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August 18, 2025 51 mins
Tonight on The Brian Crombie Hour, Brian interviews Ukrainian Econimist Roman Sheremeta about Trump and Putin's Alaska Summit. Roman Sheremeta, Ph.D., is a chair of Ukrainian-American House, a founding rector of American University Kyiv, and a professor of economics at the Weatherhead School of Management at Case Western Reserve University. He holds a Ph.D. in economics from Purdue University and is a recipient of many research and teaching awards, including the 2018 Smith Ascending Scholar Prize for a "budding genius" in social science.

Roman discusses the summit between Putin and Trump, expressing strong criticism. He argues that the meeting was a diplomatic failure as it resulted in no ceasefire, no sanctions, and no concrete agreements. Roman accuses Trump of being naive and easily flattered by Putin, who he said had strategically prepared for the meeting. He also points out that Trump's trade relations with Russia seemed illogical given the ongoing sanctions. 

Roman covers Russia's strategic escalation of aggression, starting with actions in Chechnya, Georgia, and Moldova, and how weak Western responses, including Obama's lackluster reaction to Crimea's annexation, emboldened Russia to invade Ukraine in 2022. They address the Russian narrative about NATO expansion as a pretext for the invasion, which Roman dismissed as false, noting that Finland's NATO membership has not led to conflict and that Ukrainians historically did not want to join NATO but shifted to 90% support after Russia's full-scale invasion. 

Roman spoke about the prospects for peace in Ukraine. He suggests that a reasonable solution would be to freeze the current front lines, with Ukraine not recognizing the captured territories as Russian but agreeing not to use military force to recapture them. Roman emphasized that Ukraine would never accept giving up territories like the Eastern Donbas or Zaporizhia to Russia, as it would abandon Ukrainian citizens to Russian control and create new vulnerabilities. He argues that any peace deal must include strong security guarantees for Ukraine, such as NATO membership or significant military support, to deter future Russian aggression. Roman compared the situation to the Munich Agreement, warning that without robust security guarantees, Ukraine could face a similar fate.
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Speaker 1 (00:00):
The views expressed in the following program are those of
the participants and do not necessarily reflect the views of
SAGA nine sixty am or its management.

Speaker 2 (00:18):
Good evening, everyone, and welcome to the Brian Crombie Radio War.
I've got Roman Shurometa with us today. He is a
professor of economics, He's Ukrainian. He's living and working in
the United States right now. I've had the privilege I've
interviewing him before. He's obviously an incredibly smart gentleman, but
also someone that follows what's going on in Eastern Europe
Ukraine very closely. And he's been very prolific in commenting

(00:40):
on this site. That occurred on Friday between Utin and Trump.
And you've been pretty negative in your review, sir, and
tell me why what do you think?

Speaker 3 (00:51):
Oh? My contract question would be why would be why
should it be positive? I mean, there was no agreement
on the ceasefire. We have welcomed a war criminal to
the United States, put the red carpet in front of him,
basically humiliated ourselves. We have invited him to the table.

(01:14):
Just imagine this happening in nineteen forties, after the all
the Holocaust, the atrocities have been unveiled, and we are
inviting Hitler to the United States. You know, I mean
that would have been I mean, it would be it
would be crazy right to even think about this. But

(01:35):
that's exactly what happens. So and not only we have
done that, but there was nothing agreed upon. There is
no ceasefire, there's no sanctions, there is no even understanding
what has happened on Fridays. So absolutely I'm critical. The
bombing continues today tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, or

(01:57):
the killing continues, the kidnapping of children continues. What's to
be happy about?

Speaker 2 (02:04):
Well, you know, they're trying to get peace. It would
appear that Trump believes he's got something agreed to. He's
spoken to NATO and NATO leaders in Zelenski. Don't you
think there's something that is agreed to us. He's just
keeping it close to his vest. For one.

Speaker 3 (02:18):
Look, Trump said that he's going to stop this wor
in twenty four hours. Then he pushed this to a month,
then two months, than half a year. He said, two
more weeks, two more weeks. He repeated it like so
many times. Then there was a deadline on August eighth,
and these deadlines have passed, nothing has happened. This is
just unrealistic. You know, when you need to think about

(02:42):
what to expect, how to read him, I mean, you
need to look at the past performance, and that is
predictive of what is happening. So no, I don't believe
anything has happened. I just believe and Putting came very
strategically prepared. This is something to applaud him for. You know,
he was completely ready. He flattered him, He said all

(03:02):
the right things. He said that if he were a
president in twenty twenty, the war would have never started.
That Trump lost election because it was rigged, and everything
literally repeating everything that Trump wanted to hear. I mean
that was you know, ten out of ten diplomacy, or
maybe not diplomacy is not the right word, but ten

(03:24):
out of ten terms of flattery, right, And so it worked,
it worked marvelously. Trump somehow believes now that things are
going to get moving. And I mean I based on
the past performance. And I know how my friends took
part in Minsk negotiations, my friends that I know who

(03:45):
were in the room negotiating the PC's fire since twenty fourteen,
and they all fell for the same trap, these false
promises for Putin and some sort of hopefuls that things
going to get better. It's just not it's just wishful thinking.

