August 19, 2025 • 31 mins
Donald Trump has just met both Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the same week - two leaders locked in a war that has reshaped global security. For Putin, the meeting with Trump offered legitimacy and a chance to show that Russia is still a power the US must engage with. For Zelenskyy, it was about survival, pressing Trump to keep American support flowing as Ukraine fights for its future.So what really happened behind those closed doors and what does it mean for NATO, Europe and the wider world? In this episode of The Fourcast, Matt Frei speaks to Emily Ferris from RUSI and William Alberque, a specialist on arms control and NATO, to explore what Trump’s diplomacy tells us about the next phase of the war - and America’s role in it.
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
(00:00):
If you read the tea leaves, it is clear that some sort of land
swap is going to happen. What some of these conversations
have have revealed is the extentto which Russia is interested in
trying to pry apart the the Americans and the Europeans.
One of the arguments that comes up over and over again is that
the reason why we need to contain Putin in Ukraine is that
it could spill over into the rest of Europe.
(00:21):
Do you actually think that is a possibility?
Hello and welcome to the forecast.
It has been a week of extraordinary diplomacy.
Donald Trump first meeting Vladimir Putin in Alaska and
then Vladimir Zelensky in Washington, DC, together with
his backup band of seven European leaders.
(00:41):
Encounters that could shape the future of the war in Ukraine and
America's role in the world. For Putin, it is about
legitimacy and legacy. For Zelensky, above all, about
survival. And for Trump, well, maybe
getting that Nobel Peace Prize, but also proving that he is
still the master of the art of the deal.
(01:02):
To unpack what really happened and what it means for NATO, for
Europe and beyond, I'm joined byEmily Ferris from RUSI and
William Albert, an expert on arms control and NATO strategy.
Welcome to you both. Let me start with you, Emily.
Is this an an exceptional week? Is it an unprecedented week in
terms of the kind of weird shuttle diplomacy that we've
seen? I think it is actually, it's
(01:25):
always very tempting, I think with with these sorts of summits
to try to divide it into winnersand losers and who came out on
top. But the very fact that it took
place, at least from Moscow's perspective is, is enormous.
It's the chance to be seated at the table with another great
power, to be regarded on equal footing, which after all, is
what Russia has been wanting formany years.
(01:46):
It's a chance to put their perspective across, which they
they claim is something that's lacking from the conversation.
And it's an opportunity, just asyou say, to to cement Putin's
legitimacy as a great leader. What about you, William?
What do you think? Put it into context.
Oh, I absolutely agree. I mean the the fact that the US
is meeting face to face the president with President Putin
(02:09):
is legitimacy he so dearly craves.
The fact that the US is negotiating on the behalf of
Ukraine without Ukraine in the room is just really painful
thing for Zelensky to have to gothrough.
And the fact that all of this may collapse and what we have in
the end is some sort of conversation that's happened
that could lead to further US, Russia relations, arms control
(02:33):
talks, trade deals, whatever, what have you, at the expense of
Ukraine. So it really is an unprecedented
situation as far as I've seen. Emily, what really struck me
when I was in Alaska and then also covering the events in
Washington yesterday is that there are two negotiations going
on here. There's the one between Putin
and Trump or maybe Putin and then eventually Zelensky and the
(02:56):
European leaders. And then there's the other
negotiation that's a daily thingbetween the Europeans and mostly
Zelensky and Trump. Because the Western camp, as it
were, the NATO side is divided and there are things to be seem
to be changing literally on a ona daily, possibly even hourly
basis. So given the latest summit in
(03:16):
Washington and all the really positive mood music and the glad
handing and the kind of love fest that we saw, where do you
think today those relations, first of all between the
Europeans and Zelensky on one side and Trump actually stand?
Well, I think as far as Russia is concerned, the fact that
(03:37):
Putin and, and Trump met 1st andthey were sort of the, the big
ticket if you were. And then you have the Europeans
scrambling for, for an audience with Trump and having a, a
conversation completely separately is something that the
Russian press has pointed to with a, with a bit of Glee.
And they've been talking up especially since Trump took
(03:58):
office, the the sort of perceived rupture in the West
between European powers and trying to divide NATO into
different flanks. And whilst they've been sort of,
I suppose, cautiously flatteringof the American part of NATO,
what they're really trying to dois so divisions among NATO.
And I think what what some of these conversations have have
(04:19):
revealed is, is the extent to which Russia is interested in
trying to prior part the the Americans and the Europeans.
Which has been, you could argue,the policy in Moscow for a very
long time, William. Are they succeeding in prying
apart the the Europeans from theAmericans?
Because it seems to change literally on a daily basis.
(04:42):
It really does. And I mean, the Europeans have
been adapting on the fly on how to deal with Donald Trump.
I mean, you'll recall in his first term, Jens Stoltenberg was
very effective at mitigating thethe threat of Trump withdrawing
from NATO. And this time around, they've
been much better. They've they, they're so well
prepared this time with Secretary General Ruta
(05:03):
flattering President Trump very heavily.
And even the fact that they're there, that the European leaders
are there with Zelensky, that they're showing support, that
they're meeting with Trump, although they've been divided,
the very fact that they're thereis kind of an extraordinary
display of unity that reminds Trump that there are real
consequences here. But it's also a signal that the
(05:24):
Europeans realize they're going to have to bear the brunt of
whatever kind of peace deal, whatever kind of peacekeeping
force, they're going to be paying the costs for whatever
happens in Ukraine next. And they're making sure that
Trump sees that. Trump knows that they're working
together. They're influencing him.
I would be far more concerned ifthey were nowhere to be seen
throughout this entire process. The fact that they're actually
(05:45):
putting some influence into the situation means we have at least
not the worst outcome here. Not a great outcome, but we're
not seeing the worst outcome, which would be a complete
washing of the hands of the United States from Europe or
from NATO or from the Ukraine situation.
Instead, Trump does seem to be engaged.
Indeed. But really the price of that
engagement is sycophancy or a basement in front of Donald
(06:07):
Trump. I mean, it was amazing.
I talked to a number of senior European leaders, you know, over
the years and they always laughed at the fact that there
was this sort of show of fealty around the cabinet table in
Washington, you know, with everyone putting up their hand
up and saying, Trump, you're an amazing guy or Mr. President,
Sir, you're remarkable. And they were doing exactly the
same thing yesterday in the White House.
They each had their little preamble, you know, of, of
(06:29):
sucking up to Donald Trump. And that is, I guess, the way it
works in the king of in the in the court of King Donald.
Unfortunately, yes. And they're the fact that
they're able to recognize this and they're able to look at
what's in their real long term interest here and to understand
that working with Trump requiresa certain way of adapting your
your, the way you would normallydo things.
(06:50):
The fact that they're willing todo this shows that they have
learned there is an outcome herethat they think is possible.
That would be positive. And again, there was a real fear
when Trump came in the second time that he would finish the
business of the first term and withdraw from NATO.
And the fact that that's not being discussed, that Trump is
praising NATO, if the cost of that is, you know, kissing up a
(07:12):
little bit then. And let's face it, the United
States has always dominated NATOmilitarily. the United States
has always played the tune. This may be the most naked and
distasteful way of showing it, but it's always been in the
background of these conversations.
And the fact that instead of, you know, Macron saying no and
refusing to do so, the fact thathe's willing to go along and
(07:32):
say, hey, look, this is what we need to do for European security
and for the future of NATO. I'm I'm sad and I'm a little bit
embarrassed, but I'm also glad that they're working so hard and
willing to do anything it takes to maintain this alliance.
