AI and Radioactive Shoe Salesmen

What does artificial intelligence have to do with an outdated practice that involved blasting shoe stores with radiation? Trust me, there's a connection. Or at least I make one. 

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Episode Transcript

Speaker 1 (00:04):
Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey there,
and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland.
I'm an executive producer with iHeart Podcasts and how the
tech are you? So? This morning I was thinking, as
I often do, about artificial intelligence and how quickly various

(00:29):
people and companies are rushing to apply AI to just
about everything. And this isn't exactly new. It would be
naive and reductive to say it. We're so Researchers have
been developing AI for decades, with a focus on different
aspects of AI throughout the ages generative AI, while splashy

(00:51):
is really just one of the more recent implementations that
have has caught our attention. So while we can't say
that AI has exactly crept up on us, the push
to make use of AI, when one could argue we
don't even have a full appreciation for what it can do,
both in good and bad scenarios, means that we're being

(01:13):
a little premature. And this actually reminds me of shoe stores.
Now that's a pretty big leap, but I promise I'm
going somewhere. I'm sure you've all heard the phrase history
repeats itself, or maybe the slightly more florid version. Those
who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it. Well,

(01:35):
once upon a time there was an era in which
people made use of a powerful technology for a trivial purpose,
and many people potentially paid the price for that decision.
This is just one example. Obviously, there are lots of others,
some of which are famous enough to have had entire
documentaries made about their stories. But I am talking about

(02:00):
when shoe salespeople were regularly irradiated as part of their job. Okay,
so let's set the scene, and it's the last decade
of the nineteenth century, eighteen ninety five in fact, and
a German smarty pants by the name of Wilhelm Konrad

(02:22):
Runtgen was working as the director of the Physical Institute
at the University of Fursburg. Now I don't mean he
was working at a physical school and other people were,
I don't know, working in some sort of philosophically hypothetical
school that would be putting discartes before the horse. Rather,

(02:43):
I mean Runtgen specialized in physics. In the eighteen nineties,
he was experimenting with a fairly new technology. What essentially
was a cathode ray tube or CRT. This is the
technology that would later be responsible for producing images in

(03:04):
old television sets, the big, boxy kind that you might
remember from decades ago. Runtgn was studying how high voltage
electricity could pass through low vacuum tubes, like essentially a
cathode ray tube. Now, the story goes that one day
he was shutting things down for the evening in his
lab and he noticed something peculiar. So he had covered

(03:29):
the cathode tube with a piece of black cardboard, and
when he powered up the tube and turned off the light,
he saw that there was something glowing in his lab.
So he investigates and he discovers the glowing is coming
from a piece of paper that has a coating of

(03:51):
barium platinu cyanide on it, and that this is what
was glowing in the dark, and it was several feet
away from the tube, which again was covered by black cardboard.
It was far enough away from the tube that Runkan
thought the tube would not be able to illuminate this
particular piece of paper. Moreover, there was some sort of

(04:14):
energy outside of visible light happening here, something that could
stimulate the barium platinus cyanide to fluoresce and something that
could pass through this black cardboard. Now, Runkan was a
methodical sort, and he repeated this somewhat accidental experiment many
times to make certain that what he was seeing was

(04:37):
actually real, that there was something to it. He further
investigated the phenomena for weeks before deciding to publish any
papers or even discuss the matter with anyone else. He
knew that lots of other people were doing experiments with
these low vacuum tubes, so he didn't want to tip
his hand too early and perhaps lose out on snag

(05:00):
a really big scientific discovery. Turns out, this was a
really good idea because there were no shortage of people
who were absolutely certain they had discovered something new and exciting,
and then after other people looked into it, they found
out that there wasn't really any discovery there at all,
which could be pretty humiliating, but this was not the
case with Rutgin. He had made the first documented observation

(05:23):
of what we would call X rays, in fact, what
he would call X rays X rays because X represents
an unknown variable. What's more, Runkin noticed something really darn cool.
So let's say that he hung up a sheet of
paper that had a coating of barium platino cyanide on it,

(05:45):
and he put that a few feet away from the tube,
and then he energizes the tube, he turns it on. Essentially,
if he put his hand between the tube, which was
serving as a lamp and the sheet of paper, then
on the sheet of paper he would see projected the
bones of his hand. It was as though he could

