February 22, 2023 • 44 mins
The United States and China are frequently brought up when discussing other regional powers in the Middle East, however, India also plays a role in the geopolitical dynamics within the region. With its long-standing linkages in economics, culture, and religion, India has long had a significant presence in the area. But as New Delhi has been interacting on political, diplomatic, and security fronts lately, this has taken a more strategic tone. In this episode, We are joined by Raja Mohan, a Senior Fellow with the Asia Society Policy Institute in Delhi. He will share with us his knowledge about India’s role in geopolitics in the Middle East as well as the perspective of New Delhi on the influence of the US-China tug-of-war within the region. He will also discuss India's relations with some states in the region and provide some insights about maritime security in the Indian Ocean and the growing influence of mixed cultures in the Gulf.
Takeaways
An overview of India’s interest in the Middle East and the shift toward the Gulf region
New Delhi's Viewpoint on the India-US-China Triangle in the Middle East
The India - China relationship in the recent decade
The geopolitical play of Iran, India, Pakistan, and GCC in the Indian Ocean
The growing partnership between India and the Gulf
The perspective of the geopolitical forces in Asia
Quotes
We'd rather have the Americans sit on our hands for good than the Chinese. - Raja Mohan
India faces challenges from China's growing presence in the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean, where China has established relationships with key island states. This requires India to work with Western partners. - Raja Mohan
Featured in the Episode
Jonathan Fulton
Nonresident Senior Fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi
Profile: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/expert/jonathan-fulton/
Linkedin: https://ae.linkedin.com/in/jonathan-fulton-2627414b
Twitter: https://twitter.com/jonathandfulton
Raja Mohan
Senior Fellow with the Asia Society Policy Institute in Delhi
Profile: https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/c-raja-mohan
Twitter: https://twitter.com/MohanCRaja
Chapters
00:00 Introduction
01:25 An overview of India’s interest in the Middle East
09:11 India’s shift into the Gulf region
13:12 The I2U2 Group and India’s approach to the Middle East
15:34 New Delhi’s perspective on the India-US-China Triangle in the Middle East
21:04 The India-China relationship today
26:00 The assessment of the China-Iran relationship
28:53 The maritime security in the Indian Ocean
31:32 Geopolitics of Iran, India, Pakistan, and the GCC
34:52 India and the Gulf’s growing partnership
38:01 Integrating different cultures and people in the Middle East
40:20 Balancing Geopolitical forces in Asia
42:27 Conclusion
Produced by Heartcast Media
www.heartcastmedia.com
Takeaways
An overview of India’s interest in the Middle East and the shift toward the Gulf region
New Delhi's Viewpoint on the India-US-China Triangle in the Middle East
The India - China relationship in the recent decade
The geopolitical play of Iran, India, Pakistan, and GCC in the Indian Ocean
The growing partnership between India and the Gulf
The perspective of the geopolitical forces in Asia
Quotes
We'd rather have the Americans sit on our hands for good than the Chinese. - Raja Mohan
India faces challenges from China's growing presence in the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean, where China has established relationships with key island states. This requires India to work with Western partners. - Raja Mohan
Featured in the Episode
Jonathan Fulton
Nonresident Senior Fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi
Profile: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/expert/jonathan-fulton/
Linkedin: https://ae.linkedin.com/in/jonathan-fulton-2627414b
Twitter: https://twitter.com/jonathandfulton
Raja Mohan
Senior Fellow with the Asia Society Policy Institute in Delhi
Profile: https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/c-raja-mohan
Twitter: https://twitter.com/MohanCRaja
Chapters
00:00 Introduction
01:25 An overview of India’s interest in the Middle East
09:11 India’s shift into the Gulf region
13:12 The I2U2 Group and India’s approach to the Middle East
15:34 New Delhi’s perspective on the India-US-China Triangle in the Middle East
21:04 The India-China relationship today
26:00 The assessment of the China-Iran relationship
28:53 The maritime security in the Indian Ocean
31:32 Geopolitics of Iran, India, Pakistan, and the GCC
34:52 India and the Gulf’s growing partnership
38:01 Integrating different cultures and people in the Middle East
40:20 Balancing Geopolitical forces in Asia
42:27 Conclusion
Produced by Heartcast Media
www.heartcastmedia.com
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
(00:00):
Yeah. I mean, you know, put it very bluntly, I mean,
we'd rather have the Americans sit onthe oils figure than the Chinese,
There's no question. I mean,there was a time when we were very
anti American, but I think today, given all contradictions with China which have
shopping that we would rather see theUS remain a major player in the in
(00:25):
the in the Gulf, and Ithink and in the Middle East as a
whole. That suits our larger IndoPacific strategy as well, because there we
need the US might to be ableto produce a stable balance of our system
in the East, and I thinkthe same thing. Welcome to the China
(00:50):
Mina Podcast. I'm your host JonathanFulton, a non resident Senior Fellow at
the Atlanta Council and a political scientistoutside university in abud Abbey, United Arab
Emirates. When we talk about extraregional powers in the Middle East, we
tend to focus on the US inChina, but don't take your eye off
of India. With historically long religious, cultural and economic ties, India has
(01:11):
always had a deep presence in theregion. In recent years, however,
this has taken a more strategic turn. As New Delhi has been engaging across
political, diplomatic and security issues aswell. To tell us more about India's
footprint in the Middle East and thelarger geopolitical consequences. I'm delighted to be
joined by see Raja Mohan Raja isa senior Fellow with the Asia Society Policy
(01:33):
Institute in Delhi, a division ofthe Asia Policy Center in Mumbai. He's
a visiting research professor at the Instituteof South Asian Studies at the National University
