July 30, 2025 • 37 mins
Since rockstar interviewer Mishal Husain joined Bloomberg earlier this year, she’s grilled the likes of Elon Musk and Keir Starmer. Now, she’s set her sights on Australia. This week on the Bloomberg Australia Podcast, Mishal sits down with Malcolm Turnbull, who as you might expect has a fair bit to say about his old mate US President Donald Trump. Mishal also asks our former Prime Minister his thoughts on US tariffs, China and the way forward for the AUKUS pact.
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Speaker 1 (00:02):
Welcome to the Bloomberg Australia Podcast. I'm Rebecca Jones. Since
legendary interviewer Michelle Hussein joined Bloomberger earlier this year, she's
grilled the likes of Elong Musk and Cursed Armer, and
now she's set her sights on Australia. This week, Michelle
sits down with Malcolm Turnbull, who, as you might expect,
has a fair bit to say about his old mate,
(00:24):
US President Donald Trump. Michelle also asks our former PM
his thoughts on US tariffs, China and the way forward
for orcis. Here's an edited version of that conversation Michelle
Hussain with Malcolm Turnbull.
Speaker 2 (00:40):
Given we do have another tariff deadline approaching, what do
you think is going to happen in the run up
to that? What do you think that deadline means?
Speaker 3 (00:51):
Well, it's very hard to tell. With Donald Trump, he's
so mercurial. His goal is to secure wins, so some concession,
some arrangement that he can say is a win for him.
But the one thing that is very clear is that
the average tariff rate that the United States is imposing
(01:13):
keeps on inching upwards, and it is likely to settle
overall at at least twenty percent, So this will be
the highest tariffs in a century, and according to say
the Peterson Institute's estimates, will add an average annual cost
of about twenty five hundred US dollars per household.
Speaker 2 (01:36):
So that is a new reality. Then that in a
way it means perhaps governments, including Australia, shouldn't be scrambling
too hard or there's a limit to what they can
do to try and negotiate this down. Are you saying
this is going to be a new reality of tariffs
and higher tariffs and international trade.
Speaker 4 (01:53):
Absolutely.
Speaker 3 (01:53):
When I was dealing with Trump in the first administration
and I secured an exemption for Australia from steel and
aluminium tariffs, his goal was largely to get what he
regarded as reciprocity, so a level playing field. That's at
least what he was saying. And of course it was
(02:16):
easy for me to make that argument because Australia has
a free trade agreement with the United States. There are
no tariffs on American imports to Australia, no barriers to investment,
and they have a big trade surplus. So as I
said to Donald many times, you can't get a better
deal than this.
Speaker 4 (02:33):
This is a fantastic deal. How can you improve on it?
Speaker 3 (02:36):
The difference today is that he has two additional goals,
one which he had before in the background, and the
other one which didn't really feature the one he had
in the background, was reindustrialization, where he thinks he can
use tariffs to create well, to create a tariff wall,
protectionist wall, so that people will move their factories and
(02:59):
industries into the United States and thereby avoid the tariff.
And that's the point he makes all the time in
every one of these letters, you know, which are written
with so many capitalized nouns. He says, you won't have
to pay any tariffs if you move to America. That
was there in the first administration, but not to a
great extent. But that big feature now. The second one, however,
(03:23):
which is first and foremost, is revenue raising, and so
he is seeing this the tariffs as a way of
raising additional revenues for the US government. And of course
it's ultimately it's going to be paid by American consumers.
We know that, but he doesn't seem to acknowledge that
Americans will find out. But he, you know, in receipts
(03:46):
from tariff's you know, customs receipts have shot up, as
of course they would, because America's average rate of tariffs
before Trump started this exercise was you know, two or
three percent across the board.
Speaker 2 (04:03):
I wonder, more broadly, how you feel about all of
this politically, And I asked that because ideologically you ought
to share a lot with Donald Trump. You are a
center right conservative, that's the tradition you come from. I
assume that you have had and probably still have friends
in the Republican Party. So what do you think happened
(04:26):
to the Republicans.
Speaker 3 (04:27):
Well, it's been taken over by Trump. I mean, it's
you can call it a personality cult if you like,
but it is he has taken it over. And Donald Trump,
whatever you want to call him, is not a conservative,
and he is certainly not a centrist. You know, his
political movement is based overwhelmingly on his personality, and it
(04:49):
is and it is founded or grounded in a series
of notions about American primacy and America priority, some of
which are frankly from an economic point of view, fallacious, such.
Speaker 4 (05:04):
As his views on trade.
Speaker 3 (05:05):
I mean, he thinks if America has a trade deficit
for the country America is losing.
Speaker 4 (05:10):
If it has a surplus, it's winning.
Speaker 3 (05:12):
Well, you know, given the lack of savings in the
United States and the fact that you need foreigners to
finance it, it's inevitable that they're going to have a
trade deficit with the rest of the world. But the
bottom line is that he does not accept notions of
comparative advantage, which was Adam Smith throwit about.
Speaker 4 (05:35):
Hundreds of years ago.
Speaker 3 (05:36):
So when Trump and I would meet with Shinzo Abe,
then the Prime Minister of Japan, he would berate Shinzo
for the trade surplus that Japan has for the United States,
and he would complain about that, and I would say
I did so on one occasion publicly, I'd say, well, Donald,
you know you have a trade surplus with us, we
(05:59):
have a trade surp with Japan. They have a trade
surplus with you. But none of that is unfair. But
he was having none of it. He's had these views
at least since the nineteen eighties, and now he.
Speaker 4 (06:12):
Is in the position to implement them.
Speaker 3 (06:14):
The problems with this approach shall four America's allies like Australia,
is that his goal and it is an avowed goal,
he makes no bones about it is to enrich the
United States, to make America rich again, as he says,
at the expense of other countries, whether they are friends
(06:36):
or rivals.
Speaker 4 (06:37):
And so from our.
Speaker 3 (06:38):
Point of view in Australia, we deeply resent having tariffs,
any tariffs imposed on us, because we say that is
in breach of the free trade agreement we have. And
of course Trump, just in case you missed the message
that he believes that might is right and that the
strong should be able to do what they will while
(07:00):
the weak suffer as they must, he adds in his
letters this proviso, he said, I am imposing on you,
right to one country or another, this tariff on the
basis that you impose no tariffs on American imports into
your country, and if you dare to retaliate, I will
increase the tariff on your goods by the amount you
(07:22):
impose on ours.
Speaker 4 (07:24):
So do you this is strong man politics?
Speaker 2 (07:27):
And are you confident that that brand of politics won't
have currency in Australia in the future because your party
recently lost an election with a candidate who had Trump
style messages. Not exactly making Australia great again, but wanting
to return Australia to what it was, and he was
(07:49):
roundly defeated. And something similar happened in Canada.
Speaker 3 (07:53):
Well, I think there are two different cases. In Canada,
it was pretty clear, as you know, the Liberal Party
in Canada, which is the center left party, was absolutely
on the ropes, ready to be wiped out. Trump declared
economic war on Canada, the imposed or threatened massive tariff,
(08:14):
said Canada should be the fifty first state. They changed
the leader to Mark Carney, the former Governor of the
Bank of England, and miraculously they won the election.
Speaker 4 (08:25):
And that was a reaction.
Speaker 3 (08:28):
Canadians got together and they said no to Trump's bullying
and that's why Mark is Prime Minister of Canada. In Australia,
we weren't suffering coercion or bullying of that card.
Speaker 4 (08:38):
Yes, there've been some tariffs.
