Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:16):
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(00:47):
Two days before Christmas in nineteen seventy two, the capital
city of Nicaragua was destroyed by an earthquake.
Speaker 2 (00:54):
When daylight finally came, you could still see smoke billowing
over the city of Managua. The crews shook themselves and
began another long day of digging out and trying to
clear this city and stop the fires.
Speaker 1 (01:06):
Bulldozers combed the streets in search of bodies.
Speaker 3 (01:10):
The scent of the city has been utterly destroyed. Even
the few tall buildings which do remain will soon be
brought down by dynamite. Unofficial estimates of the dead are
running as high as five thousand, many of these.
Speaker 1 (01:22):
As the city burned, Nicaragua's right wing dictator Anastasio Simosa,
declared martial law.
Speaker 3 (01:29):
The army is now in full command of the city
and the country. General Simosa is overflying the city in
a US helicopter. He will personally direct the demolition operations
to level the city.
Speaker 1 (01:41):
Simosa and his family had ruled over Nicaragua for decades,
always with the full backing of the United States, but
in the aftermath of the earthquake, the Samosa government was
accused of stockpiling foreign aid, mismanagement, and fraud. Simosa responded
to the criticism by tightening the screws on all forms
of descent.
Speaker 4 (02:00):
The country felt increasingly militarized. As a child, you could
feel it.
Speaker 1 (02:05):
Victoria Gonzales Rivera was growing up in Nicaragua during these
turbulent years after the earthquake. Today, she's a history professor
at San Diego State University. Gonzales Rivera remembers General Simosa
seeming all powerful. His control over Nicaragua was embodied by
the constant presence of his armed loyalists, the National Guard.
Speaker 4 (02:25):
They wore their uniforms, you know, these olive green uniforms.
They were everywhere. I remember, for example, at one point
a National Guards member shot someone, a civilian, you know,
on my street, and I heard the shot, and of course,
you know, adults just made me go inside the house,
and later on I could still see the blood on
the road, and the violence just became really, really widespread.
Speaker 1 (02:48):
The Samosa government's increasing authoritarianism and corruption gave rise to
a popular opposition movement. A socialist revolutionary group started to
gain momentum.
Speaker 5 (02:59):
The Sandinista National Liberation Front or FSLN, is named after
the nineteen twenties nationalist leader Augusto Sandino.
Speaker 1 (03:09):
As the Samosa As regime grew more brutal, the FSLN,
also known as the Sandinistas, evolved into a cohesive force
with real military strength.
Speaker 5 (03:20):
The Sandonist gorillas have launched what they called their final offensive.
With the recent development of fighting in Managua for anoun
signs that Washington will start to priss Moore openly Forsmoza's resignation.
Speaker 1 (03:33):
In July of nineteen seventy nine, they deposed Simosa and
declared a new government in Nicaragua.
Speaker 6 (03:40):
By midmorning here in Managua, Sandinista gorillas were coming.
Speaker 1 (03:43):
In from every direction.
Speaker 6 (03:44):
On Many of the tough young gorillas were raised in
the four sections of this country were support for the
Sandinista movement has been the strongest, and it.
Speaker 7 (03:52):
Was the poor people in the capitol.
Speaker 6 (03:53):
Who filled the breach today the Greek, the winners of
the eighteen month old war.
Speaker 8 (03:58):
It wasn't long before the Gorilla.
Speaker 1 (04:00):
The Sandinista government started implementing its policy agenda, including a
slate of social programs in public health and education, and
for the first time in years, it felt as though
peace was coming to Nicaragua.
Speaker 4 (04:11):
Right after the revolution, there was some euphoria the literacy campaign,
vaccination campaigns. That was really safe, you know, I remember
that really clearly, Like you could be out in the
street really late, and it felt so safe. There was
a sense of there being sort of endless possibilities.
Speaker 1 (04:33):
But the euphoria didn't last long. The Sandinistas quickly encountered
resistance from Nicaraguans who were unhappy with the new government.
That included former Somosa supporters and rural laborers who were
forced into collective farming. Several groups of counter revolutionaries started
popping up all over the country. Collectively, they were called
(04:53):
the Contras, and soon a new armed conflict was brewing
in Nicaragua.
Speaker 9 (05:01):
The so called Contras claim an army of ten thousand,
with more joining every day.
Speaker 4 (05:05):
The Contra War started fairly soon after seventy nine. So
it became a vicious circle of sorts where the Sandinistas
justified the authoritarianism because it was wartime.
Speaker 8 (05:20):
They have shut down the only opposition newspaper five times,
They've postponed election, outlawed strikes, and jailed some of their opponents.
Speaker 4 (05:29):
And then more people then turned away because of the authoritarianism.
It just felt like never ending war.