of Singapore, where he previously wasa director. Raja, thanks so much
for joining us, wonderful Magma tookay, So Raja, can we can
(01:53):
we start with a brief overview ofwhat India's interests in the Middle East are,
how have they changed in recent yearsand are there any countries in particular
that are more strategically important to India. Look, I think, as you
mentioned in your initial remarks, Indiahas had a very close link with the
(02:13):
the Arabian Peninsula with Iran and thefurther in Levant and North Africa. So
it's a long standing relationship that hasbeen there. Three things have changed,
I would say in the last fiftyyears. One India's a major importer of
energy, so therefore India's dependence almostninety percent of imported energy. So therefore,
(02:38):
what we saw happen from the seventieswas the dramatic surge in oil imports
as well as the value in thecost of those imports. This of course
has remains a major challenge for India. That because India inflation sensitive and inflation
is sensitive to energy prices. Sotherefore what happens in the garl as a
(03:00):
direct bearing on the Indian economy.The second factor, I think this was
partly compensated by the fact that Indiaexported large number of you know, working
people into the Gulf. Today they'reclose to eight million Indians living in the
Gulf alone. I'm not up tothe whole of the Middle East in the
(03:20):
Gulf alone, and the remittances theysent home are partly compensate for the high
price we pay for the for theoil. So in a way, while
the India pace for the oil,India also benefits from the construction and the
economic activity because of the Indians arequite a key component to the labor market
in the in the Gulf. Athird aspect has been which has been less
(03:45):
understood because India historically under you know, had a historically security role in the
Gulf under the British arch that muchof the security of the Gulf and the
Arabian Sea and the northwestern quadrant ofthe Indian Ocean was done from Bombay.
But Nehru quite you know, youknow, deliberately we drew from the roll.
(04:09):
But as we discovered over the lastforty years, I mean, the
security of the Arabian Peninsula and Indiadeeply interdependent. That the radical ideas that
emerged out of the Arabian Peninsula havehad a great effect on the subcontinent.
The forces of religious violent religious extremismhave encouraged a whole lot of new thinking
(04:31):
in the subcontinent, partly accelerated bythe Afghanjihart Pakistan's adoption of you know,
Islamic instruments. So this this produceda layer to the conflict naturally existed between
India and Pakistan. So therefore theimpact of the Gulf politics, ideas about
(04:55):
religion and politics, religion and societyhave a deep impact on South Asian So
combating violent religious extremism terrorism is ais a many challenge for India and there.
I think what we've seen happen isreally the beginnings of an expansive cooperation
with the moderate Gulf Arab States,which includes you know, U Sauth Arabia.
(05:19):
As we speak, the President ofEgypt LCC is an India terrorism extremism
at at the top of the conversationbetween mister Mudi and mister LCC, and
I think what we're seeing is thatthe India in the past was so focused
on supporting Arab nationalism against Western Israel, today is actually working with the moderate
(05:45):
Gulf states which are which are todayengage Israel themselves so that contradiction is no
longer there. Second, I thinkthey're also close partners for India in battling
religious extremism. And finally, theeconomic links between the subpoint in between India
and on the Gulf, mainly throughthe UAE and Saudi Arabia of growing rapidly,
(06:09):
and India hopes that the Gulf capital, which has grown in large volumes,
will play a big role in India'sacceleration of India's economic growth. So
I would say at this point themoderate Arab States are major partners and over
the last few decades India has alsobuilt up a good relationship with Israel,
and now we have the eye toIndia, Israel, Emirates, and the
(06:32):
United States. It's interesting that thesewere the three forces we tried to keep
away from, away from the UnitedStates, away from Israel, and away
from the Gulf Arabs. Today,I think they're also close partners. Luckily
for US. They were closely withEgypt, they were closely with Israel.
So I think we are in avery very different framework in dealing with the
(06:55):
Middle East. That's a really greatoverview. One of the points you brought
up, Um, I think isreally important that that there are eight million
plus Indian residents in the Golf loan. That really complicates or or gives more
depth, I guess, to thestrategic side of things, and the defense
side of things. When when Indianleaders have to think about the Golf um
(07:18):
you know, security or insecurity here, it has a deep impact I'm sure
on the domestic political narratives within Indiaitself. I'm sure everybody in India has
family here, everybody here has familyback in India. It's a very deep
in measurement, I'd say, yeah, it's it's a huge as as you
rightly said, it's an opportunity aswell as a danger. In when Iraq
(07:42):
invaded Grewate in nineteen ninety, youknow, and they had to evacuate,
you know, thousands of Indians fromthe from the war theater. And later
when things were happening in Libya intwenty sixteen, if i'd a called right,
and they had to evacuate close tothirty thousand Indians from Libya. So
I think the presence of such alarge number of Indians also has increased responsibility
(08:03):
in India for their security, fortheir welfare. So in a way,
the use of Indian army, whichNehru shunned in the post independence years,
today Indian you know, security forcesbecome critical for uh you know, evacuating
in crisis and increasingly also work withthe Gulf countries to improve the life and
(08:28):
improve the life of the Indian workersin the in the Gulf, you know,
giving the better rights, giving thembetter insurance, a whole range of
factors. Because unlike the previous governments, mister Moody is deeply committed to the
welfare of the Indian diaspora. SoI think that that brings it to a
whole new dimension where he's taken itup directly, and I think he's had
(08:50):
some success with the UAE, withsauth Arabia, that which which are the
two largest hosts of Indian population,to respond more positively to the concern of
the Indian books. Oh yeah,well here and a wild we see it.