Speaker 2 (04:04):
You posted that the bravest person was a female reporter
who asked put In the toughest questions. What were they, sir?

Speaker 3 (04:12):
Well, I think that was very brave, and it happened
actually a couple of times. We actually by now I
believe we even have an idea who that reporter was.
And she basically said, when will you stop killing civilians?
I mean that was the very strong statement. It wasn't
going around the bush. I mean, this is something that

(04:35):
if you really wanted to stop peace, you would start
off with that question, right, I mean, when are you
going to stop killing civilians? When are you going to
start stop kidnapping children? Return those children back to Ukraine.
And of course the fact that there was no basically
meeting or question and answer with journalists after the the

(05:00):
press conference, I mean it was just non existent. Right.
Trump gave only one exclusive interview to Fox and that
was it. I mean, that is very strange for the
meetings like that. And my friends journalists who were present
in the room, they said that they felt like they
didn't know anything at the end of the meeting, and

(05:21):
so that is telling in itself.

Speaker 2 (05:23):
Well do we know anything, Like, we know we chat,
they chatted, We know that putin flattery Trump, but we
don't know any details of whatever deal they agree to.

Speaker 3 (05:35):
Nothing. The only thing we know is some tweets that
Trump has posted on Saturday basically saying that, hey, you know,
we we decided to go right away to the not
to the ceasefire, but put to the permanent peace. Which
is ridiculous, you know, because how can you even start

(05:56):
negotiation and everything while you know the guns are being fired.
So the first step that everybody was expecting from President
Trump was to agree to cease fire and start negotiation process.
And if there is no cease fire, then everybody was
expecting sanctions and some sort of pressure that would be

(06:18):
put on Russia. Now, obviously there is no cease fire,
so the expectation was that there will be some actions
from Trump. No actions are following. In fact, he has
just reiterated that he is not planning to put any
pressure on Russia because everything is great. Because he felt
really good with putting it.

Speaker 2 (06:40):
Seemed almost like it was more of a business dealer
or a whole bunch of Russian businessmen that attended, I understand,
and Putin bragged about trade being up, what was it
twenty five percent or something like this.

Speaker 3 (06:50):
I believe. Yeah.

Speaker 2 (06:51):
Trump. Trump has come to office, which in a world
of severe sanctions against the Ukraine, sorry, against Russia. I'm
not sure I was actually maybe a riding slip against Russia.
I'm not sure how that actually happened and what it
has been of. You know, he's putting sanctions against India
because India is buying goods oil from Russia. How can

(07:13):
they trade between Russia and the United States be up
by twenty percent. It's a little bit illogical.

Speaker 3 (07:19):
It is a strange world that we live in. Brian
And there's a couple comments that I want to make.
First of all, that slip that you said, sanctions against Ukraine,
it's actually not a slip because at one of the
press conferences with Trump, it was a couple months ago
when he was making these phone calls, was putting and
trying to put pressure. He literally said that in the

(07:42):
press conference that he's considering placing sanctions not only on
Russia but actually on Ukraine to force Ukraine to capitulate,
which is ridiculous. I mean, this is unheard of, but hey,
it's on the record, it's for the history. So yeah,
there is even that possibility, and it would be very

(08:02):
telling to see what will happen if Zelenski or Ukrainian
government in general, or Ukrainian people as a whole basically
declined the offer that put In makes or Trump makes,
and what will be next from his perspective. So that's

(08:23):
my first comment. My second comment about the sanctions against India.
So I don't view sanctions against India in any way
as a kind of anti Russian move by Trump. So
you have to understand that Trump has this agenda. It's
a mistaken, mistaken belief some sort of maybe because of

(08:46):
his lack of knowledge of economics or no advisory board,
economic advisory board or whatever it is, but he believes
that by a sanctioning and sorry, we're putting tariffs on everybody,
that's some how United States is gonna win and we're
gonna live. Well, well, we're just paying higher prices. But nonetheless,

(09:07):
that's his policy. He wants to place teriffs on India,
on other countries. And now he has an excuse. He says, Oh,
I'm putting this on India because I want to hurt Russia.
Now he's putting that in India because he believes in
that that's the way to handle business with India. And
these sanctions are or let's say, tariffs are relatively minor.

(09:30):
The twenty five percent that he put these numbers on Canada,
on his allies in all the Natose countries. He put
the flat tax or taror fifteen percent on all the
European countries. So no, I don't see that as any
way pressure on Russia. This is just the deal making

(09:50):
with India.

Speaker 2 (09:51):
You're a professor of economics, correct, absolutely, does this tariff
strategy make any sense.

Speaker 3 (09:58):
No sense whatsoever. It doesn't makes sense theoretically. So when
we analyze how the terrors work, we know who pays
the terrors. The burden is usually falls on the more
inelastic side of the of the demand and supply curve.
It falls on the consumers. So consumers end up paying

(10:18):
the higher portion of this tax. And it is a tax,
it's plainly a tax placed on mostly consumers. So Americans
are the ones who are paying this tax. So from
that perspective, sure, if you want to raise tax revenue,
which is not a Republican sort of move right. The
Republicans have always been anti tax or reducing tax burden.

