March 3, 2021 • 29 mins
Imagine a nuclear threat to another nuclear nation and no way to communicate? Believe it or not communications can be hacked and most nations have no direct communications in a crisis at all.
On this Back Story with Dana Lewis, talks with former British Rear Admiral John Gower, on nuclear threats and communication as the single biggest component of averting war, and Philip Reiner of the U.S. Institute for Security and Technology on a newly proposed nuclear hotline for nations with nuclear weapons.
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Speaker 1 (00:00):
The whole office offensive buildup, a strict
quarantine on all offensivemilitary equipment under
shipment to Cuba is beinginitiated all ships of any kind
bounds to Cuba from whatevernation or port where they found
to contain cargoes of offensiveweapons be turned back, shall be
the policy of this nation toregard any nuclear missile
(00:24):
launch from Cuba against anynation in the Western
hemisphere.
As an attack by the Soviet unionon the United States requiring a
full retaliatory response uponthe Soviet union.
I call upon chairman crucial tohaul and eliminate this plan to
Stein, reckless and provocativethreat to world peace.
Speaker 2 (00:52):
Hi everyone.
And welcome to another editionof backstory.
I'm Dana Lewis.
I've devoted a few segments hereto nuclear arms control because
it's a former correspondent.
It was based in Moscow forAmerican TV.
I covered many of the strategicarms control negotiations and
came, I think to understand hownuclear war is a larger risk
(01:14):
than we realize that recording.
You just heard a presidentKennedy came about an October,
1962.
The closest the world may havecome to nuclear war.
The Cuban missile crisis.
When the us discovered Sovietnuclear missiles on Cuba,
president Kennedy demanded theirremoval
Speaker 3 (01:31):
And announced a Naval blockade of the Island and the
Soviet leader, Khrushchevexceeded to us demands a week
later, but it wasn't as simpleas that, there were tense
moments, a lack ofcommunication.
Anything could have gone wrong,and it was decided to establish
a hotline between the twonuclear superpowers in the wake
of that to ensure if heightenedtensions arose again, there
(01:54):
would be communication to talk,but since then a lot has
changed.
Nuclear weapons are hypersonicand warheads appear on
conventional delivery systemslike cruise missiles.
There are more nuclear nations.
It's simply more complicated,more confusing.
And as you're about to hear onthis backstory, incredibly
(02:15):
communications can be hacked andhijacked and are sorely lacking.
And when decisions have to bemade in seconds in a crisis,
none of it is good.
And then you system is beingproposed a kind of nuclear
crisis conference call.
One that we hope will probablynever have to happen.
(02:41):
All right, joining me now fromEngland is rear Admiral John
Gower, who served until hisretirement in 2014 as the
assistant chief of defensestaff, nuclear chemical
biological in the UK ministry ofdefense.
Hi John, thanks for joining me.
Good to see you again.
And Phillip Reiner fromCalifornia is the chief
executive officer of theInstitute for security and
(03:02):
technology.
Phillip, thank you.
Speaker 4 (03:06):
It's really great to be here.
Thanks for having me,
Speaker 3 (03:08):
Phil.
First of all, you are a podcastexpert because I've listened to
your podcast.
What's it called again?
Speaker 4 (03:15):
We have a podcast that's focused on a very niche
set of issues in the nucleardomain.
We call it the fourth leg.
Speaker 3 (03:22):
That's what I listened to and I thought you've
got some great segments there.
And, uh, so, and I've stolen allthe questions from that.
They were so good.
Let's talk risk.
First of all, before we talkabout communication, I mean
there are, are there ninecountries, somebody said seven
in one of your broadcasts,Russia, the United States,
China, India, Israel, France,North Korea, Pakistan, and the
(03:44):
United Kingdom.
I hope somebody was counting.
Do they communicate if there's acrisis like the Cuban missile
crisis, do you want to take thatfirst film?
Speaker 4 (03:54):
There are historical precedents via which nations
that maintain a nuclear weaponsarsenal are able to potentially
communicate with one anothermuch of which actually Springs
out of, of something youreferred to to keep in missile
crisis where the United Statesand the Soviet union found
themselves in the lead up towhat, uh, what could have been a
disastrous nuclear exchangewithout said means for
(04:17):
communication.
And what it did was itestablished a historical
precedent via which, uh, uh, thered phone was something that was
deployed for leader levelengagement in the lead up to an,
uh, in order to avoid such asuch a nuclear catastrophe.
And what you found in thatinstance was this, uh,
(04:38):
diplomatic and technical meansof a hotline via which the two
leaders could communicate withone another.
And it is something that hasevolved over time.
And I'd love to invite Johninto, to talk about this a
little bit as well.
It's something that's, you canfind in a number of different
historical examples, really in,in a number of the different
(04:59):
nuclear dyads around the world.
Um, it is, it is not somethinghowever that has been revisited
for quite some time, both from apolitical and a technical
perspective, much less, uh,acknowledging how the nuclear
really the nuclear world that welive in has evolved from kind of
these dyadic relationships intoa much more multipolar reality.
Speaker 3 (05:23):
John Gower, I not been in the white house, but I
haven't been in the Kremlin andseeing these rickety old, uh,
white and red telephones, uh,that, you know, our crisis lines
and surely, um, it has evolvedfrom that because the weapons
themselves.
And I would think that the time,uh, those precious minutes
(05:44):
involved in being able torespond to a crisis, uh, that is
also, you know, a moving targetbecause the missiles are getting
faster and the time is gettingshorter.
Well, I think that there areseveral, uh,
Speaker 5 (05:58):
I wish I could allay your, your concern about this
catching up with the reality ofthe world, but, but the truth is
apart from, with the possibilityof, of Russia to America, um,
one-to-one Moscow to Washington,and I don't have any specific
knowledge, but I think given allthe arms control and arms
(06:19):
reduction activity, that'sprobably the hotline that is,
uh, the most likely to beeffective one-to-one, but the
world has significantly changedand it is no longer a crisis.
And a nuclear domain is notgoing to be just for the two
guys head to head on thatparticular crisis, um, for a
(06:40):
start and for a long time, NATOas an organization has three
nuclear arms States in itsmembership, and they have needed
a way to communicate with eachother and with the rest of their
allies in any crisis.
So that is a separate thing.
