December 23, 2025 • 61 mins
Leighton is on summer break, so we are highlighting some of his favourite guests from 2025.
Romanians are still navigating the difficult path of building democratic institutions and a culture of transparency.
At the same time, widespread perceptions of corruption and cronyism have caused many Romanians to see little change from communist leadership.
Antonia Colibasanu, a lecturer on International Relations at the Romanian National University, backgrounds Romania’s position and future influence in Europe and analyses the difficulties the country is faced with.
She also summarises the country’s relationship between Russia, Ukraine, Poland and the rest of Europe.
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Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:09):
You're listening to a podcast from news talks it B.
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It's time for all the attitude, all the opinion, all
the information, all the debates of the now, the Leyton
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Speaker 2 (00:28):
Now Welcome to the best of the Layton Smith Podcast
for twenty twenty five, where we replay some of the
interesting conversations that we've had during the course of the year,
and maybe sometimes outside of that restrictive boundary. Romanians are
still navigating the difficult path of building democratic institutions and
(00:50):
a culture of transparency now. At the same time, widespread
perceptions of corruption and cronyism have caused many Romanians to
see little change from communist leadership. Atonia Kalabanasu is a
lecturer on international relations at the Romanian National University. We
talk about Romania's position and future influence in Europe and
(01:12):
analyze the difficulties the country is faced with. She also
summarizes the country's relationship between Russia, Ukraine, Poland and the
rest of Europe. It all continues to be of major
interest to much of the rest of the world. Now,
one thing that interested me was the discussion that we
had at various points in the conversation with regard to
(01:35):
well Romania as a travel destination, and it certainly wet
my appetite. So it's a bit travelogueish as well. Now
at the end, I'll recommend a book to you in
case you want a follow up and read a little
more on what you've heard. Tonio Colabasanu is a Senior
(02:10):
Fellow for the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
She is also Associate Professor of geopolitics and geoeconomics on
international Relations at the Romanian National University of Political Studies
and Public Administration. Now, there is a very long list
of qualifications that she has, but probably the most important
(02:33):
one I've left to the last. She is embedded with
George Friedman and geopolitical futures. Before that, as I just
discovered a while back, she worked in association was George
at his previous operation which was which.
Speaker 3 (02:53):
Was stratfor And yes, I've worked for way too long
in essence with George, but I'm glad to do so.
He marked my career well.
Speaker 2 (03:06):
I could only say that you must have a lot
of patience, so I Welcome to the vodcast anyway, strange
way of getting here, but here we are. Look, I
want to start with something that I know will find
favor with those listening, and that is the blackout that
(03:27):
the Spanish experienced just a few weeks ago April twenty eight. Actually,
millions across Spain, Portugal and pats of France were plunged
into darkness after a massive unexpected power outage. Metro systems
stalled airport's ground to halt, hospitals switched frantically to backup generators,
and critical communication networks collapsed temporarily. Now, of course we
(03:51):
covered this in New Zealand, like everybody did around the world.
But the article that you wrote, the first line of
it is the incident proves that true energy independence is
a myth. Would you like to expand on that?
Speaker 3 (04:06):
Of course, Well, basically you have no energy independence, and
that's because networks are interconnected. But beyond that, this push
towards the green energy needed to replace fossil energy sources
has creative vulnerabilities that are not necessarily understood and therefore
(04:33):
they cannot be fully managed. And that's probably the hardest
lesson that Spain and Portugal learned throughout the blackout. The
problem was that once you have mostly electricity coming from
green energy from solar and wind, you do not necessarily
(04:55):
have the backout the flow. You do not have an
ensured flow of energy and an ensured constancy of energy
that the other fossil fuel US natural gas, which is
not necessarily a fossil fuel, and everything else is giving.
(05:16):
So what happened there is because of changes in temperature,
everything collapsed and then they didn't know how to put
it all back. So that lesson is likely going to
get into another lesson for Europe and the European Union
in particular, where we have this push towards green We
(05:39):
have this idea that we need to manage climate change
and whatnot, but at the same time we tend to
forget that all changes drive vulnerable elements. And therefore, while
we're doing this for one reason or another, we need
to be cautious about what could go wrong. And I
(06:02):
don't think we have had that on our mind. And
I believe that right now the policy discourse, at least
time this green energy push is going to be modified
because obviously, I mean, if nothing else, the blackout push
towards Okay, we also need reliable fossil fuels to maintain
(06:25):
constancy in our networks, and green energy cannot ensure independence
because everything is linked together. And guess what, we also
have vulnerable parts that are linked together because this started
in France but did not finish influence. So all that
points out that we're in a new thinking mode, at
(06:49):
least for green energy and everything that relates to it.
Speaker 2 (06:55):
So when somebody writes to me after hearing this and
says to me, what would she know. She's an economist,
she's not a scientist, So why does she have the
right to say it's a myth?
Speaker 3 (07:10):
Well, bottom line, I've read a lot because I had to.
So in geopolitics, what we do is looking at those
vulnerable sectors that are driving instability, which means that you
are looking at elements that would cause unstable economics and
(07:32):
therefore unstable politics. So energy is the one factor that
cuts into both worlds, because without energy, you cannot really
sustain economic production and you cannot sustain social stability because
if you do not have economic production, you will have
(07:55):
likely protests and unemployment that drive from economic production and
therefore political instability. Let alone, I mean these these writings,
and you know, these readings that I've done during the
years starting with Stratford were also related to Russia and
(08:22):
Russia's strategy towards Europe and European Union, in particular because
Russia basically supported its strategy of resurrecting as a global
power through energy raw materials that it is selling all
over the globe and in particular for Europe oil and gas.
(08:47):
So I had to basically read a lot about what
energy means and what this i'd say idea of getting
less and less dependent on imports of oil and gas
through green energy means for the europe Union for a while.
(09:09):
I'll also I also served as an honorary advisory in
my capacity of TEO political analysts for a Romanian energy minister,
just because I knew how Russia is playing with all
sorts of things, including globbing from green for green energy
and Brussels at the time, because it had an interest
(09:33):
to maintain itself the only and sole provider of oil
and gas and cut down while the Europeans would cut
down all fossil fuel production and got into the green
energy side. That was profitable for Russia because it knew
that Europe needs fossil fuels to maintain this constancy, and
(09:57):
therefore it needed to have imports from Russia, while not
producing themselves would lower the European Union capacity of truly
lowering dependency. Again, independency is a myth, but lowering dependency
was not and is not. So it's basically from the
(10:20):
study of the balance of powers, if you will, through
energy that I've learned all things about engineering processes that
refer to the way green energy is being produced, how
solar and wind are not necessarily reliable because they depend
on whether changes, and they're very much volatile in some
(10:42):
parts more than others in Europe, and other things related
to how do you sustain production, how do you sustain
the push for policy making, and all that sort of
thing which is more political the later part in politicking
(11:05):
in Brussels that referred to the balance of power per se,
and not even discussing the economics repercussions.
Speaker 2 (11:16):
Okay, I asked that question because I knew the answer,
but I asked it for a specific reason. I wanted
to hear you say it. But in this part of
the world, Australia has just had an election, as you'd know,
and they've voted in a bunch of insane people, and
I mean that in a few cases, and as a
(11:38):
result of that, net zero is full on. Now, net
zero is impossible. I know this from all the reading
that I've done, but specifically from one expat Kiwi, New Zealander,
who was a very highly ranked professor in engineering in
the UK at Cambridge, and I've interviewed him on Northern
(12:01):
one occasion and he has explained it. Now. The reason
I'm telling you this is because he visits back here
every couple of years, and I know there have been
efforts to get him to talk with them, with the politicians,
those who are making the decisions and others, and I'm
about the only one who would interview him. They didn't
(12:22):
want to know. Albeit that, as I said, he's an
expant New Zealander still a whole citizenship, that he is
highly that he is highly educated, and he knows exactly
what he's talking about and he explains it perfectly. And
net zero is a myth. I tell you that for
interest sake. I just wonder whether you had the same
or a similar approach. You took a similar line toward
(12:46):
COVID at its effect.
Speaker 3 (12:48):
Well, basically covered as has been a virus that well,
everyone needed to stay away from. But at the same
time there is a balance, and we need to think
about the effects that staying away and staying fully protected
(13:08):
from the virus, which is rather impossible, I might say,
because it's a virus. You couldnot be fully protected from
a virus unless you're very, very lucky or live on
a cliff somewhere, and even then who knows. I mean.
