NZ risks 'riding cavalry into battle against tanks' without Aukus

New Zealand is not stranger to tectonic shifts, perched as it is on a volcanic belt, but the current geopolitical quakes may prove an entirely different matter.

The University of Waikato's Dr Reuben Steff joins the podcast to argue that without joining the high tech-focused pillar two of the Australia, UK and US (AUKUS) agreement, NZ may find themselves at a major disadvantage in the new world order.

Plus, the US Defence Secretary Peter Hegseth orders a softer cybersecurity stance toward Russia.

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Episode Transcript

Speaker 1 (00:00):
From Chinese warships in the Tasman Sea.

Speaker 2 (00:03):
A trans Tasman war of words is underway over how
long can we Defense staff took to tell Australia about
China's live firing exercise in the Tasman Sea last Friday.

Speaker 1 (00:14):
To the Cook Islands cozying up to China.

Speaker 3 (00:16):
The Cook Islands is set to strike a major partnership
agreement with China, causing deep concern.

Speaker 1 (00:22):
Once distant pressures are quickly becoming very real in our
isolated neck of the woods.

Speaker 4 (00:28):
Couple that with the Trump administration's warm relationship with former
faux Russia, it's pretty clear that a new world order
is forming, the rules of which could look very different
from the past.

Speaker 1 (00:39):
This week, on the Business of Tech, powered by two
Degrees Business, one of the country's leading geopolitical analysts walks
us through what the heck is going on in the world.

Speaker 4 (00:49):
Doctor Rubinsteff also gives his assessment of the Orcus Advanced
Security Pact and whether we should get involved with it,
the state of fied defense tech and what role we
might be expect did to play in a hot war
in the South China Sea if China invades Taiwan.

Speaker 3 (01:05):
I mean, if aliens come to your country, it'd say, hey,
do you want the best technologies that are ever being created?
Do you just say on that? Are we good? She'll
be right. No. If you're a mature country, when there's
a potentially strategically relevant development, BAMS, you should be able
to sit down, play out. The pros and coms have
some kind of natural conversational debate in their latent decision.

(01:27):
So I decided, Okay, I've got to step in here
and at least Steelman argent for us.

Speaker 1 (01:32):
Joy. Yes, we're all in on the big issues this week.

Speaker 4 (01:36):
And just to set the scene, another stunning piece of
news this week that has national security implication for many countries,
the Trump administration, according to widespread media reports, has decided
that Russia no longer poses a cyber security threat to
the US. It's suspended some of its cyber operations against Russia.

Speaker 1 (01:58):
Ben that's what they tell us. So Pete haigsth former
TV presenter and now Secretary of Defense go figure is
a has called for a cease of offensive cybersecurity operations
against Russia. So nobody's quite sure exactly how far this extends,
but what we can say is it's a pretty big

(02:20):
signal that Pete Haigseth has said this to the people
that report to him, and I think just a further
indicator of the closer relationship that the Trump administration is
trying to form with Russia.

Speaker 4 (02:34):
Yeah, and that extends to discussions apparently about dialing back
to sanctions on Russia. Obviously it's sort of siding with
Russia encouraging Ukraine to come to the table except some
of the demands that Russia has to try and come
up with a peace deal in Ukraine. This is mind

(02:55):
bogging really, the implications of this. You know, Russia has
been a well acknowledged cyber threat to the US and
frankly most countries for a long time. It hosts ransomware gangs,
crypto money launderers, disinformation operations. So there's documented evidence of

(03:16):
it attempting to manipulate elections in other countries, including the US.
It has an elite group of government sanctioned hackers, as
do the Chinese, but the Russians are very adept at this.
You know, the Cold War produced a lot of gifted mathematicians,
cryptographers and the like, and that legacy has come down

(03:39):
that to one area where Russia is incredibly strong computer science,
mathematics and how to infiltrate people's networks. So you know,
this is stunning. Really. You know, there are offensive operations
going on to try and disrupt things like botnets and
efforts to put malware into critical infrastructure. And you know,

(04:03):
we saw the US cyber agencies warn us in twenty
twenty three about Vault Typhoon that was a Chinese group
of hackers that were embedding malware in critical infrastructure providers
like utility companies, electricity, water, little sort of packags of
software that could be activated to take out those critical

(04:23):
infrastructure in the future. So the Russians are doing exactly
the same thing. They've taken out power plants in the
past in Europe. So you know, this is absolutely staggering
and has implications for US because we get so much
of our cybersecurity intel from the US.

Speaker 1 (04:41):
Yeah. Absolutely, And you know they have said that they
are going to continue to defend that critical infrastructure from everyone,
including Russia, although how that intersects with a change in
approach we don't quite know yet. But the other thing
is that critical infrastructure may include the kinds of data
centers that house a lot of data. And you know,

(05:06):
when you start talking about telecommunications in the US, you
start to extend it out to beyond the US borders
when it comes to housing data, because if there is
a way to get data from a data center that's
offshore and bring it back to the parent company, you
know that that could potentially be exploited by an attacker.

(05:28):
So it is a huge and wide ranging thing, and
I'm really interested to hear some comment from the Trump
administration on it, because we don't really know yet. And
also we haven't had any comment coming out of our
defense agencies or Australia or anything on this situation. So
it seems to be going a little bit more under

(05:50):
the radar, possibly just because of the sheer torrent flood
of stuff that is happening at the moment.

Speaker 4 (05:57):
Yeah, but if you think about the implications, even if
it's a small pause or just a dialing back off
offensive capabilities, I mean, if you're a cyber criminal, a
Russian cyber criminal, you'd be like, going, now is our opportunity.
Let's go full bore on trying to penetrate networks, create

(06:18):
bot nets and the like, and every other cyber adversary
around the world is going to be thinking, like the
North Koreans and the Chinese hackers are going to be thinking,
let's disguise ourselves to look like the Russians because they're
leaving the Russians alone. Let's make our attacks have a
sort of a Russian signature, and they'll get the nod,

(06:41):
they'll be allowed to operate with impunity. So it's just
absolutely staggering. You know what the implications, even if it
was just for a temporary thing, you know, they will
exploit it to the nth degree.

Speaker 1 (06:55):
Absolutely, And you know, I think more important as well
as what it rapres sense, which is the compromise that
Donald Trump is making. And you mentioned the disinformation campaign
as well, and you know, there's been a lot of
chatter around the fact that it was those disinformation campaigns

(07:15):
that has brought Trump closer to Putin back in twenty sixteen,
when everyone was saying, well, you know, Putin was putting
out these campaigns and that's the part of the reason
that Trump won. And Trump took that personally. And of course,
if Puton comes in and strukes his ego and says, no,
we haven't done anything, you know, you you're just a big,
powerful man like I am. Then that's gonna really kind

(07:38):
of help to grease the wheels of that relationship. And
so yeah, I think that is all wrapped up together
in this situation where Trump's saying, look, he's he's not
a threat. Look, you know, all of the stuff about
this disinformation, it's all just lies, has been proven by

(07:59):
the fact that they try to use it against me
and my campaign and back in twenty sixteen. And so yeah,
there's just so much complicated ego and years and years
of tension that is ramping up into these moments, which

(08:21):
is clearly demonstrated in this decision to say we are
no longer going to proactively fight against Russia.

