Gary Hamel - Humanocracy Finale Reinventing Roche

In this episode, we conclude the comprehensive series on Gary Hamel and 'Humanocracy,' diving deep into the principles and practices that can transform entrenched bureaucracies into more dynamic and innovative organizations. Host Aidan interviews Gary Hamel to discuss the persistent issue of bureaucracy stifling economic growth and the groundbreaking transformation at Roche as a case study. The conversation covers the increasing bureaucracy in global companies, the decline in productivity, and innovative methods like outcome-based planning and cross-functional squads to elevate organizational efficiency. The episode also emphasizes personal accountability and offers actionable steps for leaders aiming to foster a more adaptive and resilient work environment. This informative discussion is a must-watch for CEOs and business leaders looking to revolutionize their companies.

 

00:00 Introduction and Giveaway Announcement

00:52 The Problem with Bureaucracy in Organizations

06:16 Case Study: Roche's Transformation

11:16 Leadership Reboot and Principles at Roche

20:31 Implementing Change: Design Teams and I Squads

26:34 Outcome-Based Planning and Resource Allocation

29:53 Resource Allocation and Organizational Ethos

31:16 Resilience in the Face of Challenges

32:59 Leadership and Change Management

37:47 Cross-Functional Squads and Collaboration

42:43 Patient-Centric Approach

46:31 Personal Accountability and Bureaucracy

50:30 Experimentation and Innovation

56:22 Conclusion and Final Thoughts

 

Find Gary 

https://www.garyhamel.com

Episode Transcript

(00:00):
Before we launch into the finale ofboth this series on Gary Hamel and
indeed the finale of the three partepisode on Humanocracy, I wanna tell
you there's a copy up for grabs ifyou sign up to the innovation show.io.
Or you go to the substack and sign up.
I'm giving away a copy of Humanocracy,the new edition with each episode, and

(00:22):
I wanna thank our sponsor,  Kyndryl. Kyndryl have just dropped their biannual
journal that features many of the world'sbest thought leaders, including policy
leaders, AI leaders, guests of theshows such as Rita McGrath, and you can
find that at ww.Kyndryl.com/institute.
welcome back to the finaleof both Humanocracy.

(00:44):
The new edition has just dropped, and tothis series on the tome of Gary Hamel.
Hey, Aidan.
Nice to be back.
I thought a great way to finishwould be first to talk about why
humanocracy, have we not learned anylessons about the bureaucracy and
how it's weighing down organizations?
Why at this point I. In economic growth,are we talking about bureaucracy still?

(01:10):
The second then is the Roche Brilliantcase study and Roche show dramatic
results as a result of eliminatingbureaucracy and more so leaning
into human ocracy and then finallyholding up the mirror to ourselves.
How do we look at ourselves anddecide, are we contributing to this?
Are we contributing to whatyou call bureauscolrosis.

(01:33):
So they're the threethings to get stuck in.
The very first is, why are we stilltalking about this in the first place?
you know, we talked about before, Aidan,that around the world, you know, , we
see the growth of the bureaucraticclass, the number of managers,
administrators, is going far fasterthan all other employment categories.
And we've talked a littlebit about why that is.
What you see is I wouldkind, I might call it

(01:55):
The epidemic of mediocrity.
A growing number of global thousandcompanies are proving themselves
unable to grow as fast as theGDP and that's not stripping out
all the mergers and acquisitions.
If I look at the us if I go backover the last decade, just the
last decade in the United States55 out of the top hundred companies

(02:22):
by revenue.
55, more than half failed togrow as fast as GDP, which
is not that high of a target.
If you take the previous decade,like 2003, up to 20 13, only 20% of
companies failed to grow as fast as GDP.
And when you look at the laggards, they'reall, they're names that viewers or our
viewers and our listeners around theworld will recognize , companies like.

(02:44):
Proctor and Gamble, IBM, WalmartCoca-Cola, Boeing and so on.
And many of these companies, in fact,virtually all of them have spent over that
last decade or so, have spent more money, on deals and share buybacks than they've
spent on r and d and capital investment.
And so that's, that's not verygood when your organization

(03:04):
can't go as fast as the economy.
Secondly there's increasing data orsome very good data from two researchers
Germán Gutiérrez and Thomas Philippon.
And they looked Aidan at whatthey call the American superstars.
So these are , the top companiesby market value in the economy
overall, and then the top companiesby market value in each sector.

(03:26):
And they found thatover the last 20 years.
The productivity of these companieshas declined by 40% and that actually
these what you would expect to bethe bleeding edge of the US economy.
They're now a drag.
On productivity and partly becauseall these organizations, all
these companies are monopolies.

(03:47):
They're oligopolies, but they're notnecessarily all that, that productive.
And recently if you look at Microsoftand Meta and so on, they're all going
through major rounds of layoffs.
Tried to correct that.
Finally, and I think we have talkedabout this, but in this context,
maybe worth coming back to this.
Is that around the world, largecompanies are becoming more entrenched.

(04:08):
I don't think there's any moreevidence that they're more resilient
or creative or innovative, butthey are becoming more entrenched
and less likely to be disrupted.
We looked at this in the US where Eachyear, going back to 2000, we took the
top a hundred companies by revenue.

(04:29):
And then we asked for how many yearshad those companies been in that list of
the top a hundred, going back a decade.
So if you take the decade from, ending in2000 45 of the top a hundred US companies
had been on the list of the a hundred forall of the previous 10 years back to 1991.
You run that now, startingin 20 24 and 75% of them.

(04:54):
Have been in the top a hundred forevery year, going back to , 20 15.
So, as these companies becomemore entrenched and we just
saw they're not very dynamic.
The whole economy loses its dynamism andyou see this around the world because
these companies are just getting bigger.
They have a lot ofpolitical power and so on.
So, yeah, I think there's definitely areason to be concerned that this problem

(05:14):
is not getting any better, and thatwe're gonna have to dig deep and have a
pretty solid commitment to changing this.
If we wanna reverse the productivityslump if we want to have faster growing
economies and if we just wanna havelike more choices as consumers and more
innovation and so on it's not good whencompanies are so deeply entrenched that

(05:35):
they can take the consumer for grantedand don't really have to compete.
So, yeah, we, I don't think we've yetreached the turning point on this.
So we still have a problem.
But the good news is and you alludedto this many times throughout the
series, there are chinks of light.
And big, big companies, companies that have a legacy.