It's not a hotline, it's aseries of abilities within the
NATO infrastructure tocommunicate, but we have the de
(07:01):
facto for, um, who have becomenuclear arms States since, uh,
the[inaudible] joined thenuclear nonproliferation treaty.
We have India and Pakistan whohave a history of going toe to
toe over a whole load of things.
We have the DPRK North Korea,um, and we have Israel who is
(07:22):
reputed to, um, own nuclearweapons, but doesn't talk to
anyone about that.
So a crisis, and of course the[inaudible] China, Russia, and
the three NATO allies, UKFrance, and the U S and any
crisis that is approaching, uh,a level where nuclear weapons
(07:42):
may be employed, involves everyone of those.
Speaker 3 (07:45):
I want to ask you, but first I want to, will you
give me an idea of a crisis?
I mean, what, what would be,would it be a launch?
Would it just be tensions on theborder?
Uh, probably all of the above.
Speaker 5 (07:56):
Well, the answer is all of the above, but what a
significantly changed is thatthe things that people were
feared of in the Cuban missilecrisis, and for most of the cold
war, where a strike from theblue, by the opposing super
power who suddenly got up onemorning and decided they could
win a nuclear exchange and thentire politics, and, uh, an
(08:17):
armaments of the, of the coldwar that rush up to 60,000
warheads was based on, on thatpremise.
That is still a possibility, butin my view, in the view of many
others, that is really theoutside risk.
The risk is that nationscolliding with each other over a
whole host of things from theavailability of water, the
(08:37):
effects of climate changeambitions in the South China,
sea injure, and Pakistan'senmity, and a whole host of
other issues, we'll stumble intoa crisis where through
misinterpretation ormiscalculation nuclear weapons
will be employed.
And this is not helped by havingwhole batch of nuclear weapons
and the death of the inf treaty.
(08:58):
They're all increasing thechances of these slightly easier
to use mentally nuclear weaponsbeing used.
And so what is needed really isa proper way in the 21st century
of communicating yourself awayfrom the brink.
And I think, uh, Philip and histeam have used operations at the
(09:18):
brink.
And that's exactly what we'retalking about, and you can't
with any number of crises.
And, and you can add to that ifwe fail to reinstate the JCPO,
if we fail to deal with Iran ina grown-up way that acknowledges
needs as a nation, but also thefear of her becoming nuclear.
And in recent weeks, they'vebeen very vocal about how
(09:41):
effects got wrong.
They will follow a nuclear pathin a way that they've not been
vocal over the years of theworry about them.
That just adds you then have 10,
Speaker 3 (09:53):
This just not the old mutually assured destruction,
uh, um, uh, you know, argumentwhere one side, you know,
wouldn't push the button becausethey know that the other side
would destroy them as well.
Uh, but now you have a lot ofthese weapons like hypersonic,
uh, I don't want to use Trump'sterm, but, you know, hypersonic
weapons and then, uh, cruisemissile deployment with nuclear
(10:15):
warheads, which suddenly onenation doesn't know what's in
common.
Is, is it nuclear or is itconventional?
So the stakes as we talk aboutthis, and I want to set this up
properly because a lot of peoplethink, well, you know, nuclear
war is somewhere out there.
And, uh, Saifai movie.
I mean, John, you've spent yourcareer on this, are you, are you
(10:35):
worried that we are much closerto that brink than we've
probably been in a long time?
Speaker 5 (10:41):
I think the brink is more difficult to identify and
therefore we may be very closeor a little bit further away,
but I think it is fair to saythat I am more concerned now in
2021 than I was at any time inthe six years, between 2008 and
2014, when I was involved inthis,
Speaker 3 (11:00):
That's really notable.
It's Phillip, thank you forbeing patient.
So what that brings us to, um,is how do you then have some
kind of communication betweennations, uh, that is able to, I
think one of your guests on oneof your podcasts said, you know,
get the off ramp on the superhighway heading to disaster,
(11:21):
which I thought was a very goodanalogy.
Speaker 4 (11:24):
Well, this is where, uh, some of the ingenuity and
the, the depth of technicalunderstanding within, uh, the
communities that we're able totouch here in California in
Silicon Valley, really come intoplay.
And through some of theconversations that we've been
able to engender, some of whichyou can hear in those podcasts
and the papers that accompanythem.
(11:45):
There's the, the reminder thatcomplexity is the enemy of
security, where so many, thetechnical solutions that may be
devised to address some of thesereal challenges go so far out in
terms of, uh, the, the backendtechnical complexity that it
actually, uh, increases, uh, theattack vector.
(12:08):
It makes it something simpler to, for instance, through cyber
means to, to go after.
Um, how can we from a jumpingoff point actually build
something from the firmware allthe way up that can, through a
very transparent, open sourceprocess, be collectively and
collaboratively built that thatthese nuclear weapons States
(12:31):
could turn to as acommunications options.
Speaker 3 (12:35):
So tell me, take me, take me through the range of
that.
W one would be in the old daysthat rickety old phone, um, you
know, a hotline, a bilateralhotline between the two nations
that have detentions.
Um, and now you're talking aboutCA cattle link.
Is that that's, how am I sayingit properly?
And what is the name
Speaker 4 (12:55):
That is right?
So the, this, this capabilitythat we've been talking about
potentially building is if wecall it Katelyn and Katelyn
consists of essentially twodifferent components, there is
an endpoint device that isactually used somewhat similar
to, uh, the, the telephone thatone recognizes today.
And then there is a system uponwhich that can actually ride,
(13:17):
which we call the rocks.
And so there's the puck devicein the rocks network upon which
the signal has to has to travel.
Speaker 3 (13:25):
You've completely lost me.
I hope you weren't meaning to dothat.
Speaker 4 (13:29):
The, the intent and that's, that's somewhat ironic
there because it's a, it's anattempt to, to simplify things,
um, is to build a very basiccommunications device that you
can open source the code for allthe way up from the actual
Silicon.
You can show that it issomething that's secure.
(13:50):
And so what we have been able todo is we can talk to someone
like Eric Gross, who is theformer security chief at Google.
You can talk to one of hiscounterparts who is also, uh, at
Google, who is referred to asthe high priest of core boot in
the communities, in which heexists.
