China-Global South Relations

China has made significant inroads into much of the global south, a trend that does not always receive adequate attention in the West. China's image in those countries has deteriorated in recent years, and there appears to be an assumption that this is universal. However, polling data from Africa and the Middle East show that China's reputation in the developing world is in much better shape.
In today's podcast, we are joined by Dr. Lina Benabdallah. Dr. Lina Benabdallah is a Wake Forest University assistant professor of politics and international affairs. Her research interests include international relations theory, foreign policy, critical theories of power, past politics, and knowledge production and hegemony in South-South relations. Dr. Lina will provide an overview of China's influence in the Global South, as well as why China is viewed positively by African countries. She will also discuss how China gained positive impressions from Africans and how this affects the global stage.
Takeaways
Overview of China’s influence on the Global South
The difference between Western perspectives and the Global South to China
Africa’s positive impressions of China
Position of Africans in the US-China conflict
China’s influence in terms of relations and production
Quotes
Positive impressions and perceptions of China in Africa come from these tangible projects, goods, and infrastructure that people can use to make their life easier - Dr. Lina
China is identifying itself as a member of the Global South family. This makes them more appealing to countries in the Global South, as well as a model for countries aspiring to be great nations. - Dr. Lina
Featured in this Episode
Jonathan Fulton
Nonresident Senior Fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi
Profile: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/expert/jonathan-fulton/
Linkedin: https://ae.linkedin.com/in/jonathan-fulton-2627414b
Twitter: https://twitter.com/jonathandfulton
Dr. Lina Benabdallah
Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Wake Forest University
https://linabenabdallah.com
https://twitter.com/lbenabdallah
Her Book:
Shaping the future of Power, Knowledge, Production, and Network Building in China-Africa relations
https://www.amazon.com/Shaping-Future-Power-Network-Building-China-Africa/dp/0472074547
https://www.press.umich.edu/10194365/shaping_the_future_of_power
The Article mentioned:
China's Soft Power Advantage in Africa
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2021-12-23/chinas-soft-power-advantage-africa

Chapters
00:00 Introduction
02:17 An Overview of China’s outreach to the Global South
09:10 Western perspective of China versus the perspective of the Global South
16:11 Reasons why China has positive impressions in Africa
24:13 Africans in the US-China conflict
35:58 Developing the social capital of Africa
45:06 Measuring China’s influence in terms of relations and productions
51:57 Professional approach to learning China’s influence in the Global South

This podcast was produced by Heart cast Media.
https://www.heartcastmedia.com

Episode Transcript

(00:05):
Well, let's set up a way, for instance, for a government to
have a third party doing risk analysisof X, Y or Z project coming
in so that you have the fullpicture of what other potentials on debt issues,
on financial solvability, on environmental sustainability. I'm pretty sure people would listen

(00:28):
to something like that. So ifit was framed in sort of a building
the capacity of Africans to negotiate betterin terms of figuring out what the project
might look like or might bring interms of risks, that was not what
was presented. Welcome to the ChinaMina Podcast. I'm your host Jonathan Fulton,

(00:53):
a non resident Senior Fellow at theAtlanta Council and a political scientist at
Side University and Aboud Abbe United ArabEmirates. On this episode, we'll be
discussing the gains China has made inmuch of the Global South, a trend
that doesn't always receive enough thorough analysisin the West. Perceptions of China in
those countries have plummeted in recent years, and there seems to be an assumption

(01:17):
that this is universal. Yet pollingdata from Africa in the Middle East indicates
that China's reputation in the developing worldis in much better shape. In a
recent episode, Michael Robbins from theArab Barometer walked us through a report that
they published in August of this summerthat emphasized positive views of China and the
Arab world, and a twenty twentyone report from the Afro Barometer also showed

(01:38):
that Africans tend to have positive viewsof Chinese assistance and influence on the continent.
So what is it that China's doingdifferently in the global South and why
is it effective? I can't thinkof anyone better to talk with about this
than my guest today, doctor Lenaben Abdala. Lena is an assistant professor
of politics and International Affairs at wakeForest University. Her research focuses on international

(02:02):
relations theory, foreign policy, criticaltheories and power, politics of the past,
and knowledge production and hegemony and SouthSouth relations. She's the author of
a fantastic book which I have righthere called The Shaping the Future of Power,
Knowledge Production and Network Building in ChinaAfrica Relations. And we'll put a

(02:22):
link to it on the show pageso you can find it and read it
and enjoy it as much as Ihave. She frequently contributes to a lot
of great publications as well as Africais a country where she is a contributing
editor. Lena, welcome to theshow. Thank you so much for having
me. Jonathan, it's a pleasureto be with you. It's a pleasure
to be with you too. So, Lena, to get us started,

(02:45):
can you give us a general overviewof China's outreach to the Global South.
Why is it so important for Beijingto make such significant inroads into what we
used to call the Third World butnow we call the Global South. Yeah,
So China's early days and early encounterswith much of the Global South,

(03:06):
and goes back to the Bandum Conferencein nineteen fifty five when we have PRC
delegates coming into close contact with delegatescoming from Egypt, from Ghana, from
Algeria, lots of African and Asiancountries, lots of African countries that were
not even independent. And during thatBandoon conference, it became really evident for

(03:34):
the PRC that there was an opportunityfor China to take on this kind of
stage of developing countries, countries inthe Global South, to sort of share
lessons from the CCP's own revolutionary timesfrom its own ideology about anti imperialism and

(03:57):
anti colonialism and and and the relationshipbasically starts there. Starts with these opportunities
that the Bandoon kind of created andopened up for Chinese delegates to get to
know delegates from varying countries in theGlobal South and try to give China that
kind of the platform to really talkabout its own experience and that history.

