January 10, 2025 • 32 mins
“Evacuate the airport, we’ve planted bombs,” a terrorist tells the telephone operator at the airport in Gran Canaria, in 1977. By the end of that day, 583 people will have lost their lives – but not to a bomb explosion.
The planes are diverted to the neighboring island of Tenerife. Loaded with passengers, they’re forced to sit on the hot tarmac for hours. Meanwhile, the flight crews rely on air traffic control to keep them updated.
Two Boeing 747s are waiting for thick fog to lift so that they can begin the journey home; they're anxious to receive clearance to take off. One of them has just taken on a hefty 15,000 gallons of fuel. What unfolds next is the most deadly aviation accident in history.
For a full list of sources see the show notes at timharford.com.
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Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:15):
Pushkin. Did you know that the most deadly aviation accident
in history happened on the ground? You might if you're
a Pushkin Plus subscriber, because the episode you're about to
hear has been available to those subscribers for a year.
(00:36):
We thought that everyone else might enjoy it and the
gripping sequel in a terrifying two part special on the
nineteen seventy seven ten reef air disaster. And if you're
a Pushkin Plus subscriber already, thank you. I hope you're
enjoying our special episodes about the Panama Canal. And there
is another exclusive cautionary tale coming very soon on the
(00:58):
cancer beating therrac Machine. But for now, we want everyone
to enjoy this terrifying but fascinating cautionary tale about the
fatal consequence of a simple miscommunication. Captain Jakob Veldhausen van
Zanten opens up the throttles on his Boeing seven four seven.
(01:23):
We're going, says Captain van Zanten in Dutch. The big
KLM plane starts to trundle down the runway. On board
are two hundred and thirty five passengers looking forward to
a package holiday on the Canary Islands off the coast
of Morocco. But their holidays have not got off to
a good start because they've had to land on the
(01:46):
wrong Canary island. They've been hanging around in the airport
all afternoon waiting to be able to take off for
the short hop over to the right Canary island. Finally
they're on their way. The crew were keen to get going,
it's been a long day. They just want to drop
off their passengers, pick up the ones who are waiting,
(02:07):
and get back home to Amsterdam. The seven four seven
gathers pace. The runway is shrouded in thick fog. You
can't see far ahead. The flight engineer says something. Captain
Vanzantin doesn't catch it. What was that, he asked. It's
not off yet. The Pan American off the runway. The
(02:27):
flight engineer means. There's another seven four seven, the Pan
am that's also been hanging around all afternoon waiting to
make the hop from one island to the other. The
KLM plane taxied down the runway first, then turned around.
The Pan American plane was going to taxi part of
the way down the runway behind them, then turn off
(02:50):
onto the first available exit. But was the pan American
plane definitely off the runway now, well, says Captain Vanzanten. Yes,
well is the literal translation, but the senses Yes, of course,
perhaps with a hint of annoyance. Of course, the PanAm
plane is off the runway. Faster and faster goes the
(03:12):
KLM plane. It passes one hundred and fifty miles an hour,
too fast now to abort the takeoff. And then through
the fog a shape begins to appear on the runway
ahead of them. It's the PanAm plane. Oh God damn it,
says Captain van Zanten. I'm Tim Harford, and you're listening
(03:37):
to cautionary tales. The Canary Islands are a group of
(04:05):
volcanoes poking up above the Atlantic Ocean. They've been ruled
from Spain since the fourteen hundreds, the colonial history of
slavery and sugarcane. By nineteen seventy seven, the economy has
shifted to tourism, and most Canary Islanders are happy enough
to be part of Spain, which is just emerging into
(04:26):
democracy after decades of dictatorship. Most but not all, the
movement for the Independence and self determination of the Canarias
Archipelago doesn't have many followers, but the followers it has
are zealous. On Sunday, March twenty seventh, nineteen seventy seven,
(04:48):
two young supporters of the movement walk into the airport
on Grand Canaria with a bomb in a suitcase. The
two men leave the suitcase surreptitiously outside a florist's shop
in the terminal building. Then they call the airport.
Speaker 2 (05:04):
Switchboard evacuate the airport lanch. It bombs.
Speaker 1 (05:11):
The switchboard operator is still getting the message to airport
security when the bomb goes off, glass shatters, plaster falls
from the ceiling. Could have been worse. When the smoke clears,
only a few people have been injured. But did the
voice on the phone say they'd planted a bomb or bombs?
(05:35):
They'd better get everyone out of the airport and conduct
a thorough search. Up in the air Captain Jakob Veeldhausen
van Zanten is preparing to land his seven four seven,
filled with expectant holidaymakers. Vanzanten has just turned fifty. At KLM,
he's something of a celebrity. He's the head of the
(05:57):
flight training department. He drives a yellow Ferrari Dino. The
Airlines magazine adverts feature an image of Van Zanten at
the cockpit controls, looking back over his shoulder, silver haired,
sun tanned and confident with a gleaming white smile. At KLM.
(06:18):
The advert promises, you'll find your trust sincerely reciprocated thanks
to that singular Dutch ability for doing things well. Van
zanton hasn't been flying much these days. He's mostly been
training others. Later in the week, he's due in Ireland
to oversee exams for trainee pilots on the seven four seven,
(06:41):
and in Zurich for an international meeting on aviation safety.
But he knows he needs to keep his hand in
with actual flights, so he's taken this one. It should
be straightforward from Amsterdam to Grand Canaria, then straight back home,
hopefully in time for dinner. But then comes the message
from Grand Canaria airport. Don't land. A bomb's gone off
(07:05):
circle above us while we figure out what to do.
Then we think there might be another bomb. We have
to clear the airport and search. It'll take a while.
Land in tena Reef wait there till we give the
all clear. Ten a Reef is the next island over
from Grand Canaria, about fifty miles away. The airport is tiny,
(07:29):
it's not really set up for seven four sevens, and
Vanzantin's KLM flight isn't the only one that's been diverted
to ten Reef because of the bomb. They're soon followed
by another seven four seven, the Pan American, and a
lot of smaller planes. They all land taxi off the
runway and find a place to park as best they can.