These are folks who have thoughtfor many, many years about how
(14:10):
do you actually build softwarethat is reliable, that is
verifiably secure, and theintent here, and this gets back
to some of what John was talkingabout.
How do you then get that intothe hands of not just the United
States and Russia who may havevery well developed
capabilities, but you're talkingabout a much more diverse set of
(14:33):
actors who need this sort ofcapability, uh, to, to
potentially reduce theincreasing, uh, tensions that
are, that are building up to apotential nuclear exchange.
Speaker 3 (14:44):
Well, let me bring John in here, by the way you
said puck, would you say that toa Canadian, you, you know, we
get the wrong idea right away,but there's no ice in this one
and there's, there's no hockey.
So John, this is, um, somethingthat would bring in all nations
because I presume first of all,to set the scene for that, a
(15:04):
launch somewhere, if that's whatwe're talking about, uh, people
don't necessarily know what thetarget is and where it's headed,
and suddenly everybody moves toa hair trigger, and you can have
a very dangerous exchange maybewith people that nations that
were not even part of theoriginal conflict.
Is that the idea?
Speaker 5 (15:23):
Well, I think I'd walk back a little bit from
that.
I mean, clearly it has a usewhen launch has happened, but
its primary use is to preventthe transition to a nuclear
weapon launch.
And I think the significantthings that there's open source
based technology would bring isthe critical issues which we've
seen in Hollywood.
Um, do you know who the guy orgirl is at the other end of the
(15:45):
phone?
Can you be certain that they arethe leader of that particular
notion?
Can you have a conversation withthem with other leaders of
directly involved nations?
And I would say that is thenuclear arms States to start
with.
Um, and can you have such aconversation, uh, within all
levels of disaster?
(16:06):
So after launch as well, and infact, after detonation, and I
think the trick here is thatthis is in, in, in technological
terms, it's relatively simple,but the trick is not to try and
make another iPhone.
This is about making it capablesimply to conduct the sort of
textual messaging that wouldneed to be undertaken to
(16:30):
identify what's going down totalk and to deconflict
Speaker 3 (16:36):
And kind of link the audio.
Would it be strictly an audiotelephone call that's encrypted
since somebody couldn't hack inthere?
Speaker 5 (16:43):
I think that that is for discussion, but at its
primary level, it's like a textmessaging service.
And so it is about theidentification and the
cryptology of that through anopen source algorithm that gives
confidence and trust between thenuclear arms States who take
this system up, that when theyspeak on it, the people they
(17:04):
want to listen can listen at theright level and nobody else can
get in the way or spoof it.
And I think it is demonstratingthat capability through the kind
of open source technology.
And one of the problems withpeople thinking about this is
they're too used to a new thing,having all the bells and
whistles they want, and largelyit's the bells and whistles, the
(17:26):
ability to send images or musicor video like we're doing now
with zoom, it's those bells andwhistles that give, um, problems
with security and with identityand with hacking.
And if you shed all of that, ifyou bear bear it down to its
barest elements, do you want thepresident to be able to talk to
the Supreme leader, to be ableto talk to the prime minister in
(17:48):
a tripartite way and
Speaker 3 (17:50):
Get everybody that calm the hell down?
That's exactly what this isgoing to be pulling out a, you
know, a mobile launcher andsomebody sees it on a satellite.
This is the first thing thatthey're going to reach for and
engage that region and engagethe nuclear powers.
So who's been involved inpushing this idea because it
(18:11):
seems like the nations want todo the old do business, the old
way with their plastictelephones, you know, kind of
can I just before Phillipanswers that question, because
he's been driving the engagementwith a multiple number of
countries, every one of the newKieron state says clearly that
their weapons are last resort.
They don't want to use them.
(18:31):
They'd really rather not.
It's all about security, well,not rushing anymore.
They said that they would, theywould use nuclear weapons well
that they have, but the part oftheir declaratory policy, each
of the nuclear arms States usethe words of restraint, whatever
you may believe about them.
And, but this is the ultimatelevel of restraint.
And so if they believe what theysay, if they do what they say on
(18:53):
the tin, they should havesomething like this.
But I'll let Phillip answer yourquestion.
Phillip, try to try and reassureme a little bit because, uh, you
know, when they, when they talkabout restraint and we talk
about some of the nations thatare involved in this
conversation, you know, it'snot, it's not very consoling
isn't
Speaker 4 (19:08):
And I think there's one more piece on the technical
element.
And then I'll, you know, veryspecifically to that, you know,
one, one may ask, why don't youjust rely on WhatsApp in these
scenarios, that's secure Indian,uh, encrypted communications
cable.
Why don't you just use signal?
That is not something that theseStates could turn to in these
(19:29):
very extremely sensitivescenarios, because they haven't
seen it built from the bottomup.
And the discussion that we'rehaving is, so how do you
actually do this withtechnically savvy individuals
from each of these countries,um, within their industry, how
do you get those people togetherso that they actually see it
from the beginning?
(19:50):
And you come up with a solutionthat is imbued with integrity
from the outset, because they'vebeen part of that technical
build from the very beginning.
So we continue to haveconversations with people really
all around the world on thisvery topic.
We have had conversations withfolks who are based in, in
Geneva, uh, folks who are basedin Berlin, uh, those who are
(20:13):
based in London, uh, as Lama bodnew Delhi, the conversation
really has attempted to makesure that we're reaching out to
folks who are in Moscow and inBeijing, but then all of those
who may be able to contribute tothis as well, who bring a bit of
a technical savvy or whounderstand what it is to
actually work through the, whatis known as the open source
(20:35):
community of folks who canpotentially help develop these
things in an open, transparentway again, so that you imbue the
outcome with a significant levelof trust.
And that gets to what John wastalking about.
And Dana, to a certain extentyourself, if these leaders are
going to be able to use this,they have to know what it looks
like from the inside out.
And they have to be able to redteam it.
(20:56):
They have to be able to go afterit and try to break it, find
vulnerabilities in it.
And the process that we've putin place, both from a political
and a technical standpoint isbuilt off of that.
Very notion.
How do you build it withintegrity?
Speaker 3 (21:08):
I mean, I take a big breath because the very notion
or idea that somebody would hackinto a conversation or pretend
to be somebody that they're notwith a world leader whose finger
is near a nuclear button or codeor whatever, it's, it, it really
takes you back.