Emily, there's, of course, someone else who's playing this
Bonfire of the Vanities game, and that's a guy called Vladimir
Putin. I mean, the flattery that he
(07:53):
came up with in Alaska on Fridaywas frankly astonishing.
I mean, he repeated all the president's talking points, some
of which are frankly, looney from the campaign trail, how the
2020 election was rigged. And if he had, if Trump had been
president, then there wouldn't have been war in Ukraine.
I mean, this is even by by Putin's standards, just kind of
jaw-dropping really. And again, you kind of wonder
(08:13):
who's more, you know, who's bigger in Trump's ear, Vladimir
Putin, you know, the strong man from Moscow who he probably
admires on one level, or all those Europeans, you know, in
their, in their varying degrees of English fluency, whispering
into his ear. Who is more persuasive, do you
think? Well, I think there's certainly
a degree of commonality between Putin and Trump in the way that
(08:35):
they sort of, I suppose, admire personalities that are a little
bit more brash and perhaps the sort of strong man image.
But well. That's kind of big.
Sorry. That's quite a big commonality
is that, I mean, I'm sure, you know, Trump likes to shut down
free media that criticizes him. You know, who's done the very
that very effectively for years,one Vladimir Putin.
You know, when it comes to kind of, you know, interfering in the
(08:56):
economy, maybe Putin does less of that than Trump would like to
do. I mean, there's quite a lot of
commonality on one level. Well, I suppose there's a
difference very much between taking personality traits that
you find appealing and finding common ways of running a
country. I think those are quite
different things. But certainly, you know, the
fact that that Putin is repeating talking points, it's
something that Trump has also done with Russia's talking
(09:19):
points, most notably. So it's, it's very interesting
to see that Trump is sometimes as good as the last thing that
he's heard. And sometimes if the the last
thing that he's heard is something that that Putin has
said, it can be quite alarming. But I don't think it
particularly costs Putin anything to repeat some of the
things that the Trump was talking about it.
It was I think an exercise in trying to restore the bilateral
(09:41):
relationship that didn't requirehim to do make any concessions.
It didn't require him particularly to seem weakened.
The level of flattery didn't really extend, I think to
anything particularly overly sincere.
And then I think the the reaction in the Russian media
afterwards has been that yes, there might be a meeting, there
might be a trilateral meeting, but they haven't really they
(10:04):
committed to the fact that that Putin would attend.
They suggested, well, there might be other more senior
leaders in Russia that might come to A to a meeting between
Zelensky and Trump. But I think they're trying to
kick this into the long grass tosee what the Americans might
come up with next. And, and just I want to ask you
both this question. You know, we spent so much time
(10:24):
analysing the theatre and the body language, you know, of
Donald Trump and his court and the people around him and all
that is important because those words actually really do matter.
And the mood can translate into policy.
But where we stand right now, what do you think was actually
decided in Washington? The nitty gritty of any kind of
security guarantee? What do those plans look like?
(10:47):
First you, Emily. Well, I don't think anything
particularly concrete has been decided.
And perhaps the reason that it'snot been published is, is that
it's in such a sort of febrile state that there isn't really
anything to discuss yet. I know it's a little bit of a
boring thing to say, but the fact that the meeting took place
in and of itself is pretty historic.
(11:07):
Russia obviously isn't politically isolated when it
comes to its own partners like China and Iran and Belarus and
North Korea. But when it comes to the West,
this is a pretty big deal that they've, they've sort of scored
this audience with Trump. So I wouldn't denigrate too much
perhaps the fact that it took place and that it might open the
door for more conversation. I suppose it just depends the
(11:28):
extent to which people think that the diplomacy and dialogue
can be used as a tool of national security and A and a
tool of foreign policy, rather than something that, as you
referred to earlier, is is more sort of a basement.
Right, William, it's interesting.
I mean, Trump had us all guessing yesterday when he said,
again, very much off the cuff. You know, there's a lot of loose
(11:49):
talk there about, you know, maybe there'll be, you know,
American security guarantees, maybe the troops will get
involved, maybe not. I mean, again, I was left
completely confused by the end of it.
What do you think he was actually trying to say and what
does he mean? Right.
I think if you boil it down, if you really parse, if you read
the tea leaves, I think what wasdiscussed was it is clear that
(12:13):
some sort of land swap's going to happen.
So Russia's going to have some land, but they're going to have
to give up some territory that they're currently holding.
France, Britain and Germany can put troops in Ukraine as part of
the peacekeeping force, but not under a NATO flag per SE.
Now there are ways, hybrid ways to do that, that NATO has done
before, where it's using the tools of NATO for planning and
(12:37):
for commitment control, but without a NATO flag, with EU
leadership instead, which we've done in the Balkans before.
He said that Crimea is not beingreturned to Ukraine.
He said accession to NATO is notgoing to happen and that the US
could help Europe to deploy troops and could even possibly
supply some sort of air support.So I think what was discussed
(12:58):
was a no fly zone. I think what was discussed was
European troops on Ukrainian soil.
I think what was discussed was asecurity guarantee.
That would be harder than the Budapest memorandum, which
promised to have a meeting. If you know anything bad
happened, this could actually be, you know, kinetic if
something bad happens and European boots on the ground
will be absolutely essential to any kind of peace and stability.
The fact that Trump said those things and that these aren't
(13:20):
things that people interpreted that he said suggests to me, you
know, the the way you see him operate, you have a pretty good
idea of what was discussed now. And you can see the framework of
a peace agreement coming to force.
The real question is what's going to happen when Zelensky
and Putin are in the room together?
Yeah, and that's going to be ournext question.
But but just before that, there was an interesting article by
Timothy Snyder, the historian. He was obviously not a a Putin
(13:44):
fan and not a Trump fan either, saying that the the mere wording
land swap is incredibly toxic because the Ukrainians have no
land to speak of to give back tothe Russians after they lost
most of Kursk province. So it would be a swap of land
for peace and security. But the fact that the Russians
are talking about land swaps andthe fact that Trump picked that
(14:05):
up sort of makes it look as if, you know, there's an equality
there of, you know, invasion of territory.
And there just simply isn't. And I think that's a really
important point, you know, to keep in mind.
And so, Emily, I mean this again, because we're so busy
trying to work out what, you know, Donald Trump thinks.
What we haven't really established yet is how far do
you think Vladimir Putin is prepared to compromise?
(14:29):
Well, I think it's right that that Peter will probably stop at
nothing to subjugate Ukraine ultimately, whether in the short
term there would be some sort ofsecurity negotiation with
Ukraine that would, you know. So obviously we're we're not
going to go for for boots on theground, but perhaps some sort of
intelligence showing relationship between the
Americans and the Ukrainians that endures some sort of aerial
(14:52):
defence patrol similar I supposeto to what NATO has over the
Baltic states. There was, I think a lot of
wiggle room in some of the security guarantees without it
being something so clumsy as a as sort of soldiers that are
posted in Ukraine as a deterrence.
But ultimately the longer term problem is going to be, as
you've said that that really Putin will not leave it there.
(15:13):
It will always be the fact that in the next, I don't know, sort
of 5-10 years when you see perhaps another president in
power. I mean, it was very interesting
what you pointed to earlier whenyou noted that, that Putin
agreed that if, if Trump, if Trump had been president at the
time, that he maybe would have considered not invading Ukraine.
Obviously, we can't know that, but it's a possibility.
(15:36):
So if, for example, you have, say, a Democrat president in
power and their position on the Russians is, is very well known
and very negative, I'm sure thatyou could see an opportunity for
the Russians to attempt again, perhaps not something like a
military invasion of Ukraine, but certainly over the next 5 or
6 years, you could see them try to invest in their political
(15:57):
technologies. They'll, as they like to call
it, to try to influence electionprocesses in Ukraine, to try to
get parties in power that are ultimately favourable to Russia.