(07:52):
The tarmac's getting crowded and nobody knows how long the
delay is going to be. For Captain vanzanton that presents
a headache. KLM has rules on how long a flight
crew is allowed to be on duty inneed. Rules like
that you don't want tired and overworked pilots in charge
(08:12):
of a plane, But the rules have recently changed. Before
they were more like company guidelines. The captain could use
discretion if they went a bit over the limit, with
a good enough excuse, they'd be forgiven. Not anymore, Pilot
overtime rules have been written into Dutch law. That's not
(08:34):
all With the old guidelines, there'd been a simple way
to calculate the maximum hours the crew could work. It
out themselves. With the new law, it's more complicated. Kalm's
headquarters in the Netherlands have to apply a formula to
work it out. Van Zanton walks to the control tower
and asks to use the phone. He calls headquarters, explains
(08:58):
the situation and says, by when will I have to
leave Grand Canaria? If I want to be sure I
can make it back to Amsterdam without exceeding the time limit,
good question. Say if you can get off Tenerif in
the next hour or so, he'll probably be fine. If not, HM,
we'll figure it out and send you a telex In
(09:19):
Grand Canaria. So Van Zanton doesn't yet know how much
time he's got, but he does know that if he
gets home a minute too late, he'll be in trouble,
maybe serious trouble. The captain now has personal legal responsibility
for not exceeding the crew's maximum duty time. In the cockpit,
(09:44):
the crew discuss what all these recent changes mean. What
are the repercussions you'll face the judge.
Speaker 3 (09:50):
Is it a question of fines or of prison?
Speaker 1 (09:53):
Van Zanton joins the conversation.
Speaker 4 (09:55):
At any rate, he says, it would mean revocation of
your license for quite a while.
Speaker 2 (10:01):
And that means money.
Speaker 1 (10:03):
The clock ticks on, there's still no word from Grand
Canaria Airport on how they're bomb sweep is going. Vanz
Anton really doesn't want to be stuck on Tenerif or
Grand Canaria for the night. He's got a busy, weakerhead,
and besides, wherever they're going to magic up last minute
hotel rooms for a planeload of stranded passengers, but he
(10:25):
can't afford to risk his license. He starts to think
about what will happen when they finally get to Grand Canaria.
How long will it take to turn the plane around
for Amsterdam. He'd been planning to refuel there for the
journey home, but after all the delays and diversions, the
airport's bound to be manic. Maybe he should try to
(10:46):
save time by refueling here in Tenerif. Instead, he calls
the control tower and makes the order. Fifteen thousand gallons
fuel trucks arrive, and wouldn't you know it, No sooner
has the nozzle gone into the airplane. The news comes
through from Grand Canaria. They've finished the search, no more bombs,
(11:07):
the airport's open again. Well, they've started refueling. Now they
may as well finish. Some other smaller planes start to
taxi pass and make their takeoffs for Grand Canarrea. But
further down the tarmac there's one plane that can't get
past Vanzanton. It's too big. It's the other seven four seven,
(11:29):
the Pan American. Its pilot comes on the radio in
Van Zanton's cockpit.
Speaker 3 (11:35):
How much longer are you going to be with that refueling?
Speaker 1 (11:38):
About twenty minutes, says van Zanten. The two big planes
sit and wait, and as they do, the weather changes.
The island of Tenerif is a twelve thousand foot volcano
poking up above the ocean. The airport is on the
side of the mountain two thousand feet above sea level.
(11:59):
Sometimes clouds form quickly higher up the slopes and roll
down towards the airport. That happens now. By the time
the ALM plane has been fueled up, thick fog is
all around. Cautionary tails will be back after the break.
(12:27):
In the nineteen nineties, academic researchers ask their students to
imagine a hypothetical plane crash on a national border with
debris strewn on both sides. They wanted to know what
the students thought should happen next. Where should the survivors
be buried? If they were mostly European, what if they
(12:48):
were traveling circus performers of no fixed abode. About half
the students thoughtfully engaged with the question of the most
appropriate burial site. Only half said, hold on, you asked
whether survivors should be buried, You don't bury survivors. They're
still alive. The researchers were trying to learn more about
(13:10):
a curious phenomenon known as the Moses illusion. It had
been discovered a few years earlier by the social scientist
Thomas Erickson and the psychologist Mark Matson. How many animals
of each different kind did Moses take onto the ark?
The answer, of course, is that it wasn't Moses, it
(13:30):
was Noah. Still, when Ericson and Matson asked experimental subjects
to this question, they found roughly half gave the confident
answer too. It's not that these people didn't know who
took the animals on the ark. When asked afterwards, they
were well aware that Noah was the arc guy and
(13:51):
Moses was the one who parted the Red Sea and
brought down the Ten Commandments. So why hadn't they noticed
that the question was wrong. Ericson and Matson were intrigued.
Perhaps they thought it's because Moses and Noah sounds so
what are like They're both two syllable names. They picked
(14:13):
another two syllable name and ran an experiment. How many
animals did Nixon take on the arc? This time? Nobody
answered to Everyone said Nixon, and they tried another old
Testament name instead, one that sounds nothing like Noah. How
many animals did Abraham take on the arc? Again? A
(14:37):
lot of people answered too. Language scientists are still investigating
exactly what's going on when people make this kind of error.
They run experiments scanning people's brains as they listened to
different sentences that might trigger the illusion. But the basic
problem seems clear enough. Sometimes the brain fills in the gaps.
(15:00):
It hears what we expect to hear rather than what's
actually said something something arc animals. How many another word
in the sentence sounds incongruous like Nixon. We pay attention
and the illusion breaks. But when all the other words
sound conceptually related arc animals, some dude from the Bible,
(15:23):
we often don't notice the mistake. The researchers who asked
students about burying survivors of a plane crash found something similar.
They wanted to test how variations on phrasing the question
would affect how many people fell for the illusion. But
they also tested a question without that conceptual link. Instead
(15:45):
of asking about a plane crash, they asked about a
bicycle accident. Where should we bury the survivors? Nobody suggested location,
apparently because survivors isn't a word you usually hear. With
bicycle accident, we notice straight away that something's wrong, but
survivors and plane crash they often go together, so the
(16:06):
brain might not flag up that the sentence makes no sense.
We just hear something something plane crash, bury ware, and
we fill in the blanks for ourselves. At the airport
in Tenerif, at long last, the final drop of the
fifteen thousand gallons of fuel has been deposited in the
(16:30):
tank of the KLM plane. An airport employee comes into
the cockpit to give Captain van Zanten the good news.
