Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:05):
Everyone. It's just me today, James again, and I'm talking
today with my friend Billy Billy Ford. Billy is a
program officer for the Burma team at the United States
Institute of Peace. And do you want to say hello, Billy, James,
thanks for joining it. Yeah, thanks for joining us. Without
a decent introduction, have I summed up what you don't
(00:26):
want to get that wrong? So people will have heard
Billy before and or heard from Billy when we finished
our last series on them, where we spoke about the
funding that the PDFs are using and how they're using
a lot of unique and really innovative methods to continue
to support their revolution when they're not getting very much
at all in the way of international support, and certainly
(00:47):
nothing compared to countries like Ukraine. But what we wanted
to talk a little bit about today was the s
a C or the Hunter's attempts at kind of staging
a sham election, which they've sort of back off on.
Can you explain a little bit about what they had
proposed and then what they maybe what they're doing now, right? Yeah. Um,
(01:09):
So the expectation was upon UM instigating the coup February
that UM the state of emergency would end on UM February,
which was two days ago, UM, giving them six months
after that, uh, that period to kind of undertake an election.
(01:33):
And so the expectation was that before August one, there
would be this sort of sham electoral process UM, and
the the Hunter would essentially structure of the process in
such a way that they they're there, their political party,
the U s DP, would prevail, UM, and that the
(01:54):
Commander in Chief men online who runs the HUNTA would
and as he had dreamed to become the president of
the country and kind of rule in a military dictatorship model,
but under kind of these auspices of civilian governance. So
that was the expectation. But things have changed, as you
kind of alluded to. Yeah, so they've they've said they've
(02:16):
got to extend for another six months. Who's that right,
that's right? UM, So they said they would extend for
another six months until August first. But then this morning
they also announced a new political, Economic, and Social objectives
which includes a five point road map UM, which, for
those of you who have been following m R for
some time, is often the way that they frame their
(02:38):
UM kind of sham and circuitous approaches to civilian governance. UM.
But UM that articulates a series of reforms, restoring law
and order, you know, social development, implementing a peace process,
and then holding elections UM. And this is I think
(03:00):
indicates to most people that elections are very unlikely to
occur any time in the near future. UM. They did
something almost identical in two thousand and four articulating a
roadmap to democracy, and that didn't really start until two
thousand and ten, UM, where when there were elections and
(03:22):
there weren't really meaningful ones until UM. This is kind
of an indication to I think a lot of folks
that UM elections are unlikely this year and that there's
kind of a long road ahead. UH. The interesting element
of this will be to see how the the hunta's
kind of enablers in the international community, including Thailand, China,
(03:45):
and India in particular, how they will respond, in part
because they were pushing the sac very hard to undertake
these elections as a potential off ramp to the horrifying
violence that is UM that resulted from the coup and UM,
you know, all the atrocities that the SEC has committed.
Maybe we could talk a little bit about the international
(04:07):
support they have because it's still quite significant, and like
especially in terms of propping up their military force through
the use of air power they can and they don't
have domestic like fighting yet manufacturing, right, So can you
talk a little bit about that, Like I think they
received a couple more planes very recently, right, Yeah, from
(04:28):
UM the Chinese. UM. Yeah. There it's kind of an
interesting dynamic whereby you have a an entire country of
fifty three ish million people UM fighting against a tiny
military institution of about five or fewer if you include
their families and all the medics UM. And that tiny
(04:48):
institution is being supported by just a handful of countries UM.
As I said, kind of China, Russia, UH to a
certain agree, Indian and Thailand, UM, and a few others UM.
