July 7, 2025 • 25 mins
Guest host Dana El Kurd, Palestinian researcher and writer, provides an overview of Palestinian politics, explains the legitimacy crisis within Palestinian politics, and outlines the impact international actors have had on Palestinian leadership and strategy. She highlights how these issues affect ending the war on Gaza, and the future of Palestine more broadly.
Sources:
Raz Segal on genocide - https://jewishcurrents.org/a-textbook-case-of-genocide
Omer Bartov on genocide – https://www.democracynow.org/2024/12/30/omer_bartov_israel_gaza_genocide
Amos Goldberg on genocide - https://thefirethesetimes.com/2025/05/25/intent-holocaust-studies-and-the-gaza-genocide-w-amos-goldberg/
Khaled Elgindy on Biden’s “bear hug” - https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/10/biden-israel-hamas-war-gaza-us-policy/
Bezalel Smotrich on population transfer - https://www.timesofisrael.com/smotrich-says-gaza-to-be-totally-destroyed-population-concentrated-in-small-area/
Nissim Vaturi on population transfer - https://www.timesofisrael.com/occupy-expel-settle-minister-mks-at-far-right-rally-call-to-empty-gaza-of-gazans/
Arab Peace Initiative - https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=a5dab26d-a2fe-dc66-8910-a13730828279&groupId=268421
Arab Center Washington – “The Biden Administration and the Middle East in 2023” - https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-biden-administration-and-the-middle-east-in-2023/
Mike Huckabee on Palestinians - https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/12/politics/mike-huckabee-palestinian-comments-trump-israel-ambassador
Steve Witkoff making deals with Hamas - https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-says-witkoffs-gaza-ceasefire-proposal-must-lead-end-war-2025-05-31/
Adam Boehler “we are not an agent of Israel” - https://www.axios.com/2025/03/09/adam-boehler-hamas-israel-talks
Philippe Lazzarini on Gaza Humanitarian Foundation - https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/unrwa-commissioner-general-gaza-aid-distribution-has-become-death-trap
Doctors without Borders on Gaza Humanitarian Foundation - https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/siege-gaza-msf-denounces-new-aid-mechanism-proposed-us-and-israel
Jake Woods, Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, resigns - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/26/gaza-humanitari
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:01):
Cool Zone Media.
Speaker 2 (00:06):
Hello everyone, and welcome to It can Happen Here. My
name is Dan al Kurd. I'm a writer, analyst, and
researcher of Palestinian and Arab politics. I'm an associate professor
of political science and a senior non resident Fellow at
the Arab Center Washington. You may have heard me on
It Could Happen Here before or behind the Bastards. I've
been following cool Zone media projects for a while. I
(00:28):
was happy when Robert and Sophie reached out and said, hey,
come talk to our listeners on a more regular basis.
Speaker 1 (00:35):
Today.
Speaker 2 (00:36):
I want to talk to you about something that doesn't
get almost any attention in Western media, internal Palestinian politics.
Something I've argued for a while and continues to be
the focus of my work is that Pasadian politics are
important and the Passingian issue is important. I remember once
being on stage for one of these DC events with
(00:57):
none other than General Stanley McCrystal, and he turns to
me and says, essentially, the Palstadian issue is an issue.
Speaker 1 (01:04):
Of the past.
Speaker 2 (01:05):
Other Arabs want to move on, and it took everything
in me to not respond, what planet are you living on?
A genocide has been unfolding for the past almost two years,
and crackdown on pro pastine activists is in the American
media every other day. Maybe now we recognize that this
is an important issue to understand, Maybe one can hope,
(01:27):
But you would not believe how many people in DC,
in the American government, and by extension, lots of people
in power, convinced themselves for years that the Pasadian issue
and internal Pastadian politics were not worth addressing. For today's episode,
I want to start to tackle a sort of big
question of what is going on with Pastadian politics, and
I'll give you the takeaways for this episode right away.
(01:50):
Number One, the Palestinian people are totally unrepresented by their
leadership right now. The Pasadian people haven't had a say
in a very long time, and that's a big problem
because if we want to resolve any part of this
conflict sustainably, will need people to go along. And the
conflict got to where it is now because international actors
thought that they could ignore the Palestinian people. That's literally
(02:12):
as simple as it gets. Number Two, no one internationally
or state side seems to have learned this lesson. In
the US, we've had bipartisan support for ignoring Palestinians and internationally,
the response has been Okay, let's go back and try
to do the same things we've always done, and maybe
this time it'll work out for us. I'll explain more
(02:33):
of what I mean as I go along.
Speaker 1 (02:35):
Stay with me.
Speaker 2 (02:39):
Let's start first with the present. What's on everyone's minds
and screens, The war in Gaza, the genocide that's unfolding there.
I use that term because it's been credibly identified as
a genocide by scholars of genocide and holocaust studies such
as ras Segal, Omer Bartov and Amos Goldberg.
Speaker 1 (02:58):
But I don't really care about this mantics here.
Speaker 2 (03:01):
Even if it was just mass violence and war crimes,
that's still pretty bad too. But this genocide and this
war has been relentless for over six hundred days now.
So what's everyone's endgame here? When this latest iteration of
violence started under the Biden registration, with Hamas's October seventh
attack that killed twelve hundred people and took two hundred
(03:23):
and fifty hostages, the president and his team took every
step to support Israel in its war. As Krada del Guindhi,
author and political analysts wrote for Foreign policy last year,
Biden's embrace of Nittanne, who was rooted in the belief
that only positive inducements and constant reassurances, both militarily and diplomatically,
(03:43):
could restrain Israel's actions in Gaza.
Speaker 1 (03:46):
End quote, the.
