December 23, 2024 • 46 mins
James talks to Kevin McDonald, in an interview recorded before the ceasefire, about his experience as a peacekeeper with the Irish Defence Forces within UNIFIL and UNTSO in Lebanon.
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Speaker 1 (00:01):
Calls media.
Speaker 2 (00:04):
Hi everyone, and welcome to it could happen here. It's
me James and I'm joined today by Kevin McDonald, who
previously served as a senior officer in the Irish Defense
Forces with Special Forces experience and has significant experience working
all over the world after that with the United Nations
and other organizations. And Kevin, welcome to the show.
Speaker 3 (00:24):
I'm glad to be here. Thanks for having me.
Speaker 2 (00:25):
Yeah, hopefully I've done a good job introducing you. I'm
always terrible at that. What we thought we talked about today,
Kevin is you have significant experience in Lebanon with UNIPHIL,
and I think obviously when we've spoken about this before,
we've spoken about it from a sort of looking at
it from above strategic level. But what we've not spoken
about is what it looks like on the ground. So
(00:47):
hopefully you can give us some insight into that, especially
having been there both as like an enlisted soldier and
as an officer. I think can you explain at first?
I think there's been a lot of confusion or misinformation
about like how did these Irish if we look at
the Irish soldiers. That's so when you've obviously the most
(01:08):
experience with how do they end up deployed to Lebanon.
Is it a voluntary thing? Do they sort of say,
put a hand up a set, I want to do this,
or is it your units going so you're going?
Speaker 3 (01:20):
Okay? Well, just I suppose as a brief reminder to
your listeners, UNIFIL is the United Nations interim force in Lebanon,
and it's been interim since nineteen seventy eight. What it
started first, the Irish were one of the first countries
to sign up to deploy a battalion there, and we
had a battalion in Lebanon from nineteen seventy eight until
(01:40):
two thousand and In two thousand, the Israelis withdrew from
what they called a security zone about like a ten
kilometer buffer zone in southern Lebanon. So when they did
that and retreat to the frontier between the two countries
and departs it's battalion. Its left a few staff officers there,
but it didn't supply a battalion anymore. It was concentrating
(02:02):
on the missions in Syria and other places. And then
after the two thousand and six war, they were asked
to come back with a battalion and we've been there
ever since with an infantry battalion. In relation to your
question about it, is it a volunteer mission. It is
for most people. However, there have been people who will
be what's known as mandatory selected if they have certain
(02:24):
skill sets, whether it be a doctor, whether it be
whatever happens to be. If you know, if the army
can't get sufficient volunteers, then they will mandatory select. But
generally speaking, certainly in the early years, it was actually
quite difficult to get to become a volunteer for Leblon
because so many people wanted to go there because there is,
(02:44):
you know, there's a bit of a financial incentive to
do that as well. I deployed there as a private
soldier in nineteen eighty four. I wasn't even twelve months
in the army at that stage, and within two months
I was made in acting corporal. So then I went
back as an office in nineteen ninety three where we
had a seven day war operational accountability. I was back
(03:05):
in ninety ninety six as an officer for another seven
day war operation Grapes of Wrath, and I ended up
there with my family as an unarmed minity observer in
two thousand and six for the a full thirty four
days of carnage. So, yeah, Lebanon was always well regarded
by the Arish Defense Forces because it did the couple
(03:26):
of things. It exposed troops to not just new cultures
and new areas, but it exposed them to danger as well.
And it also gave a chance for young NCOs and
young officers to physically lead their troops in a challenging environment,
which you don't always get, you know, when you're at
home in Ireland or with the UK or whatever, you
(03:47):
don't always get that type of leadership experience. Plus you're
exposed to other cultures, whether it be the Nordic countries
or you know, you're exposed to different ways of operating.
And it's been it's been a positive experience. But I
would find out that since we started there, we've lost
far to get troops killed in Lebanon.
Speaker 2 (04:07):
Yeah, it's because not an insignificant amount, especially considering like
the Irish Defense Forces are much smaller. When if people
are more familiar with the US military, right, which is
more than a million people, you know, forty eight is
a significant amount. You talked about how it exposes you
to look at other cultures and obviously one of them
is like the Lebanese people. But it's a very international deployment, right,
(04:29):
It's you're not just sort of sitting there on your
Irish base with Irish Defense Forces people and not interacting
with other militaries. So can you explain like some of
the other countries that have this long history there.
Speaker 3 (04:40):
When I went there in nineteen eighty four, there was
a battalion from Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, ourselves, the Netherlands,
Norway and Senegal. Wow, what a strength. At the time
of about six thousand, when I was there as a
non our military observer with UNSOL, which is a different mission,
the strength had dropped to two thousand and two thousand
and six with just two battalions that can name battalion
(05:03):
and in Indian battalion. And now essentially since after the
war in two thousand and six they started building up,
there's probably about ten thousand troops there at the moment.
There is some huge interaction at the battalion level between
different nations. In other words, a battalion will have its
own area of responsibility. It's responsible for patrolling in that area.
(05:26):
Now with the likes of Nso you're much more exposed
to other armies, other nationalities because essentially, every time you
go patrolling, you can't, like two Irish officers couldn't patrol
together because if they see an infringement, whether it's a
firing close, whether it's one side sending drones into leven
(05:46):
and Ano the other side sending contucial rockets into Israel,
they're all violations, but to record it as a violation,
you can't have two people from the same country. So
you're much more exposed, as I said, to foreign nationalities.
Speaker 2 (06:00):
Yeah, yeah, and there's certainly a lot of nation I
know the Indonesians are there now and the contiguent from
India when people talk about UNIFIL now a lot. You'll
see one of two accusations, right, You'll see that they're
either like they're as allies of Hezbollah in Lebanon, which
is not the case, or you'll see that they're there
as observers for the IDF or spies for the IDF.
(06:22):
And like, obviously the fact that they're being accused of
both probably suggest that they are neither, because it be
fairly obvious if they were. But can you explain the
tripartite agreement. It seems to me like that might make
it difficult to do the things that uniform is supposed
to be doing. Is that fair?
Speaker 3 (06:38):
I don't know. I think it's I think it's a
fair assessment. And if you're if both sides are complaining
about you, as you say, it probably does indicate that
you're you're at least doing something right.
Speaker 2 (06:49):
Yeah.
Speaker 3 (06:50):
So UNIFIL, it's a it's a peacekeeping mission, and so
there with the agreement of both parties. So in other words,
the Lebanese government and the Israeli government have agreed that
UNIFIL be established in Lebanon. That's the first thing to
point out. The second thing, which is kind of contentious now,
especially with the extent of Hesbodus Tunnels is being exposed,
(07:11):
is that there's a lot of generally misinformed chatter about
what UNIFIL can and cannot do. So after the two
thousand and six War, Resolution seventeen oh one was enforced
or was brought in to develop more thoroughly the mandate
for what UNIFIL can and cannot do, and one of
(07:31):
the stated paragraphs is that UNIFIL will assist the Lebanese
armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment between the
Blue Line and the Latanian River of an area free
of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those
of the Government of Lebanon and of uniful deployed in
this area. And this is one of the failings. But
(07:51):
it should be pointed out that the responsibility of the
Laugh of the Lebanese armed forces to instigate it supported
by uniform, not unifil going in looking for arms and
weapons supported by the Laugh. It's the other way around.
And one of the difficulties that you're always going to
have is that Lebanon has a divided society. Yeah, it's
an extremely rich and significant society, and I've lived there
(08:13):
quite a lot and have great respect for the people
and their traditions. However, the sectarianism is kind of baked
into how the government works, and that kind of works
as way down. So the president has to be a Marianite,
Christian speak of the House has to be Shia, and
the Prime Minister has to be sunny. Yeah, And that
(08:34):
division was based on the last time there was a
census in Lebanon, which was nineteen thirty two, and since
then the dynamics have changed, so Hezbela is not just
a minitary organization. It's a political organization, and it's a
wealthier organization.
Speaker 2 (08:49):
Yeah, I think a lot of people don't get that.
Speaker 3 (08:51):
And it's Shia and the majority of the people in
the south are Shia. And you know a lot of
them get their schooling and their medication from Hesbulla. So
it's not just a military organization. And there's various estimates,
but you could be looking at them. But we say,
prior to the present conflict, maybe seventy thousand Hesbla in
(09:15):
south of their root, shall we say. And some of
them are full time, some of them are part time,
some of them are just sympathizers, helpers, friends. You know,
it's difficult. And another factor that has proven extremely difficult
is so when unifim patrol with the laugh, there is
certain restrictions that even the laugh have in terms of
(09:37):
entering certain areas. And what has Bullah have done is
that they have designated certain nature reserves and generally speaking,
the laugh won't go in there. And if the laugh
won't go win, the uniful can't goin right, So the
laugh for kind of you know that they have a
balancing act to do. In terms of retaining the trust
of the people in the south and also not causing
(10:00):
a sectarian divide within their own ranks.
Speaker 2 (10:02):
Yeah, of course.
Speaker 3 (10:03):
And also they have another problem in terms of equipment.
They're sort of relying on other countries, the UK, the US,
France to supply them with equipment. But like they have
no tanks. They have a few helicopters. They're very much
like there's no way they will take on has bullet no.
Speaker 2 (10:21):
Way, right, yeah, or the IDEF.
Speaker 3 (10:23):
And UNIFOR itself is likely armed, you know, it's not
gone round in tanks or anything armored carriage. Yes. The
only time, the last time UNIFAL had tanks in Lebanon
was just after the war when the French deployed with
the Lea clerk tanks, right, which did not please the
locals because the clerk tanks driving up and down the
roads was nearly doing as much damage as the Markava
(10:44):
tanks during the war. And plus Lebanon isn't a very
tank friendly area to be operating against.
Speaker 2 (10:52):
What we said, right, yeah, was that when the IDF
came in and then Macava tanks and the French like
physically blocked them with their own tanks. I can't remember
when that was, and I'm.
Speaker 3 (11:01):
Not aware of that, but it could will happen because
I know certainly back in the.
Speaker 2 (11:04):
Nineties that may have been. When it was when Israel was.