And the vast mo jority of the world is kind
of opposes this military takeover and the subsequent dictatorship and
all the her indos atrocities that they've committed. UM. And
(05:09):
so there's quite a lot of international actors who are
providing kind of UM rhetorical support to the resistance and
some you know, support to civil society and humanitarian assistance
and others. But you know, on balance the support that
the Chinese, Indians Russians in particular UM have provided in
(05:30):
terms of material assistance to the s A c UM
as well as the diplomatic assistance that the Chinese provide
at the Security Council in particular, but also the Ties
provide UM with an ascion is you know for outweighs
the rhetorical and small material assistance at the West and
UM you know other supporters of the resistance movements have
(05:53):
provided UM so yes, to answer your question, the you know,
the Chinese and Indians continue to provide material military assistance
to the s A c UM. And you know, my
question is kind of what is there theory of change
here and how will UM supporting the SAC militarily lead
(06:15):
to anything like stabilization. It's just kind of perplexing to
me when both countries are very UM interested in in
in supporting US a level of functional stability so they
can undertake their economic and geopolitical objectives UM, many of
which go through my Mr UM. I just don't really
understand how they see kind of a military victory bry
(06:37):
the s A c as a pathway to stabilization when
you have an entire nation that has risen up against
UH the dictatorship and has wholly rejected it and demonstrated
that they're willing to make the these incredible sacrifices to
UM to ensure that this coup does not succeed. Yeah,
(06:58):
it is. It's very perfecting because like it's not in
in any sort of conventional sense like a consolidated regime
and no show any chance of being one. Right, Like,
it doesn't even have territorial control of a large sways
of the country that they claims. Yeah, exactly, and you're
you're even hearing this. I mean, there's been quite a
bit of research, contested research that that shows the HUNTA
(07:21):
has less than fifty control. But even today you are differ.
Yesterday you heard from an online the the hunter leader
UM that he's now admitting that they UM only have
sixty percent control, which is a pretty sangular analysis of
what they control. UM, it's probably much smaller than that.
But you know, them demonstrating that they do not have
(07:43):
UM control over forty of the country as a pretty
staggering proposition and kind of indication to their allies that UM,
you know, they just don't have the capacity to administer
a country that's unwilling to be pacified and um so
and and you know, on top of that, there's very
(08:05):
little I just don't see a pathway in which they
will capture more territory. Um. I mean they have, you know,
constrained resources. Um they have. I think they had twenty
two entrants into the Defense Service Academy last year. I
mean there's when they when there's casualties on the front lines,
you just there's not a lot of replacement happening. Um,
(08:26):
They're not able to get spare parts for their Russian
made helicopters. You know, there's just major material constraints that
the S a c. S. Military is facing, and it's
just hard to imagine that they will ever regain much
more than you know, what they say is territorial control. Yeah,
it's it's very if. Then if we look at the
(08:47):
PDF by comparison, and I got banned from Twitter last
week for posting a picture of them, but their equipment
compared to even a year ago, is vastly improved. I
don't know if you saw the one group of guys
with it actually international rifle, but I have no idea
where that came from, but it it's very impressive that
(09:08):
they have one. Yeah, yeah, it's kind of um Honestly,
the resilience of this movement is partly a testament to
the ingenuity and innovation UM. I mean, we saw it
in the beginning in the non violent action, demonstrating or
kind of deploying tactics that we've never seen before that
have you know, been lessons to other international non violent
(09:30):
movements around the world. Just really creative fundraising tactics, as
you and I have discussed in the past. But yeah,
now it's the military ingenuity. I mean, essentially creating UM
facilities for retrofitting drones for aerial attacks. UM. One of
the military's helicopters was taken down this morning. I haven't
(09:52):
I don't know exactly what weapons were used in that,
but you know, it's just kind of a level of
innovation given uh, these you know, the PDFs and most
of the eras have have very little access to very
few kind of international um, you know, arms markets. So
(10:12):
the fact that they're able to sustain themselves at all
and maintain this, you know, which is probably much more
of the territory is is kind of an incredible testament
to their innovation and ingenuity. Yeah, it's like there's a
couple obviously of several PDF fighters who I keep in
touch with, and like they they have spoken to me
about like first or three D printed guns, which we've
(10:34):
spoken about extentively, but also torna CA's night vision goggles,
even process like like limbs people who have lost legs,
right to land minds and things. So like, it's amazing
that they've set up all these things which normally require
like a massive interaction with the state and with an
international system, and they've done it using in this case,
(10:55):
the Internet and a three hundred dollar printer. They've got
an early Express or something. Yeah, it's incredible. Yeah, it's
it's extremely sort of inspiration on that sense, but also
very sad. Like I want to talk a little bit
about the the s a C seems to have. It's
not fair to say they've pivoted to war crimes, because
it's been kind of integral to what they've done from
the outset, but they seem to have given up on
(11:18):
trying to make like targeted strikes against the military formations
and just pivoted to dropping bombs on civilians. Could you
talk about a couple of those, like maybe we could
talk about the Kitchen Music cultural festival they bombed, or
well one of the other examples of that. Yeah, there's
definitely been a shift from UM a strategy of essentially
(11:42):
augmenting UM or providing air support to UH kind of
exposed frontline light infantry, to a tactic of targeted air
strikes against civilian targets and against UM or organization headquarters
which had UM under previous UM negotiation has been deemed
(12:08):
like off limits, but UM it seems as if there's
nothing off limits now. They bombed UM the Chin National
Front's headquarters which is right on the India Chin border
UM on the western part of the mr UM and
there's pretty reliable accounts that there were UM there were
(12:28):
bombs that landed in Indian territory. UM. I mean, as
you reference, they there was a bombing in um, a
Chin state on a on a festival, killing at least
sixty civilians. They've done something similar on UM UH ethnic
Armed Organization headquarters in the southeastern Karan territories, including the
(12:50):
our acount of armies facilities in those areas. So there
has been a shift in tactic to UM targeting headquarters
facilities in that sense and as you said, kind of
civilian targets to I don't know, you know, this is
just the modus operandi of an institution that is devoid
(13:11):
of humanity and um, so alienated from society that they
you know, they're they're willing to go to any ends
to kind of protect themselves and their control of power.