(05:58):
Who have been around for a very longtime, who have managed to do this,
and it didn't happen overnight.
That's a big, piece of this.
But for the skeptics who werekind of going, yeah, yeah,
that's all good for them.
It isn't easy, but thereturns are massive and
I want to talk here directly to the CEOs.
The impact of Roche'stransformation has been remarkable.

(06:20):
In 2023, Genentech's revenueswere 24% higher than they'd been
five years earlier, and ROI wasup 27% despite a patent cliff.
This remarkable result wasachieved with 22% fewer people.
The resulting part of a deepcommitment to layering that Gary
talked about throughout this series.

(06:42):
The changes in Pharma internationalhave been equally dramatic, the
changes freed up $3 billion peryear which Roche have put into r
and d which is just an incredibleendorsement for the transformation.
And I'd love you to take us through this.
Maybe give us a little bit of a history.
Gary, you've done hundreds of hoursof interviews with the executives

(07:03):
involved, but also you've discovered thisbrilliant case study, which has led to
their new edition of the book as well.
so Roche is I think now the secondlargest pharma company in the world.
They have about 150,000employees in 156 countries.
So obviously a very large,very complex company.
I often when I'm talking aboutthese issues, Aidan, the pushback

(07:27):
is, well, we have all thisbureaucracy because of regulation.
Well, pharmaceuticals is one of themost highly regulated industries in
the world, and even there, when Rochebegan to dig into things, they found
that at least three quarters of kindof the excess bureaucracy had nothing
to do with external regulation.
It was all kind ofself-imposed, self-inflicted.

(07:49):
Like every farm, like everybig pharma company over recent
years, they faced a whole bunchof challenges around the world.
Healthcare authorities are basically goingbankrupt as the cost of medicine goes up.
They've had a swarm of new biotechcompetitors about between two thirds and
three quarters of all new drugs comingto market now come out are invented by

(08:11):
relatively small or organ organizations.
And back in 2016, 17, Roche wasreally feeling these pressures and
adding to that was the fact that threeof their biggest drugs, which were
bringing in about $22 billion a year.
We're gonna go off patent within the nextfew years, what they call a patent cliff.

(08:32):
They were also undergoing ashift from in their portfolio.
They historically been very strongin cancer, drugs and oncology.
They were be beginning to moveinto other drug categories.
More, more therapeutic drugs, forexample, for multiple sclerosis.
Which meant that you were treatingchronic conditions and had to have a co
completely different level of patientsupport over, could be multiple years.

(08:57):
And so all of this, they realize that likemore of the same was not gonna cut it.
And I just wanna back up for a moment,because this situation is not unique.
You know,, every company out thereis living on borrowed time, if
you have the guts to like face thefuture as it is to really unpack
what's our existing economic model,what's driving our revenue, whatever.
And you're willing to be honest aboutthat, I can guarantee you're gonna see

(09:19):
a lot of those things are running outtasteam and you have to start, working.
Now I, I think about, where the Germaneconomy is right now, where they've had
now a dozen years of rapidly declining,flattening, now negative productivity
growth, and they're struggling,to get themselves back on track.
And then if you go back, you lookat, highly dependent on Russian
energy, how long is that gonna last?

(09:41):
Highly dependent on the Chinese consumer.
. That may not like, so if you'rewilling to be honest about where
you sit as an organization.
will always be a, you know, it doesn'thave to be an incipient crisis, but
there will always be a real urgency thatyou should have just given the kind of
chaotic complex nature of our environment.
So they, they could see that coming.

(10:02):
And I think what made it reallyunique is at that time bill Anderson,
who was, I think as the storybegins as the CEO of Genetech.
So that was, that is Lily,the world's first biotech
company, a California company.
He was a CEO there.
I'd spoken at Genetech, multipletimes about the issues we're talking

(10:24):
about here, and I'd met Bill and hewas super unique in the sense that he
was not satisfied with half measures.
He wasn't satisfied with, Hey, let'sput another plaster on this, or let's go
through another round of restructuring,or another round of process improvement.
And I might have mentioned earlier inthe series, one of the things he said,
which takes a lot of humility and a lot ofguts, which very few leaders are willing

(10:47):
to say, he said, I had to conclude thatthere was a problem with the whole system.
Because they had been working by thistime, they've been working for multiple
years on trying to embed the principlesAgile, which is a, super good thing to do.
They, this is obviously a very smartcompany filled with PhDs and smart people.
Obviously highly motivated todo the right thing for patients.

(11:08):
And despite that, he said.
People were telling me theycould not get things done.
We were, too slow, tooinwardly focused and so on.
So the process really starts with abig leadership reboot 2017 and 18.
And their hr head at the time led this.

(11:28):
And they, it was a problem,a program called Kinesis.
they started by bringing a fewhundred of the top leaders together.
And then it, went out from there and theybrought them together about 25 at a time.
But what they really want, what theywere really asking is if we want
to build a faster, more vital moreresilient organization, what needs
to change in what we do as leaders?

(11:51):
I don't know how often.
Leaders step back and really say,Hey, maybe the problem is us.
Or maybe, maybe before we can askthe organization to change, we have
to change in some deep fundamentallevel, but probably not often enough.
So they, they did peerassessments among the leaders.
And the question they werebasically trying to get at is how

(12:16):
as a leader do you have impact?
How, where do you spend your time?
How do you think you succeedin the role of being a leader?
And there are basically kindof two dimensions to this.
Like a you know, four quadrants Aidan.
One was, how much of your time doyou spend kind of in task mode, just,
you know, working on specific tasks?
How much of your time do you spendin relationship mode where you're

(12:37):
mentoring and encouraging and so on.
So that was one.
Are you task focused orrelationship focused?
The other dimension was, do you spendmost of your time reacting, right?
Emergencies, problems coming in,you're in basket or do you spend
more time kind of creating, lookingforward, building capability and so on?
So if you think about, those, youknow, tasks versus relationship

(12:58):
reacting versus creating
obviously these assessments, when youunpack 'em, most of their leadership
team was in that task orientation,reacting mode, which, like all of us
are in that mode a lot of the time.
You gotta get stuff done.
But what I think there are acouple of epiphanies for them.
One is, hey, we have a lot of good peoplein this company who can get work done.

(13:23):
And can respond to emergencies and so on.
That is not our job.
Our job is not to be down in kind ofthat that managing administrating space.
You know, we are, we're supposedto be looking out to the future
and building new capabilities.
also recognition that, being inthat space ultimately exhausts you.

