Amb. Dan Shapiro on U.S. Policy, Israel, and the Iran Equation

On this week’s episode, Israel Policy Forum Policy Advisor and Tel Aviv-based journalist Neri Zilber hosts Dan Shapiro, former U.S. ambassador to Israel. They discuss the prospects for a new nuclear deal with Iran, the utility of the U.S. and Israel threatening military action, how close a Saudi-Israel normalization deal was before October 7, the truth behind the Biden administration's weapons shipments to Israel, the current state of the U.S.-Israel relationship, and more.

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Episode Transcript

Neri (00:02):
Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod.
I'm Nery Zilber, a journalistbased in Tel Aviv and a policy
advisor to Israel Policy Forum.
We have a great episode for youthis week with Dan Shapiro
joining us to discuss Iran, theGaza war, both past and present,
and the state of the US-Israelrelationship.
Us-israel relationship.

(00:27):
Dan was, of course, USambassador to Israel for the
vast majority of the Obamaadministration, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defensefor the Middle East in the Biden
administration and, in general.
He has held a slew of seniorpolicymaking positions at the
State Department, the NationalSecurity Council and the US
Congress, dealing with suchissues as regional integration,
Israel, Iran and most otherthings that we all care about.

(00:49):
Dan is currently adistinguished fellow at the
Atlantic Council in theScolcroft Middle East Security
Initiative.
It goes without saying, butI'll say it anyway Dan is one of
the best observers of, andpractitioners in, the US-Israel
relationship.
This was an illuminatingconversation with someone who

(01:10):
has been at the business end ofall of it for well over two
decades.
With all that said, let's getto Dan Shapiro.
Hi, Dan, Welcome to the IsraelPolicy Pod.

Dan (01:21):
Thanks, neri, good to be with you.

Neri (01:24):
It's great to have you, Dan.
As we were just saying, it's agood week, I think, for various
reasons, to have youspecifically on.
So I'm really looking forwardto this conversation and we do
have a lot of things to get intoand I'd like to touch on.
But first question to you it'sbeen five months since the Biden
administration finished up itsterm in office and the Trump

(01:45):
administration came in.
Seems already like a lifetime.
How is life outside ofgovernment treating you
personally?

Dan (01:53):
Life's treating me well.
I'm at the Atlantic Council,which is a great institution in
Washington that allows me to doa lot of work.
On other things I care about,especially Middle East regional
integration and picking up onthe successes and the advances
we had in moving forward MiddleEast regional integration in the
defense sector during my lastyear in the Biden administration

(02:15):
at the Pentagon, and I do otherthings as well.
Certainly have some concernsabout the state of the world.
I have some concerns about thestate of my own country, but
basically life is good for meand my family.

Neri (02:30):
Right, as they say here, but maybe also in the States.
Personally doing fine, butexcept for the obvious, yeah,
except for the obvious Soundsright.
Yeah.
So first issue I wanted to getinto with you, dan Iran Sounds

(02:59):
right and withdrew the US fromthe previous agreement signed by
your former boss, presidentObama, but really they're trying
to hash out a new agreement.
This weekend, I believe,they're going to be meeting in
Oman for the sixth round oftalks, led by US envoy Steve
Witkoff.
You guys in the Bidenadministration, right after you

(03:22):
came into office in 2020, triedto renew the deal, get a new
deal and restarted negotiationsto put Iran's nuclear program I
think it was called to put itback in a box, as it were.
That didn't didn't quitesucceed.
So now Trump, I suppose, thinkshe can do better.
But the first question to you,dan as things stand now, what do

(03:45):
you think the chances ofsuccess are for this Trump team
to get a deal, especially sinceit seems like, with every couple
of days depending on which USofficial is talking the
goalposts seem to be moving,especially in terms of the key
issue of nuclear enrichment yesor no on the part of Iran.
So what do you think?
Nuclear enrichment, yes or noon the part of Iran?
So what do you think?

Dan (04:06):
I think the Trump administration went into these
talks without having settled onwhat its goal was, and that has
played out in the conflictingstatements you referenced, from
the special envoy, steve Witkoff, from others in the
administration, sometimes fromthe president himself, about
whether that fundamentalquestion of whether you allow
Iran to continue to enrichuranium would be permissible in

(04:29):
some future deal.
That was one of the maincriticisms of the JCPOA, the
deal President Obama signed in2015.
There were others that it hadsunsets, that there were
expiration dates on variousrestrictions or that there was
too much sanctions relief.
But when President Trumpwithdrew from that agreement in
2018, one of the main criticismsthat critics had voiced was

(04:51):
that Iran had been able tocontinue to sustain its
enrichment capability.
Then it continued to advancethat capability after President
Trump withdrew from it andincluding into the Biden years,
with more advanced centrifugesand higher levels of enrichment
and building up a higher, abigger stockpile of highly
enriched uranium that it could,on fairly short notice, enrich

(05:15):
to weapons grade.
So almost in any circumstance,a deal would involve Iran
downblending or shipping outsome of the highly enriched
uranium, but they insist thatthey must retain a domestic
enrichment capability to fuelwhat they say is a peaceful
nuclear energy program.
The problem is the technologyand the knowledge has advanced

(05:37):
so much that that almost bydefinition gives them the
ability also to enrich all theway to weapons grade and then
eventually be able to produce aweapon.
There should be verification,there should be inspections that
would make sure they wouldn'tdo it.
But that has been kind of ablack and white issue going into
this sixth round of thenegotiations where it seems that

(05:59):
the administration is more orless settled on the no
enrichment requirement.
That's something they werepushed very hard on by
Republicans in Congress and thatis something that the Iranians
say they will never agree to.
They're looking at variouscreative solutions.
Some have been floated in thepast A consortium, allow Iran to
be part of some regionalgrouping that could do

(06:21):
enrichment that would serveeverybody in the region's
nuclear energy needs.
But this is pretty far-fetchedand certainly long-term.
So there's a big decision comingup for President Trump.
Is he going to hold to thatposition of no enrichment or is
he going to find some way ofsaying he's held to it but

(06:41):
actually allowing Iran tocontinue to enrich uranium?
And I think it's very difficult.
I think always the more likelyscenario for this year and then
we can talk a little bit aboutsome of those derivative
scenarios.
Is in negotiations up to acertain stage a crisis.
By October, the Europeangovernments who are still part

(07:01):
of the JCB would be able totrigger the snapback of
sanctions, the return ofsanctions under the former deal,
and then Iran would potentiallyretaliate, withdraw from the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treatyor expel inspectors or make some
other move toward a breakout.
And then the decision pointarrives for President Trump and
Prime Minister Netanyahu,probably on whether or not to

(07:23):
use military force.