It will be difficult, but it's certainly something that given
the mistakes that the Russians made in their intelligence
assessments of how the Ukrainianpeople would have responded to
an invasion of their country, they thought they would welcome
(16:17):
them with open arms. They're going to be doing a lot
of, I suppose, revisiting of their own intelligence
assessments of how Ukraine works, and it will be
interesting to see what else wrote it next.
William, I mean, in order to make a deal, whether it's a
cease-fire or a lasting peace deal, you do need the Russians
to sign that piece of paper having raised the stakes in
(16:39):
Ukraine. I mean, he calls it a special
military operation. But it's, you know, everyone
knows it's a full scale war. The Russians have lost up to
1,000,000 men either killed or maimed.
That's a huge number of men thatthey've lost and, you know,
they've been turned into pariah state as a result of the
response. Certainly in the West And for
Putin himself, he has said we'vegot a, a Nazi government in
(17:02):
Kiev, which of course is nonsense.
Zelensky is Jewish. But, you know, he said this is
the worst possible threat. If he doesn't get rid of that
government, if it doesn't changefundamentally, then in the eyes
of his own propaganda, he would have lost that war.
So again, I come back to this, you know, we are very good at
doing the nuance of security measures here and there.
But ultimately Putin doesn't do nuance when it comes to Ukraine.
(17:25):
So where do we meet? Where?
Where's the Where's the landing strip here?
Look, this is really an extraordinary situation because
if if Trump is correct and you're talking about the
possibility of European troops in Ukraine and the possibility
of some kind of no fly zone, you're talking about fixing the
front lines somewhere where Russia does not achieve its war
aims. You have to believe that Russia
(17:46):
is just going to try to rearm and somehow divide the Europeans
and do this again, this is not something that Putin is ever
going to stop. He, he, he really feels this is
an existential threat to, to hisrule.
You're right there. Emily is correct as well.
This will go on. So what really intrigues me is
what's going to happen between Zelensky and Putin.
It may be that Putin goes in andblows that meeting up, blame
(18:10):
Zalenski, and then sees if Trumpwill side with Putin or Zalenski
at the end of this and hoping that Trump will side with Putin,
blame Ukraine for all of this and just wash his hands of the
whole thing. I think that's got to be Putin's
play here because otherwise he could declare an end to this
conflict or cessation of hostilities anytime he wants.
He can go home anytime he wants.He and and I would push back a
(18:33):
little bit against what you said.
I think Putin could declare victory tomorrow and would just
change the propaganda. He has done this so many times
during his rule of, you know, whatever I said yesterday that
never happened. How dare you say I said that?
This is what I've always said. This has always been the case.
He can redefine reality within Russia however he wants.
But I do think it would be an incredible weakening of his
(18:54):
position of anything less than regime change or, as you point
out, the complete loss of Ukrainian sovereignty.
And really, what's on the table right now is more of a holding
position like the end of World War 2 with East and West Germany
or the Baltic states under Soviet control, where we're
kicking some of these problems into the long grass with the
idea of eventual reunification of Ukraine under Western terms,
(19:16):
not reunification of Ukraine under Russian control or as a
Russian province. So I do think Putin is losing
here. I think he can declare whatever
he wants and change the narrative.
I think it will weaken him. But he's also, you know, he's
also incredibly old as well. I think he's nearing the end of
his presidency. Yeah, his life.
I think he wants to. Bring up the same thing, by the
(19:36):
way. Yeah, no, you're right.
You're absolutely right. Russian presidents don't leave
through the door. They get carried off on the
door. Yeah, So we'll see.
But I, I do think, I think for Putin, this is existential.
He can end it, but he could haveended at any point.
So I do think he's going to try to see this as some kind of
pause to rearm and then do it again.
Emily, I want to ask you broadenit out a little bit.
(19:58):
I mean, it was so impressive to see the Europeans all show up in
Washington speaking with one voice.
You know, that's a remarkable thing for Europe these days, to
have a voice. I know that some some awkward
squad members were not there, like Viktor Orban.
But you know, they've got Maloney onside.
It's sort of populist, right? And they've got and then they've
got Merts. Who's sort of more in the
middle? And Macron, you know, I mean,
(20:19):
it's it's an interesting bunch and they're all talking from the
same song sheet singing and even.
But one of the arguments that comes up over and over again is
that the reason why we need to contain Putin and Ukraine is
that it could spill over into the rest of Europe.
Now, do you actually think that is a possibility?
I think I'd take some convincingabout whether Putin really has
(20:41):
designs on, on the Baltic states.
Yes, it was psychologically difficult for for Russia to lose
the Baltic states to the EU and to NATO.
But I think broadly there is an acceptance in Russia that they
are part of NATO. And I think Article 5 is, is
very effective as a deterrence. That doesn't mean that that
Russia is not interested in the Baltic states.
They expend a lot of resources, political, financial and and
(21:03):
intelligence on penetrating the Baltic states to figure out
what's going on to see if they they can influence political
parties. And that's much more effective
than just say a land invasion, something as clumsy as that,
that would generate a third World War.
I don't believe that Russia has that interest.
Then I suppose there's the more,the more practical aspect of it.
So if Russia has failed geographically to conquer
(21:25):
Ukraine in terms of territory, which is enormous, there is
nothing to lead us to suspect that Russia would be able to do
similar in Europe. I know there's lots of, you
know, these NATO scenarios aboutthe sulky gap, but this is not
really something that Russia really refers to or talks about
very much. It's not an area of weakness
that Russia is as interested in probing as other things.
(21:46):
So trying to figure out NATO's logistical weaknesses, for
example. So there's been plenty of
attacks on NATO infrastructure in multiple different countries
across Europe. It's something that Russia is
very keen to to, to, you know, distance itself from and use the
third parties and proxies. But we can, we can pretty much
attribute it to Russia's attemptto try to overload NATO
(22:08):
infrastructure, things like hospitals and, and water
treatment plants. So it's clear that Russia thinks
that trying to distract NATO, prevent it from continuing to
arm Ukraine and share intelligence, all of these are
sort of worthwhile causes for Russia to spend its time on.
But that's a very different scenario than than trying to
(22:29):
have a sort of territorial takeover of another country.
And I think there was a real distinction to be made between
the way that Russia sees Belarusand Ukraine and the way that
Russia sees other former Soviet territories.
Because as, as we've sort of discussed earlier briefly, you
know, Russia sees these countries as that kind of
triumvirate of, you know, the origin of Kiev and Ruse and the
(22:50):
heir to this historical Orthodoxtradition.
That's a very different way of thinking than former Soviet
Union territories and trying to reconstitute.
I don't really believe that Russia is interested, for
example, in taking trunks out ofnorthern Kazakhstan.
The relationship is completely different.
Yeah. William, do you agree with that
or do you do you look a little bit doubtful there?
(23:13):
Well, I think the Cazaks would disagree with that because you
remember when there was the CSTO, quote, UN quote,
peacekeeping mission in Kazakhstan and the Russian
troops wanted to stay. And you had the unprecedented
step of the president of Kazakhstan talking to Putin in
Kazakh for the first time that had ever happened in public to
kind of push back against this what was seen as real Russian
(23:33):
revanchism. I do think moving nuclear
weapons into Belarus is a part of the broader effort to
reabsorb Belarus into a a Russian confederation into what
they call the Union state that removes with Armenia and
Azerbaijan before that conflict re kicked off where Russia was
trying to position itself with Azerbaijan to put peacekeepers
in there right before the war. And now all that's been blown
(23:56):
away. So I do think if this war had
gone differently, if Ukraine hadcollapsed immediately as Russia
thought it would, Russia thoughtthis was going to be like the
Czechoslovakia 1968 campaign andbe over in 72 hours.