Speaker 3 (08:40):
I think the problem that the Liberal Party in which
in Australia confusingly is the center right party my party
under led by Peter Dutton now or was led by
Peter Dutton. Since I ceased to be the leader in
twenty eighteen, it has moved further and further to the right.
(09:01):
And when I say further, to the right. It has
moved further and further into that right wing populist anger
tainment media ecosystem that you see on the right, much
but not all of which is owned by Rupert Murdoch.
You know, the big example is Fox News, of course,
in the United States, here there's the Murdock's owner cable
(09:25):
TV service called Sky News, very different to the one
in the UK made at which is similarly aligned or inclined.
And so if you decide in our system that your
goal politically is to win the approbation of that right
wing angertainment media ecosystem, you are at great risk of
(09:51):
losing the center. You see, in Australia, we have compulsory voting,
so well over ninety percent of the people in Australia
vote at an election, and we have preferential voting what
Americans called ranked choice voting, and that brings our politics,
our electoral politics, to the center. So if you're running
(10:11):
off to the right or indeed to the left, you
run the risk of either independence coming through the center
and taking your safest seats, which is what has happened
to the larger Liberal Party in Australia, or just simply
centrists moving to the other team, and that's basically what happened,
and it was a wipeout. So the right wing of
(10:34):
the party, both inside the party and in Murdoch Media,
who were behind the machinations that brought my prime ministership
to an end, finally got what they wanted. They got
control of the party, they got the leader, they wanted
complete control, and they burnt it to the ground. And
that's a great lesson. So we're so lucky in Australia
(10:59):
to have an electoral system that brings politics to the center.
And I think I think America would be a better
would have a better democracy if its electoral system was
rather different, but the chances of that being reformed are
pretty slim.
Speaker 2 (11:16):
You've said that Donald Trump today is different from how
he was in his first term when you were dealing
with him. In fact, one of his early calls after
his first inauguration was with you, and that was that
that was a tricky one, so you had you had
a taste of it. But you're saying he's got it.
(11:37):
You know, he's got different imperatives and extra goals this
time around. So if you were in office now as
the Australian Prime Minister, might you be deploying flattery because
that does seem to work, whether it's Keir Starmer brandishing
a handwritten letter from the King in the Oval Office,
or whether it's Mark Ritter of NATO sending him extremely
(12:00):
flattering WhatsApp messages.
Speaker 3 (12:04):
Well, look, we didn't work for me. I mean that
I tried. What worked for me was standing up to Trump.
As you know, I had done a deal. I had
not done a deal. It was an agreement. It was
a written agreement between the Australia and the United States
to resettle refugees in the United States, and Trump wanted
to reneg on it, and we had a huge argument
(12:26):
about it. He became very incensed and furious and he
I guess the call started off with him saying no way,
Jose and ended up saying yes, I hate you.
Speaker 2 (12:40):
You know.
Speaker 3 (12:40):
He was furious that the call was the worst one
he'd had all day and so forth.
Speaker 4 (12:45):
He was very angry. But after that we got on
very well.
Speaker 3 (12:49):
The reason we got on very well because he respected
me because I'd stood up to him. The problem with
all the flattery and the sicker fancy and if it
just goes on at the surface and it's just for show,
you know, what, you know, just the kind of social
social courtesy. If it goes beyond that, he will recognize
(13:10):
weakness and he will exploit it. And so that's why
people who suck up to bullies invariably get bullied more so,
I think you have I think with Trump, there's no
point trying to be rude to him or punch him
in the nose or anything like that. You've got to
be strong, courteous, respectful, but above all stand up for
(13:32):
yourself because that's what he respects.
Speaker 4 (13:33):
That's what he does.
Speaker 3 (13:35):
I mean, think about this, Michelle jd Vance, who is
if you like the future of the Marga movement and
you know, certainly a perhaps are more openly thoughtful proponent
of margarism than Trump. Jd Vance has praised General Charles
(13:55):
de Gaull for having ensured in the nineteen sixties, in
the face of enormous American opposition, that France retained its
sovereignty and its own control over its own military capabilities
and above all, over its own nuclear deterrant, whereas the.
Speaker 4 (14:13):
United Kingdom did not.
Speaker 3 (14:15):
The US, the UK's nuclear deterrant really cannot be operated
without the concurrence of the United States. So de Gaul
was notoriously prickly and difficult as far as the Americans
were concerned. This is presidents Kennedy and Johnson. But here
is Vance saying, I respect to Gaul, because he stood
(14:36):
up for France. He put France first, and he said
in that same interview that there is no why should
any European country be a permanent vassal of the United States.
So this is so you know, look, Mark Ruter may
have got through and I know Mark who He's a
very brilliant guy and so forth, that may have got
(14:57):
through a particular difficult point. But the key message for
the Europeans is, and this is the message both from
Washington and in their own self interest, is to be
self reliant and not be dependent on the US. You know,
it's not I mean, the MARGA movement America First is
(15:18):
not seeking American primacy in the world. They feel they're
entitled to that. But what they are expecting their allies
to do is to be more self reliant.
Speaker 2 (15:30):
Donald Trump hasn't forgotten certainly hasn't forgotten you, has he
when you said something a Bloomberg TV interview earlier. This
year that he didn't like about America creating an opportunity
for China. Ended up calling you a weak and ineffective leader,
and they're essentially saying that that's why you lost power
in Australia.
Speaker 3 (15:50):
Yeah, well, I think he found me to be both
strong and effective. That's so he's No, he was, he
just he was obviously watching the Bloomberg interview.
Speaker 4 (16:02):
It was quite funny, Michelle.
Speaker 3 (16:03):
I mean I'd made some observations which I thought were
pretty mundane, to be honest, namely that China will take
advantage of this and seek to be go on a
charm offensive, seek to promote themselves as defenders of free
and open markets and free trade and international rules based order,
(16:25):
which is exactly what they are.
Speaker 4 (16:26):
Doing, of course. And he found that offense.
Speaker 3 (16:29):
He was watching it in Washington and fired off this
post on truth Social But it was posted just as
literally only just taken my microphone off my jacket and
it was up online. So it's good instant feedback, but
just shows how many people watch Bloomberg.
Speaker 2 (16:48):
Well, speaking of China, is the effect of all of
this to push Canberra more towards Beijing.
Speaker 3 (16:55):
No, I think the Australia does not want to be
enlisted in an American campaign against China. I mean Emmanuel Macron,
who I admire a great deal, spoke very well about
this at the Shangri La conference recently in Singapore where
he said, and he was really talking about France and
(17:17):
other nations if you late Middle Powers, that is to say,
nations other than China and the US should neither be
enlisted nor bullied. So what we You know, it's in
our interest and as it is in the United Kingdoms,
to preserve our sovereign autonomy and be able to chart
(17:43):
our own course. Now you know, clearly our security partner,
you know, the sheet anchor, as they say, of our
security arrangements in the United States, is our alliance in
Australia is our alliance with the United States. But we
do not want to be enlisted in some proactive campaign
to slow Chinese growth, to inhibit the Chinese economy. I mean, yes,
(18:08):
would we would push back against economic coercion or indeed
physical kinetic coercion.
Speaker 4 (18:16):
But from Australia's.
Speaker 3 (18:17):
Point of view, we're in this region. China is our
largest trading partner. You know, there are one and a
half million Australians of Chinese heritage. This is our part
of the world where we live. China is the largest
single nation in it, if you like, the largest single
cultural influence in this part of the world, and has
(18:38):
been for thousands of years. So we you know, we
live with that, we work with that. But our critical
obligation in Australia, and this is what every nation's critical
obligation should be, is to stand up for their own rights.