Speaker 4 (08:29):
Yeah, and you know, I've watched a lot of commentators
in the last few weeks sort of going, you know,
what is really at the heart of this? You know,
is Trump a Russian asset from decades back that do
they have something on him? Or is it just that
fascination with the strong man that he actually really admires

(08:51):
cutin or does he just want to be seen as
the guy who brought peace to the Ukraine by hammering
out an agreement and to do that he knows he
has to keep putin happy. Bottom line, bottom line, whatever
it is. These sorts of moves are just eroding the

(09:12):
likes of NATO, the Five Eyes, our cybersecurity relationship between
those Five Eyes countries. And that's bad for US because
we don't have a lot of capability. We've run down.
We never really even invested in cybersecurity to any great degree.
The Australians did, so we're really reliant on getting those memos,

(09:34):
getting that intel from the US, in particular saying we've
identified these sorts of attacks on our networks, you need
to do something about it. You know, hopefully that will
continue the sharing of that information, but in terms of
the actual proactive measures to try and address those threats,
when it comes to Russia, it may not be that

(09:54):
they go after them.

Speaker 3 (09:56):
Yeah.

Speaker 1 (09:57):
Yes, It's going to be a very interesting set situation
in the future to see what happens in the world
of cybersecurity as a result of this, And I'm really
looking forward to seeing what some of these what some
of the allies say about it as well. And cybersecurity
is certainly an area of priority for the US. In

(10:18):
the Orcus Trilateral partnership between Australia the United Kingdom and
the United States, which is intended to promote a free
and open endo Pacific.

Speaker 4 (10:28):
Yeah, ORCUS has been running for a few years now.
Part of it is about nuclear submarines, which we understandably
don't want to bar off. But Pillar two I ORCUS
sounds kind of cool. It's all the advanced tech that
is going to come into play in the future of
defense and warfare. Think artificial intelligence, drone swarms, quantum technologies,

(10:48):
even hypersonic missiles.

Speaker 1 (10:51):
Dr Rubin's Steph is a geopolitical and international relations analyst
and senior lecturer at the University of Waikotto who has
been writing quite widely about all of this.

Speaker 4 (11:01):
He has a new book out New Zealand's Geopolitics and
the US China Competition, which delves into all of this
in detail and season make the case for joining ORCUS,
but also outline the alternative, which really amounts to us
taking a position of armed neutrality or independence. Is that
even realistic? Or is Helen Clark's vision of US using

(11:22):
soft power to navigate our way in the world, staying
friends with everyone increasingly looking like a pipe dream.

Speaker 1 (11:30):
Well, here's your interview with Doctor Rubin Staff better to
find out his take.

Speaker 4 (11:42):
Ruben Stapf, Welcome to the Business of Tech. Great to
have you on.

Speaker 3 (11:48):
Thanks Peter, great to be here.

Speaker 4 (11:50):
You wrote in your post column a couple of weeks ago,
really nice quote from Vladimir Lenin. There are decades where
nothing has and there are weeks where decades happen. I
think it could be more apt what we've seen in
the last couple of weeks between what's gone on with
the Cook Islands, relationship with New Zealand, the Chinese warships

(12:13):
in the Tasman. I've never seen that in my lifetime
growing up in New Zealand. The just remarkable episode in
the White House with President Zelenski basically been thrown under
the bus by Jade Vance and President Trump. It's accelerating,
isn't it. At the moment, We've had probably twenty or

(12:34):
thirty years at least since the fracturing off ANDAs and
in the eighties we've had relative stability as our military
has sort of been degraded really through lack of investment.
Now all of that is on the table and we're
looking very exposed. Paint a picture for us, Reuben, to
begin with, fleshing out that column that you wrote in

(12:56):
the Post last week about the strategic picture that's unfolding
in Eurasia, the Pacific island chains as they are known
in strategy terms, and how this is implicating us in
this sort of huge US China power dynamic that's going on.

Speaker 3 (13:17):
Sure, look, it's an incredibly discombobulating time to be alive.
Every day at the moment you wake up and you
just wonder, geez, what the hell is going on? And
where should I focus my attention? Because we're just overwhelmed
by an assault of the sensus these days, I think
at the grand strategic level, which I think we in
New Zealand need to get better at thinking about what

(13:38):
we're essentially seeing. And this draws us to the Russia
Ukraine conflict, to all the drama we're seeing as it
relates to the diplomacy going on in that theater Donald Trump,
and this is part of a continuum over years now
in US grand strategy. But they are attempting to shift
more attention to the Indo Pacific because that's where the

(14:00):
key challenger for the twenty first century is that being
China Russia is a major concern for a range of reasons.
The size of its economy is only about that of Italy,
but you can cause a lot of destruction and disrupt
a lot of things, it turns out, even with a
relatively small economy. Russia is essentially allied with China right now,
which is a terrible, terrible geostrategic mix for the United

(14:22):
States and its allies to be confronting when Eurasia is
kind of within the grasp, if you will, of these
revisionist powers China, Russia, Iran and so on. Trump is
trying to de escalate the war in Ukraine to turn
attention towards the Pacific. China is watching what's happening between
Putin and Trump, and the are quite concerned about where

(14:43):
that might all go. It's not that Russia tomorrow is
going to sort of dump China and switch towards the
Europeans and Americans. That might be more of a long
term development if it ever happens. But China wants to,
I think, flex its muscles in the Pacific right now.
It wants to to show the Americans and Australia, New Zealand, etc.

(15:04):
That they have leverage and that could very well account
for things we've seen recently in Curebas of course the
Cook Islands, but also in the Tasman Sea with this
Chinese flotilla that has some considerable, considerable firepower, and they
decided to position itself underneath where many commercial airliners go

(15:24):
back and forth between New Zealand and a straight So
an intentional move to show us to the Australians, but
I suspect more than us, it's to signal the Americans, Hey,
we have options in this great Pacific competition. That's that's
underway now. Now just to paint a little bit of
a picture quickly for our listeners. New Zealand is part
of what's called the Third Island Chain. They can go

(15:45):
on Google Images and put into three Pacific island chains.
The first Pacific Island chain goes from Japan down around
Taiwan and the South China set okay, so Taiwan's South
China see are within the Chinese kind of sphere, if
you will, in the first island chain. The second island
chain goes from Japan to Guam, which is a US
essentially military territory and base, and then goes down to Indonesia.