If that happened, I think you would see Putin bringing back,
putting the band back together, you know, putting enormous
pressure on Kazakhstan, putting enormous pressure on Armenia and
(24:17):
Azerbaijan, absorbing Belarus more politically rather than
only militarily. And so then what's the next
step? As you seen with Ukraine, our
whole discussion going back to how you started, Russia wants to
take away Ukrainian sovereignty.I think he wants to take away
Baltic sovereignty the same way he wants to take away Finnish
sovereignty. He wants none of the countries
on his borders to have true sovereignty.
(24:39):
Whenever you take down a statue of Stalin, the Russians say you
can't do that. You remember the Russians
proposed to this big treaty, theEuropean Security Treaty back in
2010, which would have given Russia veto right over domestic
legislation in NATO countries. Russia has a very different idea
of what sovereignty in its near abroad should be.
(24:59):
And I do think they want to see a massive sphere of influence as
to whether it's a territorial invasion or not.
I think if Russia thought it could take some NATO territory
and break Article 5, show the weakness of NATO, then he would
do that. But of course, with the 2014
vision of Crimea and all the things that NATO has done since
then, including putting troops, NATO troops in Eastern Europe on
(25:22):
a rotational first and then moreon a permanent basis in
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, thishas sort of taken that move off
the table. But I think Russia will
continually test where our boundaries are.
And if, if we did not put more NATO troops into the Eastern
Front, I do think he would have thought about more of a
territorial grab, not to conquerthem all per SE, but just to
(25:43):
show that NATO was hollow. Because ultimately, and again,
Matt, I go back to what you started with, Russia's longest
term ambition going back to the Soviet Union is to decouple the
United States and the UK from European security to to
sequester them so that he can dominate them.
And that's the longer term ambition here.
OK, couple of things before we end Ukraine, right?
(26:05):
Whether it's a member of NATO oreven the EU, at the end of this
whole process, whether you like it or not, it is going to become
the best armed, the most qualified at war fighting nation
probably anywhere in the world. I mean, these guys are really
good at fighting. I know they're tired.
They, they're, they're tooled upto the eyeballs.
They have a mission, you know, they're prepared to sacrifice
(26:26):
despite more fatigue setting in and all that.
You don't invite them into your tent at your peril.
I would say if you have them outside floating around, you
know, who knows it's going to berunning Ukraine in five years
time. Could Ukraine?
And Angela Mozila von der Leyen likes to say, you know, it's
like swallowing a porcupine, theporcupine swallowed by Russia.
But also it could be porcupine swallowed by Europe or pricking
(26:49):
up against Europe next to Europein a kind of uncomfortable way.
I do think that Ukraine will integrate more and more into
European structures. Certainly there is much more of
a problem in the Far East of Ukraine in terms of feeling more
Russian and being just, you know, separate in terms of how
they think of themselves. I wouldn't concede that as a
(27:09):
territorial concession, but I can see the rest of Ukraine
integrating very well into Europe.
It really was. I mean, the Maidan protest at
the 1st place was a real desire by the majority of Ukrainians to
integrate into Western Europe. So I can see this as a long term
project. And you're absolutely right, we
shouldn't leave them alone. They have massive capability.
We've seen their technological prowess, their ability to
(27:32):
develop even under wartime, amazing technologies, their
ability to adapt, their willingness to adopt, you know,
great countermeasures against crime and corruption, to take on
EU legislation. This was all part of this whole
story. And so I do think they will
integrate. And leaving them alone is,
you're absolutely right. It would be a terrible move.
It would create this weird Badlands in the center of
(27:52):
Europe, you know, between Belarus and Ukraine as the sort
of ungoverned space with rampantcorruption.
And that's where we were 1015 years ago.
We need to take care of this. And I'd say the same thing with
Moldova and Transnistria as well.
We can't allow these Cold War hangover gaps to exist.
We need to integrate more of these territories into a
European way of thinking, European business style,
(28:13):
European education. And I do think that's the great
way forward. And whether it's through the EU
or through NATO or some combination, I I think it has to
happen for Europe's future. OK.
Emily, just briefly, will you can become a liability or an
asset for us in Europe? Annoyingly, I'm sorry to answer
this in such a way. It very much depends on how the
war ends. I think it depends on whether
(28:37):
this is a an enormous defeat forUkraine.
It depends on Europe's willingness to to sort of
integrate them, as William was saying.
But it also depends on the extent to which they're able to
root out some of the corruption problems that they do have.
The reason that they have been precluded from NATO membership
before was not only because there was a war on their
territory, but also the corruption problems that William
(28:58):
noted earlier. They're really quite systemic.
It's very difficult to get out of that way of thinking.
And yes, of course there are European standards that that can
be imposed. But as some of the processes in
Ukraine around their anti corruption agencies showed only
a few weeks ago, it will be a little bit of a damper to those
that were hoping that Ukraine might be able to rid itself of
(29:18):
some of those elements. So hopefully there will be a
strategic plan for integrating Ukraine into into structures
because of course what you don'twant is the porcupine that you
referred to and you don't want that to be absorbed by Russia or
for Russia to take advantage of that chaos as well.
So if there is a vacuum that that Europe and NATO are not
(29:39):
able to fill, you can probably guarantee that Russia will be
there to try to absorb some of that discontent and and
weaponize it against Europe. OK, we're going to end with one
quick question to both of you. There's a lot of bad that has
happened in the last 3 1/2 years.
Lots of lives lost, countries trampled on.
Now we have the insecurity, the mercurial nature of Trump's
(30:01):
presidency, Monarchy. Call it what you like.
What is the one good thing that has come out of this strange
relationship between Trump, Europe, Zelensky and Putin?
The one good thing? Emily, you first.
One good thing. Sorry, I can't think of
anything. OK, All right.
Yeah. What about you, William?
Is there a good thing? Yes, I think there is.
I think the fact that Europe haswoken up to the idea that the
(30:22):
world is a dangerous place and that defence matters and you go
back to 2013, the US had removedthe last battle tank from
Europe. NATO spending on defense was
hovering around 1%. The Japanese had very little
spent on defense. Everyone in the West was just
thinking we don't have to take care of these things.
And Russia and China and North Korea and Iran did not think
(30:44):
that way. And they were arming.
You know, we now know that Chinawas well into a nuclear build up
at this point. Russia is, you know, at that
point was still 15 years into a major nuclear build up.
And the fact that we were willing to ignore that across
Europe, that in the UK, if they were talking about, you know,
getting rid of nukes, all of this is over.
And now we're looking at Europe and the UK really thinking hard
(31:07):
about the future of security. And that it's based on the
traditional things of national power, of cooperation and
alliances on top of all that, ofsolid industrial base, all these
kinds of thinking. I think that this is a terrible
dark timeline, but at least you see people waking up and being
serious about security and how to contribute to peace is not
(31:29):
through total unilateral disarmament, but through working
together to make a stronger future.
Emily Ferris, William Albert, thank you very much to both of
you. I hope you've enjoyed the
forecast. See you next time.
If you read the tea leaves, it is clear that some sort of land
swap is going to happen. What some of these conversations
have have revealed is the extentto which Russia is interested in
trying to pry apart the the Americans and the Europeans.