(04:21):
Right, that moment of solidarity wherewe see the CCP get to know and
try to kind of enter into thatrevolutionary kind of friendship, is it stayed
right? It's It is a rehtoricand it is a moment that is celebrated
even today in political discourses between Chinesepresidents and an African and Asian and other

(04:47):
presidents and leaders from throughout the globalSouth. So it has always been important
for kind of China to orient itselfto war it's the global South, because
it could exercise that kind of leadershiprole to show that China has something to
share with the global South. Inthe nineteen fifties, it was this anti

(05:11):
imperialism and anti colonialism lessons that theCCP was interested in kind of building on
and and finding momentum for its ownrevolution outside of the its borders and in
the global South. And we seethat as well, you know, even
today with this idea of kind ofdemocratizing international relations by including you know,

(05:38):
China in the conversation and not justfocusing on Cold war kind of bipolar moment
And so the global South has alwaysbeen important for Chinese foreign policy orientation because
it allows for China to exercise thatsort of leadership. Sure, and when
you talk about the democratization of internationalpolitics, I mean this is something I

(06:00):
think that also factor is right becauseyou know, you hear Chinese leaders often
talking about this that they want tosee more democratic global order. But I
think the politics of it also playedto China's advantage too. When you look
at you know, democratic international institutionslike the United Nations, where you've got
a lot of countries you know thatthat don't necessarily see things the same way

(06:23):
that maybe the US or the EUCthings, and they might vote with China
on issues that are more important tothem, and it gives a lot more
weight I think in those kind offorums. Yeah, that's correct, And
you mentioned the UN of course,it's it is through the UN right that

(06:44):
the Block of seventy seven was ableto kind of shows its support back to
China, right. So this issomething that C. Jimpin had brought up
as recently as twenty twenty one,this idea that China that the PRC owes
a lot to the Global South interms of gaining that United Nations recognition,

(07:04):
as you know, the PRC beingthe official China, the official representation of
China, and of course with thatcame the United Nations Security Council. So
the vote was tilted to the favorof the PRC precisely because of this group
of countries that became independent, right, they gained their independence in the late

(07:26):
sixties, you know, mid sixtiesand late sixties, and a lot of
that solidarity that was built around abandonedconference translated itself and manifested itself into something
like that vote, and something thatyou know, kind of is present even
today in China's rhetoric with the GlobalSouth, that sort of recognition of the

(07:49):
support that China got from these countriesthat were supported by China during the revolutionary
wars as well. And so wesee that manifest station of that solidarity even
and and and and talking about iteven today, UM is present. Yeah,
well, so I know that typicallyevery year when the Foreign Minister Wonge

(08:13):
makes his first trip, you know, his first international trip, it's it's
to Africa, right, And thisis something that I think is the optics
of it are are pretty important.I think for for a lot of folks
in developing world to see this gianteconomic power, this political power that says
our first trip but every year isgoing to be an Africa, to show
that this is an important set ofrelationships. UM. And I have I

(08:35):
was doing some reading before the show, and I've found this quote from a
Shijimping a speech he gave in intwenty twenty one, when he said,
China will always be a member ofthe family of developing countries. We will
continue to be to do our utmostin raising the representation and voice of developing
nations in the global governance system.UM. I've seen other quotes where you
know, Chinese leaders talking about themselvesas the permanent representative of the developing world

(09:00):
a lot of international institutions. Soit does seem to be more than just
rhetoric. It seems to be somethingthat that's taken pretty seriously by Beijing.
UM, yeah, I agree.Yeah, So I think one reason I
want to talk to you about thisis because you've got such a unique perspective,
right because you are you can seethis from a lot of different angles.
You're based in the US, soof course you're you're you're hearing a

(09:22):
lot of the narratives within the USdiscourse, whether it's academic or political,
what people are saying about China.Um. But then with your background,
with your academic focus, you yousee it from from different vantage points as
well. So just for our audience, how are perceptions of China different in
the global South, you know,whether it's at home in North Africa or

(09:43):
it's whether it's in the countries whereyou've done fieldwork in the past. And
why is this important for audiences inthe West to understand? Yeah, and
that's a that's a very important questionyou had mentioned earlier. Arab Barometer.
There's a similar thing to that,which is the Afro Parameter, which is

(10:03):
which is a survey that's conducted bya whole big research team that typically goes
to survey Africans. I think insomething close to forty countries thirty seven thirty
eight countries across the African continent,and then the surveys ask a whole bunch
of different questions about government, aboutinstitutions, about but also in the recent

(10:26):
two to three iterations of the surveysthat have been in questions about China.
So the Afro parameter has been askingabout how Africans perceive China and how Africans
perceive their country's engagement with China,and by and large, the perceptions of
China in Africa through Afrobarometer, ourperceptions that show that Africans are aware of

(10:54):
their countries foreign partnerships and of theircountries form partships. They are generally overwhelmingly
supportive of the relations with China,their country's relations with China. And when
we follow sort of the Afrobarometer questionsand we try to understand what is it

(11:15):
about China that Africans give such apositive perception of, then we find that
there is a high appreciation of Sothere is an association of Chinese investments with
palpable material sort of infrastructure that peoplecan see in their immediate background. So

(11:39):
it's not sort of a fungible kindof aid that goes to someone's bank account
or some sort of relationship that favorsthe elite over the rest of the country,
or that feeds into those kind ofdivisions that already kind of exist in
societies. But people associate, forinstance, having infrastructure that is in the

(12:03):
form of highways or ports or airports, or schools or hospitals or apartment complexes.
They see these things as ways andopportunities and infrastructure that actually benefits the
general population. And so a lotmore people see benefit in having those infrastructure
projects built in our countries than theywould the usual kind of fungible aid kind