I think, particularly now that they've seen that the public
is against them, and um probably quite concerned that if
(13:31):
they are unsuccessful in this military endeavor that they will
be kind of strung up, you know. So it's um yeah,
I think it's kind of a sign of desperation and
as you mentioned, kind of a tactical shifty. Maybe we
(13:53):
should explain the sort of four cut strategy, which has
been a long term strategy even before the coupe of
the military, and what that means and how that sort
of provide I guess I didn't like a moral framework,
maybe a certain weight that you know that it's it's
not like they started doing this ship in February one,
right like that, this is what this is how they
(14:13):
do stuff. I mean, this is an institution that's been
at war with its own people for seventy years. Um yeah,
I mean, the there is an underlying philosophy of them,
our military that that that they essentially are the protectors
of national sovereignty and to a certain degree of protectors
(14:34):
of the Bamar ethnic group and Bomar Buddhism in particular.
And UM, this is a deeply in trance philosophy within
the UM military establishment, and UM it's been to a
certain degree a fairly compelling narrative for retention and institutional solidarity,
(14:56):
which is why in some part, I mean, it's one
of the reasons there are a number why this the
s A C. And the sit that memory military is
has been resilient to UM collapse despite you know, being
extremely incompetent and UM very isolated UM and virtually never
having one a war, despite being at war for seventy
(15:17):
years and having structural and military manages UM. And so
this is kind of underlying the justification and the moral
philosophy of this institution that is morally UM corrupted. But
as you said, their UM tactical strategy is essentially one
of social isolation, division UM and ensuring as much human
(15:42):
suffering as possible so as to UM pacify a population
into submission. And so essentially the strategy is to kind
of cut communications and food supply and um uh connections
between communities and these sorts of things, which is um
we're For a very long time, the military strategy has
(16:02):
been one of divide and conquer, in which they've um
attempted to exacerbate divisions between ethnic and religious minority communities
to ensure that they would not face a united front.
And so the incredible challenge and opportunity of the current
resistance movement is one in which the MIAM or military
(16:23):
is no longer at the table in conversations with one another,
um and they are trying to build cohesion with one another.
And frankly, this is where there's unbelievable progress that I
don't think gets enough attention and appreciation that there's meaningful
changes in behavior in terms of the Bomar majority ethnic communities,
(16:47):
posture towards ethnic and religious minorities, and you know, communication
and coordination across UM institutions that had historically been at
odds and happy to go more into that, but yeah,
the strategy of dividing conqueror is really front and center. Yeah,
and ironically, by pushing that so high that they've they've
(17:08):
done the complete opposite, which is forced people to form
like a popular front against him. Yeah, let's talk about that,
because I find it really fascinating, how like even how
like E A O s and PDFs are kind of
vaguely underneath a unified command at this point. And again,
let's talk about how those barriers which you doceted for
so long a sort of gradually breaking down now, yeah, rapidly.
(17:30):
I guess one of the ways in which there's been
a meaningful shift has been just kind of the individual
experiences of the military's atrocities. I mean, um, I think
in your previous episode with Conchomo, he had indicated that, uh,
you know, public perception of Rohena has shifted somewhat, although
(17:51):
it's kind of questionable whether it's a durable shift and
whether it's meaningful and all that. But um, he had
attributed that shift in part to the fact that the
Bomar majority Buddhist population is now experiencing frankly, some of
the forms of atrocity that the Rohenja had experienced, you know,
in the seventies and the nineties and then in seventeen
(18:11):
um when things escalated to genocide. So I think this
is One of the shifts is that the in the
Burmese heartland, in the area where the military recruits most
of its soldiers, UM, they are undertaking the most arguably
the most um extreme atrocities, burning villages to the ground, um,
you know, just horrendous stuff that like I don't even
(18:33):
want to say on the air, but just um, you know,
just an incredible campaign of terror. Um. In part because
the people's defense forces and the resistance forces are are
extremely strong there and only strengthening in response to these atrocities.