I mean, they're building an Indiantemple here. Um. You know,
the Indian community as acknowledge as beinga really important pillar of the society
(09:11):
here. I think something like fortypercent of the UAE is South Asian,
so you know that that independence worksboth ways. I would say you mentioned
a lot about the golf, andI think that's it's it's really interesting for
me living here in the UAE andfocusing a lot on golf. International politics,
there's been a bit of a shiftfor India, you know. It's
the GCC has become more important andit's kind of backed away from Iran,
(09:33):
which traditionally has been a little closerto India, at least in strategic affairs.
Is this about the economic opportunity?Is it about, like you describe
the population shift where there's so manyIndian resident of residents living in the GCC
countries, or is there a largergeopolitical logic at play as well. Yeah,
(09:54):
I think there's been a lot oftalk about India's partnership with Dada,
but it doesn't get to anyway becauseIran is locked in a confrontation with its
neighbors, and it's locked in aconfrontation with the US and the West.
So while Iran is important for Indiasurely because it's as a huge border with
Pakistan and Afghanistan, and it alsoprovides access to India to Central Asia.
(10:18):
So therefore, from a long termgeopolitical perspective, Iran is important. It's
location, its population all make itimportant. But right now there is not
very much we can do with Iran. There was some coordination with them during
the when the Taliban was in power, hopefully there will be more today again.
But the eight million people that remittancesthe oil we get from the Gulf,
(10:41):
I mean, you know, isway way above what we do with
Iran. And while ideally we wouldlike to do business with Iran, I
mean it's constrained, as I said, the limits to what we can do
with them. So I think Iran, the talk is more than the actual
action. While the Gulf, Ithink in the past, we tended to
(11:03):
look at it very in a merchantilistfashion, merely looking at oil and the
export of labor. One of thethings mister Modi has changed is really to
take a more strategic view of theGulf that we can do things with them.
And I think we're beginning to geta recognition that the kind of capital
what some of the scholars in theGulf called the Kalegi capital. The volumes
(11:26):
of Kalegi capital are so large thatactually, for an India that's looking for
capital for its own growth, it'sgoing to be the Gulf is going to
be a great partner. And mysenses, we're just beginning to explore those
possibilities and you'll see a lot moreof that happened. We've just signed an
FDA with the UA, as youknow, hopefully we can do something similar
(11:50):
with the with the GCC as awhole, and a little more difficult would
be while there are talks about Indiaplaying a security role that I think we'll
have to work out in greater detailof how we do this in the in
the days ahead. I think oneof the problems with the focus on the
Gulf in the last few years hasbeen we tended to neglect the western part
(12:13):
of the Arab world. Our relationshipwith Israel a dramatically improved under mster Mudi,
but the western part of the Levant, the North Africa, Egypt were
neglected. And I think I wouldsee Elsie's visit really as a as a
way of getting back to Egypt,because Egypt was a great partner in the
fifties and the sixties. So insome senses, you know, we're getting
(12:37):
back to because it's Egypt that hasthe heft, large population, large standing
army, and its pivotal position inthe region. So for us, getting
back to Egypt brings back some balanceinto a policy which is not you know,
just limited to the to the Gulf. Yeah. I mean it's interesting
(12:58):
because that leads into you know,my next question. You mentioned, you
know, India's rising presence in theLevant, and I was in Israel recently
and there was a lot of talkabout Israel India ties. Pretty much everybody
I spoke with we're becoming, youknow, kind of expert on India very
quickly because they were realizing that thatthings have changed pretty dramatically, especially over
(13:22):
the past year with this I too, you two that you mentioned this,
this configuration of the two eyes ofIsrael and India and the two years of
the UAE and the US. SoI'm still surprised it doesn't get as much
notice here as I thought it would. Um, I'm not sure how people
in other places are thinking about it. So could you give our listeners just
(13:43):
a quick description of what I too? You two is and how have the
Abraham Accords reconfigured India's approach to theMiddle East. Yeah, I think for
us, for India, given itschampion of championship of the Arab nationalism and
its support for Palestinians in the past, there was a problem of how do
(14:03):
we normalize relationship with Israel well atthe same time keeping up our traditional positions
in the in the Arab world.And I think the the Abraham Accords have
actually made it easier for us todon't have to constantly look out our shoulders.
So I think that opened a lotof space for India to work with
work with Israel and the Gulf Arabsat the same time. The Eye to
(14:24):
YouTube at this point, I mean, I think it's still really the beginnings
of a major project. The initialfocus is on economic issues, but I
think the question how soon would itrequire a strategic character, I would say,
look, it will take some moretime. It's better to build this
slowly and strongly rather than rushing intogrand security structures at this point. But
(14:52):
the idea was to have the USas part of this and get India,
UA and Israel to do a lotmore things, so they just I think
that at the beginning of the process. Yeah, and I think it's it's
been pretty interesting to watch at thisstage because, like you say, the
focus I think has been very careful, you know, focusing on issues like
food security, on development, ontechnology, you know, things that everybody
(15:16):
needs more of, and kind ofkeeping the geopolitics out of it. But
of course geopolitics is a big partof what we talk about on this show,
and I think it's kind of hardto not think about what those consequences
might be. I mean, Ithink the I two YouTube members have been
really good at framing it as ageo economic initiative, and it's not balancing
(15:37):
against Iran, it's not balancing againstChina. There's no balancing. It's it's
meant to be inclusive. But Iimagine the view from Beijing is pretty different.