(12:30):
of classic models. So in manyways, that's what people in lots of
African countries when you when you talkabout China's investments, that those are the
things that come to their mind.And I would say from my own research
and my own travels and fieldwork,it is very much the same impression I
get. So even when I wasin Babmaco doing fieldwork in twenty nineteen,

(12:56):
it's really interesting when you talk aboutChina, people can point to a bridge
and say that's the Chinese bridge.So it's you. Bamacu is a city
that's divided by this big river Niger, and so we have both sides of
the river, so you always arein traffic crossing from one side to the
other um and so bridge bridges areextremely important. I mean it's the only

(13:16):
way to get across, to goto the side or the other side.
And there are three bridges, andone of the most recently built one is
a Chinese built bridge, and andand and immediately people can point to that
and say this is what we think. Or they point to the motorbikes.
And you get around in the cityon motorbikes if you don't want to be

(13:37):
stuck in traffic for hours. Anda lot of those motorbikes are Chinese.
They come they're important from China,and so people are able to point to
these things and say, so thisis, you know, having China being
involved in the economy. This iswhat we can point at to see that
connection. And I think that alot of what, you know, a

(13:58):
lot of the reason behind positive youknow, impressions and perceptions of China in
Africa come from these tangible um umprojects and goods and infrastructure that that people
can point to and say, umit, you know, it makes my
life easier to be able to getonto this bridge and across the get across

(14:24):
the city or get onto this motorbikeor have this phone that I'm able to
do my business on because of allthe e you know, commerce and and
and and all the you know facilitiesthat that that comes with um that that
people have these positive impressions because thereis a very present alternative, there's a
present kind of contribution that they cansee in their daily lives. It's not

(14:50):
out there, it's not just atthe level of basically talking right, So
China's presence and the continent is reallypresent. And so these are the things
that people can point to and sayyeah, I mean, but you also
get obviously some more critical perceptions.Of course, people can speak about issues

(15:11):
of competition with you know, smallerbusinesses not being able to make it in
front of giant kind of conglomerates ofof of Chinese companies coming in. So
all of those you get, youget into the nuance of it, and
of course there are nuanced perceptions,but by and large that positive perception comes
from there being kind of these materialpresences of China in in in the daily

(15:33):
lives of regular citizens. But sothis is interesting because you know a lot
of different companies or countries can canbuild bridges or or you know, build
roads or these projects. Is thisjust a matter of a lot of in
Africa specifically a lot of those countriesor companies just having engaged in the same

(15:54):
level that China has, or youknow, is there something beyond the tangible
outcome? Is there something about Chinathat's unique? I think too. In
an earlier episode, we spoke withtin Hanan al Kadi, who talked about,
you know, growing growing up inAlgeria and seeing just how China kind

(16:14):
of transformed itself during her lifetime froma place where people tended to have kind
of negative perceptions of a kind ofa poor and backwards country and then suddenly
it's this technological and economic giant andthinking, you know, like how do
we do this? How did theymanage to navigate this development gap so quickly
and efficiently, where a lot ofcountries in the global South have been trying

(16:37):
to do this for decades and itjust hasn't really been you know, successful.
Is it something that China does differentlyor better or more appealing or is
it just that China's who's there now? I mean, it is it is
it is all of the above.I mean, when it comes to actual
infrastructure projects. There's a huge deficitin the African continent in the real of

(17:00):
infrastructure. There's a huge deficit.Even with all the hype around what what's
China been building and what Turkey hasbeen building, what the UAE has been
contributing, there is an absolute,uh, there's a huge need. There's
there, there's a very vast gapin terms of infrastructure building in the continent.
And so UM, I don't thinkthat there is a big competition really

(17:26):
as much as there is a hugegap in an infrastructure building in the continent.
And so it is not necessarily fromfrom that immediate sense, Chinese companies
are doing essentially the work without havinga huge competition. So there's not a
whole lot that's there that can saythese are these companies are building the same

(17:48):
thing. And then why is Chinesecompanies more popular? It's actually not there
at all. Um, Maybe inother aspects right, but not in the
in the in the idiot kind ofpresence of those infrastructure projects. UM.
And so, actually I was lookingat Brookings put out a report a couple

(18:10):
of years ago, but I waslooking at just the um the share of
China's investment in infrastructure projects. Ithink in terms of funding about um almost
twenty percent of infrastructure projects that's builtin the continent is funded by by China.
And then and then sort of thethe next the next biggest one is

(18:33):
is individual governments. Uh, andthen you know, you have from twenty
percent, then you have you know, individual countries like the US is like
five percent, and then you know, I MF World Bank. All of
these things are in the single digit, tiny, tiny percentages. And then
you sort of you get the ideahere that uh, it's just by and
large kind of you know, it'smore present in that way. But to

(18:56):
the point that you brought up,um, you know, aside from these
infrastructure projects at the level of theelites at least, right, so then
we can we can talk about thisrelationship at the level of of the regular
sort of you know, citizen,what is present to what's immediately present to
them, what's available to them,But we can also talk about this at

(19:18):
the level of sort of the elitesand the leadership and and that and and
in that sense of course, thenyou can see that the conversation moves maybe
a little bit beyond kind of thematerial things that are available to more or
less the aspiration. And so thisaspiration of China's uh success story in terms

(19:41):
of its development and in terms ofbasically how it was able to achieve historically
huge levels of development in uh inIn in very short amount of time,
is very much in the back ofpeople pos minds and leaders and elites when

