December 2, 2020 • 33 mins
In November an Iranian top nuclear scientist is assassinated. Israel is blamed.
Is Iran complying with an International nuclear deal to stop it from obtaining nuclear weapons, or it this smoke and mirrors and deception by Tehran?
Should incoming U.S. President Joe Biden re-enter a nuclear agreement, which Former President Trump pulled out of claiming it was horrible deal?
What will Iran do next?
In this Back Story Host Dana Lewis interviews Sir. Mark Lyall Grant, who was the former National Security Advisor for Britain and negotiated with The Iranians.
And we also speak to The Soufan Centre's analyst on Iran, Colin Clarke.
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
Covert and over key part of the plan was to form new
organizations to continue thework.
This is how dr.
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(00:20):
You know what that is?
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scientific k now-how development.
Speaker 2 (00:32):
Hi everyone.
I'm Dana Lewis and welcome toanother edition of backstory
that was Israeli prime ministerBenjamin Netanyahu in 2018.
Talking about the Uranian seniornuclear scientist, who on
November the 27th wasassassinated by a remotely
operated series of weapons inIran, Wilson, r esided.
(00:53):
It was a Brigadier general inthe Islamic revolutionary
guards, an academic physicist,and he headed up the nuclear
program of I ran.
Netanyahu has always been aproponent of military action
against Iran and likely orderedthe killing.
It's ironic that just a few daysbefore the h eat on[ inaudible]
(01:13):
[ inaudible] newspaper in Israelran an analysis piece saying
Netanyahu warns Biden.
As if he's I ran strategy hadn'tfailed miserably with Obama and
Trump in terms of actuallyinfluencing the nuclear deal.
It said the prime minister nevermisses an opportunity to miss an
opportunity.
The essence of that article wasin warning incoming us president
(01:35):
B iden, not to go back on the2015 nuclear agreement.
Mr.
Iran, as Netanyahu was oftendubbed in Israel could have
taken an active role in theoriginal nuclear talks with
Tehran and made the deal to stopIran from developing a nuclear
bomb air tight, but Netanyahupreferred to sulk on the
(01:56):
sidelines and then heavilycriticized the agreement,
poisoning his relations with theObama presidency.
And now probably he's doing thesame with the Biden
administration on this backstoryanalysis from the Soufan center
think tank on what he run may donow, but first, a rare
opportunity to hear from a manwho was on the European team,
(02:20):
negotiating the Iranian nucleardeal.
He was a former nationalsecurity advisor here in
Britain, incredibly well briefedwith firsthand knowledge on Iran
and its attempts to arm itselfwith nuclear weapons.
Speaker 3 (02:40):
All right, in London where I am now, I want to
introduce you to sir, Mark Lylegrant, who previously worked for
the foreign and Commonwealthoffice as high commissioner in
Pakistan.
And he served the UK is aambassador to the UN for six
years, and he was nationalsecurity advisor to two prime
ministers, David Cameron andTheresa May until 17.
(03:00):
Hi Mark.
Thanks for joining us.
Thanks Donna.
Pleasure to be here, mr.
Investor, can I say, I mean, you, you were in Iran, you went
there as part of thenegotiations.
Um, how many times?
Speaker 4 (03:14):
Well, just once, um, I was the UK, um, Iranian
nuclear negotiator for basicallya two and a half year period
when I was the politicaldirector in the foreign office
in London and together with theFrance Germany, United States,
China and Russia, we negotiatedsuccessfully whilst I was there,
(03:35):
but eventually leading to thejoint comprehensive plan of
action, uh, which was a greatinfinity 15.
And as part of that process, uh,we went to Tehran in, uh, 2008,
um, present, uh, an agreed planby the foreign ministers of
those six countries.
And then we met Iran twice more,uh, in Geneva, um, as follow up
(03:58):
meetings to that first one.
So we had just the one visit toTaylor.
Speaker 3 (04:02):
And what was that like?
What was the atmosphere like inTehran?
Speaker 4 (04:06):
Well, I mean, Tyrone is a, I hadn't been there
before.
It's a very interesting, uh,city.
I mean, you've got the mountainsin the background.
I wouldn't say it's a beautifulcity, but the setting is, is
very pleasant.
Um, and there's a lot of peoplewho, if you meet them privately
can speak perfectly openly.
One of the paradoxes about Iranand, and particularly the
(04:27):
rupture between Iran and UnitedStates since 1979 is that Iran
is probably has a populationthat is more pro Western than
any of the Arab nations in theregion.
It has great internet titrationthan any of the neighbors near
the, in the Arab countries.
(04:47):
And therefore it is a quite asophisticated population.
And when you meet in private, asI met with various, uh, uh, NGOs
and think tankers after theofficial tools, and you can have
some very interestingdiscussions,
Speaker 3 (05:00):
Let's fast forward to where we are now.
I mean, a lot has happened.
So, right.
So now you have, uh, people whoare calling, uh, in Europe,
diplomats that are sayingFrance, Germany, the UK must
move quickly to set out aroadmap for Iran so that the,
the incoming Bidenadministration, uh, we'll get
the U S to come back to thetable, get Iran to come back to
(05:22):
the table, especially now giventhe escalating tensions.
Do you think that's happening inthe background and it's got to
happen?
Speaker 4 (05:30):
Yeah, I'm sure it is happening and it, it should
happen.
Um, because there is anopportunity with Joe Biden
coming in in January to seewhether there is a possibility
of reengaging Iran on this, uh,nuclear deal.
But cause personally, and Ithink I I'm speaking, uh,
certainly for the three Europeangovernments, uh, it was a
(05:51):
mistake for president Trump topull out of the deal completely
in 2018, the deal perfect.
Let's be a hundred percent clearabout that.
And we can talk about that andweaknesses in the deal, but it
was certainly a lot better thanthe potential alternatives at
the time.
It was therefore mistake to justpull out of the deal rather than
(06:11):
see whether it would be improvedin some way.
So I think Dubai,
Speaker 3 (06:16):
If I can jump in there, I mean, John Bolton, the
former national security advisorof Trump and a lot of different
Republicans have poured so muchwater on this deal saying that
it's unverifiable, it's the, youknow, Trump himself is saying,
it's the worst deal ever.
Why did they say that?
If you say, essentially,
Speaker 4 (06:33):
Let me, let me, let me address some of those
criticisms because essentiallythere are three criticisms that
you can make legitimatecriticisms you can make of the
deal that was struck.
Uh, the first is that it coveredonly the nuclear weapons
program.
It did not cover a ballisticmissile technology program,
(06:54):
which of course is important.
Secondly, it did not coverIran's malign regional role it's
support for terroristorganizations for them.
Fears is below et cetera, in theregion and its attempts to
destabilize some of its names.
And thirdly, the deal was timelimited.
(07:14):
There was a sort of sunsetclause in the deal.
So it would last only a maximumof 15 years.
Now those are all legitimatecriticisms, but you have to put
that against the alternatives at, because if I just could delve
into the history a little bit,there was a time when I was, uh,
in the negotiating where theintelligence was clear that Iran
(07:38):
had the capability to acquire anuclear weapon, a bomb, and you
feel a bomb within a less thanone year period.
Now this deal, it prevent, uh,Avon, former nuclear weapons for
at least 15 years.
Of course it had some veryimportant characteristics in it.
(08:00):
It had in it, um, the need toeliminate entirely the stockpile
of medium enrich uranium.
It had to get rid of the, reducethe stock pile of low in which
germanium, um, 80, 98% of that.
And he only allowed very limitedamounts of low enriched uranium
(08:21):
for the next 15 years.