Neri (07:26):
Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu probably, on whether
or not to use military force.
So that's a good segue.
In terms of the military forceoption, you've written of late
that you think that the militaryoption, a credible use of force
, should very much be put on thetable, including with and
through the Israelis.
Fair to say, trump himselfseems a bit lukewarm to the idea

(07:47):
of actually using force or, ashe put it, the destruction and
death option.
The more isolationist wing ofhis administration definitely
seems like they're not in favorof the use of force.
So, in terms of your own view,do you think the military option
is just a course of diplomatictool you know to find leverage,

(08:08):
or do you actually believe that,if push comes to shove in the
negotiations themselves, thatIsrael and or the US should
actually use the military?

Dan (08:17):
option of going into the beginning of this year, coming
out of 2024,.
Iran was made significantlyweaker and more vulnerable,
based on actions taken largelyby Israel, but also by the
United States, during the courseof the war, of course, israel

(08:38):
largely decimated Hezbollah andLebanon, the largest and most
well-armed and equipped Iranianproxy right on Israel's border,
that had long been feared to beIran's essential second strike
capability.
If Israel or the United Stateswere ever to attack Iranian
nuclear facilities, they couldrain terror down on the skies of

(08:59):
Tel Aviv.
Hezbollah is not destroyed but,uh, its capability to conduct
that kind of attack is severely,severely diminished.
Uh then, uh, on October 26th,the following, the second of the
two Iranian attacks on Israel,which was on October 1st, when
they sent over 200 ballisticmissiles to Israel, largely
defeated by the U?

(09:19):
S and Israeli, is, I should say, israeli and US missile defense
capabilities.
Israel struck on October 26thin Iran, severely damaged Iran's
most advanced strategic airdefense systems, the S-300s
provided by Russia, as well assome of their ballistic missile

(09:39):
production capability, andreally left Iran much more
exposed, first of all,demonstrated they could reach
those targets, and leftuntouched targets that would be
much harder to protect becauseof the diminished air defense
capability.
So we go into the year and wego into this attempt to
negotiate with Iran in a muchmore vulnerable state, not

(10:00):
unable to respond if they wereever attacked, but certainly
without some of the tools todefend against and retaliate for
such an attack.
So the military option, or atleast the threat of military
force, becomes a very crucialtool to use if you're going to
try to advance diplomacy and getthe Iranians to move off of

(10:21):
some of their very stubbornpositions, particularly on the
issue of enrichment.
Actually, I think PresidentTrump used the presence of US
force by elevating what wasalready a very significant US
posture in the region.
Early in his term it waslargely defined as being used
for the strikes against theHouthis in Yemen.

(10:43):
But the same capabilities asecond aircraft carrier, b-2
stealth bombers placed in DiegoGarcia, additional air defense
units were all relevant if therewere going to be some kind of
confrontation with Iran.
And the Iranians took noticeand it actually, I think, helped
Iran dispense with a lot of itsusual delaying tactics even

(11:07):
getting into the talks.
Sometimes it takes months justto figure out where to meet and
the shape of the table and who'stalking to whom.
Very quickly, by April thosetalks were underway and I credit
that to very much the PresidentTrump's use of the military
tool as a way of focusing Iran'smind on what was at risk if
these talks wouldn't getunderway.

(11:29):
Then there were some oppositesignals, especially once the
talks began.
First there were some leaks outof discussions between Prime
Minister Netanyahu and PresidentTrump, in which President Trump
apparently said you know, Idon't want an Israeli strike on
Iran.
Ok, fair enough, while talksare underway.
But anytime that leak, thatstory is leaked, it sends a

(11:50):
message to Iran that well, ok,there's some less pressure.
Then you have very prominentvoices in President Trump's
coalition, and one in particularI think is worth paying
attention to.
That's Tucker Carlson, a veryinfluential tribune, let's say,
of the more isolationist wing ofthe MAGA coalition, speaking
out very bluntly saying that anywar with Iran or any military

(12:15):
action with Iran would put theUnited States in grave danger,
and strongly opposing it.
I won't go through all of hisarguments, and he is seen as
speaking for let's call it theJD Vance wing of the folks
internally in the administration.
That wing of the coalitionseems to be ascendant to the
administration.
More hawkish members, likeMichael Waltz, the former

(12:37):
National Security Advisor weredispensed with, or Marco Rubio
seems to have downplayed many ofhis long-held positions.
Rubio seems to have downplayedmany of his long held positions.
And then, of course, PresidentTrump went to the region.
He met with the Saudis and theQataris and the Emiratis, all of
whom seem to be sending signalsthat they want to focus on
deals, they want to focus oneconomic and technology

(12:57):
development.
They don't want to have.

(13:21):
The look of the talks is thatif they insist on moving forward
, they're already essentially anuclear threshold state and
maintaining and sustaining thatcapability that it's going to be
very unlikely to get a deal.
So I think there are a numberof steps, which I wrote about
and I can go through them, thatthe administration could take
that would put that threat verymuch on the table in a way that

(13:42):
would hopefully focus theIranians' mind threat very much
on the table in a way that wouldhopefully focus the Iranians'
mind, definitely useful to haveleverage in any negotiation on
any issue.

Neri (13:50):
But I'm curious okay, if the Iranian minds is focused and
they do come to the table, Isay sincerely and earnest,
looking for a deal, but they'renot willing to give up all
enrichment.
Do you think as a US, leavingaside what the Israeli
government may or may not want,but if you were a US policymaker

(14:12):
advising this US president,would you tell him okay, zero
enrichment, no enrichment.
Dismantling of the entirenuclear program in Iran may not
be realistic, may be a bridgetoo far, but we were willing to
settle for a bit less in orderto get a deal and in order to
really kind of limit the Iraniannuclear program and its kind of
ability to break out to anactual weapon.

(14:34):
Would that be your advice tothis US president?

Dan (14:39):
Well, of course I supported the JCPOA in 2015.
I was the ambassador of theUnited States to Israel, so of
course you know the president'spolicy was my policy.

Neri (14:50):
I never-.
You were just to say for ourlisteners, you were on the.
You probably had, I don't wantto say the hardest job, because
the negotiators in Vienna had areally tough job, but to be the
envoy of the US, administration,negotiating that deal and

(15:13):
dealing with that Israeligovernment not an easy job
either.