(13:43):
You know, when you have a very large andcomplex company and you're sitting at
the top, the number of issues, problems,and so on, you have to worry about
is literally like close to infinite.
all these people, , these leaders,they're working, 12, 15 hour days.
And yet they never can seemto be on top of things.
They're, perpetually exhausted becausethey're just trying to do like too much.

(14:03):
So I think that was, and after thisassessment, as they bring these groups
of 25 or so together, they lay out thislike grid that was in a circle form,
but these quadrants, they lay that outin a big kind of map on the ground.
And they asked people to go standin the space that represented
how their peers viewed them.
And of course, pretty much everybodyends up in that kind of managing space

(14:25):
and not in kind of the leading space.
So I think you know, there was a lotof insight that was driven there.
Now, again, what I think wasvery different about what they
did and a testament to theperseverance at Roche and.
You cannot overemphasizethat word of perseverance.
They recognized that, like changing theway they showed up for the organization,

(14:47):
prototyping their future selves, gettingout of that, that kind of managing
box, that that was gonna take a lotof work and they had to change the
way they thought about their jobs.
They had to change the way theyinteracted with their teams.
They had to change some of their habits.
You know, let me ask the really toughquestions and intervene and show that
I getting control and give orders.

(15:08):
And that wasn't gonna happen overnight.
So both in Genentech, which representsRoche in the United States and then
in their international pharmaceuticalbusiness, these leaders spent
multiple days together over thecourse of the next year, kind of
thinking about what do we change?
And that activity had a few things.
One is outlining some firststeps that they could take.

(15:30):
Little things that they coulddo that kind of put them on this
path of changing their role.
For example, just learning to ask a lotmore questions in meetings, learning
to not make a decision right away.
Learning to push decisionsback down and so on.
And so.
They would all commit to doing that.
They'd go out for a week ortwo, they'd work on that.
They'd come back together.
They'd talk about, youknow, how's that going?

(15:51):
What's difficult?
What am I having to learn?
So that was very muchpart of what they did.
They also spent a lot of time in thatfirst year thinking about what are
the principles around which we wanna,you know, reinvent our organization.
And I, I, you know, I, I arguedbefore Aidan, in our conversations.
That you get to a point inany organization, any field

(16:13):
where you can't solve the newproblems with the old principles.
And I think Roche, to their credit,they realize that they realize.
You have to go back tothe level of principles.
It's not all, well, let's justfind another practice or let's,
you know, do another reorg.
It's like, no, no, no.
We have to start with a whole differentset of principles that are not based
on bureau bureaucratic thinkingof everything has to be perfect.
And control is exerted from above.

(16:35):
And everybody spends most of theirenergy kind of reporting to a manager
and figuring out what they want.
So the initial of principles they cameout with, and this evolved over time.
But the first principle, whichis also the first principle in
humanocracy is, everyone needsto think and act like an owner.
And that means you have to have autonomy,you have to have decision rights.

(16:57):
You have to understand the businessin kind of a holographic way rather
than in a narrow, functional way.
But that was number one.
And they knew that if they didn'tget that right, nothing else happens.
Number two was everybody needs tobe relentlessly patient focused.
That for them was way more than justsaying, yeah, we got an, obviously
we take care of patients and wegotta kind of think about that.

(17:19):
In most organizations it would only besalespeople or in this case the people
who interact with physicians and medicalaffairs who would really be explicitly
everyday thinking about the patient.
And Roche wanted to changethat just as at hire.
They wanted everybody tohave a patient facing role.
And where this would evolve to theybegan to look at every single activity

(17:41):
across the company and ask, is thisreally making a difference for patients?
And if it wasn't like,why are we doing this?
There better be a really,really good justification.
Because if you can't draw line, whateveryour functional, whatever your role,
if you cannot draw a direct line.
Between what you're doing, notlike some squiggly line of maybe it
will impact it and maybe one day.
And what if you can draw a fairly directline between what you're doing and how

(18:03):
it makes lives better for patients?
Why the heck are we doing this?
So that was the second principle.
third principle, again, easyto state, but spent a lot of
time working this through us.
I need to be able to partnerwell with colleagues.
So I, I think, and act like an owner.
I'm relentlessly patient focused, andI, I partner well with colleagues.

(18:23):
Now behind that was a recognition thatthey wanted to build an organization
that was far more lateral than vertical.
And so, you know, fewer layers, butmuch denser connections around, you
know, people who are working on thesame disease categories around the world
and all of their country organizations.
How do we share all that learning?
How do we.
Accelerate the pace of improvement,and that means we, we have

(18:46):
to be able to partner well.
And then the fourth principle isI'm empowered and act decisively.
And that was really around the factthat, everybody needs to step up.
You need to be able to takepersonal risks in your career.
You cannot delegate up.
You cannot wait for somebody to tell you,you know, that just slows everything down.
We have to have people who are actionoriented and, , move at a high tempo.

(19:08):
So there was about a year or so morewhere that was the work of the leadership
team and I they did it slightlydifferently between the US and Europe.
I think in the US maybe theywere spending one day to get
together every week in Europe.
Maybe it was a day, every fortnightor so on, but you think of the typical
leadership team in any business,you know, small, medium or large.

(19:29):
How much time do they actuallyspend together in a week or a month?
it's actually not very much.
And here they were sayinglike, guys, this is big work.
It is not work that any oneof us can do alone, right?
This is like gonna be so emotionally,intellectually, personally challenging.
Like, we gotta link up arms,do this together, and so on.
And out of this came afundamental redefinition of

(19:54):
the senior team , in Roche.
In Pharma International.
, I believe that the, I'm pretty, I'm surethat the top leaders the, the business was
led by, by wonderful Irishman por Ward.
They abandoned their titles, the tophalf a dozen people, and they said,
we're not gonna be part of a larger

(20:16):
international network enabling team.
You know, our role isenabling, not controlling,
huge shift in, in the mindset.
And and they wanted, again, theywanted to be more like a community
than like the top of the pyramid.
the way they got started I. In,both the US and in Europe, they
had design teams coming together.

(20:38):
These , were teams that of 10or 12 people that had been drawn
from across the organization.
They represented a diagonalslice of the organization.
And in putting together those teams,they were super conscious about
making sure all the various aspectsof the business were represented.
And again, the teams.
Did their work slightly differently.
I'll maybe give you an amalgam,but the teams would come together.