Speaker 3 (11:07):
Operating the security Zone. We the Irish and our colleagues
from Finland and Norway had had numerous standoffs with Israelis
trying to enter certain villages.
Speaker 2 (11:17):
And yeah, but.
Speaker 3 (11:20):
Yeah, I saw the day before yesterday the two I
think two bulldozers in the Marcava or I said, yeah,
two d nines broke down a U and watchtower and
a UN fence at the un UNIFIL headquarters in the Cura,
which is a few k from the frontier with Israel. Yes,
I should I note as well for your listeners that
Israel and Lebanon have been at a state of war
(11:42):
since nineteen forty eight. Yes, they've never had a seat
or a peace agreement, and.
Speaker 2 (11:47):
The Triparte Agreement is the only place where they actually meet, right.
Speaker 3 (11:51):
Yeah, so there is a UNIFIL post a meeting normally
right at the frontier where you can cross between one
country and the other. And I keep using the word
frontier because it's not a border. It hasn't been officially demarketd.
The blue line, which I mentioned earlier on simply verifies
that the IDF have withdrawn into Israel, but it's not
(12:12):
the border right however, going back to your point about
the Tripartheid Agreement, and that's where the senior Israeli officials
senior Lebanese officials, under the chairmanship of UNIFIL meat and
they discuss items of concern that maybe UNIFIL can help
or now between the two of them, and in twenty
(12:33):
twenty two they managed to organize a maritime boundary between
Lebanon and Israel, which was kind of fascinating because on
the western side of Lebanon and the northwesterns coast of
Israel the huge gas fields. So the two countries actually
they've agreed their maritime boundary under the auspices of UNIFIL.
(12:55):
They still haven't agreed their land. But it's the first
time that a peace keep mission has arranged and courage
developed and led successfully discussions about a maritime boundary. So
the uniform does have some successes.
Speaker 2 (13:09):
Yeah, yeah, no, I think it would be wrong to
over looks. We'll take a quick break for adverts and
we'll come back. We're back, And Kevin, you'd mentioned that
you were in Lebanon in two thousand and six. I
(13:30):
think you said you're an unarms observer at that time,
Is that right.
Speaker 3 (13:32):
Yeah, that's right. Yet, so one of the oldest missions
in the world is one, so the United Nations Truth
Supervisory Organization, and that essentially was established, I suppose after
the forty eight War, and it had well say, offices
and observers in Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. You
(13:54):
know that they were quite effective in certain ways, Like
certainly the eventual peace agreement between Egypt and Israel was
very much helped along by the presence of ONSO in
Cairo and Shamra Shaik. The dieasagreement between Jordan and Israel
again was very much assisted by ONSO. So they have
a kind of a fairly good track record. And what
(14:17):
they bring to the table is that first of all,
they're unarmed military observers, which takes some of the sting
out of heaven. You know, a heavily armed guy with
a hell and there's and sunglasses walk around, you know that,
and some armies, as you know, can tend to be
more intimidating than others in how they how they carry themselves.
(14:40):
So I went there. I went to the region in
two thousand and five and I was working on the
occupied Golden Heights, living in the in Tiberias on the
Sea of Galilee with my wife and two kids who
then were four and five. And in February zero six
I was transferred to Lebanon and we were living in
the city of Tier. The kids were going to a
local English speaking Arab school and Lebanon was absolutely thriving.
(15:04):
It must happened. We had the kids in bear Rouge,
we had them and a man done in what they
run and my normal routine. We had four observation posts
along the frontier with with Israel, yeah staft by five
guys who spent a week seven days up there and
then you come down for four or five and then
go back up again. And each team had its specific
(15:26):
area to operate with, and we say a specific battalion
that we would interact with. And also quite importantly, we
had liaison assistants who were locals like translators, but but
they're a lot more important than that. And based on
the sectarian nature of the area, you know, you'd always
have a Christian you'd always have a share, but you
(15:47):
could have the Drews. If you were further up to
the north, you could have suddenly. And each team had
four or five of these because we used to send
two patrols out each day. So we had huge interaction
with the locals and ARMERI, with the mayors and the muktar,
and we were very much a force multiplier for UNIFIL
because we could get information from people. You know, we
(16:08):
used to stop and have lunch in some of the
little restaurants and we were always talking to people, and
you know, it was the window down, waving out, having
a chat, learning a bit of Arabic, whereas Uniful by
its nature goes around in armor cars, right, and even
if you stop, when you get out and you take
off the sunglasses, people will just react differently. The two
(16:29):
guys with a local that they know in the car.
Speaker 2 (16:33):
Yeah, as about someone in full battle rattle again.
Speaker 3 (16:35):
Now, we definitely were. But the war kicked off on
the twelfth of July two thousand and six and I
was I had done on patrol to pick up or
Christian liaison assistant in her village and literally we were
heading off on patrol and over the radio all stations
go to the nearest U went position immediately. The nearest
(16:57):
U went position tours at the time was an inn
the platoon position on top of a hill. From my
past experience, I had reckoned that there was a bit
of stuff going on either in shade the farms, which
is a disputed area in the southeastern part of Lebanon,
up in the mountains. So I said to the guy
that was with me, I said, look, this could be
over a couple of hours. Let's go straight back to
(17:19):
our patrol base. And you know, we knew we had
a fool the facility, and we also knew we had
a good bunker in the place, so we had it
back at a fair agnuts, shall we say. And normally,
when we would have two patrols out, there'd be one
guy left in the patrol base and he'd be responsible
for radio checks and all that kind of stuff. But
(17:41):
what we'd do is, when we were about maybe a
kilometer away, we would inform our headquarters in in the
Kura that were closing down at our final destination, which
would give this guy time to come out and unlock
the gate to let us in. And just as I
had transmitted that up on the ear and said don't
come in, don't come in, we're getting hit up. So
(18:03):
we're at that stage we will restigate, and about maybe
two kilometers away there was a huge idea of position
and they were just banging with pine fives and gpmg's
not directly at us, but kind of in the general area.
Speaker 2 (18:18):
Yeah, explain those weapons systems for people who aren't familiar,
like what's a GPMG If as somebody is not.
Speaker 3 (18:24):
Okay, sorry, So you've everyone's familiar with with, say in
AK forty seven or and then sixteen, which would be
known as small arms. In other words, that caliber is
five point five six or seven point six two. Then
you have medium machine guns which are generally belt fed,
and there are seven point six two yeah. And then
you have heavy machine guns, again belt fed, and they're
(18:46):
twelve point seven or fifty caliber. Yeah. So we were
getting a fair bit. But it took us maybe an
hour of listening to various news channels, both in Lebanon
and in Israel to realize that as we had carried
cross border attack hit up an idea of convoy kidnapped
two who were seriously injured and subsequently died and killed
(19:07):
initially four and then against their own orders and Israeli
mccalva went into Lebanon to have a kind of commanding
view over where they thought that Hespital were bringing these guys.
Hesbala knew that that's what they do, and big anti
tank mind and killed four guys inside the Murcava. So
(19:28):
Israel had last eight and two kidnapped in the space
of maybe maybe an hour. So the reaction was was
it was fast and furious, and yeah, it took us
nearly six days to get our Lee as an assistant
back back to her village. It took the un nearly
(19:50):
two and a half weeks two of actually with the families,
because at that stage once it was a family mission,
and where I was, I could see the jets dropping
bombs in to Tier, and my wife could look up
on the skyline knowing where I was and see the
same thing happening. I was sort of used to being
under fire, but it's a different thing to see your
family under fire as well. And eventually when the charter
(20:15):
the sort of a cruise liner from Cyprus to come
over and stand offshore and send in its lifeboats to
bring the families out. So when this has been planned
and so had try to organize that an armored convoy
would bring those onmos that were deployed on the four
posts down to tier to say goodbye. But where I was,
(20:37):
we were getting hammered with artillery fire and tank fire.
So I was the only one with family that couldn't
get out. So when my wife and two kids that
were five and seven, that's fit, were getting into the
lifeboat to bring them out to the ship, I rang
her and I said, look, I'll see you want to
see which is not a great way to end the
family mission, let me tell you now. And then in
(20:58):
the space of the next three days, we had a
strength of fifty two officers and in about three days
we last over ten percent. We had one Italian captain
shot in the back. He's known a wheel chair. We
had another Australian captain seriously injured when the converse she
was in was I suppose target is probably the way
to explain it. But she she was thrown up against
(21:22):
the inside of the armored car and essentially her back
was broken. She was evacuated with my wife and kids,
and then I think it was the day later or
two days later, the Israeli dropped the Jadam, which is
a bunker busted missile into the post, just up for me,
killing for very good friends of mine. So yeah, two
thousand and six was a bit rough.
Speaker 2 (21:43):
Yeah, if you're comfortable, could we talk about that last
one a little bit, because I think it's one of
the ones that, like, there's no mistaking that un position, right,
it's you don't and you don't accidentally disco dropping Jadam's
left right in center all over the place.
Speaker 3 (21:57):
Like. The first thing I should say is that twenty
one years previously that observation post was completely destroyed, but
there was no one in it at the time. So
when it was rebuilt, it had the best bunker in Lebanon,
so that they dug down first and had like a
lot of the the bunkers currently in Lebanar are overgrown
the bunkers, but this this was dug down into the
(22:21):
into the rock essentially, and it had its roof was
about a meter and a half of reinforced steel and
concrete with the two story concrete building on top of it.
So without doubt it was the best bunker in Lebanon.
So that on that this this happened on the twenty
fifth of July, and on that particular day we'd already
lost the patrol base in Marouna rass when when Roberto
(22:45):
was shot and they had I have to say, in fairness,
but there's the liaison branch that kind of liaises between
IDF and UNIFIL. Okay, and UNIFIL couldn't launch one of
the telecopter to do a medevac. So the decision was
made that the guys would get into an armored land
cruiser and follow Israeli tank tracks back into Israel.
Speaker 2 (23:08):
Where they couldn't deconflict the air space to launch it
or what was stopping them launching their helicopter to evacuate.
Speaker 3 (23:15):
There was too much connectic activity at that it wouldn't
have been able to land.