Dan (15:18):
Let's just give you some credit here Solved the problem.
It wasn't the greatest deal ofall time.
It was the least bad option orthe best available option to buy
the most time by keeping Iranverifiably at a distance of
about a year from the ability tocreate a nuclear weapon and
keeping them there for 10 to 15years, always with the knowledge

(16:10):
that we would have to come backand revisit that question
before those sunsets, beforethose expirations, and ensure we
find a way to extend thoserestrictions and potentially
even consider military action ifrequireduges that do the
enrichment much faster and muchmore efficiently.
So that's one thing that haschanged.
They have that knowledge.
So that's one thing that haschanged.

(16:45):
They have that knowledge.
In fact, by now we couldn't getthem back to the one year
breakout timeline that the JCPOAprovided, because they would
have the ability, if they choseto violate a new agreement, to
rush with this new capability toa much faster enrichment of the
weapons grade material.
The second thing that's changed, of course, is we saw Iran
twice in 2024 break alongstanding cautionary approach
to avoiding directconfrontations with the United
States and Israel with these twomassive barrages of, in the
first case, ballistic missiles,cruise missiles and drones and,
in the second case, double thenumber of ballistic missiles
against Israel in April and inOctober, and that is a very

(17:11):
alarming development.
If Iran now feels that thetaboo has been lifted on direct
state-to-state attack ratherthan using proxies, rather than
using deniable means that theyhave some ability to distance
themselves from, deniable meansthat they have some ability to
distance themselves from, but adirect state-on-state
confrontation against Israel, itraises the danger or the stakes

(17:32):
much more about Iran havingthat capability to move toward a
nuclear weapon in a relativelyshort period of time.
So I do think that therequirement of removing their
enrichment capability and havingthat verifiably monitored is
more important now than it wasin 2015.
And I do think that's the rightstandard, that the military

(17:54):
option is a serious one, to tryto focus their mind.
First, as I said, I think theyhave to fear those strikes.
They have to fear it because ofthe vulnerability of their
reduced air defenses, because ofHezbollah's decimation, to help

(18:17):
ensure that these negotiationshave the best chance to be
successful.
One way you do that is throughconsistent messaging that has
been lacking in these first twomonths of the negotiations, as
you mentioned, some statementsback and forth, but I think it's
becoming more consistent thatthe goal is zero enrichment and
we prefer the United Statesprefers to achieve that through

(18:38):
diplomacy, but it's prepared todo it through force if necessary
.
To do it through force ifnecessary.
The second is through bettercoordination with Israel, rather
than have the coveragedominated by the leaks about the
United States saying to Israeldon't do this, don't do this.
I need more time, even thoughthat's a legitimate thing for a
president to tell an Israeliprime minister he doesn't have
to give a green light, but heshould.
I think the negotiations andthe leverage in them would be

(19:00):
advanced by creating theopposite impression, and there
are various ways you can do thatthat don't give a green light.
General Eric Carrillo, thecommander of USENTCOM, who
travels to the region frequently, could be sent to Israel for
very high profile consultationswith the Israeli military
command, and it'd be known thekinds of things they were
discussing.

(19:20):
In the past, israel and theUnited States have conducted
advanced joint exercises theJuniper Series, particularly
Juniper Oak in 2023, whichrehearsed long-range bombings
and suppression of enemy airdefenses and messaged in such a
way that it was very clear whatwas being rehearsed.

(19:40):
There are other forms ofindicating that in certain
scenarios, the United Stateswouldn't necessarily restrain
Israel while still giving thepresident the full ability to
communicate when he would beopen to that actual activity.
There, of course, is Pentagonplanning on a US military option

(20:01):
.
That's true all the time and itgoes through various updates.
It, of course, has had to beupdated since the Iranian air
defenses were hit last October.
There are ways that can bebriefed, that don't reveal what
shouldn't be revealed, to makeclear that the United States is
also looking at its own militaryoption.
And then, of course, to thinkabout the timing of such a

(20:21):
strike.
If you go through a negotiationprocess and you reach the
crisis point of snapback and isIran withdrawing from the NPT or
something that's probably thetiming that becomes most
relevant.
The point is that a crediblemilitary threat actually
increases the odds.
You don't have to use it.
By increasing the odds, you canget an agreement in
negotiations, but if thosenegotiations fail and Iran

(20:45):
continues to want to sustain itsthreshold current nuclear
threshold status and the abilityto move, at a time of their
choosing, very quickly towardactual nuclear weapon, I think
the military option has to bevery, very seriously considered.
A credible military that's onlycredible if you actually are
prepared to use it when it'scalled upon.

Neri (21:05):
Very interesting.
Unfortunately, we have to shiftto other topics.
We could talk about Iran, Ithink, for another 40 minutes,
but I wanted to really get yoursense because you were a unique
role just before October 7th2023, and the outbreak of the
Gaza war.
Obviously you were thecoordinator for regional

(21:25):
integration out of the StateDepartment.
So I want the definitive answerhow close was the US in
brokering and gettingIsrael-Saudi normalization deal
on October 6th 2023?

Dan (21:43):
I don't think we can say that we were right on the verge
of the agreement, but I think wecan say that we had made very
significant progress on thatagreement and some other
progress in regional integration.
By the way, I'll just mentionthe other briefly One of the
things I was tasked with in thatrole at the State Department
was to continue to move theNEGEV Forum forward.