(20:02):
they are thinking about their own development, their own country's trajectories, and thinking
about what is what's an aspiration,right, what's a model to aspire to?
And I think that this is somethingthat has also worked for China.
Earlier you mentioned how Cijimpin talks aboutChina being a member of the Global South
family and the family of developing countries, and that is in itself really exercising

(20:26):
that attraction on leaders and elites fromthe Global South because they can still today
associated. It resonates, right,so people can identify with China because they
don't think of it as okay,it already jumped over to the other side.
It's a developing country, it's abig, great power, and all

(20:48):
of a sudden that experience is notavailable as something that can be done or
is doable in the same way itwould be if people thought of China as
part of this family of developing countries, and so in a way that that
that that language used is a practice, as you said, precisely because it

(21:08):
keeps, you know, this momentumgoing around. If China was able to
achieve this level of development in thirtyforty years, of course coming from similar
background in developing world, then thatprovides that aspiration that people, elites and
and leaders can also achieve or canhave the aspiration to achieve those levels of

(21:33):
development as well. It's not inaccessible, it's not um you know, impossible
to do. So there is definitelythat aspect that's also important in the developing
uh in in in Africa at leastin terms of looking at China as a
very viable and also just an enviablereally success story that China was able to
do this in this amount of time, coming from all the challenges that the

(21:57):
PRC came out of it nineteen fortynine, which are very similar challenges to
a lot of African countries coming outof their own struggles for independence. There's
so much in there that that's reallystruck me. You know, when I
was doing my bachelor's degree in themid nineties, I was focused mostly on

(22:18):
African politics, and I had thisvision of myself working, you know,
on African politics, and then Ihad I took a turn and ended up
in Taiwan by by accident, Iguess, and became like an Asia guy
and now I'm in the Middle East. But I remember one of the things
in that period was, you know, the African department at my university was

(22:40):
not expanding in the mid nineties becauseafter the Cold War, it was you
could see the direction things were goingin a lot of a lot of Western
institutions. I think saw that itwasn't maybe as useful piece of real estate
as it was during the Cold War, and you could see, I think
politically maybe that that became a bigissue where especially the US didn't engage in

(23:03):
Africa in the way it did andyou can see at a point when China
starts becoming a much bigger actor there. And so I think just to your
point about showing up, I mean, I remember a couple of years ago,
I think when John Bolton was aNational security advisor and he gave he
went to I can't remember which countryhe was in East Africa, and he
gave a speech and I think hementioned China upwards of thirty times in the

(23:26):
speech, and it was pretty clearto the audience that the focus wasn't what
can the US do with African countries? It was mostly like Africa has to
work with us, you know,in this kind of geostrategic struggle with China.
So I think your point of justshowing up and delivering material or tangible
outcomes is something that's really important.I think that transfers across you know,

(23:51):
a lot of different countries and regions. One of the things I keep seeing
studying a lot of Belton Road projectsover the years is there's been a lot
of caution from Western government saying,you know, to to developing countries,
you shouldn't engage with China on thisstuff. Uh. You know, there's
the debt trapped narrative, which ofcourse was very very prominent for a long
time. There was talk of environmentaldegradation or or lacks of labor standards,

(24:15):
there any number of things, alot of reasons for countries to not engage
with China. Um. But Ithink what we saw was what you're describing,
where, well, what's the alternativedo you are you going to come
in with something that that we needthat you can deliver on time, that
we can afford that it's going tomeet the same criteria. UM, And

(24:36):
often the answer was no. Sohow does it resonate do you think when
you know this this narrative of youshouldn't let China into this, whether it's
critical infrastructure or whether it's just youknow, standard infrastructure that countries need for
you know, economic you know abridge. Yeah, I mean it's it's

(24:57):
um. You you you, youset it up very nicely in that UM.
Even in the speech that you mentionedby Bolton, it is not that
Africans are naive to the possible challengesand disadvantages of their relationships with X,
Y and Z partners. And oftentimesyou will will you will see Africans actually

(25:22):
being very open and to listen inright, to to engage in in a
conversation. The issue with a speechlike the one that Bolton made was that
it kind of showed Africans. Itjust gave the impression that the US did
not at all see Africans as apartner in this relationship. It just was

(25:44):
a platform for a theater, whichis the language used in in in the
military. But it's it is youknow, not just you know, um,
it's the theatrics of it. Actuallyis very interesting is that the African
continent is then at this point justused as a theater to counter China,
as much as it was used asa theater to counter the USSR, as

(26:07):
much as it will be a theaterto counter X threat in the future,
and so on and so forth.So when putting this longer context of interaction
with the US, then Africans area little bit skeptical because they can they
are not able to figure out whatis it exactly right that the US is

(26:29):
interested in doing differently in Africa thanChina is. At the end of the
day, then it becomes the casewhere Africa is kind of used in this
you really US China competition and thereis not genuine interest in actually figuring out
what works for Africans or not.So if this conversation was to say,

(26:51):
well, let's set up a way, for instance, for a government to
have a third party doing analysis ofX, Y or Z project coming in
so that you have the full pictureof what other potentials on debt issues,
on financial solvability, on environmental sustainability, I'm pretty sure people would listen to

(27:15):
something like that. So if itwas framed in sort of a building the
capacity of Africans to negotiate better interms of figuring out what the project might
look like or might bring in termsof risks, that was not what was
presented. What was presented is justkind of a very patronizing discourse that treats
Africans as less than able to makedecisions on their own and that there is

(27:41):
a threat coming from China that theyjust needed to be protected from. And
that is really what you know.Foreign Minister Pandor of South Africa just this
last time when Secretary Blincoln was visitedin South Africa and held a meeting and
press conference with her, she didmention this to say to a Secretary of