But besides that, getting into full protection chair basically gets
(13:30):
to have social effects because obviously there is the science
that says this could be deadly and this is how
you should protect and this is whatever, you know, the
list of things that you need to do. But from
science to imposing things that you need to do you
(13:53):
must do, then we are basically having the science taking
over institutions and institutions that relate to rights, to fundamental
rights that human beings should have in a working democracy,
for instance, which is what we strive for and what
(14:16):
we hope to maintain. Now, that caused a lot of
side effects. Basically we have the economic side effects. We
had the economic repercussions which are very well known and yes,
to a certain extent, it was probably good that we
had higher level of protection, higher level of reassuring ourselves
(14:41):
that we are doing the right thing, that we have
the right medicines, and therefore, in order to get the
right medicines, we need to slow down our economic captivity
and whatever. But getting ourselves into a situation where we
basically did not function as a society was detrimental, first
(15:05):
for the economics and later for the sociopolitics. I mean,
we wonder now in Europe at least, there's this discussion
about disinformation and how disinformation basically started during the pandemic. Now,
all fears came alive during the pandemic, and when fears
(15:27):
come alive, you basically have waves of narratives that refer
to those fears. And obviously, because we also live in
a world where they have Internet, where we have all
sorts of communication channels, and where we have states interested
(15:48):
in supporting their own agendas, so yes, states will take
those fears and will transform them into sort of propaganda narratives.
But the cause, the root cause of that was basically
the way we managed COVID. The fact that we made
off that virus was a very dangerous verse and all that,
(16:11):
But the fact that we made of it a source
of all fears and we kept it going for years.
Speaker 2 (16:18):
How how suppressed was society in Romania during that period
and for how long.
Speaker 3 (16:29):
I would think, I mean, compared to others in obvious China.
Obviously China is the you know, the most the most
obvious example of suppressed society. But in Romania, I don't
think we had a level of suppression that went really
(16:50):
really high. There was the during the first two years,
there were the interdictions of you know, traveling from one
place to another, maintaining social distance, making sure that people
of elderly age stay in for the rush hours and whatnot.
(17:14):
So it was a mild kind of suppression. But at
the same time, Romania was on the borderland. And when
I say this, I say it is a democracy that
is still building itself, that still remembers the suppression that
(17:35):
was in a sense much higher than the suppression in
the Eastern Bloc. So bottom line, it was a fertile
land for everything, including this information campaign, including all sorts
of social engineering, if you will. So even if we
(17:59):
had a mild suppression code and code, and we had
this idea that mainly in the main cities, you are
very much surveilled in what you're doing and you should
not do this and this and that. Then in the
rural side, in the non urban side, it was a
(18:20):
totally different way of living. And this clash between the
urban and the non urban. Uh. The idea that some
could still impose on the people's will while we are
still building our democrats, democratic rights and all that and
(18:40):
democratic institutions has created an environment that we have to
deal with even today.
Speaker 2 (18:49):
Were you aware of how difficult life got in this
in this country? In New Zealand.
Speaker 3 (18:56):
To tell you this, there is no.
Speaker 2 (18:58):
No We experienced totalitarianism and it's not an exaggeration. It
mightn't have been the worst kind of totalitarianism, but it
was a good step into it, and no one will
deny that. Now. Same with Australia and the state of Victoria.
There was a race between the government in Victoria and
(19:18):
the government New Zealand to see who could be the biggest,
the biggest tyrant. But it's for another day. That would
make an interesting detail. In fact, I might even send
you something to show you what it was like. But
it was it's recognized as being as bad as I've
got anywhere in the world. Amazingly. I hope I just
(19:41):
live in hope that the population of New Zealand has
learned a lesson from it. Now, if we turn our
attention to the election that you've just had, we don't
have to spend too long on it. But it was
a mess, was it not.
Speaker 3 (19:59):
I'd say it was one of the most interesting cases
in recent elections because in a way we had all
the problems the pandemic forward basically between the urban and
the non urban. It was a case of international interference.
(20:23):
And I am not saying only Russian because it's an
only Russian interference. Again, all major powers are taking their
share when they see a fertial ground to promote and
influence the public, and that was the case in our
election season. And it was also a pointing case on
(20:46):
how institutions are failing to provide trust to the basic
trust for the population, because the result actually pointed out
that there was the population basically challenging the mainstream, but
at the same time challenging the whole system, saying that
(21:10):
we no longer trust the system that was built starting
nineteen nineties and we want something different. We don't really
care how that different looks like and while we are
still very much trustful into the Western world which means NATO,
(21:34):
US EU, we want to challenge how things are done internally,
and that I believe is actually one major result of
the last five plus years in Romania, with the pandemic included.
(21:54):
I mean, that's that's how I read it right now,
and I believe that in the next two years, if
nothing will be done with reference to restructure, showing change
and so on that the population has voted for, then
(22:17):
we might have a case where the so called sovereignist
populist parties are getting full control in parliament. Because we
have parliamentarian elections in almost three years coming up, so
we're getting into the campaign.
Speaker 2 (22:35):
Give me a short profile of Nikosa dam who is
the new president.
Speaker 3 (22:41):
So the new president is an independent, it's coming from
the independent branch of politics and so called pro European
populist branch, and many here would challenge me by saying populist,
but bottom line, it is the Union for Saving Roumania,
(23:05):
which is his brainchild, that has been the first serious
populist party in Romania and has campaigned against the mainstream
parties here, basically saying that the system is not working,
the system is corrupt. We need to have something different,
(23:26):
without necessarily naming what that's something different would look like.
So he was not a member and did not stay
on as a member of the party, and he basically
went into the election season as an independent because his
(23:49):
former party had its own candidate, and therefore got in
and got elected on this populist platform of I as
a person as an independent, want to really support the change,
want to really come forward with the change, and I
(24:13):
am a pro European. This was his main feature.
Speaker 2 (24:18):
If you will, sorry, you sign your pro European or he.
Speaker 3 (24:23):
Was, he was pro European, So he is pro European.
That's that's his main campaign promise, which means basically, I
am a supporter of the EU. I have been educated
in the EU style. I have been educated in France.
(24:47):
So he's a former not national international Olympic in mathematics.
I studied in Paris for his PhD. So his profile
is that of an intellectual that is coming from the
European class of intellectuals, but at the same time is
(25:10):
challenging how things are being done in Romanian politics and
has been doing that for the last ten plus years
as a former mayor of Bucharest now and as the
founder of this pro European populist party that I've talked about.
Speaker 2 (25:32):
So back on May eleven, you published fault Lines in
the East, Romania's political transformation, in Europe's Future and Analysis.
Here's a quote from it. The outcome will influence not
only Romania's governance and regional stability, but also the EU's
Eastern cohesion, particularly in Moldova and Poland, as nationalist populist
(25:56):
rhetoric gains traction across Europe during a period of geopolitical
uncertainty and democratic fragility. That sounds very insecure.
Speaker 3 (26:07):
Well, it is in secure, not only because this is
fertile ground for this information and whatnot, but this is
also fertile ground for political instability. The economics are not
very stable, obviously, and this is partly an effect of
(26:28):
the pandemic, but also partly an aspect of the fact
that these countries have been the most emerging economies of Europe.
So in a sense they needed the stability of Western
Europe to thrive, but did not have that during the
last ten years. So there was this idea of what
(26:51):
do we do next? Considering all these trade wars, all
these elements of instability that are threatening the life of
what we observe to be our foundation of growth and
even our model development, which is the West in its entirety.
(27:12):
And at the same time we are on the borderline,
and therefore from the Baltic Sea to Romania you have
societies that are coming to accept their role on the borderline,
which also means military engagement or potential military engagement with Russia.
(27:37):
That's the common threat. And at the same time they
do not necessarily have an anchor anymore. And I'm not
only referring to the US as an anchor, but I'm
also referring to the European Union as an anchor in
their case, where they're observing the EU having to deal
(28:00):
with its own problems, with the Eurozone in particular, having
to deal with its own problems, and states that our
member states of the EU no longer longer being, at
least in their declarations, not even being united, not exerting
(28:23):
themselves as a united front anymore, but getting more nationalistic,
getting more focused on their own internal problems, which is natural.
But this gets to be discussed in the Eastern European
countries as so what do we do next. We fear Russia.
(28:45):
We do not know exactly what future lies for us
in the European Union, and therefore there is some hope
that the European Union could act somehow, but at the
same time we don't know if that's the possibility. So
(29:05):
that's where the insecurity comes from. And we've seen this
during the last elections in Poland, where the conservative candidate
won basically saying well, we need a balance. The population
send the message of we need a balance. We need
(29:26):
to make sure that we sustain our traditions, that we
keep our boundaries with regards to everything that the EU
pushes us to do. And in a sense, because we
are also talking about internal politics in the case of Poland,
(29:46):
keep a balance between the pro German, pro European camp,
which is led by the current Prime Minister and his party,
and a balance to the pro American camp, which is
led by Navrowski, the current president. Now there is also
an issue of Trumpism, and I don't I don't know
(30:09):
if we want to get into this because obviously the
American influence here is also getting in through the new
kind of politics and the new kind of campaigning that
the US has been dealing with, and Trump has been
pushing as a new style of politics, as a new
(30:30):
style of diplomacy, and this all is kind of influencing
the debate.