I think they probably see this andassociate with other Indo Pacific mini laterals
like the quad or Aucus, andthis seems to be yet another US centered
approach to limiting Chinese gains in theregion. So I imagine in Beijing it's
(16:03):
probably not perceived as an entirely positivedevelopment. How are people in New Daily
thinking about the India US China trianglein the Middle East? Yeah, I
mean, you know, put itvery bluntly. I mean, we'd rather
have the Americans sit on the oilsfigured than the Chinese, There's no question.
I mean, there was a timewhen we were very anti American,
(16:26):
but I think today, given ourcontradictions with China, which have sharpened,
that we would rather see the USremain a major player in the in the
in the Gulf, and I thinkand in the Middle East as a whole.
That suits our larger Indo Pacific strategyas well, because there we need
the US might to be able toproduce a stable balance, suppose system in
(16:49):
the East, and I think thesame thing applies to the West. Unfortunately,
the Biding administration's initial mistakes in thein the Middle East of framing you
know too much of this democracy versusautocracy business. It's uh, you know,
by targeting so much fire it mombeIN Salman there, I think created
(17:15):
problems for themselves and you know,compelled I think the region to to diversify
away from the US. But hopefully, I mean, this is not a
permanent rupture, and the US wouldcome back to be a part of the
security structure and remain an important partof the security structure. Because there's too
(17:36):
much talk about US pivoting away orUS burning its bridges with the with the
Gulf. But I think both sideswill need each other. And for US,
as we build our capabilities, we'drather have the Americans for as long
as we can, rather than Americansleave, and we are not in a
position to fill the vacuum. Soso I don't think there are any illusions
in Delhi that if the US leaves, we can simply step in. So
(18:00):
for US, I think to workwith the US, with France, with
Britain wherever possible to be able tohave a structure there that is not left
to Russia and China to simply walkall over. But my senses, I
hope that the Bush Biden administration willbegin to make the adjustments necessary to make
(18:21):
shore that there's no geopolitical vacuum,are there. Yeah, I think that
really accurate. I actually also thinkthat they kind of have gotten their feet
under them a little bit in theregion in the past few months. You
know, you saw UM there.Everybody focused on the Biden trip to Saudi
and the negative you know imagery thatcame of that, or even the negative
(18:45):
consequences of it, but it's trippedIsrael. They signed this UM Strategic Dialogue
on technology cooperation. They're really showingthat commitment. We saw recently this hundred
billion dollars development project with the UAEon on clean energy. You saw them
them talking to Turkey just last week, and then in December there's report about
(19:08):
how the US have been working withstory with Saudi to help them develop their
national security strategy. So it doesseem that they've you know, um got
some success that they're building on,and like you said, I think that's
really good for countries like India,like the UK, like France, and
Asian allies and partners that rely onthis kind of US security structure that that
allows these countries to have, youknow, the interests in the region met
(19:32):
with a pretty low security cost.Absolutely, and and because I think the
depth of the guys between US andthe and to say, let's put more
bluntly, the Anglo American world andthe Gulf is so deep that it'll be
you know, it's not easy orwise for either side to simply walk away.
(19:52):
But as you know in Washington,you're right in the Beltway. I
mean, they're always ideological groups seekingyou know, you know, and solutions.
But but I think common sense willwill come back because the scale of
interest, because it looked like Gulfoil did not matter when the by then
administation took charge here, laid upit's essential to the world of energy security,
(20:17):
of dealing with the consequences of thewater in Ukraine. Yeah, absolutely,
just that recognition. That's sure.The US isn't reliant on golf energy,
but everybody's affected by you know,energy pricing, and of course golf
countries have a major role in this, right. So I think they've they've
realized that they have to be involvedhere politically, and that might require them
(20:40):
to maybe swallow some things politically thatthey weren't willing to maybe this time last
year, especially like you mentioned therelations with Saudi But but I think it
has been shifting. It's also interestingtoo because like we were just saying with
it to you two with the quad, you know, as you described,
India's really reconsidered how it approaches thisrelations with the US a lot this century.
(21:00):
UM. This show, of course, we talk a lot about China,
and I always see China as askind of an animating factor in that
that the strategic landscape in Asia hasreally changed with China becoming much more active
throughout Asia above for India especially,I mean, I think of what China's
been doing throughout South Asia, youknow, with with speck with you know,
(21:23):
it's it's Brii projects in all ofthe smaller South Asian states. UM.
So it really does seem for Indiathat it's it's a pretty difficult balancing
act to consider. How to youknow, cooperate with the US without antagonizing
China overtly. You know, howhow do you see this India China relationship?
Um? Right now, No,we have had a pretty rough relationship
(21:48):
or China. We've had a seriesof military crisis on the border in twenty
thirteen, twenty fourteen, twenty seventeen, twenty twenty. So this idea that
India should not get closer to theUS because China will get upset. That
has been a powerful argument because ofIndia's historic nonalignment ation, solidarity, multipolarity,
(22:11):
these kind of goals. I mean, it was a very deeply held
view. But I think we shouldreally thank Cashijan Ping for pushing India to
the other side that whatever the ambivalenceis that India has had, I think
a Chinese military assertiveness in the lastdecade in the Himalayas has really compelled India
to take a fresh look. SoI don't think there are any illusions of
(22:34):
the kind that Miscenehu started with thatChina has a natural partner for India in
building a new order in Asia andin the international system. Those illusions are
no longer there. I mean thatit's quite clear that we need the US,
we need the West to deal withthe China's China challenge. But at
(22:55):
the same time, it's a factthat China's power has grown dramatically on the
economic front, and its power isbeing projected into the Indian Ocean, and
the first military base abroad is inDjibouti, right next to the Gulf,
and probably they'll be looking around fornew places to acquire a permanent military presence.
