon and things like that.
But as you can see in places likeBurkina Fasu or in Congo or with Indian
(41:38):
Pakistan, like places on the periphery.
Those places get worse becausethose places become the proxy wars
that the Olympians use to fighttheir battles because they're
not gonna fight their battles.
So sort of to your point with realwars, Russia tried to do that and
look where Russia is right now.
Nobody else is gonna do that, Chinaincluded with Taiwan in my opinion.
But it's in those like forgotten places ofthe world that nobody really cares about.
(41:59):
I think that actually the lack ofhegemonic power, and it's not even
hegemonic power, the lack of internationalorder, like those are the places
that I think it shows up the most.
And the second is, um.
I think you're right for, forthe snapshot in history where.
Countries are all trying to takeadvantage of the multipolar system.
But previous area eras of multipolarityeventually go to the point where you
(42:21):
have countries that get strong enoughin their own backyards where they think
they can be the global hegemon, or theyhave an imperative, say like Japan in
the early 19 hundreds to become a hegemonbecause otherwise they can't continue to
grow or can't continue to do the thingsthat geopolitics is forcing them to do.
So you have this.
Period.
I think you're right of likestable dynamism where you have
balancing against each other.
(42:42):
But if you get to the point wheresay, uh, and we're not there,
people have been calling this aboutChina for example, for decades.
The moment where China really can'tfeed itself or can't power itself and
it has to go out and get those thingsfrom other places, and it needs, you
know, a Blue Water Navy to do that.
It needs to fight the Americans orthe Russians or anybody else, wherever
they are, in order to secure accessto those resources, and they think
(43:02):
that they're strong enough to do it.
Well, suddenly you canget sort of global war.
So I, the caveat there is, I think you'reright in the short term, I just think
that if you go too far in that directionand you get countries that begin to
drink the Kool-Aid and believe thatthey are themselves, regional hegemons,
then you get the, the possibilityof some of these global conflicts.
And I think the hardestthing for countries in
navigating the multipolar era.
(43:24):
We'll be 20 years from now that we'renot in World War ii because I think if
things go unchecked and if you get theUS on one side and China on one side, and
Europe and all of these mutually exclusiveinterests and countries that think they
are strong enough or deserve differentthings, like then you can get into the
situation that we were in in the early19 hundreds and, and mid 19 hundreds.
But I, I think broadly speaking,like that's the reason I am so
(43:45):
like optimistic from an investmentperspective over the next 10 to 15 years.
This should be a time of booming, notof, to your point, like constraint.
Marko Papic (43:54):
Well, I mean, uh,
but let's, let's put ourselves
back in 1914, you know?
Mm-hmm.
I may have done this with the podcastbefore, so stop me if I have, but
Jacob Shapiro (44:04):
you know, I don't
think, I don't remember this.
Marko Papic (44:05):
Okay, so let's,
let's say the go of Princip,
you know, shut out to my people.
Serbs original terrorists since1914, uh, started World War I, right.
Um, shot.
The, uh, crown Prince of basicallyAster Hungary in Sarajevo, and
that launches World War I. Now,let's imagine, let's create a
(44:30):
scenario, a game where that happens.
But every great power is a nuclear power.
Mm-hmm.
So Serbia is not a great power.
So no nukes for Serbia, but also Hungaryis, they have nukes, Russia has nukes.
Uh.
German Empire has nukes,France has nus, have
Jacob Shapiro (44:51):
nukes,
Marko Papic (44:52):
uh, let's say no.
Jacob Shapiro (44:54):
Oh, okay.
That's, that's, uh, throwing someshade at the Ottomans, but, okay.
What, let's throw some shade.
I mean, like, they, theyhad the Janice series.
They were ahead of mostpeople and, but fine.
No, no nukes for the Turks.
Yeah.
Well put Turkey.
Turkey.
Please remember that I was stickingup for you in this conversation.
You can have Burkina Fasu, uh, to, toour listeners in Istanbul and Ra with
Marko Papic (45:11):
you.