Speaker 2 (23:20):
It was.
Speaker 3 (23:20):
It was a battle long ago, okay. Yeah, So they
essentially followed Israeli tank tracks that had come into Leblon.
They followed those tank tracks back into Israel where they
were met by an Israeli patrol and Roberto was flown
through Rambam hospital. But yeah, going back to going back
to kem on the twenty fifth of July, as we
(23:40):
were all taking a fair bit of incoming where I was.
It wasn't targeting, it was more sort of harassment fire.
Speaker 2 (23:49):
Yeah, like that.
Speaker 3 (23:51):
The house next door took three direct tank rounds and
it was five meters away Jesus from post, and our
post was tiny. Yeah, but in the guys in Kiam
were taking a coupit of archarity. But there was a
lot of air strikes coming in close. And again for
(24:12):
your listeners, the UN has a designation what it calls
a firing close. So we'll say a firing close from
a sixteen is I don't know, something like fifty meters
or something like that. Firing close from an artillery shell
is five hundred meters, and a firing close from an
aerial bomb is a kilometer. So if it lands within
(24:34):
a kilometer, it's officially designated as a firing close, and
it's recorded, and you know, both sides get you know,
it's it's an official account of of what's happening. So
the guys who are getting you know, a good few
firings close from area bombs and there was three distinct
waves of attack in the general area. So naturally Force
(24:56):
Commander uniful chief of staff on so you win a
quarters in New York were screaming at the Israelis, you know,
stopped targeting disposition. What was it hes bull in the area?
Of course there was keam is a hesbil a stronghold.
But eventually that that evening the decision was made that
the patrol buss is going to be evacuated. But because
(25:17):
of the level of kinetic activity that evening, it was
going to be done at first light next morning. And
since the war started, we had all been on the
twenty four to seven twenty minute radio so every twenty
minutes you had to respond to a radio check. So
the last transmission from the post was from a Canadian
(25:37):
friend of mine X Special Forces. Really really cool and
I could hear it in his voice. He was requested
a luck in time for a firing close. It's danger close,
it's danger close, get them to stop. And that was
the last transmission. So when they miss the next radio check,
we presumed another shell had come in and blown all
the aerials of the of the building. So myself and
(25:58):
a NAUSI feund the Mind requested permission to take our
armored land cruiser and try and drive up and see
what was happening. That was refused by UNIFIL, so they
sent a patrol from the Indian battalion, which was kind
of in fairness that it was nearer. So we switched
on to their radio frequency to hear what they were saying,
and so they approached the base. They had obviously had
to break down the gate and said the base had
(26:20):
taken a direct hit by an aerial bond. And at
that stage we were still thinking maybe they're trapped under
the rubble or something like that. And then the one
of them transmitters, we have found the body of a
Chinese officer, so we knew the four guys were were
were killed. And the Indians found three bodies that night
(26:42):
and brought them to the marchary in marja Un, which
is a large Christian town. So the next morning there
was I think five of us tasked to open identify
the bodies.
Speaker 2 (26:53):
Yeah.
Speaker 3 (26:54):
So the first guy was Chinese, was over pressure, killed time,
so that that was an easy one to identify. The
next guy had no arms, no legs, and wead Jesus
and where his head should have been was the chain
of a dog tag and I went down into his body.
Paris Yeah, and the other guy yeah, so yeah, it
(27:17):
was a difficult, difficult procedure, and then we had to
try and arrange to get the bodies transferred into Israel
to where you and colleagues from Jerusalem so they could
go to Rambam Hospital and have have you know, a
proper identification and all that sort of stuff.
Speaker 2 (27:34):
Yeah, eventually be returned to their families, I suppose.
Speaker 3 (27:37):
And that was a difficult procedure because where the Ideas
said they could meet us, there was a minefield in
front of us, and where we said we could meet them,
they thought it was too exposed. So eventually we went
into an old, small, tiny Indian platoon position and about
one hundred meters away there was a gate that the
(27:59):
Israelis used to you who's to come in a note
when the security's own was there. But the area between
the un position and the gate hadn't been mind swept
in six years. But we had no choice. We couldn't
bring the guys back to the march because I had
resorted to using refrigerated trucks to store bodies because the
marcher was full. Yeah, So there was there was an
IDEF company there under a I think it was a
(28:20):
full brigadier and there's a war going on, naturally, Yeah,
all the time, gunships and katouch's passing each other over
our heads. So when we had the three lads transfer
over to our colleagues fro Jerusalem, I stood in front
of the Ideas Brigadier and I lined up all the
UN troops and he says, we're not going to have
a minute silence and memory of our friends who were
(28:41):
murdered on the cause of peace, and no, having a
having a minute silence in the middle of a battle
is a odd experience. In fairness to this guy, he
still to attention, And because I lived in Tiberias, I
had a small bit of Hebrew and I went over
afterwards and thanked them for hisp And we didn't find
(29:02):
the fourth body on the left of the seas for Jesus. Yeah, yeah,
that's rough.
Speaker 2 (29:07):
Sorry, that's terrible to think about.
Speaker 3 (29:09):
So the obvious question is I know what the one
you want to ask? Why? Yeah, And I should have
said it at the start. Anything I say here, it's
it's my personal opinion. So it can't be construed as
being the views of the Irish Defense Forces. Yes, of course,
are certainly not the views of the United Nations. They
are my personal views. So you know, people should just
(29:30):
take it that it's it's Kevin McDonald describing what happened
to him and what his personal views on it are.
So why did they do it? Well, I think there's
a couple of things. Hubris is one. I think at
that stage there they were like a schoolyard bully who
got better and wanted to lash out of anything and everything.
A second, probably more tactical reason is that the village
(29:52):
of kim Is on a ridge, would say, at the
end of the redge ridged closest to Israel, because it's
only about four miles away, is where this op was.
And that's the reason was there and between kem and
we say, the frontier with Israel is the Hula Valley,
which is the biggest maneuver space. If you want a
maneuver armor and stuff into Lebanon with plenty of space,
that's where you do it. In fact, decide it is
(30:15):
an old Vichy French airfield from the Second World War,
so it's low space, and I think they didn't want
eyes on the ground seeing what they were doing. And
like one of the things for military observers is you
observe in your reports. That's your task. So was there
hez Bulla in the area around the around the OPI
yes there was. But as you probably know, if you
(30:37):
want to attack troops in the open, you use airburst
artillery shells, which the Israelis they did in nineteen ninety
six when they fired fifteen of them into a UN
battalion head quarters, killing one hundred and six leban These men,
women and children. See cancelter shelter in the UN headquarters.
But you don't fire a bunk or bust and missile
into a UN post to attack Hesbula.
Speaker 2 (30:57):
The subtle difference, Yeah, there's a different Yeah. I suppose
what people will ask is like, it's I think it's
important to explain this from the point of view of
someone on the ground. It's obviously UN troops are not
there to fight. They're there to keep peace, but they
are an armed presence, and so they'll wonder how or
why the UN can or can't defend itself the uniform
(31:21):
troops specifically in these positions. So, like, can you explain
how your rules of engagement and how that works for
from the sort of on the ground perspective.
Speaker 3 (31:32):
Okay, Well, the rules of engagement we said for a
peacekeeper mission, like we pack on one side because they're unarmed,
but for a peacekeeper mission. Yeah, So peacekeeping is generally
based on three principles consent, impartiality, and the use of
force in self defense of the mandate. So naturally, like
the guys there at the moment aren't going to try
(31:54):
and take on through or former KALFA tanks. First of all,
they don't have the capability to it.
Speaker 2 (32:01):
Yeah, that's an interesting Do they not have the guinances?
That's fine? Do they have, for instance, javelin and things
like that. Do they have those weapons systems available?
Speaker 3 (32:10):
I'm not sure what they have currently. Certainly we didn't have, Okay,
and it wasn't ever going to be an issue because
that's kind of not our job like that. The sole
responsibility to protect the people of Leblon is the Lebanese government.
Uniful is there to assist. It's not there to say, okay,
you step back, you know, we stemmed up and protect you.
(32:31):
That's not what Uniful or any peacekeeping mission. The only
peacekeeping mission that eventually had an offensive capability built into
its mandate was the mission that's now closing down in
the DRC. The Democratic Republic of Congo and it's Monusco,
and they specifically changed the mandate to include an offensive
(32:52):
capability to go after the twenty three rebels in the
Kivus in sort of the northeast. And when they did it,
like you know, attack helicopters should forces a lot. Yeah,
it was quite effective. But which kind of brings me
to another point because I just last year a completed
a Masters in Peace and Conflict Studies and mandates was
the evolution of mandates is what I sort of looked
(33:12):
at and haven't wrote bus mandates is all well and good,
but the TCCs, the true contrip in countries, have to
have the ability, the capability of the training and the
will to carry out the robust nature of the mandate.
So you know, we we were saying in Ireland paper
never refuses ink. You can put whatever you want into
a mandate, but you have to be able to effectively
(33:35):
implement the mandate. Yeah, and I think often that's that's
the reason that that maybe people are kind of broad
in how mandates are written, But that's that's that's for
someone way further up the food food chain than me.
Speaker 2 (33:49):
Yeah, So for those like the people on the ground then,
and now that's not a great deal. They can do, right,
They can attempt to ask the IDEAF to stop, which
they did, which has historically not work. And they can
(34:12):
take shelter in their bunkers, which they did, which it's
only helpful if they're not going to use bunker busting
missiles to destroy that bunker. So, like, it must be terrible.
Like it's one thing to be engaged in combat with someone,
and especially if you're a soldier, bro it's another thing.
And I found myself in this situation last year to
be effectively like I'm able to respond. I'm thinking here
(34:34):
of the Turkish drone bombing and fighter jets and bombers
in Syria where I was. But it's a horrible thing
to be in that situation, And is it for those peacekeepers?
It must be a really difficult sort of place to be.