(23:15):
So it's not it's no longer aquestion of weather, but it is
a question of when. Notwithstanding thecurrent crisis in his China Sea, in
the South China Sea, I don'tthink China is going to give up its
two ocean strategy, that it willcontinue to project power into the into the
Indian Ocean. And I think forIndia this is really so a problem is
(23:37):
not just in the Himalayas, butalso in the in the south, in
the waters of the Indian Ocean,and the fact that China has cultivated special
relationships with the key island states luSri Lunka, mold Leaves Mauritius Sayshells.
I think the Chinese presence has grown, so so this is really a long
(23:59):
term challenge for India and that againI think makes it clear that India has
to work with the Western partners.And that's why the COD is so focused
on maritime security issues and on doinga range of things to secure the ocean
spaces from being you know, Chinesetaking a much larger role in this part
(24:19):
of the world. So so thatI think is set now. It is
both in the in the Himalayas aswell as in the Indian Ocean. India's
problems which are only going to rise. And for all the talk about she
Dident being charm diplomacy, we haven'tseen much in relation to India. They're
doing a lot of sweet talk tothe US Finance capital Endavos, but with
(24:41):
Japan, where they have a massiveterritorial dispute, or with India, there
is no sign of any easing upof the treasures. So I don't see
she Dident being giving up on theon the territorial questions where they think it
is their right to unilaterally change theborders. So I think our problems with
(25:02):
China are only going to grow whilethe US there are sections which you will
continue to argue, Look, thereis room for God, rays is room
for collaboration. All that is finemy senses. For India, the contradiction
with China will be the principal contradictionfor the next three decades and coming decades.
And addressing that any answer that weproduced to will will necessarily involve the
(25:26):
US and its allies, and notonly in Asia but also in Europe.
M So, yeah, there's alot of really great stuff in that.
But one thing that I kept thinkingabout while you're describing this is, you
know, the China Iround relationship,which seems very troubling to folks in Washington.
And I always caution, you know, just by looking at the numbers
(25:48):
and saying, I don't think thatChina's engagement with Iran is really as deep
as it's often portrayed. I'm oftenasked to explain how, you know,
China can can have this good relationshipwith Iron and also have this good relationship
with the Saudis and the Amadis.And I think that a lot of folks
seem to think that when when I'mtrying to announced the strategic partnership or comprehensive
(26:11):
strategic partnership, that it would somehowalter the balance of power in the Gulf.
And I didn't think that was thecase at all, But I did
think it did alter or it haspotential to alter the balance of power in
South Asia. You know, Ithought that a deeper China Iran relationship probably
isn't going to mean much to Saudiin the big picture, but for India
(26:32):
it actually could be problematic. Doyou agree with that assessment or do you
think that it's not really a bigdeal in South Asia either. You are
right, and I think we shouldalso see this as part of a growing
Sino Russian partnership. That is,they've been enticing Pakistan. I mean,
in fact, the fact that Pakistan'sPrime Minister, then Prime Minister Imran Khan
(26:53):
showed up on February twenty third inMoscow just before Putin was ordering the invasion.
A lot of people thought, atleast in daily the speculation was that
the Chinese encouraged him to go toMoscow. So this idea that you know,
Russia China can drawin other you know, partners in the greater at least
to show up their alliance. Andboth Pakistan and Iran are natural partners there.
(27:18):
But Pakistan still has a lot oflinks with the UK and the US,
so I don't see them, whilethey're very close to China, whether
they will actually be allowed. Youknow, they're trying to make some adjustments
the army now after Imran Khan,you know, resetting their relationship with the
US, trying to reset the relationshipwith the US with Iran, you know,
it's always a difficult partner for anyone. I mean that you know,
(27:44):
they're not easy to deal with.So it's not that the Chinese just because
they signed a declaration it's automatically goingto translate into something you know, immediate
outcome. They might be able tobuild a relationship or the period and that
will certainly, and live Ussia andChina do it together, it'll certainly could
become a problem for India. Andthe fact is that Iran, if you
(28:08):
know, unlike Saudi Arabia today orUa, which are taking a more moderate
position, which are doing social reforminternally, we don't see Iran actually cracking
down on what against the women,against the various forces. So I think
that's also going to be a problemfor us. Though idely for us in
(28:29):
Iran that's at peace with device wouldprovide us a lot of opportunities, but
that's not in our hands to produce. Yeah, yeah, there's there's just
so many moving parts here, rightAnd you know, when you're talking about
maritime securities being such an important considerationin the Indian Ocean region, I was
thinking about Guadar and how much Chinais you know, put into this this
(28:52):
port in Pakistan, and also thinkingjust up the coastline a bit in Schabahar
and how India has been working wantingto work on forever um and starts making
headway and then something happens in Iran, or something happens with the Iran US
relationship, and it just keeps beingharder. But we saw a couple of
years ago some Iranian officials talking about, you know how they're very happy to
(29:14):
engage much more closely with China anddeveloping Chabahar UM. I think that would