Yeah, well, I mean, Janice series weremostly serves in Albanians, first of all.
But, uh, let's, let's not forget that.
Also, also, uh, United Kingdom has nukes,but here's what happens in that scenario.
I think in that scenario, what happensis Austria-Hungary attack Serbia as
they did, they get their asses kicked,which, which happened in real life.
They, they, they're shockingly loose.
(45:33):
Then they invade Serbia again, and as inreal life, they get their asses kicked.
So it was only with a third attemptthat the Austrians actually won,
and it was because the Germanscame along this third time.
And so I think what happens in.
The world, if everybody has nukes, isthat basically Austria-Hungary versus
(45:54):
Serbia becomes a Russia versus Ukraineconflict, United Kingdom, France.
Then Russia supports Serbia withweapons, um, and Germany supports
Austria-Hungary with weapons.
And it's basically, you know, likethese two blocks fighting a proxy
war such as the Korean warp, suchas Vietnam warp to an extent.
(46:14):
And ultimately what's happeningright now, uh, in other words,
we don't get to World War I.
We get to an Austria-Hungary versusSerbia conflict over effectively Bosnia
here, governor, which Austrians lose.
Jacob Shapiro (46:28):
Yeah.
And, and to your point, I mean, andmaybe, maybe not a lot of people even die
because both sides at this point also havedrones and artificial intelligence, and
it's just a battle of who has the bestdrones and robots and things like that.
And then whoever wins gets toconquer the social media, blah, blah,
blah, blah, blah, of that country.
And you go forward.
But, and obviously,
Marko Papic (46:46):
yeah.
Sorry, go ahead.
Jacob Shapiro (46:47):
No, I just, the,
the, the devil's advocate is.
Um, at the time when World War Ibroke out, like the, I, the prevailing
conventional theory was that economieswere so interconnected that no country
would choose to go to war becauseit would be catastrophic for their
economies, and therefore they wouldn't.
Um, I think we've already, likethat was proven wrong, like
countries were willing to do that.
(47:08):
Um, and we, I think we'veseen that with the trade war.
Now, the extent to which the tradewar has already gone shows you that
economic interconnectedness does notstop countries when they think their
geopolitical interests are at stake.
The, the way I'm gonna push backagainst you though, is that.
The notion that nukes will prevent greatpower conflict from breaking out feels
a little bit to me, like, oh, economicinterconnectedness will obviously prevent
(47:31):
countries from going to war with eachother because it would destroy them
like it has worked that way thus far.
But I, I don't know.
I'm not so saying when that,that is always gonna be the case.
Marko Papic (47:41):
Well, look, there's
two ways to look at this Jacob.
Number one is that I'm right.
Because people,
wait, wait.
Just lay.
Let,
Jacob Shapiro (47:53):
let, let.
I know it was, it was justfunny the way you phrased it.
There are two ways to look at this.
First of all, I'm right.
Marko Papic (47:58):
First of all, I'm right.
Second of all, you're wrong.
No, that would be the same thing.
No.
First of all, I'm right, and the reasonI would be right is because it's much
easier for a mere pleb to understand.
Being incinerated by thermonuclear device.
Then like how the web of interconnectedfinance and economy prevents conflict.
(48:18):
In other words, like there is a, there'sa real challenge in accepting nuclear war.
Even amongst the dumbest of us.
Right?
So that's, that would be the first.
The second way to think aboutit is that you are correct.
I'll be wrong.
There'll be the nuclearwar and then we'll all die.
But I'm gonna stick to my viewbecause, and I'll tell you why.
(48:41):
If there is a thermonuclearwar and you are correct.
The entire listening base of geopoliticalcousins will, for a split second,
think that Marco Pop is a moron, andthat will be the last thought they
have as they're incinerated, andI'm just comfortable with that view.
I'm comfortable with being wrongfor three seconds, so I'm gonna
(49:06):
say that I'll be correct the
Jacob Shapiro (49:08):
best, the best
three seconds of my life.