Is Captain van Zanten so stressed by the delay that
he can't think straight. If he is, he's doing a
good job of hiding it. The airport staff said that
he was kind, polite and easy going. He gets on
(16:53):
the radio to the control tower.
Speaker 4 (16:55):
Tenerif Kalem four eight zero five is ready to start.
Speaker 1 (17:00):
The controller instructs him to taxi down the runway. Usually
a plane will use a separate taxiway to get themselves
to the right end of the runway, but that's not
an option. Here in the cockpit, the KLM crew can
also hear everything that's being said between the control tower
and the pan And plane called Clipper Victor. They're using
(17:21):
the same radio frequency.
Speaker 3 (17:23):
Tenerif Clipper are one seven three six Clipper one seven
three six ten reef, we were instructed to contact you,
and also taxi down the runway.
Speaker 2 (17:33):
Is that correct?
Speaker 4 (17:34):
Affirmative? Taxi into the runway and leave the runway third
third to your left, third third to the left.
Speaker 1 (17:42):
Okay, So Captain van Zanton knows that the pan AM plane,
the Clipper one seven three six, is going to taxi
down the runway behind him. The clouds are coming and going.
The fog thickens and easies and thickens again. At times
you can barely see more than three hundred meters ahead,
less than a tenth of the length of the runway
(18:04):
from the control tower. The controller can't see the planes
on the runway. He has to ask where they are,
and in the fog, it's not always easy for the
pilots to be sure. How many of those exits to
the left they've gone past?
Speaker 4 (18:17):
Kalemn four eight zero five? How many taxiways did you pass?
Speaker 5 (18:22):
I think we just passed Charlie four.
Speaker 4 (18:24):
Now, okay, at the end of the runway, make it
one to eighty and report ready for EIGHTC clearance.
Speaker 5 (18:30):
Okay, sir.
Speaker 1 (18:32):
EIGHTC clearance. That's air traffic control. Before they can depart,
planes need two kinds of clearance. There's clearance for the
takeoff itself, and there's ATC clearance that's for where to
go after you've taken off their separate things. In the
KLM cockpit, another conversation between the pan and plane and
the control tower comes over the radio.
Speaker 3 (18:56):
Would you confirm that you want the clipper one seven
three six to turn left at the third intersection.
Speaker 4 (19:02):
Third one, sir one two three third third one, Very good,
Thank you, clipper one seven three six. Report leaving the runway.
Speaker 1 (19:13):
Report leaving the runway. The controller is asking them to
report on the radio when they're leaving the runway. Is
it possible Captain van Zanten misheard and thought they were
reporting they were leaving the runway. Maybe Captain Vanzanton gets
to the end of the runway and turns his plane around.
(19:34):
That isn't easy. The seven four seven is a big
plane with a wide turning circle, but he manages appointing
the right way. Now in the cockpit, the first officer
is going through the last of the formalities.
Speaker 5 (19:47):
Buddy gave dis Armed landing lights on, checklists.
Speaker 1 (19:50):
Completed, Vanzanten releases the brakes and starts to move forward.
Speaker 5 (19:55):
Wait a minute, we don't have an eighty SE clearance.
Speaker 1 (19:58):
No I know that, says van Zanten. Go ahead and
ask hmm did Vanzanton know that or had he forgotten?
Vanzanton was the head of KLM's flight training department. It
had been twelve weeks since he had been in charge
of an actual plane. He's more used to instructing trainees
(20:19):
in the simulator and as the instructor, he also plays
the role of the controller. He's the one who gives
clearances to the trainee pilot. Has he got too accustomed
to not needing clearance from anyone else? Perhaps the first
officer gets on the radio.
Speaker 5 (20:38):
The KLM for eight zero or five is now ready
for takeoff, and we're waiting for our eighty C clearance.
Speaker 1 (20:47):
Remember, they need two types of clearance from the control tower,
the eighty C clearance for their route after takeoff and
the clearance for takeoff itself. The first officer has asked
for both types of clearance, Explicitly we're waiting for our
ATC clearance and implicitly we're ready for takeoff. In response,
(21:10):
the controller gives him the ATC clearance, but doesn't tell
him that he can take off yet.
Speaker 4 (21:17):
Kalem eight seven zero five, you are clear to the
PAPA beacon. Climb to and maintain flight level nine zero
right turn after takeoff, proceed with heading zero four zero
until intercepting these three to two five radio from Las Palmas.
Speaker 1 (21:33):
By the way, what's the KLM flight's number? In that
last message, the controller messed it up. He said eight
seven zero five, not four eight zero five?
Speaker 2 (21:43):
Did you notice? Why should you?
Speaker 1 (21:45):
It doesn't matter. There's only one KLM plane here. Everyone
knew what he meant. Maybe that's why our brains evolved
to be susceptible to the Moses illusion. Most of the time,
when we hear what we expect to hear, it's also
what the person we're talking to intended to say. It's
our brain helpfully filtering out a misspeak. But the Moses
(22:08):
illusion can be deadly. Captain van Zanten was expecting to
hear that he was cleared for takeoff. He got only
the air traffic control clearance, but the sentence did also
contain the word takeoff and a bunch of other words
that are all conceptually related. It seems that all he
heard was something something cleared take off. We're going, said
(22:33):
Captain van Zanten. He opened the throttles and the plane
began to move. The calamity could still have been averted.
We'll hear why it wasn't. After the break. When Captain
(23:01):
van Zanten said we're going, his first officer was just
finishing reading back the air traffic control clearance to the controlled.
Speaker 5 (23:10):
Roger, Sir, we are clear to the PAPA Beacon flight
level nine zero right turnout zero for zero until intercepting
the three two five, and we're now at takeoff.
Speaker 1 (23:20):
Is that what he said at takeoff? That's what most
of the investigators heard. Some think he said we're now
taken off. But the controller seems to have heard at
takeoff and understood it to mean we're in position ready
for takeoff. Okay, said the controller.
Speaker 2 (23:40):
Stand by for a takeoff. I will call you.
Speaker 1 (23:43):
But then a tragic coincidence, both the KLM plane and
the pan AM plane. Remember are using the same frequency
to talk to the control tower. In the cockpit of
the PanAm plane, they've also heard the KLM first officer
say we're now at takeoff, and they think they'd better
make sure everyone knows where They are still moving slowly
(24:06):
along the runway trying to count the exit. It's in
the fog.