It also reduce the number ofcentrifuges by two-thirds.
And most importantly, and thisis a based some of the
commentary that you'vementioned.
It was entirely verifiable.
There was a whole regime ofinspections by the energy, by
(08:42):
the international atomic energyagency, which is a thought off,
uh, affiliated to the UN if youlike, where they could go with,
uh, inspections whenever theywanted in all the facilities
that were covered.
So it was, uh, I think a gooddeal.
And what it meant was twothings.
One that it prevented everyoneacquiring a nuclear weapon for
(09:05):
first 15 years and 15 years is along time in politics.
So in that 15 years, you couldhave regime change into Iran.
You could have, uh, newabilities to attack the program,
perhaps offensive, cyberweapons, et cetera, that could
be used against the program.
So buying 15 years, when itlooked as though they would have
(09:27):
that capability within one yearwas very important.
And he did this famous musical,um, the fork in the work that as
you approach the period whereyou had a fall, where you had to
decide, are you all gonna bondme around and try and take out
militarily?
All its nuclear facilities,incidentally would not be easy
(09:49):
because they are deep, deep,underground.
Uh, many of them or the otherfolk is that you accept, like we
have for India and Pakistan sothat they have acquired nuclear
weapons despite thenonproliferation treaty.
And you contain them in someother political diplomatic way.
That is the fork in the roadthat the JCP airway avoided or
(10:13):
pushed back at least the 15, 15years, what we're faced with
now, having president Trump,having pulled out of the deal
and essentially the team fallingapart, although the Europeans
have never sort of formallyadvocated isn't normal in fact
is Iran completely, but it hasstarted reaching the deal is
that you're going to just bringthat fork in the road to get
(10:35):
closer.
So there is an opportunity nowto try and reverse that bad
decision that I think presidentTrump made.
Why did he do it?
Speaker 3 (10:45):
You say, you know, people like Bolton and Trump say
it wasn't verifiable, but Imean, clearly it's just not your
, just not your opinion, but Imean, the UA, the UN the IAEA
clearly is showing us picturesand life camera feeds.
And they said it was absolutelyverifiable.
And that's why Europeans werewilling to stick with the deal.
(11:06):
Why did the Americans want topull out of it just for
political a headline?
You know, how was itunderstandable?
Speaker 4 (11:15):
I think there's a lot of politics in it.
I mean, you're right to, toquote the fact that president
Trump had said it was the worstdeal ever.
And he said that before he waselected, I mean, this was during
his sort of campaign rhetoric.
And at the fundamentally itwasn't a bomber deal.
You know, the deal was done bypresident Barack Obama and
everything that president Obamadid, president Trump didn't like
(11:36):
whether there was a pharma carein generally or, or lots of the
foreign policy issues.
So given the, a bomberconsidered the nuclear deal to
be a sort of shiny example ofhis achievements in foreign
policy.
And to be honest, he didn't havea huge number to point to, but,
Speaker 3 (11:54):
And you're not the first one to say that.
Yep.
Speaker 4 (11:56):
Well, listen, it was an opportunity to, to attack it.
I think it was probably morethat than anything else.
I think then you fold in Israelprobably a bit played a role in
it because don't forget that,you know, president Trump had
two years in office before hepulled out after the deal, and
it's not complete coincidencethat he did so shortly after
John Bolton was appointed asnational security,
Speaker 3 (12:18):
Right?
Bolton was never a favor ofdealing with Iran, negotiating
with Iran, uh, and was always aproponent of military action
against Iran, but without reallyever laying out how that would
be successful, otherwise Israelprobably would have done it on
its own, but you roll in Israeltoo, though.
I mean, there is anotherinterloper and a state, which
didn't think it's a real dealand didn't think that it was
(12:39):
verifiable and thought all alongthat Iran was slowly making the
bomb anyway.
Speaker 4 (12:46):
Yes, he made that case publicly that the United
nations over call with a bigsort of cartoon picture of a
bomb and, uh, an hourthreatening that was, and I
attended talks between, um,present upon it as an engine
yard who, and Theresa May inDowning street when we argued
back and forth about the meritsof the, of the nuclear deal.
(13:06):
Um, I think, uh, and I post meargued the case with, um, with
Jared Kushner and Steve Bannon,uh, and Trump's team when, um,
when they came into office.
So, you know, we knew thearguments that the Israelis were
going to make, and we knew thearguments that president Trump's
team were going to make, but wesimply didn't agree with them.
(13:26):
And I think they had a, perhapsa lack of understanding, not
being raised, but the Trump teamand a slight lack of
understanding of the historythat had gone into this on the
sort of 15 years of negotiationsthat had led up to up to the
deal.
I think there's in yarns pointof view, of course he wanted, uh
, Trump to, uh, advocate thedeal who, because he wanted a
(13:47):
free hand to try and actuallyforce the fork in the road.
I think Israel fought came.
He could persuade the Americansto do the bombing.
I mean, Israel could do someitself, but it could wipe out
Iran's nuclear facilities on theturf.
Speaker 3 (14:04):
And now you have Israel that has carried on this
allegedly this assassination ofmost in fact Rosati.
And of course, Netanyahu hasn'tcommented.
And I think the head of hisintelligence services has said
they don't know who carried outthe deal, but certainly Iran
thinks it was Israel.
And maybe some of the Iranianopposition that is based in
Europe, they have accused themas well.
(14:25):
Does it achieve anything?
Does it roll back a nuclearprogram by killing the head
scientist?
And who do you think did it?
Speaker 4 (14:35):
I, I don't, I mean, I, I don't know who did it, but
I don't think it's unreasonableto conclude that it was probably
the Israelis.
Um, and I don't think it'sreasonable to conclude that the
timing is linked to the factthat president Trump has two
more months in the office, but Ithink, whereas you could argue,
(14:56):
and I think by probably wouldargue that the killing of
general Soleimani in January,this year by like eight have
quite a, uh, substantive impacton the ability of the COOs force
to, uh, carry out terroristoperations overseas, but the was
ahead.
And he was a very powerfulfigure.
(15:19):
I'm not so sure about factories.
Are there, I mean, he'scertainly an important scientist
with other scientists and Iranalready has the nuclear
know-how, it's not as though itneeds a research.
It's more about the developmentof the program rather than
actually, uh, initiate things,such semi to get the technology.
Right.
So, so I, I'm less convinced I'mnot, I don't know, back resigned
(15:42):
his background and his pitchsize wrong.
Um, I don't think it will have aparticularly substantial impact
on the, um, program itself.
And I think there is a risk thatit could be counterproductive,
but do reasons one, it willreinforce, uh, Iranian, um,
(16:03):
incentive and determination toplus, and with the program.
And also, let's not forget thatthere are presidential elections
in Iran coming in 2021.
And president Rouhani may notlook like a sort of moderate
Democrat, and certainly isn't amoderate Democrat, but as we
know from Ahmadinejad and otherswho have proceeded him, there
are people who are much moreradical and much more hard-line
(16:27):
than him, uh, who will leave onnotes of, uh, attacks.
And it will certainly improvetheir chances on election.
Speaker 3 (16:34):
If whoever carried out this attack was interested
in carrying up the pavement fora Biden administration, to
re-engage with Iran and hopingthat Iran will fiercely respond
and make the gap betweendialogue with a new American
(16:55):
administration, even larger.
Do you think that Iran willdisappoint them?
Are they, are they smart enoughto hold back and wait for that
moment where they can move todialogue rather than move to
some kind of response, whetherwherever it be.
Speaker 4 (17:14):
I think it's difficult to judge that because
one called, think about Iran asa political entity.