(22:04):
That was the outgrowth of theNegev Summit from March 2022,
when Secretary Blinken met withForeign Minister Lapid and the
foreign ministers of Egypt,morocco, uae and Bahrain, and
then an ongoing series ofworking groups called the Negev
Forum emerged for projects insix areas, and there was work
underway to have a secondministerial summit, which we had

(22:26):
actually scheduled for October19th in Marrakesh you probably
don't remember it because ofcourse it didn't happen at which
not only those six countriesbut other countries were likely
to participate Jordan andPalestinian Authority and some
other Arab states, and maybesome Muslim states outside of
the Arab League would haveparticipated as observers.
We really were making progresson building out this broader

(22:49):
regional integration.
On a separate track, there werevery advanced discussions with
the Saudis on both the US-Saudibilateral negotiations
negotiations, the bilateralagreements, security commitments

(23:09):
and energy and technologyagreements that would be
accompanying and undergirding aSaudi decision to normalize with
Israel, and on what the sort ofPalestinian component of this
agreement would be.
The Saudis had always been clearthat they sought some pathway
toward Palestinian statehood.
Exactly what that meant, whatthat required, what the Israeli

(23:31):
government would have to say,was not exactly clear and was
going to have to be negotiated.
But there were advanceddiscussions between Saudis and
Palestinians, between Saudis andAmericans, in fact, on October
6th I know I've heard mycolleague Brett McGurk describe
he had a Saudi delegation in hisoffice on October 6th going
over the latest drafts of someof these proposals.
So we weren't right there, butwe had made very good progress

(23:54):
and it was advancing and I thinkthere was a very decent
likelihood that 2023 would havebeen the year of the
breakthrough had the October 7thattacks not occurred.
And of course, we know thatamong Hamas' motivations for
those attacks was the desire toderail this expanding
integration in Israel'sincreasing recognition and

(24:16):
normalization in the region.

Neri (24:19):
Absolutely.
I think you may have made somenews there, dan, in terms of
Jordan and the Palestinianauthority going to Marrakesh for
the NEGA forum because theyinitially refused to take part
in, I think, what was it 2022?
They didn't take part, so youheard it here first.
Just on the issue of thePalestinian component and what

(24:40):
they used to call, I believe, asignificant Palestinian
component as part of the overallIsrael-Saudi normalization deal
, I mean, do you think that thiscurrent Israeli government
which was the same Israeligovernment back in 2023, could
have given anything on thePalestinian component without
perhaps risking its survival and, I guess, follow up to that?

(25:01):
Given the ongoing war, has theSaudi position, especially
vis-a-vis the Palestiniangovernment component of any deal
, hardened because of the Gazaand, I guess, also the behavior
of this Israeli government?

Dan (25:15):
So that question has, of course, hung heavy over these
discussions all along and Ithink, personally it was always
a concern and, I think, a sourceof maybe some skepticism that
we get all of the pieces put inplace, because it would
ultimately require an Israeligovernment to make some gesture
and some signal, whatever thatrequirement for the Saudis was

(25:38):
and they would have to speak forthemselves on what they were
looking for but signaling thatthe path toward Palestinian
statehood and some futuretwo-state arrangement over some
period of time was stillpossible or was still the
political horizon.
And obviously, a governmentthat is really dominated, I
think you could say, byrejectionists of that vision

(26:03):
Smotrich and Ben-Gvir and whomPrime Minister Netanyahu was
totally dependent on for hispolitical survival, is not a
government.
You would expect to be able tosay the magic words, whatever
those magic words are.
So there was always a questionthat hung over these discussions
If a real opportunity for Saudinormalization presented itself

(26:24):
and that had to be folded intoit, would that require a cabinet
shuffle?
Would that require evenelections in Israel?
That is something that I thinkwas an unknown, but certainly
the conversations that wereunderway with the Saudis were
done very transparently with theprime minister and with the
Israeli government.

(26:44):
So you know he was alsothinking about those questions.
If it came to it, in order toachieve cybernization, how would
he deliver whatever he wouldneed to deliver, or would he
just choose not to?
So that was, that was aquestion.
Of course, all of these talkswere put on the shelf after
October 7th.
All the focus turned to the war, to trying to negotiate the

(27:07):
release of hostages, to workingon humanitarian assistance.
Secretary Blinken's diplomacyin the region really focused on
that set of issues over themonths that followed to the
discussions again on thebilateral US-Saudi agreements
that were to accompanynormalization and were expected

(27:39):
at that point to perhaps be partof a broader package of how you
would end the war.
First you'd get a ceasefire anda hostage deal of all the
hostages released and then, aspart of that, you would pivot to

(28:08):
the big move on normalization,the signing of various
Israeli-US-S.
I was part of his delegation,along with Brett McGurk, thomas
Hochstein, derek Cholet andothers, to really try to
complete these agreementsbetween the United States and
Saudi Arabia.
We didn't complete them,nothing was signed, but we
advanced them to the point wherewe knew we could complete them
and that was a mutual defensetreaty, a very significant US
commitment to Saudi Arabia'ssecurity and, of course, saudi

(28:32):
commitments to us in terms oftheir relationships with China
and US basing and the things ofthat sort, a defense cooperation
agreement, an economicagreement and a civil nuclear
energy agreement to allow SaudiArabia to have access to nuclear
energy.
And following those talks, jakewent to Israel and this was all

(28:52):
public.
He spoke to the prime ministerNetanyahu and he said I think
we're at the point where wecould deliver those agreements,
so let's get to the ceasefire,let's get to the hostages coming
home, and then we should beable to execute on this, still
pending the question of thePalestinian component component.

(29:14):
It was a couple of weeks afterthat, maybe less than that, by
the end of May, that PresidentBiden announced the framework
for the hostage and ceasefiredeal.
And had we been able tocomplete that in the summer,
let's say, then I think we wouldhave had at least enough time
to try to put the rest of thesepieces together.
It would have involved bringinga treaty to the Senate, the

(29:34):
United States Senate, forratification on US-Saudi mutual
defense.
Of course it would haveinvolved the Palestinian
component, raising very muchagain the question you raised a
moment ago about whether thisIsraeli government was poised to
do that.
But since the talks on thehostage and ceasefire deal just
dragged on and on through thesummer and we really were never
able to get to that moment, thatbreakthrough moment, those

(29:58):
agreements remained on the shelf.
And now we'll see.
If President Trump went to SaudiArabia last month, he didn't
talk about it very much.
He mentioned it.
He was much more focused onvarious economic deals with the

(30:19):
Saudis, technology deals, verylittle discussion of a US
commitment to Saudi Arabia'ssecurity.
Frankly, if I were the Saudis,I'd be asking a very serious
question is would a PresidentTrump be willing to make such a
commitment?
He's not such a big fan of thealliances we have and he doesn't

(30:39):
treat our alliances, our alliesin those alliances in NATO and
in Asia the way most previouspresidents have done, certainly
doesn't speak about them thesame way.
So, second, would you really beright?
Would you really be gettingthat kind of security commitment
, even if it was signed?
And third, would PresidentTrump, governing as he does in a
kind of scorched earth fashion,be able to get a treaty

(31:03):
ratified by the Senate?
That would require 15 to 20Democratic Senate votes.
I don't think the Saudis wouldknow the answer to that, but
those are real, very legitimatequestions.
So the whole structure of thedeal that we were trying to
build, I think, is in somequestion right now, but of
course it's also still stalledby the fact that the war drags
on and on.
Hostages remain held, and so Idon't think it's anything that's

(31:27):
likely to emerge this year,let's say Right that's likely to
emerge this year, let's sayRight.