And I assume than some of thepeople that are really pushing
this are like John Gower who has, uh, you know, deep knowledge
(21:34):
and career in working withnuclear forces and understands,
you know, this is not a, um,this is not a far-fetched idea
that we have miscommunicationthat leads to nuclear war.
Speaker 5 (21:49):
No, I, in fact, I would class it and I have
written recently, and I'm notalone in this and saying that
misinterpretation of misdemeanorlocation is the single greatest
risk for stumbling into anuclear conflict.
And, and, you know, Dana that I,that I write and work in many
areas of risk reduction, um, in,uh, against nuclear cruise
(22:09):
missiles against low yieldsagainst dual-purpose weapons,
this doesn't supplant any ofthat work.
All of that work remainsimportant, but this is the
fullback.
This is the backstop, thelinebacker, depending on what
sport you're looking at, I don'tknow the, the ice hockey
equivalent, but if you fail tomake these changes, to remove
(22:30):
the weapons that are most liableto misinterpretation and
miscalculation, and you stumbledtowards a crisis, what you
really need at that point is thebest way of communicating your
way out of a crisis.
Speaker 3 (22:43):
It's not there.
And I think a lot of peoplelistening to this would, would
be as well.
What is the support Philip forthe concept and John, what are
the next steps?
Why don't we start with Phillips?
Speaker 4 (22:54):
I think we've seen a, a real positive set of responses
from a number of the, of thefolks that I mentioned just a
moment ago.
I think people realize that and,and directly to what you just
said, Dana, I think it'sincredibly important.
There may be something forinstance, that the United States
can put forward right now thatcould potentially serve as this
(23:15):
solution.
But why would for by way ofexample, why would Pakistan want
to adopt something that wasdeveloped by the United States
without asking questions aboutwhat it was, what it actually
could do, for example, theywould have to plug it into their
system.
What does it give the UnitedStates access to the demand?
Those are the exact trust issuesthat this would begin to address
(23:37):
from the, from the bottom ofthis
Speaker 3 (23:38):
Conversation's already well underway.
Speaker 4 (23:41):
So the, yes, those are the types of technical
conversations have been havinginternally at the political
level.
We have engaged withcounterparts, um, in each of the
countries that I mentionedbefore and in a number of others
as well, people see the inherentvalue to trying to build
something like this, because itdoes, I think, provide that
(24:01):
nuclear risk reduction potentialthat John was alluding to
Speaker 5 (24:05):
John next steps.
I mean, you, you feel that thishas some momentum now.
Well, it has a certain degree ofmomentum in the non-governmental
world in particular, although wehave engaged with governments,
uh, clearly we've been in a timeof huge distracting crisis.
We've gone through a major, uh,significant political change in
(24:25):
the U S and elsewhere in theworld.
Um, and we're just coming togrips with the implications of
the new administration in the US and I think it's true to say
that that coinciding with all ofthat change has probably led
some of the governments, just,just Mark Pace two or three
times, but Phillips mentionedthe key word, and this is trust.
(24:45):
Trust is both essential to takethis forward, but I also believe
this is a very vehicle uponwhich trust, which is lacking in
other places could be built.
And so, uh, I know there areorganizations like European
leadership network, which ishighly significant in the Euro
Atlantic area, and others whohave endorsed this as a very
positive step of it's takenforward.
(25:07):
And one of the purposes oftalking about it to you today is
to, is to raise awareness of itand to seek an opportunity for
governments to, to, to engagemore proactively and, and
together so that we can, we cantake this beyond what is an
extremely good idea with a lotof the, the foot work done on
(25:27):
the technical side, um, tosomething that could be taken
forward, not necessarily by ateam led by a us centric think
tank, as, as Phillip says, youknow, you can have the idea, but
you want to hand it on and youwant to hand it on to a
government or severalgovernments who would be trusted
to, to engage at thegovernmental level.
(25:47):
This is only going to fly whenthe governments of the nuclear
arms States, uh, engage with it.
And that's what we're trying todo at the moment.
And any involvement from themwould be extremely, extremely
positive because in the end isnot very high tech, all of this
is it, it really comes down topersonalities and who's on the
(26:07):
other end of the, whatever thecommunication device is.
And whether they're going topull the trigger on a nuclear
launch and, you know, presidentKennedy, um, his speech in front
of the United nations talkedabout the ominous and
omnipresent sword of Damoclesthat everybody lives under
hanging by the slenderest ofthreads, capable of being cut at
(26:27):
any moment by accident ormiscalculation, or as he rightly
pointed out by madness.
And that slender thread steelall these decades later is still
in place.
And you would have think that wewe'd come further than where are
now with assuring that therewouldn't be a nuclear exchange
(26:48):
somewhere.
I think something like this,they know, and I agree with all
that you've said is, um, part ofthis reestablishment of trust.
We, with the last time that wehad a positive, uh, level of
trust in my mind was around2010.
And if you look at the way inwhich NATO is writing about its
relations with Russia, thedirection of travel, uh, with,
(27:11):
uh, star, the fact the I andhalf was still, uh, the
intermediate nuclear forcestreaty was still operating.
All of the conventional armedforces treaties were operating
in Europe.
Um, things have gone seriouslydownhill since then.
And what is really missing isco-operative trust.
And if you don't havecooperative trust, then it
really doesn't matter.
(27:33):
Your, your chances of having amiscalculation or
misinterpretation are hugelymagnified.
And so whilst this has apractical application in the
reality, it is also a vehiclefor trust.
Speaker 4 (27:46):
Oh, I would just, I would reinforce what John was
just talking about.
There's so few instances in allof the dialogues around, around
nuclear weapons, the nuclearenterprise writ large, where you
can see a positive conversationaround technical trends.
And what we've we feel we'vestruck upon here is something
that could add value, not onlyfrom a technical perspective and
(28:06):
give people tools that theycould build off of, but it would
be something that a diplomaticlevel that they could use as
potentially a way to createtrusted discussions and
collaborative endeavors.
That's our intention here is toboth address from a technical
perspective, but maybe givepeople some political space to
engage with one another as well.
Speaker 5 (28:25):
Let's do a quick, thank you so much to both of
you.
Former rear Admiral John Gowerand Phil Brian,
Speaker 2 (28:31):
The chief executive officer of the Institute for
security and technology.
