July 30, 2025 • 31 mins
US President Donald Trump's trade war on the world and the Federal Reserve has increased investment risk. But it's only the latest overhang for the US, with ongoing concerns about high fiscal debt exacerbated by the passage of Trump's $3.4 trillion tax and spending package.
That's prompted Idanna Appio, portfolio manager and economist at First Eagle -- a $161 billion investment manager -- to look increasingly outside the US for value. In her view, investors are too complacent about these risks, as they have yet to see the full effect of tariff and other policies on growth and inflation.
She joins John and Katia to talk about where she sees value in Asia, the many risks ahead and how she allocates money as a long-term investor.
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Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:01):
It's getting trickier for investors to navigate markets. Every day
there are new announcements from the White House that threaten
to upend global trade and potentially even the Central Bank.
Especially for those making bets for the long term, it's
tough to predict.
Speaker 2 (00:17):
This has significant ramifications for Asian currencies and bonds. Governments
are forced intervene more, and the US dollar, once a
source of stability, is now seen as less safe. Meanwhile,
the nation's debt levels and fiscal situation that prompted at
downgrading its credit rating also threatens assets long term. Should
(00:37):
investors look outside the US towards Asia.
Speaker 1 (00:42):
You're listening to Asia Centric from Bloomberg Intelligence. I'm Kat
Dmitri in Hong Kong.
Speaker 2 (00:47):
I'm John Lee, also in Hong Kong.
Speaker 1 (00:49):
And this week we're speaking with Adana Apio. She's an
economist and portfolio manager at First Egal Investment Management, which
oversees one hundred and sixty one billion dollars in assets.
She joins us very early in the morning from New York.
Thank you for joining us today, Donna.
Speaker 3 (01:06):
Thank you so much for having me. Really looking forward
to this.
Speaker 1 (01:10):
So, Donna, as we just mentioned tariffs, trade, this is
something that investors need to be thinking about every minute
of every day. You're a long term investor, how do
you think about tariffs and trade impacting your investments right now?
Speaker 3 (01:26):
I think the challenge with tariffs, as you first highlighted,
is that, of course, every day there's a new announcement,
and you're constantly wondering what are other people thinking about
these announcements, and then thinking about, you know, from my
perspective as both an economists, currency analysts, sovereign analysts, thinking about,
you know, what does this mean for the economy, and
(01:47):
then what does that sort of translate into asset prices?
So many steps there. Obviously, we heard the news about
or the tweet about the Japan framework the other day
the Japan dealed, and so maybe there's a fair amount
of optimism because there are signs that there is some
flexibility on the sectoral tariffs this. You know, the negotiations
(02:08):
to date have largely been about the reciprocal tariffs. I
don't really like using that words since they aren't technically reciprocal,
but about the reciprocal tariffs with the sectoral tariffs being
in place. But what we saw from the broad outlines
of the Japan deal, and it's rumored to be part
of the deal with the EU is that there's flexibility
(02:32):
on the sectoral side for auto So I think that
is what is providing some good news and maybe a
bit more certainty. That said, I am still very skeptical
that we sort of have heard the last about tariffs.
I think it's still not sure exactly where tariff levels
will settle. We have uncertainty about how the US courts
(02:53):
will handle the reciprocal or ie EPA tariffs when they
start the arguments surrounding at the end of the month.
And then you know, there's still talk of new sectoral
tariffs that the administration is looking at pharma, perhaps semiconductors,
you know, so there's other potential sort of knives to fall.
(03:14):
So I realized the market is happy to see some flexibility,
and I'm happy to see some flexibility on the sectoral tariffs,
but I'm not convinced this is sort of the end
all when it comes to tariffs. So that's step one.
You know, some news, maybe a little more certainty, but
still a lot of open questions for me. But then
the question is how does it affect the economy. We
(03:37):
have some initial signs. If you look at Q two data,
the US collected about sixty five billion in tariff revenue,
which was about a nine percent effective teriff freight for June.
What we see in the data is that it doesn't
appear that foreign exporters into the US are paying much
(03:59):
of the tarraf Yes, instead, most of it's being absorbed
by the US. Some seems to be having been passed
on to consumers, and consumers in terms of inflation in
certain sectors we see it showing up, but for the
most part at this point, and again it's early days
in tariffs, it seems that firms are absorbing the tariffs.
Speaker 1 (04:22):
And that there'll be US firms like US importers.
Speaker 3 (04:25):
US importers exactly, US importing firms.
Speaker 1 (04:29):
Yeah, because you're referring there probably to the export prices
from Asia in particular, where we haven't really seen a
lot of movement, and then US import prices have also
been relatively flat, which kind of just shows you, Okay,
importers are paying this, and you know, certain sectors like
maybe japan autos are absorbing in exactly.
Speaker 2 (04:46):
But importantly, it seems like US consumers have yet to
feel the brunt of the tariffs. You're an economist, are
you surprised that the American inflation data has been relatively
benign so far? Well, do you think it's just a
matter of time before we start seeing this rise.
Speaker 3 (05:05):
I think it's a matter of time. We do see
the tariff impact in certain sectors, so core goods X autos.
For now we are seeing a material increase, but that
is being swamped by the very good sort of decline
that we've been seeing in housing, rents inflation that are
(05:26):
much larger component of inflation series, and that really swamp
what's going on. It's sort of the goods side of
the inflation data. So that's the good news. But as
I said, since it seems like for now, given the
uncertainty the early days of the tariffs, the US firms
importing firms have absorbed those tariffs. I think the question
(05:48):
is over time, what happens At some point do they
begin to pass those on to other firms to end consumers.
Do they need to cut other costs to support their margins,
you know, canceling and vement projects, potentially firing workers. That's
the unknown, and so I think it's going to take
time to work through the system. So maybe it shows
(06:08):
up through prices, maybe it shows up through more growth,
through weaker investment, weaker employment. But I think we have
to wait for thousands of individual firms to make their
decisions about how they're going to handle this. It's perhaps
helpful that they're getting maybe a little more certainty that
maybe the equilibrium tariff rate might be around fifteen percent.
(06:30):
Maybe that's something we can sort of the sign maybe
we're getting from these deals. You know, compared to the
pre tariff level or pre April level of about one
and a half percent, that's a huge increase. And so
you know, I think we have to wait for firms
to make their decisions. So as an economist, you know,
(06:50):
we always want to plug in our models and this
sort of gets to the asset prices and all that.