Speaker 2 (24:10):
And we're still taxiing down the runway.
Speaker 1 (24:13):
But both transmissions happen at the same time, and that
causes interference. In the KLM cockpit, all they hear.
Speaker 2 (24:20):
Is step back, I will call you.
Speaker 1 (24:23):
They might just have made out what was being said
if they'd been listening closely. They weren't. Captain van Zanten
was pushing the big plane down the runway faster and
faster through the fog. But then another transmission on the
radio between the controller and the PanAm plane, and this
one was perfectly clear.
Speaker 2 (24:45):
About a fore six, report runway clear. Okay, we'll report
when we're clear.
Speaker 1 (24:52):
Captain Vanzanton doesn't respond to this, nor does the first officer.
The flight engineer has heard the exchange and he speaks up,
Is he.
Speaker 3 (25:01):
Not off yet?
Speaker 2 (25:01):
Then? What was that?
Speaker 3 (25:03):
It's not off yet?
Speaker 5 (25:04):
The Pan American y?
Speaker 1 (25:06):
Well, of course, the PanAm plane off the runway. Why
is van Zanton so sure? Perhaps because he mistakenly believes
he's been cleared for takeoff and he knows the controller
wouldn't have given him that clearance if the runway was
still blocked. But hasn't he just heard that exchange on
the radio with the controller saying report when runway clear,
(25:29):
and PanAm replying we'll report when we're clear. Maybe he
wasn't listening, or maybe he half heard and it was
another Moses illusion something something runway clear. Van Zanten heard
what he expected. After every accident, there are some causes
(25:52):
you just have to file under one of those things.
There isn't much of a lesson we can draw from
the strange sequence of the bomb, the diversion, the refueling
and the fog. But sometimes there are causes you can
learn from and they change how things are done. Nowadays,
all members of a flight's crew are training to speak
(26:13):
up respectfully but forcefully when they think the captain is
making a mistake. There's room to wander if the first
officer and the flight engineer felt too timid to contradict
Captain Jakob Veldhausen van Zanten, the celebrity pilot whose face
beamed from the KLM adverts. Some investigators think the first
officer said we're now taken off in a tone of surprise,
(26:38):
trying to alert the controller that Van Zanten had jumped
the gun. Maybe, but just a few moments earlier he
had reminded van Zanten that they didn't have air traffic
control clearance. That doesn't sound like he was too overawed
to point out when his boss was messing something up.
If he'd realized they weren't cleared for takeoff, he'd surely
(26:59):
have mentioned that too. What about the flight engineer. Was
he genuinely reassured by van Zanton's emphatic javelle assuming the
cap must have access to information he doesn't know, or
did he spend the last few seconds of his life
thinking should I insist he aborts the takeoff? Paddled a
(27:19):
layers and I'll get the blame. Would he have been
more insistent if it had the kind of training flight
crews get today. We'll never know. But something else changed
too as a result of what happened that day on
Tenerif let's pick up our copy of a Guide to
Phraseology for General aviation Pilots in Europe and turn to
(27:43):
page seven.
Speaker 4 (27:45):
Listen carefully to make sure you understand what.
Speaker 1 (27:47):
Is said to you.
Speaker 4 (27:48):
It is easy to hear what you expect rather than
what is actually said.
Speaker 1 (27:53):
It is easy to hear what you expect rather than
what is actually said. A perfect warning not to succumb
to the Moses illusion. Pilots are now trained to be
aware of the risk. But apart from asking people to
listen more carefully, what can we do if we want
to minimize the chance that someone might fall prey to
(28:15):
the illusion. One approaches simply not to say the words
that might lead to confusion. Turn to page seventeen of
our Guide to Aviation Phraseology.
Speaker 4 (28:27):
To avoid confusion. The word cleared is only used in
connection with a clearance to take.
Speaker 3 (28:33):
Off or land.
Speaker 4 (28:34):
The words take off are only used when an aircraft
is cleared for takeoff or when canceling a takeoff clearance.
Speaker 1 (28:44):
Pilots and controllers are now taught to use different words
in different situations. Instead of ready for takeoff, say ready
for departure. Instead of after takeoff, say wants airborne. If
you want to make sure nobody hears something something cleared
take off, don't say the words cleared or take off
(29:06):
at all. The KLM plane is hurtling down the fog
bound runway in Tenerif, and there's the PanAm plane still
searching for the right exit. Captain van Zanton is going
over one hundred and fifty miles an hour, too quickly
(29:28):
to stop. But is he going quickly enough to get
into the air. He yanks on the controls. If the
nose points up, the tail slams down into the runway.
It leaves a streak of metal and the tarmac twenty
meters long. At last, the plane starts to lift off
the runway, but it struggles. If only it didn't have
(29:48):
those extra fifteen thousand gallons of fuel on board. The
nose clears the top of the PanAm plane, but the
rest isn't going to make it.
Speaker 2 (29:59):
Oh God, damn it.
Speaker 1 (30:02):
The bottom of the plane clips the top of the other.
It crashes back onto the tarmac and careens along the runway.
The collision ruptures the fuel tanks. The fifteen thousand gallons
explode into a fireball hot enough to melt the fuselage.
Flames rise high in the air. Everyone on board is
(30:24):
killed instantly. Forty four of the bodies are so badly
burned they can never be identified. Among them, Captain Jakob
Veldhausen van Zanten, a few hundred meters back from the fireball,
stands what's left of the PanAm plane. Some of its
(30:44):
passengers have also been killed already. Others are still alive,
but many of these survivors will end up being buried.
They don't have long before fire will begin to consume
their plane. We'll hear what decides who makes it out
and who doesn't in the next episode of Cautionary Tales.
(31:14):
An important source for this episode was Collision on tenna
Reef for How and Why of the World's worst aviation
disaster by John Ziamec and Caroline Hopkins. For a full
list of our sources, see the show notes at Timharford
dot com. Cautionary Tales is written by me Tim Harford
(31:37):
with Andrew Wright. It's produced by Alice Fines with support
from Marilyn Rust. The sound design and original music is
the work of Pascal Wise. Sarah Nix edited the scripts.