Speaker 9 (05:36):
The largest of the rebel groups has extended its control
from a sliver around the Hunduran border to several advanced
locations in the center of Nicaragua. They say the war
will continue until the Sandinistas are gone.
Speaker 1 (05:49):
Just as the Sandinistas were coming to power in Nicaragua,
a presidential election was getting under way in the United
States for Ronald Reagan, the Republican nominee. The spread of
communism to a Central American nation looked like a serious threat.
Here is Doyle McManus, who covered the Contra War for
the Los Angeles Times and co authored the book Landslide.
Speaker 10 (06:09):
It was owned only five years after the United States
lost the Vietnam War, and in those five years, the
perception on the American right was that the United States
was in headlong retreat. All over the world, and that
the Soviet Union was winning everywhere, and there was in
(06:30):
effect a new Domino theory that first Nicaragua, then l Salvador,
then perhaps Guatemala, Honduras, and you are on the border
of Mexico, and suddenly we have a new problem of
communist regimes right up to our border.
Speaker 1 (06:45):
At the nineteen eighty Republican Convention, the GOP added a
plank to its platform affirming the party's support for a
free and independent government in Nicaragua. Reagan drove the point
home when he accepted his party's nomination.
Speaker 11 (06:58):
The United States has an obligation to its citizens and
to the people of the world, never to let those
who would destroy freedom dictate the future course of life
on this planet.
Speaker 1 (07:14):
As President, Reagan made no secret of his disdain for
the Sandinistas, but most Americans were opposed to the United
States getting involved in yet another proxy war abroad. One
poll in nineteen eighty three found that sixty six percent
of Americans feared that a US intervention in Nicaragua would
turn into a repeat of Vietnam. That anxiety underpinned a
(07:35):
lot of American politics in the seventies and eighties. It
was known as Vietnam syndrome.
Speaker 5 (07:40):
Congressional critics warn of another Vietnam and say it's time
for the US to keep its hands off.
Speaker 2 (07:46):
Is there now a.
Speaker 11 (07:47):
Kind of Vietnam phobia, a predisposition against the use of
military force, a presumption that that is wrong and has
to be proved right the old Mark Twain anecdote, a
cat that jumps on a hot stove not only will
not jump on a hot stove, won't jump on any
stove at all.
Speaker 1 (08:03):
Even some of his fellow Republicans broke from Reagan on
the Sandinista question. They agreed that democracy in Nicaragua would
be a good thing, but they didn't want the US
getting its hands dirty by helping the Contras make it happen.
Speaker 3 (08:15):
I don't think President Reagan has convinced some of the
most powerful members, even of his own.
Speaker 4 (08:19):
Party, that it is really a Marxist struggle down there,
and it's the US versus the Kamis. It is a
very comminateduation.
Speaker 1 (08:27):
But Reagan and his top advisors did not harbor any
doubts about what was going on down in Central America.
By the same logic that would lead to the invasion
of Grenada. Nicaragua looked poised to turn into a Soviet
outpost in the Western Hemisphere if something wasn't done.
Speaker 10 (08:42):
Think about the big issues the Middle East, the Soviet
Union at the time, the Cold War. They went on
endlessly and there was nothing there you could solve. But
here was a theater where someone sitting in the White
House or the Defense Department or the State Department could say,
you know, we actually do have enough power to fix
this problem, if we only dare to use it.
Speaker 1 (09:06):
Nicaragua was a problem Reagan thought he could solve. The
overwhelming opposition of the American people was an obstacle, but
it wasn't insurmountable. Maybe the United States could help the
Nicaragua in contras without anyone finding out about it. Maybe
Reagan could set the Soviets BACKUPEG in Central America and
nobody would ever have to know. I'm Leon Nathalk from
(09:31):
Prologue Projects and Pushkin Industries. This is fiasco Iran Contra.
The Reagan administration secret war in Nicaragua.
Speaker 11 (09:40):
Covert activities being engaged in uncovertly cannot be justified.
Speaker 12 (09:44):
The administration is going into high gear to salvage its
policies on Central America.
Speaker 11 (09:48):
We cannot turn our backs on this crisis at our doorstick.
Speaker 9 (09:51):
No longer can we so easily bear witness to the
standards of international law.
Speaker 6 (09:56):
The Sandinistas can hold out forever, but the US Congress cannot.
Speaker 1 (10:00):
Episode three Contra Dance. How the Reagan administration forged a
secret military alliance with the Contra fighters in Nicaragua, and
what happened when Congress tried to stop them. We'll be
right back. Anthony Quainton started his mission as the US
(10:25):
Ambassador to Nicaragua in March of nineteen eighty two. Given
Reagan's intense interest in Nicaragua, Quainton knew the job would
put him in the spotlight, but he didn't expect the
headaches to start quite as immediately as they did.