That's why I say, in many respects, our America's allies
(18:58):
need to be more like Tonald Trump, not in the
sense of running off on all of the you know,
the extreme rhetoric and braggadocio, but simply to be putting
their country first, but in a very clear eyed way.
Speaker 4 (19:13):
And that's why we shouldn't.
Speaker 3 (19:14):
Be able to do more to defend ourselves. And in
a circumstance we don't have the Americans.
Speaker 2 (19:20):
Okay, and I want to get to that, but I
also want to put to you a couple of scenarios
and they're not completely hypothetical because we live in we
live in a world where China has twice I think
done li fire exercises off the Australian coast, but if
there was a crisis over Taiwan tomorrow, how would Australia respond.
Speaker 3 (19:43):
Well, the first question you've got to ask is what
is the crisis and how is the United States responding?
I mean, if there was if there was a war
in the Pacific between the United States and China that
began over tai w on the Australia, you no Australian
(20:04):
government would make a commitment, but you could as an outsider,
you could reasonably expect Australia to be.
Speaker 4 (20:11):
Aligned on America's side.
Speaker 3 (20:13):
You know, we have a treaty, the Answers Treaty with
the Americans, and it's certainly in visages that if either
party were attacked in the Pacific, the other would come
to their assistance. But you know, how much do we
have to know? There's a lot of complexity here, and
(20:35):
you know, I mean it is Alban Easy was just
just being in China and he was right to push
back against people saying to him, you should guarantee that
you know, why aren't you guaranteeing that you would, you know,
fight to defend Taiwan when no American president has given
that guarantee. I mean, the United States official position and
(20:57):
Donald Biden sort of wobbled on this. But Trump's explicit position,
including given in an interview to Bloomberg I Madter on
this is not to make a commitment to defend Taiwan,
and in fact, he's expressed the view again to Bloomberg
that Taiwan may well be indefensible because of its proximity
(21:21):
to China. So, you know, I don't I think that's well,
I guess that's that is my answer. I mean, you're
dealing with the question to Australia is asking for a
hypothetical on a hypothetical.
Speaker 2 (21:35):
Well, except that the Pentagon officials have confirmed that they
would like a clarification from Australia and Japan about what
they would do in the event of a conflict with
China over Taiwan, and they're asking for that at the
set from Australia at the same time as they're reviewing
the Orca submarine deal.
Speaker 3 (21:53):
Yeah, well, I think that I think leaving Japan to
one side, Michelle, the US submarine deal has got It
was a very bad deal for Australia, right, it was
very unfair to Australia.
Speaker 4 (22:10):
It's scrapped.
Speaker 2 (22:10):
The deal that you had reached to buy submarines from
the French scrap.
Speaker 3 (22:14):
The partnership we had was the partnership. We were building
submarines in a partnership with France. Yes, But the difference
there was we were in control of our own destiny.
You know, we'd acquired the IP, we had the shipyard,
we were building, going to build a subject. The problem
with the orcus well they call aucust pillar one about
submarines is that the longer term plan is to have
(22:37):
a partnership with the United Kingdom to build submarines, the
first of which would be likely delivered sometime in the
twenty forties. Now this submarine, this new submarine, has not
even been finally designed yet.
Speaker 4 (22:52):
It's a very long way off.
Speaker 3 (22:53):
It could be it could be twenty fifties for all.
You know, these projects tend to run late. They tend
to be later and more expensive than planned. So because
of that decision, the Australia's existing fleet of submarines is
getting very old and it would have a what they
call a capability gap, a period in which we'd have
no submarines at all. So the Americans generously said, we
(23:19):
will sell you a number of secondhand Virginia class submarines,
which is their current attack submarine SSNs, and several new ones.
If you haven't got your own submarine production up and running,
then so we'll help out. But they put a very
big proviso on this, which is in the aucust legislation,
(23:42):
which is that before any submarines sold to Australia, the
President of the United States has to certify that the
sale would not degrade the undersea capabilities of the US Navy. Now,
they are currently about twenty submarines of this type short
of what they believe they need, and their industry, despite
(24:04):
a lot of money being spent and a lot of efforts,
has not been able to lift its production rate such
that they're currently producing about half as many as they
need simply to meet their own requirements, let alone any
subs for Australia. So the point that Bridge Colby, the
Undersecretary of the Defense, has made before he was under secretary,
(24:26):
and indeed he made this point in his confirmation hearings,
is that if the United States is short of these submarines,
and they are the most valuable and strategically important and
survivable assets in their navy, if they're short of these submarines,
how can they responsibly transfer them to anyone, even to
a friend. And so this is why I say the
(24:49):
aucest Pillar hun deal is a bad deal, because you're
sure we're giving money to the Americans to support their industry.
We're building a base a submarine based in Western Australia
for the US Navy, spending millions of dollars on it.
Speaker 4 (25:01):
But we could very.
Speaker 3 (25:03):
Likely, I think almost certainly, we'll end up with no
submarines at least for a very very long time.
Speaker 1 (25:08):
You're listening to Michelle Hussain, editor at Large for Bloomberg Weekends,
conversation with former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. You'll hear
part two of that conversation in just a moment. This
is the Bloomberg Australia Podcast. Welcome back to the Bloomberg
(25:28):
Australia Podcast. I'm Rebecca Jones. Here is the rest of
the conversation between a Bloomberg Weekend editor at Large Michelle
Hussain and former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull.
Speaker 2 (25:41):
Let's say the submarines materialize at whatever point in the future,
and America wants Australia to use them to patrol the
Strait of Taiwan.
Speaker 3 (25:51):
Acceptable well, Australian submarines do operate in the South China
see already and they operate.
Speaker 4 (26:00):
Work with closely.
Speaker 3 (26:02):
You know, there's a high degree of interoperability with the
United States, and we work closely with the US and
other allies and partners across the Pacific already, so that
happens all the time. Now the question is that you know,
what do you do in the event of a conflict.
Speaker 4 (26:18):
And look, the.
Speaker 3 (26:19):
Reality is Australia if there were a full blown war
with China, which did not hopefully did not turn into
a nuclear walk so it turned into a nuclear war,
maybe curtains for all of us. But if there was
a full blown war with China, it is likely that
Australian territory will be attacked because there are American bases
(26:41):
or the Australian bases but used by American forces on
Australian soil. You know, there are very important satellite communication
listening posts in Australia and other facilities of marines in
the northern territory are the naval ships in Western Australia.
Speaker 4 (27:00):
It is likely that Australia.
Speaker 3 (27:01):
Would be drawn into that conflict inevitably. But the you
know the I mean, what is Australia's objective. But let's
just leaving aside what America might wanted to Australia's objective
is to have no conflict in this region. Australia's objective
is not should not be to support American primacy in
the region, such as might have been the case twenty
(27:23):
years ago or thirty years ago. Our objective should be
to ensure that the United States remains engaged. That's important,
but that there is a balance and so that so
that we maintain a region where Leqwan used much quoted words,
you know, the big fish can't eat the little fish,
and the little fish can't eat the shrimps, and we
(27:44):
all managed to get along with each other, respecting our respective.
Speaker 4 (27:50):
Autonomy.
Speaker 2 (27:51):
But is the effect of the last few months that
China is getting bigger and more powerful and therefore there
we're looking at. Is Chinese supremacy in the region.
Speaker 4 (28:03):
Well, I don't know.