Speaker 2 (30:37):
So the battle for Poland is not over.
Speaker 3 (30:41):
I don't think so. I believe that Poland is still
trying to discover itself. There are many that are making
analogies to the past and are pointing out the historical
cycles for Poland, and some are even pointing to the
(31:06):
way Poland looked like in the thirties, which is, you know,
the same is said about Romania. However, I don't think, well,
history repeats itself, obviously, but the shape of that repetition
is different. So I believe that right now we're living
(31:27):
in a more complex world and the battle, the so
called battle between East and West, is also a battle
about what kind of Poland does the population really want
to have? What?
Speaker 2 (31:46):
And if i'm if I might, how do you how
do you pronounce his name? No, Rocky Navarovsky, Noosky.
Speaker 3 (31:55):
Yea Navarrovsky, It's I don't know. The W comes as
a V. From what I've learned from the Polish to V.
Speaker 2 (32:11):
Since is what win? And I'm quoting not from you,
but from Michael Cram's if that means anything. Commentators of
all stripes have been eager to pigeonhole the election as
a win for Russia or as the nail in the
coffin of Poland's warm relationship with Ukraine. In truth, it's
none of those things. Politics here, certain is never so simple.
(32:32):
The raise a thin margin of Sunday's election, and indeed
the divided, hamstrung government that has existed here for the
last thirteen months is emblematic of a deeper fight about
the nature of Polish identity in the twenty first century.
And there's a quote, if I might, because I like it,
from somebody who back in the twenties made the comment
(32:54):
that most beloved state of the Polish people is in decision,
which seems to fit what you were saying.
Speaker 3 (33:00):
M Yeah, indeed, and I think the question mark is
not about has went, but about the extreme right, and
I really mean the extreme right Confederatia in Poland and
how that goes, because right now the Conservative Party has
(33:23):
won this vote, but it is the first time that
the Conservatives and Nabrovski has done an understanding on some
of the major points regarding what needs to be kept
for the constitutional justice institutions and the courts basically in Poland,
(33:46):
and some constitutional rights and you know, the abortion and
all that stuff. But those are bullet points coming from
the so called Tarun Declaration that he signed together with
the candidate of Confderderatia, and Confederatia is the very extreme
(34:07):
right party which has indeed the flavor of the very nationalistic,
sometimes very pro Russian in declaration. And one thing, and
this is an important footnote that I'd like to to
insert here. In Poland and in Romania both and in
(34:32):
Eastern European states, there are no such thing of pro
Russian candidates because the population is anti Russian, so you
cannot be a full pro Russian candidate. The narratives that
you take may be influenced by Russia, and the politicians
(34:54):
are sometimes very much tied to Russia through previous engagements
because these have been former satellites and therefore they still
have ways to get to the politicians, influence them through
money or through other engagements. So they don't look straightforward
(35:17):
to the so called pro Russian electorate. Because there is
no such thing, no one would be elected here if
they say openly I'm pro Russian, but they would be
elected if they would go with anti Ukrainian narratives or
anti European Union narratives or anti American narratives at times,
(35:38):
or anti NATO narratives, which is more complex in a way,
but better for Russia to get their individuals. They are
political players in So that's that's one important footnote. And
for Confederatia to get back to the Polish election, this
(35:59):
is exactly it. I mean, the question is how will
the Conservatives, which are traditionally a pro American party in
Poland and are not necessarily against EU, but they want
a more, let's say, a better voice for Poland within
the EU. How will they manage a partnership that they've
(36:23):
enforced by signing the Starun Declaration with a very extreme
right party which is against the EU and has narratives
that go against the American interest as well. So that's
that's the question for the coming years.
Speaker 2 (36:39):
I think you mentioned a month ago you mentioned foreign policy.
What is the what is the influence of Romanian foreign
policy in Europe?
Speaker 3 (36:50):
Well, that's a very good question. Romania has managed to
get countries like France and Germany to acknowledge the Black
Sea as an important geopolitical note, but only Recentlyanian foreign
policy has been in a sense adaptive to the larger players.
(37:16):
It has worked together with Poland to acknowledge the Eastern
European risks for the European Union, and it has worked
together with Poland even in NATO as the strategic partners
that want to get the US closer to the eastern border,
(37:38):
but has not been very vocal. Romania has started to
be vocal only recently, and by recently I mean during
the last one year, one year and a half, very
recent also because it was fearful of Russia, and Romania
I think is likely the most fearful country of Russia,
(38:03):
considering Russia is on its border and it sees Russia
has still a mighty threat to its security, and considering this,
the foreign policy push was mainly to get allies from
the European Union, from NATO, to get the US together
(38:27):
with others to push forward elements that would secure its borders,
but never alone. So Romania has not ever been like Poland,
for instance, I want this and I will fight for
it with regards to its foreign policy, because it thought
(38:48):
always that that kind of attitude would have attached to
it a risk that it cannot bear, it cannot solve.
That's a more let's say shy adaptive and a posture
that is likely due to the geographical position I mean
(39:08):
regards multiple fronts. It is the Black Sea is the
most important in terms of Russian threat, but at the
same time the Western Balkans, and it sees that region
only as a challenging region and something that you need
to be aware of. And that's why the adaptive stands.
Speaker 2 (39:32):
Okay, now the importance of the Black Sea, which country
would you say has the I mean, nobody owns it,
but which country has the right to the greater claim?
Do you think?
Speaker 4 (39:44):
Well?
Speaker 3 (39:45):
I would say that in history we had the greater
claims coming from Russia or Turkey through you know, Ottoman
Empire or the Russian taurist To empires and so on.
Right now we have the risk of the country of
(40:05):
the Sea becoming split, I think that's the best word
to use, split between Russia and Turkey in terms of
economic zones, but also in terms of influence and the
push of Romania is basically to maintain Turkey and Bulgaria,
(40:28):
but especially Turkey involved in the security of the Black Sea,
to make certain that there is always a counterbalance to
the Russian influence and that Turkey and Russia did not
get to an understanding of sorts, which is not impossible
(40:51):
historically speaking. Now also with regards to the Black Sea,
to make things more complicated. When Crimea became independent, we
in Romania were very much happy, even if there were
conflicts around islands and whatnot, but we were very much
happy because Russia's posture was pushed away. So in a
(41:16):
sense there was this new state that was taking a
chunk of the Russian of the former USSR, part of
the Black Sea, because the Black Sea is a closed
sea and therefore without having international waters, you always have
to deal with neighbors, which is why for Romania wasn't happy.
(41:38):
The moment that Ukraine took part of the USSR, the
former USSR part, that was a happy time considering we
were no longer bordering the USSR, but we were bordering
Ukraine now. With Crimea being taken over Sins twenty fourteen,
Romania got to be on the border with Russia again,
(42:00):
which is you know, the main question mark is whether
Russia will come closer, and one could Russia do from
the facto position that it holds now that Crimea is
basically covering a big part of more than half of
(42:22):
what Ukraine held previously. So that's where we stand right now,
and that's why Romania is also very much supportive of
Ukraine getting back its share of the Black Sea, because
that basically means that we are going to be bordering
Ukraine again and not Russia.
Speaker 2 (42:43):
So let's target something very local as far as the
area is concerned, the Russians. The Russians took a place
called Snake Island back in February of twenty two. When
they do I think it was on the first day
that they went berserk, but more recently it has fallen
(43:03):
back into Ukraine's hands. Is that significant by talking about
a forty six acre rocky outcrop here, does that have
any significance? Do you think?
Speaker 4 (43:15):
Well?
Speaker 3 (43:16):
But certainly for the region and certainly for Romania that
that is important because the Snake Island basically makes it
taking Russia. Taking the Snake Island basically made impossible for
Ukraine to continue trading through the Black Sea. So if
(43:37):
you're looking at the map, the Snake Island is very
very close to Romani, I'm shure, and it basically if
you cross from the Snake Island to Crimea, if you
just draw a line on the map, you're basically having
the coast of Ukraine completely off the charts of the
(44:01):
Black Sea, and that territory being taken meant that you
basically have no way you as Ukraine, have no way
to protect your coastline. That's why Ukraine mined the sea
and that's why we have both Ukraine Hints and Russians
(44:26):
dealing with mining operations during those days, because the worst
fear for Ukraine was that the Russians would get on
the shore and by taking the coastline would basically take
the economic lifeline of Ukraine, considering trade was being done
mostly through the Black Sea, and by keeping the Snake
(44:48):
Island would have meant that Romania had problems helping Ukraine
with trade or anything, because that would would have meant
that Russia is really close to the so called Danube Mouth,
which is the way out for most of Ukrainian trade today.
(45:13):
So in other words, that that was a blocking posture,
and that was strategically a way for Russia to make
sure that by blocking economic operations of Ukraine will it
would eventually take over Kiev, even if militarily that would
(45:37):
have been impossible. In a sense, the economic lifeline being
cut would have meant that Kiev could eventually fall off.