Yeah.
You can say in Saudi Arabia thatall the decisions are taken by
one, maybe two people, you can'tsay that in Iran, you know, it's
not a democracy, but there is aplurality of politics in Iran
that is completely absent fromthe Arab States, for instance.
(17:38):
So there is a precedent, he hasa role, Ronnie, but there is the
Supreme leader.
There's the IGC, there's thebizarre is there's the Magister
shooter.
Now all of these bodies have aninfluence in the eventual
decision at night be taken in.
So I think if you look atpresident Mahoney or the foreign
ministers a week, they willcertainly want to not close off
(18:02):
the possibility of engagementwith Joe Biden, but equally
Israelis probably absolutely.
For the reasons you say, have aninterest in making it much more
difficult that we engagement totake place.
And president Trump in his lastcouple of months may help to
facilitate that.
So I think there is a risk thatIran will be, will be pushed
(18:24):
into a retaliation, which wouldmake engagement more difficult.
Certainly
Speaker 3 (18:28):
Last question to you, you know, you said you got to
that fork in the road where, youknow, you, you, you either had
to choose them getting a bomb oryou had to choose dialogue.
Um, and then the drawbacks inthe deal with the fact that you
didn't take into it, it didn't,uh, put a new surround their
rocket program, or it didn'tbridal malign activities.
(18:50):
I mean, it's, it's almost naiveto think that a, a, a new
agreement, even with the bestintentions, uh, is suddenly
going to deal with all of that.
I mean, it's, it's almost a lotof people would say, you have to
start somewhere, go back into,uh, a nuclear non-proliferation
agreement with Iran.
(19:12):
And then while you have whateverthe period is going to be this
time, whether it's going to beanother 15 years or up to that
15 years, then you start dealingwith some of these other issues.
Or do you think it should be amore encompassing in retrospect,
a more encompassing deal?
Speaker 4 (19:27):
Well, I think you can try and make it a more
encompassing deal.
I mean, let's not forget thatthe original deal, yes, it was
restricted to the nuclearprogram, but that didn't prevent
other action taking place at thesame time on the ballistic,
besides, and particularly on theregional, well, it didn't rule
out anything either then, orindeed on the nuclear program at
the end of the 15, 15 yearperiod, know, John Bolton is a
(19:52):
good example of someone who saysoften let's make the problem
bigger.
So we made the problem bigger.
We bring in these other twoissues and then let's sit down
and negotiate.
And I think there may well be,uh, an effort to try and do
that, but whether it will besuccessful or not, we'll see,
um, it wasn't successful in thesort of 15 year negotiations in
(20:14):
which I was involved.
Um, but it's, there is no doubtthat what is constraining, the
Arabians is the sanctions.
They do have economic sanctions.
The UN security council isUnited against the nuclear
program.
So the opportunity for toughersanctions, so they are suffering
and that may make them moreamenable to some of these wider
(20:36):
discussions,
Speaker 3 (20:38):
Ambassador, Mark Lau grant.
Great to have your perspective,somebody who's been in the room
and we're part of thenegotiations as a former
national security advisor to twoprime ministers here in Britain.
Great to talk to you, sir.
Thank you.
All right.
Let's go to Pittsburgh now.
And Colin Clark is a seniorresearch fellow with the Soufan
(21:02):
center.
Hi, Colin, how are you doingDana timing?
You know, talk to me about theassassination of the, the senior
nuclear scientist.
What, why now?
And who do you think that?
Speaker 5 (21:18):
Well, I think there's considerable concern.
Um, at least by the Israelisthat, uh, Biden administration
is not going to be, um, asopen-minded to, uh, you know,
Israel's kind of point of viewas the Trump administration was.
And I, and I think that'sprobably correct.
Um, there are concerns that theBiden administration will
(21:39):
re-engage with the Iranians andattempt to reinsure, uh, the
multi-lateral, uh, nuclear deal.
And that's something that, um,the Israelis are very adamant
against
Speaker 3 (21:48):
Why isn't it than Yahoo, so adamantly against it.
And then I also talked to JohnBolton, Trump's national
security advisor and formerambassador to the, to the, to
the UN before.
And he said, it just wasn'tverifiable.
I mean, they, they really, um,you know, they really put holes
in the agreement.
And yet you talk to otherpeople, Europeans here who some
(22:10):
of them I've talked to whohelped negotiate this agreement
and they say it was verifiableand it was a good agreement.
And it stopped Iran from gettinga nuclear weapon.
Speaker 5 (22:19):
Yeah, well, clearly Netanyahu disagrees.
I think, you know, manyhardliners within Israel are
uncomfortable, uh, where therecomes to an element of trust
with the Iranian regime.
And I think that's born overdecades of, uh, mistrust and,
and, and so, uh, in some ways Ido see the perspective of
Netanyahu, however, um, youknow, it's my belief that the
(22:42):
only really viable way forwardis engaging with the Iranians
diplomatically.
And even if we are able to kindof, uh, you know, renegotiate a
deal, I'm not one for blindtrust.
I'm, I'm more of a guy thatbelieves in, you know, trust in
God, but lock your car
Speaker 3 (22:59):
Trust, but verify as the Russians or as, um, as
president Reagan said to glory,you know, trust, but verify.
And in fact, in this case, theyhad, uh, UN inspectors in there
verifying, and the UN the IAEAseemed like they were pretty
happy with the outcome.
Look, do you believe, and I'vejust read your report that you
(23:19):
wrote for the Soufan center.
Um, do you believe that, uh, theSaudis were approached in this
meeting by, by Netanyahu to laythe groundwork for a military
strike against Iran by the Trumpadministration?
Speaker 5 (23:36):
I don't know.
I hope not.
Um, I do believe it's feasiblethat the Saudis were approached.
Um, but you know, if you are theSaudis, the MRR or, or, you
know, another country in theregion, and you think that, um,
you know, you've got leverage oryou've got some chips to play, I
(23:56):
don't know why you'd cash themin now with the Trump
administration.
You're more likely to wait, uh,and, and engage with divided
administration because you're,otherwise you're dealing with a
lame duck.
Uh, I know that Trump's approachhas been one of scorched earth.
He's trying to break everythingon his way out, uh, which is
really, you know, in my opinion,that's detrimental to us policy,
(24:18):
uh, you know, it's really apolicy of vengeance, uh, and you
know, so it's, it's going to besomething we're going to have to
spend a lot of time repairing.
Um, so, so, yeah.
Is it feasible that the Saudiswere approached about this?
Probably.
Um, but I don't think it's wiseto, uh, begin a conflict, uh,
right.
You know, full stop, much less,um, you know, with less than 70
(24:41):
days left in the administration,uh, and really no mandate,
right?
I mean, this is someone that's,um, spending most of this time
trying to discredit free andfair elections in his own
country.
Speaker 3 (24:51):
Well, he's always worried about his record and
wiping out, uh, presidentObama's record.
And this deal by the way waspart of the Obama
administration's deal that hewanted to get rid of in the
campaign.
But you mentioned the wordvengeance.
Talk to me about Iranianinventions.
I mean, what are they capable ofdoing?
And do you think that they'llpull the trigger on retaliation
(25:13):
at this point,
Speaker 5 (25:15):
Could be, uh, if you go back to September, 2019, you
see exactly what the Iraniansare capable of doing operating
through the region, putting theHouthi rebels, operating from a
Rocky soil, uh, you know, inareas kind of nominally
controlled by Iraqi Shiamilitia.