(06:06):
see straight through his flesh and look at the skeleton inside. Clearly,
he couldn't just keep this a secret, so he had
to tell his closest friend. He brought his wife to
his lab and showed her the discovery. He had her
hold her hand against a sheet of this paper, and
then he exposed her hand for a fifteen minute long

(06:29):
X ray exposure, and instead of it just projecting the
images of the bones on the sheet of paper, it
actually made a record of it, an image like a photograph,
the first radiograph known on record. She reportedly exclaimed, I
have seen my own death, meaning she had seen her

(06:50):
own skeleton. Those the Rengins really knew how to turn
up the romance. It tells you anyway, after weeks of
investigative work, Jen reached a point where he felt confident
in coming forward to his peers to present his findings,
and once he did, it caught on like a house
on fire. His paper published at the end of eighteen

(07:13):
ninety five in December of eighteen ninety five. By eighteen
ninety six, people were making practical use of X rays.
Mostly this was in the medical field, but not exclusively,
because suddenly it was possible for physicians to gaze into
the human body, you know, looking into a patient without
first having to make an opening, which, as you can imagine,

(07:36):
presents certain advantages. All right, but now it's time to
jump to a different smarty pants, someone who was quite
the opportunistic smarty pants. In fact, some people could argue
that the true smarty pants nature of this man is
that he found new ways to claim authorship over work

(07:58):
that really just happened within him his place of business.
I am talking about Thomas Edison. Now, whether you think
of Edison as a truly brilliant inventor responsible for inventing
countless things in his lifetime, or you think of him
as someone who was more likely to employ people who

(08:21):
did most of the actual inventing, and then he would
put his names on the patents. I'll leave all that
to you. The truth of the matter is probably somewhere
in the middle. But the important part of our story
is that Edison and his staff were working on a
technology that would leverage X rays in a really interesting way.
So the basic concept wasn't that different from what Reunjin

(08:44):
had been experimenting with in his lab. The invention would
have a screen that would be coded with some sort
of fluorescent material on it and would thus fluoresce when
exposed to X rays. There would also be a lamp
capable of generating those X rays, and if you were
to place something between the lamp and the screen, you

(09:07):
would be able to see the stuff that blocked X
rays from hitting the screen. Now, your flesh would let
X rays pass right through it, so you would see
your bones on the fluorescent screen behind, and you can
have the lamp on, you can move your hand back
and forth, and you can watch the bones in your
hands move in real time. Edison called his invention the vitascope,

(09:30):
and I'm pretty sure later on he thought that was
a really ironic name, a poor name for him to
pick for this invention because vita means life, you can
see that in words like vitality. But the vitoscope would
actually lead to the death of one of Edison's most
loyal members of staff. That person was Clarence Madison Dally. He,

(09:55):
like his father and his brothers, would work as a
glassblower for T. Thomas Edison. Dally worked closely with Edison
while trying to design a practical incandescent lamp. Again, Essen
didn't really invent the light bulb, but in his lab
the light bulb was turned into something that was actually
of practical use. Now, upon runk Jen's discovery of X rays,

(10:21):
Dali would actually shift his own work to focus on
creating X ray lamps as well as a fluorescent sheet
that actually used calcium tungue state as the fluorescing material
instead of the barium platinum cyanide. This was seen to
produce sharper images and thus a higher fidelity kind of image.

(10:44):
For years, Dali worked in the lab developing this technology,
perfecting it, and over time he began to experience some
pretty not just pretty, some truly serious health problems. His
hands showed signs of radiation burns, particularly his left hand,
which he used to demonstrate the X rays by waving

(11:07):
it in the path of the X rays. He began
to develop skin lesions, which are part of you know,
radiation burns. His problems progressed to the point that he
actually had to have his left hand amputated, but that
was only the beginning. Later on he had to have
more of his left arm amputated, then several of the

(11:27):
fingers on his right hand, and then ultimately he had
one arm amputated to the elbow and the other arm
amputated to the shoulder. But the damage was even more severe,
and in nineteen oh four, when he was not even
forty years old, Dally passed away from terminal cancer. This
experience hit Edison very, very hard. He truly liked Dali,

(11:50):
and it also convinced him that X ray technology was
far more dangerous than beneficial, and he was quoted to say,
don't talk to me about x I am afraid of them.
But Edison's team had already invented the fluoroscope at that point,
and there were all sorts of potential applications for that technology.
When we come back, I'll talk about some of those,