(28:08):
Lincoln that Africans are not willing totake sides in somebody else's conflict. If
the US has issues with China,it should be able to resolve its issues
with China outside of its relationship withAfricans, and that Africans today are more

(28:29):
interested in cooperation and they are morethan willing to cooperate with Chinese companies and
with US companies and take sort ofyou know, the better, the better
bit, the better you know,kind of offer. And she kind of
pushed a bit against this rhetoric andthis growing kind of discourse trying to pull
Africa into this US China kind ofcompetition and trying to influence Africans. And

(28:53):
she mentioned precisely the burden right ofbeing talked at and talked down at as
Africans when leaders she didn't mention theUS. In fact, she said that
that's that she doesn't she's not talkingabout blinking as as having done that.
But she said she had set intoin meetings with several Western leaders where she

(29:15):
is asked basically to stay away andto choose, you know, between and
to basically move away from from dealingwith China, and she had refused that.
She said, we actually are sovereigncountries, and if you are going
to talk about partnerships, you haveto recognize our sovereignty first, and our
ability and responsibility to deal with ourpartners in the way we see fits our

(29:42):
own constituents and our own people andso on and so forth. UM.
And so we see this pushback,We see this at least awareness right on
the African side that's trying to say, please leave us out of this UM.
You know, distensions that the UShas experienced in with China precisely because
we've already been through that in theCold War, where you have these two

(30:03):
giant powers and then somewhat playing theseproxy you know, conflicts on the African
continent and then the African is onthe losing and um, you know of
this relationship. So um so umum yeah, So I think I think,
um, I think we are.We are seeing um that kind of

(30:29):
pushback and coming from African leaders,and that's that's that's a good thing.
So I take your point. Ihear the same kind of thing. Like
so, there was an article we'rerecording this in early November. There's an
article yesterday in the Wall Street Journalabout huge and pings um expected trip to
Saudi Arabia in December. And Ithink the way that um, we often

(30:51):
hear about this trip is how Saudiis trying to get things from China.
They're trying to get things from theUS as this hedging strategy that they're using
this tension. And I was actuallyquoted in the article. My point was,
I don't think that's I think it'skind of a superficial way of looking
at it because I don't think they'retrying to take advantage of a situation.
I think that you know, theSaudis have deep interest with the US and

(31:15):
they have deep interests with China,and they're trying to pursue both of those
things concurrently. It doesn't have tobe one or the other. This binary,
I think doesn't register with a lotof countries leaders who aren't thinking about
things as pieces on chessboard. They'rethinking how can we address our own domestic
or economic or political pressures. Andwhen I think if the point you're making

(31:37):
about the the the narrative, Idon't think it's always necessarily from a patronizing
tone, like I know it oftenis, but I don't think it always
is. I think one thing thatI really enjoy, and I've heard you
on it as well as it usedto be the China Africa Podcast, I
think now it's the China Global SalesPodcast, which is a really good show.
And when what I get when Ilistened to that is I hear a

(32:00):
lot of really brilliant African people whoknow China really well. And I think
that's one of the things that folksmaybe should listen to more is just the
voices from country X or region X, because I think what's off the assumption
it isn't really you don't know whatyou're doing. The assumption is there's not

(32:21):
always a lot of knowledge production aboutChina coming out of a lot of countries.
I mean, I see this inthe Middle East, where you know,
here in the UAE, I don'tknow a lot of people who have
studied Chinese. I don't know alot of people who've been studying Chinese history
and language or culture. So Ithink what we see as a place like
the US, where there's an amazingcommunity of China scholars and China watchers who

(32:42):
are maybe sometimes a little heavy handedlysaying, you know, learn from our
experience and it doesn't work very wellsometimes. But you know, I don't
think it's always necessarily meant to be, you know, kind of finger wagging,
even though probably often sounds like that, yeah, no, I agree
with you, and just yeah,I agree. And just to add to

(33:04):
that, oftentimes the point you makeabout the voice and listening to voices from
the country is important is extremely It'son point, precisely because if you think
about, for instance, you takethe example of confucious institutes and Confucius institutes
in the US have been in thelast few years. There's the strand of
basically closing down and canceling the contracts, or at least trying to basically curve

(33:30):
a bit the influence of Confucius instituteson curriculum design and all hiring and all
kinds of other issues. If onedoes not understand that Confucius institutes in the
US are are are basically built ona very different premise than Confucious institutes in
African countries, one could assume thatthe experience that universities in the US have

(33:52):
experienced with Confucius institutes is directly translatableto the experiences of universities in Africa with
the Confucius institutes, and then whatyou come with from the US, and
this experience, as the lesson learned, will sound like patronizing because it just
doesn't even match the reality. Andso what and so that gap that you

(34:14):
mentioned right, that gap is thatyou mentioned should be mediated through knowing more
about how Africans experienced China in theirown context and not in the context of
let's say, universities across the USor across European institutions, and how they
experience Confucius Institute. So that's justone example to kind of go back to

(34:35):
the point you made about the importanceof listening and learning from Africans about their
own experiences so that we can figureout which lessons make more sense, and
then if the lessons don't make sense, then that's where the patronizing experience becomes
real. Sure, yeah, goodpoint. I was smiling as you're talking
about the Confucius Institutes because I've seena lot of them around the Middle least,

(35:00):
and you know, you'll hear,obviously when they're say the UK,
or in the US or in inyou know, European countries, you do
hear these narratives of they're serving,you know, very overt political agendas.
What I've seen here couldn't be furtherfrom the truth. I mean, they
they seem almost cute in comparison.They're just you know, two or three