Now taking over the Snake Island basically reversed that stance.
So that's why it was very important that Ukraine managed
to take back the Snake Island several months after.
Speaker 2 (46:00):
Does that mean it'll become a target for Putin again.
Speaker 3 (46:04):
I don't think so, and it is not at the
island that is now determined target. And the reason is
because there there is no naval posture anymore in the
Black Sea by the Russians, so the Ukrainians managed to
cut that to almost zero. And at this point I
(46:31):
think Puddin is looking to the ports of Odessa and
to generally to the Ukrainian coastline through land operations and
no longer through sea operations because it has no Russia
has no capabilities to employ to take back the Snake Island,
(46:51):
so what it wants is to basically take the coast,
take the south western coast of Ukraine. And managed to
come back to a posture where it can effectively control
all the trade route in the Black Sea that Ukraine has.
Speaker 2 (47:12):
Before we leave the Black Sea, I have a question
for you. You have been to Odessa.
Speaker 3 (47:18):
I have, but not during wartime.
Speaker 2 (47:20):
No, no, no, no no. I tell you why I asked.
There was a book that came out on Odessa in
twenty eleven, written by a fellow called Charles King, and
on my radio program I made mention to it quite
a bit at the time because I was fascinated by
Odessa and I wanted to get there at some stage
(47:41):
and get to know it. So in twenty fifteen, which
is ten years ago, we were on a cruise. A
whole bunch of us from New Zealand were on a
cruise and it was to do with the anzac centenary,
and it was announced that we would not be going
into the Black Sea because it was a developing dangerous time.
(48:03):
I can't remember exactly what was going on, but it
was probably something along the time lines that we've been discussing. Uh.
And so we didn't get to Odessa, and that was
the one place I wanted to go. And now I
believe it's not worth going to Why why, in your opinion,
having been there, was Odessa or is Odessa still hopefully
(48:26):
such a romantic place.
Speaker 3 (48:29):
Well, because all travelers from north to southeast to west
have something to do with Odessa. There is almost Roman
architecture and Italian architecture dominating Goddessa. So this is a
(48:54):
sort of a hidden place where you would not expect
to see that kind of architecture, but you're still seeing it.
There is the domination, the domination, the cultural domination of
the Italians that have been the world's the the European
(49:16):
medieval merchants of the time, and that kind of made
of Odessa a very important strategic port on the Black Sea,
but also a very interesting cultural port. I don't remember
now the name of the poet, the Ukrainian poet that
(49:42):
got to being exiled in Odessa, but there is also
a fascinating history of how Russian and Ukrainian poets both
have held Odessa very dear because they were either exiled
or they were either fascinated by the place and managed
(50:06):
to stay there for another number of years. So there
is this romantic approach of Odessa the city of poetry.
Speaker 2 (50:14):
Okay, so there is there is another reason that I've
just recalled that Edessa is worthy of a little more discussion.
It was a fairly healthy Jewish city, I believe true,
and there are some people in New Zealand who have
his You know, the history comes from Odessa, and I
(50:37):
just wondered what the attitude to Jews now is. And
the reason for this is she probably worked out is
because of what's going on in America and Australia. Not
so much here, but it's it's there and in other places.
With regard to the assault on Jewish folk, well, I.
Speaker 3 (50:59):
Will say that Odessa and much of the Ukrainian city
is a KEYV two that had Jewish communities. Important Jewish
communities are not having them anymore because of the Soviet
Union that basically started right after the end of the
(51:21):
of the Second World War. But that aside, I am
noticing in places where we did not have any kind
of discussion before about Israel, in Gaza, about the Middle
(51:42):
East in general, and about the rise of the Jewish
community as well, I am noticing elements that are coming alive.
What do I mean by that? In places like the
Czech Republic, where you would not see any discussion about
the Middle East, and that was probably the country that's
(52:06):
closest to Israel. During the last thirty years, if not
more well thirty years, because that's basically after the end
of the Cold War. I have been there recently and
have witnessed a protest, a pro Palestine protest, and a
(52:26):
community that was very vocal against Israeli right, and that
usually means that there is something going on with regards
to the Jewish community being seen in another kind of light.
So these elements, these social protests and discussions about the
(52:54):
Middle East have been very very popular in Western Europe.
Speaker 2 (53:00):
What about in Romania.
Speaker 3 (53:01):
In Eastern Europe you don't see that. And in Romania
last I think it was last week that I have
seen people on the streets with pro Palestine cards, and
right before the elections, even if it wasn't very clear
(53:23):
which side these protesters were supporting, I mean for the
Romanian elections. Now, although in Romania the Jewish community is
a sort of an expat community, right now they are
coming in for the sides, the former Jewish sides. Romania
(53:46):
has this history of having the Jews sent back to
their home country during the communist times. And if you read,
because we were talking earlier about Robert Kaplan's work, that
was a big chunk of his discovery in the seventies
(54:11):
was referring to the way that the communist regime of
Romania at the time, which was kind of a particular
totalitarian regime, was trading almost the Jewish community with Israel.
So there is an ambiguous past which was translated into
(54:36):
good business and into a community that is very welcomed
because it does business with Romania. It supports the entrepreneurial spirit.
So there isn't much talk about the Jewish community per se,
but there are weird attempts. And by weird attempts, I say,
(55:01):
these discussions about what happens in the Middle East are
likely going to lead to some discuss ession with regards
to the way the Jewish community is being is being
seen in Romania. Not to mention that not in the
last round of election, but especially during the the first
(55:23):
round of election, we had the so called right wing
historical elements leg you or not, which is our inter
war let's say, Nazi style of party, which was pretty
(55:46):
vocal during the first round with George Escu and less
vocal during the second round was with this pro Russian,
the so called pro Russian Simeon that ran into the elections. However,
for me, for my generation, discovering those narratives was a
(56:11):
total new thing because we were not even aware of
the kind of narratives the former Nazi party would play
against the Jewish community at the time. Coming back to
that now is a major question mark for me as
(56:32):
an analyst. Why is this happening while we have all
these good links for the business communities, you know, in
Israel and Romania both. Why is this happening while there
was really silence and throughout the Eastern Bloc with regards
(56:54):
to the Jewish community and in Romania in particular, Why
do we have all of a sudden a discussion about Gaza,
about Israel and about the Middle East when I'm not
saying that we shouldn't, but we did not have such
a public interest into the matter.
Speaker 2 (57:14):
So before we go, I've got a couple of questions.
One is, can you recommend a good book on the
history of Romania.
Speaker 3 (57:26):
I can recommend a few, but readers will not be
very happy to read academic books, so I will recommend
the travel and academic and history book. But Robert D.
Kaplan actually in Europe's shadow. This is after a recent,
(57:47):
somewhat recent trip to the region in between twenty fourteen
twenty sixteen, so it should cover also the fears that
Romania has towards Russia. And as a bonus, the trip
(58:10):
also covered the Republic of Moldova, so there is also
a history of relations between Romania, the tensions between Romania
and Moldova that are covered in the book. And it's
easy to read and I like it very much.
Speaker 2 (58:28):
That's in Europe Shadow, did you say, by Robert Kaplan.
Speaker 3 (58:31):
Yes. In Europe Shadow by Robert Dick Caplan, Yes, excellent.
Speaker 2 (58:36):
Now the second point is not a question, actually it's
a statement. I want to clarify something I said that
I knew people here who emanated from Odessa. I made
a mistake, so I'm rectifying it now. They didn't. They
came from Romania, and they're very close friends too, and
(58:56):
they're just lovely people. But there have been a number
of Romanians who have settled in New Zealand over the years,
earlier on really sort of post war that's the Second
World War, and they've added a great deal to the
atmosphere of the country. I think Antonia it's been a pleasure.
(59:21):
I want to thank you very much, and I trust
that the opportunity will provide itself again to have another discussion.
Speaker 3 (59:31):
Oh, thank you very much, and I hope we will
have the opportunity to talk more about the region and
Europe in general, because we have interesting times coming along.
I think more and more interesting, so we will have
topics to cover.
Speaker 2 (59:48):
I think you're right, Antonio, and I'll spell it for you.
Co O l ib A s A n U.
Speaker 3 (59:58):
It's a difficult Romanian name.
Speaker 2 (01:00:00):
No, not difficult to talk. So thank you, thank you
once again, and you take care. We'll talk again.
Speaker 3 (01:00:09):
Thank you very much. You take care to all the best.
Speaker 4 (01:00:13):
Guy.
Speaker 2 (01:00:27):
Now, at the risk of repetition, I just make a
quick reference to the book by Robert V. Kaplan called
Adriatic single titled Adriatic A Concert of Civilizations at the
end of the Modern Age. It's been a good writer,
recommended by the Wall Street Journal, if that makes any difference.