(12:13):
but first let's take a quick break to thank our sponsor.
All Right, before the break, I mentioned that Edison's fluoroscope
would end up having various applications, So the most obvious
ones were in medicine, right, and there was a darn

(12:36):
good reason to lean heavily on medicine in the early
twentieth century. You had a real provocative reason why you
wanted to advance the science of medicine. Several million reasons,
as it turned out, because in July nineteen fourteen, World
War One began. Of course, back then we didn't call

(12:58):
it World War one because being optimistic anyway. One of
the big challenges presented by the World War involved making
sure soldiers had the right equipment, and that included a
good pair of boots. Soldiers could end up having terrible injuries.
If they weren't wearing the right boots. They wouldn't be
able to march as far. They could suffer from things

(13:20):
like trench foot, So they needed to make sure the
boots were as well made and as good a fit
as was practical for the purposes of mass producing them
for soldiers. This is a delicate thing to balance, so
the thought was we should make sure that soldiers had
boots that would give them the support they needed and
not create a source of distraction or injury. And so

(13:42):
a guy named Frank Keefer created a book that he
titled a Textbook of Military Hygiene and Sanitation. This was
all with the goal of trying to keep soldiers as
healthy as possible before they were forced to march out
in front of a German machine gun in this time.
Next book, Kiefer included X ray images also known as radiographs,

(14:05):
in order to show how a soldier's foot should fit
inside a boot and what it would look like if
the soldier were wearing the wrong size boot. So this
was really just to illustrate the importance of matching the
size to the soldier. Keifer was not suggesting that the
army invest in thousands of fluoroscopes and check each recruit individually.

(14:26):
This was just to demonstrate the importance of a good fit,
but his idea sparked other ideas. A doctor named Jacob J.
Lowe used a fluoroscope to examine wounded soldier's feet without
having to first take off their boots. And you can
definitely understand how that could be a really useful thing

(14:48):
to do. You know why, would you potentially make an
injury worse or perhaps even create a new injury if
you can get a look in a non invasive kind
of way, and it works so well that Low thought
it would make sense to bring the technology to pediatrists
and to shoe stores in general. Why just use this

(15:09):
on soldiers when you could have a fluoroscope in your
local shoe shop, Customers could try on a pair of
new shoes. They could step up to the fluoroscope, the
staff could check to make sure that the shoes were
actually a really good fit. Maybe they could even employ
someone who could take a look at those images and say, oh,
you know what, you need special shoes because otherwise you're

(15:32):
not going to get the support you need and your
feet are going to hurt. Right, You could actually employ
people who could be experts in this. They could be
like the equivalent of a foot doctor working in a
shoe store and practice preventive medicine. It would be incredible.
So Low files for a patent in nineteen nineteen for

(15:53):
a shoe store version of this technology. However, it would
take nearly a decade for the patent off to grant
a patent. He called it the foot of scope, and
I am not making a joke about that. That is
actually what it would be called. And yeah, the idea
is that the customer would stick their feet into this

(16:13):
machine I'll describe it in a second, and the shoe
store salesperson would be able to look through a visor
and determine if the shoe was a good fit or not.
Low was not the only person pursuing this dream, believe
it or not. There were others around the world who
were filing similar patents. And while they filed their patents

(16:36):
after Low had already submitted his to the US Patent Office,
and at least a couple of cases, they got their
patents first. So kind of shows the great injustice of
global commerce, right, But eventually it all shook out that
really there were two major companies that would use this
technology to create machines for shoe shops. So in England

(17:01):
you had a company called the Petoscope Company, and here
in the United States you had the X Ray Shoe
Fitter Incorporated. Now, these fluoroscopes looked a lot like a
tall wooden cabinet, maybe like a little bit higher than
waist tall. So the customer would approach the cabinet on

(17:21):
one side, and the customer would be standing up and
they would step up onto a step at the base
of the cabinet, and at that point in the cabinet's
wall there was kind of a little alcove where they
could slide their feet into this thing, so it's inside
the cabinet, So you're standing on the step, your feet

(17:42):
are now inside the cabinet. On the inside of the cabinet,
the X ray lamp would actually be below the customer's feet,
pointing up at a fluorescent screen, and the fluorescent screen
would be above the customer's feet, so the lamp would
blast X rays up through the shoes, through the flesh
of the customer's feet, and would leave a moving image