(16:08):
The third island chain goes all the way out to Hawaii,
then runs north south down to the South Pacific Islands
and then to New Zealand. So we are deep south
of this third island chain. And these island chains are
used by strategists to understand the geopolitical competition and machination
in the region, especially between well the Americans on one

(16:29):
side and the Chinese on the other. And then the
Pacific is right in the middle of these three island chains.
And what we see in recent year is the Americans
deepening and locking down their influence in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Australia.
So they're trying across these archipelagic lines of kind of
defense view will to lock down their position to make
it more difficult for China to project power outwards throughout

(16:51):
the Pacific. But coming to the third island chain, okay,
this is kind of potentially a week undervalley for those
first two island chains. And if you're China and you're
struggling to make inroads in the first and second island
chain where US allies are, well, there's a whole bunch
of our relatively you might say, weak countries in the

(17:12):
South Pacific where you can look to expand your influence,
your trade, your infrastructure developments, which they've been doing to
try and look for military positions, access agreements to try
and access subsea resources in the future, hence the Cook Islands.
And once that happens for New Zealand, that starts to
really activate a response by us, because the South Pacific

(17:33):
is our area of existential importance. Things happen in the
mid least, things happen in Eastern Europe, that's concerned to
New Zealand. But when things start to happen in our
actual immediate region, when we see the balance of power
and influence start to change, that's when the New Zealand government,
as we've seen for many years now, starts to get
very concerned. So that's the state of play that New

(17:53):
Zealand is now geostrategically implicated in this much larger game
playing out. And we just have not had this feeling
that this reality for decades and decades now, so we
are psychologically not prepared for it, I think. And yeah,
you see that now the defense was being run down
in the.

Speaker 4 (18:09):
Glib I mean there is the as you write in
the book, you know that the memories of World War
Two where this island chain very much was potentially going
to come into play.

Speaker 5 (18:18):
Thankfully it didn't to any great degree.

Speaker 4 (18:21):
But you know, I've read a lot of military strategists
and that over in recent years sort of saying well,
China doesn't really have a blue water fleet, but what
it's showing I think this is probably the furthest it's
traveled in recent years, thousands of kilometers away, and sure
they're doing one big round trip, but I mean it
would just be unimaginable. I think if China was able

(18:44):
to secure a base somewhere in this third island chain
by doing a deal with one of our neighbors, I
guess that's the worst case scenario.

Speaker 3 (18:53):
Yeah, that is a worst case scenario. And the New
Zealand government, Australian government had been warning about this for years.
In fact, Kurt Campbell, who's an American, he was President
Biden sort of chief Indo Pacific diplomat, if you will,
he said in his final interview to the Australian newspaper.
So this was late last year. He said, China is

(19:13):
looking for military bases in the South Pacific. Now, prior
to that, we'd only had we'd had some allusions to this,
but that was the first time an official came out
and said explicitly that's what they're looking for. Prior to that,
it was statements like, oh, it would be extremely concerning
to the New Zealand and US governments if a country

(19:33):
with different values and interest was to establish a military
base in the region. That it now looks like officials
are being much more front foot and saying that's what
they're looking for, and the nature of how this might
play out. It's not obvious in a way, but in
the Solomon Islands is a real case in point where

(19:53):
China now has a logistics kind of naval access agreement
to ports in the Solomon Islands. They can come in
at the invitation of the Solomon Islands government. But the
text of that agreement very much mimics the text of
an agreement with Djibouti on the Eastern Horn of Africa
that inevitabent that did lead to China getting essentially a

(20:15):
permanent naval position there. So we have a kind of
a mimicry of strategy. You can look at how China
has approached other parts of the world and what has
preceded them getting a military base and it's trade, its infrastructure,
it's ad then it's these logistics agreements, and then it
leads into a military position. So you take what we're
seeing elsewhere and you look at the evidence that we

(20:37):
have for the South Pacific with some of these countries,
and it looks almost identical. So that's why people are
concerned that this is a distinct possibility in the is
to come.

Speaker 4 (20:46):
Yeah, and the government is clearly concerned about this, and
we've had both Judith Collins, Defense Minister, and Christopher lux
and the Prime Minister saying that there will be significant
funding for defense in this year's budget. So we are
belatedly about to scale up. And you know, I know
people in defense who you know, just shake their head

(21:08):
at what they have to deal with every day. Trying
to muster enough crew for ships and the like alone
is a real challenge. The talent issue, let alone the
hardware issue is real for New Zealand. So we have
some decisions to make and the government looks like it's
going in that direction. One of the decisions we maybe
will have to make in the next couple of years,

(21:28):
and it's been contentious already, is if we're given the
opportunity whether we join this relationship, the Orcust relationship. Three
players in there at the moment, America, the UK, and Australia,
and the door is potentially open for us to join.
Rubin talk us through, just so you refresh our minds
about what Orcus is. It's got two pillars, one about submarines,

(21:52):
the other about advanced technology. Give us the overview.

Speaker 3 (21:55):
Yes, sure so. August Pillar one is to facilitate the
train of nuclear powered submarines from the UK and United
States to Australia, which is a massive undertaking. And this
is some of the most sophisticated, state of the art
technology on the planet, these nuclear powered submarines that's going
to play out over decades. There will be issues with that,

(22:19):
some of the timelines have already been pushed out, but nonetheless,
let's set that aside. It's August Pillar two that's relevant
to New Zealand. So this is an agreement between the US, UK,
Australia to collaborate and share the most advanced emerging technologies,
so artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cyber undersea hypersonics, information sharing,
electronic warfare, and maybe future technologies that haven't even been

(22:41):
conceived of yet. In March twenty twenty three, Kirk Campbell
came to Auckland and essentially offered New Zealand the potential
to join August in the future when we were comfortable
with it. He said. The response to this was overwhelmingly
negative in the New Zealand media, and I thought this
was quite odd because I mean, if aliens come to

(23:02):
your country and say, hey, do you want the best
technologies that have ever been created? Do you just say, oh, nah,
now we're good. She'll be right. No, if you're a
mature country when there's a potentially strategically relevant development like this,
you should be able to sit down, play out the
pros and columns, have some kind of national conversational debate
and then make a decision. So I decided, okay, I'd

(23:25):
be to step in here and at least steel Mann
the argument for us joining. And of course this is
against the context of a deteriorating strategic environment for New Zealand. Okay,
so there during good times be nine times ah, maybe
we don't join, but things have changed and maybe it
takes on added importance right now that we consider it.
So why is August potentially significant to New Zealand? Why

(23:48):
might we want to join. Well, in future conflicts, there
may very well be very little competition between militaries that
have integrated the most advanced technologies and those that happened.
It could be the difference between you know and UB one.
A country was writing cavalry into battle against tacts. You
know that actually happened in some cases because you had
technology changing so quickly, and some countries were able to

(24:09):
adapt and adopt the new tech technology quickly and other
countries were stuck in the past. We also know technology
is evolving in an exponential rate. We are not going
to be able to create these technologies on our own. Okay,
we might be able to plug in. We have some
promising tech and software companies that will be able to
contribute to some of the technology stacks NORKS Pillar two,

(24:29):
but we cannot create these technologies from scratch in New Zealand.
I also imagine that the technology, information sharing protocols, and
communication channels that intelligence agencies use will be updated based
upon ORCHEST Pillar two technology. So for us to remain
part of the Five Eyes, for our military to remain

(24:49):
interoperable with like minded militaries, we may have to join
ORCHEST Pilar two. Secondly, these technologies are going to be
critical to really every spe of human activity in the
years to come, to our economy, to product productivity. We're
the big productivity problem to industry rich large to the
nature of work, to education, and as I said before,

(25:12):
of course also to military affairs. But you know our
tech startups, our software startups, which is a it's a
promising part of our economy and it has grown quite quickly.
Are they going to be able to survive and thrive
without inward investment, with capital with expertise from abroad. I'm skeptical.