Robert Caplan also wrote The Revenge of Geography, which again
(01:00:51):
is another very informative book. Trust you enjoyed that. We
shall be back again, of course, with another in the
summer series of the Best of the Latensmith Podcast of
twenty twenty five. In the meantime, Merry Christmas, Happy New Year,
and playshape mm hmmmmmmmmmmm.
Speaker 1 (01:01:15):
Thank you for more from News Talks at b Listen
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You're listening to a podcast from news talks it B.
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Smith Podcast powered by news talks it B.
Speaker 2 (00:28):
Now Welcome to the best of the Layton Smith Podcast
for twenty twenty five, where we replay some of the
interesting conversations that we've had during the course of the year,
and maybe sometimes outside of that restrictive boundary. Romanians are
still navigating the difficult path of building democratic institutions and
(00:50):
a culture of transparency now. At the same time, widespread
perceptions of corruption and cronyism have caused many Romanians to
see little change from communist leadership. Atonia Kalabanasu is a
lecturer on international relations at the Romanian National University. We
talk about Romania's position and future influence in Europe and
(01:12):
analyze the difficulties the country is faced with. She also
summarizes the country's relationship between Russia, Ukraine, Poland and the
rest of Europe. It all continues to be of major
interest to much of the rest of the world. Now,
one thing that interested me was the discussion that we
had at various points in the conversation with regard to
(01:35):
well Romania as a travel destination, and it certainly wet
my appetite. So it's a bit travelogueish as well. Now
at the end, I'll recommend a book to you in
case you want a follow up and read a little
more on what you've heard. Tonio Colabasanu is a Senior
(02:10):
Fellow for the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
She is also Associate Professor of geopolitics and geoeconomics on
international Relations at the Romanian National University of Political Studies
and Public Administration. Now, there is a very long list
of qualifications that she has, but probably the most important
(02:33):
one I've left to the last. She is embedded with
George Friedman and geopolitical futures. Before that, as I just
discovered a while back, she worked in association was George
at his previous operation which was which.
Speaker 3 (02:53):
Was stratfor And yes, I've worked for way too long
in essence with George, but I'm glad to do so.
He marked my career well.
Speaker 2 (03:06):
I could only say that you must have a lot
of patience, so I Welcome to the vodcast anyway, strange
way of getting here, but here we are. Look, I
want to start with something that I know will find
favor with those listening, and that is the blackout that
(03:27):
the Spanish experienced just a few weeks ago April twenty eight. Actually,
millions across Spain, Portugal and pats of France were plunged
into darkness after a massive unexpected power outage. Metro systems
stalled airport's ground to halt, hospitals switched frantically to backup generators,
and critical communication networks collapsed temporarily. Now, of course we
(03:51):
covered this in New Zealand, like everybody did around the world.
But the article that you wrote, the first line of
it is the incident proves that true energy independence is
a myth. Would you like to expand on that?
Speaker 3 (04:06):
Of course, Well, basically you have no energy independence, and
that's because networks are interconnected. But beyond that, this push
towards the green energy needed to replace fossil energy sources
has creative vulnerabilities that are not necessarily understood and therefore
(04:33):
they cannot be fully managed. And that's probably the hardest
lesson that Spain and Portugal learned throughout the blackout. The
problem was that once you have mostly electricity coming from
green energy from solar and wind, you do not necessarily
(04:55):
have the backout the flow. You do not have an
ensured flow of energy and an ensured constancy of energy
that the other fossil fuel US natural gas, which is
not necessarily a fossil fuel, and everything else is giving.
(05:16):
So what happened there is because of changes in temperature,
everything collapsed and then they didn't know how to put
it all back. So that lesson is likely going to
get into another lesson for Europe and the European Union
in particular, where we have this push towards green We
(05:39):
have this idea that we need to manage climate change
and whatnot, but at the same time we tend to
forget that all changes drive vulnerable elements. And therefore, while
we're doing this for one reason or another, we need
to be cautious about what could go wrong. And I
(06:02):
don't think we have had that on our mind. And
I believe that right now the policy discourse, at least
time this green energy push is going to be modified
because obviously, I mean, if nothing else, the blackout push
towards Okay, we also need reliable fossil fuels to maintain
(06:25):
constancy in our networks, and green energy cannot ensure independence
because everything is linked together. And guess what, we also
have vulnerable parts that are linked together because this started
in France but did not finish influence. So all that
points out that we're in a new thinking mode, at
(06:49):
least for green energy and everything that relates to it.
Speaker 2 (06:55):
So when somebody writes to me after hearing this and
says to me, what would she know. She's an economist,
she's not a scientist, So why does she have the
right to say it's a myth?
Speaker 3 (07:10):
Well, bottom line, I've read a lot because I had to.
So in geopolitics, what we do is looking at those
vulnerable sectors that are driving instability, which means that you
are looking at elements that would cause unstable economics and
(07:32):
therefore unstable politics. So energy is the one factor that
cuts into both worlds, because without energy, you cannot really
sustain economic production and you cannot sustain social stability because
if you do not have economic production, you will have
(07:55):
likely protests and unemployment that drive from economic production and
therefore political instability. Let alone, I mean these these writings,
and you know, these readings that I've done during the
years starting with Stratford were also related to Russia and
(08:22):
Russia's strategy towards Europe and European Union, in particular because
Russia basically supported its strategy of resurrecting as a global
power through energy raw materials that it is selling all
over the globe and in particular for Europe oil and gas.
(08:47):
So I had to basically read a lot about what
energy means and what this i'd say idea of getting
less and less dependent on imports of oil and gas
through green energy means for the europe Union for a while.
(09:09):
I'll also I also served as an honorary advisory in
my capacity of TEO political analysts for a Romanian energy minister,
just because I knew how Russia is playing with all
sorts of things, including globbing from green for green energy
and Brussels at the time, because it had an interest
(09:33):
to maintain itself the only and sole provider of oil
and gas and cut down while the Europeans would cut
down all fossil fuel production and got into the green
energy side. That was profitable for Russia because it knew
that Europe needs fossil fuels to maintain this constancy, and
(09:57):
therefore it needed to have imports from Russia, while not
producing themselves would lower the European Union capacity of truly
lowering dependency. Again, independency is a myth, but lowering dependency
was not and is not. So it's basically from the
(10:20):
study of the balance of powers, if you will, through
energy that I've learned all things about engineering processes that
refer to the way green energy is being produced, how
solar and wind are not necessarily reliable because they depend
on whether changes, and they're very much volatile in some
(10:42):
parts more than others in Europe, and other things related
to how do you sustain production, how do you sustain
the push for policy making, and all that sort of
thing which is more political the later part in politicking
(11:05):
in Brussels that referred to the balance of power per se,
and not even discussing the economics repercussions.
Speaker 2 (11:16):
Okay, I asked that question because I knew the answer,
but I asked it for a specific reason. I wanted
to hear you say it. But in this part of
the world, Australia has just had an election, as you'd know,
and they've voted in a bunch of insane people, and
I mean that in a few cases, and as a
(11:38):
result of that, net zero is full on. Now, net
zero is impossible. I know this from all the reading
that I've done, but specifically from one expat Kiwi, New Zealander,
who was a very highly ranked professor in engineering in
the UK at Cambridge, and I've interviewed him on Northern
(12:01):
one occasion and he has explained it. Now. The reason
I'm telling you this is because he visits back here
every couple of years, and I know there have been
efforts to get him to talk with them, with the politicians,
those who are making the decisions and others, and I'm
about the only one who would interview him. They didn't
(12:22):
want to know. Albeit that, as I said, he's an
expant New Zealander still a whole citizenship, that he is
highly that he is highly educated, and he knows exactly
what he's talking about and he explains it perfectly. And
net zero is a myth. I tell you that for
interest sake. I just wonder whether you had the same
or a similar approach. You took a similar line toward
(12:46):
COVID at its effect.
Speaker 3 (12:48):
Well, basically covered as has been a virus that well,
everyone needed to stay away from. But at the same
time there is a balance, and we need to think
about the effects that staying away and staying fully protected
(13:08):
from the virus, which is rather impossible, I might say,
because it's a virus. You couldnot be fully protected from
a virus unless you're very, very lucky or live on
a cliff somewhere, and even then who knows. I mean.
But besides that, getting into full protection chair basically gets
(13:30):
to have social effects because obviously there is the science
that says this could be deadly and this is how
you should protect and this is whatever, you know, the
list of things that you need to do. But from
science to imposing things that you need to do you
(13:53):
must do, then we are basically having the science taking
over institutions and institutions that relate to rights, to fundamental
rights that human beings should have in a working democracy,
for instance, which is what we strive for and what
(14:16):
we hope to maintain. Now, that caused a lot of
side effects. Basically we have the economic side effects. We
had the economic repercussions which are very well known and yes,
to a certain extent, it was probably good that we
had higher level of protection, higher level of reassuring ourselves
(14:41):
that we are doing the right thing, that we have
the right medicines, and therefore, in order to get the
right medicines, we need to slow down our economic captivity
and whatever. But getting ourselves into a situation where we
basically did not function as a society was detrimental, first
(15:05):
for the economics and later for the sociopolitics. I mean,
we wonder now in Europe at least, there's this discussion
about disinformation and how disinformation basically started during the pandemic. Now,
all fears came alive during the pandemic, and when fears
(15:27):
come alive, you basically have waves of narratives that refer
to those fears. And obviously, because we also live in
a world where they have Internet, where we have all
sorts of communication channels, and where we have states interested
(15:48):
in supporting their own agendas, so yes, states will take
those fears and will transform them into sort of propaganda narratives.