It features the voice talents of Ben Crowe, Melanie Guttridge,
Stella Harford, Jemmy Saunders and Rufus Wright. The show also
wouldn't have been possible without the work of Jacob Weisberg,
(32:00):
Ryan Dilly, Greta Cohne, Betal Mollard, John Schnaz, Eric's handler,
Carrie Brody, and Christina Sullivan. Details is a production of
Pushkin Industries. It's recorded at Wardour Studios in London by
Tom Berry. If you like the show, please remember to share,
(32:20):
rate and review, tell your friends and if you want
to hear the show ad free, sign up for Pushkin
Plus on the show page in Apple Podcasts or at
pushkin dot fm, slash plus
Pushkin. Did you know that the most deadly aviation accident
in history happened on the ground? You might if you're
a Pushkin Plus subscriber, because the episode you're about to
hear has been available to those subscribers for a year.
(00:36):
We thought that everyone else might enjoy it and the
gripping sequel in a terrifying two part special on the
nineteen seventy seven ten reef air disaster. And if you're
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is another exclusive cautionary tale coming very soon on the
(00:58):
cancer beating therrac Machine. But for now, we want everyone
to enjoy this terrifying but fascinating cautionary tale about the
fatal consequence of a simple miscommunication. Captain Jakob Veldhausen van
Zanten opens up the throttles on his Boeing seven four seven.
(01:23):
We're going, says Captain van Zanten in Dutch. The big
KLM plane starts to trundle down the runway. On board
are two hundred and thirty five passengers looking forward to
a package holiday on the Canary Islands off the coast
of Morocco. But their holidays have not got off to
a good start because they've had to land on the
(01:46):
wrong Canary island. They've been hanging around in the airport
all afternoon waiting to be able to take off for
the short hop over to the right Canary island. Finally
they're on their way. The crew were keen to get going,
it's been a long day. They just want to drop
off their passengers, pick up the ones who are waiting,
(02:07):
and get back home to Amsterdam. The seven four seven
gathers pace. The runway is shrouded in thick fog. You
can't see far ahead. The flight engineer says something. Captain
Vanzantin doesn't catch it. What was that, he asked. It's
not off yet. The Pan American off the runway. The
(02:27):
flight engineer means. There's another seven four seven, the Pan
am that's also been hanging around all afternoon waiting to
make the hop from one island to the other. The
KLM plane taxied down the runway first, then turned around.
The Pan American plane was going to taxi part of
the way down the runway behind them, then turn off
(02:50):
onto the first available exit. But was the pan American
plane definitely off the runway now, well, says Captain Vanzanten. Yes,
well is the literal translation, but the senses Yes, of course,
perhaps with a hint of annoyance. Of course, the PanAm
plane is off the runway. Faster and faster goes the
(03:12):
KLM plane. It passes one hundred and fifty miles an hour,
too fast now to abort the takeoff. And then through
the fog a shape begins to appear on the runway
ahead of them. It's the PanAm plane. Oh God damn it,
says Captain van Zanten. I'm Tim Harford, and you're listening
(03:37):
to cautionary tales. The Canary Islands are a group of
(04:05):
volcanoes poking up above the Atlantic Ocean. They've been ruled
from Spain since the fourteen hundreds, the colonial history of
slavery and sugarcane. By nineteen seventy seven, the economy has
shifted to tourism, and most Canary Islanders are happy enough
to be part of Spain, which is just emerging into
(04:26):
democracy after decades of dictatorship. Most but not all, the
movement for the Independence and self determination of the Canarias
Archipelago doesn't have many followers, but the followers it has
are zealous. On Sunday, March twenty seventh, nineteen seventy seven,
(04:48):
two young supporters of the movement walk into the airport
on Grand Canaria with a bomb in a suitcase. The
two men leave the suitcase surreptitiously outside a florist's shop
in the terminal building. Then they call the airport.
Speaker 2 (05:04):
Switchboard evacuate the airport lanch. It bombs.
Speaker 1 (05:11):
The switchboard operator is still getting the message to airport
security when the bomb goes off, glass shatters, plaster falls
from the ceiling. Could have been worse. When the smoke clears,
only a few people have been injured. But did the
voice on the phone say they'd planted a bomb or bombs?
(05:35):
They'd better get everyone out of the airport and conduct
a thorough search. Up in the air Captain Jakob Veeldhausen
van Zanten is preparing to land his seven four seven,
filled with expectant holidaymakers. Vanzanten has just turned fifty. At KLM,
he's something of a celebrity. He's the head of the
(05:57):
flight training department. He drives a yellow Ferrari Dino. The
Airlines magazine adverts feature an image of Van Zanten at
the cockpit controls, looking back over his shoulder, silver haired,
sun tanned and confident with a gleaming white smile. At KLM.
(06:18):
The advert promises, you'll find your trust sincerely reciprocated thanks
to that singular Dutch ability for doing things well. Van
zanton hasn't been flying much these days. He's mostly been
training others. Later in the week, he's due in Ireland
to oversee exams for trainee pilots on the seven four seven,
(06:41):
and in Zurich for an international meeting on aviation safety.
But he knows he needs to keep his hand in
with actual flights, so he's taken this one. It should
be straightforward from Amsterdam to Grand Canaria, then straight back home,
hopefully in time for dinner. But then comes the message
from Grand Canaria airport. Don't land. A bomb's gone off
(07:05):
circle above us while we figure out what to do.
Then we think there might be another bomb. We have
to clear the airport and search. It'll take a while.
Land in tena Reef wait there till we give the
all clear. Ten a Reef is the next island over
from Grand Canaria, about fifty miles away. The airport is tiny,
(07:29):
it's not really set up for seven four sevens, and
Vanzantin's KLM flight isn't the only one that's been diverted
to ten Reef because of the bomb. They're soon followed
by another seven four seven, the Pan American, and a
lot of smaller planes. They all land taxi off the
runway and find a place to park as best they can.