One of the arguments that comes up over and over again is that
the reason why we need to contain Putin in Ukraine is that
it could spill over into the rest of Europe.
(00:21):
Do you actually think that is a possibility?
Hello and welcome to the forecast.
It has been a week of extraordinary diplomacy.
Donald Trump first meeting Vladimir Putin in Alaska and
then Vladimir Zelensky in Washington, DC, together with
his backup band of seven European leaders.
(00:41):
Encounters that could shape the future of the war in Ukraine and
America's role in the world. For Putin, it is about
legitimacy and legacy. For Zelensky, above all, about
survival. And for Trump, well, maybe
getting that Nobel Peace Prize, but also proving that he is
still the master of the art of the deal.
(01:02):
To unpack what really happened and what it means for NATO, for
Europe and beyond, I'm joined byEmily Ferris from RUSI and
William Albert, an expert on arms control and NATO strategy.
Welcome to you both. Let me start with you, Emily.
Is this an an exceptional week? Is it an unprecedented week in
terms of the kind of weird shuttle diplomacy that we've
seen? I think it is actually, it's
(01:25):
always very tempting, I think with with these sorts of summits
to try to divide it into winnersand losers and who came out on
top. But the very fact that it took
place, at least from Moscow's perspective is, is enormous.
It's the chance to be seated at the table with another great
power, to be regarded on equal footing, which after all, is
what Russia has been wanting formany years.
(01:46):
It's a chance to put their perspective across, which they
they claim is something that's lacking from the conversation.
And it's an opportunity, just asyou say, to to cement Putin's
legitimacy as a great leader. What about you, William?
What do you think? Put it into context.
Oh, I absolutely agree. I mean the the fact that the US
is meeting face to face the president with President Putin
(02:09):
is legitimacy he so dearly craves.
The fact that the US is negotiating on the behalf of
Ukraine without Ukraine in the room is just really painful
thing for Zelensky to have to gothrough.
And the fact that all of this may collapse and what we have in
the end is some sort of conversation that's happened
that could lead to further US, Russia relations, arms control
(02:33):
talks, trade deals, whatever, what have you, at the expense of
Ukraine. So it really is an unprecedented
situation as far as I've seen. Emily, what really struck me
when I was in Alaska and then also covering the events in
Washington yesterday is that there are two negotiations going
on here. There's the one between Putin
and Trump or maybe Putin and then eventually Zelensky and the
(02:56):
European leaders. And then there's the other
negotiation that's a daily thingbetween the Europeans and mostly
Zelensky and Trump. Because the Western camp, as it
were, the NATO side is divided and there are things to be seem
to be changing literally on a ona daily, possibly even hourly
basis. So given the latest summit in
(03:16):
Washington and all the really positive mood music and the glad
handing and the kind of love fest that we saw, where do you
think today those relations, first of all between the
Europeans and Zelensky on one side and Trump actually stand?
Well, I think as far as Russia is concerned, the fact that
(03:37):
Putin and, and Trump met 1st andthey were sort of the, the big
ticket if you were. And then you have the Europeans
scrambling for, for an audience with Trump and having a, a
conversation completely separately is something that the
Russian press has pointed to with a, with a bit of Glee.
And they've been talking up especially since Trump took
(03:58):
office, the the sort of perceived rupture in the West
between European powers and trying to divide NATO into
different flanks. And whilst they've been sort of,
I suppose, cautiously flatteringof the American part of NATO,
what they're really trying to dois so divisions among NATO.
And I think what what some of these conversations have have
(04:19):
revealed is, is the extent to which Russia is interested in
trying to prior part the the Americans and the Europeans.
Which has been, you could argue,the policy in Moscow for a very
long time, William. Are they succeeding in prying
apart the the Europeans from theAmericans?
Because it seems to change literally on a daily basis.
(04:42):
It really does. And I mean, the Europeans have
been adapting on the fly on how to deal with Donald Trump.
I mean, you'll recall in his first term, Jens Stoltenberg was
very effective at mitigating thethe threat of Trump withdrawing
from NATO. And this time around, they've
been much better. They've they, they're so well
prepared this time with Secretary General Ruta
(05:03):
flattering President Trump very heavily.
And even the fact that they're there, that the European leaders
are there with Zelensky, that they're showing support, that
they're meeting with Trump, although they've been divided,
the very fact that they're thereis kind of an extraordinary
display of unity that reminds Trump that there are real
consequences here. But it's also a signal that the
(05:24):
Europeans realize they're going to have to bear the brunt of
whatever kind of peace deal, whatever kind of peacekeeping
force, they're going to be paying the costs for whatever
happens in Ukraine next. And they're making sure that
Trump sees that. Trump knows that they're working
together. They're influencing him.
I would be far more concerned ifthey were nowhere to be seen
throughout this entire process. The fact that they're actually
(05:45):
putting some influence into the situation means we have at least
not the worst outcome here. Not a great outcome, but we're
not seeing the worst outcome, which would be a complete
washing of the hands of the United States from Europe or
from NATO or from the Ukraine situation.
Instead, Trump does seem to be engaged.
Indeed. But really the price of that
engagement is sycophancy or a basement in front of Donald
(06:07):
Trump. I mean, it was amazing.
I talked to a number of senior European leaders, you know, over
the years and they always laughed at the fact that there
was this sort of show of fealty around the cabinet table in
Washington, you know, with everyone putting up their hand
up and saying, Trump, you're an amazing guy or Mr. President,
Sir, you're remarkable. And they were doing exactly the
same thing yesterday in the White House.
They each had their little preamble, you know, of, of
(06:29):
sucking up to Donald Trump. And that is, I guess, the way it
works in the king of in the in the court of King Donald.
Unfortunately, yes. And they're the fact that
they're able to recognize this and they're able to look at
what's in their real long term interest here and to understand
that working with Trump requiresa certain way of adapting your
your, the way you would normallydo things.
(06:50):
The fact that they're willing todo this shows that they have
learned there is an outcome herethat they think is possible.
That would be positive. And again, there was a real fear
when Trump came in the second time that he would finish the
business of the first term and withdraw from NATO.
And the fact that that's not being discussed, that Trump is
praising NATO, if the cost of that is, you know, kissing up a
(07:12):
little bit then. And let's face it, the United
States has always dominated NATOmilitarily. the United States
has always played the tune. This may be the most naked and
distasteful way of showing it, but it's always been in the
background of these conversations.
And the fact that instead of, you know, Macron saying no and
refusing to do so, the fact thathe's willing to go along and
(07:32):
say, hey, look, this is what we need to do for European security
and for the future of NATO. I'm I'm sad and I'm a little bit
embarrassed, but I'm also glad that they're working so hard and
willing to do anything it takes to maintain this alliance.
Emily, there's, of course, someone else who's playing this
Bonfire of the Vanities game, and that's a guy called Vladimir
Putin. I mean, the flattery that he
(07:53):
came up with in Alaska on Fridaywas frankly astonishing.
I mean, he repeated all the president's talking points, some
of which are frankly, looney from the campaign trail, how the
2020 election was rigged. And if he had, if Trump had been
president, then there wouldn't have been war in Ukraine.
I mean, this is even by by Putin's standards, just kind of
jaw-dropping really. And again, you kind of wonder
(08:13):
who's more, you know, who's bigger in Trump's ear, Vladimir
Putin, you know, the strong man from Moscow who he probably
admires on one level, or all those Europeans, you know, in
their, in their varying degrees of English fluency, whispering
into his ear. Who is more persuasive, do you
think? Well, I think there's certainly
a degree of commonality between Putin and Trump in the way that
(08:35):
they sort of, I suppose, admire personalities that are a little
bit more brash and perhaps the sort of strong man image.