Speaker 3 (28:05):
I don't think it's Chinese supremacy, And certainly China is
more powerful. If you look at this hemisphere, you've got Japan,
the third largest national economy.
Speaker 4 (28:15):
In the world.
Speaker 3 (28:16):
Still, I believe you've got South Korea also in the
G twenty. You know, you've got Indonesia, the largest Muslim
majority country in the world, and I think the fourth
largest by population, the third largest by population, and the
host of other important economies and countries, including Australia of course,
(28:38):
So I don't think China is in a position to
become the sole unchallenged henchament in this region.
Speaker 2 (28:46):
Yeah, and this point about self reliance in Australian's sovereignty,
which you're emphasizing. You've also called for an Australia first
approach to defense, and yet the realities are that your
country is a middle power and it spends less than
two percent of GDP on defense. Even in another decade,
that's not going to change a huge amount. It's not
(29:06):
going to go much beyond two percent.
Speaker 4 (29:10):
Yeah, but I agree, yes, not.
Speaker 2 (29:11):
But the trajectory is not like what NATO is now
committed to. And then if I wonder, how realistic is
it to think that Australia can look after its own
interest to a greater extent in a world where America
is not the partner it was.
Speaker 4 (29:29):
Well it is. It's clearly better.
Speaker 3 (29:31):
We're stronger with allies and partners, but at the end
of the day, you have to be able to do
what you can to defend yourself. And that's why when
you're spending money on military capabilities, you have to be
asking whether these are capabilities that are designed to support,
(29:52):
for example, the US Navy and operations off the China coast,
or whether they are capabilities that are designed long range
strike capabilities, which may include submarines, which are designed to
keep any adversary at arm's length. So it's the question.
There is an unfortunate tendency in Australia for too many
(30:20):
people to think that the best definition of Australian national
security or even Australian patriotism is to be more and
more tightly zipped onto the United States. And that is
a dependency that the United States can neither deliver, nor
(30:42):
is it one that they want or welcome. And this
is the point that JD. Vance has made, and Bridge
Colby has made this point also before he was Under Secretary,
that the United States has in the past in effect
encouraged its allies to become dependent on them, a little
bit like a parent that doesn't really want the children
(31:04):
to leave home and encourages them to stick around at home,
when in fact they should be saying, off you go,
you know, time to do your own thing, and the
you know, it's it Vitally, we do not lose respect
in Washington if we are seen to be in fighting
(31:25):
for our own corner and focused on our own interests,
because that is absolutely what the American President is doing
for his country and he respects.
Speaker 4 (31:35):
I mean, look at the leaders that he respects, whether
you like them or not.
Speaker 3 (31:39):
The other leaders around the world that he respects and
pays great attention to, ones who are ruthlessly, often brutally,
are determined to defend their own country's interests as they
see them putin you mean, well sech thing.
Speaker 4 (32:01):
Letting take that in the out.
Speaker 3 (32:02):
I mean it's you know, brutal is probably an understatement,
but the although you know, he wouldn't cavil at.
Speaker 4 (32:10):
That, I imagine.
Speaker 3 (32:11):
But the point I'm making is that you there's no
point going to Washington. I mean, I know people have
been going there flattering Trump and so forth. Personally, I
think it's a waste of time. I mean, on the
real capital, they regard difference as theirs, it's as their.
Speaker 2 (32:30):
Due so one more thought on defense before we before
we move on and wrap up, which is that is
one possible lesson on this that Australia first in defense
might have to mean nuclear weapons. I know you've said
in the past that the capacity or the capability isn't
(32:52):
there even if it wanted to, but it is one
way that smaller nations have had to be taken very
seriously on the world stage.
Speaker 4 (33:04):
Mi Charlotte's that's a really good question. And the you.
Speaker 3 (33:10):
Know, prolifer nuclear proliferation in this region has been really
limited to I'm talking about East Asia being limited to
North Korea. But the countries that are close to the
United States, like Japan and South Korea, for example, who
certainly have the capacity nuclear industries and certainly would have
(33:33):
the capacity to develop nuclear weapons very quickly, have not
done so because they feel protected by the American nuclear umbrella.
If they felt that protection, that support was unreliable or
couldn't be counted on, then I think they would move
(33:54):
to nuclear weapons very quickly. And I think you're I
think you make a very you make a very I
mean the the uh uh, Australia doesn't doesn't have a
nuclear industry.
Speaker 4 (34:06):
We don't have a civil nuclear industry. We have a small.
Speaker 3 (34:09):
Scientific reactor, a very limited expertise in that area. But
you're absolutely right. I think the the the the lesson.
I mean, you look at Iran for example, the H
the American efforts to an e efforts to it appears
successfully disrupt the Iranian UH nuclear enrichment program AH that
(34:35):
you know has obviously been a you know, a great
h relief to the United States and it's allies, particularly
Israel and no doubt the Sunni States and the region
as well that feel threatened by Iran. But you can
imagine there would be many people in Iran today that
would be saying our mi state was not to have
developed a weapon already.
Speaker 4 (34:54):
And so it's I I think this is w we are.
Speaker 3 (34:57):
We are on the brink and this is part this
will be partly because of the United States being seen
to be a less reliable ally.
Speaker 4 (35:06):
We are on the brink of greater proliferation.
Speaker 3 (35:09):
I mean, look, this is not a case of proliferation,
but a look in Europe. But the way Britain and
France are talking the only nuclear states, nuclear powers in
Europe talking about combined you know, working together to provide
an independent nuclear deterrent, independent of the United States to
(35:29):
deter putin.
Speaker 4 (35:31):
Now, that's you know that the French.
Speaker 3 (35:34):
Have always, as I said earlier, always to have been
determined to be independent.
Speaker 4 (35:39):
The British have not been.
Speaker 3 (35:41):
That is that's a huge change, and so yes, I
think that's I don't think that would be. That would
that's a possibility that wouldn't be regarded as a serious
one or even probably within the Overton window in Australia
at the moment, but it could well be in the
years to come, depending on how.
Speaker 4 (35:59):
This new American posture in the world evolves.
Speaker 2 (36:03):
Do you miss the power?
Speaker 3 (36:06):
I miss the look, I don't miss the politics and
the you know, the horrible you know it's got. It's
pretty obvious it can be a pretty ghastly business in
terms of the precious and strains. And so I missed
the opportunity to do good things, to affect good reforms.
(36:27):
And I've never enjoyed power for its own sake. A
lot of people do a lot of people pursue. Power
for a lot of people is like a drug. I mean,
saying why do you like powers? Likely like saying to
someone why do you like sex? Or chocolate eating chocolate,
for example. It's a passion for me. Power has always
(36:47):
had to have a purpose to it. So I enjoyed
having the office of Prime Minister, or indeed other offices
I've had that have had political power because of the
things you can do with it. But you can't have
these roles forever, at least not in democracy, and or
you shouldn't be able to. And so I was glad
to have a role when I did, and I was
(37:09):
glad to be able to get as much done in
the time I was allotted as I did get done.
Speaker 2 (37:14):
And we'll let you go because you've given us lots
of your time today. Thank you so much, Malcolm Turnbank,
thanks so much.
Speaker 1 (37:20):
Thank you for listening to the Bloomberg Australia podcast. I'm
Rebecca Jones. This conversation was part of the Bloomberg Weekend Interview,
where host Michelle Hussein speaks with influential voices in politics,
business and culture from around the globe. You can find
an annotated transcript of the interview with Malcolm Turnbull, as
well as an archive of past conversations at bloomberg dot com,
(37:42):
Slash Weekend, or in the Bloomberg app Our. Special thanks
go to Jessica beck, Ed Johnson, Andy Clark, and Paul Allen.