(10:42):
And the fact that you are now placing tax as
a Republican representative, that doesn't make any sense. But more so,
it doesn't make sense also empirically, because if you look
at the historical depressions recessions in the United States, it
all would stock art with some sort of protectionism, high tariffs,

(11:03):
and you see a recession happening right now. We already
see that inflation is picking up, really picking up in
the United States. We've been going down, down, down for
the past four years. We had quite a significant inflation
after COVID because of all the money that was put
into the system. But then we started to find that
inflation and it was going down to the two percent

(11:26):
targeted inflation by the Federal Reserve. And now we're back
up again. So the inflation is picking up and it's
going to get only worse as these tariffs take place.
So I don't see any sense in it. I don't
see any reason for it. Is just blutting economic ignorance.

Speaker 2 (11:44):
So you made a comment just a minute ago that
you know, Snewer's recessions have been caused or depressions have
been caused by tariffs. You know, lots of people watched
that one movie that talked about the smooth Harley tariffs.
What was that famous fame movie Feelers Fewest Blue fut
Bluler's Day Off, where yeah, the teacher talked about that.

(12:07):
But let's talk about it. So the nineteen thirties, when else,
you know, I've heard about the eighteen nineties. You know,
are there really historical experiences where high tariffs protectionist measures
have caused depressions of recessions.

Speaker 3 (12:22):
Well, so again, depression and recessions, those are very kind
of significant events. Those are the contractions in GDP for
a prolonged period of time. So it's usually a compilation
of factors. So financial crisis of two thousand and eight
and nine, I mean that was, you know, a quite

(12:45):
significant event in itself. So a better way to look
at this is to look at the data when you
place tariffs, if your country places tariffs, and you can
then examine what happens to the crisis. Right, those goods
that are being important other substitutions. So the idea was
the belief that if we're going to put tariffs on

(13:08):
these bilateral or trades, that somehow the American companies are
going to move back to producing in America and they're
going to be more competitive, and that that will cause
the prices to go down. When our cost of labor
is exponentially higher than it is in India, Vietnam, or China.

(13:29):
That doesn't make any sense. Yeah. Sure, maybe some companies,
maybe five percent or whatever, will increase their presence in
the United States, but that will come at the significant
increase of the prices. And we already seen this happen
in twenty eighteen. There is actually economic studies that have
been published and showing the negative impact the tariffs have

(13:52):
on both the GDP growth and on the prices. So
it's just an empirical fact that we know by now,
and out of all of the economists that I know,
and I know hundreds of them, out of all the
Nobel laureates that I know, and I know dozens of them,
not a single one of them would say that the

(14:13):
current policy of Trump makes any sense, not a single
one of them. The only people that may say some
support will be some marginalized faculty at some random universities
in the middle of nowhere, but basically not a single
respected economists would say that this is a meaningful policy

(14:36):
economic policy.

Speaker 2 (14:38):
We're going to take a break for some messages and
come back in just two minutes with our guest, a
Roma Tramata, Professor of Economics Center, Ukrainian, talking about this
summit in Alaska between President Putin and President ta Trump.
I'm going to come back and ask him about security
guarantees because it was almost as if Russia was demanding
more security guarantees than you know, I thought Ukraine would

(14:58):
demand and deserve, and that that that was all where
the attention was. Stay with us at one You're going
to be back and just.

Speaker 3 (15:03):
Tune its.

Speaker 1 (15:09):
Stream us live at SAGA nine to sixty am dot.

Speaker 3 (15:12):
CA A.

Speaker 2 (15:23):
Welcome back everyone to the Bran crimeby Radio. I've got
Roman Shirmata with me tonight. He's a PhD. He's a
professor of economics at the Weatherhoods School of Management at
Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio, and the United States.
He's also a founding rector of the American University in Kiev.
He earned his PhD in economics from Purdue University and
I got to tell you this. He's received numerous research

(15:44):
and teaching accolades, including the twenty eighteen smith As Sending
Scholar Prize for a Budding Genius, A budding Genius in
social science, I got to ask you about what what
ranks as a budding genius. Sharmata was recognized as a
talk economic thinker of Ukrainian descent by Forbes in twenty fifteen,
a top rated young economist globally by Ideas in twenty eighteen,

(16:06):
and the best forty under forty professors by Poets and
Quants in twenty nineteen. Since Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraini,
he has been actively engaged in delivering humanitarian aid and
working on various initiatives to rebuild Ukraine, including the National
Recovery Council and Advisory Board to the President of Ukraine.
He's a board member of Save Ukraine and Ukrainian American House,

(16:27):
organizations dedicated to returning kidnapped Ukrainian children and supporting Ukrainian people.
Professor Schmata, thank you so much again for joining us.
I really appreciate the opportunity to chat with you. I
gotta ask you, what did you win this Budding Genius
award for you got must have done something fantastic.

Speaker 3 (16:43):
Yeah, so this was a work that I started as
a PhD student. Were doing. That work was on the
contest conflict tournament. So imagine any scenario when you have
two parties going against each other to win a scarce
resource and they exert some resources. And so the way
that I approached this problem was instead of just looking

(17:07):
at in the real world data and trying to you know,
decipher what's happening in these sort of situations, I decided
to run some experiments and so collect the data myself,
so I would actually set up these artificial conflicts, artificial competitions,
and that created actually a significant support from the academic field.