Speaker 13 (10:39):
When I arrived, I climbed off the plane from Miami
to be greeted by cameras, clea lights, microphones, and there
were some hopes that maybe a new ambassador would bring
a new approach.
Speaker 1 (10:52):
It turned out that while Quainton was in the air
flying from Miami to Monagua, Contra forces had blown up
two bridges as part of their war on the Sandinistas.
Speaker 6 (11:02):
The chief reason for the imposition of the state of
emergency was the sabotage of two Nicaragua bridges by anti
government guerrillas.
Speaker 1 (11:09):
And according to the government led by Daniel Ortega, the
CIA had been in on the plot.
Speaker 6 (11:14):
Military leaders here are telling the people they must be
prepared for a US backed invasion.
Speaker 13 (11:20):
I was confronted with questions, which began more or less
as follows. Mister, Ambassador Daniel Ortega has declared a state
of emergency because the CIA has blown up the bridges
connecting Nicaragua and Honduras. What do you think about this
start to your investorship?
Speaker 1 (11:37):
Quentin didn't quite know what to say. He didn't know
anything about a CIA operation to blow up bridges in Nicaragua. Officially,
the Reagan administration was exercising restraint in its opposition to
the Sandinistas. Officially they were holding back from joining the
contra war.
Speaker 13 (11:53):
And I had to think very quickly because I had
not been briefed on the operation, nor did I expect
any particular clandestine operation would be time to with my arrival.
So I don't know whether I mumbled. I tried not
to mumble, but to suggest that these were very difficult issues,
(12:13):
and I look forward to discussing them with Commandante Ortega
and others.
Speaker 6 (12:18):
The newly appointed US Ambassador, Anthony Quainton is now a Nicaragua.
He says he wants to try to decrease the level
of tension.
Speaker 1 (12:24):
That was only the first time Quainton would find himself
caught between the Reagan administration he was supposed to be
representing in the Nicaraguin leaders he was supposed to be
working with. The awkwardness was never more palpable than when
the Sandinistas sang their anthem in Quaintan's presence. The hymn
of the Sandinistas was sung at nearly every official function
(12:46):
and referred to the Yankee enemy of mankind.
Speaker 13 (12:49):
So every time they sang an Imigo del money, that
enemy of humanity, it was a dilemma. I mean, at
what point would I should I be? Was I expected
to be visibly in opposition? It was a constant question
(13:10):
for me.
Speaker 1 (13:14):
The tension over the Contra War escalated in the fall
of nineteen eighty two when Newsweek ran a blockbuster cover
story about CIA covert operations being coordinated out of Honduras
along the Nicaragua border.
Speaker 6 (13:26):
Newsweek's cover story this week is an extraordinary exclusive report
on the Reagan administration secret war in Nicaragua.
Speaker 14 (13:32):
There are a number of different types of operations in
what is generally perceived to be a war of nerves.
Speaker 1 (13:38):
Newsweek reported that some fifty CIA operatives were working in
Central America to undermine the Sandinistas. The Contras only had
about twelve thousand guerrilla soldiers, but according to Newsweek, Reagan
had approved a CIA plan to help them. It entailed
relatively modest activities like repairing equipment and disrupting Sandinista supply chains,
but it also involved training Contra forces and helping them
(14:01):
plan attacks. According to many of the US officials quoted
in the Newsweek story, these efforts were ineffective, risky, and
deeply embarrassing. One official said, this is our bay of pigs.
The contract didn't come across well in the article either.
One Contra officer was quoted saying that come the counter revolution,
(14:21):
there will be a massacre in Nicaragua. We have a
lot of scores to settle, and there will be bodies
from the border to Monagua. Here's one of the authors
of the Newsweek story giving a radio interview about her piece.
Speaker 14 (14:33):
The policy may in fact have the opposite effect of
that which is intended. In other words, it may consolidate
what little support remains for the Sandinistas. As one person
told me in Minaugua earlier this summer, just because we
want these bastards out doesn't mean we want the old
bastards back.
Speaker 1 (14:51):
The Newsweek's story put a lot of heat on Reagan
and the CIA.
Speaker 3 (14:54):
The COVID operation in Central America has drawn sharp criticism
on Capitol Hill.
Speaker 9 (14:59):
I've told the President I feel that he makes a
foreign policy mistake if he wants to substitute COVID activity
for a good foreign policy.
Speaker 1 (15:09):
Opposite position to Reagan's secret medaling in Nicaragua was led
by Democratic Congressman Edward P. Boland.
Speaker 8 (15:16):
House Intelligence Committee Chairman Edward Boland has made it almost
a personal crusade to cut off CIA financing for guerrillas
in Nicaragua.