Thank you for listening. I'll see you next week.
Welcome to the Bloomberg Australia Podcast. I'm Rebecca Jones. Since
legendary interviewer Michelle Hussein joined Bloomberger earlier this year, she's
grilled the likes of Elong Musk and Cursed Armer, and
now she's set her sights on Australia. This week, Michelle
sits down with Malcolm Turnbull, who, as you might expect,
has a fair bit to say about his old mate,
(00:24):
US President Donald Trump. Michelle also asks our former PM
his thoughts on US tariffs, China and the way forward
for orcis. Here's an edited version of that conversation Michelle
Hussain with Malcolm Turnbull.
Speaker 2 (00:40):
Given we do have another tariff deadline approaching, what do
you think is going to happen in the run up
to that? What do you think that deadline means?
Speaker 3 (00:51):
Well, it's very hard to tell. With Donald Trump, he's
so mercurial. His goal is to secure wins, so some concession,
some arrangement that he can say is a win for him.
But the one thing that is very clear is that
the average tariff rate that the United States is imposing
(01:13):
keeps on inching upwards, and it is likely to settle
overall at at least twenty percent, So this will be
the highest tariffs in a century, and according to say
the Peterson Institute's estimates, will add an average annual cost
of about twenty five hundred US dollars per household.
Speaker 2 (01:36):
So that is a new reality. Then that in a
way it means perhaps governments, including Australia, shouldn't be scrambling
too hard or there's a limit to what they can
do to try and negotiate this down. Are you saying
this is going to be a new reality of tariffs
and higher tariffs and international trade.
Speaker 4 (01:53):
Absolutely.
Speaker 3 (01:53):
When I was dealing with Trump in the first administration
and I secured an exemption for Australia from steel and
aluminium tariffs, his goal was largely to get what he
regarded as reciprocity, so a level playing field. That's at
least what he was saying. And of course it was
(02:16):
easy for me to make that argument because Australia has
a free trade agreement with the United States. There are
no tariffs on American imports to Australia, no barriers to investment,
and they have a big trade surplus. So as I
said to Donald many times, you can't get a better
deal than this.
Speaker 4 (02:33):
This is a fantastic deal. How can you improve on it?
Speaker 3 (02:36):
The difference today is that he has two additional goals,
one which he had before in the background, and the
other one which didn't really feature the one he had
in the background, was reindustrialization, where he thinks he can
use tariffs to create well, to create a tariff wall,
protectionist wall, so that people will move their factories and
(02:59):
industries into the United States and thereby avoid the tariff.
And that's the point he makes all the time in
every one of these letters, you know, which are written
with so many capitalized nouns. He says, you won't have
to pay any tariffs if you move to America. That
was there in the first administration, but not to a
great extent. But that big feature now. The second one, however,
(03:23):
which is first and foremost, is revenue raising, and so
he is seeing this the tariffs as a way of
raising additional revenues for the US government. And of course
it's ultimately it's going to be paid by American consumers.
We know that, but he doesn't seem to acknowledge that
Americans will find out. But he, you know, in receipts
(03:46):
from tariff's you know, customs receipts have shot up, as
of course they would, because America's average rate of tariffs
before Trump started this exercise was you know, two or
three percent across the board.
Speaker 2 (04:03):
I wonder, more broadly, how you feel about all of
this politically, And I asked that because ideologically you ought
to share a lot with Donald Trump. You are a
center right conservative, that's the tradition you come from. I
assume that you have had and probably still have friends
in the Republican Party. So what do you think happened
(04:26):
to the Republicans.
Speaker 3 (04:27):
Well, it's been taken over by Trump. I mean, it's
you can call it a personality cult if you like,
but it is he has taken it over. And Donald Trump,
whatever you want to call him, is not a conservative,
and he is certainly not a centrist. You know, his
political movement is based overwhelmingly on his personality, and it
(04:49):
is and it is founded or grounded in a series
of notions about American primacy and America priority, some of
which are frankly from an economic point of view, fallacious, such.
Speaker 4 (05:04):
As his views on trade.
Speaker 3 (05:05):
I mean, he thinks if America has a trade deficit
for the country America is losing.
Speaker 4 (05:10):
If it has a surplus, it's winning.
Speaker 3 (05:12):
Well, you know, given the lack of savings in the
United States and the fact that you need foreigners to
finance it, it's inevitable that they're going to have a
trade deficit with the rest of the world. But the
bottom line is that he does not accept notions of
comparative advantage, which was Adam Smith throwit about.
Speaker 4 (05:35):
Hundreds of years ago.
Speaker 3 (05:36):
So when Trump and I would meet with Shinzo Abe,
then the Prime Minister of Japan, he would berate Shinzo
for the trade surplus that Japan has for the United States,
and he would complain about that, and I would say
I did so on one occasion publicly, I'd say, well, Donald,
you know you have a trade surplus with us, we
(05:59):
have a trade surp with Japan. They have a trade
surplus with you. But none of that is unfair. But
he was having none of it. He's had these views
at least since the nineteen eighties, and now he.
Speaker 4 (06:12):
Is in the position to implement them.
Speaker 3 (06:14):
The problems with this approach shall four America's allies like Australia,
is that his goal and it is an avowed goal,
he makes no bones about it is to enrich the
United States, to make America rich again, as he says,
at the expense of other countries, whether they are friends
(06:36):
or rivals.
Speaker 4 (06:37):
And so from our.
Speaker 3 (06:38):
Point of view in Australia, we deeply resent having tariffs,
any tariffs imposed on us, because we say that is
in breach of the free trade agreement we have. And
of course Trump, just in case you missed the message
that he believes that might is right and that the
strong should be able to do what they will while
(07:00):
the weak suffer as they must, he adds in his
letters this proviso, he said, I am imposing on you,
right to one country or another, this tariff on the
basis that you impose no tariffs on American imports into
your country, and if you dare to retaliate, I will
increase the tariff on your goods by the amount you
(07:22):
impose on ours.
Speaker 4 (07:24):
So do you this is strong man politics?
Speaker 2 (07:27):
And are you confident that that brand of politics won't
have currency in Australia in the future because your party
recently lost an election with a candidate who had Trump
style messages. Not exactly making Australia great again, but wanting
to return Australia to what it was, and he was
(07:49):
roundly defeated. And something similar happened in Canada.
Speaker 3 (07:53):
Well, I think there are two different cases. In Canada,
it was pretty clear, as you know, the Liberal Party
in Canada, which is the center left party, was absolutely
on the ropes, ready to be wiped out. Trump declared
economic war on Canada, the imposed or threatened massive tariff,
(08:14):
said Canada should be the fifty first state. They changed
the leader to Mark Carney, the former Governor of the
Bank of England, and miraculously they won the election.
Speaker 4 (08:25):
And that was a reaction.
Speaker 3 (08:28):
Canadians got together and they said no to Trump's bullying
and that's why Mark is Prime Minister of Canada. In Australia,
we weren't suffering coercion or bullying of that card.
Speaker 4 (08:38):
Yes, there've been some tariffs.
Speaker 3 (08:40):
I think the problem that the Liberal Party in which
in Australia confusingly is the center right party my party
under led by Peter Dutton now or was led by
Peter Dutton. Since I ceased to be the leader in
twenty eighteen, it has moved further and further to the right.