But well. That's kind of big.
Sorry. That's quite a big commonality
is that, I mean, I'm sure, you know, Trump likes to shut down
free media that criticizes him. You know, who's done the very
that very effectively for years,one Vladimir Putin.
You know, when it comes to kind of, you know, interfering in the
(08:56):
economy, maybe Putin does less of that than Trump would like to
do. I mean, there's quite a lot of
commonality on one level. Well, I suppose there's a
difference very much between taking personality traits that
you find appealing and finding common ways of running a
country. I think those are quite
different things. But certainly, you know, the
fact that that Putin is repeating talking points, it's
something that Trump has also done with Russia's talking
(09:19):
points, most notably. So it's, it's very interesting
to see that Trump is sometimes as good as the last thing that
he's heard. And sometimes if the the last
thing that he's heard is something that that Putin has
said, it can be quite alarming. But I don't think it
particularly costs Putin anything to repeat some of the
things that the Trump was talking about it.
It was I think an exercise in trying to restore the bilateral
(09:41):
relationship that didn't requirehim to do make any concessions.
It didn't require him particularly to seem weakened.
The level of flattery didn't really extend, I think to
anything particularly overly sincere.
And then I think the the reaction in the Russian media
afterwards has been that yes, there might be a meeting, there
might be a trilateral meeting, but they haven't really they
(10:04):
committed to the fact that that Putin would attend.
They suggested, well, there might be other more senior
leaders in Russia that might come to A to a meeting between
Zelensky and Trump. But I think they're trying to
kick this into the long grass tosee what the Americans might
come up with next. And, and just I want to ask you
both this question. You know, we spent so much time
(10:24):
analysing the theatre and the body language, you know, of
Donald Trump and his court and the people around him and all
that is important because those words actually really do matter.
And the mood can translate into policy.
But where we stand right now, what do you think was actually
decided in Washington? The nitty gritty of any kind of
security guarantee? What do those plans look like?
(10:47):
First you, Emily. Well, I don't think anything
particularly concrete has been decided.
And perhaps the reason that it'snot been published is, is that
it's in such a sort of febrile state that there isn't really
anything to discuss yet. I know it's a little bit of a
boring thing to say, but the fact that the meeting took place
in and of itself is pretty historic.
(11:07):
Russia obviously isn't politically isolated when it
comes to its own partners like China and Iran and Belarus and
North Korea. But when it comes to the West,
this is a pretty big deal that they've, they've sort of scored
this audience with Trump. So I wouldn't denigrate too much
perhaps the fact that it took place and that it might open the
door for more conversation. I suppose it just depends the
(11:28):
extent to which people think that the diplomacy and dialogue
can be used as a tool of national security and A and a
tool of foreign policy, rather than something that, as you
referred to earlier, is is more sort of a basement.
Right, William, it's interesting.
I mean, Trump had us all guessing yesterday when he said,
again, very much off the cuff. You know, there's a lot of loose
(11:49):
talk there about, you know, maybe there'll be, you know,
American security guarantees, maybe the troops will get
involved, maybe not. I mean, again, I was left
completely confused by the end of it.
What do you think he was actually trying to say and what
does he mean? Right.
I think if you boil it down, if you really parse, if you read
the tea leaves, I think what wasdiscussed was it is clear that
(12:13):
some sort of land swap's going to happen.
So Russia's going to have some land, but they're going to have
to give up some territory that they're currently holding.
France, Britain and Germany can put troops in Ukraine as part of
the peacekeeping force, but not under a NATO flag per SE.
Now there are ways, hybrid ways to do that, that NATO has done
before, where it's using the tools of NATO for planning and
(12:37):
for commitment control, but without a NATO flag, with EU
leadership instead, which we've done in the Balkans before.
He said that Crimea is not beingreturned to Ukraine.
He said accession to NATO is notgoing to happen and that the US
could help Europe to deploy troops and could even possibly
supply some sort of air support.So I think what was discussed
(12:58):
was a no fly zone. I think what was discussed was
European troops on Ukrainian soil.
I think what was discussed was asecurity guarantee.
That would be harder than the Budapest memorandum, which
promised to have a meeting. If you know anything bad
happened, this could actually be, you know, kinetic if
something bad happens and European boots on the ground
will be absolutely essential to any kind of peace and stability.
The fact that Trump said those things and that these aren't
(13:20):
things that people interpreted that he said suggests to me, you
know, the the way you see him operate, you have a pretty good
idea of what was discussed now. And you can see the framework of
a peace agreement coming to force.
The real question is what's going to happen when Zelensky
and Putin are in the room together?
Yeah, and that's going to be ournext question.
But but just before that, there was an interesting article by
Timothy Snyder, the historian. He was obviously not a a Putin
(13:44):
fan and not a Trump fan either, saying that the the mere wording
land swap is incredibly toxic because the Ukrainians have no
land to speak of to give back tothe Russians after they lost
most of Kursk province. So it would be a swap of land
for peace and security. But the fact that the Russians
are talking about land swaps andthe fact that Trump picked that
(14:05):
up sort of makes it look as if, you know, there's an equality
there of, you know, invasion of territory.
And there just simply isn't. And I think that's a really
important point, you know, to keep in mind.
And so, Emily, I mean this again, because we're so busy
trying to work out what, you know, Donald Trump thinks.
What we haven't really established yet is how far do
you think Vladimir Putin is prepared to compromise?
(14:29):
Well, I think it's right that that Peter will probably stop at
nothing to subjugate Ukraine ultimately, whether in the short
term there would be some sort ofsecurity negotiation with
Ukraine that would, you know. So obviously we're we're not
going to go for for boots on theground, but perhaps some sort of
intelligence showing relationship between the
Americans and the Ukrainians that endures some sort of aerial
(14:52):
defence patrol similar I supposeto to what NATO has over the
Baltic states. There was, I think a lot of
wiggle room in some of the security guarantees without it
being something so clumsy as a as sort of soldiers that are
posted in Ukraine as a deterrence.
But ultimately the longer term problem is going to be, as
you've said that that really Putin will not leave it there.
(15:13):
It will always be the fact that in the next, I don't know, sort
of 5-10 years when you see perhaps another president in
power. I mean, it was very interesting
what you pointed to earlier whenyou noted that, that Putin
agreed that if, if Trump, if Trump had been president at the
time, that he maybe would have considered not invading Ukraine.
Obviously, we can't know that, but it's a possibility.
(15:36):
So if, for example, you have, say, a Democrat president in
power and their position on the Russians is, is very well known
and very negative, I'm sure thatyou could see an opportunity for
the Russians to attempt again, perhaps not something like a
military invasion of Ukraine, but certainly over the next 5 or
6 years, you could see them try to invest in their political
(15:57):
technologies. They'll, as they like to call
it, to try to influence electionprocesses in Ukraine, to try to
get parties in power that are ultimately favourable to Russia.
It will be difficult, but it's certainly something that given
the mistakes that the Russians made in their intelligence
assessments of how the Ukrainianpeople would have responded to
an invasion of their country, they thought they would welcome
(16:17):
them with open arms. They're going to be doing a lot
of, I suppose, revisiting of their own intelligence
assessments of how Ukraine works, and it will be
interesting to see what else wrote it next.
William, I mean, in order to make a deal, whether it's a
cease-fire or a lasting peace deal, you do need the Russians
to sign that piece of paper having raised the stakes in
(16:39):
Ukraine. I mean, he calls it a special
military operation. But it's, you know, everyone
knows it's a full scale war. The Russians have lost up to
1,000,000 men either killed or maimed.