(18:05):
of dim bones on the fluorescent screen, which staff could
view from above. So on the opposite side of the
cabinet were the controls that the staff would use, so
pretty simple stuff. They would have, you know, like a
switch to turn the fluoroscope on, and at that point
they would start powering up the cathode ray tube and

(18:28):
start beaming X rays toward the fluorescent screen. There would
be at least one, but usually several viewing ports that
would look down from the top of the cabinet into
the cabinet itself. Now, these ports remind me a little
bit of like a submarine periscope, you know, has kind
of like a visor kind of of attachment that fits

(18:50):
around the eyes, which of course obviously blocks out the
ambient light of the shop while you're looking at the
tootsis inside the cabinet. And the multiple visors meant more
than one per and could look at a time. So
maybe it's the shoe salesperson, maybe they have an assistant,
and there's probably some curious lookilu who wants to take
a look that skeleton bones. In fact, I'm sure there

(19:12):
was no shortage of variations of the phrase oh honey,
I can see your skeleton feet and these shoe shops
at the time. Anyway, the idea was the shoe salesperson
would be able to study the feet inside the shoe
and determine if the shoe really was a good fit.
Though I'm sure in many, perhaps most cases, the real

(19:34):
use of the technology was that it attracted customers and
it helped move sales. Sure, I bet in some cases
the clerk might say, this pair of shoes looks like
it's on the small side. For you or maybe you
need a wider pair of shoes or something along those lines.
But most of the time, I bet it was really
just a way to get folks into the door. Now,

(19:54):
as I'm sure you've all gathered, this practice was also
extremely dangerous. Customers might get a large dose of X rays,
a larger one than they would in a normal year,
especially these days. But the real risk was for the
staff who were using these machines over and over on
multiple customers a day. The first of these machines hit

(20:16):
the market in nineteen twenty seven, we wouldn't even settle
on a standard unit of measurement for radiation, the run Gin,
named after the guy who discovered X rays. We wouldn't
decide on that till nineteen twenty eight the following year,
and we still didn't have that much data to draw
conclusions as to how much or how little radiation exposure

(20:38):
was really safe or harmful. Now you had some scientists
who were arguing that it would be a really bad
idea to make use of radiation technology in an environment
like a shoe store, that it represented a true risk
to employees, that radiation really was no joke. Then you had,

(20:59):
on the other side the owners of the stores, who
essentially said shut up. The stores were claiming that the
X rays would let them create real like osteopathic solutions
to foot problems, but in reality, almost no one had
that kind of expertise or knowledge or experience. They had

(21:19):
no way of making any real meaningful decisions based on
what they were seeing. It was just a gimmick and
a gravy train. And by golly, they didn't need some
boffin telling them that their killer sales pitch was going
to give them cancer. And so the machines prospered for
a couple of decades. In fact, by the nineteen forties,

(21:40):
there was something like ten thousand fluoroscopes in the United
States alone, There were another say, three thousand in the UK,
and there were a few thousand more in a couple
of other countries. So just imagine for a moment all
those store employees who absorbed way more X rays than
any person is supposed to in a day. Just most

(22:01):
people wouldn't even absorb that much in a full year,
And day after day, these folks were getting blasted by
X rays. When in the mid nineteen forties, the American
Standards Association made a determination about X rays. They concluded
that at max, a person should encounter less than zero
point one rent gens worth of radiation per day. Now,

(22:23):
in nineteen forty eight, there was a survey done of
around forty something machines that were being used in Detroit,
these fluoroscope machines, and in that study they found that
the machines emitted radiation at a level between sixteen to
seventy five rent gens per minute. You were not supposed

(22:47):
to absorb more than point one per day. Now, keep
in mind the standards those are for, like super protective,
let's be extra careful, let's limit liability as much as possible.
So you could argue that it's overly cautious, if you
want to take that point of view. But the point
being that these machines were putting out way more radiation

(23:10):
than what people were supposed to be encountering in a
work environment. They were dangerous, and they were largely unregulated.
In the United States, laws about these devices were on
a state by state basis. In fact, it wouldn't be
until the nineteen seventies that you would start to see
laws across the country limiting their use and requiring the

(23:31):
machines to adhere to strict rules for manufacturing and operation.
Pennsylvania was the first US state to ban them outright,
That was in nineteen fifty seven. Even by nineteen seventy
only thirty three states had a ban in place. The
federal government couldn't take action until the early nineteen seventies

(23:52):
because there was no legal basis. The FDA, which was
the most likely organization to be able to step in,
had no authority for anything that had to do with
radiation that was not part of their responsibilities, so there
was nothing they could do. There was no legal basis
to make any kind of action on a federal level.