(25:32):
I mean, some of them may be able to get
a foothold in. But we want these companies to go
global if we can, and we want them to retain
some of their operations in New Zealand instead of just
abandoning US and going off to Australia or Europe or
the United States, which they may very well do, unless
we can get into something like orchest Pillar two and
benefit from all the joint research and development and capital

(25:53):
potentially tens of billions of dollars of capital that will
be flowing around the orchest Pillar two and technology exchanges.
In some of my research I have listed a whole
bunch of companies we have that are working in all
sorts of really promising technological areas. We have expertise in rocketry,
wireless power transmission, underwater sensors, drones, hydrophones, data storage, software,

(26:18):
artificial intelligence, virtual reality, infusion energy. We have universities doing
all sorts of interesting research on emerging technologies. So we
already I think, have a suite of companies, thinkers, innovators
that can kind of plug into potentially Orchest Pilar two,
enjoining the kind of big collaborative network that is being

(26:40):
established there. Another reason I think worchst Pilar two is
in our interests is because we are seeing the bifurcation
of the global technology system. You have when it comes
to semiconductors, five gtailcommunications, and no doubt other areas of
advanced technology. The US and China are essentially decoupling from
one another, and I suspect as they decouple well, as

(27:03):
we've actually seen already, they are pulling countries into their
technological ecosystems when it comes to the most advanced technologies,
and I think that's only going to deepen. I think
more and more areas of technology will be labeled as
of national security importance, and therefore if you want that technology,
you have to either be in the kind of American

(27:25):
tech sphere or the Chinese tech sphere. I think it
will create technological path dependency in which Beijing or Washington
they will be able to impede and or offer critical technologies,
data and upgrades of those technologies to the countries that
in their spheres of influence. So as we go further

(27:45):
down one path, and right now it is into I
think the kind of Western technological ecosystem. It's not the
five years from now we'll just be able to go, okay,
let's jump ship and join the other technological ecosystem. We
will be kind of locked right now. Some people will
limit this, they say, oh, this is an affront to
our sovereignty and so on. I'm a realist. Okay, we
just have to deal with the world as it is.

(28:05):
We can't. We can't just in the abstract imagine a
better world is going to emerge tomorrow. Okay, we have
to deal with the cards that are being played to us.
And that's the way it is. Essentially. We should try
and you know, have as much independence as we can
and have our own sovereign capabilities. We absolutely should, but
that's going to require investment, it's going to require thinking,

(28:27):
it's going to require require creativity. So we should try
and do that. But we just have to realize right
now we we kind of take the hands being played
to us, and we are not able to fully set
the scene for others. They are kind of setting the
strategy for us in many instances, and partly that's just
the reality of being a small country. So a quick
fifth thing and then I'll hand it back to you.

(28:50):
I know I've been going on a bit, but you know,
there is this accusation that August increases the chance of
conflict in our region. Now this is a very difficult
one to truly make an assessment of, but clearly there
is a kind of arms race and geostrategic competition playing out,
and Orcus is one component of that. I would just

(29:10):
say though, that it is really essentially China that has
catalyzed many of these moves. They had engaged a massive
military build up over the last twenty years and that
has frightened much of the region. That's why Japan is
doubling its defense spending. That's why the Philippines have deepened
their alliance with the Americans. That's why Orcus came into being.
And as a country's military power grows relative to others,

(29:33):
so does their influence and ambitions. And so what if
we see we see around twenty fifteen twenty sixteen, China
essentially try and start to annex the South China. See
we see them engage in will warror diplomacy at times,
We've seen them bully countries, get into trade spats, already
place trade sanctions on South Korea, Australia, other nations. And

(29:57):
unless there is a geostrategic military rebalancing by America, by Australia,
by Japan, by New Zealand, we can imagine China is
only going to become more and more emboldened. And the
prospects that they will actually use military power at some
point also grows as they become more confident that they
could achieve their ends, whether it's around Taiwana or South China,

(30:18):
see by using military power and emerging victorious. So something
like Orcus, which is going to see Australia and other
countries have the state of the art and military technologies
that deepens the alliances in the region things like this. Actually,
China actually has to take into account that this is
increasing the military position of other countries and that may

(30:40):
be effort and likely does enhance deterrence in the region.

Speaker 4 (30:46):
There is an argument in relation to ORCUS that we
could buy this technology off the shelf, but I think
what we've seen with the US is hardening towards its
own allies and its attitude. And we can talk a
little bit five eyes as well, but those countries that
are very much in that pact with the Americans are

(31:07):
going to get that technology first. We'll be lucky if
we get it down the track. And in terms of
I think you make a very compelling case in the book,
the case for ORCUS, the interoperability and the opportunities to
our tech companies. We've already have Rocket Lab that has
done very well by working with the US military on

(31:28):
national security satellite launchers, hypersonic testing, that sort of stuff
with its electron rocket. There are other sort of pockets
of capability that we have and this could actually lead
to real money flowing to those companies we've seen already
as part of the ORCUS, they call it the Innovation Challenge.

(31:52):
A handful of Australian companies. It was announced a couple
of weeks ago eight million dollars to develop electronic warfare technology.
So it's early days, but money is already flowing from
ORCUS to those companies. What do we know about the
sort of There's been some public coverage off some of
the things that they're doing as part of ORCUST. There's
coordinated drone flights and testing that's been done in the UK.

(32:16):
What else do we know about what's actually going on
in August?

Speaker 3 (32:20):
Yes, so this is an area that I need to
look more into. But as you mentioned, there are already
some orchest pulito activities underway. Like you say, there has
been tests when it comes to collaborative drone swarms. There's
also progress being made on quantum technologies between the Orchestra
Pular two countries by the end of twenty twenty four.

(32:40):
So at the end of last year, lot what I
heard is that the US, Australia, UK would be testing
out trilateral algorithms when it pertains to the P eight
maritrime aircraft. Now, if you don't know, New Zealand also
has pights. These are basically militarized seven three sevens that
contain real sophisticated advanced sensors for sub seed detection and

(33:05):
surface seed detection. They can also attack submarines and so on.
But the Pillar two nations are being conducting trilateral algorithm tests.
Now I'm not like a tech guy, so I don't
know exactly what that is. But nonetheless, it's to say
they are already collaborating on sophisticated technologies, and those are
only the ones I know about. There may very well
be a whole suite of technologies that they are kind

(33:28):
of convert covertly engaging on. So that is something that
I think we need to do a bit more investigation of,
and I suspect that's going on behind the scenes. There
will be conversations going on between New Zealand and the
Orcist countries about Okay, what exactly is this Pillar two,
how exactly would we contribute to it, how would we benefit?
What would be you know, potentially the cost of New Zealand.

(33:50):
There is this idea out there that you know, you
probably have to pay your way into aucast Pilar two. Now,
whether that means actually we have to hand over one
hundred million dollars out outright I'm not sure, but it
will be. You have to show some capability, technological capability,
some human capital, things like this that we can contribute
to the pillar to arrangements. That that's something when you

(34:13):
know a lot more about Peter, because I personally don't.