Uh, if you look at, uh, again,going back to the who these,
(25:36):
their capabilities, you'retalking about a violent
non-state actor with thecapabilities of a nation state,
I mean, really fairlysophisticated, um, you know,
ability to use drones, um,ability to use, um, some, some
pretty high-speed weaponry,including vessels.
Speaker 3 (25:54):
You can go after who
Speaker 5 (25:57):
And attack the Saudis attack, Saudi infrastructure,
uh, primarily.
And I think, you know, when yougo back to September, 2019, I
remember, I think I was onBloomberg, uh, television a
couple of days after the attack.
And the interviewer said, well,so what's the United States
going to do?
And I said, what do you mean weweren't attacked Saudis were,
(26:17):
and he was kind of taken abackthat, um, you know, I would even
suggest that the Saudi shoulddefend themselves.
I made a Quip, which, you know,I think, um, you know, drew, uh,
drew a lot of flack from it, butI said, we sell them the
weapons.
Do we have to pull the triggerfor them as well?
Um, so, you know, I'm certainlynot concerned,
Speaker 3 (26:34):
Uranian missile assault on a oil infrastructure
in Saudi Arabia, but then therehave been many other, what, what
else could Iran do?
I mean, what, what are thetargets terms of Israeli, uh,
targets, uh, American targetsabroad?
What do they have?
What are they capable of?
Speaker 5 (26:51):
People have a lot look through Lebanese has Bola.
They have global reach.
We've seen, has Bola, uh, Stripe, you know, all over the world
in Latin America and elsewhere.
Um, there's been plots that havebeen disrupted, uh, in Georgia
and India and Thailand.
We've seen the bus bottling inBulgaria.
So I have no, um, no doubt thatthe Iranians are capable of
(27:12):
responding.
The question becomes how wise isit?
Uh, you know, the Israelis aremore than capable of taking care
of themselves.
Uh, and I just don't thinkgetting into a kind of tit for
tat conflict with Israel rightnow, um, you know, the Israelis
have, have shown what they'recapable of doing.
Um, and, and, you know, theydon't really feel compelled to
hold back.
So it would be unwise on thepart of Iran, um, to, um, to
(27:35):
respond in full force.
But what I will say is Iran iskind of the master of walking
right up to the line withoutcrossing it, these kinds of
nibbling attacks, you know,around the edges.
And for that they they'd likelyuse proxies whether, you know,
Shia militia in Iraq, um, orLebanese Hezbollah or another
kind of Iranian prophecy.
Speaker 3 (27:56):
And I guess the big question for the Biden
administration now is can theyeasily reenter this agreement
with Iran?
Um, because a lot of things havehappened on the ground.
And in fact, the Iranian, theprogram has moved, the nuclear
program has moved forward.
So what is the challenge for anewly elected president Biden to
(28:19):
, to try to bring not Iran toheal, but to have some kind of
agreement on transparency withintheir nuclear program and, and
to try to get them to step back.
Speaker 5 (28:31):
It's, it's a real challenge.
I mean, it's certainly no faitaccompli, as you know, some
analysts have described andcommentary and various hop takes
that.
I've read that just becausethere's a Biden administration
means we're going to have anIran nuclear deal.
I think far from it, the regionlooks quite different than it
did even four years ago.
Um, you know, some of thealliances, uh, have shifted.
(28:51):
So I wouldn't say that it's acertainty, uh, that the us will
reenter the deal.
And I think, you know, there's alot that Iran still needs to do,
um, including curving itsbehavior through the proxies
that we just talked about, uh,before, you know, we should, you
know, just blindly reenter adeal, um, and reward the
Iranians.
(29:13):
Uh, I just don't think it'ssmart.
Speaker 3 (29:15):
Do you really think that the discussion should be
that broad, that, that not onlydo you talk about their nuclear
program, but you start talkingabout malign activities, you
start talking about theirmissile programs.
A lot of people think thatthat's just becomes unwieldy and
impossible in a, in a discussionto come to an agreement that you
need to start somewhere and youat least start building blocks
(29:37):
on that agreement and thesanctions around it and their
nuclear program.
Speaker 5 (29:42):
I do think it's worth discussing because one, you need
to raise the issue that it'sunacceptable now, what your
expectations are in terms ofwhat you're going to get out of
that is totally different.
But yeah, I do think it needs to, uh, uh, to be broached.
Uh, and I, and I think, youknow, it all depends on how you
view your own leverage, right?
Um, with economic sanctions,that's one of the problems I've
(30:04):
had with the Trumpadministration over the last
four years.
I've never really gotten a senseof how effective the Trump
administration itself believesthis maximum pressure campaign
has been, uh, because it's been,and I've written about this with
, uh, with my colleague AryanTabatabaie, we've called it a
tautology of sorts because nomatter what Iran seems to do,
(30:25):
the administration trumpets, uh,you know, the success of the
maximum pressure campaign, butthen also paints Iran, um, as
this, uh, actor that can't bestopped and that's, you know,
dominating the middle East.
Well, if that's the case, thenmaximum pressure hasn't worked,
right.
Uh, if Iran acts out andincreases attacks, you know, the
(30:45):
administration has said, look,maximum pressure is working.
And if the attacks decrease,they say, look, maximum pressure
is working.
So, uh, you know, I don't knowwhat the administration really
believes.
I don't know if they do well,it's up to the next
administration.
Now.
It looks like that thiscontemplation of any kind of
military action in Iran, um, ththat shadow seems to have
passed.
(31:05):
Although I wouldn't put anythingpast a desperate, uh, president
Trump right now, but, uh, we'llsee what president Biden does in
the future then, and whetherthey can bring them back into
some kind of a negotiatedsettlement.
Yeah.
I mean, I'll just say, you know,lastly, I think it speaks to the
incoherence of, of Trump'sstrategy in the middle East.
(31:25):
If the goal, as you statedbefore us and endless Wars, he's
going to start one right beforehe leaves office.
I think we haven't had acoherent approach to the region.
It's been one oftransactionalism.
Um, and, and so I'm lookingforward to a more cogent, uh,
you know, pragmatic relationshipor, you know, uh, strategy
(31:46):
formulation with a Bidenadministration, with someone
like a Jake Sullivan that knowsthe region.
Well, that knows the playersthat actually works across the
aisle and consults with, youknow, so-called hardliners
within the United States.
And so, um, I'm hopeful that,uh, we're, you know, we're able
to make progress on that front.
Thank you, Colin.
Thank you.
Speaker 2 (32:10):
And that's our backstory on Iran and the bomb
in case you didn't know, as wespeak, there is a trial underway
in Belgium of an Iraniandiplomat and several others
believe to be from Iranintelligence network for
smuggling explosives intoEurope, and then plotting to
carry out a bombing of anIranian opposition group in
(32:31):
France.
The bomb was handed over at apizza hut in Luxenberg.
The intent prosecutors say wasto blow up a rally in France of
a prominent opposition group tothe Uranian government.
Hundreds would have been killedthe Uranian diplomat Asadullah
Assadi allegedly carried thebomb a little more than a pound
(32:52):
of tea, TP, explosives, and adetonator to Vienna from Iran in
his luggage on an Austrianairlines flight.
He then drove it to Luxembourgin a rented car and handed it
over to an Iranian Belgiumcouple on June 30th, 2018.
And it was the Israeli Mossadwho tipped off French and
(33:13):
Belgium authorities.
Iran has denied the plot andsaid the charges were designed
to embarrass Tehran just beforepresident Hassan Rouhani
traveled to Europe to rallysupport for the 2015 nuclear
deal.
Thanks for listening tobackstory, share this link,
subscribe to our podcasts,wherever you listen.