But the real world is far more complex than our
models correct. And so you know, thinking about like the pandemic,
none of us had lived through a global pandemic before
we weren't sure what the impacts on the economy would be.
None of us have lived through a massive increase in
(07:11):
terrorists from the largest economy in the world, the biggest
sort of importer in the world. I think we have
to be humble that we're just not sure what the
impacts are going to be and the timeframe.
Speaker 2 (07:22):
Don I don't want to bash on economists, but I
do remember at the beginning of the pandemic, most economists
said that COVID will be deflationary. There was supposed to
be a lot of job losses, especially in the SME sector,
and you were supposed to see deflation. The opposite occuld
it ended up being massively inflationary. Is there a chance
(07:45):
that this time around the economists could also be wrong.
All economists are expecting tariffs to lead to inflationary pressure,
but we're still not seeing that yet.
Speaker 3 (07:53):
It's definitely possible. I think the mistake in the pandemic
was underestimating the supply side effects, and also there were surprises,
I think underestimating the degree of monetary and fiscal response
that was just outsize compared to anything we see, especially
in the US, especially in the US, and then of
course the unknown of the Russia's invasion of Ukraine and
(08:16):
the spike and energy prices, so there were a lot
of factors there here. You know, I think you're absolutely right,
firms are going to have to decide how to respond.
If the end consumer can't absorb the price increases, then
there'll be less more of a demand shock. Firms may
cut back production more. We may see more reductions and investment,
(08:39):
we may see job losses. So it is possible that
it ends up being more weighs more on growth, and
so therefore the inflationary effects in certain products are more
than swamped by the sort of weaker growth outlook. The
other challenge to me that I'm watching is, at the
same time we're having something that's receiving less attention, but
(09:01):
another bold experiment with our immigration policies, which it would
also tend to be in the direction of higher prices
weaker growth. So, you know, the combination of these two
is why I think it can be very difficult, you know.
I think also why you see the Federal Reserve is
waiting for data to decide how to respond, and they
face the same uncertainty that we do. Is this inflationary,
(09:23):
is it more of a growth shock, is it stagflationary?
We kind of have to wait and see.
Speaker 1 (09:28):
Well, since you brought up the FED, I wonder as
an economist, as an investment manager, how do you factor
in everything that's happening with the FED into your decisions,
because of course we're in a moment in time where
the FED is being highly politicized. There could be a
(09:49):
shift in leadership. Maybe it depends on the day and
who's talking from the administration. How do you consider that
and even begin to think about, for example, inflation forecasting,
if something could change so rapidly.
Speaker 3 (10:04):
Yeah, it is challenging. And I worked at the New
York FED for almost fifteen years. Personally, I find it
very disheartening to see the attacks on an institution that
is really committed to its public service mandate and to
remaining a political and sort of acting in the best
interest of the US economy. Whereas I would have thought
(10:26):
there's very little chance of the FED losing its independence,
I'm increasingly worried about the political noise surrounding the FED,
and it's another factor that could be weighing on inflation forecasts,
And certainly it is coming into my thinking about inflation
inflation forecasts, medium term inflation expectations. We don't see it
(10:49):
in market pricing yet, but I know it certainly is
affecting our views on the way we are investing in
our portfolio.
Speaker 1 (10:57):
In what ways.
Speaker 3 (10:59):
You know, added quite a lot to inflation linked treasury
bonds in our portfolios over the last year or so,
especially more recently, given that the factors we're discussing terrorists,
immigration changes, now more attacks on the FED at least
a bias you towards perhaps easier policy all else equal,
(11:23):
that that should be inflationary over the medium term. At
some point that should start to show up more in
markets and in inflation statistics.
Speaker 2 (11:32):
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(11:55):
If you like what you hear, don't forget to subscribe
and share. And Sticking with the US, are you worried
about the fiscal position of the government. The US spends
more money on interest expense than the defense budget.
Speaker 1 (12:10):
You know.
Speaker 2 (12:11):
The US also lost its Triple A credit rating recently.
What's your views there?
Speaker 1 (12:16):
We also have the Big Beautiful Bill. Don't forget about that.
Speaker 2 (12:20):
Exactly.
Speaker 3 (12:21):
I've been concerned about the US fiscal position for a while.
There are a number of structural, sort of medium term
trends aging the challenges we have with our entitlements that
are growing as a share of the budget, that sort
of paint a worrisome picture. However, more recently, you know,
with higher interest rates, that makes the situation much more troubling,
(12:44):
as you're going to be rolling from lower cost debt
into higher cost debt. And of course the passage of
the One Big Beautiful Bill, by our estimates, should add
to the deficit over time. The challenges with the bill
is it's some deceptive. It's much larger than sort of
traditionally scored because the tax cuts are front loaded, the
(13:08):
tax hikes and expenditure cuts are backloaded. And I have
my doubts. And that change really happens after twenty twenty eight,
So after the next administration comes in, you'll have a
new president, new Congress. At that point, are they going
to suddenly tighten fiscal policy dramatically? I think we've learned
over time that no politician wants to take that on.
(13:32):
So it's actually a much more expensive expansive bill than
written on paper and reduces the flexibility. As you said,
interest expenses growing, the discretionary parts of the budget are
being squeezed, discretionary spending being squeezed. At the same time
the sort of entitlements, the mandatory spending keeps growing, and
(13:53):
then you've reduced your tax intake further. So again, as
a sovereign analyst, these are all sorts of things that
you don't want to see when a government puts together
a budget. I am definitely nervous about the fiscal trajectory.
And when I look across sort of the long end
of the yield curve, there is concern. You know, we
hear from US Treasury, the Treasury Secretary that they want
(14:16):
to skew issuance to the shorter end of the curve.
They want to reduce long term rates. When you look
sort of across in the past twenty years or so,
long term bond yields are still not that high, considering
the level of debt, the uncertainties in the economy, and
so there's always the chance that long term rates rise
from here. Additionally, when you look at the term premia,
(14:38):
which is the difference between long term bond yields and
the expected path of short rates. The term premia has increased.