(17:32):
A lot of people joined the wagon, and so that
you know, now there is a inexperimental and behavioral economics,
there is a field of contest theory, and so my
name is kind of engraved in that in that part,
and that's what mostly the price was given to me for.

(17:55):
And it was actually about the besides the recognition, which
was right, it was also coming with a check of
fifty thousand dollars, which was nice too.

Speaker 2 (18:04):
So I did, of course and I guess something comparable
to what you're talking about was all about the prisoner's
dilemma and numerous studies about how to best win that
conflict between two people in a prisoner's dilemma. And I
thought the answer of all that was tit for tat
was the best policy. And so that comes back to

(18:24):
this current situation is that shouldn't Trump have done something
if he didn't get what he wanted, like to not
do tit for tat? Is he not acceding to to
putin and encouraging putin to move forward? Like tell me
how your theory actually applies to the current situation if
you could, And am I right that TAT is the

(18:46):
right answer?

Speaker 3 (18:47):
So if you want the idea here is if you
want to sustain corporation, which we all want, right, is
some sort of a good state of the world. The
very very useful strategy, dynamic strategy that has proven to
work really well both in simulations, in experiments and in
the real world is tit for tat. So basically, if

(19:10):
you see the aggression from the other side, you respond
with aggression. If you see it concession, then you respond
with concession.

Speaker 2 (19:19):
Equal aggression matched aggression. Is that not correct?

Speaker 3 (19:21):
That's correct. So here's the thing. You see that Russia
is attacking Ukraine and killing more civilians, which has happened
since Trump became president. The number of civilians that is killed,
the number of attacks that have been launched against Ukraine

(19:42):
have tripled. In some cases it's even tenfold if we're
talking about cities like Odessa. So basically, if you see
that sort of escalation, in order to uh, to prevent putting,
we should have been leveling up even higher sanctions, giving
Ukraine even more weapons to defend itself. Instead, we actually

(20:05):
took away what that was promised. We didn't give them
anything new, which only in bolded Putin to do even
more atrocities and he continues to do so and we
are not doing anything. So this doesn't make any sense.
And you know, especially coming from somebody who you know,

(20:25):
tries to sell himself as a great negotiator, the art
of the deal and everything is just it's just laughable.
The person doesn't know what they're talking about.

Speaker 2 (20:35):
So, going back to the theory that I took it,
at some point in time, you got to get out
of the tit for tat, and you've got to cooperate
once to see if the other person will cooperate.

Speaker 3 (20:44):
That's correct.

Speaker 2 (20:45):
That and so therefore you got to give the person
a chance to get out of the constant back and forth.
But if they don't cooperate, then you should go to
double tit for tat and really discipline them.

Speaker 3 (20:56):
That's correct.

Speaker 2 (20:57):
Shouldn't we have not just done what you said, but
done what you said times too.

Speaker 3 (21:01):
That's all right, that's exactly right. That's my point, and
it's you know, we are losing. We're losing this strategic
interaction because I do believe that Russia has been playing
very strategically here. They anticipated the weakness from the West,
and so they have escalated aggression. They tried that first

(21:24):
with the Georgia, well, first Versa, then Georgia, then Moldova.
You know, they it's not the first time that they
do it. And then we're probably going to talk about
security guarantees. And it's so laughable that the excuse about
NATO expansion. Well we will talk about that, but the
point is that Russia has been attacking these neighbors and

(21:45):
they've been seeing what would be the response from the West,
and there was none. It was very weak I mean
Obama's response to Russian's annexation of Crimea was laughable. I
mean it was you know, we sometimes blame only the
Republican side, but the Democrats were no better, especially on
the President Obama. It was really literally no response whatsoever,

(22:07):
and it was horrible. And Obama got peace, noble peace price,
I mean for what for not stopping Russia. And so
basically these sort of steps have emboldened Russia to go
full scale invasion in Ukraine in twenty twenty two because
strategically they understood that the West is not responding in

(22:29):
the way that you have just described.

Speaker 2 (22:32):
Okay, so let's talk about security guarantees. On Friday at
the press conference, I didn't hear about, and maybe I
missed it, anything in regards to security guarantees for Ukraine.
But I did hear Putin talk about the needed security
guarantees for Russia, which I presume is this contention that
part of the reason why this war started was because

(22:52):
the threat of NATO expanding to the east and taking
in the Baltics and then potentially taking in Ukraine at
some point in time in the future, even though that
never actually happened, and so therefore Russia is looking for
security guarantees. Tell me, how do you think about this
argument about Russian needing security guarantees? Is it real? It

(23:13):
was the expansion of NATO to the east really a
reason for the invasion or was it just a manufactured reason?
And in addition, what are the security guarantees that you
think that the US that NATO needs to provide Ukraine
before Zelensky could should come to the table.