Speaker 1 (15:24):
Boland was appalled that the administration was trying to avoid
congressional oversight in order to pursue a secret agenda. Boland
wanted to rein in the rogue executive branch.
Speaker 8 (15:33):
He argues, the Reagan administration is trying to overthrow the
Nicaraguan government with the gorillas and the US support for them,
makes this country the meddler the bully in the region.
Speaker 1 (15:43):
Another congressman had proposed a blanket ban on all military
aid to the Contras, but Boland wanted to find a
compromise that Reagan would be willing to sign, so he
suggested an amendment to the Defense budget that would specifically
forbid the CIA from sending military aid to anyone seeking
to overthrow the Sandinista government, which is to say, the
(16:03):
CIA could help the Contras as long as they weren't
doing it with the intention of bringing about regime change.
The law came to be called the bowl In Amendment,
and it passed the House unanimously with overwhelming support from
both Democrats and Republicans. Here again is La Times reporter
Doyle McManus.
Speaker 10 (16:22):
As long as they said the purpose of this operation,
the purpose of this arms shipment is not to overthrow
the government of Nicaragua, they figured they were in the clear.
So the CIA saw that as the biggest loophole that
they could drive arms trucks through that they had ever seen,
(16:42):
and that's exactly what they did.
Speaker 8 (16:44):
So for now, the administration feels free to pursue what
some here feel are rather uncovert covert activities in Nicaragua.
Speaker 1 (16:52):
The debate over the Bolan Amendment coincided with the major
pr push by the Reagan administration. They wanted to galvanize
support for the contrast among American lawmakers and to get
regular Americans excited about the contract cause. To that end,
the CIA set about finding a group of counter revolutionary
who could represent Nicaragua's anti communist movement, and if they
(17:14):
couldn't find one, they would settle for creating one.
Speaker 10 (17:18):
There was in the Reagan administration a kind of generalized
search for good guys. We could back that if you
wanted to organize and mobilize American public support for this
great crusade against Soviet Communism, you needed some heroes, You
needed some good guys, and so that was an important
part of the narrative.
Speaker 1 (17:40):
Selecting members for this contra organization was kind of like
putting together a boy band. The perfect number of people
to serve in the group was seven. It would include
a businessman, a politician, and a doctor. The CIA was
looking for Nicaraguan anti communists with good reputations, people who
weren't associated with the brutality of the Samosa National Guard.
(18:02):
The new seven person directorate was going to be the
public face of an entity called the Nicaraguan Democratic Force,
the FDN.
Speaker 15 (18:12):
Well, my life called many, many ups and downs, or
ins and out.
Speaker 1 (18:18):
Edgar Chamorro moved to Miami from Monagua in the midst
of the Sandinista Revolution. Chamorro was born to one of
Nicaragua's most powerful and well connected families. There were multiple
former presidents of Nicaragua and the Chamorrow family tree, but
Edgar never felt the poll of politics. After a short
stint as a Jesuit priest, he founded an advertising agency
(18:39):
and made ads from breweries, rum distilleries, and car dealerships.
After he moved to Miami, Chamorrow became more interested in
his home country's politics. He didn't doubt that the Sandinistas
genuinely wanted to help people, but he thought their plans
for transforming the country were too radical. He started attending
meetings in the homes of other Nicaragua expats who were
critical of the Sandinista government.
Speaker 15 (19:00):
When I started attending groups that were interesting what was
going on, I followed very closely, and I went to
many meetings and I heard things that people were sending
weapons or even hunting rifles. I heard stories like that.
Speaker 1 (19:15):
The meetings were pretty informal. What could a bunch of
people sitting in the living room in Miami we do
about a government a thousand miles away. But then at
the end of nineteen eighty two, Tomorrow got a mysterious
phone call.
Speaker 15 (19:29):
He spoke with a very solemn or gravitas, like somebody
who has power or something. He said us speaking on
behalf of high authority of the government.
Speaker 1 (19:43):
The man said his name was Steve Davis, and he
invited Tomorrow to lunch.
Speaker 15 (19:48):
He already had chosen a restaur and we went there.
But he looked like a very sharp, well dressed like
politician or Washington executive or business executive. He was well dressed.
Speaker 1 (20:03):
Tomorrow came to believe that Steve Davis was an agent
of the CIA. He invited Chamorro to join the new
FDN Directorate, and Chamorrow accepted the offer. About a month later,
he and the other members of the Directorate gathered for
a press conference at a hotel near Fort Lauderdale. There
they would introduce the new Contra brand to the world.
Speaker 15 (20:31):
There was a long table with aposion. We all very
just stop. I had to buy best suit or best usual.
Speaker 13 (20:38):
You know.
Speaker 15 (20:39):
Everybody looked very sharp, and so it was like a
meeting for something in olive or something.