It used to be negative. It was negative for many
numbers of years. It's become positive, which I think is
a healthy development, suggesting that you're getting paid for taking
some duration risk. But it's still below sort of historical
(15:00):
averages of term premia, even though, as you highlighted, sort
of the credit quality, the credit standing of the United
States has deteriorated, so you know, we see scope that
there could be further increases in term premia. And when
you couple that with questions about the FED and their
commitment to inflation fighting, that's sort of another risk for
the long end of the yield curve.
Speaker 2 (15:21):
So what does this all mean. It sounds like it's
going to be more inflation in the US. Does this
mean that you underweight US assets versus the rest of
the world, any in particular Asia, And what's your views
also on the US dollar?
Speaker 3 (15:34):
So at First Eagle, we invest for the long term.
We build globally diversified portfolios, and so valuations really are
guiding north star. We try to invest in businesses or
assets when we think they're below our estimate of intrinsic
value or fair value. Because US markets have been expensive
(15:56):
for extended period time, equity markets, credit markets, the dollar
has been overvalued for an extended period of time. That
has meant that we've been adding much more to the
portfolios overseas. Internationally, emerging markets were hit quite hard during
the pandemic, and so again it's not surprising that you know,
if we can find a good business or a sovereign
(16:18):
or an asset that we like that we want to own,
that we take advantage. When it's unloved by the market,
that's typically when we will enter into positions. So, yes,
we have been shying away from US assets adding more
international assets to the portfolio for a number of years.
I will say, not all sectors of the US markets
(16:39):
are loved, and so again we'll use flexibility. So when
we see a very nice business that we believe is
trading below its fair value, you know, we will enter
those positions. So then coming to currencies, you know, we
have to think about the impact of taris on the economy,
and then we think about the impact of currencies, and
the thing, you know, if you had asked me this
(16:59):
question out my outlook for the dollar in December, I
would have said, well, we're unsure about tariffs, but all
else equal, everything in equilibrium. A good economist answer means
that the dollars should appreciate to offset the change in
relative prices coming from tariffs. And indeed we did see
(17:20):
that in the twenty eighteen nineteen period, when tariffs were
mainly focused on China, the China dollar exchange rate really shifted.
The dollar appreciated and offset quite a lot of the tariffs.
This time around, of course, we've had the exact opposite again,
proving that economists can be wrong and are often wrong.
And the dollar has depreciated, and so I think you
(17:42):
have to start to bring in you know, not everything
else is equal. What else is happening? Our investors losing
confidence in the dollar in US assets? And is that
changing behavior? Is there more concerns about growth in the
US versus the rest of the world. Is there more
concerned about inflation in the US compared to the rest
(18:03):
of the world.
Speaker 1 (18:05):
I wonder if the first trade war offers some guidance
for this trade war or if it's just completely uncertain.
And the reason I ask that is because there are
a lot of differences in the way the world economy
is right now, we also have a trade war against
much of the world as opposed to just primarily one
(18:27):
country being China. And the other thing that I've been
talking to some economists about is when it comes to
inflation in the US, we now have a situation where
supply chains are potentially going to become even more complex
and inefficient, and the potential for companies to start offloading
(18:48):
those even higher costs throughout the world, not just in
the US. So I wonder how you're thinking about this
trade war versus the.
Speaker 3 (18:57):
Last Yes, And I think the mistake, certainly, my mistake
is perhaps I initially viewed Trade War two point zero
in the same lens as the original one, which was
largely focused against China.
Speaker 1 (19:12):
Everyone did yeah, yeah.
Speaker 3 (19:13):
You know, against China until the board came out, and
I think there was a collective gasp of oh, my goodness,
this is this is a different beast. The first trade
war was largely focused against China, and the effective tariff
rate went from one and a half percent to about
three percent in the US, so doubled. But now we're
(19:35):
talking fifteen to twenty percent. I mean, it's just a
different order of magnitude, and then over time that effective
tariff rate sort of crept back down to you know,
in the twos as firms reoriented supply chains, as Chinese
firms changed the sort of structure of their exports to
the US through third countries, and so you could see
(19:56):
how over time businesses were sort of optimizing around those tariffs.
A trade war against everybody. Again, as an economist, you know,
free trade, it's like a core tenant and part of
the religion of an economist, sort of comparative advantage gains
from trade, and so we're conducting war against everybody else.
(20:18):
It is likely to make the US first and foremost
less competitive, grow more slowly. There have been studies done
on the first trade war, you know, for instance, washing
machines and dryers where there were high tariffs and posed
there were studies that were done that showed that US
firms raise their prices just as much as imports. Studies
(20:39):
done on the steel industry where steel tariffs were quite high,
that US steel using firms importing firms became much less
competitive after them position. So there's a number of reasons
to believe that this is going to make the US
less competitive grow less quickly, and it will be bad
for the global economy, both because the US is such
(21:01):
a large consumer, so a weaker US obviously not great
for the rest of the world. And to the extent
that the US is poor consumes less, perhaps there's some
shifting of production. It also begins to hit other economies,
and of course Asia, which is the world's largest exporter,
especially to the US, will be hit by that. So
everybody else is worse off. To your point about complexity,
(21:25):
and I think again this sort of gets at in
the US. We haven't seen really the results yet. Firms
unsure of how to respond. You're not sure where ultimate
teriff rates end up. You know, it's hard enough for
a supply chain manager to deal with suddenly much higher
tariffs on China, but suddenly you have to look at,
you know, terif rates around the world different industries. Yeah,
(21:48):
I think it's going a lot of wasted time in
this space, you know. I know there was a lot
of hope with this administration that they pursue a deregulatory agenda,
but they are creating a massive regulatory burden surrounding trade.
Both for the government who suddenly has to enforce a
wide range of tear of schedules and for firms that
(22:10):
suddenly are going to be faced with this difficult optimization
problem of how to rejigger supply chains in an ever
changing world.
Speaker 2 (22:19):
Don I'd love to bring the discussion to Asia, given
everything that we've said, is there any particular Asian you know,
sovereign or country that you think could outperform in this
type of environment.
Speaker 3 (22:33):
So two points one, I think countries that are less
export dependent perhaps tend to fare a bit better. So
maybe that's an India and Indonesia just you know, they're
less open to trade and less exposed to the US market. Additionally,
to the extent you know, again we haven't really seen
(22:54):
the details of any of these deals yet, there's still
more tweet form than full of trade agreements. But also
to the extent that they do reduce tariffs, a country
like India or Indonesia again that have relatively high tariff rates,
to the extent they help bring down their own domestic
tariff rates because again, as an economist, we think lower
(23:16):
tariff rates are actually very good for your economy and
your business sector to improve sort of the competitive landscape.