(35:23):
teachers trying to you know, wrestlestudents into a classroom so they can learn
something about China. And it's it'sreally I think, you know, your
point that it's different in different placesis important because because here doesn't look like
that I was I do. Idid a lot of research for this show.
I was reading a whole lot ofyour stuff and I went and I

(35:45):
found an article you published in ForeignAffairs in twenty nineteen is called China's Soft
Power Advantage in Africa, which willalso link to in the show page.
It's a good article. Um,but I think you made a good point.
We keep hearing, maybe less soin the past couple of years.
You published in twenty nineteen, whenyou know, the Brii narratives still dominated,

(36:06):
you know, the big ports andthe billion dollar MOUs that we kept
seeing every time that a Chinese officialwould visit a country. We've seen less
of that as there's been less traveland there's been more focus on smaller projects.
But I think the point you madeis still hold. You wrote about
the less visible elements of Beijing's diplomacyand how this is important in a lot

(36:27):
of countries, and I thought thatwas something that also really should be described
or unpacked a little bit. Whatare these less villable, visible elements of
what China is doing in countries beyondthe big, splashing headlines. Yeah,
yeah, I think in the bookas well as in that piece, the
my my, my experience looking atChina Africa relations on China's involvement in Africa,

(36:52):
and also for the for the editedvolume chapter that I worked for you,
Jonathan, I make the same argumentthat we that there is this aspect
of human capital investments, that thisaspect of trying to build social capital in
Africa through exchanges, through m delegationvisits and seminars and you know, summit

(37:17):
meetings with Africans, that focuses onhaving those networks, having that social capital,
focuses on expanding that human capital.And that's exactly what I mean by
the sort of invisible infrastructure so asideand beyond looking at what buildings show up,
you know, after signing deals andso on and so forthwith China and

(37:39):
Chinese companies. It's also important tounderstand that China's foreign policy in Africa is
also interested in that human capital aspect, in the sense of, you know,
trying to expand party to party relations. For example, so the CCP
has increasingly been inviting members of differentpolitical parties from the African continent to China,

(38:05):
and so they would travel to China, they would sit Usually there's a
mix a combination of sort of reallydoing seminars and substantial kind of conversations with
tours and touring cities and touring differentfacilities and sort of the combination of those
two lead to and of course overtime, when you have these routinized visits

(38:29):
and exchanges, what it does itIt kind of it brings closer people,
right, So these are elites thatare part of the CCP on the Chinese
side and part of the political partiesof different political parties on the African side.
Then it gets political party elites andfrom Africa a firsthand experience of how

(38:49):
the CCP is managing all this development, How is the CCP able to keep
its people happy, and how isthe CCP managing media to people relations,
or how is it manage in civilsociety organizations, how is it managing its
own relations between civil military ties andso on and so forth. And so
you have these opportunities for elites fromdifferent African countries to learn firsthand how the

(39:15):
CCP has been able to achieve thisperceived success that it has achieved over the
last thirty to forty years. Andso I think that that aspect, this
element of network, this element ofsocial capital, and building this momentum of
bringing delegations from various African countries toChina for these experiences is extremely important and

(39:36):
so that's one aspect looking at itfrom that party elites. And of course
now in Africa we have there's thisnew party leadership school that opened in Tanzania
that is a joint party school thatsix political parties on the African continent joined

(39:57):
together, and it's very much it'smodeled after the CCP leadership party leadership schools
and basically on the very first kindof inaugurative kind of you know class then
um you see, participants wrote aletter to c GMPN to basically thank the
CCP for providing the model, andso c gimpin actually you know, he

(40:21):
wrote back, so he got themessage and he wrote back to them.
And so you see these connections.Right. So as the ANC in South
Africa as well has all kinds ofyou know, vocal the ANC is the
political party um African National Congress inin in in South Africa has made several

(40:42):
um and you know speeches and ofcourse there's an outside of Johannesburg as well
as party leadership school that's modeled afterthe CCP, and so we see these
connections, you know, that they'renot as visible as let's say a port
that China built or an airport orhighway, but they are connections. They
are an infrastructure that is going tosustain China Africa relations for generations to come

(41:08):
because these essentially what today is kindof a lower or mid ranked political officer
in a political party over time isgoing to be you know, high ranking
officers. These are people who aregoing to elites who are going to take
on positions in their government or inthat piece that you mentioned. I also

(41:29):
talk about, for instance, journalistsfrom African countries who receive these trainings so
opportunities to go to China for trainings, and as well, when they come
back, they have you know,the power to kind of portray and write
and disseminate these courses and narratives andstories and and and and basically a retoric
around China and China's investments in Africa. So it is a very important.

(41:52):
I really do think that, especiallynow when we are seeing investments in terms
of BRI investments and in terms ofhard kind of financial investments kind of dip
in a little bit in China forcorrelations, we are still seeing these kind
of connections in terms of the socialcapital. They are even more important now
than they were before because they needto do this sustaining They need to do

(42:15):
the work of sustaining China's interests inChina's foreign policy, interest in the continent
on the long run. Yeah.So that's one of the things about the
Belton Road that I thought was reallyinteresting because it really was quite vaguely defined
in a lot of people's minds.But you know, they did lay out
these five cooperation priorities, and theydidn't make a hierarchy of it. They
said, you know, we wantto focus on these five baskets of things,

(42:37):
and it was of course the infrastructureand the financial integration, the trade
and policy coordination, but the peopleto people bonds. I think it's the
way they put it. We're thelast of the five that were listed.
And when you know, you startto see things like less big funding for
huge projects, or you saw COVID, you know, making the the trade

(43:00):
less viable. You start seeing theseother things, whether it was you know,
educational or sharing health information or youknow, a lot of these things
start to step up, and youcould say there's still this kind of cooperation
that's that's linking these countries to Chinain a pretty meaningful way. I know,
before COVID, when and you knowwhen I used to be able to