(21:03):
I believe for the start it was acouple of weeks in a hotel room, like
just, working on, okay, how do youtranslate these principles into action?
And the work of thoseteams was very transparent.
So even when they're holed up in ahotel room, getting started on this.
Daily, they're reaching out to colleagues.

(21:25):
Does this make sense?
What do you think?
This is the conversation we had today.
Are we on the right track?
They would hold kind of townhalls where anybody could dial
in and ask questions and comment.
As the team was doing the work,they would put up kind of quick
pulse polls to test ideas.
People reflecting back on thisprocess said it was by far the most
transparent and engaging change processever in the history of Roche and.

(21:48):
That is absolutely critical in reducingthe elapsed time for making real change.
Because if people know what you'rethinking about, what problems
you're trying to solve, whatalternatives you're looking at, , how
did you get to these answers?
you end up is way more credible andunderstandable than if some team is
working in a black box and go like,surprise, here's like what we're

(22:10):
gonna do next as an organization.
So, so,
very, very transparent.
Roche had been fairly functionallyorganized and a lot of kind of
powerful top level functionsrelated to the drug industry around.
medical affairs patientaccess, digitization and so on.
And so they wanted to kind of breakthose functional silos up, so they

(22:33):
created what they called I squads.
These were teams of about adozen people could be more.
There were only two or threethat were really permanent.
The head of that ice squad and everybodyelse was just a member of that team.
The head of the ice Squad, each ice squadis built around a therapeutic class, a
category of drugs, one or more drugs.

(22:54):
But the point was we are now.
All mutually and severally responsiblefor the results of this business.
It had been that the sales team, thecommercial team, which had before been
the kind of the core of the business.
They were responsible for results.
But all these functions around 'em werereally responsible for other things, you
know, for helping out or building programsor providing data, which may or may not be

(23:17):
helpful, actually helpful to those teams.
And so part of what they didin informing the I squads, they
said more or less explicitly.
want to kind of shift the matrix.
We want to, I don't wanna say blowup, but we in some sense wanna
disaggregate those functions and we'regonna put all of those functional

(23:37):
people onto these I squad teams.
So now my primary responsibility is toa business team, not to my function.
The function still existed.
They would still get together.
Another critical thing theydid fairly early on is.
of the functions now.
Now, imagine as, as a corollary,imagine the kind of HR and accounting
and IT and finance, whatever show upin front of like line people running

(24:00):
the business and say, here's what we'redoing, here's where we're investing.
Like how much of this is useful?
Well, that happened at Roche.
I. Where all these functions had tocome and present to these business
focus teams, these ice squadsand say, this is our roadmap.
These are the capabilities we're building.
This is, do you wanna buy this or not?
So it really became a two-sided marketwhere if the people actually trying to.

(24:22):
Deliver benefit to the customerscould not find value in a lot
of that functional activity.
They just like, like they quit that.
A very critical move was at one point theyblew up all the international divisions.
they had added divisions in Europe,middle East and Africa, and Asia
and Latin America and so on.
They disbanded those several Ithink close to a thousand people

(24:45):
were moved out of those roles.
They said that's just like another layerof accounting consolidation and we're
just mimicking what's going on at headoffice anyway, so they got rid of that.
But to ensure that there was a lotof coordination, collaboration,
they established, I'm gonna seeif I can remember, I think it
was called the Network Enabling.

(25:06):
Office, I'll probably havethis wrong, so apologies.
But essentially what they didwas they, they created a team.
Drawn from around the world ofaround 50 people who were responsible
for looking at opportunities forcollaboration across geographies.
And they had sparkers within thoseteams who were supposed to find these
opportunities, spark conversations,and then get lateral teams set up.

(25:30):
So for example, you might find multiplecountries who are working to improve
access to breast cancer screening.
And so they find that,put these teams together.
And then those teams wouldwork on a shared problem.
So the goal was how do we, ratherthan being another layer and trying to
direct all the country organizations,how do we create a team that will

(25:51):
look for shared problems and energizethose teams to come up with solutions?
That was like an enormous change in
And by the way, Aidan, of thesethings, you know, they all took time.
They, they didn't takelike a lot of resources.
It wasn't that, you know, I meanthe teams were relatively small.
They'd come togetherfor a couple of weeks.
The design teams, they'd workon this, they'd go back into the

(26:11):
organization, have a lot moreconversations, are we on the right path?
Would come back and have another round.
And so a lot of the things likethe I squads and these ideas
came out of these design teams.
But
but they were, they were workingexplicitly on the management
model in every aspect of that, ina way that very seldom happens.

(26:32):
So other things that came out of this.
Was outcome-based planning.
And so they started to realize that theywere, as many organizations do, they were
spending an enormous amount of time everyyear kind of building up forecasts, doing
plannings, going up and down the pyramidto try to get alignment and you know, and
out for the next 12 months and beyond.

(26:54):
And like, it just didn'tmake any difference.
Nobody paid any attention to it.
It was like basicallya huge waste of time.
so for a bit they experimentedwith no planning at all.
That didn't seem to be the right answer,but what they ended up was something
they call outcome-based planning.
And it works in kind of a simple way.
Each year, the senior team ofRoche Pharma, again, through a

(27:16):
lot of consultation and listening.
Will identify what they think arethree or four big themes, big areas for
improvement, areas where they need to moveforward as they're running the business.
they do not like try to put plans.
They don't roll out sub changeprocess around those, but they just
let people know these are the thingsthat are gonna be really important.
every country organization,every affiliate is.

(27:40):
Charged with turning those into90 day sprints, 90 day plans.
So if we take this seriously,what do we do over the next 90
days to move in that direction?
And how will we measure our outcomes?
And so you imagine over many countries,all of those outcome-based plans are
online and transparent, and everybodycould see, oh, that's how they're dealing
it, or that, isn't that interesting?

(28:01):
They're ideal.
Let's collaborate on thatand work on that together.
And so rather than having kind of this.
Accounting, exercise, budgeting,exercise, which nobody paid attention
to, is now a very fast pace of90 or a hundred day sprints where
everybody's reporting to everybody else.
We know the progress we're making.
And so just the clock speed of thewhole organization picked up a lot.