But the cause, the root cause of that was basically
the way we managed COVID. The fact that we made
off that virus was a very dangerous verse and all that,
(16:11):
But the fact that we made of it a source
of all fears and we kept it going for years.
Speaker 2 (16:18):
How how suppressed was society in Romania during that period
and for how long.
Speaker 3 (16:29):
I would think, I mean, compared to others in obvious China.
Obviously China is the you know, the most the most
obvious example of suppressed society. But in Romania, I don't
think we had a level of suppression that went really
(16:50):
really high. There was the during the first two years,
there were the interdictions of you know, traveling from one
place to another, maintaining social distance, making sure that people
of elderly age stay in for the rush hours and whatnot.
(17:14):
So it was a mild kind of suppression. But at
the same time, Romania was on the borderland. And when
I say this, I say it is a democracy that
is still building itself, that still remembers the suppression that
(17:35):
was in a sense much higher than the suppression in
the Eastern Bloc. So bottom line, it was a fertile
land for everything, including this information campaign, including all sorts
of social engineering, if you will. So even if we
(17:59):
had a mild suppression code and code, and we had
this idea that mainly in the main cities, you are
very much surveilled in what you're doing and you should
not do this and this and that. Then in the
rural side, in the non urban side, it was a
(18:20):
totally different way of living. And this clash between the
urban and the non urban. Uh. The idea that some
could still impose on the people's will while we are
still building our democrats, democratic rights and all that and
(18:40):
democratic institutions has created an environment that we have to
deal with even today.
Speaker 2 (18:49):
Were you aware of how difficult life got in this
in this country? In New Zealand.
Speaker 3 (18:56):
To tell you this, there is no.
Speaker 2 (18:58):
No We experienced totalitarianism and it's not an exaggeration. It
mightn't have been the worst kind of totalitarianism, but it
was a good step into it, and no one will
deny that. Now. Same with Australia and the state of Victoria.
There was a race between the government in Victoria and
(19:18):
the government New Zealand to see who could be the biggest,
the biggest tyrant. But it's for another day. That would
make an interesting detail. In fact, I might even send
you something to show you what it was like. But
it was it's recognized as being as bad as I've
got anywhere in the world. Amazingly. I hope I just
(19:41):
live in hope that the population of New Zealand has
learned a lesson from it. Now, if we turn our
attention to the election that you've just had, we don't
have to spend too long on it. But it was
a mess, was it not.
Speaker 3 (19:59):
I'd say it was one of the most interesting cases
in recent elections because in a way we had all
the problems the pandemic forward basically between the urban and
the non urban. It was a case of international interference.
(20:23):
And I am not saying only Russian because it's an
only Russian interference. Again, all major powers are taking their
share when they see a fertial ground to promote and
influence the public, and that was the case in our
election season. And it was also a pointing case on
(20:46):
how institutions are failing to provide trust to the basic
trust for the population, because the result actually pointed out
that there was the population basically challenging the mainstream, but
at the same time challenging the whole system, saying that
(21:10):
we no longer trust the system that was built starting
nineteen nineties and we want something different. We don't really
care how that different looks like and while we are
still very much trustful into the Western world which means NATO,
(21:34):
US EU, we want to challenge how things are done internally,
and that I believe is actually one major result of
the last five plus years in Romania, with the pandemic included.
(21:54):
I mean, that's that's how I read it right now,
and I believe that in the next two years, if
nothing will be done with reference to restructure, showing change
and so on that the population has voted for, then
(22:17):
we might have a case where the so called sovereignist
populist parties are getting full control in parliament. Because we
have parliamentarian elections in almost three years coming up, so
we're getting into the campaign.
Speaker 2 (22:35):
Give me a short profile of Nikosa dam who is
the new president.
Speaker 3 (22:41):
So the new president is an independent, it's coming from
the independent branch of politics and so called pro European
populist branch, and many here would challenge me by saying populist,
but bottom line, it is the Union for Saving Roumania,
(23:05):
which is his brainchild, that has been the first serious
populist party in Romania and has campaigned against the mainstream
parties here, basically saying that the system is not working,
the system is corrupt. We need to have something different,
(23:26):
without necessarily naming what that's something different would look like.
So he was not a member and did not stay
on as a member of the party, and he basically
went into the election season as an independent because his
(23:49):
former party had its own candidate, and therefore got in
and got elected on this populist platform of I as
a person as an independent, want to really support the change,
want to really come forward with the change, and I
(24:13):
am a pro European. This was his main feature.
Speaker 2 (24:18):
If you will, sorry, you sign your pro European or he.
Speaker 3 (24:23):
Was, he was pro European, So he is pro European.
That's that's his main campaign promise, which means basically, I
am a supporter of the EU. I have been educated
in the EU style. I have been educated in France.
(24:47):
So he's a former not national international Olympic in mathematics.
I studied in Paris for his PhD. So his profile
is that of an intellectual that is coming from the
European class of intellectuals, but at the same time is
(25:10):
challenging how things are being done in Romanian politics and
has been doing that for the last ten plus years
as a former mayor of Bucharest now and as the
founder of this pro European populist party that I've talked about.
Speaker 2 (25:32):
So back on May eleven, you published fault Lines in
the East, Romania's political transformation, in Europe's Future and Analysis.
Here's a quote from it. The outcome will influence not
only Romania's governance and regional stability, but also the EU's
Eastern cohesion, particularly in Moldova and Poland, as nationalist populist
(25:56):
rhetoric gains traction across Europe during a period of geopolitical
uncertainty and democratic fragility. That sounds very insecure.
Speaker 3 (26:07):
Well, it is in secure, not only because this is
fertile ground for this information and whatnot, but this is
also fertile ground for political instability. The economics are not
very stable, obviously, and this is partly an effect of
(26:28):
the pandemic, but also partly an aspect of the fact
that these countries have been the most emerging economies of Europe.
So in a sense they needed the stability of Western
Europe to thrive, but did not have that during the
last ten years. So there was this idea of what
(26:51):
do we do next? Considering all these trade wars, all
these elements of instability that are threatening the life of
what we observe to be our foundation of growth and
even our model development, which is the West in its entirety.
(27:12):
And at the same time we are on the borderline,
and therefore from the Baltic Sea to Romania you have
societies that are coming to accept their role on the borderline,
which also means military engagement or potential military engagement with Russia.
(27:37):
That's the common threat. And at the same time they
do not necessarily have an anchor anymore. And I'm not
only referring to the US as an anchor, but I'm
also referring to the European Union as an anchor in
their case, where they're observing the EU having to deal
(28:00):
with its own problems, with the Eurozone in particular, having
to deal with its own problems, and states that our
member states of the EU no longer longer being, at
least in their declarations, not even being united, not exerting
(28:23):
themselves as a united front anymore, but getting more nationalistic,
getting more focused on their own internal problems, which is natural.
But this gets to be discussed in the Eastern European
countries as so what do we do next. We fear Russia.
(28:45):
We do not know exactly what future lies for us
in the European Union, and therefore there is some hope
that the European Union could act somehow, but at the
same time we don't know if that's the possibility. So
(29:05):
that's where the insecurity comes from. And we've seen this
during the last elections in Poland, where the conservative candidate
won basically saying well, we need a balance. The population
send the message of we need a balance. We need
(29:26):
to make sure that we sustain our traditions, that we
keep our boundaries with regards to everything that the EU
pushes us to do. And in a sense, because we
are also talking about internal politics in the case of Poland,
(29:46):
keep a balance between the pro German, pro European camp,
which is led by the current Prime Minister and his party,
and a balance to the pro American camp, which is
led by Navrowski, the current president. Now there is also
an issue of Trumpism, and I don't I don't know
(30:09):
if we want to get into this because obviously the
American influence here is also getting in through the new
kind of politics and the new kind of campaigning that
the US has been dealing with, and Trump has been
pushing as a new style of politics, as a new
(30:30):
style of diplomacy, and this all is kind of influencing
the debate.
Speaker 2 (30:37):
So the battle for Poland is not over.