(43:21):
go to China pretty easily. Iwas always amazed to see, you know,
just this broad range of international studentsgoing to all these different Chinese universities,
and it was I thought, areally really smart move, you know,
to to meet people from Ega,people from yem and people from Nigeria,
people from wherever that we're going ingetting a master's degree in China and

(43:42):
learning Chinese and they go back homeand obviously they're going to have pretty favorable
stories to tell it, assume.Yeah, and at the very least they
have the language skills to be ableto act as direct kind of bridge between
their own government and Chinese government,or in terms of translating, or in

(44:06):
terms of so you don't have togo through France band Kat to understand what's
going on in China. When youhave people who have been trained and have
lived in China and have that sortof deep knowledge of the history of the
culture, of the economics, ofthe politics and so on, and yeah,
it's smart. I mean, yousee it. Wherever you go,
you'll You'll meet people that went touniversity in the US and they go back

(44:27):
home and they've got their their alumniassociations, and they're very you know,
they've got great nostalgia and they they'vegot great memories, and you know,
I think it's it's pretty smart onChina's part. Another piece of your writing
that I was reading recently was againwith your very very very good book.
I'm really enjoying it. I haven'tfinished yet, but I promise I will.

(44:49):
But one of the things you wroteabout that I thought was interesting was
you wrote about the errors of conventionalwisdom that a lot of folks when they
think about China's engagement with you writeabout an Africa, but I think it
applies in other places. You knowthat that China's power is measured in material
terms, you know, you know, it's it's military power or or you
know, things like this, ratherthan relational or productive dimensions. And a

(45:15):
lot of what you've just discussed werethese relational dimensions. I think of how
China is able to you know,enhance those political ties or personal ties.
Um, but just can you gointo this little more like what do you
what do you mean by these relationalproductive dimensions, because I think it gives
us a pretty useful way of thinkingabout how China's influence in the global south.

(45:36):
You know, whether it's in Africaor the Middle East, or Latin
America or wherever. It's much moreinteresting than I think we tend to to
look at it. Yeah, Ithink the premise for for that argument is
it's exactly as you describe. Imean, it's it's rather simple. It
just says that when we are examiningChina's influence in Africa, for example,

(46:00):
and we try to understand what doesChina's influence look like in the continent,
or where is China's influence in thecontinent the biggest or the strongest influence.
What I'm proposing to do there isinstead of looking at whereas China built the
most number of the largest number ofports, highways and airports, I say,

(46:22):
actually, at the end of theday, then you know a port
even if it's built by channel.Let's say an airport is built by Chinese
company. It's true that immediately peoplewill remember that, but over time they
may not necessarily associate that airport withsomething that China has built. It just
becomes part of the background, it'sjust an airport. You just go and

(46:43):
you fly in the airport and comein it. But what I'm trying to
say here is if we really wantedto measure the influence and or try to
understand that influence, we need tolook at these investments that are really long
term. And I think the investmentsof long term as opposed to an airport
which, let's say in ten years, people will forget that it was built
in China. If you have apolitical party membership that has annual trainings,

(47:07):
annual and more than annual, evenmore frequent than that, close connections and
close ties and visits and exchanges andseminars and learning from the CCP and from
Chinese counterparts on the long term,that's not going to go anywhere. You're
not going to forget that in tenyears or fifteen or twenty or longer.
So I think that what I'm tryingto do there is to shift the way

(47:30):
we understand influence and the way wecalculate or we measure influence by saying,
instead of really focusing on these immediatelyaccessible, visibly ready projects, we need
to also really figure out a wayto calculate in our understanding of influence precisely

(47:51):
what you were what you were mentionedearlier about students. So if you know
if a generation, for instance,there were there were a couple of different
statistics. I mean, I know, for instance, in Juba University of
Sasudan, the vast majority actually ofpeople trained who work now at the university
are people who got their PhDs fromuniversities across China. Because of these scholarships

(48:15):
that Chinese embassy has been the firstkind of you know, saw an opportunity.
It's a new country, it's it'sa country that needs to have its
elite and capacity building invested in,and so you have Chinese universities inviting PhDs
and so it's not essentially not goinganywhere in that way the influence and also

(48:36):
saw a piece of There was apublication in Courts Africa December twenty twenty one
that where the authors say that inthe year of twenty in twenty twenty one,
there were more Ghanaians with a PhDwho who graduated in Chinese universities in
that year than there were Ghanaians withPhDs that graduated from Ghanaian universities. And

(49:00):
so that is quite impressive at thatscale of figuring out kind of these long
term investments. So these are longterm investments of people who get their degrees
from China. They are people wholived in China. They identify, they
have friends, they have stories,they have connections, and they just have

(49:21):
a way of looking at whatever itis, it's if it's engineering or journalism
or whatever it is that they gottheir degree in, that's mediated through their
experience in China, and that's goingto stay there. It's not going to
go anywhere. So these people,these elites, young people who come back
with their degrees, they take jobs, they kind of you know, get
promoted through the ranks. And themore we have these connections over time and

(49:50):
over the scale that they are happening, I think that to me, that's
how we should measure China's influence ina way, looking at it from the
perspective of network theory. So it'snot about how big the port is or
the airport is, it's actually howmany layers, how dense that network is
in terms of figuring out you know, the numbers of delegations, the programs

(50:14):
that send students to universities, ajournalists that go for training, the kind
of party to party connections, andthen on top of that, of course,
and then also happy to add,you know, the other sense of
influence. But what I'm trying toget at is really these relations that Chinese
foreign policy is building in the continentthrough investments in capacity building, in human