Speaker 3 (34:47):
Well, it is, yeah, And of course you know, they're
all conscious of the fact that their families back in
Ireland are fully aware of what's going on. And Yeah,
shortly after the invasion, the IDF decided that they had
told unif they wanted them out. Essentially, and not just
the Irish, but both other nationalities that were not going,
(35:10):
you know. So the ide if everywhere they go in Lebanon,
the first vehicle is a dena in Buldozer, because that
is more robust than Amercava, and it can also very
quickly throw up earth and ramparts to sort of you know,
protect from direct fire. Yeah, the idea of troops. So
they decided that they would literally conjoin an IDF position
(35:32):
to the Irish position, hoping that they could intimidate the
Irish into leaving. And the position's name was six Ash
five two, very close to the frontier. Ironically, when the
Israelis withdrew in two thousand, they recognized that this particular
area was what we in the millers would call key
terrain because that area overlooked a vulnerable part of northern Israel,
(35:54):
villages like Avavem and a few others. So the ideas
requested Uniful to put a position there which would would
say stop has bullet them put in the position there,
and then suddenly they're up close and personal trying to
intimidate the Irish and other nationalities as well. Yeah, So
it's one of the things, and I think one of
the reasons that they didn't want unifilled, and there's about
(36:17):
twenty small of these small positions, mainly close to the frontier.
I think one of the reasons that they and again
this is a personal point of view, I think one
of the reasons that they didn't want UNIFIL in any
of these positions was eight to turn it into a
free fire zone would be. One of the things that
UNIFIL is supposed to do is to monitor and report,
(36:39):
monitor and observe, and of course if you're not there,
you can't do it. That's actually one of the things
that the UNIFIL, even though they're hunt could in their
bases would with very little mobility, they can still monitor
and observe what's happening in the general area. Now, would say,
in the case of this position six five to two,
if the IDs ultimately gain, our goal was to take
(37:02):
a major has been a stronghold which is called binchebail
that's a good further north than disposition, so that the
focus of attention would move on from with they our
guys and go a wee bit further north.
Speaker 2 (37:14):
Yeah, so that's sort of where they find themselves now, right,
is these can you explain like you've got these positions
along the frontier, and then you've got the headquarters that
you just mentioned two days ago have been infringed by
a bulldozer attacked depends how you want to say it.
Speaker 3 (37:33):
Well, it makes a change from having a tanker on
fired into an op which they did yeh a few
days previously.
Speaker 2 (37:39):
Yeah, and they've done consistently right for for a month
or so. Now is firing directly into these observing positions?
Are these positions that are now are they left isolated
as the idea full advance passed and around them And
in addition to firing directly at them.
Speaker 3 (37:56):
There's somewhat isolated. Now all these positions would be well
stoped with water and emergency rations and stuff like that.
And as I mentioned before, UNIFIL do have a liaison
branch which I'm sure are talking to the Idea if
on an hourly basis and they will coordinate the movements
of UNIFIL with it supply their positions or I think
(38:19):
last week they had a convoy went into the city
of Tier, which is probably twelve krom from the head
quarters to distribute aid, especially medical aid, because Tier is
getting fairly whacked. Like all of the self I suppose
so there is engagement to make sure that these posts
aren't like completely isolated, that there is a means of
(38:42):
doing resupply.
Speaker 2 (38:44):
Yeah, Israel stopped one of those at some point, isn't
it like was it a resupply movement?
Speaker 3 (38:49):
The stop things that are on a regular basis. As
I said, there is interaction, like nothing happens in a vacuum.
Like we'll said, yeah, the Irish Italian headquarters would not
send a convoy to sixtass five two without it being
communicated to the Israelis and saying we're going to go
on three vehicles that or seven hundred hours blah blah blah,
(39:11):
and and get the confirmation back that yeah, that's okay,
because you know, they mentioned the foul the war and
that that's not from the fairly real as you can
imagine yourself. It's a fairly real thing that happens, you
know sometimes you know, yeah, instructions don't get passed down
or sometimes instructions are ignored for whatever reason. So it's
(39:35):
a bit of a delicate, delicate balancing act. But from
what I understand, it's working well.
Speaker 2 (39:41):
That's good. Yeah, yeah, And I think it's working well
in terms of like, what's happening in Lebanon is bad,
and it'd be better if it wasn't. But it's not
at the same tier as it has been in Gaza.
Speaker 3 (39:54):
No, you're looking at will be three and a half
thousand compared to forty three and a half thousand killed.
Speaker 2 (39:59):
Yeah, and so many of those being civilians, right, people
who absolutely no business targeting, and like that genocidal violence
that we've seen in Gaza hasn't come to Lebanon, and
in part I think we can attribute that to their
being observed. Is there is that fair to say?
Speaker 3 (40:17):
I think it's a fair point. Of course, there's there's
no real the un footprint in Gaza. My understanding is
it's extremely extremely light. Yeah, and as you know that
would say banished genre, yeah, whereas I mean uniform the
ten thousand troops in southern Lebanon, So there's very much more.
Maybe there's a more consciousness, but there's still Latin in
(40:41):
the place, but it's in terms of civilian casualties. As
we said, it's not going on as long as Gaza either.
But on the we'll say the combat front, but not
exactly having things the wrong way either. They've been trying
to take the village of Kim for the last I
think two weeks, and my understanding is that haven't have
(41:02):
destroyed it, right, but they haven't taken it. And it
was like in two thousand and six they claimed that
the town of ben Schebail was the Hesivila capital of
the South, which and I supp wasn't the way it was,
but the turns of ent draws me. But they never
controlled it. They were still getting attacked, you know, days
after they had seized it. Right.
Speaker 2 (41:22):
Yeah, they've never really established like control or like a
monopoly and non violence in the area. And yeah, they've
not done that this time. And I think I suppose
the last thing I wanted to ask about is like
we've just talked about like why this mission is important,
and we've spoken about four like you had your family
there when they were being bombed, and like this investment
(41:44):
in being there in Lebanon, being alongside the Lebanese people
in your case with your own family, like it's it's
one that island has had for a long time. Ireland
has historically, amongst European nations, been much better on the
rights of Palestine and Palestinian people, and then most European nations.
How is this peacekeeping mission perceived in Ireland? Like a
(42:08):
people proud that they're there?
Speaker 3 (42:10):
Oh yeah, oh, hugely proud. And and you know, the
Irish have always been extremely proud of what our defense
forces have achieved, despite us being a very small defense forces.
Like I think at the moment, between the Navy, the
Army and the Air Corps, we're probably looking at in
total in total, well yeah, very small and then we're
(42:34):
overseas in a lot of places as well, so like
to dup that from the nine thousand, you're probably down
to eight. Yeah, but we do tend to punsch up
over with internationally. We obviously had no colonial baggage, which
affects some other countries. Yes, and I think generally speaking
we're seeing as I'm not sure if annest Barker is
the right word, but certainly not as threatening and not
(42:57):
coming with an agenda, right yeah, whereas other other countries
might have a certain agenda for whatever political reasons at home.
And it's certainly in Ireland s Caes As I said,
we were there from seventy eight two thousand and now
from two thousand and six to present day, and a
lot of it has been in the same general area,
so people would know Irish soldiers some Lebanese talk with
(43:19):
an Irish accent.
Speaker 2 (43:20):
I've heard that. Yeah, there it's mad.
Speaker 3 (43:22):
Yeah, yeah, it's true. And depending on what part of
Ireland the troops were from, you could even go further down,
like some of them talk with a very broad Dublin accent,
some of them would talk with a very broad Cork
accent because of that interaction. And I know one of
the first big projects the Irish did, certainly from the
(43:42):
early eighties, was to build an orphanage in a provincial
capital called Sipneyme and they've been doing that even when
we know troops there, guys were still sending money and
toys and everything. That's been demolished last week.
Speaker 2 (43:57):
For Arty Jesus an orphan It's like story book evil stuff,
isn't it.
Speaker 3 (44:02):
Like yeah, well, you know, it's just there's a lot
of evil stuff going on in the Middle East at
the moment unfortunately.
Speaker 2 (44:09):
Yeah yeah, yeah. I mean I've personally seen hospitals bombed
and all that kind of stuff myself, and it sometimes
doesn't even make the news. I mean, that orphanage evidently
didn't really make my news diet. Kevin, thank you very
much for sharing some of your experiences over there, and
I'd love to have you on again to talk about
the things you've the work you've done in Africa and
the line after after eleven and you've written a book
(44:31):
right about your experiences peacekeeping and other things. Where could
people find that?
Speaker 3 (44:36):
Okay? So this initially started off as a lockdown project
during the COVID lockdown in the Central African Republican And
initially it was just from my wife and family. But
as it starts writing, you kind of started remembering and
it's not just your typical military guy tell us about
how Bravey was. I have a separate career in mountaineering
and a separate career in archaeology as well, So it's
(44:58):
a kind of a much more different mishmash of of
of stuff going on. So that the book is called
a Lifeless Ordinary and it can be purchased online at
Male Books Dot, I m A Y or or chats.
Speaker 2 (45:13):
Yeah. I like that balance. I've always thought that, like,
I'll go somewhere and I'll write about the worst things
I saw there and the worst days I had there,
and that'll be my story. But I've always wanted to
write about the mountains of Kurdistan are beautiful and I
really loved being there, And there are other places that
people think of them as wars, not countries, and I
(45:35):
think it would be I'd love to write about mountaineering,
backpacking in these places where often it's really sad that
you don't get to share that part.
Speaker 3 (45:43):
I'll write about this in the book. I mean like,
I've lived a few times in Lebanon, and I've lived
and worked in Jerusalem a few times, and it's a
fascinating region. Oh yeah, and the people in both countries
some I have some really good friends in Israel and
have some really good friends of Lebanon, and I've been
treated extremely well by people in both countries. Certainly, if
(46:05):
you've an interest in archaeology, it's to be else could
put shit not one to be you know, like the
Phoenicians in Tier and no matter where you go in
Tire you can pick up Roman posturally or you can
see all these amazing sites, whether it's from the Phoenicians,
from the Romans, from the Trusaders. It's just it's all
there in front of you.
Speaker 2 (46:26):
Yeah, yeah, creative civilization there. Well, thank you so much
for sharing your experiences, Kevin, thanks so much.
Speaker 3 (46:31):
Okay, cheers.