Speaker 3 (23:32):
Yeah, so let's start with a couple of points here.
First of all, NATO as an excuse. Absolutely, that's a
part of the Russian narrative, Russian propaganda. It's been pushed
and it's completely false. It's false, especially when you look,
for example, at countries like Finland that has joined NATO

(23:54):
and guess what, there is no conflict on the border.
In fact, you know, Russia is not even saying anything
about that, right, I mean, and the border with Russia
and NATO country is as double because of Finland joining NATO.
So that's just a BS from that perspective. But let
me go further. Let's talk about Ukraine. So Ukrainians never

(24:17):
wanted to join NATO. In fact, if you look at
the polls before twenty fourteen, before Russia and next Crimea,
about twenty percent of Ukrainians wanted to join NATO. I
remember these conversations with my parents actually when I was
a kid, and that's when the Baltics were joining NATO,
and I just remember that Ukrainians were always saying, well,

(24:41):
you know, we don't want to have being NATO. We
don't want our soldiers dying, you know, other battles. In fact,
the Constitution of Ukraine had very specifically would state that
we are sovereign country, that we don't belong to any
blocks or any alliances. We just sort of, you know,
an independent sovereign country was in constitution. In less than

(25:01):
twenty percent of Ukrainians actually wanted to join NATO. Then
twenty fourteen happens annexation of Crimea and the polls are
conducted again. Now fifty percent of Ukrainians want to join NATO.
And now twenty twenty two, after Russia's full scale invasion,
more than ninety percent of Ukrainians want to join NATO.

(25:24):
So it's not NATO that is expanding and Russia is defending.
It's because Russia's aggression that people like people of Ukraine
are wanting to join NATO as a way to protect themselves.
So the red causation here is the reverse one when

(25:47):
Russia is the aggressor and countries want to defend themselves
so they join these alliances. So that's a very important
point to understand for somebody like me, you know, who
actually start these closal inferences, not just correlations.

Speaker 2 (26:03):
Okay, so finally let me let let me ask you
about that for a second, if I could. I recently
come back from a trip to Florida on business where
I was, you know, interacting with numerous great gentlemen that
I really quite like, who are very firm Magas supporters,
and their their answer is, well, Brian, think about the
Cuban missile crisis. So when Russia, you know, was bringing

(26:24):
missiles to Cuba close to American territory, we came the
closest to the Third World War we've ever come. We
demanded that they withdraw it. So that what's happening with
NATO expanding and the Ukraine potentially joining NATO, it's comparable
to the Ukrainian missile the Cuban missile crisis, and how
could you imagine that Putin would respond just the way

(26:46):
that John F. Kennedy responded the Cuban missile crisis. How
would you respond to that, sir.

Speaker 3 (26:50):
Well, I would respond that those are not comparable situations
at all. I mean you comparing apples to oranges. The
very simple fact here is that Russia is the one like. Okay,
so reverse that situation. Russia comes to Cuba and we
we are not doing anything. In response, okay, we're not

(27:15):
doing anything. We're saying sure, fine, stay there, because this
is exactly what Russia is doing today. They're coming to Ukraine,
they're coming to bill Russia, they're putting the clear weapons
in Biller, Russia. They're coming to Ukraine, and we're saying, no,
it's fine. So it's the reverse order. It's the Russia
that is making the first step, and we need to

(27:37):
respond to it by saying no, you cannot go here,
No you cannot invade Ukraine, No you cannot do this.
So it's it's funny how people use exactly the same story,
exactly the same narrative, but they completely twist the causal argument.
It's the opposite of what they're saying. So it's again,

(27:58):
as I said, this is why it's so important to
look at the data and understand that because of Russia's aggression,
because of their first step, that we are responding. Ukrainian
people are responding, They're saying, we don't want to have this.
So this is a very different scenario and it's a
completely different one than the Cuban missile crisis.

Speaker 2 (28:21):
So if one of the issues in this negotiation, either
on Friday or coming up this coming week, is going
to be that NATO has to guarantee that it will
not incorporate Ukraine or won't move farther east. Should NATO
agree to that. Should the United States agree to that?

Speaker 3 (28:37):
Oh, absolutely not. I mean they should not agree with
Russia on anything, because, as I said, there is not
a single guarantee that you can get from Russia that
they would honor. I can quote you hundreds, not of
my head, but dozens of my head of agreements that
Russia has violated. So United States also violates agree. Don't

(29:00):
get me wrong, well, they also have done this many times.
But Russia is I mean famous in this. I mean
the one of the most famous one is a Budapest
memoranda in nineteen ninety four. Russia becomes one of the
main guaranteers of Ukrainian sovereignty and independence. They literally saying,
give us the nuclear weapons and we will defend you

(29:22):
from anybody attacking you. Russia signed that document. They are
the one who guaranteed Ukrainian's sovereignty, and they are the
ones who attacked and the next Ukraine. Instead of defending
them from any invasion, they actually became the inventors themselves.
So how can you trust anybody?

Speaker 2 (29:42):
Okay, but you know others signed that agreement as well.

Speaker 3 (29:45):
Correct, that's correct, and nobody else attacked Ukraine, right.

Speaker 2 (29:49):
Okay, but they also didn't defend Ukraine and they.

Speaker 3 (29:51):
Were well, yeah, we can go there. They didn't defend,
but they did provide weapons. They did, especially United States
did a lot in the initial stages of war. They
have provided support in the United Nations until Trump came
along and then basically dismantled all the voting as well.