And so you know, that could be an added bonus.
But also when I think about the rest of Asia,
it is looking like that perhaps everybody is going to
face about a relatively similar teriff rate. With respect to
(23:38):
the US, we seem to be sort of in the
fifteen to twenty percent, So in that case, maybe the
relative competitiveness doesn't change among Asian economies or between Asia
and Europe and the rest of the world. And quite frankly,
I find it hard to believe that the US, especially initially,
is going to be able to produce everything that we
(23:58):
import from Asia. Quite frankly, we won't be able to. So,
you know, at some point, I'm sort of left with
if Asian economies are facing similar teriff rates, you know,
maybe in a relative perspective, they're no worse off. So again,
very competitive economies like a Korea or Japan, or China
or Taiwan don't end up being that much worse off.
(24:19):
Maybe they see somewhat weaker growth, weaker demand for their
products because the US is somewhat poorer buying less, but
from a competitive position doesn't make much of a big deal.
Speaker 1 (24:31):
And earlier, Adanna, you said that you're looking for opportunities
outside of the US. If we can put it that way.
So Indian and Indonesia are you kind of focused? There
are there other countries that you've been interested in recently.
Speaker 3 (24:45):
For the rest of Asia. So if thinking from my
perspective on currencies, Asian currencies have been quite weak for
extended period of time. Some of that has to do
with the weakness in the end in yuan. It's hard
for other currencies to appreciate when the two behemoth currencies
are so weak, and so I think this is a
(25:07):
struct you know, with the weakness and the dollar, this
gives sort of a structural ability for Asian currencies to
start to strengthen, especially I think the unknown question again
coming back to the dollar. The unknown is even with
the dollar having depreciated, you know, ten percent year to
(25:27):
date against the broad currencies, the dollar is still overvalued.
The question that I'm particularly focused on is whether this
weakness in the dollar persists, if there's a change. When
you look over time over history, the dollar moves in
large swings. They're strong dollar regimes, week dollar regimes. Are
(25:47):
we moving into a weaker dollar regime? Are we moving
away from that period of US exceptionalism? Foreign investors into
the US have become very overweight US assets in their portfolio.
Those their stock and bond investments to the share of
US GDP have reached record highs. If we begin to
see just a small shift away from the US, or
(26:11):
just less flows moving into US markets, or even just
more hedging of dollar exposure in those US investments, that
could cause weakness in the dollar and weakness in US assets.
And a lot of that capital has come from Asia,
to the extent we see capital flow back to Asia
where valuations are more compelling across Asian equities and currencies.
(26:36):
You know, again, do we get more of that capital
flow coming back? That remains to be seen. But so
if we're investing based on valuations, that's where we're headed,
because we do see those opportunities.
Speaker 1 (26:49):
You're outlining the sort of I don't want to say pessimistic,
but you're you're outlining a future that there are a
lot of risks out there. And I think I've been surprised,
and you touched on this as well, but sort of
the surprising strength in equity markets, and also we continue
to see really tight spreads kind of globally, so our
(27:10):
investors being a bit too complacent here or are they
kind of waiting for something to drop, like it just
seems like a lot of this risk is not really
priced into markets.
Speaker 3 (27:22):
So I think there's a fair amount of complacency. As
I said, I think we've yet to see the impact
of tariffs over time if they persist, which I have
to assume they will, but again, depending on the daily headline,
sometimes you have a different view. But assuming they persist,
you know, firms are going to have to make this
decision about how do they address those costs. I'm of
(27:46):
the view that once it begins to show up in
the data, either in the form of higher inflation or
weaker growth, weaker earnings, or a combination of all of those,
that equity markets, credit markets should begin to reflect those risks.
On top of that, you know, if they're concerns about
(28:07):
the FED, and if there's questions about whether the Fed's
actions if they're viewed through a political lens, that could
sort of add to those market fears. So I do
think there's a fair amount of complacency here. And finally,
you know, when you look at again the US fiscal position,
we're running deficits around six and a half percent of GDP,
(28:28):
which will only grow over time, and we're at full
employment the top of a business cycle. These don't sort
of correlate. The markets are priced for that. We're sort
of in this perfect world, goldilocks world, but there's a
lot that could go wrong from here. So that's sort
of how I'm thinking about it.
Speaker 2 (28:51):
It done it. Before we let you go, I wanted
to ask first. Egally manages over one hundred billion dollars
in assets under management. But before we started recording this podcast,
you mentioned that you invest over the long term. You
have an investment horizon of ten years. Now, tell us
how do you look so far ahead.
Speaker 1 (29:11):
Especially when things are changing so quickly every single day.
Speaker 3 (29:15):
One of our core tenants is that our crystal ball
is foggy at best, and I think that's been proven
over and over again the last five years, that we
really can't know where the world is headed. So instead,
our north star is really valuations. If we can buy
into a business at a price below what we think
(29:37):
it's worth, if we can buy into a currency that
we think is undervalued versus its medium term value, if
we can buy into a yield curve that we think
is above sort of where we think it's equilibrium. Level
is then that hopefully provides some protection in a very
volatile unknown world. And then because you know, our crystal
(30:01):
ball is so foggy and the world has been so
chaotic and volatile the last several years. As an active manager,
it does provide you a lot of opportunities. The world
is always changing, the market is moving. It can give
you those opportunities to invest in excellent businesses or currencies
or sovereigns at a very attractive price if you're willing
(30:25):
to look through the noise of you know, things may
move up or down or not. The other I think
unique aspect is that first eagle. We use gold in
all our portfolios as a portfolio hedge. That is something
we've done for a long period of time. It's useful.
It performs well in inflationary and deflationary environments. It has
(30:48):
sort of a zero percent correlation with equities, except in
times when in very risk off events, that correlation term
sharply negative. So that's why it's very useful as a
portfolio hedge.
Speaker 1 (31:00):
Exciting times. Thank you so much for joining us.
Speaker 3 (31:03):
Sure, thank you, thank you so much.
Speaker 1 (31:07):
You've been listening to Asia Centric from Bloomberg Intelligence and
Katjadmitreva here in Hong Kong.