(07:52):
The tarmac's getting crowded and nobody knows how long the
delay is going to be. For Captain vanzanton that presents
a headache. KLM has rules on how long a flight
crew is allowed to be on duty inneed. Rules like
that you don't want tired and overworked pilots in charge
(08:12):
of a plane, But the rules have recently changed. Before
they were more like company guidelines. The captain could use
discretion if they went a bit over the limit, with
a good enough excuse, they'd be forgiven. Not anymore, Pilot
overtime rules have been written into Dutch law. That's not
(08:34):
all With the old guidelines, there'd been a simple way
to calculate the maximum hours the crew could work. It
out themselves. With the new law, it's more complicated. Kalm's
headquarters in the Netherlands have to apply a formula to
work it out. Van Zanton walks to the control tower
and asks to use the phone. He calls headquarters, explains
(08:58):
the situation and says, by when will I have to
leave Grand Canaria? If I want to be sure I
can make it back to Amsterdam without exceeding the time limit,
good question. Say if you can get off Tenerif in
the next hour or so, he'll probably be fine. If not, HM,
we'll figure it out and send you a telex In
(09:19):
Grand Canaria. So Van Zanton doesn't yet know how much
time he's got, but he does know that if he
gets home a minute too late, he'll be in trouble,
maybe serious trouble. The captain now has personal legal responsibility
for not exceeding the crew's maximum duty time. In the cockpit,
(09:44):
the crew discuss what all these recent changes mean. What
are the repercussions you'll face the judge.
Speaker 3 (09:50):
Is it a question of fines or of prison?
Speaker 1 (09:53):
Van Zanton joins the conversation.
Speaker 4 (09:55):
At any rate, he says, it would mean revocation of
your license for quite a while.
Speaker 2 (10:01):
And that means money.
Speaker 1 (10:03):
The clock ticks on, there's still no word from Grand
Canaria Airport on how they're bomb sweep is going. Vanz
Anton really doesn't want to be stuck on Tenerif or
Grand Canaria for the night. He's got a busy, weakerhead,
and besides, wherever they're going to magic up last minute
hotel rooms for a planeload of stranded passengers, but he
(10:25):
can't afford to risk his license. He starts to think
about what will happen when they finally get to Grand Canaria.
How long will it take to turn the plane around
for Amsterdam. He'd been planning to refuel there for the
journey home, but after all the delays and diversions, the
airport's bound to be manic. Maybe he should try to
(10:46):
save time by refueling here in Tenerif. Instead, he calls
the control tower and makes the order. Fifteen thousand gallons
fuel trucks arrive, and wouldn't you know it, No sooner
has the nozzle gone into the airplane. The news comes
through from Grand Canaria. They've finished the search, no more bombs,
(11:07):
the airport's open again. Well, they've started refueling. Now they
may as well finish. Some other smaller planes start to
taxi pass and make their takeoffs for Grand Canarrea. But
further down the tarmac there's one plane that can't get
past Vanzanton. It's too big. It's the other seven four seven,
(11:29):
the Pan American. Its pilot comes on the radio in
Van Zanton's cockpit.
Speaker 3 (11:35):
How much longer are you going to be with that refueling?
Speaker 1 (11:38):
About twenty minutes, says van Zanten. The two big planes
sit and wait, and as they do, the weather changes.
The island of Tenerif is a twelve thousand foot volcano
poking up above the ocean. The airport is on the
side of the mountain two thousand feet above sea level.
(11:59):
Sometimes clouds form quickly higher up the slopes and roll
down towards the airport. That happens now. By the time
the ALM plane has been fueled up, thick fog is
all around. Cautionary tails will be back after the break.
(12:27):
In the nineteen nineties, academic researchers ask their students to
imagine a hypothetical plane crash on a national border with
debris strewn on both sides. They wanted to know what
the students thought should happen next. Where should the survivors
be buried? If they were mostly European, what if they
(12:48):
were traveling circus performers of no fixed abode. About half
the students thoughtfully engaged with the question of the most
appropriate burial site. Only half said, hold on, you asked
whether survivors should be buried, You don't bury survivors. They're
still alive. The researchers were trying to learn more about
(13:10):
a curious phenomenon known as the Moses illusion. It had
been discovered a few years earlier by the social scientist
Thomas Erickson and the psychologist Mark Matson. How many animals
of each different kind did Moses take onto the ark?
The answer, of course, is that it wasn't Moses, it
(13:30):
was Noah. Still, when Ericson and Matson asked experimental subjects
to this question, they found roughly half gave the confident
answer too. It's not that these people didn't know who
took the animals on the ark. When asked afterwards, they
were well aware that Noah was the arc guy and
(13:51):
Moses was the one who parted the Red Sea and
brought down the Ten Commandments. So why hadn't they noticed
that the question was wrong. Ericson and Matson were intrigued.
Perhaps they thought it's because Moses and Noah sounds so
what are like They're both two syllable names. They picked
(14:13):
another two syllable name and ran an experiment. How many
animals did Nixon take on the arc? This time? Nobody
answered to Everyone said Nixon, and they tried another old
Testament name instead, one that sounds nothing like Noah. How
many animals did Abraham take on the arc? Again? A
(14:37):
lot of people answered too. Language scientists are still investigating
exactly what's going on when people make this kind of error.
They run experiments scanning people's brains as they listened to
different sentences that might trigger the illusion. But the basic
problem seems clear enough. Sometimes the brain fills in the gaps.
(15:00):
It hears what we expect to hear rather than what's
actually said something something arc animals. How many another word
in the sentence sounds incongruous like Nixon. We pay attention
and the illusion breaks. But when all the other words
sound conceptually related arc animals, some dude from the Bible,
(15:23):
we often don't notice the mistake. The researchers who asked
students about burying survivors of a plane crash found something similar.
They wanted to test how variations on phrasing the question
would affect how many people fell for the illusion. But
they also tested a question without that conceptual link. Instead
(15:45):
of asking about a plane crash, they asked about a
bicycle accident. Where should we bury the survivors? Nobody suggested location,
apparently because survivors isn't a word you usually hear. With
bicycle accident, we notice straight away that something's wrong, but
survivors and plane crash they often go together, so the
(16:06):
brain might not flag up that the sentence makes no sense.
We just hear something something plane crash, bury ware, and
we fill in the blanks for ourselves. At the airport
in Tenerif, at long last, the final drop of the
fifteen thousand gallons of fuel has been deposited in the
(16:30):
tank of the KLM plane. An airport employee comes into
the cockpit to give Captain van Zanten the good news.
Is Captain van Zanten so stressed by the delay that
he can't think straight. If he is, he's doing a
good job of hiding it. The airport staff said that
he was kind, polite and easy going. He gets on
(16:53):
the radio to the control tower.
Speaker 4 (16:55):
Tenerif Kalem four eight zero five is ready to start.
Speaker 1 (17:00):
The controller instructs him to taxi down the runway. Usually
a plane will use a separate taxiway to get themselves
to the right end of the runway, but that's not
an option. Here in the cockpit, the KLM crew can
also hear everything that's being said between the control tower
and the pan And plane called Clipper Victor. They're using
(17:21):
the same radio frequency.