Thank you so much.
Thank you, Dana.
Thank you, Dana.
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(28:54):
what's important and steerpeople away from this
information.
It's Dana Lewis dot substack.com.
Sign up.
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I'm Dana Lewis reporting fromLondon.
Thanks for listening.
And I'll talk to you again soon.
The whole office offensive buildup, a strict
quarantine on all offensivemilitary equipment under
shipment to Cuba is beinginitiated all ships of any kind
bounds to Cuba from whatevernation or port where they found
to contain cargoes of offensiveweapons be turned back, shall be
the policy of this nation toregard any nuclear missile
(00:24):
launch from Cuba against anynation in the Western
hemisphere.
As an attack by the Soviet unionon the United States requiring a
full retaliatory response uponthe Soviet union.
I call upon chairman crucial tohaul and eliminate this plan to
Stein, reckless and provocativethreat to world peace.
Speaker 2 (00:52):
Hi everyone.
And welcome to another editionof backstory.
I'm Dana Lewis.
I've devoted a few segments hereto nuclear arms control because
it's a former correspondent.
It was based in Moscow forAmerican TV.
I covered many of the strategicarms control negotiations and
came, I think to understand hownuclear war is a larger risk
(01:14):
than we realize that recording.
You just heard a presidentKennedy came about an October,
1962.
The closest the world may havecome to nuclear war.
The Cuban missile crisis.
When the us discovered Sovietnuclear missiles on Cuba,
president Kennedy demanded theirremoval
Speaker 3 (01:31):
And announced a Naval blockade of the Island and the
Soviet leader, Khrushchevexceeded to us demands a week
later, but it wasn't as simpleas that, there were tense
moments, a lack ofcommunication.
Anything could have gone wrong,and it was decided to establish
a hotline between the twonuclear superpowers in the wake
of that to ensure if heightenedtensions arose again, there
(01:54):
would be communication to talk,but since then a lot has
changed.
Nuclear weapons are hypersonicand warheads appear on
conventional delivery systemslike cruise missiles.
There are more nuclear nations.
It's simply more complicated,more confusing.
And as you're about to hear onthis backstory, incredibly
(02:15):
communications can be hacked andhijacked and are sorely lacking.
And when decisions have to bemade in seconds in a crisis,
none of it is good.
And then you system is beingproposed a kind of nuclear
crisis conference call.
One that we hope will probablynever have to happen.
(02:41):
All right, joining me now fromEngland is rear Admiral John
Gower, who served until hisretirement in 2014 as the
assistant chief of defensestaff, nuclear chemical
biological in the UK ministry ofdefense.
Hi John, thanks for joining me.
Good to see you again.
And Phillip Reiner fromCalifornia is the chief
executive officer of theInstitute for security and
(03:02):
technology.
Phillip, thank you.
Speaker 4 (03:06):
It's really great to be here.
Thanks for having me,
Speaker 3 (03:08):
Phil.
First of all, you are a podcastexpert because I've listened to
your podcast.
What's it called again?
Speaker 4 (03:15):
We have a podcast that's focused on a very niche
set of issues in the nucleardomain.
We call it the fourth leg.
Speaker 3 (03:22):
That's what I listened to and I thought you've
got some great segments there.
And, uh, so, and I've stolen allthe questions from that.
They were so good.
Let's talk risk.
First of all, before we talkabout communication, I mean
there are, are there ninecountries, somebody said seven
in one of your broadcasts,Russia, the United States,
China, India, Israel, France,North Korea, Pakistan, and the
(03:44):
United Kingdom.
I hope somebody was counting.
Do they communicate if there's acrisis like the Cuban missile
crisis, do you want to take thatfirst film?
Speaker 4 (03:54):
There are historical precedents via which nations
that maintain a nuclear weaponsarsenal are able to potentially
communicate with one anothermuch of which actually Springs
out of, of something youreferred to to keep in missile
crisis where the United Statesand the Soviet union found
themselves in the lead up towhat, uh, what could have been a
disastrous nuclear exchangewithout said means for
(04:17):
communication.
And what it did was itestablished a historical
precedent via which, uh, uh, thered phone was something that was
deployed for leader levelengagement in the lead up to an,
uh, in order to avoid such asuch a nuclear catastrophe.
And what you found in thatinstance was this, uh,
(04:38):
diplomatic and technical meansof a hotline via which the two
leaders could communicate withone another.
And it is something that hasevolved over time.
And I'd love to invite Johninto, to talk about this a
little bit as well.
It's something that's, you canfind in a number of different
historical examples, really in,in a number of the different
(04:59):
nuclear dyads around the world.
Um, it is, it is not somethinghowever that has been revisited
for quite some time, both from apolitical and a technical
perspective, much less, uh,acknowledging how the nuclear
really the nuclear world that welive in has evolved from kind of
these dyadic relationships intoa much more multipolar reality.
Speaker 3 (05:23):
John Gower, I not been in the white house, but I
haven't been in the Kremlin andseeing these rickety old, uh,
white and red telephones, uh,that, you know, our crisis lines
and surely, um, it has evolvedfrom that because the weapons
themselves.
And I would think that the time,uh, those precious minutes
(05:44):
involved in being able torespond to a crisis, uh, that is
also, you know, a moving targetbecause the missiles are getting
faster and the time is gettingshorter.
Well, I think that there areseveral, uh,
Speaker 5 (05:58):
I wish I could allay your, your concern about this
catching up with the reality ofthe world, but, but the truth is
apart from, with the possibilityof, of Russia to America, um,
one-to-one Moscow to Washington,and I don't have any specific
knowledge, but I think given allthe arms control and arms
(06:19):
reduction activity, that'sprobably the hotline that is,
uh, the most likely to beeffective one-to-one, but the
world has significantly changedand it is no longer a crisis.
And a nuclear domain is notgoing to be just for the two
guys head to head on thatparticular crisis, um, for a
(06:40):
start and for a long time, NATOas an organization has three
nuclear arms States in itsmembership, and they have needed
a way to communicate with eachother and with the rest of their
allies in any crisis.
So that is a separate thing.
It's not a hotline, it's aseries of abilities within the
NATO infrastructure tocommunicate, but we have the de
(07:01):
facto for, um, who have becomenuclear arms States since, uh,
the[inaudible] joined thenuclear nonproliferation treaty.