Speaker 1 (20:46):
The Americans overseeing the directorate briefed Tomorrow and the others
on what they should say to the public and more importantly,
what they absolutely should not say. The main thing was
to never, under any circumstances let it slip they had
received help or even been in contact with anyone from
the American government. At one point during the press conference,
(21:07):
a reporter asked whether the group had any supporters who
were fits in Nicaragua. We do have people, chamorro' said many.
Speaker 15 (21:15):
I knew all that I was not telling them the truth.
I mean, it was so fake in that sense, but
dous the way the American want us to do it.
Speaker 1 (21:26):
Soon, Chamorro moved to Honduras to be closer to where
most of the contras were based. At a salary of
two thousand dollars per month plus expenses, he was put
in charge of communications and pr Among his responsibilities was
giving interviews to international newspapers and TV reporters. He also
worked on propaganda. One of the most consequential projects Chamorro
(21:48):
helped with was an eighty eight page guide called Psychological
Operations in Guerrilla Warfare. It was intended for distribution among
contra leadership on the ground, but when Chamorro looked over
the final draft of the text, he was deeply disturbed.
Under the heading selective use of violence for propagandistic effects,
he read the following line, it is possible to neutralize
(22:12):
carefully selected and planned targets such as court judges, police
and state security officials.
Speaker 15 (22:19):
And I started reading the booklet and I got very upset.
It says very clearly neutralize, a word that sounds neutral,
but it's not neutral at all. It means eliminating people
who are capable, or leaders of unions or whatever. So
he wasn't recommending selective assassination.
Speaker 1 (22:39):
Tomorrow knew from that very first FDN press conference in
Florida that American agents might ask him to bite his
tongue or even lie in service of the contract. Cause
now Tomorrow just felt like a puppet of the US government.
That feeling was reinforced when in the middle of the
night on January fifth, nineteen eighty four, he was awakened
by a call from a CIA operative.
Speaker 15 (23:01):
It was a late at night. I was called and
I was told it was something very important I have
to do right now. Or who was an origin matter?
Speaker 1 (23:13):
The agent told Chamorrow that bombs had been placed in
Nicaraguan harbors. The idea had been to scare off commercial
ships from other countries that were doing business with the Sandinistas.
Chamorrow had to get on the radio right away and
announce on air that the contrast had been behind the operation.
Speaker 15 (23:31):
And then he gave me this page that I was
supposed to read. I was asked to cover it up. Basically.
Speaker 1 (23:39):
Three months later, the Wall Street Journal told the world
who was actually responsible for planning the harbor bombing operation.
Speaker 8 (23:46):
US government sources confirmed tonight that the Central Intelligence Agency
is actively directing the mining of Nicaragua harbors.
Speaker 7 (23:54):
The government of Nicaragua opened Puerto Corinto to foreign journalists.
Speaker 3 (23:58):
Today.
Speaker 1 (23:59):
Military leaders at the port say it.
Speaker 7 (24:01):
Was done to show the world that the US is
involved in so called terrorist acts.
Speaker 4 (24:05):
The mines have been removed.
Speaker 1 (24:07):
This was an enormous story. The harbor bombings were evidence
of direct military action taken by Americans in a foreign country.
Speaker 12 (24:15):
Suddenly, the law and order president is being attacked around
the world and even by members of his own party
as a man who has no respect for law and order.
Speaker 1 (24:22):
The backlash was swift and broad.
Speaker 12 (24:25):
Nicaragua and some Democratic Congressmen are saying that US involvement
with that mining of the Nicaragua Harbor's constitutes an act
of war.
Speaker 1 (24:33):
Even Barry Goldwater, the Republican Senator, was furious. Here's Doyle
McManus again.
Speaker 10 (24:39):
Barry Goldwater, the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, asked
the CIA what the hell was going on? And the
CIA's answer was, oh, we told you about this. And
Senator Goldwater was not happy because, as far as he knew,
he had never been told, and as far as most
of the members of the committee knew, they had never
(25:01):
been told. And Goldwater hit the ceiling.
Speaker 1 (25:06):
Goldwater wrote a letter to the director of the CIA
to express his frustration that Congress had not been informed
of the operation. It gets down to one little simple phrase,
Goldwater wrote, I am pissed off. This was not just
about the contras and whether they deserved America's support. It
was about the separation of powers between the executive branch
(25:26):
and Congress. Lawmakers had used the power of the purse
to impose restrictions from the president's foreign policy objectives, and
the president had gone ahead and pursued those objectives. Anyway,
the controversy would have been a major headache under any circumstances,
but this was erupting during Reagan's re election campaign.
Speaker 11 (25:45):
My fellow Americans, much has been made of late regarding
our proper role in Central America and in particular toward Nicaragua.