Speaker 2 (31:12):
I'm John Lee, also in Hong Kong. This podcast was
produced and edited by Clara Chen and You can listen
to all our episodes on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or review listen.
Thanks for listening.
It's getting trickier for investors to navigate markets. Every day
there are new announcements from the White House that threaten
to upend global trade and potentially even the Central Bank.
Especially for those making bets for the long term, it's
tough to predict.
Speaker 2 (00:17):
This has significant ramifications for Asian currencies and bonds. Governments
are forced intervene more, and the US dollar, once a
source of stability, is now seen as less safe. Meanwhile,
the nation's debt levels and fiscal situation that prompted at
downgrading its credit rating also threatens assets long term. Should
(00:37):
investors look outside the US towards Asia.
Speaker 1 (00:42):
You're listening to Asia Centric from Bloomberg Intelligence. I'm Kat
Dmitri in Hong Kong.
Speaker 2 (00:47):
I'm John Lee, also in Hong Kong.
Speaker 1 (00:49):
And this week we're speaking with Adana Apio. She's an
economist and portfolio manager at First Egal Investment Management, which
oversees one hundred and sixty one billion dollars in assets.
She joins us very early in the morning from New York.
Thank you for joining us today, Donna.
Speaker 3 (01:06):
Thank you so much for having me. Really looking forward
to this.
Speaker 1 (01:10):
So, Donna, as we just mentioned tariffs, trade, this is
something that investors need to be thinking about every minute
of every day. You're a long term investor, how do
you think about tariffs and trade impacting your investments right now?
Speaker 3 (01:26):
I think the challenge with tariffs, as you first highlighted,
is that, of course, every day there's a new announcement,
and you're constantly wondering what are other people thinking about
these announcements, and then thinking about, you know, from my
perspective as both an economists, currency analysts, sovereign analysts, thinking about,
you know, what does this mean for the economy, and
(01:47):
then what does that sort of translate into asset prices?
So many steps there. Obviously, we heard the news about
or the tweet about the Japan framework the other day
the Japan dealed, and so maybe there's a fair amount
of optimism because there are signs that there is some
flexibility on the sectoral tariffs this. You know, the negotiations
(02:08):
to date have largely been about the reciprocal tariffs. I
don't really like using that words since they aren't technically reciprocal,
but about the reciprocal tariffs with the sectoral tariffs being
in place. But what we saw from the broad outlines
of the Japan deal, and it's rumored to be part
of the deal with the EU is that there's flexibility
(02:32):
on the sectoral side for auto So I think that
is what is providing some good news and maybe a
bit more certainty. That said, I am still very skeptical
that we sort of have heard the last about tariffs.
I think it's still not sure exactly where tariff levels
will settle. We have uncertainty about how the US courts
(02:53):
will handle the reciprocal or ie EPA tariffs when they
start the arguments surrounding at the end of the month.
And then you know, there's still talk of new sectoral
tariffs that the administration is looking at pharma, perhaps semiconductors,
you know, so there's other potential sort of knives to fall.
(03:14):
So I realized the market is happy to see some flexibility,
and I'm happy to see some flexibility on the sectoral tariffs,
but I'm not convinced this is sort of the end
all when it comes to tariffs. So that's step one.
You know, some news, maybe a little more certainty, but
still a lot of open questions for me. But then
the question is how does it affect the economy. We
(03:37):
have some initial signs. If you look at Q two data,
the US collected about sixty five billion in tariff revenue,
which was about a nine percent effective teriff freight for June.
What we see in the data is that it doesn't
appear that foreign exporters into the US are paying much
(03:59):
of the tarraf Yes, instead, most of it's being absorbed
by the US. Some seems to be having been passed
on to consumers, and consumers in terms of inflation in
certain sectors we see it showing up, but for the
most part at this point, and again it's early days
in tariffs, it seems that firms are absorbing the tariffs.
Speaker 1 (04:22):
And that there'll be US firms like US importers.
Speaker 3 (04:25):
US importers exactly, US importing firms.
Speaker 1 (04:29):
Yeah, because you're referring there probably to the export prices
from Asia in particular, where we haven't really seen a
lot of movement, and then US import prices have also
been relatively flat, which kind of just shows you, Okay,
importers are paying this, and you know, certain sectors like
maybe japan autos are absorbing in exactly.
Speaker 2 (04:46):
But importantly, it seems like US consumers have yet to
feel the brunt of the tariffs. You're an economist, are
you surprised that the American inflation data has been relatively
benign so far? Well, do you think it's just a
matter of time before we start seeing this rise.
Speaker 3 (05:05):
I think it's a matter of time. We do see
the tariff impact in certain sectors, so core goods X autos.
For now we are seeing a material increase, but that
is being swamped by the very good sort of decline
that we've been seeing in housing, rents inflation that are
(05:26):
much larger component of inflation series, and that really swamp
what's going on. It's sort of the goods side of
the inflation data. So that's the good news. But as
I said, since it seems like for now, given the
uncertainty the early days of the tariffs, the US firms
importing firms have absorbed those tariffs. I think the question
(05:48):
is over time, what happens At some point do they
begin to pass those on to other firms to end consumers.
Do they need to cut other costs to support their margins,
you know, canceling and vement projects, potentially firing workers. That's
the unknown, and so I think it's going to take
time to work through the system. So maybe it shows
(06:08):
up through prices, maybe it shows up through more growth,
through weaker investment, weaker employment. But I think we have
to wait for thousands of individual firms to make their
decisions about how they're going to handle this. It's perhaps
helpful that they're getting maybe a little more certainty that
maybe the equilibrium tariff rate might be around fifteen percent.
(06:30):
Maybe that's something we can sort of the sign maybe
we're getting from these deals. You know, compared to the
pre tariff level or pre April level of about one
and a half percent, that's a huge increase. And so
you know, I think we have to wait for firms
to make their decisions. So as an economist, you know,
(06:50):
we always want to plug in our models and this
sort of gets to the asset prices and all that.
But the real world is far more complex than our
models correct. And so you know, thinking about like the pandemic,
none of us had lived through a global pandemic before
we weren't sure what the impacts on the economy would be.
None of us have lived through a massive increase in
(07:11):
terrorists from the largest economy in the world, the biggest
sort of importer in the world. I think we have
to be humble that we're just not sure what the
impacts are going to be and the timeframe.