We have India and Pakistan whohave a history of going toe to
toe over a whole load of things.
We have the DPRK North Korea,um, and we have Israel who is
(07:22):
reputed to, um, own nuclearweapons, but doesn't talk to
anyone about that.
So a crisis, and of course the[inaudible] China, Russia, and
the three NATO allies, UKFrance, and the U S and any
crisis that is approaching, uh,a level where nuclear weapons
(07:42):
may be employed, involves everyone of those.
Speaker 3 (07:45):
I want to ask you, but first I want to, will you
give me an idea of a crisis?
I mean, what, what would be,would it be a launch?
Would it just be tensions on theborder?
Uh, probably all of the above.
Speaker 5 (07:56):
Well, the answer is all of the above, but what a
significantly changed is thatthe things that people were
feared of in the Cuban missilecrisis, and for most of the cold
war, where a strike from theblue, by the opposing super
power who suddenly got up onemorning and decided they could
win a nuclear exchange and thentire politics, and, uh, an
(08:17):
armaments of the, of the coldwar that rush up to 60,000
warheads was based on, on thatpremise.
That is still a possibility, butin my view, in the view of many
others, that is really theoutside risk.
The risk is that nationscolliding with each other over a
whole host of things from theavailability of water, the
(08:37):
effects of climate changeambitions in the South China,
sea injure, and Pakistan'senmity, and a whole host of
other issues, we'll stumble intoa crisis where through
misinterpretation ormiscalculation nuclear weapons
will be employed.
And this is not helped by havingwhole batch of nuclear weapons
and the death of the inf treaty.
(08:58):
They're all increasing thechances of these slightly easier
to use mentally nuclear weaponsbeing used.
And so what is needed really isa proper way in the 21st century
of communicating yourself awayfrom the brink.
And I think, uh, Philip and histeam have used operations at the
(09:18):
brink.
And that's exactly what we'retalking about, and you can't
with any number of crises.
And, and you can add to that ifwe fail to reinstate the JCPO,
if we fail to deal with Iran ina grown-up way that acknowledges
needs as a nation, but also thefear of her becoming nuclear.
And in recent weeks, they'vebeen very vocal about how
(09:41):
effects got wrong.
They will follow a nuclear pathin a way that they've not been
vocal over the years of theworry about them.
That just adds you then have 10,
Speaker 3 (09:53):
This just not the old mutually assured destruction,
uh, um, uh, you know, argumentwhere one side, you know,
wouldn't push the button becausethey know that the other side
would destroy them as well.
Uh, but now you have a lot ofthese weapons like hypersonic,
uh, I don't want to use Trump'sterm, but, you know, hypersonic
weapons and then, uh, cruisemissile deployment with nuclear
(10:15):
warheads, which suddenly onenation doesn't know what's in
common.
Is, is it nuclear or is itconventional?
So the stakes as we talk aboutthis, and I want to set this up
properly because a lot of peoplethink, well, you know, nuclear
war is somewhere out there.
And, uh, Saifai movie.
I mean, John, you've spent yourcareer on this, are you, are you
(10:35):
worried that we are much closerto that brink than we've
probably been in a long time?
Speaker 5 (10:41):
I think the brink is more difficult to identify and
therefore we may be very closeor a little bit further away,
but I think it is fair to saythat I am more concerned now in
2021 than I was at any time inthe six years, between 2008 and
2014, when I was involved inthis,
Speaker 3 (11:00):
That's really notable.
It's Phillip, thank you forbeing patient.
So what that brings us to, um,is how do you then have some
kind of communication betweennations, uh, that is able to, I
think one of your guests on oneof your podcasts said, you know,
get the off ramp on the superhighway heading to disaster,
(11:21):
which I thought was a very goodanalogy.
Speaker 4 (11:24):
Well, this is where, uh, some of the ingenuity and
the, the depth of technicalunderstanding within, uh, the
communities that we're able totouch here in California in
Silicon Valley, really come intoplay.
And through some of theconversations that we've been
able to engender, some of whichyou can hear in those podcasts
and the papers that accompanythem.
(11:45):
There's the, the reminder thatcomplexity is the enemy of
security, where so many, thetechnical solutions that may be
devised to address some of thesereal challenges go so far out in
terms of, uh, the, the backendtechnical complexity that it
actually, uh, increases, uh, theattack vector.
(12:08):
It makes it something simpler to, for instance, through cyber
means to, to go after.
Um, how can we from a jumpingoff point actually build
something from the firmware allthe way up that can, through a
very transparent, open sourceprocess, be collectively and
collaboratively built that thatthese nuclear weapons States
(12:31):
could turn to as acommunications options.
Speaker 3 (12:35):
So tell me, take me, take me through the range of
that.
W one would be in the old daysthat rickety old phone, um, you
know, a hotline, a bilateralhotline between the two nations
that have detentions.
Um, and now you're talking aboutCA cattle link.
Is that that's, how am I sayingit properly?
And what is the name
Speaker 4 (12:55):
That is right?
So the, this, this capabilitythat we've been talking about
potentially building is if wecall it Katelyn and Katelyn
consists of essentially twodifferent components, there is
an endpoint device that isactually used somewhat similar
to, uh, the, the telephone thatone recognizes today.
And then there is a system uponwhich that can actually ride,
(13:17):
which we call the rocks.
And so there's the puck devicein the rocks network upon which
the signal has to has to travel.
Speaker 3 (13:25):
You've completely lost me.
I hope you weren't meaning to dothat.
Speaker 4 (13:29):
The, the intent and that's, that's somewhat ironic
there because it's a, it's anattempt to, to simplify things,
um, is to build a very basiccommunications device that you
can open source the code for allthe way up from the actual
Silicon.
You can show that it issomething that's secure.
(13:50):
And so what we have been able todo is we can talk to someone
like Eric Gross, who is theformer security chief at Google.
You can talk to one of hiscounterparts who is also, uh, at
Google, who is referred to asthe high priest of core boot in
the communities, in which heexists.
These are folks who have thoughtfor many, many years about how
(14:10):
do you actually build softwarethat is reliable, that is
verifiably secure, and theintent here, and this gets back
to some of what John was talkingabout.