Neri (31:38):
I was going to add, before you mentioned the issue of the
ongoing war and the fact that atleast this Israeli prime
minister and this Israeligovernment have shown no
inclination that they're goingto end it anytime soon.
That may shift, depending onvarious factors, whether here in
Israel or in Washington, but Isuppose, like you said, there is
this carrot that's beendangling out in front of the
Netanyahu government since, well, a year ago, which is the prize

(32:02):
of Saudi normalization as partof this overall grand bargain to
end the war, to get thehostages back, et cetera, et
cetera.
Not a bad bargain.

Dan (32:11):
I should say yeah, it's true, but I should say, in
fairness to the prime minister,et cetera, et cetera, not a bad
bargain here.
Yeah, it's true, but I shouldsay in fairness to the prime
minister, of course mostIsraelis I know, including those
who have long been supportersor proponents, or at least open
to some sort of two-stateoutcome, are not ready to have
that conversation as long ashostages are held, ready to have

(32:34):
that conversation as long ashostages are held, as long as
Hamas the risk of Hamas hangingon somehow and re-emerging as a
governing authority andthreatening entity in Gaza
remain.
The notion of a Palestinianstate on the model that was
considered through many years ofdiplomacy following the Oslo
Accords, basically in the WestBank and Gaza, and that same
type of entity existingalongside Israel's population

(32:57):
centers in Central Israel, is avery difficult proposition for
most Israelis to absorb.
So I'm not sure, even if it wasa different government, that
this is the right moment forthat.
Certainly we have to get pastthe war, have to get hostages
home and have to get Hamasreliably removed from power in
Gaza.

Neri (33:16):
That's a fair point.
Probably the majority of theIsraeli public doesn't want to
even countenance the idea ofterritorial withdrawals and the
establishment of a realPalestinian state.
But beginning the process,putting together the framework
for making it possible in future, I suppose, with with some kind

(33:36):
of leadership, even even inIsrael, even post October 7th,
maybe, maybe you could sell it.
But like you said, I agree, youknow it would be a hard sell,
given, given the trauma ofOctober 7.

Dan (33:48):
It would be.
And, by the way, any discussionof a pathway I think that's the
word that we sort of landed ona pathway to a future
Palestinian state is going tolook different than all those
post-Oslo negotiations, some ofwhich I took part in.
Territorially security-wise,the timeline will look different

(34:15):
.
It would certainly only bepossible if we knew Hamas was no
longer in power and a reallydifferent and reformed
Palestinian authority was incharge.
So we're not talking about nextyear sort of a handshake on the
White House lawn that creates aPalestinian state.
I don't think in anycircumstance.

Neri (34:31):
Okay, we'll be right back after this brief message.

Speaker 3 (34:34):
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Neri (35:30):
Dan.
Last question, in terms oflooking back, I have to ask,
since you were there in the roomand in the building, set the
record straight for us, if youcould?
A lot of people in Israel, fromthe prime minister on down,
keep saying and I believe it tobe true, that President Biden
and his administration placed anarms embargo on Israel a year

(35:56):
ago due to the offensive inTerafah in southern Gaza and
that now Trump has kind oflifted the embargo, opened the
floodgates.
What's the truth actuallybehind the US weapons and aid
shipments to Israel during thewar, especially under President
Biden?
I know there was one largeshipment or maybe not a large

(36:20):
shipment, but a shipment oflarge bombs.
That was suspended for a time.
But what's the truth behind thespin that many Israelis believe
to be true?

Dan (36:30):
Yeah, the notion of an embargo is nonsense.
Starting immediately, onOctober 7th, president Biden
directed the Pentagon and theState Department, which has an
important role, to accelerate tothe maximum degree the
provision of assistance,assistance that was
pre-positioned in Israel,assistance drawn from US stocks,

(36:50):
israel assistance drawn from USstocks fast-forwarding
processes that normally takeweeks to months or even longer,
to hours to days, and suddenly ahuge, huge flow of weaponry was
coming.
It was all manner, it wasaerial munitions, it was

(37:10):
artillery, it was small arms, itwas really just about
everything that Israel uses andneeds and that was flowing very
quickly in the in the first twoto three months of the war.
At a certain point some of thelower hanging fruit of that
provision had been used up.
That provision had been used up, the US stocks that could be

(37:35):
drawn on without putting USreadiness beyond what it should
normally be kept at.
There were competing demandsfrom Ukraine for certain systems
as well.
So you couldn't do the samesurge in April as you could in
November, just simply because wedidn't have the stuff to search
but the main provision, andthere was a very rigorous

(37:57):
cross-department working groupat the Pentagon to streamline
and cut through normalbureaucratic processes to make
sure that everything flowed asquickly as possible.
Then there's a separate processat the State Department that
requires approvals and then tosend to Congress for
notification.
There is, and President Bidendid use initially, an emergency

(38:20):
procedure to bypass thecongressional notification, but
that's extraordinary and so thecongressional notification.
Sometimes there were somedelays in that.
All concurrent to that, ofcourse President Biden was
pushing to pass the SupplementalAppropriations Bill, which
ultimately passed.
To that, of course PresidentBiden was pushing to pass the
Supplemental Appropriations Bill, which ultimately passed, I
think about April, about $14billion.
Some of that backfilled whathad been previously provided.
Some allowed for new shipments.

(38:43):
So there was a massive supply ofweaponry to Israel to ensure it
could defend itself and fulfillwhat President Biden said was
the requirement to ensure Israelcan respond appropriately to
the October 7th attacks and makesure it can never happen again.
And that was true throughoutthe war.
Now you highlighted the onevery well-known shipment.

(39:05):
There was a shipment of oneship that contained both
2,000-pound bombs and 500-poundbombs.
It was in North Carolina.
These were already Israelimunitions and they were getting
ready to sail.
And there was a certain point Ithink it was early May when
President Biden directed thatthat shipment be paused.