(09:01):
And when I say further, to the right. It has
moved further and further into that right wing populist anger
tainment media ecosystem that you see on the right, much
but not all of which is owned by Rupert Murdoch.
You know, the big example is Fox News, of course,
in the United States, here there's the Murdock's owner cable
(09:25):
TV service called Sky News, very different to the one
in the UK made at which is similarly aligned or inclined.
And so if you decide in our system that your
goal politically is to win the approbation of that right
wing angertainment media ecosystem, you are at great risk of
(09:51):
losing the center. You see, in Australia, we have compulsory voting,
so well over ninety percent of the people in Australia
vote at an election, and we have preferential voting what
Americans called ranked choice voting, and that brings our politics,
our electoral politics, to the center. So if you're running
(10:11):
off to the right or indeed to the left, you
run the risk of either independence coming through the center
and taking your safest seats, which is what has happened
to the larger Liberal Party in Australia, or just simply
centrists moving to the other team, and that's basically what happened,
and it was a wipeout. So the right wing of
(10:34):
the party, both inside the party and in Murdoch Media,
who were behind the machinations that brought my prime ministership
to an end, finally got what they wanted. They got
control of the party, they got the leader, they wanted
complete control, and they burnt it to the ground. And
that's a great lesson. So we're so lucky in Australia
(10:59):
to have an electoral system that brings politics to the center.
And I think I think America would be a better
would have a better democracy if its electoral system was
rather different, but the chances of that being reformed are
pretty slim.
Speaker 2 (11:16):
You've said that Donald Trump today is different from how
he was in his first term when you were dealing
with him. In fact, one of his early calls after
his first inauguration was with you, and that was that
that was a tricky one, so you had you had
a taste of it. But you're saying he's got it.
(11:37):
You know, he's got different imperatives and extra goals this
time around. So if you were in office now as
the Australian Prime Minister, might you be deploying flattery because
that does seem to work, whether it's Keir Starmer brandishing
a handwritten letter from the King in the Oval Office,
or whether it's Mark Ritter of NATO sending him extremely
(12:00):
flattering WhatsApp messages.
Speaker 3 (12:04):
Well, look, we didn't work for me. I mean that
I tried. What worked for me was standing up to Trump.
As you know, I had done a deal. I had
not done a deal. It was an agreement. It was
a written agreement between the Australia and the United States
to resettle refugees in the United States, and Trump wanted
to reneg on it, and we had a huge argument
(12:26):
about it. He became very incensed and furious and he
I guess the call started off with him saying no way,
Jose and ended up saying yes, I hate you.
Speaker 2 (12:40):
You know.
Speaker 3 (12:40):
He was furious that the call was the worst one
he'd had all day and so forth.
Speaker 4 (12:45):
He was very angry. But after that we got on
very well.
Speaker 3 (12:49):
The reason we got on very well because he respected
me because I'd stood up to him. The problem with
all the flattery and the sicker fancy and if it
just goes on at the surface and it's just for show,
you know, what, you know, just the kind of social
social courtesy. If it goes beyond that, he will recognize
(13:10):
weakness and he will exploit it. And so that's why
people who suck up to bullies invariably get bullied more so,
I think you have I think with Trump, there's no
point trying to be rude to him or punch him
in the nose or anything like that. You've got to
be strong, courteous, respectful, but above all stand up for
(13:32):
yourself because that's what he respects.
Speaker 4 (13:33):
That's what he does.
Speaker 3 (13:35):
I mean, think about this, Michelle jd Vance, who is
if you like the future of the Marga movement and
you know, certainly a perhaps are more openly thoughtful proponent
of margarism than Trump. Jd Vance has praised General Charles
(13:55):
de Gaull for having ensured in the nineteen sixties, in
the face of enormous American opposition, that France retained its
sovereignty and its own control over its own military capabilities
and above all, over its own nuclear deterrant, whereas the.
Speaker 4 (14:13):
United Kingdom did not.
Speaker 3 (14:15):
The US, the UK's nuclear deterrant really cannot be operated
without the concurrence of the United States. So de Gaul
was notoriously prickly and difficult as far as the Americans
were concerned. This is presidents Kennedy and Johnson. But here
is Vance saying, I respect to Gaul, because he stood
(14:36):
up for France. He put France first, and he said
in that same interview that there is no why should
any European country be a permanent vassal of the United States.
So this is so you know, look, Mark Ruter may
have got through and I know Mark who He's a
very brilliant guy and so forth, that may have got
(14:57):
through a particular difficult point. But the key message for
the Europeans is, and this is the message both from
Washington and in their own self interest, is to be
self reliant and not be dependent on the US. You know,
it's not I mean, the MARGA movement America First is
(15:18):
not seeking American primacy in the world. They feel they're
entitled to that. But what they are expecting their allies
to do is to be more self reliant.
Speaker 2 (15:30):
Donald Trump hasn't forgotten certainly hasn't forgotten you, has he
when you said something a Bloomberg TV interview earlier. This
year that he didn't like about America creating an opportunity
for China. Ended up calling you a weak and ineffective leader,
and they're essentially saying that that's why you lost power
in Australia.
Speaker 3 (15:50):
Yeah, well, I think he found me to be both
strong and effective. That's so he's No, he was, he
just he was obviously watching the Bloomberg interview.
Speaker 4 (16:02):
It was quite funny, Michelle.
Speaker 3 (16:03):
I mean I'd made some observations which I thought were
pretty mundane, to be honest, namely that China will take
advantage of this and seek to be go on a
charm offensive, seek to promote themselves as defenders of free
and open markets and free trade and international rules based order,
(16:25):
which is exactly what they are.
Speaker 4 (16:26):
Doing, of course. And he found that offense.
Speaker 3 (16:29):
He was watching it in Washington and fired off this
post on truth Social But it was posted just as
literally only just taken my microphone off my jacket and
it was up online. So it's good instant feedback, but
just shows how many people watch Bloomberg.
Speaker 2 (16:48):
Well, speaking of China, is the effect of all of
this to push Canberra more towards Beijing.
Speaker 3 (16:55):
No, I think the Australia does not want to be
enlisted in an American campaign against China. I mean Emmanuel Macron,
who I admire a great deal, spoke very well about
this at the Shangri La conference recently in Singapore where
he said, and he was really talking about France and
(17:17):
other nations if you late Middle Powers, that is to say,
nations other than China and the US should neither be
enlisted nor bullied. So what we You know, it's in
our interest and as it is in the United Kingdoms,
to preserve our sovereign autonomy and be able to chart
(17:43):
our own course. Now you know, clearly our security partner,
you know, the sheet anchor, as they say, of our
security arrangements in the United States, is our alliance in
Australia is our alliance with the United States. But we
do not want to be enlisted in some proactive campaign
to slow Chinese growth, to inhibit the Chinese economy. I mean, yes,
(18:08):
would we would push back against economic coercion or indeed
physical kinetic coercion.
Speaker 4 (18:16):
But from Australia's.
Speaker 3 (18:17):
Point of view, we're in this region. China is our
largest trading partner. You know, there are one and a
half million Australians of Chinese heritage. This is our part
of the world where we live. China is the largest
single nation in it, if you like, the largest single
cultural influence in this part of the world, and has
(18:38):
been for thousands of years. So we you know, we
live with that, we work with that. But our critical
obligation in Australia, and this is what every nation's critical
obligation should be, is to stand up for their own rights.