Um, well, I I I don't, I don't wannamake it, I don't wanna get too grim
and too dystopian here, but Ha haveyou read, um, Mustafa Suleiman's book,
the Coming Wave Technology Power?
21st Century's greatest dilemma.
It's about like the sort of artificialintelligence and there's a chapter about
the intersection with biotechnologywhere the point that like some kid
(49:31):
in his garage with CRISPR could likecreate a virus that could go after
a particular family or a particularethnicity, ethnic group you can.
Um, so like, you're, you're probablyright, like in the outlier, thermonuclear
war, like, probably not gonna happen.
The nuclear powers aren't gonnado battle against each other.
Maybe Austria-Hungary, nukes,uh, Serbia in your, in your
metaphor or something like that.
(49:51):
But nobody's gonna nuke Austria-Hungary.
'cause then Austria-Hungaryis gonna nuke them.
But could you have someradical in Austria-Hungary?
He was like, okay, I have now created aweapon that will wipe out the Serbians.
And then like, you know, what's gonnahappen next is somebody gonna create
a virus that tries to wipe out theleaders of the, of Austria-Hungary
or the Austro-Hungarian themselves.
(50:12):
Like I, I think it starts to take usdown these paths where maybe things
get really dark and, and really twisty.
So, so maybe it's not nukesthat we should be worried about.
Maybe there are other ways that,that conflict and other weapons that,
that make that conflict less safer.
Marko Papic (50:24):
That's fair.
That's very dark, very fair.
Um, I think to me thus far, look,I mean, the problem with nukes is
that I. 99 out of a hundred times.
Marco may be right, butthe one time he's wrong.
I mean, obviously it will be very bad.
Um, and yet here we are, Indiaand Pakistan have a clear
(50:46):
security dilemma be between them.
Uh, Pakistan used to be equivalent toIndia in terms of military strength.
In the past, that hasn't beenthe case for like 50, 60 years.
I mean, I, I don't even know.
Uh, and yet there's a balance of power.
And yet there's this very choreographed,you know, conflict every time.
(51:06):
Like nuclear weapons.
Clearly.
I think clearly like if, if, if the,if the, if the South Asia subcontinent
didn't have nuclear weapons, Imean, don't you think that India,
given its massively overwhelming nowadvantage over the last at least 50
years, would have at some point justsaid like, what are we doing here?
Like, these guys can't fight us.
Jacob Shapiro (51:26):
No, I think, I think you're
actually making my point for me, which
is I think neither e Indian nor Pakistanbelieves it can conquer the other.
And that the noster there, to yourpoint, is a defensive fail safe.
But we have not reached a pointwhere either side can confidently
say to itself that we can conquerthem and our government can survive
the political consequences or thepain that would come from doing this.
Like, sure, there's a billion Indiansand there's 300 million Pakistanis.
(51:48):
How many Indians would have to die anda conventional war to number, wait a
minute, number one, conquer Pakistan,and then to actually govern it, like
it's just not realistic, but you could.
You could get to a scenario.
I don't think China's gonna do this, butlet's, so let me say that now, right?
This is absolutely fantastical.
But let's say United Statescontinues to decline.
We don't make ships anymore.
We only have 200 ships in the Navy.
We're having measles outbreaks everywhere.
(52:08):
China has become a true blue water Navy.
It's the everything else, and they decide.
Um, you know what?
We're gonna sail up the Mississippiand, and take the United States like
we think we can do this and we'retired of this Western power, whatever.
And it does.
The United States at that momentsay, oh, the only thing we have
is nukes, like existentially.
We have to survive.
We fire the nukes back.
Like it has to be some type ofscenario where a great power thinks
(52:29):
it can off another great power andthen they have to resort to nuke.
'cause it's like a last.
Sort of ditch effort that,
Marko Papic (52:35):
but I, I actually, I
think you're creating a straw man
and way too much of a high thresholdbecause, you know, India and
Pakistan could have a conventionalwar where a lot of people die.