How do you then get that intothe hands of not just the United
States and Russia who may havevery well developed
capabilities, but you're talkingabout a much more diverse set of
(14:33):
actors who need this sort ofcapability, uh, to, to
potentially reduce theincreasing, uh, tensions that
are, that are building up to apotential nuclear exchange.
Speaker 3 (14:44):
Well, let me bring John in here, by the way you
said puck, would you say that toa Canadian, you, you know, we
get the wrong idea right away,but there's no ice in this one
and there's, there's no hockey.
So John, this is, um, somethingthat would bring in all nations
because I presume first of all,to set the scene for that, a
(15:04):
launch somewhere, if that's whatwe're talking about, uh, people
don't necessarily know what thetarget is and where it's headed,
and suddenly everybody moves toa hair trigger, and you can have
a very dangerous exchange maybewith people that nations that
were not even part of theoriginal conflict.
Is that the idea?
Speaker 5 (15:23):
Well, I think I'd walk back a little bit from
that.
I mean, clearly it has a usewhen launch has happened, but
its primary use is to preventthe transition to a nuclear
weapon launch.
And I think the significantthings that there's open source
based technology would bring isthe critical issues which we've
seen in Hollywood.
Um, do you know who the guy orgirl is at the other end of the
(15:45):
phone?
Can you be certain that they arethe leader of that particular
notion?
Can you have a conversation withthem with other leaders of
directly involved nations?
And I would say that is thenuclear arms States to start
with.
Um, and can you have such aconversation, uh, within all
levels of disaster?
(16:06):
So after launch as well, and infact, after detonation, and I
think the trick here is thatthis is in, in, in technological
terms, it's relatively simple,but the trick is not to try and
make another iPhone.
This is about making it capablesimply to conduct the sort of
textual messaging that wouldneed to be undertaken to
(16:30):
identify what's going down totalk and to deconflict
Speaker 3 (16:36):
And kind of link the audio.
Would it be strictly an audiotelephone call that's encrypted
since somebody couldn't hack inthere?
Speaker 5 (16:43):
I think that that is for discussion, but at its
primary level, it's like a textmessaging service.
And so it is about theidentification and the
cryptology of that through anopen source algorithm that gives
confidence and trust between thenuclear arms States who take
this system up, that when theyspeak on it, the people they
(17:04):
want to listen can listen at theright level and nobody else can
get in the way or spoof it.
And I think it is demonstratingthat capability through the kind
of open source technology.
And one of the problems withpeople thinking about this is
they're too used to a new thing,having all the bells and
whistles they want, and largelyit's the bells and whistles, the
(17:26):
ability to send images or musicor video like we're doing now
with zoom, it's those bells andwhistles that give, um, problems
with security and with identityand with hacking.
And if you shed all of that, ifyou bear bear it down to its
barest elements, do you want thepresident to be able to talk to
the Supreme leader, to be ableto talk to the prime minister in
(17:48):
a tripartite way and
Speaker 3 (17:50):
Get everybody that calm the hell down?
That's exactly what this isgoing to be pulling out a, you
know, a mobile launcher andsomebody sees it on a satellite.
This is the first thing thatthey're going to reach for and
engage that region and engagethe nuclear powers.
So who's been involved inpushing this idea because it
(18:11):
seems like the nations want todo the old do business, the old
way with their plastictelephones, you know, kind of
can I just before Phillipanswers that question, because
he's been driving the engagementwith a multiple number of
countries, every one of the newKieron state says clearly that
their weapons are last resort.
They don't want to use them.
(18:31):
They'd really rather not.
It's all about security, well,not rushing anymore.
They said that they would, theywould use nuclear weapons well
that they have, but the part oftheir declaratory policy, each
of the nuclear arms States usethe words of restraint, whatever
you may believe about them.
And, but this is the ultimatelevel of restraint.
And so if they believe what theysay, if they do what they say on
(18:53):
the tin, they should havesomething like this.
But I'll let Phillip answer yourquestion.
Phillip, try to try and reassureme a little bit because, uh, you
know, when they, when they talkabout restraint and we talk
about some of the nations thatare involved in this
conversation, you know, it'snot, it's not very consoling
isn't
Speaker 4 (19:08):
And I think there's one more piece on the technical
element.
And then I'll, you know, veryspecifically to that, you know,
one, one may ask, why don't youjust rely on WhatsApp in these
scenarios, that's secure Indian,uh, encrypted communications
cable.
Why don't you just use signal?
That is not something that theseStates could turn to in these
(19:29):
very extremely sensitivescenarios, because they haven't
seen it built from the bottomup.
And the discussion that we'rehaving is, so how do you
actually do this withtechnically savvy individuals
from each of these countries,um, within their industry, how
do you get those people togetherso that they actually see it
from the beginning?
(19:50):
And you come up with a solutionthat is imbued with integrity
from the outset, because they'vebeen part of that technical
build from the very beginning.
So we continue to haveconversations with people really
all around the world on thisvery topic.
We have had conversations withfolks who are based in, in
Geneva, uh, folks who are basedin Berlin, uh, those who are
(20:13):
based in London, uh, as Lama bodnew Delhi, the conversation
really has attempted to makesure that we're reaching out to
folks who are in Moscow and inBeijing, but then all of those
who may be able to contribute tothis as well, who bring a bit of
a technical savvy or whounderstand what it is to
actually work through the, whatis known as the open source
(20:35):
community of folks who canpotentially help develop these
things in an open, transparentway again, so that you imbue the
outcome with a significant levelof trust.
And that gets to what John wastalking about.
And Dana, to a certain extentyourself, if these leaders are
going to be able to use this,they have to know what it looks
like from the inside out.
And they have to be able to redteam it.
(20:56):
They have to be able to go afterit and try to break it, find
vulnerabilities in it.
And the process that we've putin place, both from a political
and a technical standpoint isbuilt off of that.
Very notion.
How do you build it withintegrity?
Speaker 3 (21:08):
I mean, I take a big breath because the very notion
or idea that somebody would hackinto a conversation or pretend
to be somebody that they're notwith a world leader whose finger
is near a nuclear button or codeor whatever, it's, it, it really
takes you back.
And I assume than some of thepeople that are really pushing
this are like John Gower who has, uh, you know, deep knowledge
(21:34):
and career in working withnuclear forces and understands,
you know, this is not a, um,this is not a far-fetched idea
that we have miscommunicationthat leads to nuclear war.