Speaker 2 (03:47):
Israelis were pretty vocal and clear about what they thought
they needed to do in Gaza. Their goals were to
eliminate Hamas as a political actor entirely, and some vocal
members of the Cabinet, such as Nance Minister Bisilosmotrich, as
well as members of the Kanesset Israeli Parliament like nissiin Vaturi,
the deputy Kanesset speaker, were talking straight up about annihilation
(04:10):
and population transfer settlement in Gaza. Perhaps we all remember
what happened here, but even as time went on, none
of this was enough for the Biden administration to change
course on the type of support it was extending for
this war. But let's also remember that the Biden administration
had little interest in the Israeli Palestinian conflict before the
(04:31):
October seventh attack, or indeed any interest in the Middle East.
The State Department under Biden had wound down its Middle
East engagement. They didn't undo any of Trump's major policy
changes visavi the Middle East during his first administration. In fact,
they doubled down they agreed. For example, Trump during his
first term officially recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital, even though
(04:52):
this is contested and you and Resolution one four seven
says it should be an international city, internationally administered so
that studients could also have access and claim to it,
but Trump says the US doesn't care accepts Israel's sovereignty
over Jerusalem. Trump also during his first term tried to
sideline the issue of Palistine entirely by engineering these quote
(05:12):
unquote peace deals between AIRB governments and Israel. Now, most
Arab governments have had the position since the Arab Peace
Initiative of two thousand and two that they would not
have diplomatic relations with Israel and not recognize it officially
until the implementation of a two state solution, that palsienens
would need to get some sort of state and only
(05:33):
then would AIRB governments normalize relations with Israel. For a
variety of reasons I can't get into here during this episode,
but might be good to touch on in the future.
Some of these Arab governments and the Trump administration decide
to undo that precedent, sign these agreements with Israel, and
basically make the claim that the Pasienen issue.
Speaker 1 (05:51):
Doesn't need to be solved. We can all move on.
Speaker 2 (05:55):
When the Biden administration comes in, they support this line
of policy too. They seem to agree that the world
can move on while the Palestinians experience worse and worse
violence and have zero freedom of movement, and are born
and die without any sort of political rights or autonomy.
They thought that that status quo looked pretty sustainable. Two
(06:17):
years into the Biden administration, my colleagues at the Arab
Center wrote a report titled the Biden Administration and the
Middle East in twenty twenty three, where they try to
trace any shifts in his foreign policy towards the Middle East.
Speaker 1 (06:30):
There are six different analysts.
Speaker 2 (06:32):
They basically agree across a variety of issue areas, including Palestine,
that the Biden administration is pursuing business as usual. Of course,
we know now that this comes to an abrupt end
with the October seventh attacks and the subsequent war and genocide.
Speaker 1 (06:48):
Then Trump wins in twenty twenty four. He's back and
Trump and his.
Speaker 2 (06:52):
Team while they largely see the Middle East as a
business opportunity. Like everything, It's a place for money making
and grift. It's where katark can give the president a
Boeing seven four to seven, and where the president's companies
can build hotels. The uncertainty around war spilling over from Gaza,
(07:13):
it's putting a damper on all of that. The Trump
team has people on it like Mike Kuckabee, who doesn't
even believe Palestinians exists as a people. He has repeatedly
said that the occupied territories are not occupied, often uses
their biblical names. Judan Samaria when he was one of
the candidates running for president in two thousand and eight,
he said that the Palestenian identity was quote a political
(07:35):
tool to try and force land away from.
Speaker 1 (07:38):
Israel end quote. This is an argument on.
Speaker 2 (07:40):
The far right and some liberals too, who think that
the Palsainian identity is not a national identity, but it's
some sort of anti Semitic ideology. He has also since
as the ambassador to Israel, currently talked about establishing a
Palestinian state in another Muslim country. Despite these types of people,
(08:02):
the Trump administration is weirdly more willing to take steps
without Israel's approval to try and get a ceasefire in
Gaza and resolve the war that's cramping everyone's hopes and
dreams for a Gaza Rivera maybe complete with bearded belly dancers.
And if you don't know what I'm talking about, I
really envy you. So Trump's team, Steve Witkoff, US Special
(08:24):
Envoy to the Middle East and Adam Bohler, US Hostage Envoy,
actually have direct talks with Hamas the Trump team is
talking deals with Saudi Arabia without trying to pressure them
to make a deal with Israel anymore. Bohler says, the
US isn't an agent of Israel. It has to have
its own policy. Honestly, the Biden administration could never not.
To be clear, the Trump administration is still talking about
(08:47):
population transfer. They don't care about stopping Israel's worst excesses
like targeting schools and aid organizations. They in fact go
along with this idea of creating eight distribution points under
an new organization they called the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, which
all the other aid groups are screaming warnings about. The
(09:08):
United Nations Relief and Works Agency ONNERWA. Their Commissioner, General
Felipe Lazzarini has described the distribution sites as quote a
death trap with quote scores of injured and killed amongst
starving civilians. Doctors Without Borders as an organization put out
a statement affirming that this proposed AID organization is quote
(09:29):
conditional en forced displacement and vetting of the population. So
this humanitarian foundation is really just a way to politicize AID,
and indeed the Israelis promptly use them to make arrests
at AID sites and use them to sequester Palestinians into
smaller katayd areas. You'd think in the Gaza strip that
wouldn't even be possible, but they are finding a way.
(09:52):
The first executive director of this foundation, Jake Woods, literally
resigns in a matter of weeks because he can't do
his work while respecting humanitarian lis. He said specifically, it
was quote not possible to implement a new Israeli back
to aid system in the enclave while remaining neutral and independent.
So we're talking that bad. What's the endgame here for
(10:25):
the Israelis? Like I said, it's been pretty clear they
want population transfer for the US. We shall see to
what extent the Trump administration will go along with that.
For Arab leaders, for international powers outside the US, they're
all scrambling to go back to a two state solution framework.