That's why I say, in many respects, our America's allies
(18:58):
need to be more like Tonald Trump, not in the
sense of running off on all of the you know,
the extreme rhetoric and braggadocio, but simply to be putting
their country first, but in a very clear eyed way.
Speaker 4 (19:13):
And that's why we shouldn't.
Speaker 3 (19:14):
Be able to do more to defend ourselves. And in
a circumstance we don't have the Americans.
Speaker 2 (19:20):
Okay, and I want to get to that, but I
also want to put to you a couple of scenarios
and they're not completely hypothetical because we live in we
live in a world where China has twice I think
done li fire exercises off the Australian coast, but if
there was a crisis over Taiwan tomorrow, how would Australia respond.
Speaker 3 (19:43):
Well, the first question you've got to ask is what
is the crisis and how is the United States responding?
I mean, if there was if there was a war
in the Pacific between the United States and China that
began over tai w on the Australia, you no Australian
(20:04):
government would make a commitment, but you could as an outsider,
you could reasonably expect Australia to be.
Speaker 4 (20:11):
Aligned on America's side.
Speaker 3 (20:13):
You know, we have a treaty, the Answers Treaty with
the Americans, and it's certainly in visages that if either
party were attacked in the Pacific, the other would come
to their assistance. But you know, how much do we
have to know? There's a lot of complexity here, and
(20:35):
you know, I mean it is Alban Easy was just
just being in China and he was right to push
back against people saying to him, you should guarantee that
you know, why aren't you guaranteeing that you would, you know,
fight to defend Taiwan when no American president has given
that guarantee. I mean, the United States official position and
(20:57):
Donald Biden sort of wobbled on this. But Trump's explicit position,
including given in an interview to Bloomberg I Madter on
this is not to make a commitment to defend Taiwan,
and in fact, he's expressed the view again to Bloomberg
that Taiwan may well be indefensible because of its proximity
(21:21):
to China. So, you know, I don't I think that's well,
I guess that's that is my answer. I mean, you're
dealing with the question to Australia is asking for a
hypothetical on a hypothetical.
Speaker 2 (21:35):
Well, except that the Pentagon officials have confirmed that they
would like a clarification from Australia and Japan about what
they would do in the event of a conflict with
China over Taiwan, and they're asking for that at the
set from Australia at the same time as they're reviewing
the Orca submarine deal.
Speaker 3 (21:53):
Yeah, well, I think that I think leaving Japan to
one side, Michelle, the US submarine deal has got It
was a very bad deal for Australia, right, it was
very unfair to Australia.
Speaker 4 (22:10):
It's scrapped.
Speaker 2 (22:10):
The deal that you had reached to buy submarines from
the French scrap.
Speaker 3 (22:14):
The partnership we had was the partnership. We were building
submarines in a partnership with France. Yes, But the difference
there was we were in control of our own destiny.
You know, we'd acquired the IP, we had the shipyard,
we were building, going to build a subject. The problem
with the orcus well they call aucust pillar one about
submarines is that the longer term plan is to have
(22:37):
a partnership with the United Kingdom to build submarines, the
first of which would be likely delivered sometime in the
twenty forties. Now this submarine, this new submarine, has not
even been finally designed yet.
Speaker 4 (22:52):
It's a very long way off.
Speaker 3 (22:53):
It could be it could be twenty fifties for all.
You know, these projects tend to run late. They tend
to be later and more expensive than planned. So because
of that decision, the Australia's existing fleet of submarines is
getting very old and it would have a what they
call a capability gap, a period in which we'd have
no submarines at all. So the Americans generously said, we
(23:19):
will sell you a number of secondhand Virginia class submarines,
which is their current attack submarine SSNs, and several new ones.
If you haven't got your own submarine production up and running,
then so we'll help out. But they put a very
big proviso on this, which is in the aucust legislation,
(23:42):
which is that before any submarines sold to Australia, the
President of the United States has to certify that the
sale would not degrade the undersea capabilities of the US Navy. Now,
they are currently about twenty submarines of this type short
of what they believe they need, and their industry, despite
(24:04):
a lot of money being spent and a lot of efforts,
has not been able to lift its production rate such
that they're currently producing about half as many as they
need simply to meet their own requirements, let alone any
subs for Australia. So the point that Bridge Colby, the
Undersecretary of the Defense, has made before he was under secretary,
(24:26):
and indeed he made this point in his confirmation hearings,
is that if the United States is short of these submarines,
and they are the most valuable and strategically important and
survivable assets in their navy, if they're short of these submarines,
how can they responsibly transfer them to anyone, even to
a friend. And so this is why I say the
(24:49):
aucest Pillar hun deal is a bad deal, because you're
sure we're giving money to the Americans to support their industry.
We're building a base a submarine based in Western Australia
for the US Navy, spending millions of dollars on it.
Speaker 4 (25:01):
But we could very.
Speaker 3 (25:03):
Likely, I think almost certainly, we'll end up with no
submarines at least for a very very long time.
Speaker 1 (25:08):
You're listening to Michelle Hussain, editor at Large for Bloomberg Weekends,
conversation with former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. You'll hear
part two of that conversation in just a moment. This
is the Bloomberg Australia Podcast. Welcome back to the Bloomberg
(25:28):
Australia Podcast. I'm Rebecca Jones. Here is the rest of
the conversation between a Bloomberg Weekend editor at Large Michelle
Hussain and former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull.
Speaker 2 (25:41):
Let's say the submarines materialize at whatever point in the future,
and America wants Australia to use them to patrol the
Strait of Taiwan.
Speaker 3 (25:51):
Acceptable well, Australian submarines do operate in the South China
see already and they operate.
Speaker 4 (26:00):
Work with closely.
Speaker 3 (26:02):
You know, there's a high degree of interoperability with the
United States, and we work closely with the US and
other allies and partners across the Pacific already, so that
happens all the time. Now the question is that you know,
what do you do in the event of a conflict.
Speaker 4 (26:18):
And look, the.
Speaker 3 (26:19):
Reality is Australia if there were a full blown war
with China, which did not hopefully did not turn into
a nuclear walk so it turned into a nuclear war,
maybe curtains for all of us. But if there was
a full blown war with China, it is likely that
Australian territory will be attacked because there are American bases
(26:41):
or the Australian bases but used by American forces on
Australian soil. You know, there are very important satellite communication
listening posts in Australia and other facilities of marines in
the northern territory are the naval ships in Western Australia.
Speaker 4 (27:00):
It is likely that Australia.
Speaker 3 (27:01):
Would be drawn into that conflict inevitably. But the you
know the I mean, what is Australia's objective. But let's
just leaving aside what America might wanted to Australia's objective
is to have no conflict in this region. Australia's objective
is not should not be to support American primacy in
the region, such as might have been the case twenty
(27:23):
years ago or thirty years ago. Our objective should be
to ensure that the United States remains engaged. That's important,
but that there is a balance and so that so
that we maintain a region where Leqwan used much quoted words,
you know, the big fish can't eat the little fish,
and the little fish can't eat the shrimps, and we
(27:44):
all managed to get along with each other, respecting our respective.
Speaker 4 (27:50):
Autonomy.
Speaker 2 (27:51):
But is the effect of the last few months that
China is getting bigger and more powerful and therefore there
we're looking at. Is Chinese supremacy in the region.
Speaker 4 (28:03):
Well, I don't know.
Speaker 3 (28:05):
I don't think it's Chinese supremacy, And certainly China is
more powerful. If you look at this hemisphere, you've got Japan,
the third largest national economy.
Speaker 4 (28:15):
In the world.