(33:34):
We're on most major platformslike Apple, Stitcher, Spotify,
iHeartRadio, Amazon music,Pandora, Deezer, and many more.
If you would like to sponsorthis podcast, let us know.
I'm Dana Lewis and I'll talk toyou again.
Speaker 6 (33:55):
[inaudible].
Covert and over key part of the plan was to form new
organizations to continue thework.
This is how dr.
Musen is a day a nd a projectabout put it, remember that name
[ inaudible] the general lame isto announce the closure of
project a mount, but then headds special activities.
(00:20):
You know what that is?
Special activities will becarried out under the title of
scientific k now-how development.
Speaker 2 (00:32):
Hi everyone.
I'm Dana Lewis and welcome toanother edition of backstory
that was Israeli prime ministerBenjamin Netanyahu in 2018.
Talking about the Uranian seniornuclear scientist, who on
November the 27th wasassassinated by a remotely
operated series of weapons inIran, Wilson, r esided.
(00:53):
It was a Brigadier general inthe Islamic revolutionary
guards, an academic physicist,and he headed up the nuclear
program of I ran.
Netanyahu has always been aproponent of military action
against Iran and likely orderedthe killing.
It's ironic that just a few daysbefore the h eat on[ inaudible]
(01:13):
[ inaudible] newspaper in Israelran an analysis piece saying
Netanyahu warns Biden.
As if he's I ran strategy hadn'tfailed miserably with Obama and
Trump in terms of actuallyinfluencing the nuclear deal.
It said the prime minister nevermisses an opportunity to miss an
opportunity.
The essence of that article wasin warning incoming us president
(01:35):
B iden, not to go back on the2015 nuclear agreement.
Mr.
Iran, as Netanyahu was oftendubbed in Israel could have
taken an active role in theoriginal nuclear talks with
Tehran and made the deal to stopIran from developing a nuclear
bomb air tight, but Netanyahupreferred to sulk on the
(01:56):
sidelines and then heavilycriticized the agreement,
poisoning his relations with theObama presidency.
And now probably he's doing thesame with the Biden
administration on this backstoryanalysis from the Soufan center
think tank on what he run may donow, but first, a rare
opportunity to hear from a manwho was on the European team,
(02:20):
negotiating the Iranian nucleardeal.
He was a former nationalsecurity advisor here in
Britain, incredibly well briefedwith firsthand knowledge on Iran
and its attempts to arm itselfwith nuclear weapons.
Speaker 3 (02:40):
All right, in London where I am now, I want to
introduce you to sir, Mark Lylegrant, who previously worked for
the foreign and Commonwealthoffice as high commissioner in
Pakistan.
And he served the UK is aambassador to the UN for six
years, and he was nationalsecurity advisor to two prime
ministers, David Cameron andTheresa May until 17.
(03:00):
Hi Mark.
Thanks for joining us.
Thanks Donna.
Pleasure to be here, mr.
Investor, can I say, I mean, you, you were in Iran, you went
there as part of thenegotiations.
Um, how many times?
Speaker 4 (03:14):
Well, just once, um, I was the UK, um, Iranian
nuclear negotiator for basicallya two and a half year period
when I was the politicaldirector in the foreign office
in London and together with theFrance Germany, United States,
China and Russia, we negotiatedsuccessfully whilst I was there,
(03:35):
but eventually leading to thejoint comprehensive plan of
action, uh, which was a greatinfinity 15.
And as part of that process, uh,we went to Tehran in, uh, 2008,
um, present, uh, an agreed planby the foreign ministers of
those six countries.
And then we met Iran twice more,uh, in Geneva, um, as follow up
(03:58):
meetings to that first one.
So we had just the one visit toTaylor.
Speaker 3 (04:02):
And what was that like?
What was the atmosphere like inTehran?
Speaker 4 (04:06):
Well, I mean, Tyrone is a, I hadn't been there
before.
It's a very interesting, uh,city.
I mean, you've got the mountainsin the background.
I wouldn't say it's a beautifulcity, but the setting is, is
very pleasant.
Um, and there's a lot of peoplewho, if you meet them privately
can speak perfectly openly.
One of the paradoxes about Iranand, and particularly the
(04:27):
rupture between Iran and UnitedStates since 1979 is that Iran
is probably has a populationthat is more pro Western than
any of the Arab nations in theregion.
It has great internet titrationthan any of the neighbors near
the, in the Arab countries.
(04:47):
And therefore it is a quite asophisticated population.
And when you meet in private, asI met with various, uh, uh, NGOs
and think tankers after theofficial tools, and you can have
some very interestingdiscussions,
Speaker 3 (05:00):
Let's fast forward to where we are now.
I mean, a lot has happened.
So, right.
So now you have, uh, people whoare calling, uh, in Europe,
diplomats that are sayingFrance, Germany, the UK must
move quickly to set out aroadmap for Iran so that the,
the incoming Bidenadministration, uh, we'll get
the U S to come back to thetable, get Iran to come back to
(05:22):
the table, especially now giventhe escalating tensions.
Do you think that's happening inthe background and it's got to
happen?
Speaker 4 (05:30):
Yeah, I'm sure it is happening and it, it should
happen.
Um, because there is anopportunity with Joe Biden
coming in in January to seewhether there is a possibility
of reengaging Iran on this, uh,nuclear deal.
But cause personally, and Ithink I I'm speaking, uh,
certainly for the three Europeangovernments, uh, it was a
(05:51):
mistake for president Trump topull out of the deal completely
in 2018, the deal perfect.
Let's be a hundred percent clearabout that.
And we can talk about that andweaknesses in the deal, but it
was certainly a lot better thanthe potential alternatives at
the time.
It was therefore mistake to justpull out of the deal rather than
(06:11):
see whether it would be improvedin some way.
So I think Dubai,
Speaker 3 (06:16):
If I can jump in there, I mean, John Bolton, the
former national security advisorof Trump and a lot of different
Republicans have poured so muchwater on this deal saying that
it's unverifiable, it's the, youknow, Trump himself is saying,
it's the worst deal ever.
Why did they say that?
If you say, essentially,
Speaker 4 (06:33):
Let me, let me, let me address some of those
criticisms because essentiallythere are three criticisms that
you can make legitimatecriticisms you can make of the
deal that was struck.
Uh, the first is that it coveredonly the nuclear weapons
program.
It did not cover a ballisticmissile technology program,
(06:54):
which of course is important.
Secondly, it did not coverIran's malign regional role it's
support for terroristorganizations for them.
Fears is below et cetera, in theregion and its attempts to
destabilize some of its names.
And thirdly, the deal was timelimited.
(07:14):
There was a sort of sunsetclause in the deal.
So it would last only a maximumof 15 years.
Now those are all legitimatecriticisms, but you have to put
that against the alternatives at, because if I just could delve
into the history a little bit,there was a time when I was, uh,
in the negotiating where theintelligence was clear that Iran
(07:38):
had the capability to acquire anuclear weapon, a bomb, and you
feel a bomb within a less thanone year period.
Now this deal, it prevent, uh,Avon, former nuclear weapons for
at least 15 years.
Of course it had some veryimportant characteristics in it.
(08:00):
It had in it, um, the need toeliminate entirely the stockpile
of medium enrich uranium.
It had to get rid of the, reducethe stock pile of low in which
germanium, um, 80, 98% of that.
And he only allowed very limitedamounts of low enriched uranium
(08:21):
for the next 15 years.
It also reduce the number ofcentrifuges by two-thirds.
And most importantly, and thisis a based some of the
commentary that you'vementioned.
It was entirely verifiable.