They want a press reset on this war. Go back
thirty years to nineteen ninety three when Israel in the
(10:48):
past time the Liberation Organization signed the Hostile Peace Accords,
and they want to restart these promised negotiations. The Saudi
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Vesan Binfarhan bin Abdullah, has
repeat heatedly emphasized the Saudi Kingdom's commitment to the two
state solution, both at the Arab and Islamic Summit last
year and in internal ministerial meetings. French President Emmanuel Macron
(11:11):
and Saudi Crown Prince Hammad bin Seman even recently co
chaired what they called quote a high level international Conference
for the Peaceful Settlement of the Palestinian Question and the
implementation of the two State Solution.
Speaker 1 (11:23):
Quite a mouthful.
Speaker 2 (11:24):
This meeting is held at the UN, and Katari Prime
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Schehmhammad bin Androhman Arthani
also expressed.
Speaker 1 (11:32):
Support for the conference and its mission.
Speaker 2 (11:34):
A lot of regional actors would love to put an
end to all the war that's destabilizing Palestine, the region,
and the domestic politics in many countries. And that would
sound like a good idea if we didn't know how
the first attempt at the two state solution ended up.
Speaker 1 (11:50):
Let's break this down more.
Speaker 2 (11:52):
What is the Tuesday solution that they are desperately trying
to go back to, and what were the also Peace
of Courts Piece Accords was a framework agreed upon by
the Palestine Liberation Organization and the State of Israel to
start the discussion about a two state solution. As part
of that, it established the creation of a Palstinian Authority,
(12:12):
a government that was supposed to start building up the
parts of an eventual Palestinian state and occupied territories, Now
where those lines eventually would be, what the word state
actually meant for Palestinians, who would get to have sovereignty
in Jerusalem, What would happen to refugees. All of this
was put on the table for continued negotiations. But the
ASCO Accords were significant and have shaped the modern Israeli
(12:35):
Palestinian conflict because not only was it the first time
Israelis and Palestinians were directly negotiating with American oversight and control,
of course, but also because it creates this Palestinian authority apparatus.
The biggest problem is the Ascil piece of coords didn't work.
We don't have a Palestenian state today. Palstenians, in fact
have become more repressed, more restricted in their political rights
(12:58):
and freedom of movement, augmented physically and politically. After the
ASCO courts, the ALSCOLL courts create a system of separating
different parts of the occupied territories into Area A, B
and C. Eventually, Gaza and the West Bank are no
longer governed together and Palestinians in the occupied territories no
longer can access Jerusalem or inside the Green Line in Israel.
(13:20):
And all of these changes happen because of the Oslo Accords,
not to mention, of course, the fact that the Palestinians
continue to deal with the repression of the occupation as
well as the Palestinian authority. The Prime Minister of Israel
who signed the ASCO Accords, Yitzak Robin, literally said in
his last speech to Israeli parliament, quote, we will give
them something less than a state, and then after he's
(13:43):
assassinated by a right wing Israeli we get successive Israeli
governments that don't care about these negotiations at all, that
continue to take more and more land in the occupied territories,
build new Israeli settlements, and restrict Palestinian life. The Palestinian
people have not had a real say in any of this,
and the ASCOL Accords fundamentally shifted internal Palestinian politics in
(14:07):
such a way that disempowered the Palestinian people even more.
Keep this in mind, it's a very important point. Before
the Also Accords, Palestinian politics was defined by the PLO,
the Palestine Liberation Organization. The PLO is an umbrella organization
with a number of political factions.
Speaker 1 (14:27):
It includes the diaspora.
Speaker 2 (14:29):
And includes Palstenians or refugee camps Pastinians as a people
basically wherever they are.
Speaker 1 (14:34):
Of course, the Palestinians are killed.
Speaker 2 (14:36):
Wherever they are, of course, within the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem, and within the Pastinian communities
in Israel, they're repressed in a variety of ways. So
just to be clear that it wasn't great before the
Also Accords by any means, and there are divisions within
the PLO between the different factions. There are also divisions
between those within the occupied territories and those in the
(14:59):
PLO outside occupied territories. And then during the First Palestinian
Uprising in the nineteen eighties, we also have the emergence
of militant Islamus groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who
are not part of the PLO and represent a sort
of opposition to them. But the PLO is the internationally
recognized representative of the Palestinian people. It's a national liberation
(15:22):
movement by its own definition. It's not a state and
it's not a government. The Palestinian Authority, a governing body,
is supposed to be subordinate to the PLO. In actuality,
it really became the key player, and the PLO becomes
a zombie organization. Some parts of the PLO haven't seen
meetings since the nineteen nineties. The PLO today is not representative,
(15:46):
it's not very active. The PLO National Council, the main
legislative body, is supposed to meet every year, that has
only met twice in the past three decades. And then
certain bodies within the PLO, like the Executive Committee or
the Central Council really only meets to rubber stamp the
Palestinian Authority leader's decisions. Why is this relevant, Well, it
(16:08):
means the issue of Palestine became the issue of negotiating
over what this quote less than a state governing body
called the Palestinian Authority gets to do in the bits
of the occupied territories where it's allowed to operate. This
framework doesn't include Palestinians outside those bits of the occupied territories,
and the issue of Palestine is no longer about the
(16:30):
right of refugees to return, for Palestinians to have actual sovereignty,
to have a say in their own future. The PA
doesn't defend the Palestinians it's supposedly governing. In fact, it
coordinates with Israel to maintain Israeli security, and there's no
institutional way for Palestinians to impact their political leadership that
might actually negotiate away their rights. Because the p LOO
(16:53):
is no longer functioning and the PA itself is undemocratic,