(28:23):
of the other very important changes theymade was in how they allocate resources.
So, as you'd know in manyorganizations in the budgeting
process, different businesses,geographies, they compete for budget.
You have a budget that'snow your money for the year.
Maybe you can get a little more, butyou're sure as hell gonna spend everything

(28:44):
you have and and you're gonna hangonto it and you're gonna protect it.
And like, these are my people.
This is by my money.
That makes it extraordinarily difficult toreallocate talent and capital as the world
changes, which inevitably inevitably does.
So a Roche ended up on this wassomething called Signals and Sources.
And the way it works is this, allof those leaders of the iSquads, the

(29:06):
people running all the big productyou know, the drug categories.
They get together every month and theyreview the performance of every single
business that's represented there.
So not a business reviewing witha boss, but these are peers, all
these business reviewing with eachother and looking at where are, and
also prioritizing opportunities.

(29:28):
So very critical part of thatmeeting, and it's, it is backed up
by finance people, but it's for themto identify and rank the top 10.
Opportunities for Rocheover the next month or so.
So where do we see anopportunity to grow this drug?
Or where do we see a challenge?
then they look at where the resources are.
So someone might say, you know what?
I have this great opportunity to growmy market with this particular drug.

(29:51):
We're really short on training resources.
Somebody else might say, you know what?
I have $500,000 excess tradingbudget that I'm not gonna need
or would be better spent here.
And the ethos is nobody owns resources.
They are owned collectivelyor we all own resources.
They're owned collectively.
And our job as a senior team is not tofight our corner, protect our budget.

(30:14):
Our job is to get the resourcesbehind the biggest opportunities
as quickly as possible.
So it is a huge kind of antidote toparochialism, by the way, they're all paid
in the same way based on company success.
It's a huge antidote toparochialism and again.
I've said this, I dunno, Aidan, for agood part of my career, it amazes me that

(30:36):
in most middle or large organizations,if I went around the people running the
business, running the product lines,geography, and I said, are the five or six
largest opportunities for your company?
I would not get the same lists.
Well, I know what I'm doing.
I know it's important here.
Like, that's just like bogusbecause you have to understand the

(30:56):
list for the whole institution.
So you move resources behind those things.
And again, the ethos is once we understandwhat those are, if somebody like a number
one, number number two opportunity comesto me, anywhere in the organization,
says, Hey Gary, I need some help.
Its incumbent on me to deliver that help.
Rather than say, it's not my problem.
I'm already too busy, I can't do it.
So that was a huge step to creating amuch more resilient organization that

(31:22):
can redeploy resources much faster.
So, as you say a very deep changeprocess elapsed time we've covered
now is about three to four years.
You talked about the results earliernow because of the patent cliff, I
think and general pressures on pharma,I don't think their share price has made

(31:44):
a whole lot of progress over that time.
again, being resilient doesn'talways mean you're gonna be able
to deliver above average growth.
There's sometimes things going on inthe environment, which you simply,
you know, you just, they're just gonnabe a drag on your business and you do
your best or you'll sell off a businessthat's underperforming is just like
no longer fits with your portfolio.

(32:05):
So I think the successes is the fact that.
They coped with an enormoushit to the revenue line and
end up with profits are up.
Growth is way up.
Headcount is way down.
They didn't go through any masslayoffs, but they certainly learned
how to do a lot more with less.
So, you know, it's hard for me toargue that if you can do it in a

(32:30):
company with 156 affiliates aroundthe world and regulators in every
country that you can't do this inwhatever business you know you're in.
It's an incredible story and I love, man,I, this is why I love talking to you.
You recalled all of that'cause you did all the work.
You had No.
Researcher going, doing the work for you.

(32:50):
You did it yourself and you goteverything right by the way there.
You, the neo, the
good.
'cause I'm not lookingat my notes or anything
I know.
It's brilliant.
It's brilliant and I just wantedto bring it back 'cause one of
the things I always have to remindmyself here is if you're a CEO, we've
loads of CEOs listen to the show.
You're looking at this andgoing, oh my God, that's a lot

(33:12):
of work and we're not masking it.
It is a lot of work and like Gary said,first, like, I just wanna strip it
right back as, as you say to the studs.
From the background.
This means putting budget in place.
And you and I, Gary, like I'm followingin your footsteps, but I work as a
consultant and oftentimes when you'resaying you need to do more work,

(33:36):
they think you're trying to sell andyou're kind of going, no, this takes
massive persistence, as you said here.
25% of time allocated by seniorpeople in the organization.
And one of the lines I pulled outwas from the Irish man, Padraic
Ward, who's now head of RochePharma, Europe, and International.
He said the work of reshapingleadership roles and behaviors

(33:58):
was immensely time consuming.
And he actually went to far to say.
He, he felt it was a bit of a pain, , thiswas really time consuming for him, and
they wondered where the value would be.
And I just wanted to point to that.
The two things there, the willingness,so you're Roche, you acquire in 1990, I
think it was Genentech Anderson's the CEO.

(34:19):
Then he then says, okay, well if you wantme to do this, I, I'm gonna do it my way.
I need huge amount of resources.
And maybe he didn't say thatupfront, but then the company
did it and they got behind it.
And that rarely happens because that takessuch a shift of mindset in the company.
Well, and I want to say, I, I, I wouldonly caveat that with a couple things.

(34:41):
Well, maybe one thing,
the real resource that drove this was theenergy and the time of the senior team.
And yes, the design teams would goaway and I think ultimately, and they
didn't start them all at the same time.
They were staggered.
I think they ultimately had eight,eight or nine of those design teams.
And given the size of the organization,, and given that you're spending,

(35:02):
you know, billions and billions ofdollars a year on R&D and so on.
This wasn't enough of a financialinvestment to probably be a decimal
place within Roche, but it was acommitment of, of senior people and
it was a challenging and difficultthing for them to go through.
So, you've heard me say before whenI look at a change process like this,

(35:22):
I always describe it as revolutionarygoals and evolutionary steps.
And one of the leaders, one of thechange leaders in this process said,
we knew we'd have to go back to thestuds, meaning back to the framing.
I think I mentioned that in our lastconversation, you know, at one level
that sounds like incredibly scary.
Like what We're gonna, the image isa road that somebody's, pulled up and

(35:45):
we're doing construction and the road'snot passable for the next nine months.
Right.
Like, that's when yousay, we gotta go back.
It didn't happen that way.
The business is running, they'resucceeding, they're selling.
And everything that came out of this,they tried as an experiment, right?
It wasn't like, okay, let'sredo this for the whole company.
And, I think there's a thought,I've heard some at Roche say, well,

(36:07):
it would've been better if we hadthis more planned out in upfront.
It would've been better if Europe andUS were more connected or international
US were more connected on this.
Yes and no.
I think the fact that.
They didn't try to predetermine.
It meant they had, they gotmuch more creative solutions.
The fact that they let someparallel streams run to see

(36:27):
what's really gonna work.
So in any kind of change process, youwant to diverge before you converge.
And ultimately, yeah, let's find thebest way and let's try to replicate that.
But don't believe that you have toroll something out from the start
that looks the same everywherebecause you've just lost.
An enormous amount of learningopportunity when you do that.