That's a huge number of men thatthey've lost and, you know,
they've been turned into pariah state as a result of the
response. Certainly in the West And for
Putin himself, he has said we'vegot a, a Nazi government in
(17:02):
Kiev, which of course is nonsense.
Zelensky is Jewish. But, you know, he said this is
the worst possible threat. If he doesn't get rid of that
government, if it doesn't changefundamentally, then in the eyes
of his own propaganda, he would have lost that war.
So again, I come back to this, you know, we are very good at
doing the nuance of security measures here and there.
But ultimately Putin doesn't do nuance when it comes to Ukraine.
(17:25):
So where do we meet? Where?
Where's the Where's the landing strip here?
Look, this is really an extraordinary situation because
if if Trump is correct and you're talking about the
possibility of European troops in Ukraine and the possibility
of some kind of no fly zone, you're talking about fixing the
front lines somewhere where Russia does not achieve its war
aims. You have to believe that Russia
(17:46):
is just going to try to rearm and somehow divide the Europeans
and do this again, this is not something that Putin is ever
going to stop. He, he, he really feels this is
an existential threat to, to hisrule.
You're right there. Emily is correct as well.
This will go on. So what really intrigues me is
what's going to happen between Zelensky and Putin.
It may be that Putin goes in andblows that meeting up, blame
(18:10):
Zalenski, and then sees if Trumpwill side with Putin or Zalenski
at the end of this and hoping that Trump will side with Putin,
blame Ukraine for all of this and just wash his hands of the
whole thing. I think that's got to be Putin's
play here because otherwise he could declare an end to this
conflict or cessation of hostilities anytime he wants.
He can go home anytime he wants.He and and I would push back a
(18:33):
little bit against what you said.
I think Putin could declare victory tomorrow and would just
change the propaganda. He has done this so many times
during his rule of, you know, whatever I said yesterday that
never happened. How dare you say I said that?
This is what I've always said. This has always been the case.
He can redefine reality within Russia however he wants.
But I do think it would be an incredible weakening of his
(18:54):
position of anything less than regime change or, as you point
out, the complete loss of Ukrainian sovereignty.
And really, what's on the table right now is more of a holding
position like the end of World War 2 with East and West Germany
or the Baltic states under Soviet control, where we're
kicking some of these problems into the long grass with the
idea of eventual reunification of Ukraine under Western terms,
(19:16):
not reunification of Ukraine under Russian control or as a
Russian province. So I do think Putin is losing
here. I think he can declare whatever
he wants and change the narrative.
I think it will weaken him. But he's also, you know, he's
also incredibly old as well. I think he's nearing the end of
his presidency. Yeah, his life.
I think he wants to. Bring up the same thing, by the
(19:36):
way. Yeah, no, you're right.
You're absolutely right. Russian presidents don't leave
through the door. They get carried off on the
door. Yeah, So we'll see.
But I, I do think, I think for Putin, this is existential.
He can end it, but he could haveended at any point.
So I do think he's going to try to see this as some kind of
pause to rearm and then do it again.
Emily, I want to ask you broadenit out a little bit.
(19:58):
I mean, it was so impressive to see the Europeans all show up in
Washington speaking with one voice.
You know, that's a remarkable thing for Europe these days, to
have a voice. I know that some some awkward
squad members were not there, like Viktor Orban.
But you know, they've got Maloney onside.
It's sort of populist, right? And they've got and then they've
got Merts. Who's sort of more in the
middle? And Macron, you know, I mean,
(20:19):
it's it's an interesting bunch and they're all talking from the
same song sheet singing and even.
But one of the arguments that comes up over and over again is
that the reason why we need to contain Putin and Ukraine is
that it could spill over into the rest of Europe.
Now, do you actually think that is a possibility?
I think I'd take some convincingabout whether Putin really has
(20:41):
designs on, on the Baltic states.
Yes, it was psychologically difficult for for Russia to lose
the Baltic states to the EU and to NATO.
But I think broadly there is an acceptance in Russia that they
are part of NATO. And I think Article 5 is, is
very effective as a deterrence. That doesn't mean that that
Russia is not interested in the Baltic states.
They expend a lot of resources, political, financial and and
(21:03):
intelligence on penetrating the Baltic states to figure out
what's going on to see if they they can influence political
parties. And that's much more effective
than just say a land invasion, something as clumsy as that,
that would generate a third World War.
I don't believe that Russia has that interest.
Then I suppose there's the more,the more practical aspect of it.
So if Russia has failed geographically to conquer
(21:25):
Ukraine in terms of territory, which is enormous, there is
nothing to lead us to suspect that Russia would be able to do
similar in Europe. I know there's lots of, you
know, these NATO scenarios aboutthe sulky gap, but this is not
really something that Russia really refers to or talks about
very much. It's not an area of weakness
that Russia is as interested in probing as other things.
(21:46):
So trying to figure out NATO's logistical weaknesses, for
example. So there's been plenty of
attacks on NATO infrastructure in multiple different countries
across Europe. It's something that Russia is
very keen to to, to, you know, distance itself from and use the
third parties and proxies. But we can, we can pretty much
attribute it to Russia's attemptto try to overload NATO
(22:08):
infrastructure, things like hospitals and, and water
treatment plants. So it's clear that Russia thinks
that trying to distract NATO, prevent it from continuing to
arm Ukraine and share intelligence, all of these are
sort of worthwhile causes for Russia to spend its time on.
But that's a very different scenario than than trying to
(22:29):
have a sort of territorial takeover of another country.
And I think there was a real distinction to be made between
the way that Russia sees Belarusand Ukraine and the way that
Russia sees other former Soviet territories.
Because as, as we've sort of discussed earlier briefly, you
know, Russia sees these countries as that kind of
triumvirate of, you know, the origin of Kiev and Ruse and the
(22:50):
heir to this historical Orthodoxtradition.
That's a very different way of thinking than former Soviet
Union territories and trying to reconstitute.
I don't really believe that Russia is interested, for
example, in taking trunks out ofnorthern Kazakhstan.
The relationship is completely different.
Yeah. William, do you agree with that
or do you do you look a little bit doubtful there?
(23:13):
Well, I think the Cazaks would disagree with that because you
remember when there was the CSTO, quote, UN quote,
peacekeeping mission in Kazakhstan and the Russian
troops wanted to stay. And you had the unprecedented
step of the president of Kazakhstan talking to Putin in
Kazakh for the first time that had ever happened in public to
kind of push back against this what was seen as real Russian
(23:33):
revanchism. I do think moving nuclear
weapons into Belarus is a part of the broader effort to
reabsorb Belarus into a a Russian confederation into what
they call the Union state that removes with Armenia and
Azerbaijan before that conflict re kicked off where Russia was
trying to position itself with Azerbaijan to put peacekeepers
in there right before the war. And now all that's been blown
(23:56):
away. So I do think if this war had
gone differently, if Ukraine hadcollapsed immediately as Russia
thought it would, Russia thoughtthis was going to be like the
Czechoslovakia 1968 campaign andbe over in 72 hours.
If that happened, I think you would see Putin bringing back,
putting the band back together, you know, putting enormous
pressure on Kazakhstan, putting enormous pressure on Armenia and
(24:17):
Azerbaijan, absorbing Belarus more politically rather than
only militarily. And so then what's the next
step? As you seen with Ukraine, our
whole discussion going back to how you started, Russia wants to
take away Ukrainian sovereignty.I think he wants to take away
Baltic sovereignty the same way he wants to take away Finnish
sovereignty. He wants none of the countries
on his borders to have true sovereignty.