We cannot turn our backs on this crisis at our doorstep.
Speaker 1 (25:55):
The news went from bad to worse. A few days
before Reagan was set to debate his Democratic opponent, Walter Mondale,
the story of the Guerrilla Warfare Manual became public.
Speaker 7 (26:05):
Controversy mounted over a CIA manual that offers advice to
rebels on care billing officials in Nicaragua.
Speaker 8 (26:11):
In other words, that means assassination.
Speaker 1 (26:13):
It was reported that pages explaining how to carry out
political assassinations have been part of the original document, the
same pages that had horrified Edgar Chimorro. Despite his misgivings,
Chimorro defended the manual in front of the cameras.
Speaker 6 (26:28):
Rebel leader Edgar Chamorro says, in a guerrilla war sometimes
there's no choice for us.
Speaker 15 (26:33):
It's legal in our Catholic tradition to assassinate tiets.
Speaker 1 (26:39):
This prompted another flood of outrage. Here was documentary proof
that the US had a grand strategy to de stabilize Nicaragua,
a strategy that encouraged contrafighters to commit war crimes.
Speaker 6 (26:50):
Nicaragua and rebel leaders have now acknowledged that some of
the manual's tactics, including political assassination, were followed by the commandos.
Speaker 11 (26:57):
And that CIA officials not only knew about it, they
encouraged it.
Speaker 1 (27:02):
During the debate with Mondale, Reagan was caught off guard
by a question about the CIA's operations in Nicaragua. In response,
once the Great Communicator made a slip up that you
really have to hear to believe.
Speaker 14 (27:15):
Is this not, in effect our own states supported terrorism.
Speaker 11 (27:20):
No, I'm glad you asked that question, because I know
it's on many people's minds. We have a gentleman down
in Nicaragua who is on contract to the CIA, advising
supposedly on military tactics the Contras, and he drew up
this manual. It was turned over to the agency head
(27:41):
of the CIA in Nicaragua to be printed, and a
number of pages were excised by that agency head there,
the man in charge.
Speaker 7 (27:51):
Mister President, you are implying, then, that the CIA in
Nicaragua is directing the contras there.
Speaker 11 (27:57):
I'm afraid I misspoke when I said a CIA head
in Nicaragua. There's not someone there directing all of this activity.
Speaker 1 (28:04):
The Reagan campaign's internal polling numbers that night were a disaster,
but by the end of the week, nearly every poll
showed that Reagan had won the debate, in part because
the CIA exchange had been overshadowed by a much more
memorable one.
Speaker 11 (28:19):
I will not make age an issue of this campaign.
I am not going to exploit for political purposes my
opponent's youth and inexperience.
Speaker 1 (28:34):
In the end, Reagan was re elected by an astounding margin.
He won forty nine out of the fifty states.
Speaker 11 (28:41):
A jubilant President Reagan today is savory and a re
election mandate of near record proportions.
Speaker 14 (28:46):
Mister Reagan came just shy of the fifty states sweets.
Speaker 1 (28:49):
But by this point lawmakers had already made their displeasure
with Reagan known. In response to the Harbour bombing operation,
Congress had strengthened the Bowland Amendments for the upcoming fiscal year.
Speaker 10 (29:00):
The second Bowland Amendment basically said no money, no weapons,
no indirect aid, no advice, no nothing. The intelligence age
of the United States cannot get involved in this war,
and that presented the Reagan administration with a terrible problem.
The people the President wanted to support in Nicaragua had
(29:23):
no more access to the CIA or any other American
intelligence agency for help what to.
Speaker 1 (29:29):
Do, But some members of the administration saw that as
another door left slightly open. The new and improved Bonone
Amendment specifically barred US intelligence agencies from supporting the conference,
but what exactly was the definition of an intelligence agency.
(29:50):
We'll be right back. By the end of nineteen eighty four,
Oliver North was a rising star on the National Security
Council staff. He'd been assigned to the NFC in nineteen
eighty one, partly because Reagan was trying to shrink the
cost of the federal government, and it was cheaper to
(30:10):
deputize military personnel than to hire new political staffers. North
was inexperienced and overextended, but he worked harder and longer
than almost anyone else to get up to speed. North
wanted to be the guy who could be relied on
to accomplish any task as superiors put in front of him.
He wanted to be indispensable. Here is Anne Roe, the
(30:32):
obituari's editor of The Economist, an author of the book Lives,
Lives and the Iran Contra Affair.
Speaker 16 (30:38):
In his notebook, there's a rather nice little reference to
Isaiah six', eight the part where the lord, says who
AM i going to? Find who SHALL i? Send and
the obedient servant, says, HERE i am send. Me and
that was Something north was aware of all the. Time
he'd be the man who'd be available to, send and
he would.