the US and its allies consistently make sure it stays
that way. They elevate the current leader, Mahamad Abbas and
back is essentially uncontested election in two thousand and four
to the presidency, they push our best to hold parliamentary
elections in two thousand and six, and then when Hamas
(17:13):
wins a plurality, help him overturn those elections. Within the
political party that Abbas is also a leader of Fate,
the emergence of new leaders is often blocked, sometimes by
Israel simply not allowing party members to travel at attend
the conferences. Palestinian scholar thought It Dana has some really
interesting research on that front. If people are interested in
(17:34):
a chapter titled Lost in Transition the Palestinian National Movement
after Oslo, suffice to say, everyone ignores demands by Palestinians
in the occupied territories to have new leadership or to
hold elections, and the Palestinian people's regular everyday life is
such that they face more restrictions, more violence, more of
(17:54):
an inability to live. When Hamas takes control in Gaza,
Palestinians and Gaza all time so have to face a
brutal blockade. Everyone in Palestine faces layers of authoritarian control,
not just the occupation but the Palsidian authority itself, and
everyone with power around the world basically expects them to
just accept this reality. Well, they won't, not because they're crazy,
(18:17):
but because this is existential. There are more uprisings, some
very violent. The second Palestinian uprising that starts in two
thousand is more fragmented and much more violent than the first,
(18:39):
based on both death toll and tactics. Wendy Prohman's book
Violence Nonviolence in the Palestinian National Movement has an excellent
analysis of how and why this happened. There are also
nonviolent campaigns. There is the call by Palestinian Civil Society
in two thousand and five to boycott, divest from, and
sanctioned Israel, the BDS movement. There are non violent protest campaigns,
(19:01):
especially in village areas where the new segregation wall is
going up. People really lean on getting the attention of
the international community and pursuing non violent tactics as a
form of legitimacy. There are village campaigns in places like
Bilayin and Layin and Budrus, lots of books, documentaries and
press coverage.
Speaker 1 (19:19):
They get attention, but they don't stop the occupation.
Speaker 2 (19:22):
Thanks for Pastenians keep getting worse with no political options,
the appeal of violent tactics goes up with increased threats
and attacks by Israeli settlers alongside occupation forces, the appeal
of violent tactics goes up. The Pastadian Center for Policy
and Survey Research in a poll from September two on
twenty three across occupied territories, so this is right before
(19:43):
the last war, found support for armed struggle is much
higher than support for negotiations as the most effective means
of ending the Israeli occupation. Fifty three percent of respondents
support armed struggle and twenty percent support negotiations. I remember
being interviewed by the Ukrainian Outlet Commons, and I'm not
the first to say this, nor was I the last,
(20:05):
but I remember talking to them in August twenty twenty
three and saying, it really seems like mass violence is
coming because all of this isn't sustainable. On the Israeli side,
with every election, their government was becoming more extreme, more
vocal about population transfer.
Speaker 1 (20:20):
And ethnic cleansing.
Speaker 2 (20:22):
So now that you know the backstory, it puts a
new light on the discussion of a two state framework today.
Even if that two state framework remained feasible, and that's
a big if, how do international actors imagine this is
going to work out.
Speaker 1 (20:38):
If Palestinians still.
Speaker 2 (20:39):
Don't get a say in their own leadership, how are
you going to get Palestinians to go along with the
peace process they had no hand in shaping. And Palestinians
are critical of their entire political establishment, both the PA
and HAMAS in Gaza. People were protesting HAMAS before the
October seventh detexts, that were protests in July twenty twenty
(21:00):
three against governance and living conditions, and there were protests
after the October seventh attack in March of this year,
also critical of HAMAS and its conduct. In May twenty
twenty five, that same center, the Palestinian Center for Policy
and Survey Research, had a poll which showed that only
fifteen percent of respondents from across the occupied territories thought
that the Palsaenian authority's conduct had been satisfactory. Forty two
(21:23):
percent support its dissolution. So, given that this is how
the public views thinks, plans for Gaza that rely on
the return of a previous status quo, something like HAMAS
in Gaza or the PA in the West Bank, or
returning PA controlled to Gaza altogether, will not be popular
in any shape or form, and yet there haven't been
(21:44):
any clear proposals for anything but such a scenario. In fact,
it seems Israel is banking on the idea of sequestering
Palestinians into smaller camps. The US doesn't seem to have
a problem with that. The Arabs and EU actors are
still talking about supporting the Palstinian Authority. Foreign Minister of
Sad Arabia and December twenty twenty four put out a
(22:04):
statement affirming that quote the Kingdom and Arab and Islamic
countries will continue to support the Palestinian Authority, noting its
capacity despite all challenges to manage the situation in the
West Bank and Gaza end quote and because they're worried
about where the PA will go from here. Given how
old the Palestinian president what Abbass is, He's eighty nine.
(22:25):
Arab governments have also pressured him to figure out a
succession plan. A few weeks ago May twenty twenty five,
he did indeed convene the PLOW Central Council, despite objections
and despite the fact that most factions within the PLO
boycotted the proceedings. Those president changed the bylaws to make
(22:46):
a new vice president position understood to be Abbess's successor.
Abbess then appoints a man named Seenan Chez, a businessman,
a security coordination guy who pulls at two percent. I mean,
this just won't be acceptable to the Palestinian public, but
this is their best plan. Because of these shenetigans, there
(23:08):
are Palestinian initiatives with political leaders and civil society actors
calling to revitalize the PLO to make it more representative.
For example, there is the Palestinian National Conference initiative, which
has been pretty consistently attacked by the PA. This National
Conference attempts to involve a wider diaspora and include input
(23:28):
from all the political factions, and it's called on PA
leaders to revive the PLO meaningfully and allow for more input.