(24:39):
Whenever you take down a statue of Stalin, the Russians say you
can't do that. You remember the Russians
proposed to this big treaty, theEuropean Security Treaty back in
2010, which would have given Russia veto right over domestic
legislation in NATO countries. Russia has a very different idea
of what sovereignty in its near abroad should be.
(24:59):
And I do think they want to see a massive sphere of influence as
to whether it's a territorial invasion or not.
I think if Russia thought it could take some NATO territory
and break Article 5, show the weakness of NATO, then he would
do that. But of course, with the 2014
vision of Crimea and all the things that NATO has done since
then, including putting troops, NATO troops in Eastern Europe on
(25:22):
a rotational first and then moreon a permanent basis in
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, thishas sort of taken that move off
the table. But I think Russia will
continually test where our boundaries are.
And if, if we did not put more NATO troops into the Eastern
Front, I do think he would have thought about more of a
territorial grab, not to conquerthem all per SE, but just to
(25:43):
show that NATO was hollow. Because ultimately, and again,
Matt, I go back to what you started with, Russia's longest
term ambition going back to the Soviet Union is to decouple the
United States and the UK from European security to to
sequester them so that he can dominate them.
And that's the longer term ambition here.
OK, couple of things before we end Ukraine, right?
(26:05):
Whether it's a member of NATO oreven the EU, at the end of this
whole process, whether you like it or not, it is going to become
the best armed, the most qualified at war fighting nation
probably anywhere in the world. I mean, these guys are really
good at fighting. I know they're tired.
They, they're, they're tooled upto the eyeballs.
They have a mission, you know, they're prepared to sacrifice
(26:26):
despite more fatigue setting in and all that.
You don't invite them into your tent at your peril.
I would say if you have them outside floating around, you
know, who knows it's going to berunning Ukraine in five years
time. Could Ukraine?
And Angela Mozila von der Leyen likes to say, you know, it's
like swallowing a porcupine, theporcupine swallowed by Russia.
But also it could be porcupine swallowed by Europe or pricking
(26:49):
up against Europe next to Europein a kind of uncomfortable way.
I do think that Ukraine will integrate more and more into
European structures. Certainly there is much more of
a problem in the Far East of Ukraine in terms of feeling more
Russian and being just, you know, separate in terms of how
they think of themselves. I wouldn't concede that as a
(27:09):
territorial concession, but I can see the rest of Ukraine
integrating very well into Europe.
It really was. I mean, the Maidan protest at
the 1st place was a real desire by the majority of Ukrainians to
integrate into Western Europe. So I can see this as a long term
project. And you're absolutely right, we
shouldn't leave them alone. They have massive capability.
We've seen their technological prowess, their ability to
(27:32):
develop even under wartime, amazing technologies, their
ability to adapt, their willingness to adopt, you know,
great countermeasures against crime and corruption, to take on
EU legislation. This was all part of this whole
story. And so I do think they will
integrate. And leaving them alone is,
you're absolutely right. It would be a terrible move.
It would create this weird Badlands in the center of
(27:52):
Europe, you know, between Belarus and Ukraine as the sort
of ungoverned space with rampantcorruption.
And that's where we were 1015 years ago.
We need to take care of this. And I'd say the same thing with
Moldova and Transnistria as well.
We can't allow these Cold War hangover gaps to exist.
We need to integrate more of these territories into a
European way of thinking, European business style,
(28:13):
European education. And I do think that's the great
way forward. And whether it's through the EU
or through NATO or some combination, I I think it has to
happen for Europe's future. OK.
Emily, just briefly, will you can become a liability or an
asset for us in Europe? Annoyingly, I'm sorry to answer
this in such a way. It very much depends on how the
war ends. I think it depends on whether
(28:37):
this is a an enormous defeat forUkraine.
It depends on Europe's willingness to to sort of
integrate them, as William was saying.
But it also depends on the extent to which they're able to
root out some of the corruption problems that they do have.
The reason that they have been precluded from NATO membership
before was not only because there was a war on their
territory, but also the corruption problems that William
(28:58):
noted earlier. They're really quite systemic.
It's very difficult to get out of that way of thinking.
And yes, of course there are European standards that that can
be imposed. But as some of the processes in
Ukraine around their anti corruption agencies showed only
a few weeks ago, it will be a little bit of a damper to those
that were hoping that Ukraine might be able to rid itself of
(29:18):
some of those elements. So hopefully there will be a
strategic plan for integrating Ukraine into into structures
because of course what you don'twant is the porcupine that you
referred to and you don't want that to be absorbed by Russia or
for Russia to take advantage of that chaos as well.
So if there is a vacuum that that Europe and NATO are not
(29:39):
able to fill, you can probably guarantee that Russia will be
there to try to absorb some of that discontent and and
weaponize it against Europe. OK, we're going to end with one
quick question to both of you. There's a lot of bad that has
happened in the last 3 1/2 years.
Lots of lives lost, countries trampled on.
Now we have the insecurity, the mercurial nature of Trump's
(30:01):
presidency, Monarchy. Call it what you like.
What is the one good thing that has come out of this strange
relationship between Trump, Europe, Zelensky and Putin?
The one good thing? Emily, you first.
One good thing. Sorry, I can't think of
anything. OK, All right.
Yeah. What about you, William?
Is there a good thing? Yes, I think there is.
I think the fact that Europe haswoken up to the idea that the
(30:22):
world is a dangerous place and that defence matters and you go
back to 2013, the US had removedthe last battle tank from
Europe. NATO spending on defense was
hovering around 1%. The Japanese had very little
spent on defense. Everyone in the West was just
thinking we don't have to take care of these things.
And Russia and China and North Korea and Iran did not think
(30:44):
that way. And they were arming.
You know, we now know that Chinawas well into a nuclear build up
at this point. Russia is, you know, at that
point was still 15 years into a major nuclear build up.
And the fact that we were willing to ignore that across
Europe, that in the UK, if they were talking about, you know,
getting rid of nukes, all of this is over.
And now we're looking at Europe and the UK really thinking hard
(31:07):
about the future of security. And that it's based on the
traditional things of national power, of cooperation and
alliances on top of all that, ofsolid industrial base, all these
kinds of thinking. I think that this is a terrible
dark timeline, but at least you see people waking up and being
serious about security and how to contribute to peace is not
(31:29):
through total unilateral disarmament, but through working
together to make a stronger future.
Emily Ferris, William Albert, thank you very much to both of
you. I hope you've enjoyed the
forecast. See you next time.
Popular Podcasts
Stuff You Should Know
If you've ever wanted to know about champagne, satanism, the Stonewall Uprising, chaos theory, LSD, El Nino, true crime and Rosa Parks, then look no further. Josh and Chuck have you covered.
Cardiac Cowboys
The heart was always off-limits to surgeons. Cutting into it spelled instant death for the patient. That is, until a ragtag group of doctors scattered across the Midwest and Texas decided to throw out the rule book. Working in makeshift laboratories and home garages, using medical devices made from scavenged machine parts and beer tubes, these men and women invented the field of open heart surgery. Odds are, someone you know is alive because of them. So why has history left them behind? Presented by Chris Pine, CARDIAC COWBOYS tells the gripping true story behind the birth of heart surgery, and the young, Greatest Generation doctors who made it happen. For years, they competed and feuded, racing to be the first, the best, and the most prolific. Some appeared on the cover of Time Magazine, operated on kings and advised presidents. Others ended up disgraced, penniless, and convicted of felonies. Together, they ignited a revolution in medicine, and changed the world.
The Joe Rogan Experience
The official podcast of comedian Joe Rogan.