Speaker 1 (46:35):
It Could Happen Here is a production of cool Zone Media.
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Calls media.
Speaker 2 (00:04):
Hi everyone, and welcome to it could happen here. It's
me James and I'm joined today by Kevin McDonald, who
previously served as a senior officer in the Irish Defense
Forces with Special Forces experience and has significant experience working
all over the world after that with the United Nations
and other organizations. And Kevin, welcome to the show.
Speaker 3 (00:24):
I'm glad to be here. Thanks for having me.
Speaker 2 (00:25):
Yeah, hopefully I've done a good job introducing you. I'm
always terrible at that. What we thought we talked about today,
Kevin is you have significant experience in Lebanon with UNIPHIL,
and I think obviously when we've spoken about this before,
we've spoken about it from a sort of looking at
it from above strategic level. But what we've not spoken
about is what it looks like on the ground. So
(00:47):
hopefully you can give us some insight into that, especially
having been there both as like an enlisted soldier and
as an officer. I think can you explain at first?
I think there's been a lot of confusion or misinformation
about like how did these Irish if we look at
the Irish soldiers. That's so when you've obviously the most
(01:08):
experience with how do they end up deployed to Lebanon.
Is it a voluntary thing? Do they sort of say,
put a hand up a set, I want to do this,
or is it your units going so you're going?
Speaker 3 (01:20):
Okay? Well, just I suppose as a brief reminder to
your listeners, UNIFIL is the United Nations interim force in Lebanon,
and it's been interim since nineteen seventy eight. What it
started first, the Irish were one of the first countries
to sign up to deploy a battalion there, and we
had a battalion in Lebanon from nineteen seventy eight until
(01:40):
two thousand and In two thousand, the Israelis withdrew from
what they called a security zone about like a ten
kilometer buffer zone in southern Lebanon. So when they did
that and retreat to the frontier between the two countries
and departs it's battalion. Its left a few staff officers there,
but it didn't supply a battalion anymore. It was concentrating
(02:02):
on the missions in Syria and other places. And then
after the two thousand and six war, they were asked
to come back with a battalion and we've been there
ever since with an infantry battalion. In relation to your
question about it, is it a volunteer mission. It is
for most people. However, there have been people who will
be what's known as mandatory selected if they have certain
(02:24):
skill sets, whether it be a doctor, whether it be
whatever happens to be. If you know, if the army
can't get sufficient volunteers, then they will mandatory select. But
generally speaking, certainly in the early years, it was actually
quite difficult to get to become a volunteer for Leblon
because so many people wanted to go there because there is,
(02:44):
you know, there's a bit of a financial incentive to
do that as well. I deployed there as a private
soldier in nineteen eighty four. I wasn't even twelve months
in the army at that stage, and within two months
I was made in acting corporal. So then I went
back as an office in nineteen ninety three where we
had a seven day war operational accountability. I was back
(03:05):
in ninety ninety six as an officer for another seven
day war operation Grapes of Wrath, and I ended up
there with my family as an unarmed minity observer in
two thousand and six for the a full thirty four
days of carnage. So, yeah, Lebanon was always well regarded
by the Arish Defense Forces because it did the couple
(03:26):
of things. It exposed troops to not just new cultures
and new areas, but it exposed them to danger as well.
And it also gave a chance for young NCOs and
young officers to physically lead their troops in a challenging environment,
which you don't always get, you know, when you're at
home in Ireland or with the UK or whatever, you
(03:47):
don't always get that type of leadership experience. Plus you're
exposed to other cultures, whether it be the Nordic countries
or you know, you're exposed to different ways of operating.
And it's been it's been a positive experience. But I
would find out that since we started there, we've lost
far to get troops killed in Lebanon.
Speaker 2 (04:07):
Yeah, it's because not an insignificant amount, especially considering like
the Irish Defense Forces are much smaller. When if people
are more familiar with the US military, right, which is
more than a million people, you know, forty eight is
a significant amount. You talked about how it exposes you
to look at other cultures and obviously one of them
is like the Lebanese people. But it's a very international deployment, right,
(04:29):
It's you're not just sort of sitting there on your
Irish base with Irish Defense Forces people and not interacting
with other militaries. So can you explain like some of
the other countries that have this long history there.
Speaker 3 (04:40):
When I went there in nineteen eighty four, there was
a battalion from Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, ourselves, the Netherlands,
Norway and Senegal. Wow, what a strength. At the time
of about six thousand, when I was there as a
non our military observer with UNSOL, which is a different mission,
the strength had dropped to two thousand and two thousand
and six with just two battalions that can name battalion
(05:03):
and in Indian battalion. And now essentially since after the
war in two thousand and six they started building up,
there's probably about ten thousand troops there at the moment.
There is some huge interaction at the battalion level between
different nations. In other words, a battalion will have its
own area of responsibility. It's responsible for patrolling in that area.
(05:26):
Now with the likes of Nso you're much more exposed
to other armies, other nationalities because essentially, every time you
go patrolling, you can't, like two Irish officers couldn't patrol
together because if they see an infringement, whether it's a
firing close, whether it's one side sending drones into leven
(05:46):
and Ano the other side sending contucial rockets into Israel,
they're all violations, but to record it as a violation,
you can't have two people from the same country. So
you're much more exposed, as I said, to foreign nationalities.
Speaker 2 (06:00):
Yeah, yeah, and there's certainly a lot of nation I
know the Indonesians are there now and the contiguent from
India when people talk about UNIFIL now a lot. You'll
see one of two accusations, right, You'll see that they're
either like they're as allies of Hezbollah in Lebanon, which
is not the case, or you'll see that they're there
as observers for the IDF or spies for the IDF.
(06:22):
And like, obviously the fact that they're being accused of
both probably suggest that they are neither, because it be
fairly obvious if they were. But can you explain the
tripartite agreement. It seems to me like that might make
it difficult to do the things that uniform is supposed
to be doing. Is that fair?
Speaker 3 (06:38):
I don't know. I think it's I think it's a
fair assessment. And if you're if both sides are complaining
about you, as you say, it probably does indicate that
you're you're at least doing something right.
Speaker 2 (06:49):
Yeah.
Speaker 3 (06:50):
So UNIFIL, it's a it's a peacekeeping mission, and so
there with the agreement of both parties. So in other words,
the Lebanese government and the Israeli government have agreed that
UNIFIL be established in Lebanon. That's the first thing to
point out. The second thing, which is kind of contentious now,
especially with the extent of Hesbodus Tunnels is being exposed,
(07:11):
is that there's a lot of generally misinformed chatter about
what UNIFIL can and cannot do. So after the two
thousand and six War, Resolution seventeen oh one was enforced
or was brought in to develop more thoroughly the mandate
for what UNIFIL can and cannot do, and one of
(07:31):
the stated paragraphs is that UNIFIL will assist the Lebanese
armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment between the
Blue Line and the Latanian River of an area free
of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those
of the Government of Lebanon and of uniful deployed in
this area. And this is one of the failings. But
(07:51):
it should be pointed out that the responsibility of the
Laugh of the Lebanese armed forces to instigate it supported
by uniform, not unifil going in looking for arms and
weapons supported by the Laugh. It's the other way around.
And one of the difficulties that you're always going to
have is that Lebanon has a divided society. Yeah, it's
an extremely rich and significant society, and I've lived there
(08:13):
quite a lot and have great respect for the people
and their traditions. However, the sectarianism is kind of baked
into how the government works, and that kind of works
as way down. So the president has to be a Marianite,
Christian speak of the House has to be Shia, and
the Prime Minister has to be sunny. Yeah, And that
(08:34):
division was based on the last time there was a
census in Lebanon, which was nineteen thirty two, and since
then the dynamics have changed, so Hezbela is not just
a minitary organization. It's a political organization, and it's a
wealthier organization.
Speaker 2 (08:49):
Yeah, I think a lot of people don't get that.
Speaker 3 (08:51):
And it's Shia and the majority of the people in
the south are Shia. And you know a lot of
them get their schooling and their medication from Hesbulla. So
it's not just a military organization. And there's various estimates,
but you could be looking at them. But we say,
prior to the present conflict, maybe seventy thousand Hesbla in
(09:15):
south of their root, shall we say. And some of
them are full time, some of them are part time,
some of them are just sympathizers, helpers, friends. You know,
it's difficult. And another factor that has proven extremely difficult
is so when unifim patrol with the laugh, there is
certain restrictions that even the laugh have in terms of
(09:37):
entering certain areas. And what has Bullah have done is
that they have designated certain nature reserves and generally speaking,
the laugh won't go in there. And if the laugh
won't go win, the uniful can't goin right, So the
laugh for kind of you know that they have a
balancing act to do. In terms of retaining the trust
of the people in the south and also not causing
(10:00):
a sectarian divide within their own ranks.
Speaker 2 (10:02):
Yeah, of course.
Speaker 3 (10:03):
And also they have another problem in terms of equipment.
They're sort of relying on other countries, the UK, the US,
France to supply them with equipment. But like they have
no tanks. They have a few helicopters. They're very much
like there's no way they will take on has bullet no.
Speaker 2 (10:21):
Way, right, yeah, or the IDEF.
Speaker 3 (10:23):
And UNIFOR itself is likely armed, you know, it's not
gone round in tanks or anything armored carriage. Yes. The
only time, the last time UNIFAL had tanks in Lebanon
was just after the war when the French deployed with
the Lea clerk tanks, right, which did not please the
locals because the clerk tanks driving up and down the
roads was nearly doing as much damage as the Markava
(10:44):
tanks during the war. And plus Lebanon isn't a very
tank friendly area to be operating against.
Speaker 2 (10:52):
What we said, right, yeah, was that when the IDF
came in and then Macava tanks and the French like
physically blocked them with their own tanks. I can't remember
when that was, and I'm.
Speaker 3 (11:01):
Not aware of that, but it could will happen because
I know certainly back in the.
Speaker 2 (11:04):
Nineties that may have been. When it was when Israel was.
Speaker 3 (11:07):
Operating the security Zone. We the Irish and our colleagues
from Finland and Norway had had numerous standoffs with Israelis
trying to enter certain villages.