There was a whole regime ofinspections by the energy, by
(08:42):
the international atomic energyagency, which is a thought off,
uh, affiliated to the UN if youlike, where they could go with,
uh, inspections whenever theywanted in all the facilities
that were covered.
So it was, uh, I think a gooddeal.
And what it meant was twothings.
One that it prevented everyoneacquiring a nuclear weapon for
(09:05):
first 15 years and 15 years is along time in politics.
So in that 15 years, you couldhave regime change into Iran.
You could have, uh, newabilities to attack the program,
perhaps offensive, cyberweapons, et cetera, that could
be used against the program.
So buying 15 years, when itlooked as though they would have
(09:27):
that capability within one yearwas very important.
And he did this famous musical,um, the fork in the work that as
you approach the period whereyou had a fall, where you had to
decide, are you all gonna bondme around and try and take out
militarily?
All its nuclear facilities,incidentally would not be easy
(09:49):
because they are deep, deep,underground.
Uh, many of them or the otherfolk is that you accept, like we
have for India and Pakistan sothat they have acquired nuclear
weapons despite thenonproliferation treaty.
And you contain them in someother political diplomatic way.
That is the fork in the roadthat the JCP airway avoided or
(10:13):
pushed back at least the 15, 15years, what we're faced with
now, having president Trump,having pulled out of the deal
and essentially the team fallingapart, although the Europeans
have never sort of formallyadvocated isn't normal in fact
is Iran completely, but it hasstarted reaching the deal is
that you're going to just bringthat fork in the road to get
(10:35):
closer.
So there is an opportunity nowto try and reverse that bad
decision that I think presidentTrump made.
Why did he do it?
Speaker 3 (10:45):
You say, you know, people like Bolton and Trump say
it wasn't verifiable, but Imean, clearly it's just not your
, just not your opinion, but Imean, the UA, the UN the IAEA
clearly is showing us picturesand life camera feeds.
And they said it was absolutelyverifiable.
And that's why Europeans werewilling to stick with the deal.
(11:06):
Why did the Americans want topull out of it just for
political a headline?
You know, how was itunderstandable?
Speaker 4 (11:15):
I think there's a lot of politics in it.
I mean, you're right to, toquote the fact that president
Trump had said it was the worstdeal ever.
And he said that before he waselected, I mean, this was during
his sort of campaign rhetoric.
And at the fundamentally itwasn't a bomber deal.
You know, the deal was done bypresident Barack Obama and
everything that president Obamadid, president Trump didn't like
(11:36):
whether there was a pharma carein generally or, or lots of the
foreign policy issues.
So given the, a bomberconsidered the nuclear deal to
be a sort of shiny example ofhis achievements in foreign
policy.
And to be honest, he didn't havea huge number to point to, but,
Speaker 3 (11:54):
And you're not the first one to say that.
Yep.
Speaker 4 (11:56):
Well, listen, it was an opportunity to, to attack it.
I think it was probably morethat than anything else.
I think then you fold in Israelprobably a bit played a role in
it because don't forget that,you know, president Trump had
two years in office before hepulled out after the deal, and
it's not complete coincidencethat he did so shortly after
John Bolton was appointed asnational security,
Speaker 3 (12:18):
Right?
Bolton was never a favor ofdealing with Iran, negotiating
with Iran, uh, and was always aproponent of military action
against Iran, but without reallyever laying out how that would
be successful, otherwise Israelprobably would have done it on
its own, but you roll in Israeltoo, though.
I mean, there is anotherinterloper and a state, which
didn't think it's a real dealand didn't think that it was
(12:39):
verifiable and thought all alongthat Iran was slowly making the
bomb anyway.
Speaker 4 (12:46):
Yes, he made that case publicly that the United
nations over call with a bigsort of cartoon picture of a
bomb and, uh, an hourthreatening that was, and I
attended talks between, um,present upon it as an engine
yard who, and Theresa May inDowning street when we argued
back and forth about the meritsof the, of the nuclear deal.
(13:06):
Um, I think, uh, and I post meargued the case with, um, with
Jared Kushner and Steve Bannon,uh, and Trump's team when, um,
when they came into office.
So, you know, we knew thearguments that the Israelis were
going to make, and we knew thearguments that president Trump's
team were going to make, but wesimply didn't agree with them.
(13:26):
And I think they had a, perhapsa lack of understanding, not
being raised, but the Trump teamand a slight lack of
understanding of the historythat had gone into this on the
sort of 15 years of negotiationsthat had led up to up to the
deal.
I think there's in yarns pointof view, of course he wanted, uh
, Trump to, uh, advocate thedeal who, because he wanted a
(13:47):
free hand to try and actuallyforce the fork in the road.
I think Israel fought came.
He could persuade the Americansto do the bombing.
I mean, Israel could do someitself, but it could wipe out
Iran's nuclear facilities on theturf.
Speaker 3 (14:04):
And now you have Israel that has carried on this
allegedly this assassination ofmost in fact Rosati.
And of course, Netanyahu hasn'tcommented.
And I think the head of hisintelligence services has said
they don't know who carried outthe deal, but certainly Iran
thinks it was Israel.
And maybe some of the Iranianopposition that is based in
Europe, they have accused themas well.
(14:25):
Does it achieve anything?
Does it roll back a nuclearprogram by killing the head
scientist?
And who do you think did it?
Speaker 4 (14:35):
I, I don't, I mean, I, I don't know who did it, but
I don't think it's unreasonableto conclude that it was probably
the Israelis.
Um, and I don't think it'sreasonable to conclude that the
timing is linked to the factthat president Trump has two
more months in the office, but Ithink, whereas you could argue,
(14:56):
and I think by probably wouldargue that the killing of
general Soleimani in January,this year by like eight have
quite a, uh, substantive impacton the ability of the COOs force
to, uh, carry out terroristoperations overseas, but the was
ahead.
And he was a very powerfulfigure.
(15:19):
I'm not so sure about factories.
Are there, I mean, he'scertainly an important scientist
with other scientists and Iranalready has the nuclear
know-how, it's not as though itneeds a research.
It's more about the developmentof the program rather than
actually, uh, initiate things,such semi to get the technology.
Right.
So, so I, I'm less convinced I'mnot, I don't know, back resigned
(15:42):
his background and his pitchsize wrong.
Um, I don't think it will have aparticularly substantial impact
on the, um, program itself.
And I think there is a risk thatit could be counterproductive,
but do reasons one, it willreinforce, uh, Iranian, um,
(16:03):
incentive and determination toplus, and with the program.
And also, let's not forget thatthere are presidential elections
in Iran coming in 2021.
And president Rouhani may notlook like a sort of moderate
Democrat, and certainly isn't amoderate Democrat, but as we
know from Ahmadinejad and otherswho have proceeded him, there
are people who are much moreradical and much more hard-line
(16:27):
than him, uh, who will leave onnotes of, uh, attacks.
And it will certainly improvetheir chances on election.
Speaker 3 (16:34):
If whoever carried out this attack was interested
in carrying up the pavement fora Biden administration, to
re-engage with Iran and hopingthat Iran will fiercely respond
and make the gap betweendialogue with a new American
(16:55):
administration, even larger.
Do you think that Iran willdisappoint them?
Are they, are they smart enoughto hold back and wait for that
moment where they can move todialogue rather than move to
some kind of response, whetherwherever it be.
Speaker 4 (17:14):
I think it's difficult to judge that because
one called, think about Iran asa political entity.
Yeah.
You can say in Saudi Arabia thatall the decisions are taken by
one, maybe two people, you can'tsay that in Iran, you know, it's
not a democracy, but there is aplurality of politics in Iran
that is completely absent fromthe Arab States, for instance.