(30:13):
So they did provide assistance to Ukraine. And it's fight
for independence and it's fine for survival. Okay. Yes, they
didn't put the butts on the ground, but in the
theepest memoranda, to be fair, there was no agreement that
the butts on the ground would be provided. But there
was an agreement that there will be a support coming
from these countries when the war happens, when when the

(30:36):
invasion or something like along those lines would happen. So
for me, that the very talent is that the Russia
guaranteed protection of Ukraine and they're the ones who attacked.
I mean, there's so many other things that we can
just look before twenty twenty two. Just look at all
the videos that are available when publicly loved Row or

(30:57):
Putin is saying, are you crazy, We're not going to
invade Ukraine. Two hundred and fifty thousand troops are standing
on the border and they're saying, we are not going
to invade Ukraine. This is all bs. You guys are
all lying. And then a couple days later they all
invade Ukraine. So there's no world in which you can
trust Russia. Just no world. It doesn't exist.

Speaker 2 (31:19):
If there's no world where you can trust Russia, how
do you ever have a.

Speaker 3 (31:24):
Peace agreement by providing military assistance to Ukraine to the
extent that for Russia it would be so constantly to
go into Ukraine that they would not be willing to
make that move. By decimating Russian economy, by putting Russia
in the isolation, just like we did with the North

(31:46):
Korea by basically dismantling all the channels of the Russian propaganda.
This is the only way. How else can you do that?
I mean, how would you come up with a peace
agreement with the Nazi Germany innineteen forties? Well, I mean
there was only a one solution. There was no other solution.

(32:06):
There was no other solution.

Speaker 2 (32:07):
There was a peace agreement with Japan, but I guess
that was only after.

Speaker 3 (32:10):
The use of That was a surrender. That was a capitulation,
not a piece agreement, right, and it was the full
capitalation of Japan when our troops moved into Japan, into Tokyo.

Speaker 2 (32:24):
We're going to take a break for se assays. We're
going to come back and want to ask our guests
about Ukrainian sovereignty, Ukrainian security guarantees, Ukrainian territory. What needs
to be considered there, what could be considered by the
Ukrainian people. Why Isa Lensky will he give up territory?
Stay with Zvye back in two minutes.

Speaker 1 (32:45):
No Radio, No Problem stream is live on Sagay nine
sixty am dot Co.

Speaker 2 (33:02):
Welcome back, everyone to the Bryan Primi Radio whar I've
got Roman Schmta with me tonight. He is a professor
of economics at the Weatherhood School of Business Case Western
Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio. He's Ukrainian. He's an expert
on economics, and he's also extremely involved in what's going on,
analyzing it and commentating on it. In regards to the

(33:23):
Russian invasion of Ukraine, We've had a great conversation I
think about this Russian argument that they need security guarantees.
What didn't come up on Friday was anything that unless
I missed it, about Ukraine's desire need for security guarantees.
And it seems like and most people are saying that

(33:43):
to get any kind of piece, Ukraine's going to have
to give up some territory, and the territory is probably
going to be something comparable to either the current front
lines or frankly, what I've heard of late is even
more than the current front lines, sort of the whole
eastern Dawn Bass area. Professor, what do you think Zelensky
and Ukrainian people would accept what is reasonable and and

(34:07):
and and and what do you think is going to happen?

Speaker 3 (34:13):
I think that a reasonable, well let's say acceptable acceptable
solution here would be to freeze the or stop the
war at the current front line. So, but that would
also imply that Ukraine does not recognize the captured territories

(34:37):
as Russians now the juror they don't recognize, but the
fact though they understand that Russia holds those territories. There
could be an agreement that Ukraine agrees not to use
military force to recapture these territories. I see that as
potential one. So Ukraine agrees that they are not not

(35:00):
going to use military force to recapture the Russian captured territories,
the only means of basically integrating those territories back into
Ukraine would be diplomatic, if ever, right, So that is
something that is agreeable. I see no way that Ukraine

(35:20):
would actually acknowledge from their side that these territories are
the juror belonged to Russia. I see that United States,
especially under the current administration, could recognize that. But again
another present comes that could be you know, dismissed because

(35:44):
as this comes and go, I mean, we're already seen
after the violation of Budapest Memorandum any international law is
sort of out of the window. So this is what
I see as a plausible end to the war, when
we freeze the front line and basically the communication starts.

(36:08):
Now you mentioned about swapping some territories and giving Russia
the control of the full Donbas region or Zaporijia or Herson.
There's zero chance of that happening. First of all, some
of the most fortified lines of defense are around Slogans Kramatorsk.
Those are the major cities in don Bas, and they

(36:31):
are the ones that have withstood even in the initial
since twenty fourteen. Now, if Russia were to get first
of all, if Russia were to get those territories that
are not theirs, this would literally open a whole front line,
a new front line, a very easy access to to

(36:51):
Harkiv to Kiev, because really there is no defenses after that,
no significant defenses. Second, people in those cities, and you
can go and visit them and talk to them, they
don't want to live under Russia. They yeah, it would
be just imagine abandoning them to the Russian genocide. This

(37:12):
doesn't make sense. So nobody would agree to that. And
for Russia to capture those territories in military way, it
would take them years because as I said, those are
very heavily fortified cities and territories. And even right now
with Russia's significant advances, it's like a turtle that is crawling,
you know, and trying to capture Ukraine. It would take

(37:36):
them one hundred years to capture Ukraine at the speed.
So these things are not plausible. That is why the
swapping of the territories, I just don't see that happening.
What's the alternative?