Speaker 2 (11:17):
And yeah, but.
Speaker 3 (11:20):
Yeah, I saw the day before yesterday the two I
think two bulldozers in the Marcava or I said, yeah,
two d nines broke down a U and watchtower and
a UN fence at the un UNIFIL headquarters in the Cura,
which is a few k from the frontier with Israel. Yes,
I should I note as well for your listeners that
Israel and Lebanon have been at a state of war
(11:42):
since nineteen forty eight. Yes, they've never had a seat
or a peace agreement, and.
Speaker 2 (11:47):
The Triparte Agreement is the only place where they actually meet, right.
Speaker 3 (11:51):
Yeah, so there is a UNIFIL post a meeting normally
right at the frontier where you can cross between one
country and the other. And I keep using the word
frontier because it's not a border. It hasn't been officially demarketd.
The blue line, which I mentioned earlier on simply verifies
that the IDF have withdrawn into Israel, but it's not
(12:12):
the border right however, going back to your point about
the Tripartheid Agreement, and that's where the senior Israeli officials
senior Lebanese officials, under the chairmanship of UNIFIL meat and
they discuss items of concern that maybe UNIFIL can help
or now between the two of them, and in twenty
(12:33):
twenty two they managed to organize a maritime boundary between
Lebanon and Israel, which was kind of fascinating because on
the western side of Lebanon and the northwesterns coast of
Israel the huge gas fields. So the two countries actually
they've agreed their maritime boundary under the auspices of UNIFIL.
(12:55):
They still haven't agreed their land. But it's the first
time that a peace keep mission has arranged and courage
developed and led successfully discussions about a maritime boundary. So
the uniform does have some successes.
Speaker 2 (13:09):
Yeah, yeah, no, I think it would be wrong to
over looks. We'll take a quick break for adverts and
we'll come back. We're back, And Kevin, you'd mentioned that
you were in Lebanon in two thousand and six. I
(13:30):
think you said you're an unarms observer at that time,
Is that right.
Speaker 3 (13:32):
Yeah, that's right. Yet, so one of the oldest missions
in the world is one, so the United Nations Truth
Supervisory Organization, and that essentially was established, I suppose after
the forty eight War, and it had well say, offices
and observers in Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. You
(13:54):
know that they were quite effective in certain ways, Like
certainly the eventual peace agreement between Egypt and Israel was
very much helped along by the presence of ONSO in
Cairo and Shamra Shaik. The dieasagreement between Jordan and Israel
again was very much assisted by ONSO. So they have
a kind of a fairly good track record. And what
(14:17):
they bring to the table is that first of all,
they're unarmed military observers, which takes some of the sting
out of heaven. You know, a heavily armed guy with
a hell and there's and sunglasses walk around, you know that,
and some armies, as you know, can tend to be
more intimidating than others in how they how they carry themselves.
(14:40):
So I went there. I went to the region in
two thousand and five and I was working on the
occupied Golden Heights, living in the in Tiberias on the
Sea of Galilee with my wife and two kids who
then were four and five. And in February zero six
I was transferred to Lebanon and we were living in
the city of Tier. The kids were going to a
local English speaking Arab school and Lebanon was absolutely thriving.
(15:04):
It must happened. We had the kids in bear Rouge,
we had them and a man done in what they
run and my normal routine. We had four observation posts
along the frontier with with Israel, yeah staft by five
guys who spent a week seven days up there and
then you come down for four or five and then
go back up again. And each team had its specific
(15:26):
area to operate with, and we say a specific battalion
that we would interact with. And also quite importantly, we
had liaison assistants who were locals like translators, but but
they're a lot more important than that. And based on
the sectarian nature of the area, you know, you'd always
have a Christian you'd always have a share, but you
(15:47):
could have the Drews. If you were further up to
the north, you could have suddenly. And each team had
four or five of these because we used to send
two patrols out each day. So we had huge interaction
with the locals and ARMERI, with the mayors and the muktar,
and we were very much a force multiplier for UNIFIL
because we could get information from people. You know, we
(16:08):
used to stop and have lunch in some of the
little restaurants and we were always talking to people, and
you know, it was the window down, waving out, having
a chat, learning a bit of Arabic, whereas Uniful by
its nature goes around in armor cars, right, and even
if you stop, when you get out and you take
off the sunglasses, people will just react differently. The two
(16:29):
guys with a local that they know in the car.
Speaker 2 (16:33):
Yeah, as about someone in full battle rattle again.
Speaker 3 (16:35):
Now, we definitely were. But the war kicked off on
the twelfth of July two thousand and six and I
was I had done on patrol to pick up or
Christian liaison assistant in her village and literally we were
heading off on patrol and over the radio all stations
go to the nearest U went position immediately. The nearest
(16:57):
U went position tours at the time was an inn
the platoon position on top of a hill. From my
past experience, I had reckoned that there was a bit
of stuff going on either in shade the farms, which
is a disputed area in the southeastern part of Lebanon,
up in the mountains. So I said to the guy
that was with me, I said, look, this could be
over a couple of hours. Let's go straight back to
(17:19):
our patrol base. And you know, we knew we had
a fool the facility, and we also knew we had
a good bunker in the place, so we had it
back at a fair agnuts, shall we say. And normally,
when we would have two patrols out, there'd be one
guy left in the patrol base and he'd be responsible
for radio checks and all that kind of stuff. But
(17:41):
what we'd do is, when we were about maybe a
kilometer away, we would inform our headquarters in in the
Kura that were closing down at our final destination, which
would give this guy time to come out and unlock
the gate to let us in. And just as I
had transmitted that up on the ear and said don't
come in, don't come in, we're getting hit up. So
(18:03):
we're at that stage we will restigate, and about maybe
two kilometers away there was a huge idea of position
and they were just banging with pine fives and gpmg's
not directly at us, but kind of in the general area.
Speaker 2 (18:18):
Yeah, explain those weapons systems for people who aren't familiar,
like what's a GPMG If as somebody is not.
Speaker 3 (18:24):
Okay, sorry, So you've everyone's familiar with with, say in
AK forty seven or and then sixteen, which would be
known as small arms. In other words, that caliber is
five point five six or seven point six two. Then
you have medium machine guns which are generally belt fed,
and there are seven point six two yeah. And then
you have heavy machine guns, again belt fed, and they're
(18:46):
twelve point seven or fifty caliber. Yeah. So we were
getting a fair bit. But it took us maybe an
hour of listening to various news channels, both in Lebanon
and in Israel to realize that as we had carried
cross border attack hit up an idea of convoy kidnapped
two who were seriously injured and subsequently died and killed
(19:07):
initially four and then against their own orders and Israeli
mccalva went into Lebanon to have a kind of commanding
view over where they thought that Hespital were bringing these guys.
Hesbala knew that that's what they do, and big anti
tank mind and killed four guys inside the Murcava. So
(19:28):
Israel had last eight and two kidnapped in the space
of maybe maybe an hour. So the reaction was was
it was fast and furious, and yeah, it took us
nearly six days to get our Lee as an assistant
back back to her village. It took the un nearly
(19:50):
two and a half weeks two of actually with the families,
because at that stage once it was a family mission,
and where I was, I could see the jets dropping
bombs in to Tier, and my wife could look up
on the skyline knowing where I was and see the
same thing happening. I was sort of used to being
under fire, but it's a different thing to see your
family under fire as well. And eventually when the charter
(20:15):
the sort of a cruise liner from Cyprus to come
over and stand offshore and send in its lifeboats to
bring the families out. So when this has been planned
and so had try to organize that an armored convoy
would bring those onmos that were deployed on the four
posts down to tier to say goodbye. But where I was,
(20:37):
we were getting hammered with artillery fire and tank fire.
So I was the only one with family that couldn't
get out. So when my wife and two kids that
were five and seven, that's fit, were getting into the
lifeboat to bring them out to the ship, I rang
her and I said, look, I'll see you want to
see which is not a great way to end the
family mission, let me tell you now. And then in
(20:58):
the space of the next three days, we had a
strength of fifty two officers and in about three days
we last over ten percent. We had one Italian captain
shot in the back. He's known a wheel chair. We
had another Australian captain seriously injured when the converse she
was in was I suppose target is probably the way
to explain it. But she she was thrown up against
(21:22):
the inside of the armored car and essentially her back
was broken. She was evacuated with my wife and kids,
and then I think it was the day later or
two days later, the Israeli dropped the Jadam, which is
a bunker busted missile into the post, just up for me,
killing for very good friends of mine. So yeah, two
thousand and six was a bit rough.
Speaker 2 (21:43):
Yeah, if you're comfortable, could we talk about that last
one a little bit, because I think it's one of
the ones that, like, there's no mistaking that un position, right,
it's you don't and you don't accidentally disco dropping Jadam's
left right in center all over the place.
Speaker 3 (21:57):
Like. The first thing I should say is that twenty
one years previously that observation post was completely destroyed, but
there was no one in it at the time. So
when it was rebuilt, it had the best bunker in Lebanon,
so that they dug down first and had like a
lot of the the bunkers currently in Lebanar are overgrown
the bunkers, but this this was dug down into the
(22:21):
into the rock essentially, and it had its roof was
about a meter and a half of reinforced steel and
concrete with the two story concrete building on top of it.
So without doubt it was the best bunker in Lebanon.
So that on that this this happened on the twenty
fifth of July, and on that particular day we'd already
lost the patrol base in Marouna rass when when Roberto
(22:45):
was shot and they had I have to say, in fairness,
but there's the liaison branch that kind of liaises between
IDF and UNIFIL. Okay, and UNIFIL couldn't launch one of
the telecopter to do a medevac. So the decision was
made that the guys would get into an armored land
cruiser and follow Israeli tank tracks back into Israel.
Speaker 2 (23:08):
Where they couldn't deconflict the air space to launch it
or what was stopping them launching their helicopter to evacuate.
Speaker 3 (23:15):
There was too much connectic activity at that it wouldn't
have been able to land.
Speaker 2 (23:20):
It was.
Speaker 3 (23:20):
It was a battle long ago, okay. Yeah, So they
essentially followed Israeli tank tracks that had come into Leblon.