(36:48):
And I think they had, byluck or by wisdom, they let
that thing play out that way.
So step by step, nothing blew up.
No big operational disasters no regulatoryproblems, but the perseverance, and
recognizing that, yeah, in the end.
will change everything, right?
Not right away.

(37:08):
Not in ways that blow upthe system, but, if, yeah.
So that was, I think, what makes thiskind of unique story equivalent to what
happened at higher, perhaps not quite asradical, but but in a Western context.
And one of the things we talked aboutwas that over time somebody makes it up.

(37:30):
Somebody made up the systems thatwe live with today, somebody lived
up at a certain period of time.
You talked about in a previousepisode, John Locke, for example.
He just made it up and then weall are stuck with these things.
And really that's what I tookfrom this, is that they made
up these ways of working.
And one of the ones I just reallywanted to double click on before we

(37:50):
move on to looking in the mirror forourselves is the cross-functional squads.
You mentioned the I Squad, which theI stands for integrated, but there
was first the squad and how that tooka massive mindset shift across the
organization to go, you're no longer adepartment, you're now a squad working

(38:10):
together from different departmentsto take on a certain challenge or
look at a point of bureaucracy andgo, we're gonna eradicate that.
I'd love you just to explain thata little bit, because maybe that's
something people can take away.
Yeah.
Now at one level, what theydid has been done before.
I mean, they were essentially moving froma very much a functional organization.

(38:31):
We had commercial and sales and stafffunctions to one that was, around these
I squads, these integrated business.
You know, in years past Honda andToyota did things like that, you know,
the auto companies used to be highly,highly functionally organized, and
then they started organizing 'em aroundmodels and so on, and engineering and
finance and so on, all on the same page.
So in that sense, you could argue,yeah, okay, maybe some other

(38:52):
organizations have done this.
think the deeper principlethere is recognizing that.
If what you want is collaboration, if youwant the best possible outcomes that is
not gonna happen through centralization.
It's gonna happen through more laterality,more collaboration, everybody having

(39:13):
the same in information, everybodygoing after the same targets.
And so I think that was kind, that, thatwas definitely the breakthrough there.
So.
In any organization, you'll find silos.
I mean, you can, reorganize,but you just end up with silos
running in a different direction.
So the question is, how do youbuild a more lateral organization?
And for that, as we talked about,I think with Nucor, there's

(39:34):
just no substitute for FaceTime.
There's no substitute fortransparency of information.
There's no substitute for having,all focused on the same targets and
spending enough time together soyou build reciprocity and trust.
So yeah, that was
very difficult thing for them todo, but I think it was something

(39:55):
that was ultimately necessary.
So yeah, I don't want to say that, whatRoche did is the one way of doing this,
because what you have to take out of hereis the principles around, hey, if the
leaders do not change their roles and theway they show up, you're gonna be stuck.
If I continue to behave as a bureaucratand in that command control model,
rather than engage in an A model.

(40:16):
gonna trickle down.
Like, don't expect empowerment, don'texpect, rapid change if everything
has to come up to get approval.
We're just stuck.
So I think that's a key thoughthere is it does it, in the best
circumstances it does start at the top.
I think secondly the perseverance thatthis is required we've talked about
that, the humility that's required.
The fact that this is somethingthat kind of rolls out.

(40:39):
It is not something that rollsdown that the redesign is very
creative and very experimental.
You know, in, in always pretty much theopposite of a traditional change program.
That idea of one budgetand also the, the re.
The relinquishing of power, as you talkedabout in previous episodes, showed great

(41:00):
humility by the leadership team as well.
I thought that was such a huge, hugething that even getting that into an
organization where there's a sharedbonus, not only a shared budget, but
a shared bonus system, and that waspushed by senior leaderships as well.
Yeah would describe it as you talkabout it, Aidan, it is in some ways re

(41:21):
relinquishing power, certainly for seniorleaders, I would describe it as trading.
Trading, formal authorityfor business impact.
So I have less formal authority.
You know, I'm notweighing in on everything.
I'm pushing decisions down, but I will endup having a lot more impact ultimately.

(41:42):
and again, this was something that theleaders recognized fairly early on.
You know, there was this concern thatlike, if we're not exercising oversight,
if we're not on top of everything, ifwe don't know everything, like could
go crappy and they go like, wait, wait.
The real problem we have as anorganization, it's not that if we
like take our eye off the ball,everybody else no, the real problem is.

(42:03):
We're just gonna keep doing the samething and everybody's gonna do the same.
Like we have an excess of control,not an absence of control.
So we have the, we can step back.
So I think they recognize thatultimately our impact is gonna come
from building a better organization,not everyday building a better business.
If you see that distinction right,from creating more empowerment,

(42:24):
from creating more patient focus,from creating more laterality.
From accelerating the pace of decisionmaking from developing skills lower down.
So really sh and I've said this foryears, they shifted their role from
kind of being, executives to beingarchitects where we have to architect
the future of the organization.
One last thing on it before we concludewith the personal accountability

(42:48):
is a turning point was when theyactually became patient-centric, and
you talked about Ward, for example.
Padraic Ward and his seniorcolleagues spending several
hours listening to patient calls,listening to the real problems.
And again, it's something that you assumehappens in many organizations and this led
to what you call PJP's, patient journeypartners and health system partners, where

(43:13):
people were actually just focused on that.
They dealt with bureaucracy and now theywere dealing with the patient journey.
I think through the whole process.
That was
kind of the catalystfor everything they did.
One of the attitudes they strugglewith, obviously when you're working
with human health the consequencesare very dire if you get it wrong and
you do need a lot of kind of you needto make sure you're absolutely right.

(43:35):
That thing of, you know, making surethe right patient gets the right drug
at the right time, it metastasize.
And it's just like this general thing.
If you gotta review everything, look ateverything, you can't ever try anything.
And so they kind of suddenly, they knewthat they knew that in a drug company, the
idea that like, you need to take risks.
That was probably never gonnabe a message that would land.
Like what?
Like, we're like, so instead ofsaying, you need to take risks.