Speaker 1 (31:00):
Obey roe says that When north started at THE, nsc
he thought he'd be stuck in his office doing boring administrative.
Work but now he saw wo how he could be
involved in the exciting parts of foreign.
Speaker 16 (31:12):
Policy he had an, office a set up completely like
secret agent's, office with the codes on the, door and
the five telephones and the secure, phone and the tempered
glass in the, windows and the huge, safe and heaven
knows what was in the.
Speaker 1 (31:26):
Safe with the Second Bolon amendment about to go into,
effect The reagan administration needed someone who wasn't involved in
official intelligence activities to be in charge of organizing The.
Contras in their narrow reading of The New Bowlan, amendment
The National Security council wasn't technically an intelligence, agency so
they thought setting up shop in THE nsc was the
(31:48):
perfect way to get around the, restrictions And Oliver north
seemed like the right man for the.
Speaker 16 (31:52):
Job norles had maps Of managua maps At nicaragua up
on his. Wall he would talk about how they were
going to be In monagula By. Christmas he was in
a way directing the battle from his. Desk as he.
Speaker 1 (32:05):
Said north was put in charge of supplying The contra
with money for, weapons food and other, supplies but Without congressional,
funding the money had to come from somewhere. Else one
solution was to solicit donations from foreign. Countries these efforts
by The White house yielded huge piles of, cash including
(32:26):
millions of dollars From Saudi arabia and a ten million
dollar donation from The sultan Of. Brunei unfortunately for The,
contras that money was accidentally sent to the Wrong Swiss
bank account Because, north secretary wrote down the wrong routing.
Number another Way north got around The Bowland amendment was
by soliciting funds from, regular, old Wealthy. Republicans THE us
(32:48):
government wasn't allowed to pay for The contra's, weapons But
congress hadn't said anything about private. Citizens So north set
about wooing potential donors who believed in The contra's freedom fighting.
Cause to that, end he worked with a nonprofit called THE,
nepl The National endowment for The preservation Of. LIBERTY a
man Named carl Spitz channel from THE npl made the diligoustical.
(33:10):
Arrangements north was the.
Speaker 16 (33:12):
Salesman these donors were particularly an interesting group of, people
and there's a whole group of true believers who are
generally quite elderly and female and very.
Speaker 1 (33:23):
Rich one of those donors Was Ellen, garwood and she
was indeed, elderly, female and very. Rich garwood's anti communist
philanthropy was inspired by her, father who had worked in
The truman administration and was one of the architects of
The Marshall.
Speaker 16 (33:41):
Plan they'd taken out for drinks And north joined them
in somewhere like the Hay Addams.
Speaker 1 (33:46):
Hotel Here's garwood in nineteen eighty seven speaking about her
experience as A contra.
Speaker 7 (33:51):
DONOR i met with him at the Hay Adams hotel
in the. Evening after, dinner The.
Speaker 16 (33:57):
North would talk about the desperate plight of the.
Speaker 7 (33:59):
Contrast he said that they were in such a bad
condition that they were out of, food madisone other, necessities
and also practically out of. Weapons they might cease to
exist if something weren't done about these various.
Speaker 16 (34:15):
Needs he then decides he'll, go but before he, goes
he just slides a weapons price list onto the, table the.
Speaker 7 (34:23):
List of weapons that they. NEEDED i love that the
list had different categories of, weapons had hand, GRENADES i, remember,
bullets cartridge, belts possibly surface to air, missiles and there
were quantities opposite each. Category and after that there was
(34:45):
a sum of money that was needed in order to
provide those weapons that those weapons would.
Speaker 1 (34:51):
Cost the idea of helping The contras was as thrilling
to the donors as it was To.
Speaker 16 (34:56):
NORTH i love the idea of these blue rinsed women
who know buying weapons to give to The. Contras and
one of them was so enthusiastic she wanted her name
put on a missile.
Speaker 1 (35:10):
Potential donors were invited to attend special briefings in the
Old Executive office. Building north would give a slideshow presentation
showing photographs of The contras and the conditions they, faced
often including an image of A contra grave marked with a.
Cross some donors were so moved that they, cried but
they weren't always giving only out of the goodness of their.
Speaker 16 (35:31):
Hearts if you gave more than three hundred thousand, dollars
you got an audience in The Oval office for fifteen,
minutes often one on. One and it's so interesting to.
Read how you know they went in there and really
Told reagan what they thought he ought to be doing
on foreign. Policy you, know it's the moment when citizens
and complete demeateurs are trying to make foreign policy and
(35:52):
shape it. Themselves they get the air of the president
and they tell him what he what he should.