Speaker 3 (17:23):
Tenerif Clipper are one seven three six Clipper one seven
three six ten reef, we were instructed to contact you,
and also taxi down the runway.
Speaker 2 (17:33):
Is that correct?
Speaker 4 (17:34):
Affirmative? Taxi into the runway and leave the runway third
third to your left, third third to the left.
Speaker 1 (17:42):
Okay, So Captain van Zanton knows that the pan AM plane,
the Clipper one seven three six, is going to taxi
down the runway behind him. The clouds are coming and going.
The fog thickens and easies and thickens again. At times
you can barely see more than three hundred meters ahead,
less than a tenth of the length of the runway
(18:04):
from the control tower. The controller can't see the planes
on the runway. He has to ask where they are,
and in the fog, it's not always easy for the
pilots to be sure. How many of those exits to
the left they've gone past?
Speaker 4 (18:17):
Kalemn four eight zero five? How many taxiways did you pass?
Speaker 5 (18:22):
I think we just passed Charlie four.
Speaker 4 (18:24):
Now, okay, at the end of the runway, make it
one to eighty and report ready for EIGHTC clearance.
Speaker 5 (18:30):
Okay, sir.
Speaker 1 (18:32):
EIGHTC clearance. That's air traffic control. Before they can depart,
planes need two kinds of clearance. There's clearance for the
takeoff itself, and there's ATC clearance that's for where to
go after you've taken off their separate things. In the
KLM cockpit, another conversation between the pan and plane and
the control tower comes over the radio.
Speaker 3 (18:56):
Would you confirm that you want the clipper one seven
three six to turn left at the third intersection.
Speaker 4 (19:02):
Third one, sir one two three third third one, Very good,
Thank you, clipper one seven three six. Report leaving the runway.
Speaker 1 (19:13):
Report leaving the runway. The controller is asking them to
report on the radio when they're leaving the runway. Is
it possible Captain van Zanten misheard and thought they were
reporting they were leaving the runway. Maybe Captain Vanzanton gets
to the end of the runway and turns his plane around.
(19:34):
That isn't easy. The seven four seven is a big
plane with a wide turning circle, but he manages appointing
the right way. Now in the cockpit, the first officer
is going through the last of the formalities.
Speaker 5 (19:47):
Buddy gave dis Armed landing lights on, checklists.
Speaker 1 (19:50):
Completed, Vanzanten releases the brakes and starts to move forward.
Speaker 5 (19:55):
Wait a minute, we don't have an eighty SE clearance.
Speaker 1 (19:58):
No I know that, says van Zanten. Go ahead and
ask hmm did Vanzanton know that or had he forgotten?
Vanzanton was the head of KLM's flight training department. It
had been twelve weeks since he had been in charge
of an actual plane. He's more used to instructing trainees
(20:19):
in the simulator and as the instructor, he also plays
the role of the controller. He's the one who gives
clearances to the trainee pilot. Has he got too accustomed
to not needing clearance from anyone else? Perhaps the first
officer gets on the radio.
Speaker 5 (20:38):
The KLM for eight zero or five is now ready
for takeoff, and we're waiting for our eighty C clearance.
Speaker 1 (20:47):
Remember, they need two types of clearance from the control tower,
the eighty C clearance for their route after takeoff and
the clearance for takeoff itself. The first officer has asked
for both types of clearance, Explicitly we're waiting for our
ATC clearance and implicitly we're ready for takeoff. In response,
(21:10):
the controller gives him the ATC clearance, but doesn't tell
him that he can take off yet.
Speaker 4 (21:17):
Kalem eight seven zero five, you are clear to the
PAPA beacon. Climb to and maintain flight level nine zero
right turn after takeoff, proceed with heading zero four zero
until intercepting these three to two five radio from Las Palmas.
Speaker 1 (21:33):
By the way, what's the KLM flight's number? In that
last message, the controller messed it up. He said eight
seven zero five, not four eight zero five?
Speaker 2 (21:43):
Did you notice? Why should you?
Speaker 1 (21:45):
It doesn't matter. There's only one KLM plane here. Everyone
knew what he meant. Maybe that's why our brains evolved
to be susceptible to the Moses illusion. Most of the time,
when we hear what we expect to hear, it's also
what the person we're talking to intended to say. It's
our brain helpfully filtering out a misspeak. But the Moses
(22:08):
illusion can be deadly. Captain van Zanten was expecting to
hear that he was cleared for takeoff. He got only
the air traffic control clearance, but the sentence did also
contain the word takeoff and a bunch of other words
that are all conceptually related. It seems that all he
heard was something something cleared take off. We're going, said
(22:33):
Captain van Zanten. He opened the throttles and the plane
began to move. The calamity could still have been averted.
We'll hear why it wasn't. After the break. When Captain
(23:01):
van Zanten said we're going, his first officer was just
finishing reading back the air traffic control clearance to the controlled.
Speaker 5 (23:10):
Roger, Sir, we are clear to the PAPA Beacon flight
level nine zero right turnout zero for zero until intercepting
the three two five, and we're now at takeoff.
Speaker 1 (23:20):
Is that what he said at takeoff? That's what most
of the investigators heard. Some think he said we're now
taken off. But the controller seems to have heard at
takeoff and understood it to mean we're in position ready
for takeoff. Okay, said the controller.
Speaker 2 (23:40):
Stand by for a takeoff. I will call you.
Speaker 1 (23:43):
But then a tragic coincidence, both the KLM plane and
the pan AM plane. Remember are using the same frequency
to talk to the control tower. In the cockpit of
the PanAm plane, they've also heard the KLM first officer
say we're now at takeoff, and they think they'd better
make sure everyone knows where They are still moving slowly
(24:06):
along the runway trying to count the exit. It's in
the fog.
Speaker 2 (24:10):
And we're still taxiing down the runway.
Speaker 1 (24:13):
But both transmissions happen at the same time, and that
causes interference. In the KLM cockpit, all they hear.
Speaker 2 (24:20):
Is step back, I will call you.
Speaker 1 (24:23):
They might just have made out what was being said
if they'd been listening closely. They weren't. Captain van Zanten
was pushing the big plane down the runway faster and
faster through the fog. But then another transmission on the
radio between the controller and the PanAm plane, and this
one was perfectly clear.