Speaker 4 (34:16):
Yeah, it makes sense that we need to invest in
this relationship. It's nothing compared to the money involved in
Pillar one. The Australian government has committed to paying the
United States three billion dollars to enhance submarine capacity. Then
you have the Virginia class nuclear powered subs that are

(34:36):
going to be delivered. That's hundreds of billions of dollars.
So that's led some to suggest that may even not
happen because it's just so expensive. Incidentally, on that Reuben
say that happens and they do get shiny new nuclear
subs in the early twenty thirties, What does that mean
for us? So we're going to welcome those subs into

(34:56):
our waters and our ports.

Speaker 3 (35:00):
Well, yeah, this is a big question. There's a few
big questions. New Zealand is going to have to consider
it in the coming years and decades. There's some shibboliths
that we're going to have to at least test to
see if they still fit the purpose. But one is
the whole anti nuclear policy and legislation that we have
that many New Zealanders feel as part of their national identity.

(35:20):
I mean, look, I'll put it this way. Let's say
fifteen years from now that the Australians have acquired nuclear
powered submarines and there is a major crisis or threat
to New Zealand, and the Australians say, hey, look, the
fastest most advanced capability we have are nuclear powered submarines.
Are we just going to say, oh nah, sorry, you
can't seen them into our territory. So this is where

(35:43):
the rubber will meet the road eventually, and maybe there'll
be carveouts to our legislation or something like that. Maybe
we'll have to find a way around it. But there
could also be a generational turnover. I can tell you
many of my younger students they are just not as
tightly bound to the anti nuclear philosophy and policy of
New Zealand. There very concerned about things like climate change

(36:05):
and they see nuclear powers or nuclear power or small
nuclear reactors is a potential answer in part to that crisis.
It's also that eventually commercial ships, trading ships, maybe nuclear
power too. There's all sorts of things that nuclear could
facilitate in the years to come. So that's an open question,

(36:26):
and at some point someone should do an article looking
at the Yeah, just putting this out there.

Speaker 4 (36:31):
Yeah, So UCAS seems like the rational and logical thing
to do from a strategic point of view. We're not
going to militarily align ourselves with China. That's just unthinkable
to our traditional allies. But you do in the book
outline a different scenario, which you sort of call armed independence,
which essentially I guess is be the Switzerland of the

(36:54):
South Pacific. And there was some debate on LinkedIn a
friend of mine of futurists, Ben Reid, we've had on
the podcast a few times, was I guess arguing with
your colleague from Waykatta University, Brian Cole about this. Ben
Reed suggests increasing conventional defense spending for tiny nation like
hours just takes money out of our pockets and into

(37:16):
the pockets off overseas. Likely US arms manufacturers wouldn't change
the outcome of a military invasion by any large superpower.
It might take thirty minutes rather than fifteen to invade
New Zealand. So Ben says, better to spend the money
on social and economic resilience, technological and supply chain independence,

(37:36):
and a focused diplomatic effort on making tayor more more
valuable to all sides as an independent nation. So I
guess that and you do cover that scenario in your book.
A big, big ask for a small nation like New
Zealand to pull that off.

Speaker 3 (37:54):
Yeah, I have a check to on this. I think
I call armed independence, well armed, neutral and comprehensive national resilience.
Where this is an idea that does get out. There
are times and as you say, our mutual friend Ben
is sometimes involving these debates. Good on them. It's a
nice idea, it's very idealistic. It would actually take, though,

(38:17):
I think, a whole of government, to some degree, whole
of nation effort to create it. We would have to massively,
massively invest in this kind of program because even at
the best of times, New Zealand should have greater strategic
resilience because they probably are going to be more global
crises to come. They're maybe black Swan events. We could

(38:39):
be cut off on any given day from the world
potentially for a range of reasons. We have those subsea
cables that could be cut. Subse cables have been cut
around Taiwan in recent weeks, that have been cut up
in the Baltics in recent weeks. So there's all these
potential vulnerabilities we face, and then our resilience to maintain
our way of life for very long if we cut
off it's not so. I think some kind of program

(39:02):
that thinks through, Okay, what key inputs do we need,
What food stuffs do we need, oil and gas, stockpiling,
what basic other critical goods do we need to keep
the lights on to keep our cars going? You know?
How do we stop literally like a stockpile, Like a
survivalist has a stockpile under their house for a doomsday.

(39:22):
I think New Zealand should start thinking through investing in
our own kind of stockpile, and not to be fatalistic,
but just to be prepared, just to say, oh, we
could hold on for a few months on our own
if things go really bad. So that's that's the kind
of national resilience part of it. The armed and independence
part of it sounds really good, but how do we
get from where we are now to then we are

(39:44):
going to have to purchase software technology, certain military equipment
and inputs from abroad, and who's going to sell the
stuff to us if we're getting it, so that we
can turn inwards and create a kind of porcupine, if
you will, of defense of strategy. Not to say it
can't be done. We do have some manufacturing capabilities here.

(40:05):
We have some really good drone companies here. We could
invest in them, We could try accelerate them and then
then create a kind of defensive position for ourselves down
here in the South Pacific and at least our kind
of realm, or our immediate territory at least. But again,
it's going to require investment, it's going to require a
massive change of thinking. And I think there's nothing wrong

(40:26):
with people putting the strategy out there saying, hey, here's
how we get from A to B to Z. Here's
the cost, here's the first step we do, here's the
second step. Like why not have that out there? I
suspect we will not go on that direction, but we're
the value of considering these things is is that they
we could try do some of it even as we

(40:46):
retain our current settings, which is essentially Alliance of Australia
to factor alliance with the Americans and other kind of
Western countries and some Asian countries. We could retain our
sort of continue our current trajectory, but also say, okay,
but national resilience, let's put some money into that. Some
independent sovereign defensive capabilities, let's put some money into that too,

(41:08):
And that could give us options in the future if
things significantly change and we feel they need to drastically
change strategy. So I would suggest pursuing a bit of
all these things at once. But it comes down to money.
Where's the money going to come from, Peter. As you know,
we have a cost of living crisis, healthcare, infrastructure, schooling,

(41:28):
We have all these things we need to pay for,
and then we also want to find money to carve
out to take care of our sort of sovereign and
strategic responsibility. So it's a tough ask, even though I
think it's worth considering.

Speaker 4 (41:39):
Yeah, in the UK, it's quite indicative. I think, you know,
they're committing to upping their defense spending at the cost
of all of their international aid essentially, so there's something
has to give, and for us it will be core
services like health care and education, and that unless we
can grow the economy as the Prime Minister it has

(42:01):
been talking about. I guess, Reuben, there's also the prospects
with the Americans taking an America first approach to foreign
relations and unilateral action as their preferred modus operandi. Now,
what is the future of the likes of Five Eyes

(42:22):
and Orcus Without the Americans, five Eyes really is not
going to work. Do you see an ongoing commitment to
those what have been, in terms of Five Eyes anyway
for decades been a really important security collaboration between our allies.