Speaker 3 (28:16):
Still, I believe you've got South Korea also in the
G twenty. You know, you've got Indonesia, the largest Muslim
majority country in the world, and I think the fourth
largest by population, the third largest by population, and the
host of other important economies and countries, including Australia of course,
(28:38):
So I don't think China is in a position to
become the sole unchallenged henchament in this region.
Speaker 2 (28:46):
Yeah, and this point about self reliance in Australian's sovereignty,
which you're emphasizing. You've also called for an Australia first
approach to defense, and yet the realities are that your
country is a middle power and it spends less than
two percent of GDP on defense. Even in another decade,
that's not going to change a huge amount. It's not
(29:06):
going to go much beyond two percent.
Speaker 4 (29:10):
Yeah, but I agree, yes, not.
Speaker 2 (29:11):
But the trajectory is not like what NATO is now
committed to. And then if I wonder, how realistic is
it to think that Australia can look after its own
interest to a greater extent in a world where America
is not the partner it was.
Speaker 4 (29:29):
Well it is. It's clearly better.
Speaker 3 (29:31):
We're stronger with allies and partners, but at the end
of the day, you have to be able to do
what you can to defend yourself. And that's why when
you're spending money on military capabilities, you have to be
asking whether these are capabilities that are designed to support,
(29:52):
for example, the US Navy and operations off the China coast,
or whether they are capabilities that are designed long range
strike capabilities, which may include submarines, which are designed to
keep any adversary at arm's length. So it's the question.
There is an unfortunate tendency in Australia for too many
(30:20):
people to think that the best definition of Australian national
security or even Australian patriotism is to be more and
more tightly zipped onto the United States. And that is
a dependency that the United States can neither deliver, nor
(30:42):
is it one that they want or welcome. And this
is the point that JD. Vance has made, and Bridge
Colby has made this point also before he was Under Secretary,
that the United States has in the past in effect
encouraged its allies to become dependent on them, a little
bit like a parent that doesn't really want the children
(31:04):
to leave home and encourages them to stick around at home,
when in fact they should be saying, off you go,
you know, time to do your own thing, and the
you know, it's it Vitally, we do not lose respect
in Washington if we are seen to be in fighting
(31:25):
for our own corner and focused on our own interests,
because that is absolutely what the American President is doing
for his country and he respects.
Speaker 4 (31:35):
I mean, look at the leaders that he respects, whether
you like them or not.
Speaker 3 (31:39):
The other leaders around the world that he respects and
pays great attention to, ones who are ruthlessly, often brutally,
are determined to defend their own country's interests as they
see them putin you mean, well sech thing.
Speaker 4 (32:01):
Letting take that in the out.
Speaker 3 (32:02):
I mean it's you know, brutal is probably an understatement,
but the although you know, he wouldn't cavil at.
Speaker 4 (32:10):
That, I imagine.
Speaker 3 (32:11):
But the point I'm making is that you there's no
point going to Washington. I mean, I know people have
been going there flattering Trump and so forth. Personally, I
think it's a waste of time. I mean, on the
real capital, they regard difference as theirs, it's as their.
Speaker 2 (32:30):
Due so one more thought on defense before we before
we move on and wrap up, which is that is
one possible lesson on this that Australia first in defense
might have to mean nuclear weapons. I know you've said
in the past that the capacity or the capability isn't
(32:52):
there even if it wanted to, but it is one
way that smaller nations have had to be taken very
seriously on the world stage.
Speaker 4 (33:04):
Mi Charlotte's that's a really good question. And the you.
Speaker 3 (33:10):
Know, prolifer nuclear proliferation in this region has been really
limited to I'm talking about East Asia being limited to
North Korea. But the countries that are close to the
United States, like Japan and South Korea, for example, who
certainly have the capacity nuclear industries and certainly would have
(33:33):
the capacity to develop nuclear weapons very quickly, have not
done so because they feel protected by the American nuclear umbrella.
If they felt that protection, that support was unreliable or
couldn't be counted on, then I think they would move
(33:54):
to nuclear weapons very quickly. And I think you're I
think you make a very you make a very I
mean the the uh uh, Australia doesn't doesn't have a
nuclear industry.
Speaker 4 (34:06):
We don't have a civil nuclear industry. We have a small.
Speaker 3 (34:09):
Scientific reactor, a very limited expertise in that area. But
you're absolutely right. I think the the the the lesson.
I mean, you look at Iran for example, the H
the American efforts to an e efforts to it appears
successfully disrupt the Iranian UH nuclear enrichment program AH that
(34:35):
you know has obviously been a you know, a great
h relief to the United States and it's allies, particularly
Israel and no doubt the Sunni States and the region
as well that feel threatened by Iran. But you can
imagine there would be many people in Iran today that
would be saying our mi state was not to have
developed a weapon already.
Speaker 4 (34:54):
And so it's I I think this is w we are.
Speaker 3 (34:57):
We are on the brink and this is part this
will be partly because of the United States being seen
to be a less reliable ally.
Speaker 4 (35:06):
We are on the brink of greater proliferation.
Speaker 3 (35:09):
I mean, look, this is not a case of proliferation,
but a look in Europe. But the way Britain and
France are talking the only nuclear states, nuclear powers in
Europe talking about combined you know, working together to provide
an independent nuclear deterrent, independent of the United States to
(35:29):
deter putin.
Speaker 4 (35:31):
Now, that's you know that the French.
Speaker 3 (35:34):
Have always, as I said earlier, always to have been
determined to be independent.
Speaker 4 (35:39):
The British have not been.
Speaker 3 (35:41):
That is that's a huge change, and so yes, I
think that's I don't think that would be. That would
that's a possibility that wouldn't be regarded as a serious
one or even probably within the Overton window in Australia
at the moment, but it could well be in the
years to come, depending on how.
Speaker 4 (35:59):
This new American posture in the world evolves.
Speaker 2 (36:03):
Do you miss the power?
Speaker 3 (36:06):
I miss the look, I don't miss the politics and
the you know, the horrible you know it's got. It's
pretty obvious it can be a pretty ghastly business in
terms of the precious and strains. And so I missed
the opportunity to do good things, to affect good reforms.
(36:27):
And I've never enjoyed power for its own sake. A
lot of people do a lot of people pursue. Power
for a lot of people is like a drug. I mean,
saying why do you like powers? Likely like saying to
someone why do you like sex? Or chocolate eating chocolate,
for example. It's a passion for me. Power has always
(36:47):
had to have a purpose to it. So I enjoyed
having the office of Prime Minister, or indeed other offices
I've had that have had political power because of the
things you can do with it. But you can't have
these roles forever, at least not in democracy, and or
you shouldn't be able to. And so I was glad
to have a role when I did, and I was
(37:09):
glad to be able to get as much done in
the time I was allotted as I did get done.
Speaker 2 (37:14):
And we'll let you go because you've given us lots
of your time today. Thank you so much, Malcolm Turnbank,
thanks so much.
Speaker 1 (37:20):
Thank you for listening to the Bloomberg Australia podcast. I'm
Rebecca Jones. This conversation was part of the Bloomberg Weekend Interview,
where host Michelle Hussein speaks with influential voices in politics,
business and culture from around the globe. You can find
an annotated transcript of the interview with Malcolm Turnbull, as
well as an archive of past conversations at bloomberg dot com,
(37:42):
Slash Weekend, or in the Bloomberg app Our. Special thanks
go to Jessica beck, Ed Johnson, Andy Clark, and Paul Allen.
Thank you for listening. I'll see you next week.
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