So I think that's one of the dynamics is that
there's um, there's been a shift in perception because of um,
(18:55):
because of the Hunter's behavior. Another is that, frankly, there's
just a man of political shift at play. I mean,
you have you know, February one, the National League, like
Nationally for Democracy led government is deposed and they don't
necessarily have arms or an experience of military combat, whereas
the ethnic armed organizations have been fighting for seventy years
(19:16):
against the central government, including the National League for Democracy
led government. And so there is a shift in power
at that moment um that you know, shift power from
the Bamar center to ethnic minority communities in a in
a particular way. So UM, that kind of open space
for greater humility and greater dialogue and UM, you know,
(19:38):
willingness to make concessions to ethnic and religious inn arty communities. UM,
and that isn't there's actually been tremendous progress there. So
there's the National Unity Consultative Council, which is, you know,
probably the most important dialogue platform, but one one that
is very focused on big picture governance challenges UM and
(19:58):
long term kind of national dialogue processes. But UM, there's
been some good progress there. But frankly, the most progress
has been made in UM military and governance coordination platforms.
So this includes the C three C, which is essentially
a commanded control platform that's between the National Unity government
(20:19):
and ethnic armed organization leadership where they're coordinating military strategy
and tactics. So that and there's been considerable trust building
through those sorts of operations. And similarly, there's been trust
building in you know, basic things like coordinating humanitarian assistance
or UM local administration or policing these sorts of things.
(20:44):
UM where there's um, you know, there's a problem that's
needed to be solved in the near term and we
can come together to solve it collaboratively and in that
process sort of build understanding and trust with one another.
So UM, there's been really meaningful differences I've seen in
terms of cohesion across traditional lines of intercommunal division. UM.
(21:05):
Obviously a long way to go, but this is a
lot of what what we're working on at the US
and Student Peace and UM that the U. S. Government
is supporting is trying to support the resistance capacity to
chart a viable pathway to stabilization, and a lot of
that relies upon building cohesion and trust among resistance groups. Yeah.
(21:26):
Everyone I spoke to Neibly, not everyone I spoke to
is Mama, some people with Karen UM and some of
them were some of the people we've spoken to, like
remotely or Ranger. UM. All of them said that what
has to come out of this is like a federalized democracy.
Do you think that that's that's likely? And what does
(21:46):
that look like in the country it's spent war with
itself for most of the last century. Yeah, I mean,
clearly this is a question that needs to be answered
by them people. UM. And I think the National Unity
Consultative Council is a good platform for having this discussion.
But there is a number of free requisits for for
having that discussion is and one of them is kind
(22:07):
of new norms of dialogue based on trust and mutual
um respect. But yeah, I think that um, the only
viable pathway to stability is you know, is one that
results in a federal democratic system in which subnational federal
(22:30):
units have a degree of autonomy, UM, and in which
there is a baseline of equality. UM, there's rule of law,
independent judiciary, UM. You know, just the basic fundamentals that
ensure protections of minority populations. UM. You know. Another challenge
being that even you know, within states like Kachin State,
(22:53):
where you know, the Kachin at the community is an
ethnic minority at the national level, but there are also
subminaries that you know, like the Shawnee population, and and
there's concerns that you know, there may um, there needs
to be protections for the minorities within the minority state.
So you know, all of these things need to be
sort of worked out. And this is of course, like
a maybe a decade long national dialogue process that will
(23:16):
ultimately culminate in a new federal governance structure, a new
security structure that you know, maybe doesn't have a federal
you know, a union level military with the level of
autonomy or political involvement that you know has played this
country for so long. But this is really like the
key to long term peace and stability in the country.