Speaker 2 (07:22):
Don I don't want to bash on economists, but I
do remember at the beginning of the pandemic, most economists
said that COVID will be deflationary. There was supposed to
be a lot of job losses, especially in the SME sector,
and you were supposed to see deflation. The opposite occuld
it ended up being massively inflationary. Is there a chance
(07:45):
that this time around the economists could also be wrong.
All economists are expecting tariffs to lead to inflationary pressure,
but we're still not seeing that yet.
Speaker 3 (07:53):
It's definitely possible. I think the mistake in the pandemic
was underestimating the supply side effects, and also there were surprises,
I think underestimating the degree of monetary and fiscal response
that was just outsize compared to anything we see, especially
in the US, especially in the US, and then of
course the unknown of the Russia's invasion of Ukraine and
(08:16):
the spike and energy prices, so there were a lot
of factors there here. You know, I think you're absolutely right,
firms are going to have to decide how to respond.
If the end consumer can't absorb the price increases, then
there'll be less more of a demand shock. Firms may
cut back production more. We may see more reductions and investment,
(08:39):
we may see job losses. So it is possible that
it ends up being more weighs more on growth, and
so therefore the inflationary effects in certain products are more
than swamped by the sort of weaker growth outlook. The
other challenge to me that I'm watching is, at the
same time we're having something that's receiving less attention, but
(09:01):
another bold experiment with our immigration policies, which it would
also tend to be in the direction of higher prices
weaker growth. So, you know, the combination of these two
is why I think it can be very difficult, you know.
I think also why you see the Federal Reserve is
waiting for data to decide how to respond, and they
face the same uncertainty that we do. Is this inflationary,
(09:23):
is it more of a growth shock, is it stagflationary?
We kind of have to wait and see.
Speaker 1 (09:28):
Well, since you brought up the FED, I wonder as
an economist, as an investment manager, how do you factor
in everything that's happening with the FED into your decisions,
because of course we're in a moment in time where
the FED is being highly politicized. There could be a
(09:49):
shift in leadership. Maybe it depends on the day and
who's talking from the administration. How do you consider that
and even begin to think about, for example, inflation forecasting,
if something could change so rapidly.
Speaker 3 (10:04):
Yeah, it is challenging. And I worked at the New
York FED for almost fifteen years. Personally, I find it
very disheartening to see the attacks on an institution that
is really committed to its public service mandate and to
remaining a political and sort of acting in the best
interest of the US economy. Whereas I would have thought
(10:26):
there's very little chance of the FED losing its independence,
I'm increasingly worried about the political noise surrounding the FED,
and it's another factor that could be weighing on inflation forecasts,
And certainly it is coming into my thinking about inflation
inflation forecasts, medium term inflation expectations. We don't see it
(10:49):
in market pricing yet, but I know it certainly is
affecting our views on the way we are investing in
our portfolio.
Speaker 1 (10:57):
In what ways.
Speaker 3 (10:59):
You know, added quite a lot to inflation linked treasury
bonds in our portfolios over the last year or so,
especially more recently, given that the factors we're discussing terrorists,
immigration changes, now more attacks on the FED at least
a bias you towards perhaps easier policy all else equal,
(11:23):
that that should be inflationary over the medium term. At
some point that should start to show up more in
markets and in inflation statistics.
Speaker 2 (11:32):
Asia Centric is produced by Bloomberg Intelligence, where more than
five hundred experienced analysts and strategists work around the clock
to bring you timely, world class research. Our coverage spans
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(11:55):
If you like what you hear, don't forget to subscribe
and share. And Sticking with the US, are you worried
about the fiscal position of the government. The US spends
more money on interest expense than the defense budget.
Speaker 1 (12:10):
You know.
Speaker 2 (12:11):
The US also lost its Triple A credit rating recently.
What's your views there?
Speaker 1 (12:16):
We also have the Big Beautiful Bill. Don't forget about that.
Speaker 2 (12:20):
Exactly.
Speaker 3 (12:21):
I've been concerned about the US fiscal position for a while.
There are a number of structural, sort of medium term
trends aging the challenges we have with our entitlements that
are growing as a share of the budget, that sort
of paint a worrisome picture. However, more recently, you know,
with higher interest rates, that makes the situation much more troubling,
(12:44):
as you're going to be rolling from lower cost debt
into higher cost debt. And of course the passage of
the One Big Beautiful Bill, by our estimates, should add
to the deficit over time. The challenges with the bill
is it's some deceptive. It's much larger than sort of
traditionally scored because the tax cuts are front loaded, the
(13:08):
tax hikes and expenditure cuts are backloaded. And I have
my doubts. And that change really happens after twenty twenty eight,
So after the next administration comes in, you'll have a
new president, new Congress. At that point, are they going
to suddenly tighten fiscal policy dramatically? I think we've learned
over time that no politician wants to take that on.
(13:32):
So it's actually a much more expensive expansive bill than
written on paper and reduces the flexibility. As you said,
interest expenses growing, the discretionary parts of the budget are
being squeezed, discretionary spending being squeezed. At the same time
the sort of entitlements, the mandatory spending keeps growing, and
(13:53):
then you've reduced your tax intake further. So again, as
a sovereign analyst, these are all sorts of things that
you don't want to see when a government puts together
a budget. I am definitely nervous about the fiscal trajectory.
And when I look across sort of the long end
of the yield curve, there is concern. You know, we
hear from US Treasury, the Treasury Secretary that they want
(14:16):
to skew issuance to the shorter end of the curve.
They want to reduce long term rates. When you look
sort of across in the past twenty years or so,
long term bond yields are still not that high, considering
the level of debt, the uncertainties in the economy, and
so there's always the chance that long term rates rise
from here. Additionally, when you look at the term premia,
(14:38):
which is the difference between long term bond yields and
the expected path of short rates. The term premia has increased.
It used to be negative. It was negative for many
numbers of years. It's become positive, which I think is
a healthy development, suggesting that you're getting paid for taking
some duration risk. But it's still below sort of historical
(15:00):
averages of term premia, even though, as you highlighted, sort
of the credit quality, the credit standing of the United
States has deteriorated, so you know, we see scope that
there could be further increases in term premia. And when
you couple that with questions about the FED and their
commitment to inflation fighting, that's sort of another risk for
the long end of the yield curve.