(17:38):
So there is a precedent, he hasa role, Ronnie, but there is the
Supreme leader.
There's the IGC, there's thebizarre is there's the Magister
shooter.
Now all of these bodies have aninfluence in the eventual
decision at night be taken in.
So I think if you look atpresident Mahoney or the foreign
ministers a week, they willcertainly want to not close off
(18:02):
the possibility of engagementwith Joe Biden, but equally
Israelis probably absolutely.
For the reasons you say, have aninterest in making it much more
difficult that we engagement totake place.
And president Trump in his lastcouple of months may help to
facilitate that.
So I think there is a risk thatIran will be, will be pushed
(18:24):
into a retaliation, which wouldmake engagement more difficult.
Certainly
Speaker 3 (18:28):
Last question to you, you know, you said you got to
that fork in the road where, youknow, you, you, you either had
to choose them getting a bomb oryou had to choose dialogue.
Um, and then the drawbacks inthe deal with the fact that you
didn't take into it, it didn't,uh, put a new surround their
rocket program, or it didn'tbridal malign activities.
(18:50):
I mean, it's, it's almost naiveto think that a, a, a new
agreement, even with the bestintentions, uh, is suddenly
going to deal with all of that.
I mean, it's, it's almost a lotof people would say, you have to
start somewhere, go back into,uh, a nuclear non-proliferation
agreement with Iran.
(19:12):
And then while you have whateverthe period is going to be this
time, whether it's going to beanother 15 years or up to that
15 years, then you start dealingwith some of these other issues.
Or do you think it should be amore encompassing in retrospect,
a more encompassing deal?
Speaker 4 (19:27):
Well, I think you can try and make it a more
encompassing deal.
I mean, let's not forget thatthe original deal, yes, it was
restricted to the nuclearprogram, but that didn't prevent
other action taking place at thesame time on the ballistic,
besides, and particularly on theregional, well, it didn't rule
out anything either then, orindeed on the nuclear program at
the end of the 15, 15 yearperiod, know, John Bolton is a
(19:52):
good example of someone who saysoften let's make the problem
bigger.
So we made the problem bigger.
We bring in these other twoissues and then let's sit down
and negotiate.
And I think there may well be,uh, an effort to try and do
that, but whether it will besuccessful or not, we'll see,
um, it wasn't successful in thesort of 15 year negotiations in
(20:14):
which I was involved.
Um, but it's, there is no doubtthat what is constraining, the
Arabians is the sanctions.
They do have economic sanctions.
The UN security council isUnited against the nuclear
program.
So the opportunity for toughersanctions, so they are suffering
and that may make them moreamenable to some of these wider
(20:36):
discussions,
Speaker 3 (20:38):
Ambassador, Mark Lau grant.
Great to have your perspective,somebody who's been in the room
and we're part of thenegotiations as a former
national security advisor to twoprime ministers here in Britain.
Great to talk to you, sir.
Thank you.
All right.
Let's go to Pittsburgh now.
And Colin Clark is a seniorresearch fellow with the Soufan
(21:02):
center.
Hi, Colin, how are you doingDana timing?
You know, talk to me about theassassination of the, the senior
nuclear scientist.
What, why now?
And who do you think that?
Speaker 5 (21:18):
Well, I think there's considerable concern.
Um, at least by the Israelisthat, uh, Biden administration
is not going to be, um, asopen-minded to, uh, you know,
Israel's kind of point of viewas the Trump administration was.
And I, and I think that'sprobably correct.
Um, there are concerns that theBiden administration will
(21:39):
re-engage with the Iranians andattempt to reinsure, uh, the
multi-lateral, uh, nuclear deal.
And that's something that, um,the Israelis are very adamant
against
Speaker 3 (21:48):
Why isn't it than Yahoo, so adamantly against it.
And then I also talked to JohnBolton, Trump's national
security advisor and formerambassador to the, to the, to
the UN before.
And he said, it just wasn'tverifiable.
I mean, they, they really, um,you know, they really put holes
in the agreement.
And yet you talk to otherpeople, Europeans here who some
(22:10):
of them I've talked to whohelped negotiate this agreement
and they say it was verifiableand it was a good agreement.
And it stopped Iran from gettinga nuclear weapon.
Speaker 5 (22:19):
Yeah, well, clearly Netanyahu disagrees.
I think, you know, manyhardliners within Israel are
uncomfortable, uh, where therecomes to an element of trust
with the Iranian regime.
And I think that's born overdecades of, uh, mistrust and,
and, and so, uh, in some ways Ido see the perspective of
Netanyahu, however, um, youknow, it's my belief that the
(22:42):
only really viable way forwardis engaging with the Iranians
diplomatically.
And even if we are able to kindof, uh, you know, renegotiate a
deal, I'm not one for blindtrust.
I'm, I'm more of a guy thatbelieves in, you know, trust in
God, but lock your car
Speaker 3 (22:59):
Trust, but verify as the Russians or as, um, as
president Reagan said to glory,you know, trust, but verify.
And in fact, in this case, theyhad, uh, UN inspectors in there
verifying, and the UN the IAEAseemed like they were pretty
happy with the outcome.
Look, do you believe, and I'vejust read your report that you
(23:19):
wrote for the Soufan center.
Um, do you believe that, uh, theSaudis were approached in this
meeting by, by Netanyahu to laythe groundwork for a military
strike against Iran by the Trumpadministration?
Speaker 5 (23:36):
I don't know.
I hope not.
Um, I do believe it's feasiblethat the Saudis were approached.
Um, but you know, if you are theSaudis, the MRR or, or, you
know, another country in theregion, and you think that, um,
you know, you've got leverage oryou've got some chips to play, I
(23:56):
don't know why you'd cash themin now with the Trump
administration.
You're more likely to wait, uh,and, and engage with divided
administration because you're,otherwise you're dealing with a
lame duck.
Uh, I know that Trump's approachhas been one of scorched earth.
He's trying to break everythingon his way out, uh, which is
really, you know, in my opinion,that's detrimental to us policy,
(24:18):
uh, you know, it's really apolicy of vengeance, uh, and you
know, so it's, it's going to besomething we're going to have to
spend a lot of time repairing.
Um, so, so, yeah.
Is it feasible that the Saudiswere approached about this?
Probably.
Um, but I don't think it's wiseto, uh, begin a conflict, uh,
right.
You know, full stop, much less,um, you know, with less than 70
(24:41):
days left in the administration,uh, and really no mandate,
right?
I mean, this is someone that's,um, spending most of this time
trying to discredit free andfair elections in his own
country.
Speaker 3 (24:51):
Well, he's always worried about his record and
wiping out, uh, presidentObama's record.
And this deal by the way waspart of the Obama
administration's deal that hewanted to get rid of in the
campaign.
But you mentioned the wordvengeance.
Talk to me about Iranianinventions.
I mean, what are they capable ofdoing?
And do you think that they'llpull the trigger on retaliation
(25:13):
at this point,
Speaker 5 (25:15):
Could be, uh, if you go back to September, 2019, you
see exactly what the Iraniansare capable of doing operating
through the region, putting theHouthi rebels, operating from a
Rocky soil, uh, you know, inareas kind of nominally
controlled by Iraqi Shiamilitia.
Uh, if you look at, uh, again,going back to the who these,
(25:36):
their capabilities, you'retalking about a violent
non-state actor with thecapabilities of a nation state,
I mean, really fairlysophisticated, um, you know,
ability to use drones, um,ability to use, um, some, some
pretty high-speed weaponry,including vessels.