(39:27):
We actually at the Pentagonlearned about it, I think
through the news actually thatthe Pentagon learned about it, I
think through the news and theconcern that he expressed was
that the 2,000-pound bomb inparticular.
There were a number ofoccasions when that munition had
been used in very denselypopulated areas of Gaza and we
know that Hamas embedded itselfwithin and underneath civilian

(39:48):
areas of Gaza and that was oneof the huge challenges Israel
faced.
But there were obviously anumber of cases where, when it
was used, there were significantcivilian casualties and that
was the concern he expressed.
Fairly quickly, the 500-poundbombs were separated from that
shipment and they were provided,and so the remaining pause was
just on the 2,000-pound bombs.

(40:09):
We actually had worked out withDefense Minister Gallant an
agreement that he was coming toWashington to sign.
I think it was in July that hesaid I no longer need that
munition in Gaza.
I do need it for Lebanon, I doneed it for potentially other
situations, the Houthis orelsewhere.

(40:29):
But I'm willing to sign thatI'm not going to use that
munition in Gaza because of theconcern that had been expressed
and we were all set to have himcome and sign that A few days
before Golan's visit, primeMinister Niaou did a video where
he sort of lodged thisallegation of an embargo,
created a very bad environmentto try to do that agreement, as

(40:51):
if the Prime Minister was beingthe president, was being
directed to do that, and so itwas delayed.
We still thought we'd get aroundto signing it.
Unfortunately, we never did getaround to signing it.
It was something we in thePentagon were trying to solve
throughout the remainder of theadministration, but that was the
one very well-known shipmentthat was not provided.
But I think the notion of anembargo is really a misnomer.

Neri (41:15):
Okay, so I'm happy you're here to set the record straight.
Big picture and maybe even on amore personal kind of gut level
, does it make you angry thatIsraelis and even you know,
don't necessarily have have tobe right wingers, but many
Israelis, I want to say mostIsraelis, many Israelis now view

(41:36):
Biden, and before him PresidentObama, as somehow anti-Israel?
Does that make you angry, asyou know someone you personally
know and love Israel?
You've spent many years livinghere.
You speak Hebrew, dan.
Doesn't it drive you crazy whenyou hear this?

Dan (41:57):
When you're President Obama's ambassador to Israel,
you develop kind of a thick skinor you need one going in.
So no, I don't get angry.
Everyone's entitled to theirviews and I've had no shortage
of Israelis expressing theirviews to me, which is totally
fine.
Shortage of Israelis expressingtheir views to me, which is
totally fine.
And I express my views to them.

(42:20):
I think history will bear outthat both administrations were
strong partners to Israel.
There were definitelydisagreements.
Obviously, we know the ones inthe Obama administration won't
go through all that history,they're well known.
But the same administration wasalso a very good partner at
Israel in expanding its strikesin Syria against Iranian weapons
shipments to Hezbollah.

(42:41):
The same administration signeda $38 billion MOU for military
assistance, which I helpednegotiate.
There were a lot of advances inmilitary equipment and training
, the F-35, the funding for IronDome.
All happened during the Obamaadministration.
So I think all that history isalso very relevant and I think

(43:03):
you know President Biden, who ofcourse, spent his whole career
speaking about his emotionalattachment to Israel, calling
himself a Zionist, reallyrecounting in very moving terms
how he learned about Israel'sstory and connected with it and
visited throughout his career.
I think his response to October7th is something that history

(43:24):
will also record was atremendous support, coming to
Israel almost immediately,embracing, literally and
figuratively, the Israelileadership in public, saying
we're with you, we'll stand withyou, and then providing all the
assistance that I mentioned,vetoing multiple UN Security
Council resolutions trying toshort circuit the operations

(43:44):
before without blaming Hamas,which all those resolutions
didn't didn't, making clear thatdefeating Hamas was an absolute
requirement, putting all of thefocus on getting hostages
released.
The first successful deal inNovember of 23,.
And then, unfortunately, a longprocess that didn't produce the
next agreement until near theend of the administration.

(44:05):
So I think the record willdefinitely show that both of
those administrations I'm proudto have served in them were
close partners and delivered onIsrael's essential security
needs.
Had differences were forthright, as friends need to be when we
did, but did so in anappropriate way.

(44:25):
So no, I don't get angry, but Ijust turn back to the fact just
to turn back to the facts.

Neri (44:31):
Very diplomatic, I will express anger on your behalf and
on both of those presidents'behalves, because I agree with
you.
I think the historical recordand the objective facts will
show that both men were hugelysupportive of Israel and friends
of Israel.
We may get back to that in justa second.
Final issue I wanted to tacklewith you, dan and it's a big one

(44:54):
the US-Israel relationship,both the present and future of
the relationship.
I think it's fair to say thatright now, the standing of
Israel in the US and even onCapitol Hill definitely amongst
the far right and also on thefar left Hill, definitely

(45:15):
amongst the far right and alsoon the far left is really really
bad.
It's also debatable how youdefine how far each far right
and far left is these days,given the politics in the States
.
I mean, first off, howconcerned are you about Israel
standing amongst Americans?
In other words, is it just areaction to the past 20 months
of war and the images coming outof Gaza, or is there kind of a

(45:36):
deeper and longer term shift inthe offing there?

Dan (45:40):
I think there would be elements of both.
I mean, obviously, as long as awar of this difficulty and the
violence associated with it.
War is hell and terrible thingshappen in war, associated with
it.
War is hell and terrible thingshappen in war.
It casts a very heavy shadowover the relationship, simply
because that's the main thingpeople think about and talk

(46:01):
about.
Of course, there's a great dealof sympathy and support for
Israel, attacked as it was by aterrorist organization so
brutally on October 7th and withhostages still held, including,
I guess, two deceased Americansamong them.
But at the same time, you knowthe discussion around

(46:22):
humanitarian assistance, whethersufficient aid is getting into
Palestinian civilians somethingwe worked a lot on in the Biden
administration with the supportof the Israeli government,
certainly with the support ofthe IDF and obviously civilian
casualties.
That also is in the part of thediscussion and people are
concerned about that and I thinkanybody who's human should be

(46:45):
concerned about that, whateveryour politics are.
So one question is how muchlonger will this go on and what
direction will it take?
I do think there's a seriousdecision point really that the
president is at and it's evencoming out in real-time news
reporting about whether hereally wants to tell Prime

(47:08):
Minister Netanyahu, or has toldPrime Minister Netanyahu the war
needs to end and, if so, whatleverage he will use to do that?
It seems that the main leveragethey're trying to use is
through the Qataris, on Hamas toagree to a 60-day ceasefire and
release of 10 hostages, butit's pretty clear.
And that, of course, would openup eight spigots as well, but