really change the maritime landscape for India. If if if China were you know,
investing deeply into that port, investinginto Guadar, becoming a resident actor
in a lot of other Indian oceanports, this could really be an issue
for for India. Yeah, no, no, absolutely, I think the
(29:36):
we did build a terminal in youknow, in Chabahar, one terminal,
But you know, Irani classical tradingnation of the type that the Gulf Arabs
are, so the structure of theeconomy, the nature of their politics continue
to prevent where they have the naturalgateway to the inn aditia. But getting
(29:57):
that translating that beautiful line on themap into an operational corridor will be will
be quite hard, and I thinkthat's a part of the problem. So
so and then the UH if theChinese do make a major presence in the
in Iran, in Chabbaha and tobuild a military relationship. And I think
(30:18):
that's why it's important for India tostep up on the security partnership with the
Gulf Arabs. We need to doa lot more with them, look for
alternative routs. I mean, Ithink there are some people who suggested we
could work through you a Israel,Greece, you know, used you know,
roots into the Mediterranean, rather thanbeing fixated simply on cutting through Iran
(30:42):
into the into the to the north. Because it doesn't look like the regime
is changing on its own volution oris going to be forced out. Because
if Iran remains a block, it'sgrowing compulsion to align with Shan China will
grow and that will be a problem. See this problem for India. Yeah,
(31:06):
you know, it's it's it's beenreally interesting to watch. I've been
based in the Emirates now since twothousand and six, and I've been watching
this stuff for quite a while.And you know, there's a point maybe,
I guess in two thou and fifteen, when there was so much talk
about or twenty and sixteen, allthis talk about spak and I thought,
you know, the China China PakistanEconomic Quarter, it just seemed natural to
me. I thought you'd see alot more investment from the Saudis, from
(31:30):
the Amaradis going into it. AndI talked to a Pakistani officially and said,
actually, we haven't really seen themoney from the Gulf that we were
hoping for. And he said,well, you know, I kind of
blame their closer economic engagement with India. And it just seemed to me a
really fascinating kind of rectangle where youknow, historically the GCC in Pakistan lined
up pretty neatly in Iran and Indialined up pretty neatly, and that kind
(31:52):
of explained things, and just inthe past few years it doesn't anymore.
And you just look at how thosetwo very intense rivalries um that spans across
these you know, the Gulf andSouth Asia really does make for a very
interesting geopolitical chessboard here. No,absolutely, if you take a longer view.
(32:14):
I mean, when in fact Iranand Pakistan and Turkey were part of
the you know Cento, then youknow, Iraq left the Baghdad Pact,
so we were closer to Iraq atthat point of we were. India was
closer to the Abatis, the guysin the pin stripes, while the Turks
the Pakistani's. But it was thePakistanis who joined an anti Arab alliance while
(32:38):
India was actually you know, championingthe Arab course. It was Pakistan knows
that the UK that sponsored CENTO,but they didn't last too long. And
later it's post seventies we saw theGulf Arabs come much closer to closer to
Pakistan and India attending to take avery negative view and I think took a
(32:59):
uni dimensional view of the Gulf Arabs, and I don't think we fully understood
their problems post seventy nine. Imean three, you know, three major
things, as you know, happenedin seventy nine. You had the Russian
intervention Afghanistan at the end of itIranian Revolution, the attack on the Grand
Mosque in Mecca, as well asthe Arabs Arab Israel Egypt a peace treaty.
(33:22):
So in a wayse seventy nine dramaticallyaltered the structure of geopolitics in the
in the in the Middle East,and I think our Russia connection and the
problems with Pakistan and the rise ofIslamic terrorism I think made us lose our
way in terms of how we dealwith the with the with the Arabian Peninsula
(33:43):
which was historically being closed to us. But I think we've overcome those those
hurdles today. I think Inda doesnot view the Arabia through the lengths of
Pakistan or the lengths of Islam.Attracts very interesting that mister MBI's had in
MBAs or the close as friends misterModi has in the in the Middle East.
So so I think we are anegg in a new situation. And
(34:06):
I think there's a lot more sophisticationtoday in terms of how India thinks about
it. It's not because Indian economyis, for example, ten times larger
than Pakistan's, so the Gulf capitalsees a lot more opportunities in India,
and for Pakistan has becomes saying someonealways seeking money to build them out,
rather than it's not an investment opportunity. So I think those equations have changed.
(34:31):
And Iran, which was very closeto the West, I mean he's
on the other camp today. Butfor India, I think the real prospect
is the convergences with the Arab Gulf, with the moderates with the best of
significantly increase. And with this right, that's where I think, if we
keep building up this relationship, weshould be able to counter any potential negative
(34:52):
developments that would take place in Iran. Yeah, it's funny why you're describing
this as just thinking. I tookmy family on a vacation to Kerala,
you know, in twenty seventeen,and we were driving across the province and
it was beautiful, but I keptsawing these large banners with pictures of different
(35:12):
shakes from Saudi and from the UAE. When I asked the you know,
the locals, why why why somany that, Oh, there's so much
investment that has poured in from Dubai, from Riyad, from Apple, Dabian
too, this province. Um,it really just kind of hit home the
deep interdependence between you know, Indianand the UAE, Indian and Saudi.