But overall limited.
I mean, because I, I just don't see whatwould be the point of India conquering
Pakistan for what end to what end?
I don't think they would evercontemplate that, but Kashmir like
taking all of it like that is areasonable goal for a country to.
(52:58):
Decide to start a conventional war over,and even that conflict has been prevented.
And by the way, India has, hasgenuine, genuinely an overwhelming
conventional military superiority.
So clearly the reason it hasn'tdecided to do that is because of
the Pakistani nuclear deterrent.
So even a smaller conflicthas been prevented.
Jacob Shapiro (53:19):
Or, or because it
doesn't have the imperative to do it
and the capability to do it, you'reright that India is the, is a bad
example from that point of view.
The good example is the one Ibrought up earlier, which is early
19 hundreds Japan, which is tocontinue to survive and to grow.
Japan was forced to becomeimperialistic and like, you
know, dominant and militarilyaggressive, and so they had to take.
(53:39):
C the, the East Indies, theyhad to take parts of China.
They had to take parts of Russia.
They had to continue to expand until theyhad enough control to actually maintain
their economy the way that was gonna be.
So you'd have to have a, a, a country withthat kind of imperative that says, no, I
will go after the great powers, because ifI don't, then the United States can just
cut off my oil and I'm done in six months.
Or, you know, China can just saysomething, great example, and I'm done.
(54:02):
That's a, so, um, I thinkthat's a very, a very good
Marko Papic (54:05):
example.
That's how Ity fails.
Yep.
Jacob Shapiro (54:08):
Yeah, exactly.
And it's why China's maybe thescariest of, of all the countries,
because China has echoes of that.
Like China in its, in its vasthistory, usually can do things itself.
It's the middle kingdom.
It looks inwards, it thinkseverybody else is barbarians.
But if you get to the point where Chinadoes truly have to look outward and has
to secure its interest by being a globalhegemon, and if it starts to believe
(54:30):
that it can do that or must do that,like then you then multipolarity starts
to shift into a sort of darker place.
Marko Papic (54:37):
And there, there are two.
You know, we should probably dedicatea whole hour to China at some point,
but I think there's two, there'stwo views on this, including in
China, including with mainland Chinastrategists and scholars and academics.
And one is that no, China isgenuinely different civilization.
And then there's theother view which says no.
(54:57):
Uh, you know, since the end ofthe last basically dynasty and
the collapse of the SEN temporaryregime, China has effectively
adopted the operating software.
I. From, you know,Europe of a nation state.
And that does mean that they willeventually think like Japan did, like
(55:18):
the United States does, thinking interms of spheres of influence, regional
hegemony, global hegemony, and so on.
And so, uh, you know, I guess, Iguess given your example, the world
better hope that the Chinese do thinkthere are different civilization,
that they won't fall down the samepath as every other regional and, uh.
Global Hegemon.
Jacob Shapiro (55:39):
I think they
do, and I think they are.
But the United States onethought that it was too and
like history and defend it too.
Marko Papic (55:45):
To your point, of all the
countries that decided to wholeheartedly
just adopt the operating systemof European nation state, I mean,
I think Japan is a great example.
And so studying that early 20thcentury Japan and why it embarked on.
The decisions it did, Ithink is very interesting.
Of course, at the time imperialismwas on mode, you know, so like the,
(56:07):
you know, Japanese models at thetime, their, their example were the
expanding German empire talking aboutits place in the sun, the Russian empire
next door, um, you know, Europeans.
And so I can see how they.
They thought that they were behindon imperialism, but nonetheless,
I think your point is valid.
(56:28):
Imperialism's back,
Jacob Shapiro (56:28):
baby.
Uh, we, we've got pictures ofWilliam McKinley in the White House.
Remember?
Like, it's, it's back.
Yes, it's, it's, it's here to stay.
All right.
I gotta go pick up my kit.
That was a good 55 minutes.
We'll get back to y'all next week.