(24:13):
This was a case where technology and science had far
outpaced our laws and our capacity to do anything from
a legal standpoint, which sounds familiar to me as I
talk about this, and as I talk about things like AI. Now.
One thing that may have somewhat taken the wind out
of the fluoroscopes sales was the Second World War. Before

(24:37):
the introduction of the atom bomb, radiation was thought of
as more like this amazing kind of energy that could
do phenomenal stuff, like like you could use radiation for
anything to in science fiction, it was to blast around
in space, or fly at incredible speeds over the land,
or all sorts of things, and you'd be able to

(24:59):
use is it for industry? Radiation was wonderful, you know,
maybe you'd even power a superhero. But then you get
to the end of World War Two, when Fat Man
and Little Boy demonstrated the dreadful power of the atom,
and the stories of radiation poisoning and terrible things of
that nature really changed the picture. Pretty quickly. People saw

(25:22):
the destructive nature of radiation, or the destructive capability I
guess I should say of radiation. And so now the
perception shifted dramatically. They went from space age energy to
this is something we should be scared of. It's an
invisible killer. Be afraid. You know, you get into the

(25:43):
Cold War, the threat of nuclear war, all this perception
of radiation changes. It was a massive cultural shift. Keep
in mind, the radiation itself never changed. It was the
same from beginning to end. It was that way before
we got here, it'll be that way after we leave.
It's just our perception that changed. And it's interesting because

(26:06):
we would embrace our fear along with ignorance about radiation
in the exact same way that we embraced exuberance and
ignorance about radiation earlier, you know, a few decades earlier.
But now instead of thinking, hey, I can use this
invisible ray to see my bones and make my feet
fit better in these shoes, now people are thinking radiation

(26:30):
will create bloodthirsty monsters that will hunt us all down.
So the pendulum ever swings. All right, We're gonna take
another quick break, but when we come back, I'll talk
a little bit more about fluoroscopes and what happened with those,
as well as kind of related back to what I
think it has to do with artificial intelligence. But first

(26:50):
let's thank our sponsors. Okay, so we're back to talk
more about fluoroscopes and the use of X rays and
shoe stores. There was something of a decline and interest

(27:12):
in fluoroscopes after World War Two, but as I mentioned,
the technology actually stuck around for decades. Right. I saw
articles that said as late as the nineteen seventies there
were a few places that were still using them. And
these days you can sometimes find an example of a
fluoroscope in a place like a museum, but otherwise you're
not likely to run into one and that's for the best, because,

(27:34):
as I have said, these devices were dangerous. Now, I
am unaware of any kind of comprehensive study that looked
into how many people in shoe stores were injured by
these devices. There are certainly incidents, isolated incidents that we
can point to. For example, Harold Baveley reported in a

(27:55):
paper for National Safety News back in nineteen fifty that
a woman who had been serving as a shoe model
in a store ended up having radiation burns on one
leg just from the fact that she was going into
the store every day and they were operating this fluoroscope,
and the leakage from these cabinets could go as far

(28:15):
as ten feet away. These stores were not necessarily huge,
so this woman had suffered a severe radiation burn on
one leg, and ultimately doctors chose to amputate the leg
because that's how serious it had become. That's a terrible story.
That's just one, though. There are a couple of others

(28:36):
at least that are fairly well documented and seem to
link back to the use of these fluoroscopes in shoe stores.
But part of the challenge of actually assessing the impact
these machines could have had on store employees. Is that,
apart from acute injuries like radiation burns, it could be

(28:58):
hard to ascribe radiation as the reason for a problem.
We really think of radiation as increasing risk for certain
things like cancer. But that's increasing risk, like you might
have cancer. But then can you actually track that back
and say, the reason I have cancer is because of
the increased risk that I endured due to exposure to

(29:20):
X rays. That's harder to determine, right, Like you might
not be able to track down the actual source the
reason for the cancer. If you have a large enough
sample size, then you might be able to draw some
general conclusions. But there's just not been any kind of
study like that, so it's not always an open and