(50:43):
capital and student exchange programs and scholarshipsand so on and so forth, really
are That's what I call shape inthe future of power. It's really looking
at the future. It's looking atthe long term investment rather than focusing on
the airport or on the highway andso on on so forth, only without
looking at this other aspect. That'sgreat. So the way you're describing it,

(51:05):
you know, there's again there's alot that resonates when I think of
my field of research, which is, you know, the Middle East,
what China is doing in this region, and I hear I keep hearing a
lot of conversations from folks in extraregional powers who will say, you know,
how can we kind of meet theChina challenge? How can we you
know, how can we maybe notbalance but you know, step into this

(51:28):
place where China seems to be makingtremendous gains, And what you're describing is
kind of what I seem missing fora lot of countries here is just like
just articulate what does the region orthe continent or the country mean to your
country or your government, and theycome up with a policy to say,
let's let's pursue this in a meaningful, you know, serious way. That's

(51:49):
why I keep thinking when people saylike, how can we you know,
engage like in the Middle East,And I think, well, what do
you want from the Middle East?What what is the Middle Ea mean to
your country? And when you cananswer that question, then you can start
to make not a policy that isagainst China, but a policy that helps
your country in that country, ofthat region and kind of play to your

(52:13):
own strengths rather than try to,you know, hobble somebody else. That's
what I'm thinking when I'm listening toyou talking about Africa. But I'm just
wondering what advice you know, alot of the people who listen to this
are in the DC area. There'sa lot of folks who are thinking about
this professionally. Any advice you havefor people when when you're thinking about how

(52:34):
other countries could engage more meaningfully inAfrica or in the global South, I
think maybe I want to Rea toate two points that you made in our
conversation. The first one is islistening to African voices. What does that
mean? It means really being opento comment at this conversation from understanding first

(52:58):
of all, the African perspective,or the Ghanaian perspective, of the Nigerian
perspective, or the Ethiopian perspective,and really listening and trying to understand what
are these people's needs, what arethey looking for, how do they see
their position in terms of the relationswith the world. And tieing that number

(53:20):
two, which is very closely relatedand it's something that you just mentioned now,
but it is really figuring out whatis for instance, a private company
in the US, what is itscompetitive advantage in Africa? What can it
do in Africa that it can dobest. Rather than let's say, you

(53:45):
know, China is really doing greatat X, and then company wants to
outdo China at X, I thinkthat that's not the best way to look
at it, because already, asI mentioned earlier, there are huge deficits
in the continent or just within infrastructure, there's a huge gap that there's room
for all kinds of different investments andcoming at at this from the app from

(54:09):
only the narrow angle of outdoing Chinaand outperforming and outcompeting and out kind of
that's not necessarily always the best thing. Because Chinese companies, especially in terms
of infrastructure, have been doing thisfor decades. They have really entered the
market. They made themselves really smartabout kind of moving within the market and

(54:29):
figuring out their own competitive advantage.I think that for instance, for US
private sector, it would be importantto figure out what is that peace that
these companies can add. And thesame thing for the US government it would
be the same question, what isit that the US can offer Africans that
it can do the best job atdoing it rather than trying to compete directly

(54:52):
had to head with China or withRussia, or with Turkey or with UAE
on things that these countries do soin many ways. And of course,
you know, Juda Moore and andand and Aubrey Hubert and others have been
uh, you know, right intime and time and time again about what
they see US private sector competitive?What what what do they see? You

(55:16):
know, what are these investments andprojects and sectors that they see the US
can contribute or US companies can contributethe best in in Africa. But for
me, it's just in general theattitude it's in the strategy should just be
focusing on what can US companies offerto the table that the US companies can

(55:37):
do best job at rather than justtrying to ideologically, stubbornly kind of compete
in sectors that may or may notwork out. Right. Sure, very
useful, Okay, well len Up, thanks so much for this. Um,
We're going to put links to allthis, But your website is upadal
dot com where listeners can find linksto all of your articles, your book,

(56:00):
and I recommend everybody checks it outand check out lean as Twitter feed
which is at l Bina Dola.We're always posting excellent threads, stuff I
can use in my sylla buying stuff. So very helpful for me. Anything
you're working on these days that youlike to share promote, or anything you've
read lately that you think would beuseful for listeners. Um, I've been

(56:22):
I've been consumed with writing a biton China's mediation strategy and diplomacy in Africa.
Actually, I just finished turn inin a chapter in an edited volume
that's going to look at China's mediationdiplomacy and so for for my part,
I looked at um mostly at Mali, but the idea was to look at

(56:45):
the Sahil in general, and andand and it's interesting, Jonathan, you
and I should talk about this morebecause in the piece, I both found
and argued that that China UM,China's mediation policy in the Sahil is closer
to China Middle East than it isto China Horn of Africa or China's remaining

(57:07):
thinking of the continent. So it'sa little bit. I argued that it's
it's a bit closer to the MiddleEast. So at some point I'd love
to talk to you about this.But but it's um, you know,
it's it's it's work in progress.That's what I've been interested in. It's
it's um it should be coming out. I don't know when, but it's
Stimpson led project that j ensign hasbeen kind of working on for the last

(57:30):
few months. And um, I'llbe more than happy to keep in toucheck.
So that sounds like another episode.Okay, Well, you know,
thanks so much for this, reallyenjoyed it. Um, you know,
I could keep asking you questions allnight, but you know, I think
we've got to We've got to wrapit up here. So thanks so much
to our audience. Thanks for joiningus again, follow us on social media,

(57:52):
subscribe, review and rate us oniTunes, Spotify, Stitcher, or
wherever we get your podcasts, andI will see you next month. Thank
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