(23:38):
And frankly, like it felt a long way off under
the NLD administration. I mean, they were making a lot
of progress in a lot of ways, but you know,
building a just and inequitable governance structure in which ethnic
and religious minorities had a voice and didn't feel oppressed
by the dominant Bmar Budhist population um Avranfully it was,
(24:01):
it was quite all ways off. And this, you know,
as horrible as the cure has been, it is definitely
a shock to the system that may open up new
pathways for dialogue, um, new opportunities for trust building, and
you know, the opportunity to you know, think about a
new model of governance that is you know, more just
more equitable and more inclusive. Yeah, it's definitely brought in
(24:23):
a whole generation of younger people who like aren't sort
of who didn't come through the institutions that created the
old regime and just came at this it's like I'm
seventeen and I'm bucking angry and like I'm going to
make this better sort of however I can. And yeah,
they're they're really, I mean obviously very inspirational and then
(24:44):
fascinated to talk to. I wonder, like, how do you
see the end to this conflict? Because we're still a
long way from either side having an definitive military victory. Right, Certainly,
all these big cities are still more or less controlled
by the Hunter and that's there's not an immediate way
that I can foresee them not being that way. So
(25:05):
if I could ask you to like speculate a little
bit or look at the way things are going, how
do we get out of the situation where the Hunters
bombing schools and music concerts and right, um m hmm,
it's yeah. This is honestly, like I think everyone is
kind of lost, um in our attempts to make predictions
(25:25):
of where this is going. Um, Honestly, I don't know
that there is a path to a military victory for
either side here. Um, I mean, it seems pretty unlikely
that you'll SEEPDS marching on nepied on capturing the Ministry
of Defense, anytime soon, UM. But equally unlikely that the
(25:48):
s a C will consolidate, you know, control of the country.
I mean, that's just that's just not going to happen. UM.
So I mean the the a lot of our work
is thinking through the best possible outcomes and increasing the
probably trying doing the work to try to increase the
probability of those outcomes. And I think the UM this
(26:11):
is where it's just like I have questions for a
lot of the international actors that are supporting the s
a C, because I I just don't know of any
possible pathway to peace and stabilization that goes through a
stronger s a C. It just seems unfathomable. UM. But
you know, there are pathways to stabilization that go through
(26:32):
a stronger resistance movement that either yields some radical transformation
of the SACS composition and then some sort of dialogue
process UM, or you know, just a very very extended
UM conflict in which you know, the resistance holds territory
UM in some parts of the country, the SAC controls
(26:56):
some other areas UM over an extended period. The ethnic
arm to organizations contain kind of UM act more and
more autonomously, and you have areas in you know, Kachin
and Wa Ho Kong and the Chinese border, re Kind
State that's kind of gained a bit more autonomy and
sort of act more independently of one another. So like
this sort of fragmentation process. And honestly, if if there
(27:19):
is an election, you know, a sham election by the
s a C, it seems to increase the probability of
this fragmentation scenario. Um. You know, it increases the probability
that the SAC just maintains its presence in the in
the urban areas, and then Rekind State, Kachin State, Waw State,
(27:40):
these kind of become more autonomous regions, Chin State, um,
and they start to operate as semi independent states. So honestly,
that's that's part of why I feel like support to
the s a C. Not only is it the SAC
for the elections, I should say, not only does it
almost definitely increased violence because you know, the elections are
(28:03):
a target, but also it increases the probability of national
fragmentation UM. And it doesn't do anything to increase the
probability of stability. So I just don't I don't really
see that that being a pathway to any form of
stability or ending the SACS bombings of schools. Yeah, I
(28:25):
think it gives them this way talking point bit at
the Russian sham elections in the Dom Bass, like like
because we saw like I think it was a mobi
a PDFU. I don't know if you saw this, but
they did a drive by and shot some people who
were polling for it out doing some kind of election stuff,
and obviously that gives them this kind of Oh, look,
our election workers are being attacked with terrible people. The
(28:46):
PDFs are kind of but you know, if you've spent
more than ten minutes your entire life reading about Memma,
then you realize that that's the false claim. The international
(29:06):
community just doesn't seem to care to a large degree
about the trustees in Miama, about the revolution in Miama,
about the core and MIMA certainly doesn't care in the
same way that it cares about what's happening in Ukraine. Right,
it doesn't care with man pads and tanks and guns
and training and all the things that could bring this
(29:26):
water an end much more quickly. Do you think that
that will change or it's just going to be Burmese
people liberating Burmese people because the world doesn't care about them,
It doesn't care in a material fashion. Yeah. I think
there's like, yeah, I think there's UM sort of like
two dynamics, and player one is that, Yeah, people care
(29:49):
a lot less than Ukraine or Taiwan or other geopolitical interest.