Speaker 2 (24:45):
About a fore six, report runway clear. Okay, we'll report
when we're clear.
Speaker 1 (24:52):
Captain Vanzanton doesn't respond to this, nor does the first officer.
The flight engineer has heard the exchange and he speaks up,
Is he.
Speaker 3 (25:01):
Not off yet?
Speaker 2 (25:01):
Then? What was that?
Speaker 3 (25:03):
It's not off yet?
Speaker 5 (25:04):
The Pan American y?
Speaker 1 (25:06):
Well, of course, the PanAm plane off the runway. Why
is van Zanton so sure? Perhaps because he mistakenly believes
he's been cleared for takeoff and he knows the controller
wouldn't have given him that clearance if the runway was
still blocked. But hasn't he just heard that exchange on
the radio with the controller saying report when runway clear,
(25:29):
and PanAm replying we'll report when we're clear. Maybe he
wasn't listening, or maybe he half heard and it was
another Moses illusion something something runway clear. Van Zanten heard
what he expected. After every accident, there are some causes
(25:52):
you just have to file under one of those things.
There isn't much of a lesson we can draw from
the strange sequence of the bomb, the diversion, the refueling
and the fog. But sometimes there are causes you can
learn from and they change how things are done. Nowadays,
all members of a flight's crew are training to speak
(26:13):
up respectfully but forcefully when they think the captain is
making a mistake. There's room to wander if the first
officer and the flight engineer felt too timid to contradict
Captain Jakob Veldhausen van Zanten, the celebrity pilot whose face
beamed from the KLM adverts. Some investigators think the first
officer said we're now taken off in a tone of surprise,
(26:38):
trying to alert the controller that Van Zanten had jumped
the gun. Maybe, but just a few moments earlier he
had reminded van Zanten that they didn't have air traffic
control clearance. That doesn't sound like he was too overawed
to point out when his boss was messing something up.
If he'd realized they weren't cleared for takeoff, he'd surely
(26:59):
have mentioned that too. What about the flight engineer. Was
he genuinely reassured by van Zanton's emphatic javelle assuming the
cap must have access to information he doesn't know, or
did he spend the last few seconds of his life
thinking should I insist he aborts the takeoff? Paddled a
(27:19):
layers and I'll get the blame. Would he have been
more insistent if it had the kind of training flight
crews get today. We'll never know. But something else changed
too as a result of what happened that day on
Tenerif let's pick up our copy of a Guide to
Phraseology for General aviation Pilots in Europe and turn to
(27:43):
page seven.
Speaker 4 (27:45):
Listen carefully to make sure you understand what.
Speaker 1 (27:47):
Is said to you.
Speaker 4 (27:48):
It is easy to hear what you expect rather than
what is actually said.
Speaker 1 (27:53):
It is easy to hear what you expect rather than
what is actually said. A perfect warning not to succumb
to the Moses illusion. Pilots are now trained to be
aware of the risk. But apart from asking people to
listen more carefully, what can we do if we want
to minimize the chance that someone might fall prey to
(28:15):
the illusion. One approaches simply not to say the words
that might lead to confusion. Turn to page seventeen of
our Guide to Aviation Phraseology.
Speaker 4 (28:27):
To avoid confusion. The word cleared is only used in
connection with a clearance to take.
Speaker 3 (28:33):
Off or land.
Speaker 4 (28:34):
The words take off are only used when an aircraft
is cleared for takeoff or when canceling a takeoff clearance.
Speaker 1 (28:44):
Pilots and controllers are now taught to use different words
in different situations. Instead of ready for takeoff, say ready
for departure. Instead of after takeoff, say wants airborne. If
you want to make sure nobody hears something something cleared
take off, don't say the words cleared or take off
(29:06):
at all. The KLM plane is hurtling down the fog
bound runway in Tenerif, and there's the PanAm plane still
searching for the right exit. Captain van Zanton is going
over one hundred and fifty miles an hour, too quickly
(29:28):
to stop. But is he going quickly enough to get
into the air. He yanks on the controls. If the
nose points up, the tail slams down into the runway.
It leaves a streak of metal and the tarmac twenty
meters long. At last, the plane starts to lift off
the runway, but it struggles. If only it didn't have
(29:48):
those extra fifteen thousand gallons of fuel on board. The
nose clears the top of the PanAm plane, but the
rest isn't going to make it.
Speaker 2 (29:59):
Oh God, damn it.
Speaker 1 (30:02):
The bottom of the plane clips the top of the other.
It crashes back onto the tarmac and careens along the runway.
The collision ruptures the fuel tanks. The fifteen thousand gallons
explode into a fireball hot enough to melt the fuselage.
Flames rise high in the air. Everyone on board is
(30:24):
killed instantly. Forty four of the bodies are so badly
burned they can never be identified. Among them, Captain Jakob
Veldhausen van Zanten, a few hundred meters back from the fireball,
stands what's left of the PanAm plane. Some of its
(30:44):
passengers have also been killed already. Others are still alive,
but many of these survivors will end up being buried.
They don't have long before fire will begin to consume
their plane. We'll hear what decides who makes it out
and who doesn't in the next episode of Cautionary Tales.
(31:14):
An important source for this episode was Collision on tenna
Reef for How and Why of the World's worst aviation
disaster by John Ziamec and Caroline Hopkins. For a full
list of our sources, see the show notes at Timharford
dot com. Cautionary Tales is written by me Tim Harford
(31:37):
with Andrew Wright. It's produced by Alice Fines with support
from Marilyn Rust. The sound design and original music is
the work of Pascal Wise. Sarah Nix edited the scripts.
It features the voice talents of Ben Crowe, Melanie Guttridge,
Stella Harford, Jemmy Saunders and Rufus Wright. The show also
wouldn't have been possible without the work of Jacob Weisberg,
(32:00):
Ryan Dilly, Greta Cohne, Betal Mollard, John Schnaz, Eric's handler,
Carrie Brody, and Christina Sullivan. Details is a production of
Pushkin Industries. It's recorded at Wardour Studios in London by
Tom Berry. If you like the show, please remember to share,
(32:20):
rate and review, tell your friends and if you want
to hear the show ad free, sign up for Pushkin
Plus on the show page in Apple Podcasts or at
pushkin dot fm, slash plus
Host
Tim Harford
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