There are also initiatives such as Land for All, which
includes Israelis and Palestinians that talk about a new type
of two state solution and they want to move beyond
the current kind of political impacts on both sides. But
no one is really paying attention to these calls from
(23:50):
outside initiatives or from civil society, so as of now,
the only plan being taken seriously is the Israeli US
plan of repressing Gaza into oblivion. There's even reporting by
how much haw that at Zeteo that the Israeli forces
have activated and supported gangs in Gaza, some of them
with affiliations to Isis, to advance their political aims. What's
(24:13):
clear is that we do need to go back to
the drawing board, and we need to understand that unless
Palestinians have a say in their internal politics, no solutions
will be meaningful. But I don't see any indication that
anyone with any power talking about solutions for Gaza and
the war has absorbed this fact.
Speaker 1 (24:36):
That's all I have for you today.
Speaker 2 (24:37):
I'll be back to talk more about developments in Palestinian politics,
as well as deep dives on topics like Arab Israeli negotiations,
protest movements and more.
Speaker 1 (24:46):
Thanks for listening.
Speaker 3 (24:52):
It Could Happen Here is a production of pool Zone Media.
For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website
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now find sources for It Could Happen here, listed directly
in episode descriptions. Thanks for listening.
Cool Zone Media.
Speaker 2 (00:06):
Hello everyone, and welcome to It can Happen Here. My
name is Dan al Kurd. I'm a writer, analyst, and
researcher of Palestinian and Arab politics. I'm an associate professor
of political science and a senior non resident Fellow at
the Arab Center Washington. You may have heard me on
It Could Happen Here before or behind the Bastards. I've
been following cool Zone media projects for a while. I
(00:28):
was happy when Robert and Sophie reached out and said, hey,
come talk to our listeners on a more regular basis.
Speaker 1 (00:35):
Today.
Speaker 2 (00:36):
I want to talk to you about something that doesn't
get almost any attention in Western media, internal Palestinian politics.
Something I've argued for a while and continues to be
the focus of my work is that Pasadian politics are
important and the Passingian issue is important. I remember once
being on stage for one of these DC events with
(00:57):
none other than General Stanley McCrystal, and he turns to
me and says, essentially, the Palstadian issue is an issue.
Speaker 1 (01:04):
Of the past.
Speaker 2 (01:05):
Other Arabs want to move on, and it took everything
in me to not respond, what planet are you living on?
A genocide has been unfolding for the past almost two years,
and crackdown on pro pastine activists is in the American
media every other day. Maybe now we recognize that this
is an important issue to understand, Maybe one can hope,
(01:27):
But you would not believe how many people in DC,
in the American government, and by extension, lots of people
in power, convinced themselves for years that the Pasadian issue
and internal Pastadian politics were not worth addressing. For today's episode,
I want to start to tackle a sort of big
question of what is going on with Pastadian politics, and
I'll give you the takeaways for this episode right away.
(01:50):
Number One, the Palestinian people are totally unrepresented by their
leadership right now. The Pasadian people haven't had a say
in a very long time, and that's a big problem
because if we want to resolve any part of this
conflict sustainably, will need people to go along. And the
conflict got to where it is now because international actors
thought that they could ignore the Palestinian people. That's literally
(02:12):
as simple as it gets. Number Two, no one internationally
or state side seems to have learned this lesson. In
the US, we've had bipartisan support for ignoring Palestinians and internationally,
the response has been Okay, let's go back and try
to do the same things we've always done, and maybe
this time it'll work out for us. I'll explain more
(02:33):
of what I mean as I go along.
Speaker 1 (02:35):
Stay with me.
Speaker 2 (02:39):
Let's start first with the present. What's on everyone's minds
and screens, The war in Gaza, the genocide that's unfolding there.
I use that term because it's been credibly identified as
a genocide by scholars of genocide and holocaust studies such
as ras Segal, Omer Bartov and Amos Goldberg.
Speaker 1 (02:58):
But I don't really care about this mantics here.
Speaker 2 (03:01):
Even if it was just mass violence and war crimes,
that's still pretty bad too. But this genocide and this
war has been relentless for over six hundred days now.
So what's everyone's endgame here? When this latest iteration of
violence started under the Biden registration, with Hamas's October seventh
attack that killed twelve hundred people and took two hundred
(03:23):
and fifty hostages, the president and his team took every
step to support Israel in its war. As Krada del Guindhi,
author and political analysts wrote for Foreign policy last year,
Biden's embrace of Nittanne, who was rooted in the belief
that only positive inducements and constant reassurances, both militarily and diplomatically,
(03:43):
could restrain Israel's actions in Gaza.
Speaker 1 (03:46):
End quote, the.
Speaker 2 (03:47):
Israelis were pretty vocal and clear about what they thought
they needed to do in Gaza. Their goals were to
eliminate Hamas as a political actor entirely, and some vocal
members of the Cabinet, such as Nance Minister Bisilosmotrich, as
well as members of the Kanesset Israeli Parliament like nissiin Vaturi,
the deputy Kanesset speaker, were talking straight up about annihilation
(04:10):
and population transfer settlement in Gaza. Perhaps we all remember
what happened here, but even as time went on, none
of this was enough for the Biden administration to change
course on the type of support it was extending for
this war. But let's also remember that the Biden administration
had little interest in the Israeli Palestinian conflict before the
(04:31):
October seventh attack, or indeed any interest in the Middle East.
The State Department under Biden had wound down its Middle
East engagement. They didn't undo any of Trump's major policy
changes visavi the Middle East during his first administration. In fact,
they doubled down they agreed. For example, Trump during his
first term officially recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital, even though
(04:52):
this is contested and you and Resolution one four seven
says it should be an international city, internationally administered so
that studients could also have access and claim to it,
but Trump says the US doesn't care accepts Israel's sovereignty
over Jerusalem. Trump also during his first term tried to
sideline the issue of Palistine entirely by engineering these quote
(05:12):
unquote peace deals between AIRB governments and Israel. Now, most
Arab governments have had the position since the Arab Peace
Initiative of two thousand and two that they would not
have diplomatic relations with Israel and not recognize it officially
until the implementation of a two state solution, that palsienens
would need to get some sort of state and only
(05:33):
then would AIRB governments normalize relations with Israel. For a
variety of reasons I can't get into here during this episode,
but might be good to touch on in the future.