Speaker 2 (37:49):
You know, I've heard comments like there's numerous Ukrainian men
that have gone into hiding, that it's very difficult to
recruit new conscripts into the Ukraine Army. That the death
and you know, the the injuries to Ukrainian people, particularly
obviously not just civilians, not just soldiers, but civilians are

(38:10):
so extensive, you know. And I think Marco Rubio actually
addressed this at one point in time when he was
confronted by people talking about that that famous Zelenski Trump
interaction in the Oval Office, MARKA. Rubio, who historically has
been a very ardent supporter of Ukraine, said well, you know,
what's the alternative? And you know, maybe you can answer

(38:31):
that by thinking about some historical examples. Because some people
have talked about this being like Munich, where Chamberlain gave
up Czechoslovakia to Hitler. Other people have said this is
more like the Peace Talks, the Paris Peace Talks on
North Vietnam versus soth Viatnam, where Kissinger also won the

(38:52):
Nobel Peace Prize but effectively removed all support to South
Vietnam and shortly thereafter northvim took over the whole country.
So is there a good analogy from history and is
there any kind of alternative to seating territory.

Speaker 3 (39:10):
Yeah, that's a difficult question. I mean there's no perfect analogy.
It's not a I don't see an analogy to Vietnam.
I don't see this as an analogy to Korea either.
There is more resemblance to the Munich agreement between Chamberlain
and Hitler. The reason I you view that as more

(39:32):
of that along those lines because because it was a
negotiations of appeasement, it was not it was not a
solving of a problem, right, I mean, this is this
is again that this is one of those cases when
you all it all comes down, it all come down

(39:55):
to what will be the security guarantees to Ukraine. Okay,
if we come up with a plan to provide Ukraine
with a bulletproof security guarantees, then yes, maybe we would
not be like you know, the Munich agreement. But if
we don't. If we don't, then I definitely see that

(40:18):
analogy more so than Vietnam or North South Korea kind
of scenario. Now, what would those security guarantees be, Because
we already gave them Ukraine those security guarantees in nineteen
eighty four and they failed miserably. The only security guarantees
that we would provide that would be sufficient is a

(40:43):
membership in NATO. Or if we not going to give
membership in NATO right away, then we are talking about
so much weapons and so much support that Russia would
know that it's impossible for them to win this war

(41:04):
if they ever decide to go back into this war.
That's the only scenarios where we can actually assure that
Ukraine has reasonable security guarantees. Otherwise, if it's going to
be just oh yeah, I promise that you know, we
will defend, we will help Ukraine, will put more sanctions
on Russia if they attack. I mean, that's going to

(41:26):
be just laughable, right, because it will not stop Russia.
It will just give Russia a pause and then a
way to re arm, to reconscript, to reshuffle some things
and start a new war. In twenty thirty We're.

Speaker 2 (41:44):
Going to take a break for some messages of final
break and come back with some including comments. And I
want to know from our guests you know how this
is all being interpreted in the balance of Eastern Europe
and the balance of you know, because I think that's
also important. You know, you talk sir about about joining NATO,
but even Poland, I understand, is really worried about some

(42:05):
of the current negotiations and worried that they can't trust
the United States to come and defend them anymore. And
so what's joining NATO worth if you can't count on
the United States backing you up? Stay with us, everyone
back in two.

Speaker 1 (42:19):
Minutes stream us live at SAGA nine to sixty am dot.

Speaker 2 (42:27):
CA A Welcome back everyone to the Brian Crommey Radio.
AAR having a really interesting conversation with a professor Sharmata.
He's an economics professor from Case Western Reserve University. He's Ukrainian.

(42:48):
He's from Ukraine, and he's very involved in and aware
of and commenting about everything that's going on. And we're
talking about this Alaska summit between Putin and Trump and
what if anything has come out of it, And we've
had a good conversation about security guarantees and the cause
of the invasion and what potentially could be the solutions.
You mentioned just before the break that you thought that

(43:11):
the only security guarantee makes sense is allowing Ukraine to
join NATO. I wonder if that's an empty gesture though,
because even Poland is worried, and some of the Baltics
are worried. They're ramping up defense spending, you know, above
the two and a half percent of GDP off the
five percent of GDP because they worried that they have
to defend themselves and they can't count on the United States.

(43:31):
So how are some of the other frontline NATO members'
allies reacting to what's going on right now?

Speaker 3 (43:39):
So there are two things here. And on the one hand,
you're correct, and I've made the same line of argument
about a year ago, maybe a little bit less, but
basically I would say that if Rossia were to attack Baltics,
I gave a very high likelihood that United States would

(44:01):
do almost nothing, so the the Article five would not
be invoked, or at least I mean, here's another question. Okay,
how much should a NATO country do, Like Baltic countries
are attacked. Let's say United States since ten thousand of
the of their troops to Baltics and you know, a

(44:21):
couple hundred Abram tanks and maybe some F sixteen's and
then those get destroyed and ten thousand American soldiers get killed,
and that's very easy for Russia. That will be just
like that, you know, in the span of a couple
of weeks.