Speaker 3 (30:41):
I don't think so. I believe that Poland is still
trying to discover itself. There are many that are making
analogies to the past and are pointing out the historical
cycles for Poland, and some are even pointing to the
(31:06):
way Poland looked like in the thirties, which is, you know,
the same is said about Romania. However, I don't think, well,
history repeats itself, obviously, but the shape of that repetition
is different. So I believe that right now we're living
(31:27):
in a more complex world and the battle, the so
called battle between East and West, is also a battle
about what kind of Poland does the population really want
to have? What?
Speaker 2 (31:46):
And if i'm if I might, how do you how
do you pronounce his name? No, Rocky Navarovsky, Noosky.
Speaker 3 (31:55):
Yea Navarrovsky, It's I don't know. The W comes as
a V. From what I've learned from the Polish to V.
Speaker 2 (32:11):
Since is what win? And I'm quoting not from you,
but from Michael Cram's if that means anything. Commentators of
all stripes have been eager to pigeonhole the election as
a win for Russia or as the nail in the
coffin of Poland's warm relationship with Ukraine. In truth, it's
none of those things. Politics here, certain is never so simple.
(32:32):
The raise a thin margin of Sunday's election, and indeed
the divided, hamstrung government that has existed here for the
last thirteen months is emblematic of a deeper fight about
the nature of Polish identity in the twenty first century.
And there's a quote, if I might, because I like it,
from somebody who back in the twenties made the comment
(32:54):
that most beloved state of the Polish people is in decision,
which seems to fit what you were saying.
Speaker 3 (33:00):
M Yeah, indeed, and I think the question mark is
not about has went, but about the extreme right, and
I really mean the extreme right Confederatia in Poland and
how that goes, because right now the Conservative Party has
(33:23):
won this vote, but it is the first time that
the Conservatives and Nabrovski has done an understanding on some
of the major points regarding what needs to be kept
for the constitutional justice institutions and the courts basically in Poland,
(33:46):
and some constitutional rights and you know, the abortion and
all that stuff. But those are bullet points coming from
the so called Tarun Declaration that he signed together with
the candidate of Confderderatia, and Confederatia is the very extreme
(34:07):
right party which has indeed the flavor of the very nationalistic,
sometimes very pro Russian in declaration. And one thing, and
this is an important footnote that I'd like to to
insert here. In Poland and in Romania both and in
(34:32):
Eastern European states, there are no such thing of pro
Russian candidates because the population is anti Russian, so you
cannot be a full pro Russian candidate. The narratives that
you take may be influenced by Russia, and the politicians
(34:54):
are sometimes very much tied to Russia through previous engagements
because these have been former satellites and therefore they still
have ways to get to the politicians, influence them through
money or through other engagements. So they don't look straightforward
(35:17):
to the so called pro Russian electorate. Because there is
no such thing, no one would be elected here if
they say openly I'm pro Russian, but they would be
elected if they would go with anti Ukrainian narratives or
anti European Union narratives or anti American narratives at times,
(35:38):
or anti NATO narratives, which is more complex in a way,
but better for Russia to get their individuals. They are
political players in So that's that's one important footnote. And
for Confederatia to get back to the Polish election, this
(35:59):
is exactly it. I mean, the question is how will
the Conservatives, which are traditionally a pro American party in
Poland and are not necessarily against EU, but they want
a more, let's say, a better voice for Poland within
the EU. How will they manage a partnership that they've
(36:23):
enforced by signing the Starun Declaration with a very extreme
right party which is against the EU and has narratives
that go against the American interest as well. So that's
that's the question for the coming years.
Speaker 2 (36:39):
I think you mentioned a month ago you mentioned foreign policy.
What is the what is the influence of Romanian foreign
policy in Europe?
Speaker 3 (36:50):
Well, that's a very good question. Romania has managed to
get countries like France and Germany to acknowledge the Black
Sea as an important geopolitical note, but only Recentlyanian foreign
policy has been in a sense adaptive to the larger players.
(37:16):
It has worked together with Poland to acknowledge the Eastern
European risks for the European Union, and it has worked
together with Poland even in NATO as the strategic partners
that want to get the US closer to the eastern border,
(37:38):
but has not been very vocal. Romania has started to
be vocal only recently, and by recently I mean during
the last one year, one year and a half, very
recent also because it was fearful of Russia, and Romania
I think is likely the most fearful country of Russia,
(38:03):
considering Russia is on its border and it sees Russia
has still a mighty threat to its security, and considering this,
the foreign policy push was mainly to get allies from
the European Union, from NATO, to get the US together
(38:27):
with others to push forward elements that would secure its borders,
but never alone. So Romania has not ever been like Poland,
for instance, I want this and I will fight for
it with regards to its foreign policy, because it thought
(38:48):
always that that kind of attitude would have attached to
it a risk that it cannot bear, it cannot solve.
That's a more let's say shy adaptive and a posture
that is likely due to the geographical position I mean
(39:08):
regards multiple fronts. It is the Black Sea is the
most important in terms of Russian threat, but at the
same time the Western Balkans, and it sees that region
only as a challenging region and something that you need
to be aware of. And that's why the adaptive stands.
Speaker 2 (39:32):
Okay, now the importance of the Black Sea, which country
would you say has the I mean, nobody owns it,
but which country has the right to the greater claim?
Do you think?
Speaker 4 (39:44):
Well?
Speaker 3 (39:45):
I would say that in history we had the greater
claims coming from Russia or Turkey through you know, Ottoman
Empire or the Russian taurist To empires and so on.
Right now we have the risk of the country of
(40:05):
the Sea becoming split, I think that's the best word
to use, split between Russia and Turkey in terms of
economic zones, but also in terms of influence and the
push of Romania is basically to maintain Turkey and Bulgaria,
(40:28):
but especially Turkey involved in the security of the Black Sea,
to make certain that there is always a counterbalance to
the Russian influence and that Turkey and Russia did not
get to an understanding of sorts, which is not impossible
(40:51):
historically speaking. Now also with regards to the Black Sea,
to make things more complicated. When Crimea became independent, we
in Romania were very much happy, even if there were
conflicts around islands and whatnot, but we were very much
happy because Russia's posture was pushed away. So in a
(41:16):
sense there was this new state that was taking a
chunk of the Russian of the former USSR, part of
the Black Sea, because the Black Sea is a closed
sea and therefore without having international waters, you always have
to deal with neighbors, which is why for Romania wasn't happy.
(41:38):
The moment that Ukraine took part of the USSR, the
former USSR part, that was a happy time considering we
were no longer bordering the USSR, but we were bordering
Ukraine now. With Crimea being taken over Sins twenty fourteen,
Romania got to be on the border with Russia again,
(42:00):
which is you know, the main question mark is whether
Russia will come closer, and one could Russia do from
the facto position that it holds now that Crimea is
basically covering a big part of more than half of
(42:22):
what Ukraine held previously. So that's where we stand right now,
and that's why Romania is also very much supportive of
Ukraine getting back its share of the Black Sea, because
that basically means that we are going to be bordering
Ukraine again and not Russia.
Speaker 2 (42:43):
So let's target something very local as far as the
area is concerned, the Russians. The Russians took a place
called Snake Island back in February of twenty two. When
they do I think it was on the first day
that they went berserk, but more recently it has fallen
(43:03):
back into Ukraine's hands. Is that significant by talking about
a forty six acre rocky outcrop here, does that have
any significance? Do you think?
Speaker 4 (43:15):
Well?
Speaker 3 (43:16):
But certainly for the region and certainly for Romania that
that is important because the Snake Island basically makes it
taking Russia. Taking the Snake Island basically made impossible for
Ukraine to continue trading through the Black Sea. So if
(43:37):
you're looking at the map, the Snake Island is very
very close to Romani, I'm shure, and it basically if
you cross from the Snake Island to Crimea, if you
just draw a line on the map, you're basically having
the coast of Ukraine completely off the charts of the
(44:01):
Black Sea, and that territory being taken meant that you
basically have no way you as Ukraine, have no way
to protect your coastline. That's why Ukraine mined the sea
and that's why we have both Ukraine Hints and Russians
(44:26):
dealing with mining operations during those days, because the worst
fear for Ukraine was that the Russians would get on
the shore and by taking the coastline would basically take
the economic lifeline of Ukraine, considering trade was being done
mostly through the Black Sea, and by keeping the Snake
(44:48):
Island would have meant that Romania had problems helping Ukraine
with trade or anything, because that would would have meant
that Russia is really close to the so called Danube Mouth,
which is the way out for most of Ukrainian trade today.
(45:13):
So in other words, that that was a blocking posture,
and that was strategically a way for Russia to make
sure that by blocking economic operations of Ukraine will it
would eventually take over Kiev, even if militarily that would
(45:37):
have been impossible. In a sense, the economic lifeline being
cut would have meant that Kiev could eventually fall off.
Now taking over the Snake Island basically reversed that stance.
So that's why it was very important that Ukraine managed
to take back the Snake Island several months after.
Speaker 2 (46:00):
Does that mean it'll become a target for Putin again.