Speaker 2 (15:21):
So what does this all mean. It sounds like it's
going to be more inflation in the US. Does this
mean that you underweight US assets versus the rest of
the world, any in particular Asia, And what's your views
also on the US dollar?
Speaker 3 (15:34):
So at First Eagle, we invest for the long term.
We build globally diversified portfolios, and so valuations really are
guiding north star. We try to invest in businesses or
assets when we think they're below our estimate of intrinsic
value or fair value. Because US markets have been expensive
(15:56):
for extended period time, equity markets, credit markets, the dollar
has been overvalued for an extended period of time. That
has meant that we've been adding much more to the
portfolios overseas. Internationally, emerging markets were hit quite hard during
the pandemic, and so again it's not surprising that you know,
if we can find a good business or a sovereign
(16:18):
or an asset that we like that we want to own,
that we take advantage. When it's unloved by the market,
that's typically when we will enter into positions. So, yes,
we have been shying away from US assets adding more
international assets to the portfolio for a number of years.
I will say, not all sectors of the US markets
(16:39):
are loved, and so again we'll use flexibility. So when
we see a very nice business that we believe is
trading below its fair value, you know, we will enter
those positions. So then coming to currencies, you know, we
have to think about the impact of taris on the economy,
and then we think about the impact of currencies, and
the thing, you know, if you had asked me this
(16:59):
question out my outlook for the dollar in December, I
would have said, well, we're unsure about tariffs, but all
else equal, everything in equilibrium. A good economist answer means
that the dollars should appreciate to offset the change in
relative prices coming from tariffs. And indeed we did see
(17:20):
that in the twenty eighteen nineteen period, when tariffs were
mainly focused on China, the China dollar exchange rate really shifted.
The dollar appreciated and offset quite a lot of the tariffs.
This time around, of course, we've had the exact opposite again,
proving that economists can be wrong and are often wrong.
And the dollar has depreciated, and so I think you
(17:42):
have to start to bring in you know, not everything
else is equal. What else is happening? Our investors losing
confidence in the dollar in US assets? And is that
changing behavior? Is there more concerns about growth in the
US versus the rest of the world. Is there more
concerned about inflation in the US compared to the rest
(18:03):
of the world.
Speaker 1 (18:05):
I wonder if the first trade war offers some guidance
for this trade war or if it's just completely uncertain.
And the reason I ask that is because there are
a lot of differences in the way the world economy
is right now, we also have a trade war against
much of the world as opposed to just primarily one
(18:27):
country being China. And the other thing that I've been
talking to some economists about is when it comes to
inflation in the US, we now have a situation where
supply chains are potentially going to become even more complex
and inefficient, and the potential for companies to start offloading
(18:48):
those even higher costs throughout the world, not just in
the US. So I wonder how you're thinking about this
trade war versus the.
Speaker 3 (18:57):
Last Yes, And I think the mistake, certainly, my mistake
is perhaps I initially viewed Trade War two point zero
in the same lens as the original one, which was
largely focused against China.
Speaker 1 (19:12):
Everyone did yeah, yeah.
Speaker 3 (19:13):
You know, against China until the board came out, and
I think there was a collective gasp of oh, my goodness,
this is this is a different beast. The first trade
war was largely focused against China, and the effective tariff
rate went from one and a half percent to about
three percent in the US, so doubled. But now we're
(19:35):
talking fifteen to twenty percent. I mean, it's just a
different order of magnitude, and then over time that effective
tariff rate sort of crept back down to you know,
in the twos as firms reoriented supply chains, as Chinese
firms changed the sort of structure of their exports to
the US through third countries, and so you could see
(19:56):
how over time businesses were sort of optimizing around those tariffs.
A trade war against everybody. Again, as an economist, you know,
free trade, it's like a core tenant and part of
the religion of an economist, sort of comparative advantage gains
from trade, and so we're conducting war against everybody else.
(20:18):
It is likely to make the US first and foremost
less competitive, grow more slowly. There have been studies done
on the first trade war, you know, for instance, washing
machines and dryers where there were high tariffs and posed
there were studies that were done that showed that US
firms raise their prices just as much as imports. Studies
(20:39):
done on the steel industry where steel tariffs were quite high,
that US steel using firms importing firms became much less
competitive after them position. So there's a number of reasons
to believe that this is going to make the US
less competitive grow less quickly, and it will be bad
for the global economy, both because the US is such
(21:01):
a large consumer, so a weaker US obviously not great
for the rest of the world. And to the extent
that the US is poor consumes less, perhaps there's some
shifting of production. It also begins to hit other economies,
and of course Asia, which is the world's largest exporter,
especially to the US, will be hit by that. So
everybody else is worse off. To your point about complexity,
(21:25):
and I think again this sort of gets at in
the US. We haven't seen really the results yet. Firms
unsure of how to respond. You're not sure where ultimate
teriff rates end up. You know, it's hard enough for
a supply chain manager to deal with suddenly much higher
tariffs on China, but suddenly you have to look at,
you know, terif rates around the world different industries. Yeah,
(21:48):
I think it's going a lot of wasted time in
this space, you know. I know there was a lot
of hope with this administration that they pursue a deregulatory agenda,
but they are creating a massive regulatory burden surrounding trade.
Both for the government who suddenly has to enforce a
wide range of tear of schedules and for firms that
(22:10):
suddenly are going to be faced with this difficult optimization
problem of how to rejigger supply chains in an ever
changing world.
Speaker 2 (22:19):
Don I'd love to bring the discussion to Asia, given
everything that we've said, is there any particular Asian you know,
sovereign or country that you think could outperform in this
type of environment.
Speaker 3 (22:33):
So two points one, I think countries that are less
export dependent perhaps tend to fare a bit better. So
maybe that's an India and Indonesia just you know, they're
less open to trade and less exposed to the US market. Additionally,
to the extent you know, again we haven't really seen
(22:54):
the details of any of these deals yet, there's still
more tweet form than full of trade agreements. But also
to the extent that they do reduce tariffs, a country
like India or Indonesia again that have relatively high tariff rates,
to the extent they help bring down their own domestic
tariff rates because again, as an economist, we think lower
(23:16):
tariff rates are actually very good for your economy and
your business sector to improve sort of the competitive landscape.