(43:57):
What they said is, ourpatients can't wait.
Right?
We, we gotta move fast and we gotta dobetter because our patients can't wait.
yes, and they reorganized all thephysician and patient facing roles
at I mean, you know, you reflect,we've talked about this, you reflect
on your own experience on oneof these seven level phone trees
and you're on the 29 minute hold.

(44:18):
And by the way, will youplease download our app?
And you know, all the hurdles theyput in the way, like how many CEOs
of these companies have actuallybeen on the, like, gone through
this, like understood what the hellthey're subjecting their people to.
And so yeah, they made a lot of investmentin that area, which, you know, the book
talks about exactly what they did there.
But

(44:40):
and also one thing we should talk aboutfairly, and I might have mentioned this,
but quite early in the process, I thinkwhen, when when Bill Anderson moved
into the global role from Genentech Co.
And I think that was 2019
they articulated a new vision for RochePharma, which was to have three times

(45:02):
the patient impact for 50% of the cost.
Bureaucrat.
A bureaucrat is never gonnaarticulate that kind of a target
because somebody might actuallyhold you the hell accountable.
you do need to be able to distinguishbetween the target that you are going to
like achieve this month, this quarter,whatever, and is a do or die and a target

(45:22):
that is something that is aspirational.
You know so Elon Musk can say,let's get somebody to Mars.
But like he hasn't said, he's not sayingI'm gonna do it this week or this year.
Right.
I think by articulating thatvision, they realize if we wanna
make any progress towards that,everything has to change, right?

(45:43):
Like, this is, like, that's a sixx three, three times impact, x, you
know, and very few organizations haveanything like that aspirational goal.
And, I've probably said before, but nobusiness outperforms its aspirations.
And so if you don't have thecourage to kind of set those kinds
of goals that motivate people.
Now, there has to be a logic behind it.

(46:04):
It's not like, Hey, let's just allwork harder and kill ourselves.
No, no.
The logic is we got a world that isaging, population needs more healthcare
is currently unaffordable, so youhave to find something that's logical.
But if you don't have the guts tokind of articulate that and pin your
fight to that, what the hell areyou doing as a CEO or as a leader?

(46:26):
As you said before, ambition deficitdisorders is rife in most organizations.
Let's finish with this last piece,which is looking at yourself and
actually when I read through this,I was like, I was guilty of a few
of those things myself when I workedin organizations where it's like.
Have you got a secret bit of Schadenfreudethat the guy next door is failing 'cause

(46:48):
it makes you look a bit better, et cetera.
There's loads of things you talkabout in the final chapter as well.
Let me just say two things thatare really important because is
so easy to just be tranquilizedby the status quo to just bleed.
Like what could be done,like I give up and so on.
And it's very easy to feel.

(47:09):
And all of us have had, believeme, I feel that way in the
organizations that I'm part of.
You can feel like you're this mousecaught in the maze of bureaucracy and
so many people, you gotta get theirsign off and get their approval.
It takes so long and you just likego, oh heck, I'm not gonna bother.
But I think, and so that's a fairreaction, but I think the also
requires us to say it's not justthat like the mouse is in the maze.

(47:31):
It's also true to say thatthe maze is in the mouse.
If you've lived in that kind oforganization, a fairly bureaucratic
organization for a long time, you just,not only do you believe that's the
only way to do things, but you have noenergy kind of to try to change that.
And if you think like a bureaucrat, everynew problem, every new issue requires
more staffers, more metrics, morestandards, more oversight, more whatever.

(47:55):
I think you have to be willing to.
say, I am not going to perpetuate asystem that is no longer working for
our stakeholders and for our employees.
Like I cannot live with myself if I'mperpetuating something that really isn't
the very best thing for everybody here.
Number two, you have to say, andI'm willing to start with me, right?

(48:17):
Rather than say, man, we haveall these screwed up systems.
I gotta start with me.
So I call this kind of 12 stepfor bureaucrats or personal
recovery for bureaucrats.
And it simply means recognizingwhen you're operating out of
the old bureaucratic mindset.
You know, when in the courseof a week or a month, you.

(48:38):
do things that reflect a lack of faithand quite competent people around you.
You do things that are more about holdingonto power and prestige than maybe sharing
it and letting other people grow that youkind of pad a budget or you overinflate
an argument because you know that's theonly way you're gonna, you know, get

(48:59):
some resources or you sit there with asuperior and you don't challenge them on
something that you think is wrong or wherethey're going in the wrong direction.
in the book, we list out quite a few ofthese and our recommendation is, hey,
at the end of every week, step back, gothrough this and ask where am I still
operating outta that bureaucratic mindset?

(49:19):
Maybe find a few peers andhave that same conversation.
So it's a little less, like,it's not just about me.
It's like, okay, yeah, we like, weall, and critically you, when you see
something there that you don't like, I'msacrificing my values for expediency.
The question I wanna ask is, whatin the organization is rewarding

(49:39):
that and pushing us to do that?
Because it's probablynot really about you.
I have a friend, Bob Sutton at Stanford.
He wrote a book many years agocalled the No Asshole Rule,
but the Dilemmas Bureaucracyturns everybody into an asshole.
And so recognizing that and thenultimately going to your team
and saying, guys, I want to.
I want to support you in the way thatmaximizes your achievement, your capacity.

(50:05):
here's what I'm trying to avoid.
When you guys catch me doingthis, like raise the hand and
say, Gary, not so helpful.
Right?
I thought you wanted to do it differently.
So you do have to have, just likeyou would , in a 12 step program,
if you're trying to, if you'rewrestling with an addiction, you need
accountability partners with this.
But you know, as in recovery, anearly starting point is to do the
inventory of yourself so that, we laya lot of that stuff out in the book.

(50:30):
The other part Aidan, is to recognizethe power of just like starting
to hack the system where you are.
And,
it can seem very hard.
I don't own the talent process.
I don't own the resource allocationpro, like what the heck do I do?
And so, it's alwayssomebody else's problem.