Speaker 3 (42:41):
Yeah. Look, I don't think the Five Eyes is going anywhere.
In fact, I think it might even expand I've heard
at times that Japan is sometimes considered kind of the
sixth Eye, a kind of de facto an intelligence Alliance member.
I don't think it's going anywhere because the Pacific and

(43:03):
China are considered the key challenge to the United States
and things that assist them in this geostrategic competition. In
the Pacific is going to be viewed as of value,
and you have us here in the Pacific, US, Canada,
of course Australia. So I don't think we're going to
see a massive change to the Five Eyes. We might

(43:24):
see an expand expansion of it as it pertains to Aucust.
It is the same thing as you said, America is
actually going to receive billions upon billions of dollars through
Aucust from Australia. Trump will love that. I mean, what
does he love more than cardhold cash being handed over
to the Americans. He loves to highlight any announcement of
new inward investment by a foreign company or even a

(43:45):
domestic American company. So I think he'll actually love August,
even if he doesn't fully know what it is. He'll
just know money is coming into the United States through it,
and one of one of America's little sheriffs down there
Australia is paying them. He'll love that too, a close
ally having to kind of bend over even more and
pay the Americans. So this gets into the transactionalism of
the emerging American strategy, which is essentially America will it

(44:09):
will defend you, will it will give offer you something.
You have to offer them something, and you have to
offer them a bit more than you were in the past.
And you can you can kind of see why, I mean,
America has been spending a lot more on its defense
than basically all of its allies in recent decades, if
not all of them since World War Two. So from
the American point of view, you could see them being like, well, look, guys,

(44:31):
we've been paying so much for so long. Now our schools,
our social welfare sometimes has to take a hit so
we can defend the free world. In the American interpretation
of what they're doing. So New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Europe,
you guys now need to pay up. You finally have
to stop being free riders and pay up, and if
you do that then we will remain friends. So I

(44:53):
think that's the implicit or really the overt bargain here
and New Zealand. That that's why partly why I think
we will see an increase in our defense spending, because
the Americans, no doubt, behind the scenes, have been saying, hey,
come on, you guys, your little hobbits down there, you're
the ultimate free riders. Can you please pay up and
help contribute to the kind of defense of the coalition? Yeah,

(45:14):
but separate, separate to that. We shouldn't get too caught
up on that for our own sake, given we are
in a theater that is increasingly unpredictable, and where we
are seeing developments that are at odds with our interests.
We should be paying to bolster our defense forces for
our own sakes, for our children's sakes, so we don't
wake up ten years from now and we face a

(45:35):
military position in our own region and where we basically
de facto at the mercy of another power, and so
our children aren't saying, hey, what were you guys doing.
You had all the evidence, you could see the world
was rapidly changing, and it was to your detriment, and
you did nothing about it. So I think we kind
of have a responsibility for our own sakes to to
kind of pay up for the NZ defense force.

Speaker 4 (45:58):
And in terms of increased defense spending, we're not We're
not talking about, you know, having having jet fighters again
or anything like that, which would be hugely expensive and
complex to service. We're talking about things like drone capability. Right,
We've got the pights, which are excellent aircraft and provide

(46:19):
a lot of capability, are seen very favorably by allies
as well. It's it's upgrading the slightly decrepit infrastructure and
ships that we already have. We're not talking about a
massively expansionistic military. Here we're talking about actually fixing what
is broken with what we currently have.

Speaker 3 (46:38):
Yeah, I think you're right. It's it's restoring what has
been run down so much. It's so our ships actually
have soldiers on them so they can get out to
respond to cyclones and so on. But yeah, it will
be also investments into drones and increasingly autonomous systems. That
is the direction of travel, and New Zealand will have
to join that drones technology. You've probably seeing some of that.

(47:01):
If you or your listeners haven't, Peter, go check it out.
Go check out these incredible drone swarms we're seeing now.
Imagine thousands of those low cost drones swarming across parts
of the Pacific. They operate like almost schools of fish,
you know, kind of all moving together and able to
adjust and react to the environment collectively. That's the direction

(47:22):
of travel. Yes, we will have to replace our navy
because we are a big maritime power. We have a
giant exclusive economicsone. We have giant responsibilities for search and rescue,
a disaster response through a massive part of naval territory.
So we are going to have to have some of
that kind of our more traditional naval platforms, but we
also and as a small country, we should be trying

(47:45):
to emphasize and focus on those those emerging technologies that
are going to be critical in the coming years and
can off set some of our relative disadvantages like a
lack of lack of manpower and so on.

Speaker 4 (48:00):
Do you think an ask from the US might be
at some point we want to base in New Zealand
or can they sort of prevent those sort of flanking
maneuvers by the Chinese and patrol the Third Island chain
pretty much from Australia, which they do have a really
strong relationship with They have some military operations there. They
could do it from Australia.

Speaker 3 (48:22):
Yeah, the American position in Australia is broadening and deepening. Ye,
new bases are being established, Bombing aircraft can fly out
of there. Eventually we'll probably see missile defenses go on there. Yeah,
Australia is very much increasingly a hub for American military
activity and platforms as it pertains to us. So this

(48:42):
is where we get into the far reaches. If we
just don't know exactly what the long term American strategy is.
They already have bases in Hawaii, gram Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia.
Is their value in the American view of the emerging
strategic environment to have something in New Zealand potentially, Why

(49:03):
do I say that while this precedent During World War II?
Of course New Zealand and Australia we're both used for
replenishment or an r and to help the fight back
up towards the Japanese islands. So there is precedent for it.
It could also be and I'm just kind of just
kind of really just pushing the expanse of consideration as

(49:26):
far as I can here. Maybe they would think, Okay, yes, Australia,
it's very large, we can disperse forces, we can have supplies,
we can have AMMO dumps, oil gas, everything there to
go if we need it in a conflict. But what
if Australia is seriously threatened or something happens there that
really takes out our position and the Australian military position.

(49:51):
What might be good is another line of redundancy. And
where would that be, Well, New Zealand. Yeah, maybe you'd
have m O dumps here, supply depots, maybe you'd station
a few thousand American servicemen down here. I don't not,
but I wonder if the maximalist they think it could
be good to have a position down in New Zealand

(50:12):
as a final line backup.

Speaker 4 (50:16):
And finally, Ruben, sort of going back to the premise
off your calm in the post, which is really from
your point of view, Donald Trump is trying to wind
down things in Europe all the resource that's going in
there to address the real issue, which is in Eurasia,
which is containing China. Worst case scenario if it did

(50:37):
or kick off into South China Sea, if there is
an amphibious assault on Taiwan, what does it mean for us?

Speaker 5 (50:46):
What is your thoughts? What are your thoughts.

Speaker 4 (50:49):
About how we might be drawn into this? We've got
our p eights. Can you see them being called upon
by the Americans and the Australians to play aalen's role
in that war theater? But what other ways could we
potentially be expected to play a supporting role here?