They see this to a certain level as a domestic
issue that doesn't have regional locations, something that we're very
focused on demonstrating is totally untrue. UM. And the other
thing is that people don't know what to do. And
(30:10):
like I mean, even UM, the US Congress just past
the Burma Act, which is a piece of legislation that
essentially signals congressional interest in Burma and more to be
done UM, alongside appropriations of resources to support it. UM.
The challenge now is figuring out what is the best
use of resources. And I think that UM countries like
(30:32):
Japan and UM, honestly some U states, you know, Ascan states.
It's more they are very uncomfortable with the engaging with
revolutionary actors and there's just not a lot of certainty
as to how to help because there's like, okay, military
(30:52):
assistance UM. To the end, EU G It's like there's
a lot of concern that you know, you know, significant
expansion of arms access in the country is you know,
you have this mass proliferation of weapons. You have you know,
concerns about post conflict warlordism or weapons and resources getting
(31:14):
into the hands of narco traffickers. UM. You know, there's
just a lot of uncertainty, and so there's not an
adequate given what the first point that this is really
a kind of peripheral regional matter in the eyes of
some UM, it yields a very low risk tolerance and
uncertainty as to what to do. And so this kind
(31:35):
of has resulted in a couple of things, one being
that the buck is just passed to multilateral institutions like ACON.
I mean, I think China has done a very effective
job of ensuring nothing happens in the international realm UM
by pushing it to Ascion, which it knows is incapable
(31:55):
of doing anything meaningful UM. And so it's just relegated
to multilateral platforms where nothing will happen. You always have
a veto from UM Highland Cambodia or Russia and China
at the n S, at the Security Council, UM and
so you know, it's these combinations of factors that really
challenge this thing. And even within the U. S. Government
(32:17):
there's like a very robust inter agency debate about exactly
what is the best form of assistance, what is the
most ethical way of engaging and UM, what are risks
associated with different forms of assistance to the resistance movement UM.
So I think that uncertainty plays a lot into it,
and so UM a lot of what I think there's
a lot of value that could be added if UM
(32:39):
the resistance movement can come together essentially around a common
set of requests from the international community, essentially saying this
is what we need UM to be effective. And you
know you, based on your risk tolerance, help us as
you can. But we're demonstrating to you that we have
(33:01):
we're unified in these ways, we have these needs, and UM,
you know, help us however you feel is most appropriate
given your risk tolerance. So, I don't know, it's incredibly complicated.
I think them having China, India, Bangladesh, Thailand and Laos
as your neighbors also makes this just incredibly challenging. You
(33:24):
can't access the country in the way that you can UM.
For Ukraine. Um so just logistically it's incredibly challenging. Yeah,
that's true. Yeah, it does seem still like like you said,
like it's like in Ukraine, we also have deeply problematic
groups who we are, who we are arming, And yeah,
it's it's ironic that their concern is spreading the preventing
(33:46):
the proliferation in arms, and what they've done has helped
like a giant leap forward in I don't know, artisanal
homemade weapons technology, like we're probably only seeing the very
tip of in like our porting, Like, I'm sure that's
more stuff that we'll see as time goes on. And
but I wonder what can people do? People often ask
(34:07):
like if where they can donate, how they can help, right,
because obviously it is extremely difficult to see little kids
getting shot in schools, and I want to do something,
And I wonder what you would suggest for people who
are looking to help. We've both spoken to people who
are collecting money through click to donate, which is one
thing people can do. But um, do you want to
(34:28):
explain that, actually explain how people can and can participate
in click to donate. I think that's cool. Yeah, I
mean there's been a number of really fascinating fundraising models. UM. Yeah,
the click to notitate model is essentially the resistance leveraging
what it has UM a comparative advantage in which is
huge numbers of people on their side, and essentially, um,
(34:50):
the resistance creates creates web pages or YouTube content or anything,
and you know, just engages the advertisements on those pages,
which increa us is the value of those that ad space,
and then they can kind of generate revenue that way. Um.