Speaker 2 (44:36):
So to put it in perspective, I've spoken to a
Canadian military expert that says the Canadian contingent that's in
Latvia under a Russian attack would less would last less
than a week and less.

Speaker 3 (44:47):
Yeah, so that's my point. And then let's say that, yeah,
they all die. The coffins start rolling into you know,
United States, across the States, and do what do you
think next happens? People start suddenly defending and saying let's
send more troops. Now they would say, we we're not
going to send anything more, and so there would be
just nothing going in. But so yes, on the one hand,

(45:11):
it doesn't mean much. But at the same time, because
of Russia's aggression, all of the countries NATO countries have
increased their spending military defense, Germany, including which is one
of the jaggernauts in NATO, France, and of course about
the countries and Poland and other countries. So my point

(45:35):
is that NATO has become much stronger, and it will
become stronger year after year. So when something like this happens,
there will be much more capacity from each of the
country to help collectively one another. So because NATO is
becoming stronger over the next let's say ten years, I

(45:57):
actually do have more faith in NATO. And hopefully by
that time Trump gets out of the picture. I mean,
he's the old guy, and you know, so nobody lives forever,
and so maybe we're going to get back to some
sort of normalcy. Maybe there will be even restoration to
a normal Republican party that I've always been for. I mean,
I'm as my I'm a more republican leading then, you

(46:22):
know than as an economist. I'm a libertarian. I believe
in free markets, I believe in a small government, I
believe in strong military literally a lot of points that
just hit with the Republican Party. But today I don't
recognize this party anymore. And so my hope is if
there is a shift more towards this kind of Reagan

(46:42):
type of Republican party, we will actually see stronger NATO
in the long run, and being a part of NATO
would actually be a very significant determed.

Speaker 2 (46:52):
I don't think this is a Republican party today. I
think it's a Maga party. But that's my own personal
point of view.

Speaker 3 (46:56):
I agree with you, what what can we all do?

Speaker 2 (46:58):
What can Canadians? What can Americans do? What can the
coalition the willing do? What can people other than Donald
Trump do in a situation?

Speaker 3 (47:06):
Well, if we're talking about Americans, I think Americans need
to raise their voice, and they have been raising voices.
We can see that the support for Ukraine is very strong.
In fact, if you look at the recent polls, the
number of people that actually support giving Ukraine more weapons

(47:27):
is now back to twenty twenty two. So in mostly
this comes from the Republican and independent people. So it's
actually the Republican Party or not party, but people who
affiliate themselves with the Republican Party that have now voiced
out and saying we need to provide Ukraine with weapons.

(47:49):
So if you're an American, you have to start hammering
your representatives, congressman, senators, especially from the Republican side. The
midterm elections are coming in. They will want to satisfy
their electorates, so they will be pushing for aid to Ukraine.
And so we need to provide Ukraine with all the

(48:11):
tools necessary. If we're talking about Canada, European countries, I
think we as a whole collective need to stand up
to the bully and by the bully. Unfortunately today I
also mean the United States, not only Russia. We need
to support Ukraine and support one another. And when Trump

(48:35):
is going to throw Ukraine under the bus, the only
way for Europe to kind of step up will be
to actually provide more commitments, more support to Ukraine that
Russia will have no way but to sit down, meaningfully,
sit down at the negotiation table and finish this bloody war.

Speaker 2 (48:56):
To lead that, I really think we need a Churchill.
Is there anyone? Is there a president of France, or
a Prime minister of Britain, or a Prime minister of Canada,
or someone that you see, maybe the Chancellor of Germany
that is playing the role of Churchill today.

Speaker 3 (49:13):
You know, this is a great question. I don't think
there is a standalone leader. But the people that you
mentioned are definitely the ones that I've gained to respect
because you know, I was critical about many of these
individuals in the past, but I see them stepping up
and actually doing something. I will have probably more hopes

(49:33):
for the German Chancellor unfortunately didn't materialize yet as much,
but you know, it's a move in the right direction.
But I do not see a single individual on the
world arena right now that will take that role.

Speaker 2 (49:48):
Roban, Jamantha, thank you so much for Jonas. Really appreciate it.

Speaker 3 (49:51):
Thank you, Brian.

Speaker 2 (49:52):
That's our show for tonight, everybody, thank you. I think
this is going to be an issue We're going to
be following very closely, and so I really appreciate your
attention tonight and our guests participation. I think that this
is maybe Munich, as you said, but I really worry
that the Trump strategy is more akin to what happened
with the Paris Treaty, where we effectively, the United States

(50:15):
effectively gave up I had a guest on a month
ago that said this was more akin to Afghanistan, where
the United States just sort of gave up and gave
into the Taliban. So whether we're giving into the Taliban,
or whether we're giving into North VMM, or whether we're
giving into Hitler, all of them are pretty bad comparables.
And I think that we need to do what we
can as a collective to tell our leaders that people

(50:40):
shouldn't be able to take territory through violence and through
military action. It's just a world of nineteen forties that
we don't want to repeat today. Thanks for joining us, everybody.

Speaker 1 (50:50):
Good Night, No Radio, No Problem. Stream is live on
SAGA ninety sixty am.
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