(47:30):
it's pretty clear.
I think that President Trumpwould hope that, once that
ceasefire occurs, the war doesnot resume at the end of it.
There's an alternative versionof using the leverage that he
has, which is to go to the primeminister and say we can't waste
time on a two-phase deal.
Let's do the deal now that getsall the hostages out and

(47:51):
declares the end of hostilities,even though there will have to
be an ongoing effort to makesure Hamas is dislodged from
power.
That could be done through sideletter between Israel and the
United States, as there wasafter the ceasefire in Lebanon,
so that Israel continued tostrike as needed, and,
importantly, a very upgradeddiplomatic effort with the Arab

(48:12):
states to exile Hamas leadersand fighters from Gaza, really
remove them, send them todistant locations, and then only
under those circumstances doesthe real reconstruction of Gaza
begin.
So that's another optionPresident Trump has had.
Doesn't seem to have taken thatone.
Actually, I think he made avery unforced error in February
when Prime Minister Netanyahuvisited for the first time and

(48:36):
he declared that his goal wasthe Gaza Riviera, the US taking
over Gaza, all Palestiniansleaving Gaza and building the
shape of hotels.
It's never going to happen, andit's pretty clear to him, I
think, by now that it's notgoing to happen.

Neri (48:50):
So I was going to say Trump himself, and I dare say
every other US official workingfor Trump, hasn't even spoken
about this in probably twomonths.

Speaker 3 (48:58):
Correct.

Neri (48:59):
And yet, and yet, speaking to your point, every Israeli
official, senior Israeliofficial, talks about it almost
on a daily basis.

Dan (49:05):
Well, that's right.
So he's emboldened the mostextreme elements of the Israeli
government.
So Smotrich and Ben-Gurion nowthink that's the plan right.
We don't need a day after plan,we have a day after plan.
It's the Trump plan.
And even the current operationseems scoped with this new
humanitarian effort.
That's sort of struggling todeliver, to consolidate the

(49:26):
population in small areas.
Smotrich says openly that's aprelude to them leaving, being
expelled or so-calledvoluntarily.
You're right.
President Trump doesn't talkabout it anymore.
I think he understands.
Actually, if people were forcedto leave, that's ethnic
cleansing, there's no other wordfor it and so he doesn't want
to touch that.
But even Prime MinisterNetanyahu has now said yeah, a

(49:49):
new condition to ending the warnot just getting hostages home
and making sure Hamas is removedfrom power.
Those are legitimate goals ofthe war, but the new condition
is implementation of the Trumpplan.
So I think President Trump'sown initiative here has become
an obstacle to getting to theend of the war, which is part of
changing the discussion andchanging the atmosphere in which

(50:11):
the whole US-Israelrelationship takes place.
Now I don't think there's aquestion that this
administration will continue tobe friendly and supportive of
Israel, and I think majoritiesin Congress will as well.
But, as you said, we've seen, ofcourse, the protests on
campuses over the last year andthere's definitely anti-Semitic
elements to that, certainlyanti-Zionist, and often those

(50:33):
are fused and people calling notjust to end the war or not just
expressing very legitimateconcern about Palestinian
civilians or saying they want tosee Palestinians have their own
state, but actually calling forIsrael's destruction.
When you talk about from theriver to the sea, that's really
talking about removing a Jewishstate.
When you talk about globalizingthe Intifada, that is talking

(50:57):
about violence as a means topursue political ends.
And of course, we've seen theseoutrageous and tragic attacks
in Washington and Boulder,Colorado, just in the last
couple of weeks.
So that's part of thisatmosphere.
But you also mentioned that onthe far right another part of
President Trump's coalition youhave a growing, I think, voices

(51:19):
of skepticism about whetherIsrael is trying to pull the
United States into Middle Eastconflicts, that is, around the
Iran discussions.
You have a new discussion aboutwhether the next MOU Memorandum
of Understanding on US militaryassistance to Israel, which

(51:41):
would in normal times benegotiated over the next year or
so, actually involve a phcountry it can handle itself,
but also on the notion that youknow, maybe enough is enough,
and you hear that from membersof the right wing in the United

(52:02):
States as well.
So I do think that there's workto do to reinforce what have
always been the kind of corecommon values, common interests
of the United States and Israel,kind of core common values,
common interests of the UnitedStates and Israel.
It's not helped by having themost prominent and certainly
most influential members of thecoalition be very extreme in

(52:23):
their politics and how theyexpress that about Gaza,
sometimes very brutally, whatthey seem to be supporting in
the West Bank in terms ofsettlement expansion and
settlement settler violence.
So that's that's not helpingIsrael's image internationally.
It's not helping Israel's imagein the United States and, again

(52:44):
, I think, on both sides of thepolitical spectrum.
So you know, I think all ofthis is something that can be
dealt with.
But you know different Israelileadership.
But you know different Israelileadership, focused American
leadership by both parties and alot of education to our own
public and our own youth thatthere are still these core
interests and core values.
But that has to be expressed inreality.

(53:05):
That has to be expressed in howpeople conduct themselves and
how they speak and how they live.
Again, getting back to theopportunity of expanding
regional integration, expandingIsrael's acceptance and
legitimacy in the region helpspush in the other direction
because it shows that theconflicts are no longer defining

(53:27):
everything about this region,that there's opportunities,
there's growth, there's economicand energy and health and
educational cooperation acrosssocieties.
Palestinians can be folded intothat.
There's no reason that theyhave to be excluded from that.
In fact, I've always felt thatthe best opportunity for
Israelis and Palestinians tofind a future of living together

(53:49):
and they're going to have tofind a future of living together
because no one's going anywhere, have to find a future of
living together because no one'sgoing anywhere is at a table
convened by Arab states whorecognize Israel and are friends
with Israel, as the UAE andBahrain and Morocco already do,
and we hope the Saudis will andothers but who also hold to a
certain commitment to thePalestinian cause as well, with
the United States as a partnerto that, but not necessarily the

(54:11):
main or only convener of that.
That, I think, would do a lotto help create a very different
vision of the region generally,but also lift up the Israeli
story in a very positive waythat many Americans of all sorts
of different politicalpersuasions would be able to
identify with with Absolutely.