They followed those tank tracks back into Israel where they
were met by an Israeli patrol and Roberto was flown
through Rambam hospital. But yeah, going back to going back
to kem on the twenty fifth of July, as we
(23:40):
were all taking a fair bit of incoming where I was.
It wasn't targeting, it was more sort of harassment fire.
Speaker 2 (23:49):
Yeah, like that.
Speaker 3 (23:51):
The house next door took three direct tank rounds and
it was five meters away Jesus from post, and our
post was tiny. Yeah, but in the guys in Kiam
were taking a coupit of archarity. But there was a
lot of air strikes coming in close. And again for
(24:12):
your listeners, the UN has a designation what it calls
a firing close. So we'll say a firing close from
a sixteen is I don't know, something like fifty meters
or something like that. Firing close from an artillery shell
is five hundred meters, and a firing close from an
aerial bomb is a kilometer. So if it lands within
(24:34):
a kilometer, it's officially designated as a firing close, and
it's recorded, and you know, both sides get you know,
it's it's an official account of of what's happening. So
the guys who are getting you know, a good few
firings close from area bombs and there was three distinct
waves of attack in the general area. So naturally Force
(24:56):
Commander uniful chief of staff on so you win a
quarters in New York were screaming at the Israelis, you know,
stopped targeting disposition. What was it hes bull in the area?
Of course there was keam is a hesbil a stronghold.
But eventually that that evening the decision was made that
the patrol buss is going to be evacuated. But because
(25:17):
of the level of kinetic activity that evening, it was
going to be done at first light next morning. And
since the war started, we had all been on the
twenty four to seven twenty minute radio so every twenty
minutes you had to respond to a radio check. So
the last transmission from the post was from a Canadian
(25:37):
friend of mine X Special Forces. Really really cool and
I could hear it in his voice. He was requested
a luck in time for a firing close. It's danger close,
it's danger close, get them to stop. And that was
the last transmission. So when they miss the next radio check,
we presumed another shell had come in and blown all
the aerials of the of the building. So myself and
(25:58):
a NAUSI feund the Mind requested permission to take our
armored land cruiser and try and drive up and see
what was happening. That was refused by UNIFIL, so they
sent a patrol from the Indian battalion, which was kind
of in fairness that it was nearer. So we switched
on to their radio frequency to hear what they were saying,
and so they approached the base. They had obviously had
to break down the gate and said the base had
(26:20):
taken a direct hit by an aerial bond. And at
that stage we were still thinking maybe they're trapped under
the rubble or something like that. And then the one
of them transmitters, we have found the body of a
Chinese officer, so we knew the four guys were were
were killed. And the Indians found three bodies that night
(26:42):
and brought them to the marchary in marja Un, which
is a large Christian town. So the next morning there
was I think five of us tasked to open identify
the bodies.
Speaker 2 (26:53):
Yeah.
Speaker 3 (26:54):
So the first guy was Chinese, was over pressure, killed time,
so that that was an easy one to identify. The
next guy had no arms, no legs, and wead Jesus
and where his head should have been was the chain
of a dog tag and I went down into his body.
Paris Yeah, and the other guy yeah, so yeah, it
(27:17):
was a difficult, difficult procedure, and then we had to
try and arrange to get the bodies transferred into Israel
to where you and colleagues from Jerusalem so they could
go to Rambam Hospital and have have you know, a
proper identification and all that sort of stuff.
Speaker 2 (27:34):
Yeah, eventually be returned to their families, I suppose.
Speaker 3 (27:37):
And that was a difficult procedure because where the Ideas
said they could meet us, there was a minefield in
front of us, and where we said we could meet them,
they thought it was too exposed. So eventually we went
into an old, small, tiny Indian platoon position and about
one hundred meters away there was a gate that the
(27:59):
Israelis used to you who's to come in a note
when the security's own was there. But the area between
the un position and the gate hadn't been mind swept
in six years. But we had no choice. We couldn't
bring the guys back to the march because I had
resorted to using refrigerated trucks to store bodies because the
marcher was full. Yeah, So there was there was an
IDEF company there under a I think it was a
(28:20):
full brigadier and there's a war going on, naturally, Yeah,
all the time, gunships and katouch's passing each other over
our heads. So when we had the three lads transfer
over to our colleagues fro Jerusalem, I stood in front
of the Ideas Brigadier and I lined up all the
UN troops and he says, we're not going to have
a minute silence and memory of our friends who were
(28:41):
murdered on the cause of peace, and no, having a
having a minute silence in the middle of a battle
is a odd experience. In fairness to this guy, he
still to attention, And because I lived in Tiberias, I
had a small bit of Hebrew and I went over
afterwards and thanked them for hisp And we didn't find
(29:02):
the fourth body on the left of the seas for Jesus. Yeah, yeah,
that's rough.
Speaker 2 (29:07):
Sorry, that's terrible to think about.
Speaker 3 (29:09):
So the obvious question is I know what the one
you want to ask? Why? Yeah, And I should have
said it at the start. Anything I say here, it's
it's my personal opinion. So it can't be construed as
being the views of the Irish Defense Forces. Yes, of course,
are certainly not the views of the United Nations. They
are my personal views. So you know, people should just
(29:30):
take it that it's it's Kevin McDonald describing what happened
to him and what his personal views on it are.
So why did they do it? Well, I think there's
a couple of things. Hubris is one. I think at
that stage there they were like a schoolyard bully who
got better and wanted to lash out of anything and everything.
A second, probably more tactical reason is that the village
(29:52):
of kim Is on a ridge, would say, at the
end of the redge ridged closest to Israel, because it's
only about four miles away, is where this op was.
And that's the reason was there and between kem and
we say, the frontier with Israel is the Hula Valley,
which is the biggest maneuver space. If you want a
maneuver armor and stuff into Lebanon with plenty of space,
that's where you do it. In fact, decide it is
(30:15):
an old Vichy French airfield from the Second World War,
so it's low space, and I think they didn't want
eyes on the ground seeing what they were doing. And
like one of the things for military observers is you
observe in your reports. That's your task. So was there
hez Bulla in the area around the around the OPI
yes there was. But as you probably know, if you
(30:37):
want to attack troops in the open, you use airburst
artillery shells, which the Israelis they did in nineteen ninety
six when they fired fifteen of them into a UN
battalion head quarters, killing one hundred and six leban These men,
women and children. See cancelter shelter in the UN headquarters.
But you don't fire a bunk or bust and missile
into a UN post to attack Hesbula.
Speaker 2 (30:57):
The subtle difference, Yeah, there's a different Yeah. I suppose
what people will ask is like, it's I think it's
important to explain this from the point of view of
someone on the ground. It's obviously UN troops are not
there to fight. They're there to keep peace, but they
are an armed presence, and so they'll wonder how or
why the UN can or can't defend itself the uniform
(31:21):
troops specifically in these positions. So, like, can you explain
how your rules of engagement and how that works for
from the sort of on the ground perspective.
Speaker 3 (31:32):
Okay, Well, the rules of engagement we said for a
peacekeeper mission, like we pack on one side because they're unarmed,
but for a peacekeeper mission. Yeah, So peacekeeping is generally
based on three principles consent, impartiality, and the use of
force in self defense of the mandate. So naturally, like
the guys there at the moment aren't going to try
(31:54):
and take on through or former KALFA tanks. First of all,
they don't have the capability to it.
Speaker 2 (32:01):
Yeah, that's an interesting Do they not have the guinances?
That's fine? Do they have, for instance, javelin and things
like that. Do they have those weapons systems available?
Speaker 3 (32:10):
I'm not sure what they have currently. Certainly we didn't have, Okay,
and it wasn't ever going to be an issue because
that's kind of not our job like that. The sole
responsibility to protect the people of Leblon is the Lebanese government.
Uniful is there to assist. It's not there to say, okay,
you step back, you know, we stemmed up and protect you.
(32:31):
That's not what Uniful or any peacekeeping mission. The only
peacekeeping mission that eventually had an offensive capability built into
its mandate was the mission that's now closing down in
the DRC. The Democratic Republic of Congo and it's Monusco,
and they specifically changed the mandate to include an offensive
(32:52):
capability to go after the twenty three rebels in the
Kivus in sort of the northeast. And when they did it,
like you know, attack helicopters should forces a lot. Yeah,
it was quite effective. But which kind of brings me
to another point because I just last year a completed
a Masters in Peace and Conflict Studies and mandates was
the evolution of mandates is what I sort of looked
(33:12):
at and haven't wrote bus mandates is all well and good,
but the TCCs, the true contrip in countries, have to
have the ability, the capability of the training and the
will to carry out the robust nature of the mandate.
So you know, we we were saying in Ireland paper
never refuses ink. You can put whatever you want into
a mandate, but you have to be able to effectively
(33:35):
implement the mandate. Yeah, and I think often that's that's
the reason that that maybe people are kind of broad
in how mandates are written, But that's that's that's for
someone way further up the food food chain than me.
Speaker 2 (33:49):
Yeah, So for those like the people on the ground then,
and now that's not a great deal. They can do, right,
They can attempt to ask the IDEAF to stop, which
they did, which has historically not work. And they can
(34:12):
take shelter in their bunkers, which they did, which it's
only helpful if they're not going to use bunker busting
missiles to destroy that bunker. So, like, it must be terrible.
Like it's one thing to be engaged in combat with someone,
and especially if you're a soldier, bro it's another thing.
And I found myself in this situation last year to
be effectively like I'm able to respond. I'm thinking here
(34:34):
of the Turkish drone bombing and fighter jets and bombers
in Syria where I was. But it's a horrible thing
to be in that situation, And is it for those peacekeepers?
It must be a really difficult sort of place to be.