The National Unity government has also done some really fascinating
stuff issuing bonds, uh, conducting a lottery, um, selling off
(35:16):
you know, s a c military properties. I think they
just sold the minile on Alnes House and Yangon for
a considerable amount. Um. So it's kind of a an
incredible fundraising model and requiring tremendous innovation. They also created
uh a financial technology called and new g pay and
(35:36):
a digital current currency d mmk um. So yeah, it's
it's kind of a remarkable um innovation there. Um. In
terms of what kind of a uh your listeners could do,
I think, um, you know, I think engaging in uh
some of the international kind of advocacy and awareness raising
(35:59):
is is really valuable I think some of these things
like if you know, if you're a congress person acknowledges
demand for this, then that can increase that the pressure
that they put on the State Department, d D, Natural
Security Council, UM and potentially increase the risk tolemance of
the US government if if there's just more pressure there.
(36:20):
So those sorts of things I think, UM, honestly engaging
with some of the content that's being that's being created
by the resistance, learning about my mr um, you know,
just just following the story. I mean, it's like, I
don't know, you've probably experienced this doing your reporting, but
it's just like the most unbelievable stories of human resilience
(36:45):
and just like, I don't know, it's it's such like
an honor to be near by these people who are
just risking so much for such a for such an
honorable cause that they truly believe in. It's just like
the quintessential example of integrity and um, yeah, goodness, yeah,
(37:06):
it's amazing. It's stuff you couldn't make up and like
it's stories you can sell as fiction and almost like yeah,
their integrity, like even they're like and one thing I
find absolutely amazing like you said, perspectives on ethnic groups
have changed on so many things that people they're willingness
to be like, I've examined my stance on this and
it was the wrong stance, and I'm changing my stance
(37:28):
on this. It's like we spoke to so many young
people who were like, yeah, I was fairly misogynist, like
a February one, and since then, like I fought alongside women,
I've you know, I've seen them do things that I didn't.
I've been told that they weren't capable of, and I've changed.
I was wrong, and like we need to not be
(37:49):
a misogynist country going forward. Yeah, no, there was. I
was maybe you know this group, but I was engaging
with organization that was it's led by kind of an activist,
former active um, and he was kind of saying that
they've essentially tried to eliminate all of the sort of
misogyny in their in their training protocols, like even just
(38:13):
using terms like man up or something. It's like wiped
it from their approach because it's like that's a misogynistic
kind of you know, approach to thinking about strength and power,
and so it's like what you're saying is I'm here,
I'm feeling the same hearing the same things. It's which
is incredibly powerful given particularly given the pressures and what
they're all going through, just having the wherewithal to kind
(38:36):
of like their head ups and think about, you know,
be reflective of themselves. Like imagine in the American political discourse,
people actually changing their minds for once. It's remarkable. Yeah, yeah,
genuine is. And it's refreshing in that sense to see
people like wanting the right thing and not letting tiny
differences like blow them into severn thousand different pieces, right,
the broad date grain on one thing. Yeah, exactly, And
(38:57):
that's kind of the remarkable. I mean, the nation need
to consultative Counsel for example. You know, it's had its
challenges um as a dialogue platform, but it's still going
and that is like people are still coming to the table.
And frankly, it's remarkable because repeatedly, in quote unquote peace
processes in MR history, they've collapsed because you know, someone
(39:19):
said something and you know another party left the table
um and didn't return. So the fact that these dialogues
are continuing on is an incredible testament to people's willingness
to kind of open up and be more humble and
kind of consider the other's opinion and question their own,
(39:40):
which is you know, a lesson we could all learn. Yeah, yeah, definitely, Billy,
where can people like, where can people find you online?
And where can they find more get information about my
m um? I am you know, if you search Billy
Ford at us I P dot org you can find
the stuff I've written recently. And then I'm on Twitter
here at b I L L E the number four,
(40:03):
the letter d UM and good sources of information. I mean,
there's great UM investigative work by Myanmar Witness UM, which
is just an incredible group of researchers. UM. There's been
a couple of good reports recently by Global Witness and
Earth Rights related to sanctions that just came out. UM
(40:26):
U S I P. You can check out some of
our writing. My colleagues Jason Tower in Brasilo Clop just
published something related to how the conflict has regional consequences
that could be of interest UM and UM there's I
don't know, there's innumerable great UM MEAMR think tanks. The
Chin Human Rights Organization has done some incredible research and
(40:48):
reporting about military atrocities and Chin State. Um could go
on and on, but um yeah, if you I don't know,
check out my Twitter. I've tend to repost stuff that
I find fascinating and there's there's a lot out there. Yeah. Great, Well,
thank you so much for giving us some of your
time this afternoon. Already appreciate it. It's good to catch up. Yeah,
(41:08):
thanks for having me. James has been great, no worries.
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