Some of these Arab governments and the Trump administration decide
to undo that precedent, sign these agreements with Israel, and
basically make the claim that the Pasienen issue.
Speaker 1 (05:51):
Doesn't need to be solved. We can all move on.
Speaker 2 (05:55):
When the Biden administration comes in, they support this line
of policy too. They seem to agree that the world
can move on while the Palestinians experience worse and worse
violence and have zero freedom of movement, and are born
and die without any sort of political rights or autonomy.
They thought that that status quo looked pretty sustainable. Two
(06:17):
years into the Biden administration, my colleagues at the Arab
Center wrote a report titled the Biden Administration and the
Middle East in twenty twenty three, where they try to
trace any shifts in his foreign policy towards the Middle East.
Speaker 1 (06:30):
There are six different analysts.
Speaker 2 (06:32):
They basically agree across a variety of issue areas, including Palestine,
that the Biden administration is pursuing business as usual. Of course,
we know now that this comes to an abrupt end
with the October seventh attacks and the subsequent war and genocide.
Speaker 1 (06:48):
Then Trump wins in twenty twenty four. He's back and
Trump and his.
Speaker 2 (06:52):
Team while they largely see the Middle East as a
business opportunity. Like everything, It's a place for money making
and grift. It's where katark can give the president a
Boeing seven four to seven, and where the president's companies
can build hotels. The uncertainty around war spilling over from Gaza,
(07:13):
it's putting a damper on all of that. The Trump
team has people on it like Mike Kuckabee, who doesn't
even believe Palestinians exists as a people. He has repeatedly
said that the occupied territories are not occupied, often uses
their biblical names. Judan Samaria when he was one of
the candidates running for president in two thousand and eight,
he said that the Palestenian identity was quote a political
(07:35):
tool to try and force land away from.
Speaker 1 (07:38):
Israel end quote. This is an argument on.
Speaker 2 (07:40):
The far right and some liberals too, who think that
the Palsainian identity is not a national identity, but it's
some sort of anti Semitic ideology. He has also since
as the ambassador to Israel, currently talked about establishing a
Palestinian state in another Muslim country. Despite these types of people,
(08:02):
the Trump administration is weirdly more willing to take steps
without Israel's approval to try and get a ceasefire in
Gaza and resolve the war that's cramping everyone's hopes and
dreams for a Gaza Rivera maybe complete with bearded belly dancers.
And if you don't know what I'm talking about, I
really envy you. So Trump's team, Steve Witkoff, US Special
(08:24):
Envoy to the Middle East and Adam Bohler, US Hostage Envoy,
actually have direct talks with Hamas the Trump team is
talking deals with Saudi Arabia without trying to pressure them
to make a deal with Israel anymore. Bohler says, the
US isn't an agent of Israel. It has to have
its own policy. Honestly, the Biden administration could never not.
To be clear, the Trump administration is still talking about
(08:47):
population transfer. They don't care about stopping Israel's worst excesses
like targeting schools and aid organizations. They in fact go
along with this idea of creating eight distribution points under
an new organization they called the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, which
all the other aid groups are screaming warnings about. The
(09:08):
United Nations Relief and Works Agency ONNERWA. Their Commissioner, General
Felipe Lazzarini has described the distribution sites as quote a
death trap with quote scores of injured and killed amongst
starving civilians. Doctors Without Borders as an organization put out
a statement affirming that this proposed AID organization is quote
(09:29):
conditional en forced displacement and vetting of the population. So
this humanitarian foundation is really just a way to politicize AID,
and indeed the Israelis promptly use them to make arrests
at AID sites and use them to sequester Palestinians into
smaller katayd areas. You'd think in the Gaza strip that
wouldn't even be possible, but they are finding a way.
(09:52):
The first executive director of this foundation, Jake Woods, literally
resigns in a matter of weeks because he can't do
his work while respecting humanitarian lis. He said specifically, it
was quote not possible to implement a new Israeli back
to aid system in the enclave while remaining neutral and independent.
So we're talking that bad. What's the endgame here for
(10:25):
the Israelis? Like I said, it's been pretty clear they
want population transfer for the US. We shall see to
what extent the Trump administration will go along with that.
For Arab leaders, for international powers outside the US, they're
all scrambling to go back to a two state solution framework.
They want a press reset on this war. Go back
thirty years to nineteen ninety three when Israel in the
(10:48):
past time the Liberation Organization signed the Hostile Peace Accords,
and they want to restart these promised negotiations. The Saudi
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Vesan Binfarhan bin Abdullah, has
repeat heatedly emphasized the Saudi Kingdom's commitment to the two
state solution, both at the Arab and Islamic Summit last
year and in internal ministerial meetings. French President Emmanuel Macron
(11:11):
and Saudi Crown Prince Hammad bin Seman even recently co
chaired what they called quote a high level international Conference
for the Peaceful Settlement of the Palestinian Question and the
implementation of the two State Solution.
Speaker 1 (11:23):
Quite a mouthful.
Speaker 2 (11:24):
This meeting is held at the UN, and Katari Prime
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Schehmhammad bin Androhman Arthani
also expressed.
Speaker 1 (11:32):
Support for the conference and its mission.
Speaker 2 (11:34):
A lot of regional actors would love to put an
end to all the war that's destabilizing Palestine, the region,
and the domestic politics in many countries. And that would
sound like a good idea if we didn't know how
the first attempt at the two state solution ended up.