(50:51):
So we spent a lot of time, more, Ithink an entire chapter, maybe more
talking about how do you build a hackin your part of the organization.
Might have talked about some of thesealong the way, but it's basically saying,
how do I bring a few of my team together?
Start to think about, important set ofquestions you can ask each other, which

(51:11):
Roche spent a lot of time, and we didn'ttalk about this, they spent a lot of
time talking to employees and askingwhat gets in the way of achievement.
So, where does yourwork not get recognized?
What makes collaboration difficult?
, What are the tasks that wegive you that just don't, you
don't think, add any value?
Where do you fear doing somethingbecause of consequences?

(51:32):
So you start to, you start to askpeople what is getting in the way
of you doing the very best job?
And again, we kind of outline howto do that and then go, okay, what
would I change to, to do that?
lemme just give one example of a hack.
So this is a couple of, know, mid,mid to upper mid-level people in
a large organization who and thiswas actually happened in a program

(51:54):
at the London Business School.
Like advertisement just recentlyrated the number one executive
education in the world.
And I teach on their aCapstone Pro program.
So that's my littleadvertisement for the day.
But we had a team at the LondonBusiness School and these senior
executives are very frustratedabout the company's travel policies.

(52:16):
And they
the.
A regime in which somebody toldyou which airline to fly on.
They told you whichhotels you could stay in.
They told you how much you could spendevery day on, on food, and so on.
I remember somebody saying I runa $70 million business, and like
I have to get somebody to improve,like what I pay for coffee.

(52:38):
Like this is just sononsensical, I can't believe it.
So again, what do you doeven if you're mid to senior?
Like how do I change that?
So together, a few of them said, let'srun an experiment and we'll take a little
bit of heat maybe if things go wrong.
But it's not, it's not anythingthat will blow up the company.
So they found a group of ahundred people within a business.
A hundred people hit office.

(52:59):
And, and then they dividedthose into teams of 50.
So now I have two, four teams of 50.
They said we're gonna take two ofthose teams, and we changed nothing.
You still have all the travel rules,but two of the teams, 50 each for
the next, I think it was 30, 60 days.
There are no travel restrictions at all.
If you want, if you wannatravel, you just go travel.

(53:20):
If you wanna, if you wanna fly on on.
On Emirates Upper, you know,first class, I mean like help
yourself, like we don't care.
But at the end of it, you have to bringback receipts 'cause we still have
tax and we got a report and so on.
and then they said, oh, and by the way,we're gonna put all of these receipts
up online so everybody can see them.

(53:41):
So the little hypothesis they hadthere, because if you have an experiment
right, you have to have a, a hypothesis.
So the hypothesis was.
Transparency may be a better way ofcontrol than like rules and audits.
so what they found over the, over thecourse of the experiment is in that
treatment group, travel costs went down.

(54:01):
They, they were just hopingthey wouldn't go up much.
They actually went down by30% and engagement went up.
And so, you know, we just don't thinkoften of how do I. Take a challenge,
lack of empowerment, annoy some process.
How do I do a little experiment?
days, 60 days?
Nothing that will blow the company up.

(54:21):
We run it in parallel withthe old I use volunteers.
So you know, you could sit with yourteam, whatever your unit, and you
have this conversation guys, what isgetting in the way of achievement?
What's systems, processes, structures?
behaviors are at fault here.
How might we change that?
Can you imagine something we doin 30 to 60 days where we might
be able to test a different idea?

(54:43):
And so I think , it's a good place to endhere, Aidan, because I do think that every
organization is in a race to the future.
I think part of that race is buildingorganizations that can thrive in a
very difficult high velocity world.

(55:04):
Building those sorts of organizations isgonna happen one experiment at a time.
Now you can accelerate that.
We've used technology in companieswhere in a period of a couple of
months, we'll generate hundreds ofexperiments, and Roche might have moved
a little faster if they'd done it thatway, versus in person teams and so on.
I'm not sure.
But it starts by recognizing that thepace at which my organization gets

(55:26):
better is fundamentally determined by thenumber of experiments we run every year.
How do we reallocate resources faster?
How do we set bolder goals?
How do we build more collaboration?
How do we create a strongersense of ownership?
How do we give people the skillsthey need to use power effectively?
And it's a race.
And first you admit you have aproblem and then you say, I wanna win.

(55:48):
And then you unleash, the ImaginationInitiative in the organization.
Say, guys, let's solvethis problem together.
And I think that was, again, the humilityat Roche was, we don't have an answer.
We're gonna, we're gonnafigure out this thing together.
few organizations in theworld have ever done this.
That's a huge opportunity for us.
So every one of us in life.

(56:09):
We have a choice.
And in our organizations we have a choice.
Do we bitch or do we hack, right?
Do we whine or do we experiment?
And, we just need a lot of morepeople who are willing to step
up and help us build the future.
And thank you for encouragingeverybody as well.
I just pulled a final little piece here, my way of saying thanks to you as well.
So end of the book.

(56:30):
Gary says, freeing the human spirit.
That is the promise of humanocracy.
With grit and determination, you canclaim the promise for yourself, for
your team, and for your organization.
Like every epic quest, the journey willbe arduous, but ultimately fulfilling.
Now, this journey wasn't at allarduous, Gary, but it's been an absolute

(56:52):
beautiful epic quest going through.
Your full to and even gettingright up to date as well onto the
latest edition of Humanocracy.
And this is coming out rightwhen that's coming out.
So we could, and I didn'tknow that at the start.
I have to tell our audience thatI didn't know that was coming.
So it came about absolutely beautiful.
Bit of serendipity.
And Gary, I just wanna say, man,it was an absolute pleasure.

(57:15):
I know it's not gonna be the last timewe collaborate in some way in the future,
but it's been hugely fulfilling and I'mvery grateful for you for joining us.
I am very grateful as well, Aidan,and thank you to you for all
the immense work you've put in.
Thank you for everybody who's joinedus in one way or other through the,
through the, through through the series.
You know, my mission is to help us buildorganizations that allow people to thrive.

(57:39):
And you can reach me on LinkedIn.
You can reach me.
Gary Hamel.com.
But yeah, let's hope that a few sparksare lit and that someone somewhere
in the world can say, I'm livingin an organization that's like,
just is feeling better every day.
And I wanna tell you as well, lastthing for me, Gary has been voted the

(58:00):
world's top thought leader, by the way.
That there was, it was only ever doneonce it was done and Gary was voted
top thought leader in the world.
So I wanna tell youthat absolute pleasure.
It is having the world's best taughtleader on this show, covering all
his work, giving us all that time.
Gary Hamel, thank you for joining us.
Thank you.
Thank you.

(58:21):
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