It's interesting on the whole diplomacy thatthose always came from, you know,
(35:37):
the Trucial States to Indian West coast, and after seventy three we saw on
a dramatic expansion of Indian labor exportsand Kerala was one major source of those
source of those exports. So ina sense, Kerala has a very very
special connection to the to the Gulf, and you'll see them everywhere. Though
it's a tiny state by Indian standards. I mean, it's presence in the
(36:00):
in the in the Gulf is huge. But my sense is today the connections
are much wider in many other partsof India. And again I mean I
think the Gulf capital what it cando to India's real estate, construction,
telecom sectors, is events and space. For example, UA has been very
keen to develop space cooperation with India. So I think we're looking at a
(36:22):
whole range of possibilities in a waythat is positive. While the story with
Iran is always a negative, negativeone. Okay, how do we deal
with the Taliban or how do weyou know, you know, contain Pakistan
support for crazy forces in Taliban inAfghanistan. But I think the economic dimension
(36:44):
with the Gulf hireups is huge andas Gulf opens up becomes more moderate politically
and modernizers socially. The the thethe the the connections between India and they
are of gulfill only will only deepen, so so I would say this is
really we just at the beginning ofshell, we say, the whole line
(37:04):
of a really beautiful relationship. Yeah, I mean, it's it's it's a
really fascinating time to watch this stuff. Before I moved to the Gulf,
I'd spent you know, most ofmy twenties living in East Asia, and
when I came here, I hadthis in my mind. You know,
I was going to a different place. I was going from Asia to the
Middle East. And then, youknow, having been here so long,
I think of the Gulf as youknow, rather than the the easternmost limits
(37:30):
of the Middle East, I thinkof it as more of the westernmost limits
of this bigger Asia. And youknow, you just see so much happening
here in that space. You know. I had a group of students from
the US visit our campus last semesterand they were saying, like, wow,
this this is a really kind ofwesternized place. They were in Dubai,
and I was like, this isvery Asian. Look around. Everybody
(37:51):
who sees from India, or they'refrom Sri Lanka, they're from Philippines,
and it's really is this kind ofasianization process, which the way you're describing,
like all these opportunities and economic engagementand space and tourism. You know,
you can see a lot of thisstuff happening all the time, this
really positive narrative, which you know, frankly in the West, we don't
hear very many positive narratives about theMiddle East. It's usually a problem to
(38:14):
be solved, and that's just notthe way it's kind of described. You
know, this is late January thatwe're recording this. Just last week the
South Korean president was here in town. They're talking about cooperation on nuclear on
defense, on security, on anynumber of things. It really is you're
seeing a lot of these linkages betweenAsian countries and societies, and these Golf
(38:36):
ones or Middle Eastern ones really intensifyingin a very interesting way. Absolutely,
and I think I see even youknow, many people from the Gulf who
land up in Singapore used to say, oh, we had an Asia,
the notion, you know, thatMiddle East and Asia were different. Partly,
I think the colonial era way thesedivisions were identified in the faun offices
(39:00):
of the West, Near East,Far East, Middle East. I think
those divisions are breaking down. Ithink because East Asia is an economic dynamo.
West Asia in has all the energyresources as the capital now to to
transform the region. And then wesee the integration of North Africa, the
North, you know, the Hornof Africa. I think you see this
(39:22):
fusing off eastern West Asia. Wehad this talk about you know narrow in
the FORTI stalking about Asia. Wesaid, look West Asia, East Asia.
But it had no economic component atthe time. It was really a
political idea. Today it is beingdriven by by economics, by commerce,
(39:44):
by by movement of labor capital.This is this is where I think the
real connections get established. In mysenses, there will be more and more
of this where the Gulf capital contributesto the growth of the rest of the
region, while the moment of peopleinto these countries for labor and for other
purposes, we'll also grow. Soso I think we're going to see Asianization
(40:07):
of Asia in a sense. No, absolutely, Um, I couldn't agree
more. But I also am somebodywho spends a lot of time thinking about
geopolitics. And you know, whileI love these positive stories, the cultural
the you know, my students whoare fascinated by yourselves Korean you know,
cultural products in Japanese manga and Indiayou know, Bollywood film. But I
(40:30):
kind of also see the you know, the dark cloud on the horizon too,
And I do see there's a lotof tensions geopolitically across Asia which often
don't feature, you know, inthis broader narrative of the Asian century,
you know, nothing but bright skysahead economic growth. Folks on fta's um
do you see like me, Iknow you think about geopolitics a lot.
(40:51):
Do you see the potential for theseAsian tensions that are kind of beneath the
surface building out into the gulf ina way that folks that you're having had
to think about very much? Yet, Yeah, I think the Asian century
was always a simplistic idea. Imean, you know, it's really still
the colonial post colonial argument. Imean, if you think of the European
century or European centuries, it wasfull of conflict, right, I mean
(41:14):
this no, I mean European storywas also about inter European conflict, both
within the continent as well as forthe colonies outside. So I think the
myth of you know that Asia isone has been broken because of China's own
assertiveness, and it's attempt to alterterritorial status go across the region. But
(41:35):
I think, as I said forthe Thomas, I mean it is producing
new connections. I mean both themoment of capital and labor producing new connections.
I think this over the longer term, we still need a security architecture.