(29:41):
shut case. You cannot just definitively say X number of
people ended up encountering massive health problems due to their
exposure to fluoroscopes. That's just not a metric that we
can confidently point at. We can certainly say the likelihood
is very high that lots of people ended up having

(30:04):
health problems due to those fluoroscopes, but that's about as
far as we can go. It gets very vague. One
important thing to remember though, is that shoe fluoroscopes were
categorically a bad idea. They had no justification. It was
a bad way to use a new technology. It's not

(30:25):
that the technology itself was bad, it was just a
bad implementation, right. Obviously, X rays have their use. We
use X rays today for lots of stuff, just not
to fit shoes on people. It's a technology that posed
dangers that we did not fully understand or appreciate when
we developed the technology. It put people at risk unnecessarily,

(30:49):
and you can make the argument that they didn't really
do anything useful at all, right, It just served as
a sales gimmick because the people who were actually running
the tech didn't have the training or knowledge to do
anything useful with the information other than sell some shoes.
And that really does bring me back to artificial intelligence.

(31:11):
I see the rush to integrate AI into business solutions
as being somewhat similar to how these shoe stores were
doing this with X ray machines. I am convinced that
many of the business leaders who are making these choices
do not yet have a real firm grasp on what
they actually intend to accomplish with AI. It's not that

(31:35):
artificial intelligence is useless. It's not that it's bad, but
artificial intelligence can also end up being risky depending on
how you implement it. It could even be dangerous, and
unless you are implementing it the right way and for
the right reasons, then you're far more likely to do

(31:55):
more harm than you are to do good. Now, that
harm could just be in the of business results. Maybe
it just means that in the short term you don't
perform as well as you had hoped, or you have
demoralized your employee base, and now you have to rebuild
because it turns out the AI couldn't do what you
needed it to do, or it was doing it in
a way that wasn't helpful, or that harm could be

(32:18):
something far more tangible. Ultimately, it could even be tragic. Now,
am I off base? Is there no parallel here? I'm
not convinced. To me. It feels like we're walking down
a path that we've walked down many times before, or
maybe even we're not walking down a path. We're barreling
through the woods in the same general direction as one

(32:40):
we've taken before, and it was a direction that ended
up getting us scraped up, bumped up, We lost people
along the way, and I think we're doing it again.
I do not necessarily think AI is going to spell
the end of everything. I'm not a doomsayer. I'm not
saying AI is going to end us. All I do
think what we're seeing right now is kind of an

(33:04):
undirected scramble that's largely fed by the fear of being
left behind. That you have business leaders who are saying,
we can't sleep on this because if we do, our
competitors are going to get ahead of us and we'll
never catch up. I think that's what's feeding a lot
of this discourse, and often that can mean that you

(33:25):
actually end up pushing yourself backward because you make a
bad implementation. Then if you had just stayed the course.
Not that I'm saying anyone has to just do things
the way they've always done them, because that's how they've
always done them, but they do need to have a
greater understanding of the technology and its consequences before putting

(33:46):
it in action. That to me just as common sense,
And again we just look back at the fluoroscopes in
these shoe stores to say, here's an example of what
can go wrong if we don't take those steps. People
get sick, they could even die. It's something that we
need to keep in mind. Okay, that's it for this

(34:08):
episode of tech stuff. I thought it was really interesting
to dive back into that part of the tech. This
does obviously have parallels elsewhere in the tech space. I mean,
there were the so called radium girls, the women who
would use little paint brushes to paint thin lines of
radium on watch hands and watch numbers so that you

(34:30):
could have glow in the dark watches. Often they would
end up licking their paint brushes in order to be
able to keep it at a fine point, and a
lot of those women ended up having terrible problems later
on in life because of radiation. So again, it's not
the only case where we embraced a technology and a

(34:53):
phenomenon that we didn't really understand fully and we did
so without any hesitation, and people ultimately paid the price
for that. So again, just words of caution out there
for us to consider on occasion while we're hearing all
the evangelists push really hard for companies to jump on

(35:14):
board and adopt this stuff. That's it. I hope you
are all well, and I'll talk to you again really soon.
Tech Stuff is an iHeartRadio production. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio,
visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen

(35:37):
to your favorite shows.