Speaker 1 (11:50):
Let's break this down more.
Speaker 2 (11:52):
What is the Tuesday solution that they are desperately trying
to go back to, and what were the also Peace
of Courts Piece Accords was a framework agreed upon by
the Palestine Liberation Organization and the State of Israel to
start the discussion about a two state solution. As part
of that, it established the creation of a Palstinian Authority,
(12:12):
a government that was supposed to start building up the
parts of an eventual Palestinian state and occupied territories, Now
where those lines eventually would be, what the word state
actually meant for Palestinians, who would get to have sovereignty
in Jerusalem, What would happen to refugees. All of this
was put on the table for continued negotiations. But the
ASCO Accords were significant and have shaped the modern Israeli
(12:35):
Palestinian conflict because not only was it the first time
Israelis and Palestinians were directly negotiating with American oversight and control,
of course, but also because it creates this Palestinian authority apparatus.
The biggest problem is the Ascil piece of coords didn't work.
We don't have a Palestenian state today. Palstenians, in fact
have become more repressed, more restricted in their political rights
(12:58):
and freedom of movement, augmented physically and politically. After the
ASCO courts, the ALSCOLL courts create a system of separating
different parts of the occupied territories into Area A, B
and C. Eventually, Gaza and the West Bank are no
longer governed together and Palestinians in the occupied territories no
longer can access Jerusalem or inside the Green Line in Israel.
(13:20):
And all of these changes happen because of the Oslo Accords,
not to mention, of course, the fact that the Palestinians
continue to deal with the repression of the occupation as
well as the Palestinian authority. The Prime Minister of Israel
who signed the ASCO Accords, Yitzak Robin, literally said in
his last speech to Israeli parliament, quote, we will give
them something less than a state, and then after he's
(13:43):
assassinated by a right wing Israeli we get successive Israeli
governments that don't care about these negotiations at all, that
continue to take more and more land in the occupied territories,
build new Israeli settlements, and restrict Palestinian life. The Palestinian
people have not had a real say in any of this,
and the ASCOL Accords fundamentally shifted internal Palestinian politics in
(14:07):
such a way that disempowered the Palestinian people even more.
Keep this in mind, it's a very important point. Before
the Also Accords, Palestinian politics was defined by the PLO,
the Palestine Liberation Organization. The PLO is an umbrella organization
with a number of political factions.
Speaker 1 (14:27):
It includes the diaspora.
Speaker 2 (14:29):
And includes Palstenians or refugee camps Pastinians as a people
basically wherever they are.
Speaker 1 (14:34):
Of course, the Palestinians are killed.
Speaker 2 (14:36):
Wherever they are, of course, within the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem, and within the Pastinian communities
in Israel, they're repressed in a variety of ways. So
just to be clear that it wasn't great before the
Also Accords by any means, and there are divisions within
the PLO between the different factions. There are also divisions
between those within the occupied territories and those in the
(14:59):
PLO outside occupied territories. And then during the First Palestinian
Uprising in the nineteen eighties, we also have the emergence
of militant Islamus groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who
are not part of the PLO and represent a sort
of opposition to them. But the PLO is the internationally
recognized representative of the Palestinian people. It's a national liberation
(15:22):
movement by its own definition. It's not a state and
it's not a government. The Palestinian Authority, a governing body,
is supposed to be subordinate to the PLO. In actuality,
it really became the key player, and the PLO becomes
a zombie organization. Some parts of the PLO haven't seen
meetings since the nineteen nineties. The PLO today is not representative,
(15:46):
it's not very active. The PLO National Council, the main
legislative body, is supposed to meet every year, that has
only met twice in the past three decades. And then
certain bodies within the PLO, like the Executive Committee or
the Central Council really only meets to rubber stamp the
Palestinian Authority leader's decisions. Why is this relevant, Well, it
(16:08):
means the issue of Palestine became the issue of negotiating
over what this quote less than a state governing body
called the Palestinian Authority gets to do in the bits
of the occupied territories where it's allowed to operate. This
framework doesn't include Palestinians outside those bits of the occupied territories,
and the issue of Palestine is no longer about the
(16:30):
right of refugees to return, for Palestinians to have actual sovereignty,
to have a say in their own future. The PA
doesn't defend the Palestinians it's supposedly governing. In fact, it
coordinates with Israel to maintain Israeli security, and there's no
institutional way for Palestinians to impact their political leadership that
might actually negotiate away their rights. Because the p LOO
(16:53):
is no longer functioning and the PA itself is undemocratic,
the US and its allies consistently make sure it stays
that way. They elevate the current leader, Mahamad Abbas and
back is essentially uncontested election in two thousand and four
to the presidency, they push our best to hold parliamentary
elections in two thousand and six, and then when Hamas
(17:13):
wins a plurality, help him overturn those elections. Within the
political party that Abbas is also a leader of Fate,
the emergence of new leaders is often blocked, sometimes by
Israel simply not allowing party members to travel at attend
the conferences. Palestinian scholar thought It Dana has some really
interesting research on that front. If people are interested in
(17:34):
a chapter titled Lost in Transition the Palestinian National Movement
after Oslo, suffice to say, everyone ignores demands by Palestinians
in the occupied territories to have new leadership or to
hold elections, and the Palestinian people's regular everyday life is
such that they face more restrictions, more violence, more of
(17:54):
an inability to live. When Hamas takes control in Gaza,
Palestinians and Gaza all time so have to face a
brutal blockade. Everyone in Palestine faces layers of authoritarian control,
not just the occupation but the Palsidian authority itself, and
everyone with power around the world basically expects them to
just accept this reality. Well, they won't, not because they're crazy,
(18:17):
but because this is existential. There are more uprisings, some
very violent. The second Palestinian uprising that starts in two
thousand is more fragmented and much more violent than the first,
(18:39):
based on both death toll and tactics. Wendy Prohman's book
Violence Nonviolence in the Palestinian National Movement has an excellent
analysis of how and why this happened. There are also
nonviolent campaigns. There is the call by Palestinian Civil Society
in two thousand and five to boycott, divest from, and
sanctioned Israel, the BDS movement. There are non violent protest campaigns,
(19:01):
especially in village areas where the new segregation wall is
going up. People really lean on getting the attention of
the international community and pursuing non violent tactics as a
form of legitimacy. There are village campaigns in places like
Bilayin and Layin and Budrus, lots of books, documentaries and
press coverage.