Speaker 3 (25:54):
You can go after who
Speaker 5 (25:57):
And attack the Saudis attack, Saudi infrastructure,
uh, primarily.
And I think, you know, when yougo back to September, 2019, I
remember, I think I was onBloomberg, uh, television a
couple of days after the attack.
And the interviewer said, well,so what's the United States
going to do?
And I said, what do you mean weweren't attacked Saudis were,
(26:17):
and he was kind of taken abackthat, um, you know, I would even
suggest that the Saudi shoulddefend themselves.
I made a Quip, which, you know,I think, um, you know, drew, uh,
drew a lot of flack from it, butI said, we sell them the
weapons.
Do we have to pull the triggerfor them as well?
Um, so, you know, I'm certainlynot concerned,
Speaker 3 (26:34):
Uranian missile assault on a oil infrastructure
in Saudi Arabia, but then therehave been many other, what, what
else could Iran do?
I mean, what, what are thetargets terms of Israeli, uh,
targets, uh, American targetsabroad?
What do they have?
What are they capable of?
Speaker 5 (26:51):
People have a lot look through Lebanese has Bola.
They have global reach.
We've seen, has Bola, uh, Stripe, you know, all over the world
in Latin America and elsewhere.
Um, there's been plots that havebeen disrupted, uh, in Georgia
and India and Thailand.
We've seen the bus bottling inBulgaria.
So I have no, um, no doubt thatthe Iranians are capable of
(27:12):
responding.
The question becomes how wise isit?
Uh, you know, the Israelis aremore than capable of taking care
of themselves.
Uh, and I just don't thinkgetting into a kind of tit for
tat conflict with Israel rightnow, um, you know, the Israelis
have, have shown what they'recapable of doing.
Um, and, and, you know, theydon't really feel compelled to
hold back.
So it would be unwise on thepart of Iran, um, to, um, to
(27:35):
respond in full force.
But what I will say is Iran iskind of the master of walking
right up to the line withoutcrossing it, these kinds of
nibbling attacks, you know,around the edges.
And for that they they'd likelyuse proxies whether, you know,
Shia militia in Iraq, um, orLebanese Hezbollah or another
kind of Iranian prophecy.
Speaker 3 (27:56):
And I guess the big question for the Biden
administration now is can theyeasily reenter this agreement
with Iran?
Um, because a lot of things havehappened on the ground.
And in fact, the Iranian, theprogram has moved, the nuclear
program has moved forward.
So what is the challenge for anewly elected president Biden to
(28:19):
, to try to bring not Iran toheal, but to have some kind of
agreement on transparency withintheir nuclear program and, and
to try to get them to step back.
Speaker 5 (28:31):
It's, it's a real challenge.
I mean, it's certainly no faitaccompli, as you know, some
analysts have described andcommentary and various hop takes
that.
I've read that just becausethere's a Biden administration
means we're going to have anIran nuclear deal.
I think far from it, the regionlooks quite different than it
did even four years ago.
Um, you know, some of thealliances, uh, have shifted.
(28:51):
So I wouldn't say that it's acertainty, uh, that the us will
reenter the deal.
And I think, you know, there's alot that Iran still needs to do,
um, including curving itsbehavior through the proxies
that we just talked about, uh,before, you know, we should, you
know, just blindly reenter adeal, um, and reward the
Iranians.
(29:13):
Uh, I just don't think it'ssmart.
Speaker 3 (29:15):
Do you really think that the discussion should be
that broad, that, that not onlydo you talk about their nuclear
program, but you start talkingabout malign activities, you
start talking about theirmissile programs.
A lot of people think thatthat's just becomes unwieldy and
impossible in a, in a discussionto come to an agreement that you
need to start somewhere and youat least start building blocks
(29:37):
on that agreement and thesanctions around it and their
nuclear program.
Speaker 5 (29:42):
I do think it's worth discussing because one, you need
to raise the issue that it'sunacceptable now, what your
expectations are in terms ofwhat you're going to get out of
that is totally different.
But yeah, I do think it needs to, uh, uh, to be broached.
Uh, and I, and I think, youknow, it all depends on how you
view your own leverage, right?
Um, with economic sanctions,that's one of the problems I've
(30:04):
had with the Trumpadministration over the last
four years.
I've never really gotten a senseof how effective the Trump
administration itself believesthis maximum pressure campaign
has been, uh, because it's been,and I've written about this with
, uh, with my colleague AryanTabatabaie, we've called it a
tautology of sorts because nomatter what Iran seems to do,
(30:25):
the administration trumpets, uh,you know, the success of the
maximum pressure campaign, butthen also paints Iran, um, as
this, uh, actor that can't bestopped and that's, you know,
dominating the middle East.
Well, if that's the case, thenmaximum pressure hasn't worked,
right.
Uh, if Iran acts out andincreases attacks, you know, the
(30:45):
administration has said, look,maximum pressure is working.
And if the attacks decrease,they say, look, maximum pressure
is working.
So, uh, you know, I don't knowwhat the administration really
believes.
I don't know if they do well,it's up to the next
administration.
Now.
It looks like that thiscontemplation of any kind of
military action in Iran, um, ththat shadow seems to have
passed.
(31:05):
Although I wouldn't put anythingpast a desperate, uh, president
Trump right now, but, uh, we'llsee what president Biden does in
the future then, and whetherthey can bring them back into
some kind of a negotiatedsettlement.
Yeah.
I mean, I'll just say, you know,lastly, I think it speaks to the
incoherence of, of Trump'sstrategy in the middle East.
(31:25):
If the goal, as you statedbefore us and endless Wars, he's
going to start one right beforehe leaves office.
I think we haven't had acoherent approach to the region.
It's been one oftransactionalism.
Um, and, and so I'm lookingforward to a more cogent, uh,
you know, pragmatic relationshipor, you know, uh, strategy
(31:46):
formulation with a Bidenadministration, with someone
like a Jake Sullivan that knowsthe region.
Well, that knows the playersthat actually works across the
aisle and consults with, youknow, so-called hardliners
within the United States.
And so, um, I'm hopeful that,uh, we're, you know, we're able
to make progress on that front.
Thank you, Colin.
Thank you.
Speaker 2 (32:10):
And that's our backstory on Iran and the bomb
in case you didn't know, as wespeak, there is a trial underway
in Belgium of an Iraniandiplomat and several others
believe to be from Iranintelligence network for
smuggling explosives intoEurope, and then plotting to
carry out a bombing of anIranian opposition group in
(32:31):
France.
The bomb was handed over at apizza hut in Luxenberg.
The intent prosecutors say wasto blow up a rally in France of
a prominent opposition group tothe Uranian government.
Hundreds would have been killedthe Uranian diplomat Asadullah
Assadi allegedly carried thebomb a little more than a pound
(32:52):
of tea, TP, explosives, and adetonator to Vienna from Iran in
his luggage on an Austrianairlines flight.
He then drove it to Luxembourgin a rented car and handed it
over to an Iranian Belgiumcouple on June 30th, 2018.
And it was the Israeli Mossadwho tipped off French and
(33:13):
Belgium authorities.
Iran has denied the plot andsaid the charges were designed
to embarrass Tehran just beforepresident Hassan Rouhani
traveled to Europe to rallysupport for the 2015 nuclear
deal.
Thanks for listening tobackstory, share this link,
subscribe to our podcasts,wherever you listen.
(33:34):
We're on most major platformslike Apple, Stitcher, Spotify,
iHeartRadio, Amazon music,Pandora, Deezer, and many more.
If you would like to sponsorthis podcast, let us know.
I'm Dana Lewis and I'll talk toyou again.
Speaker 6 (33:55):
[inaudible].
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