Neri (54:39):
But, like you said, I suppose they have to end the war
first.
And, I guess, last question onthat topic Do you truly believe
that the moment is coming soonthat President Trump will come
to Prime Minister Netanyahu andsay, okay, wrap it up, it's done
.
Even if Netanyahu, let's say,agrees, or Israel and Hamas
agree to a 60 day temporaryceasefire, that Trump will
actually bring the hammer downand and say, ok, that's you know

(55:01):
, you're taking the full dealpermanent end to the war, with
something that Bibi has not beenwilling to do in their most
recent phone call.

Dan (55:11):
Obviously, we don't know, we weren't on the call, but the
signals are getting louder thatthe president is looking for a
hostage deal and is willing togo with Netanyahu's preference
of the 60-day 10-hostage dealrather than the full hostage and
full ceasefire deal, but thathe sees that as an exit ramp to

(55:35):
then get into the more permanentconclusion.
That's, of course, been the nubof these negotiations.
Hamas wants absolute guaranteesthat the war won't resume at
the end of the 60 days, and nowhe's not prepared to give those,
at least until now.
It sounds like today maybethere's some hope of a little
bit of narrowing, but it seemsthat President Trump, who speaks
generally about his desire toend wars Of course we know he

(55:58):
speaks about the war in Ukraine,not that he's been very
effective there, but he he wantsit to end.
He wants to avoid a war withIran, whether or not he's
willing to hold that militaryoption, but he's talked about
wanting to be the peacemaker,wanting to to end killing,
wanting to be the peacemakerwanting to end killing.
He's even expressed somesympathy for Palestinians, which

(56:25):
is not to be dismissed thatPalestinian civilians are caught
in a terrible situation in Gaza, between the IDF conducting its
operation and Hamas, sometimesbrutalizing them but also
fighting from within them andmaking them human shields.
So he has, I think, the kind ofinfluence with the prime
minister of the war.
My government will fall becauseSmoltrich and Ben-Gur will

(56:57):
bring it down.
Then it's a question aboutwhether or not he will actually
go along with that.

Neri (57:06):
Yes, it's been a huge question and on that point, this
Netanyahu government may not belong for this world,
irrespective of what happens onthe battlefields of Gaza or the
negotiating tables in Doha.
Having to do with the Haredis,the ultra-Orthodox.
That's a separate issue whichwe won't get into in the time
remaining.
Dan actual last question to youand it's a surprise, because I

(57:29):
didn't prep you for it and againit's more of a personal one.
Maybe I want to take you backto September 30th 2016,.
Mount Herzl, hare Herzl, inJerusalem, the funeral for
Shimon Peres, the former primeminister and president of Israel
.
President Obama gave a eulogythen and there.

(57:50):
That, I think, is, if not oneof the best speeches I've ever
heard, then definitely the mostZionist speech I've ever heard,
and it's not hyperbole when Isay that.
I've said that for many yearsnow.

Speaker 4 (58:04):
Shimon Peres reminds us that the state of Israel,
like the United States ofAmerica, was not built by cynics
.
We exist because people beforeus refuse to be constrained by
the past or the difficulties ofthe present, and Shimon Peres
was never cynical.

(58:24):
It is that faith, that optimism, that belief even when all the
evidence is to the contrary,that tomorrow can be better that
makes us not just honor ShimonPeres but love him.
The last of the foundinggeneration is now gone.

(58:49):
Shimon accomplished enoughthings in his life for a
thousand men.
Shimon accomplished enoughthings in his life for a
thousand men, but he understoodthat it is better to live to the
very end of his time on earthwith a longing not for the past,
but for the dreams that havenot yet come true an israel that
is secure, and a just andlasting peace with its neighbors

(59:10):
.
And so now this work is in thehand of Israel's next generation
.

Neri (59:16):
I urge everyone to go look for that speech.
We're going to put a clip of itin the show notes.
It's simply beautiful andpoetic and poignant and, above
all else, hopeful.
So I've never, I think, broughtthis up in our private
conversations.
But how did that eulogy andspeech come about?

(59:36):
Who wrote it?

Dan (59:39):
I want to hear the backstory and a bad turn and of
course he was President Obama inhis final weeks in office and
you know measuring every minute,you know, to try to maximize

(01:00:03):
what he could get done.
But I said to him, you know wesadly may have a funeral, and he
said, believe me, I will bethere for Shima.
They had a real bond.
President Obama was reallyinspired by President Paris's
vision, his optimism, hishistory of you know kind of all

(01:00:24):
through the history of the stateof Israel, but also his forward
looking optimism and beliefthat peace was possible and
technology was a forward movingmomentum that served Israel and
served the region.
And so there was really noquestion he would come.
Of course, you know, when thepresident died it was, I think,

(01:00:44):
a very short turnaround untilthe funeral, and so the eulogy
was written on the plane.
They took some inputs from theambassador from Israel, but I'm
sure he, and probably Ben Rhodes, did most of the drafting.
But I think he did a lot of thedrafting himself.
Again, this was a very personaldecision for him.
He was on the ground in Israelfor all of about six hours

(01:01:07):
because of other commitments hehad on both ends in the United
States, but he was not going tomiss it, and he took the
opportunity, as you heard andjust very beautifully recounted,
to express what Shimon Peres'life and their friendship meant
to him about the man, but alsoabout the story of Israel and

(01:01:28):
the story of the US-Israelrelationship, and so everything
expressed in that speech, Ithink, came from him very, very
personally.

Neri (01:01:34):
Israel relationship, and so everything expressed in that
speech I think came from himvery, very personally.
That's exactly what I was goingto say, that it wasn't just
about the man and his life, butalso looking to the future.
Also, president Obama got intothe similarities and there were
similarities between his journeyand Shimon Peres' journey, uh,
but really the the future ofisrael as shimon paris saw it

(01:01:56):
and wanted it to be, and,coupled with that, uh, the
history and future of the usisrael relationship.
Um, and and really it's aremarkable document.
I actually watched bits of iton youtube uh, earlier today in
preparation for this, for thisuh interview and podcast, so
we're going to have a link tothat in the show notes.

Dan (01:02:17):
Thanks for the memory.
I'll go back and take a look atit myself.
It's remarkable.

Neri (01:02:21):
Dan.
With that, I'll let you go.
I know you have a busy day backin Washington, but thank you so
much for doing this.

Dan (01:02:30):
Thanks, nery, my pleasure.

Neri (01:02:31):
Take care, talk to you soon.
Okay, thanks again toAmbassador Dan Shapiro for
Thanks, nery, my pleasure and,most importantly, thank you for

(01:02:55):
listening.