Speaker 5 (21:49):
No, I, in fact, I would class it and I have
written recently, and I'm notalone in this and saying that
misinterpretation of misdemeanorlocation is the single greatest
risk for stumbling into anuclear conflict.
And, and, you know, Dana that I,that I write and work in many
areas of risk reduction, um, in,uh, against nuclear cruise
(22:09):
missiles against low yieldsagainst dual-purpose weapons,
this doesn't supplant any ofthat work.
All of that work remainsimportant, but this is the
fullback.
This is the backstop, thelinebacker, depending on what
sport you're looking at, I don'tknow the, the ice hockey
equivalent, but if you fail tomake these changes, to remove
(22:30):
the weapons that are most liableto misinterpretation and
miscalculation, and you stumbledtowards a crisis, what you
really need at that point is thebest way of communicating your
way out of a crisis.
Speaker 3 (22:43):
It's not there.
And I think a lot of peoplelistening to this would, would
be as well.
What is the support Philip forthe concept and John, what are
the next steps?
Why don't we start with Phillips?
Speaker 4 (22:54):
I think we've seen a, a real positive set of responses
from a number of the, of thefolks that I mentioned just a
moment ago.
I think people realize that and,and directly to what you just
said, Dana, I think it'sincredibly important.
There may be something forinstance, that the United States
can put forward right now thatcould potentially serve as this
(23:15):
solution.
But why would for by way ofexample, why would Pakistan want
to adopt something that wasdeveloped by the United States
without asking questions aboutwhat it was, what it actually
could do, for example, theywould have to plug it into their
system.
What does it give the UnitedStates access to the demand?
Those are the exact trust issuesthat this would begin to address
(23:37):
from the, from the bottom ofthis
Speaker 3 (23:38):
Conversation's already well underway.
Speaker 4 (23:41):
So the, yes, those are the types of technical
conversations have been havinginternally at the political
level.
We have engaged withcounterparts, um, in each of the
countries that I mentionedbefore and in a number of others
as well, people see the inherentvalue to trying to build
something like this, because itdoes, I think, provide that
(24:01):
nuclear risk reduction potentialthat John was alluding to
Speaker 5 (24:05):
John next steps.
I mean, you, you feel that thishas some momentum now.
Well, it has a certain degree ofmomentum in the non-governmental
world in particular, although wehave engaged with governments,
uh, clearly we've been in a timeof huge distracting crisis.
We've gone through a major, uh,significant political change in
(24:25):
the U S and elsewhere in theworld.
Um, and we're just coming togrips with the implications of
the new administration in the US and I think it's true to say
that that coinciding with all ofthat change has probably led
some of the governments, just,just Mark Pace two or three
times, but Phillips mentionedthe key word, and this is trust.
(24:45):
Trust is both essential to takethis forward, but I also believe
this is a very vehicle uponwhich trust, which is lacking in
other places could be built.
And so, uh, I know there areorganizations like European
leadership network, which ishighly significant in the Euro
Atlantic area, and others whohave endorsed this as a very
positive step of it's takenforward.
(25:07):
And one of the purposes oftalking about it to you today is
to, is to raise awareness of itand to seek an opportunity for
governments to, to, to engagemore proactively and, and
together so that we can, we cantake this beyond what is an
extremely good idea with a lotof the, the foot work done on
(25:27):
the technical side, um, tosomething that could be taken
forward, not necessarily by ateam led by a us centric think
tank, as, as Phillip says, youknow, you can have the idea, but
you want to hand it on and youwant to hand it on to a
government or severalgovernments who would be trusted
to, to engage at thegovernmental level.
(25:47):
This is only going to fly whenthe governments of the nuclear
arms States, uh, engage with it.
And that's what we're trying todo at the moment.
And any involvement from themwould be extremely, extremely
positive because in the end isnot very high tech, all of this
is it, it really comes down topersonalities and who's on the
(26:07):
other end of the, whatever thecommunication device is.
And whether they're going topull the trigger on a nuclear
launch and, you know, presidentKennedy, um, his speech in front
of the United nations talkedabout the ominous and
omnipresent sword of Damoclesthat everybody lives under
hanging by the slenderest ofthreads, capable of being cut at
(26:27):
any moment by accident ormiscalculation, or as he rightly
pointed out by madness.
And that slender thread steelall these decades later is still
in place.
And you would have think that wewe'd come further than where are
now with assuring that therewouldn't be a nuclear exchange
(26:48):
somewhere.
I think something like this,they know, and I agree with all
that you've said is, um, part ofthis reestablishment of trust.
We, with the last time that wehad a positive, uh, level of
trust in my mind was around2010.
And if you look at the way inwhich NATO is writing about its
relations with Russia, thedirection of travel, uh, with,
(27:11):
uh, star, the fact the I andhalf was still, uh, the
intermediate nuclear forcestreaty was still operating.
All of the conventional armedforces treaties were operating
in Europe.
Um, things have gone seriouslydownhill since then.
And what is really missing isco-operative trust.
And if you don't havecooperative trust, then it
really doesn't matter.
(27:33):
Your, your chances of having amiscalculation or
misinterpretation are hugelymagnified.
And so whilst this has apractical application in the
reality, it is also a vehiclefor trust.
Speaker 4 (27:46):
Oh, I would just, I would reinforce what John was
just talking about.
There's so few instances in allof the dialogues around, around
nuclear weapons, the nuclearenterprise writ large, where you
can see a positive conversationaround technical trends.
And what we've we feel we'vestruck upon here is something
that could add value, not onlyfrom a technical perspective and
(28:06):
give people tools that theycould build off of, but it would
be something that a diplomaticlevel that they could use as
potentially a way to createtrusted discussions and
collaborative endeavors.
That's our intention here is toboth address from a technical
perspective, but maybe givepeople some political space to
engage with one another as well.
Speaker 5 (28:25):
Let's do a quick, thank you so much to both of
you.
Former rear Admiral John Gowerand Phil Brian,
Speaker 2 (28:31):
The chief executive officer of the Institute for
security and technology.
Thank you so much.
Thank you, Dana.
Thank you, Dana.
And that's our backstory, pleasesubscribe and share this
podcast.
I also run a newsletter now tohelp people who complained.
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(28:54):
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