Speaker 3 (51:10):
Yes, to your very first point, America doesn't want to
fight a multi front war. It doesn't want to be
fighting Russia at the same time it's fighting China at
the same time it's fighting Iraana. North Korea. So that's
my point why I think Trump is trying to de
escalate things in Eastern Europe and provide room to shift
more to the Pacific. To your second and more curly

(51:32):
difficult question, the whole range of scenarios, it depends upon
how it plays out. I mean, we can imagine China
blockading Taiwan, which might be the way they would start
the beginning of some kind of crisis or even a
military adventure so to speak. And in situations like that,
I mean, I just don't know if we'd had much
of a role to play. But if it was a

(51:54):
full scale attack invasion Taiwan, the South China seas is
somehow involved, you have the US allies or gearing up
to respond, the Americans are responding, and this response could
play out over days and weeks. I mean, the Pacific
is such a vast ocean, right, It's not going to
be this happens in Taiwana necessarily born it's full scale
World War three. But we can imagine over days and

(52:15):
weeks this thing kind of escalates and transports. Look, I
suspect the pights would be the first and maybe the
only real capability we have initially that would be involved
in some manner, and that would be in a surveillance capability.
It would also be in a It could be perhaps
to free up some Australian positions to allow them to
move north, but it could simply be New Zealand. We

(52:37):
need you to keep an eye on your own exclusive
economic zone because Chinese submarines could be in your waters.
We don't want them popping up far in the South
Pacific and they're then flanking our positions and so on,
so we need you to really be monitoring, have your
pates in the air, keeping an eye on what's happening.
As it relates to us being kinetically involved in the conflict,
well in theory, through our alliance with Australia, we are

(53:00):
obligated to the defense. So if the northern parts of
Australia were attacked or threatened, then there could reasonably be
a request from Canberra to Wellington saying hey, New Zealand,
we need your support. We need you to be sending ships.
We need to send vessels people to help base themselves
in the northern parts of Australia in case there is

(53:22):
war here or conflict here. If the South Pacific Islands
if they were involved, then there could be a similar thing. Okay,
our men and women will perhaps be headed towards the
South Pacific Islands to make sure our friends, our partners
are you know, we are essentially family with the Pacific Islands,
you might say, to help defend them or to ensure
their stability there. So there's just so many different scenarios

(53:44):
and ways that could play out, and I think we
owe it to ourselves in the coming years to be
thinking through some of these scenarios and publics and breaking
them down.

Speaker 4 (53:53):
Yeah, and there's a kinetic aspect of it in a
hot war nightmare scenario, but there's the economic warfare as well,
And probably the biggest impact for us initially if there
was conflict is we would be expected to put sanctions
on China. Potentially could have a devastating impact on our
economy literally overnight.

Speaker 3 (54:14):
Yep. And I think, look, I think those sanctions will
be in place without putting the sanctions on. I mean,
if there's a conflict or major crisis, a major crisis
around Taiwan, are we still going to be comfortable sending
our agricultural produce on ships through the South China? See
up to China. I'm not entirely sure. I mean maybe,
but there are a lot of scenarios where just all

(54:36):
trade to Northeast Asia basically shuts down overnight, and that
in itself is basically the same as sanctions. Right. One
final thing I'll say, just on the previous point, though,
is that it's space is also an arena we're going
to have to keep an eye on because of rocket
lad because of our increasing dependence on all things in space.
That is an area of increased attention, you might say.

(54:59):
And we have of strategic interests in space remaining stable
and those satellites not being interfered with or shot down
or what have you. And the real fear is that
in the beginning of a major conflict over Taiwan that
we could see basically a wall breakout in space as
well to shut down what he decides military space assets.

Speaker 4 (55:16):
And that's what Scott Morrison on his recent visit to
New Zealand suggested when it comes to what we could
potentially offer as part of a defense alliance like Orcus
Space or Space Technology and rocket labers at the heart
of it. Sure, they're now an American company working out
of Virginia, their launch site. They're very sensitive contracts with

(55:38):
the government. But we do have Dawn Aerospace for horizontal
takeoff and delivery off payloads. We've got Kia, We've got
other companies as well. So that's clearly not necessarily by design,
but just the fact that somehow our space industry took
off in New Zealand really around the work of Sir
Peter Beck. That's clearly something attractive the rest as well.

(56:00):
So and as you say that, we've got pockets of
expertise as well, so we do have potentially something to offer,
and particularly in that space realm yep, yep.

Speaker 3 (56:11):
And I'll just say one other thing. We may very
well have some considerable critical subsea minerals, you know, like
hence the Cook Islands, which are sitting on a basin
a massive amount of really critical minerals and which has
lead to the steal with China. We have a giant
exclusive economic zone. I've talked to some people and we
don't even know what really we're sitting on. So we

(56:32):
may very well be quite valuable, you could say, in
the future to certain countries who want access to those
subsea minerals for a range of batteries. Emerging technologies and
so on. So we need to start thinking a bit more,
a bit more seriously about how geostrategically significant we are
for a range of reasons.

Speaker 4 (56:52):
Well, it's a pretty complex landscape that you're navigating. The
book is fantastic. I think, you know, anyone who's interested
in the strategic direction of New Zealand from both a
business and a military and geopolitical point of view should
read it. So we'll put a link to that in
the show notes. Thanks so much for coming on. We're
going to keep up the great work. It's so good

(57:13):
having people like yourself giving this sort of commentary which
we sorely need. We need informed debate if we're going
to make some big decisions in this area in the
coming months and years.

Speaker 3 (57:22):
Awesome, Thank you, Peter. It be great to check.

Speaker 4 (57:32):
So Ben, what's your take on all of that? Where
do you stand on us joining Orcus?

Speaker 1 (57:38):
You know, I think six months ago I probably would
have been I probably would have been more keen on
the situation. You know, the stuff that Rubin was saying
about kind of access to these technologies and being able
to share in the developments, and that's all really good.

(58:00):
But I don't know if at the moment we want
another another chain attaching us to the US's global position.
I think that there's some It would concern me if
they were to say, well, you know, we've given you X,
Y and Z, so now we expect you to withdraw

(58:21):
aid from the Ukraine or some other kind of situation
like that. You know, I understand there's some separation, but
I think that when it comes down to it, any
lever that can be pulled by the Trump administration potentially.

Speaker 5 (58:38):
Will be.

Speaker 1 (58:40):
So, yeah, maybe it's a great idea to join UCAS
in four years.

Speaker 4 (58:46):
Well look, you know, ultimately I don't think we have
a choice on this. The way I see it and
the way that Reuben sort of lays us out in
the book, I've come away even more convinced that, unfortunately
that of forty or fifty year period we had really
the golden weather after World War Two, where New Zealand

(59:07):
was pretty much independent. Sure we were allied with the
US and Australian particular, but particularly after the anti nuclear
free movement of the nineteen eighties, we sort of went
out on the world stage. We used soft power as
a leaver. People listened to us that era is sort

(59:27):
of over now, and particularly when it comes to the US,
they ain't going to listen to us on anything. What
they do is expect us to play our part in
defending our realm. And as Reuben pointed out, you know,
the Third Island chain, which we are part of, is
increasingly being targeted by China basically as a flanking maneuver.

(59:47):
It's very crowded, it's very dangerous, and it's very touchy
in the other island chains, but down here it's sort
of isolated and open, which is why they popped up
in the TASM. See didn't tell anyone and no one
saw them coming. So yeah, I think we're basically being
sort of led into this sort of arrangement where we

(01:00:08):
need to double down on our defense, pick up by spending,
and do what we can to be interoperable with particularly
with the Australians, but with the Americans as well. So unfortunately,
I don't think we have much of a choice. The
alternative I don't think is realistic maintaining independence or doing
something with China that's just unthinkable. We would lose, we'd

(01:00:32):
be cut off straight away if we did that.