Speaker 1 (35:56):
Do the fundraising pitch painted The contra war as a
black and white, conflict a fight between democracy and, communism
good and, evil and that wasn't just a. Story north
And reagan told donors to try to get them to give.
Money it was a story they. Believed, meanwhile down In,
honduras some of The contras were making it awfully hard
(36:19):
to root for. Them here is An american nun who
lived In nicaragua talking to A tv reporter about the
lawless brutality of The.
Speaker 14 (36:26):
Contras when we first came, here we visited forty eight.
Communities now we only visit thirty eight because the communities
have been wiped. Out many people have frightened as a
result of contractivity in this.
Speaker 1 (36:39):
Area Edward chamorro couldn't stomach these, tactics and after just
a few years with THE fdn he grew profoundly.
Speaker 15 (36:46):
Disillusioned part of my thing was the credibility. Problem how
we were committing.
Speaker 1 (36:52):
Atrocities according To, chamorrow the contras were murdering, civilians raping,
women and destroying entire.
Speaker 15 (37:00):
VILLAGES i don't believe in the anglify the. MEANS i
believe the means and the ends have to be.
Speaker 1 (37:05):
Good chamorrow parted ways with THE fdn in nineteen eighty.
Four he returned to his family In miami and started
sharing his experiences with the.
Speaker 15 (37:14):
Press this policy has not, work and direcord of The
contra is not. GOOD i think it's time to look
for a better and cleaner.
Speaker 1 (37:24):
Approach chamorrow later settled In massachusetts and became a. Teacher,
Meanwhile Victoria Gonzales rivera moved To michigan with her. Mother
it was hard for her to hear people In america
talk About nicaragua as some, hypothetical far away, place as
if the war was just part of a political, argument
(37:46):
and she was shocked by how Little americans seemed to
know about what was really going.
Speaker 4 (37:50):
ON i felt that people in THE us were not just,
uninformed but were just so, naive very very. Naive people
wanted it to be a black and white. Story they
wanted it to, be you, know good guys and bad. Guys,
right over two percent Of nicaraua's population died between in
(38:10):
the mid seventies and nineteen Ninety and what you see
is just this, continuous CONTINUOUS us military and political and
financial involvement in this, tiny tiny. Country and it just
makes you, wonder like, why you, know what have Nicarong
(38:30):
ones done to deserve? This and there is no, answer you,
know as a nicarague and as a, historian there is no.
Speaker 1 (38:39):
Answer by the summer of nineteen eighty, Five Oliver north's
secret campaign to funnel, money, weapons and supplies to The
contras was going full steam, ahead but it wasn't quite
a secret as he. Thought here again Is doyle.
Speaker 10 (38:56):
McManus there were enough reporters In washington following The Contra
war that they began to realize That Ali north had
something to do with. It they didn't know exactly what it,
was but in the middle of nineteen eighty five a
number of articles in newspapers said That Ollie north and
The White house were somehow involved with The, contras and
(39:18):
at that Point congress got.
Speaker 1 (39:20):
Interested members Of congress started writing letters To National Security
Advisor bud McFarlane asking what exactly was going on With
Oliver north and whether THE nsc was violating The Boland.
Speaker 10 (39:33):
Amendment and McFarlane sat down and wrote a formal, reply
and it, said in, PART i can state with deep
personal conviction that at no time DID i or any
member of THE nsc staff violate the letter or spirit
of the. Law these were breathtakingly false. Denials he knew
(39:53):
that what he was writing was a.
Speaker 1 (39:55):
Lie McFarlane met with members of The House Intelligence committee in,
person and his responses reassured the committee chairman that everything
was above. Board after their, meeting the chairman told, McFarlane
i for one am willing to take you at Your
(40:21):
on the next episode Of, Fiasco Oliver north And bud
McFarlane lead A us delegation on a risky secret operation
into the heart Of.
Speaker 4 (40:30):
IRAN i later learned that he and McFarlane had suicide
pills AND i had nothing.
Speaker 1 (40:38):
For a list of, books articles and documentaries we used
in our research follow the link in the show. Notes
fiasco is a production Of Prolog projects and it's distributed
By Pushkin. Industries the show is produced By Andrew, Parsons
Madeline Kaplan ulakulpa and Me Leon. Mathock our editor Was Camilla.
Hammer our researcher Was Francis. Carr additional archival research From Caitlin.
(41:01):
Nicholas our music is By Nick. Silvester our theme song
is By Spatial. Relations our artwork is By Teddy blanks
At chips And. Water audio mixed By Rob, Buyers Michael
rayphiel And Johnny Vince. Evans copyright council provided By Peter
yassi At Yass BUTLER. Poc thanks To Sam, Graham, Felsen
(41:21):
Siria shockley And katchik And. Kova special thanks To luminary
and thank you for.
Speaker 7 (41:26):
Listening