And so you know, that could be an added bonus.
But also when I think about the rest of Asia,
it is looking like that perhaps everybody is going to
face about a relatively similar teriff rate. With respect to
(23:38):
the US, we seem to be sort of in the
fifteen to twenty percent, So in that case, maybe the
relative competitiveness doesn't change among Asian economies or between Asia
and Europe and the rest of the world. And quite frankly,
I find it hard to believe that the US, especially initially,
is going to be able to produce everything that we
(23:58):
import from Asia. Quite frankly, we won't be able to. So,
you know, at some point, I'm sort of left with
if Asian economies are facing similar teriff rates, you know,
maybe in a relative perspective, they're no worse off. So again,
very competitive economies like a Korea or Japan, or China
or Taiwan don't end up being that much worse off.
(24:19):
Maybe they see somewhat weaker growth, weaker demand for their
products because the US is somewhat poorer buying less, but
from a competitive position doesn't make much of a big deal.
Speaker 1 (24:31):
And earlier, Adanna, you said that you're looking for opportunities
outside of the US. If we can put it that way.
So Indian and Indonesia are you kind of focused? There
are there other countries that you've been interested in recently.
Speaker 3 (24:45):
For the rest of Asia. So if thinking from my
perspective on currencies, Asian currencies have been quite weak for
extended period of time. Some of that has to do
with the weakness in the end in yuan. It's hard
for other currencies to appreciate when the two behemoth currencies
are so weak, and so I think this is a
(25:07):
struct you know, with the weakness and the dollar, this
gives sort of a structural ability for Asian currencies to
start to strengthen, especially I think the unknown question again
coming back to the dollar. The unknown is even with
the dollar having depreciated, you know, ten percent year to
(25:27):
date against the broad currencies, the dollar is still overvalued.
The question that I'm particularly focused on is whether this
weakness in the dollar persists, if there's a change. When
you look over time over history, the dollar moves in
large swings. They're strong dollar regimes, week dollar regimes. Are
(25:47):
we moving into a weaker dollar regime? Are we moving
away from that period of US exceptionalism? Foreign investors into
the US have become very overweight US assets in their portfolio.
Those their stock and bond investments to the share of
US GDP have reached record highs. If we begin to
see just a small shift away from the US, or
(26:11):
just less flows moving into US markets, or even just
more hedging of dollar exposure in those US investments, that
could cause weakness in the dollar and weakness in US assets.
And a lot of that capital has come from Asia,
to the extent we see capital flow back to Asia
where valuations are more compelling across Asian equities and currencies.
(26:36):
You know, again, do we get more of that capital
flow coming back? That remains to be seen. But so
if we're investing based on valuations, that's where we're headed,
because we do see those opportunities.
Speaker 1 (26:49):
You're outlining the sort of I don't want to say pessimistic,
but you're you're outlining a future that there are a
lot of risks out there. And I think I've been surprised,
and you touched on this as well, but sort of
the surprising strength in equity markets, and also we continue
to see really tight spreads kind of globally, so our
(27:10):
investors being a bit too complacent here or are they
kind of waiting for something to drop, like it just
seems like a lot of this risk is not really
priced into markets.
Speaker 3 (27:22):
So I think there's a fair amount of complacency. As
I said, I think we've yet to see the impact
of tariffs over time if they persist, which I have
to assume they will, but again, depending on the daily headline,
sometimes you have a different view. But assuming they persist,
you know, firms are going to have to make this
decision about how do they address those costs. I'm of
(27:46):
the view that once it begins to show up in
the data, either in the form of higher inflation or
weaker growth, weaker earnings, or a combination of all of those,
that equity markets, credit markets should begin to reflect those risks.
On top of that, you know, if they're concerns about
(28:07):
the FED, and if there's questions about whether the Fed's
actions if they're viewed through a political lens, that could
sort of add to those market fears. So I do
think there's a fair amount of complacency here. And finally,
you know, when you look at again the US fiscal position,
we're running deficits around six and a half percent of GDP,
(28:28):
which will only grow over time, and we're at full
employment the top of a business cycle. These don't sort
of correlate. The markets are priced for that. We're sort
of in this perfect world, goldilocks world, but there's a
lot that could go wrong from here. So that's sort
of how I'm thinking about it.
Speaker 2 (28:51):
It done it. Before we let you go, I wanted
to ask first. Egally manages over one hundred billion dollars
in assets under management. But before we started recording this podcast,
you mentioned that you invest over the long term. You
have an investment horizon of ten years. Now, tell us
how do you look so far ahead.
Speaker 1 (29:11):
Especially when things are changing so quickly every single day.
Speaker 3 (29:15):
One of our core tenants is that our crystal ball
is foggy at best, and I think that's been proven
over and over again the last five years, that we
really can't know where the world is headed. So instead,
our north star is really valuations. If we can buy
into a business at a price below what we think
(29:37):
it's worth, if we can buy into a currency that
we think is undervalued versus its medium term value, if
we can buy into a yield curve that we think
is above sort of where we think it's equilibrium. Level
is then that hopefully provides some protection in a very
volatile unknown world. And then because you know, our crystal
(30:01):
ball is so foggy and the world has been so
chaotic and volatile the last several years. As an active manager,
it does provide you a lot of opportunities. The world
is always changing, the market is moving. It can give
you those opportunities to invest in excellent businesses or currencies
or sovereigns at a very attractive price if you're willing
(30:25):
to look through the noise of you know, things may
move up or down or not. The other I think
unique aspect is that first eagle. We use gold in
all our portfolios as a portfolio hedge. That is something
we've done for a long period of time. It's useful.
It performs well in inflationary and deflationary environments. It has
(30:48):
sort of a zero percent correlation with equities, except in
times when in very risk off events, that correlation term
sharply negative. So that's why it's very useful as a
portfolio hedge.
Speaker 1 (31:00):
Exciting times. Thank you so much for joining us.
Speaker 3 (31:03):
Sure, thank you, thank you so much.
Speaker 1 (31:07):
You've been listening to Asia Centric from Bloomberg Intelligence and
Katjadmitreva here in Hong Kong.
Speaker 2 (31:12):
I'm John Lee, also in Hong Kong. This podcast was
produced and edited by Clara Chen and You can listen
to all our episodes on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or review listen.
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