Speaker 1 (01:00:35):
Yeah, yeah, I totally agree. But you know, I just
wonder if we need to sign a contract, you know,
or like if we need to like you know, put
on wave the flag and go out there. You know,
I think there is that sense of independence is really

(01:00:57):
such a powerful thing for New Zealand's kind of defense
because it does put us in a position where, look,
we you know, we have these ties with Australia, and
you know, we're strongly allied, we're part of the Commonwealth,
and so we have all of those things around us,
but we are also at the edge of the world.

(01:01:19):
We're not really going to make a particularly good base
because of distance. It's really the only reason to come
after us would be some kind of flex which is possible,
you know. I mean, yes, Taiwan, I think there is
something there where if there was that issue, we would
have to play a part. So there is some ramping
up to do. But just to kind of sign a

(01:01:41):
thing saying please daddy us, can you feed us your
your technology and we will do whatever it takes, it
just feels I don't know, it just doesn't feel New
Zealand to me. Maybe I'm being a little bit naive
and happy to have to say that I'm not exactly

(01:02:02):
the most hawkish of people.

Speaker 4 (01:02:03):
So and look, I think you know, generation of Kiwis
have grown up in that safe environment and are really
proud of the role that New Zealand has played on
the world stage, dialing back tensions where possible, not focusing
on defense as a large partiph are spending as a nation.

(01:02:26):
I think a lot of people are really supportive of that.
But boy, the world is changing in a big way.
And sure, you know, we're never probably going to be
a big target of China, but you know we are
not going to stop them through soft power trying to
find a base in the lower South Pacific and cozy
up to our neighbors to shore up that third island

(01:02:48):
chain and try and dominate it.

Speaker 1 (01:02:50):
You know, we're not going to stop them full stop, Peter.
We New Zealand isn't going to have that kind of capability. Ever,
there's five million of us.

Speaker 3 (01:03:00):
No.

Speaker 4 (01:03:01):
But if we through you know, using these technologies as
part of ORCUS, if we are right on top of
our part of the world, surveiling it, including our Pacific
island neighbors, I think it's going to make it that
much harder for the Chinese to comfortably move about in
our part of the world. And that's what I think
the Americans expect. I don't really see it, you know,

(01:03:23):
them moving into New Zealand having a base here. They've
got Australia, They've got the nuclear submarine deal happening, and boy,
that's going to be really interesting when those nuclear powered
submarines start roaming around the Tasman. Are we going to
even allow them into our waters? That's going to be
the crunch time. That's actually more important, I think than

(01:03:43):
the Aucust Pillar two stuff, is how are we going
to embrace or not these nuclear subs if and when
they start roaming around our neighborhood.

Speaker 1 (01:03:53):
And if we sign up for August Pillar two, it's
going to make it much harder for us to say no.
And really this is such an echo of that of
that David Longey situation, isn't it. Really? You know that
we're looking at it and it is going to depend
a lot on who is in that seat, whether or
not they capitulate or whether they stand firm, and how

(01:04:14):
the people of New Zealand feel about it. You know,
what if something massive happens in our neck of the woods,
like you know, perhaps the China, Taiwan, or China starts
doing some silly things around the coast of Australia that
might change the public attitude and might make us a
little bit more comfortable allowing these nuclear subs into our

(01:04:36):
waters maybe or at least make it so that the Parliament,
you know, the government is fearful enough that they do
say yes in that situation, and maybe then aucus is
the right place for us to be.

Speaker 5 (01:04:51):
Yeah, we might not have the option.

Speaker 4 (01:04:53):
Then they might go, well, no, you had your three
months membership opportunity to sign up and too it down.

Speaker 1 (01:05:00):
See you that's true. I mean I don't know, I
can't I can't see Australia doing that to us.

Speaker 4 (01:05:06):
But you know, yeah, well it's you know, I think
the next four years we're going to see a lot
of things that we've never seen before in this part
of the world. And with this administration in the White House,
everything that was on the table is up for grabs.
So you know, who knows how long ORCUST will last

(01:05:29):
in its current format. I know, you know, Reuben said
five eyes are solid. He's not going to abandon that.
But you know, look at the relationship with NATO. You know,
one of the strongest military alliances since World War Two,
you know, anything as possible.

Speaker 1 (01:05:45):
I think the most ironic thing, truly for me, is
this return to imperialism that has taken hold of the world,
where you know, we kind of had these imperialistic rhetoric
kind of China with Tibetan, with Taiwan and Hong Kong,

(01:06:08):
and it was kind of gray in many areas because
they were you know, that the force they were using
wasn't devastating, it wasn't a full on invasion, and there
were contracts and all kinds of strange things. Russia really
changed a lot with the invasion of the Ukraine. It
is a clear imperialist move and the true foundational shaking

(01:06:33):
is what is happening with the Donald Trump administration. He
is an imperialist. The words that he is saying are
echoing the worst atrocities of the nineteenth century in the
twentieth century, and I think that any kind of rhetoric
around trying to play that down is wrongheaded and that

(01:06:58):
I mean, I'm talking outside my realm of technology, but
I think it is relevant because when you have a
country that is so that has become a center of
technology for the world, and then it starts flaunting that
technological power in an aggressive way. Then you start to

(01:07:21):
end up with a truly horrible time, especially considering the
technologies that we do have available to us now. So
my sincere hope is that if Europe can, you know,
outstrong men the spear shaking that's happening coming out of

(01:07:42):
North America or the US specifically obviously, and if Canada
can kind of help as well to somehow convince that
administration to just calm down and remember that we are
not in the twentieth early time, twentieth century anymore.

Speaker 5 (01:08:01):
Yeah.

Speaker 4 (01:08:02):
Well, you know, this week, the share market is tanking
on the back of the the tariffs with Canada and
China and others.

Speaker 5 (01:08:10):
And I think, if anything, that's.

Speaker 4 (01:08:12):
What will give Trump pause for thought about treating his
allies as something he can extract value from rather than
a true partnership. Is it's going to blow back on
the American people and it's going to cost them more.
Inflation is going to go up. He's obsessed with the markets,
and once he sees them start to tank, I think

(01:08:35):
maybe that's when he'll take his foot off the gas.

Speaker 1 (01:08:38):
I'm hoping anyway, maybe maybe but I mean the the
sh tanking share market going to impact the billion our
friends that he's made that are funding his lifestyle.

Speaker 5 (01:08:49):
Yeah, good point.

Speaker 4 (01:08:51):
So thanks so much to doctor Rubin staff for coming
on really interesting insights here and we'll link to where
you can find his book.

Speaker 5 (01:09:00):
Some of the recent.

Speaker 4 (01:09:00):
Articles he's written on the rapidly evolving geopolitical situation in
the Pacific.

Speaker 1 (01:09:05):
Show notes and this week's reading list are in the
podcast section at Businessdesk dot co, dot z.

Speaker 4 (01:09:10):
Where you can stream the podcast on iHeartRadio. It's also
available on your podcast platform of choice.

Speaker 1 (01:09:16):
Get in touch with your feedback and topic suggestions were
on LinkedIn and Blue Sky.

Speaker 4 (01:09:21):
And catch up with the podcast next Thursday for another
dose of the business of tech.

Speaker 1 (01:09:26):
In the meantime, do try and have a good week.