Speaker 1 (19:19):
They get attention, but they don't stop the occupation.
Speaker 2 (19:22):
Thanks for Pastenians keep getting worse with no political options,
the appeal of violent tactics goes up with increased threats
and attacks by Israeli settlers alongside occupation forces, the appeal
of violent tactics goes up. The Pastadian Center for Policy
and Survey Research in a poll from September two on
twenty three across occupied territories, so this is right before
(19:43):
the last war, found support for armed struggle is much
higher than support for negotiations as the most effective means
of ending the Israeli occupation. Fifty three percent of respondents
support armed struggle and twenty percent support negotiations. I remember
being interviewed by the Ukrainian Outlet Commons, and I'm not
the first to say this, nor was I the last,
(20:05):
but I remember talking to them in August twenty twenty
three and saying, it really seems like mass violence is
coming because all of this isn't sustainable. On the Israeli side,
with every election, their government was becoming more extreme, more
vocal about population transfer.
Speaker 1 (20:20):
And ethnic cleansing.
Speaker 2 (20:22):
So now that you know the backstory, it puts a
new light on the discussion of a two state framework today.
Even if that two state framework remained feasible, and that's
a big if, how do international actors imagine this is
going to work out.
Speaker 1 (20:38):
If Palestinians still.
Speaker 2 (20:39):
Don't get a say in their own leadership, how are
you going to get Palestinians to go along with the
peace process they had no hand in shaping. And Palestinians
are critical of their entire political establishment, both the PA
and HAMAS in Gaza. People were protesting HAMAS before the
October seventh detexts, that were protests in July twenty twenty
(21:00):
three against governance and living conditions, and there were protests
after the October seventh attack in March of this year,
also critical of HAMAS and its conduct. In May twenty
twenty five, that same center, the Palestinian Center for Policy
and Survey Research, had a poll which showed that only
fifteen percent of respondents from across the occupied territories thought
that the Palsaenian authority's conduct had been satisfactory. Forty two
(21:23):
percent support its dissolution. So, given that this is how
the public views thinks, plans for Gaza that rely on
the return of a previous status quo, something like HAMAS
in Gaza or the PA in the West Bank, or
returning PA controlled to Gaza altogether, will not be popular
in any shape or form, and yet there haven't been
(21:44):
any clear proposals for anything but such a scenario. In fact,
it seems Israel is banking on the idea of sequestering
Palestinians into smaller camps. The US doesn't seem to have
a problem with that. The Arabs and EU actors are
still talking about supporting the Palstinian Authority. Foreign Minister of
Sad Arabia and December twenty twenty four put out a
(22:04):
statement affirming that quote the Kingdom and Arab and Islamic
countries will continue to support the Palestinian Authority, noting its
capacity despite all challenges to manage the situation in the
West Bank and Gaza end quote and because they're worried
about where the PA will go from here. Given how
old the Palestinian president what Abbass is, He's eighty nine.
(22:25):
Arab governments have also pressured him to figure out a
succession plan. A few weeks ago May twenty twenty five,
he did indeed convene the PLOW Central Council, despite objections
and despite the fact that most factions within the PLO
boycotted the proceedings. Those president changed the bylaws to make
(22:46):
a new vice president position understood to be Abbess's successor.
Abbess then appoints a man named Seenan Chez, a businessman,
a security coordination guy who pulls at two percent. I mean,
this just won't be acceptable to the Palestinian public, but
this is their best plan. Because of these shenetigans, there
(23:08):
are Palestinian initiatives with political leaders and civil society actors
calling to revitalize the PLO to make it more representative.
For example, there is the Palestinian National Conference initiative, which
has been pretty consistently attacked by the PA. This National
Conference attempts to involve a wider diaspora and include input
(23:28):
from all the political factions, and it's called on PA
leaders to revive the PLO meaningfully and allow for more input.
There are also initiatives such as Land for All, which
includes Israelis and Palestinians that talk about a new type
of two state solution and they want to move beyond
the current kind of political impacts on both sides. But
no one is really paying attention to these calls from
(23:50):
outside initiatives or from civil society, so as of now,
the only plan being taken seriously is the Israeli US
plan of repressing Gaza into oblivion. There's even reporting by
how much haw that at Zeteo that the Israeli forces
have activated and supported gangs in Gaza, some of them
with affiliations to Isis, to advance their political aims. What's
(24:13):
clear is that we do need to go back to
the drawing board, and we need to understand that unless
Palestinians have a say in their internal politics, no solutions
will be meaningful. But I don't see any indication that
anyone with any power talking about solutions for Gaza and
the war has absorbed this fact.
Speaker 1 (24:36):
That's all I have for you today.
Speaker 2 (24:37):
I'll be back to talk more about developments in Palestinian politics,
as well as deep dives on topics like Arab Israeli negotiations,
protest movements and more.
Speaker 1 (24:46):
Thanks for listening.
Speaker 3 (24:52):
It Could Happen Here is a production of pool Zone Media.
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now find sources for It Could Happen here, listed directly
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It Could Happen Here News
Hosts And Creators
Robert Evans
Garrison Davis
James Stout
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