Speaker 3 (34:47):
Well, it is, yeah, And of course you know, they're
all conscious of the fact that their families back in
Ireland are fully aware of what's going on. And Yeah,
shortly after the invasion, the IDF decided that they had
told unif they wanted them out. Essentially, and not just
the Irish, but both other nationalities that were not going,
(35:10):
you know. So the ide if everywhere they go in Lebanon,
the first vehicle is a dena in Buldozer, because that
is more robust than Amercava, and it can also very
quickly throw up earth and ramparts to sort of you know,
protect from direct fire. Yeah, the idea of troops. So
they decided that they would literally conjoin an IDF position
(35:32):
to the Irish position, hoping that they could intimidate the
Irish into leaving. And the position's name was six Ash
five two, very close to the frontier. Ironically, when the
Israelis withdrew in two thousand, they recognized that this particular
area was what we in the millers would call key
terrain because that area overlooked a vulnerable part of northern Israel,
(35:54):
villages like Avavem and a few others. So the ideas
requested Uniful to put a position there which would would
say stop has bullet them put in the position there,
and then suddenly they're up close and personal trying to
intimidate the Irish and other nationalities as well. Yeah, So
it's one of the things, and I think one of
the reasons that they didn't want unifilled, and there's about
(36:17):
twenty small of these small positions, mainly close to the frontier.
I think one of the reasons that they and again
this is a personal point of view, I think one
of the reasons that they didn't want UNIFIL in any
of these positions was eight to turn it into a
free fire zone would be. One of the things that
UNIFIL is supposed to do is to monitor and report,
(36:39):
monitor and observe, and of course if you're not there,
you can't do it. That's actually one of the things
that the UNIFIL, even though they're hunt could in their
bases would with very little mobility, they can still monitor
and observe what's happening in the general area. Now, would say,
in the case of this position six five to two,
if the IDs ultimately gain, our goal was to take
(37:02):
a major has been a stronghold which is called binchebail
that's a good further north than disposition, so that the
focus of attention would move on from with they our
guys and go a wee bit further north.
Speaker 2 (37:14):
Yeah, so that's sort of where they find themselves now, right,
is these can you explain like you've got these positions
along the frontier, and then you've got the headquarters that
you just mentioned two days ago have been infringed by
a bulldozer attacked depends how you want to say it.
Speaker 3 (37:33):
Well, it makes a change from having a tanker on
fired into an op which they did yeh a few
days previously.
Speaker 2 (37:39):
Yeah, and they've done consistently right for for a month
or so. Now is firing directly into these observing positions?
Are these positions that are now are they left isolated
as the idea full advance passed and around them And
in addition to firing directly at them.
Speaker 3 (37:56):
There's somewhat isolated. Now all these positions would be well
stoped with water and emergency rations and stuff like that.
And as I mentioned before, UNIFIL do have a liaison
branch which I'm sure are talking to the Idea if
on an hourly basis and they will coordinate the movements
of UNIFIL with it supply their positions or I think
(38:19):
last week they had a convoy went into the city
of Tier, which is probably twelve krom from the head
quarters to distribute aid, especially medical aid, because Tier is
getting fairly whacked. Like all of the self I suppose
so there is engagement to make sure that these posts
aren't like completely isolated, that there is a means of
(38:42):
doing resupply.
Speaker 2 (38:44):
Yeah, Israel stopped one of those at some point, isn't
it like was it a resupply movement?
Speaker 3 (38:49):
The stop things that are on a regular basis. As
I said, there is interaction, like nothing happens in a vacuum.
Like we'll said, yeah, the Irish Italian headquarters would not
send a convoy to sixtass five two without it being
communicated to the Israelis and saying we're going to go
on three vehicles that or seven hundred hours blah blah blah,
(39:11):
and and get the confirmation back that yeah, that's okay,
because you know, they mentioned the foul the war and
that that's not from the fairly real as you can
imagine yourself. It's a fairly real thing that happens, you
know sometimes you know, yeah, instructions don't get passed down
or sometimes instructions are ignored for whatever reason. So it's
(39:35):
a bit of a delicate, delicate balancing act. But from
what I understand, it's working well.
Speaker 2 (39:41):
That's good. Yeah, yeah, And I think it's working well
in terms of like, what's happening in Lebanon is bad,
and it'd be better if it wasn't. But it's not
at the same tier as it has been in Gaza.
Speaker 3 (39:54):
No, you're looking at will be three and a half
thousand compared to forty three and a half thousand killed.
Speaker 2 (39:59):
Yeah, and so many of those being civilians, right, people
who absolutely no business targeting, and like that genocidal violence
that we've seen in Gaza hasn't come to Lebanon, and
in part I think we can attribute that to their
being observed. Is there is that fair to say?
Speaker 3 (40:17):
I think it's a fair point. Of course, there's there's
no real the un footprint in Gaza. My understanding is
it's extremely extremely light. Yeah, and as you know that
would say banished genre, yeah, whereas I mean uniform the
ten thousand troops in southern Lebanon, So there's very much more.
Maybe there's a more consciousness, but there's still Latin in
(40:41):
the place, but it's in terms of civilian casualties. As
we said, it's not going on as long as Gaza either.
But on the we'll say the combat front, but not
exactly having things the wrong way either. They've been trying
to take the village of Kim for the last I
think two weeks, and my understanding is that haven't have
(41:02):
destroyed it, right, but they haven't taken it. And it
was like in two thousand and six they claimed that
the town of ben Schebail was the Hesivila capital of
the South, which and I supp wasn't the way it was,
but the turns of ent draws me. But they never
controlled it. They were still getting attacked, you know, days
after they had seized it. Right.
Speaker 2 (41:22):
Yeah, they've never really established like control or like a
monopoly and non violence in the area. And yeah, they've
not done that this time. And I think I suppose
the last thing I wanted to ask about is like
we've just talked about like why this mission is important,
and we've spoken about four like you had your family
there when they were being bombed, and like this investment
(41:44):
in being there in Lebanon, being alongside the Lebanese people
in your case with your own family, like it's it's
one that island has had for a long time. Ireland
has historically, amongst European nations, been much better on the
rights of Palestine and Palestinian people, and then most European nations.
How is this peacekeeping mission perceived in Ireland? Like a
(42:08):
people proud that they're there?
Speaker 3 (42:10):
Oh yeah, oh, hugely proud. And and you know, the
Irish have always been extremely proud of what our defense
forces have achieved, despite us being a very small defense forces.
Like I think at the moment, between the Navy, the
Army and the Air Corps, we're probably looking at in
total in total, well yeah, very small and then we're
(42:34):
overseas in a lot of places as well, so like
to dup that from the nine thousand, you're probably down
to eight. Yeah, but we do tend to punsch up
over with internationally. We obviously had no colonial baggage, which
affects some other countries. Yes, and I think generally speaking
we're seeing as I'm not sure if annest Barker is
the right word, but certainly not as threatening and not
(42:57):
coming with an agenda, right yeah, whereas other other countries
might have a certain agenda for whatever political reasons at home.
And it's certainly in Ireland s Caes As I said,
we were there from seventy eight two thousand and now
from two thousand and six to present day, and a
lot of it has been in the same general area,
so people would know Irish soldiers some Lebanese talk with
(43:19):
an Irish accent.
Speaker 2 (43:20):
I've heard that. Yeah, there it's mad.
Speaker 3 (43:22):
Yeah, yeah, it's true. And depending on what part of
Ireland the troops were from, you could even go further down,
like some of them talk with a very broad Dublin accent,
some of them would talk with a very broad Cork
accent because of that interaction. And I know one of
the first big projects the Irish did, certainly from the
(43:42):
early eighties, was to build an orphanage in a provincial
capital called Sipneyme and they've been doing that even when
we know troops there, guys were still sending money and
toys and everything. That's been demolished last week.
Speaker 2 (43:57):
For Arty Jesus an orphan It's like story book evil stuff,
isn't it.
Speaker 3 (44:02):
Like yeah, well, you know, it's just there's a lot
of evil stuff going on in the Middle East at
the moment unfortunately.
Speaker 2 (44:09):
Yeah yeah, yeah. I mean I've personally seen hospitals bombed
and all that kind of stuff myself, and it sometimes
doesn't even make the news. I mean, that orphanage evidently
didn't really make my news diet. Kevin, thank you very
much for sharing some of your experiences over there, and
I'd love to have you on again to talk about
the things you've the work you've done in Africa and
the line after after eleven and you've written a book
(44:31):
right about your experiences peacekeeping and other things. Where could
people find that?
Speaker 3 (44:36):
Okay? So this initially started off as a lockdown project
during the COVID lockdown in the Central African Republican And
initially it was just from my wife and family. But
as it starts writing, you kind of started remembering and
it's not just your typical military guy tell us about
how Bravey was. I have a separate career in mountaineering
and a separate career in archaeology as well, So it's
(44:58):
a kind of a much more different mishmash of of
of stuff going on. So that the book is called
a Lifeless Ordinary and it can be purchased online at
Male Books Dot, I m A Y or or chats.
Speaker 2 (45:13):
Yeah. I like that balance. I've always thought that, like,
I'll go somewhere and I'll write about the worst things
I saw there and the worst days I had there,
and that'll be my story. But I've always wanted to
write about the mountains of Kurdistan are beautiful and I
really loved being there, And there are other places that
people think of them as wars, not countries, and I
(45:35):
think it would be I'd love to write about mountaineering,
backpacking in these places where often it's really sad that
you don't get to share that part.
Speaker 3 (45:43):
I'll write about this in the book. I mean like,
I've lived a few times in Lebanon, and I've lived
and worked in Jerusalem a few times, and it's a
fascinating region. Oh yeah, and the people in both countries
some I have some really good friends in Israel and
have some really good friends of Lebanon, and I've been
treated extremely well by people in both countries. Certainly, if
(46:05):
you've an interest in archaeology, it's to be else could
put shit not one to be you know, like the
Phoenicians in Tier and no matter where you go in
Tire you can pick up Roman posturally or you can
see all these amazing sites, whether it's from the Phoenicians,
from the Romans, from the Trusaders. It's just it's all
there in front of you.
Speaker 2 (46:26):
Yeah, yeah, creative civilization there. Well, thank you so much
for sharing your experiences, Kevin, thanks so much.
Speaker 3 (46:31):
Okay, cheers.
Speaker 1 (46:35):
It Could Happen Here is a production of cool Zone Media.
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It Could Happen Here News
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Robert Evans
Garrison Davis
James Stout
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