Speaker 3 (46:04):
I don't think so, and it is not at the
island that is now determined target. And the reason is
because there there is no naval posture anymore in the
Black Sea by the Russians, so the Ukrainians managed to
cut that to almost zero. And at this point I
(46:31):
think Puddin is looking to the ports of Odessa and
to generally to the Ukrainian coastline through land operations and
no longer through sea operations because it has no Russia
has no capabilities to employ to take back the Snake Island,
(46:51):
so what it wants is to basically take the coast,
take the south western coast of Ukraine. And managed to
come back to a posture where it can effectively control
all the trade route in the Black Sea that Ukraine has.
Speaker 2 (47:12):
Before we leave the Black Sea, I have a question
for you. You have been to Odessa.
Speaker 3 (47:18):
I have, but not during wartime.
Speaker 2 (47:20):
No, no, no, no no. I tell you why I asked.
There was a book that came out on Odessa in
twenty eleven, written by a fellow called Charles King, and
on my radio program I made mention to it quite
a bit at the time because I was fascinated by
Odessa and I wanted to get there at some stage
(47:41):
and get to know it. So in twenty fifteen, which
is ten years ago, we were on a cruise. A
whole bunch of us from New Zealand were on a
cruise and it was to do with the anzac centenary,
and it was announced that we would not be going
into the Black Sea because it was a developing dangerous time.
(48:03):
I can't remember exactly what was going on, but it
was probably something along the time lines that we've been discussing. Uh.
And so we didn't get to Odessa, and that was
the one place I wanted to go. And now I
believe it's not worth going to Why why, in your opinion,
having been there, was Odessa or is Odessa still hopefully
(48:26):
such a romantic place.
Speaker 3 (48:29):
Well, because all travelers from north to southeast to west
have something to do with Odessa. There is almost Roman
architecture and Italian architecture dominating Goddessa. So this is a
(48:54):
sort of a hidden place where you would not expect
to see that kind of architecture, but you're still seeing it.
There is the domination, the domination, the cultural domination of
the Italians that have been the world's the the European
(49:16):
medieval merchants of the time, and that kind of made
of Odessa a very important strategic port on the Black Sea,
but also a very interesting cultural port. I don't remember
now the name of the poet, the Ukrainian poet that
(49:42):
got to being exiled in Odessa, but there is also
a fascinating history of how Russian and Ukrainian poets both
have held Odessa very dear because they were either exiled
or they were either fascinated by the place and managed
(50:06):
to stay there for another number of years. So there
is this romantic approach of Odessa the city of poetry.
Speaker 2 (50:14):
Okay, so there is there is another reason that I've
just recalled that Edessa is worthy of a little more discussion.
It was a fairly healthy Jewish city, I believe true,
and there are some people in New Zealand who have
his You know, the history comes from Odessa, and I
(50:37):
just wondered what the attitude to Jews now is. And
the reason for this is she probably worked out is
because of what's going on in America and Australia. Not
so much here, but it's it's there and in other places.
With regard to the assault on Jewish folk, well, I.
Speaker 3 (50:59):
Will say that Odessa and much of the Ukrainian city
is a KEYV two that had Jewish communities. Important Jewish
communities are not having them anymore because of the Soviet
Union that basically started right after the end of the
(51:21):
of the Second World War. But that aside, I am
noticing in places where we did not have any kind
of discussion before about Israel, in Gaza, about the Middle
(51:42):
East in general, and about the rise of the Jewish
community as well, I am noticing elements that are coming alive.
What do I mean by that? In places like the
Czech Republic, where you would not see any discussion about
the Middle East, and that was probably the country that's
(52:06):
closest to Israel. During the last thirty years, if not
more well thirty years, because that's basically after the end
of the Cold War. I have been there recently and
have witnessed a protest, a pro Palestine protest, and a
(52:26):
community that was very vocal against Israeli right, and that
usually means that there is something going on with regards
to the Jewish community being seen in another kind of light.
So these elements, these social protests and discussions about the
(52:54):
Middle East have been very very popular in Western Europe.
Speaker 2 (53:00):
What about in Romania.
Speaker 3 (53:01):
In Eastern Europe you don't see that. And in Romania
last I think it was last week that I have
seen people on the streets with pro Palestine cards, and
right before the elections, even if it wasn't very clear
(53:23):
which side these protesters were supporting, I mean for the
Romanian elections. Now, although in Romania the Jewish community is
a sort of an expat community, right now they are
coming in for the sides, the former Jewish sides. Romania
(53:46):
has this history of having the Jews sent back to
their home country during the communist times. And if you read,
because we were talking earlier about Robert Kaplan's work, that
was a big chunk of his discovery in the seventies
(54:11):
was referring to the way that the communist regime of
Romania at the time, which was kind of a particular
totalitarian regime, was trading almost the Jewish community with Israel.
So there is an ambiguous past which was translated into
(54:36):
good business and into a community that is very welcomed
because it does business with Romania. It supports the entrepreneurial spirit.
So there isn't much talk about the Jewish community per se,
but there are weird attempts. And by weird attempts, I say,
(55:01):
these discussions about what happens in the Middle East are
likely going to lead to some discuss ession with regards
to the way the Jewish community is being is being
seen in Romania. Not to mention that not in the
last round of election, but especially during the the first
(55:23):
round of election, we had the so called right wing
historical elements leg you or not, which is our inter
war let's say, Nazi style of party, which was pretty
(55:46):
vocal during the first round with George Escu and less
vocal during the second round was with this pro Russian,
the so called pro Russian Simeon that ran into the elections. However,
for me, for my generation, discovering those narratives was a
(56:11):
total new thing because we were not even aware of
the kind of narratives the former Nazi party would play
against the Jewish community at the time. Coming back to
that now is a major question mark for me as
(56:32):
an analyst. Why is this happening while we have all
these good links for the business communities, you know, in
Israel and Romania both. Why is this happening while there
was really silence and throughout the Eastern Bloc with regards
(56:54):
to the Jewish community and in Romania in particular, Why
do we have all of a sudden a discussion about Gaza,
about Israel and about the Middle East when I'm not
saying that we shouldn't, but we did not have such
a public interest into the matter.
Speaker 2 (57:14):
So before we go, I've got a couple of questions.
One is, can you recommend a good book on the
history of Romania.
Speaker 3 (57:26):
I can recommend a few, but readers will not be
very happy to read academic books, so I will recommend
the travel and academic and history book. But Robert D.
Kaplan actually in Europe's shadow. This is after a recent,
(57:47):
somewhat recent trip to the region in between twenty fourteen
twenty sixteen, so it should cover also the fears that
Romania has towards Russia. And as a bonus, the trip
(58:10):
also covered the Republic of Moldova, so there is also
a history of relations between Romania, the tensions between Romania
and Moldova that are covered in the book. And it's
easy to read and I like it very much.
Speaker 2 (58:28):
That's in Europe Shadow, did you say, by Robert Kaplan.
Speaker 3 (58:31):
Yes. In Europe Shadow by Robert Dick Caplan, Yes, excellent.
Speaker 2 (58:36):
Now the second point is not a question, actually it's
a statement. I want to clarify something I said that
I knew people here who emanated from Odessa. I made
a mistake, so I'm rectifying it now. They didn't. They
came from Romania, and they're very close friends too, and
(58:56):
they're just lovely people. But there have been a number
of Romanians who have settled in New Zealand over the years,
earlier on really sort of post war that's the Second
World War, and they've added a great deal to the
atmosphere of the country. I think Antonia it's been a pleasure.
(59:21):
I want to thank you very much, and I trust
that the opportunity will provide itself again to have another discussion.
Speaker 3 (59:31):
Oh, thank you very much, and I hope we will
have the opportunity to talk more about the region and
Europe in general, because we have interesting times coming along.
I think more and more interesting, so we will have
topics to cover.
Speaker 2 (59:48):
I think you're right, Antonio, and I'll spell it for you.
Co O l ib A s A n U.
Speaker 3 (59:58):
It's a difficult Romanian name.
Speaker 2 (01:00:00):
No, not difficult to talk. So thank you, thank you
once again, and you take care. We'll talk again.
Speaker 3 (01:00:09):
Thank you very much. You take care to all the best.
Speaker 4 (01:00:13):
Guy.
Speaker 2 (01:00:27):
Now, at the risk of repetition, I just make a
quick reference to the book by Robert V. Kaplan called
Adriatic single titled Adriatic A Concert of Civilizations at the
end of the Modern Age. It's been a good writer,
recommended by the Wall Street Journal, if that makes any difference.
Robert Caplan also wrote The Revenge of Geography, which again
(01:00:51):
is another very informative book. Trust you enjoyed that. We
shall be back again, of course, with another in the
summer series of the Best of the Latensmith Podcast of
twenty twenty five. In the meantime, Merry Christmas, Happy New Year,
and playshape mm hmmmmmmmmmmm.
Speaker 1 (01:01:15):
Thank you for more from News Talks at b Listen
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