It can't just be built on ideasof Asian century or Asian unity,
because even after say four hundred yearsafter Europe's right, this still doesn't have
(41:58):
a security architecture. As we discoveredlast year that the notion that Europe has
transcended geopolitics I mean, has turnedout to be utterly false. So similarly
in Asia, I mean, Ithink we have a long way to go,
but I think if we can buildon the positive forces and it's again
it can't be something exclusive that itshould not be that Asia. You know,
(42:19):
for a long time, this framingAsia versus the West, East versus
the West, a lot of itreally was self defeating because I think we
need the West Western powers, ifyou will, I mean, to be
able to stabilize this region, andAsia will increasingly contribute to the to the
west as well. So so Ithink the if we can keep backing up
(42:44):
the positive forces in the region whilekeeping in check the negative forces those who
want to establish hegemony, whether there'sIran trying to establish hegemony in the Gulf
in the name of religion or theChinese trying to do it in the name
of their great channel Dream. ThenI think the positive story can can uh
you know, can be expriended.I would say that to me, is
(43:07):
a perfect note to end on.You know, we're ending with something positive
that doesn't come up much on showslike this where we're talking about a lot
of Middle Eastern geopolitics. So sothank you, um Roger. I always
enjoy talking politics with you. Ialways learn a lot from it, from
from your perspective. I mean,you've been based in so many fascinating places.
(43:27):
You know, everybody you've you've reallylooked at from a lot of angles.
Thanks so much for joining us onthe show today. Thank you as
wonderful speaking to today, Jonathan.Okay, and hopefully I'll see you either
here in Apple Dabi soon or inIndia. To our listeners, thanks for
joining us again. Um. Pleasecheck us out on you know, on
our YouTube channel, or like andrate and subscribe and all that stuff on
(43:52):
on stitcher. Spotify and iTunes andall those great venues, and we'll see
you next month. Thank You.Produced by haartcast Media
Yeah. I mean, you know, put it very bluntly, I mean,
we'd rather have the Americans sit onthe oils figure than the Chinese,
There's no question. I mean,there was a time when we were very
anti American, but I think today, given all contradictions with China which have
shopping that we would rather see theUS remain a major player in the in
(00:25):
the in the Gulf, and Ithink and in the Middle East as a
whole. That suits our larger IndoPacific strategy as well, because there we
need the US might to be ableto produce a stable balance of our system
in the East, and I thinkthe same thing. Welcome to the China
(00:50):
Mina Podcast. I'm your host JonathanFulton, a non resident Senior Fellow at
the Atlanta Council and a political scientistoutside university in abud Abbey, United Arab
Emirates. When we talk about extraregional powers in the Middle East, we
tend to focus on the US inChina, but don't take your eye off
of India. With historically long religious, cultural and economic ties, India has
(01:11):
always had a deep presence in theregion. In recent years, however,
this has taken a more strategic turn. As New Delhi has been engaging across
political, diplomatic and security issues aswell. To tell us more about India's
footprint in the Middle East and thelarger geopolitical consequences. I'm delighted to be
joined by see Raja Mohan Raja isa senior Fellow with the Asia Society Policy
(01:33):
Institute in Delhi, a division ofthe Asia Policy Center in Mumbai. He's
a visiting research professor at the Instituteof South Asian Studies at the National University
of Singapore, where he previously wasa director. Raja, thanks so much
for joining us, wonderful Magma tookay, So Raja, can we can
(01:53):
we start with a brief overview ofwhat India's interests in the Middle East are,
how have they changed in recent yearsand are there any countries in particular
that are more strategically important to India. Look, I think, as you
mentioned in your initial remarks, Indiahas had a very close link with the
(02:13):
the Arabian Peninsula with Iran and thefurther in Levant and North Africa. So
it's a long standing relationship that hasbeen there. Three things have changed,
I would say in the last fiftyyears. One India's a major importer of
energy, so therefore India's dependence almostninety percent of imported energy. So therefore,
(02:38):
what we saw happen from the seventieswas the dramatic surge in oil imports
as well as the value in thecost of those imports. This of course
has remains a major challenge for India. That because India inflation sensitive and inflation
is sensitive to energy prices. Sotherefore what happens in the garl as a
(03:00):
direct bearing on the Indian economy.The second factor, I think this was
partly compensated by the fact that Indiaexported large number of you know, working
people into the Gulf. Today they'reclose to eight million Indians living in the
Gulf alone. I'm not up tothe whole of the Middle East in the
(03:20):
Gulf alone, and the remittances theysent home are partly compensate for the high
price we pay for the for theoil. So in a way, while
the India pace for the oil,India also benefits from the construction and the
economic activity because of the Indians arequite a key component to the labor market
in the in the Gulf. Athird aspect has been which has been less
(03:45):
understood because India historically under you know, had a historically security role in the
Gulf under the British arch that muchof the security of the Gulf and the
Arabian Sea and the northwestern quadrant ofthe Indian Ocean was done from Bombay.
But Nehru quite you know, youknow, deliberately we drew from the roll.
(04:09):
But as we discovered over the lastforty years, I mean, the
security of the Arabian Peninsula and Indiadeeply interdependent. That the radical ideas that
emerged out of the Arabian Peninsula havehad a great effect on the subcontinent.
The forces of religious violent religious extremismhave encouraged a whole lot of new thinking
(04:31):
in the subcontinent, partly accelerated bythe Afghanjihart Pakistan's adoption of you know,
Islamic instruments. So this this produceda layer to the conflict naturally existed between
India and Pakistan. So therefore theimpact of the Gulf politics, ideas about
(04:55):
religion and politics, religion and societyhave a deep impact on South Asian So
combating violent religious extremism terrorism is ais a many challenge for India and there.
I think what we've seen happen isreally the beginnings of an expansive cooperation
with the moderate Gulf Arab States,which includes you know, U Sauth Arabia.
(05:19):
As we speak, the President ofEgypt LCC is an India terrorism extremism
at at the top of the conversationbetween mister Mudi and mister LCC, and
I think what we're seeing is thatthe India in the past was so focused
on supporting Arab nationalism against Western Israel, today is actually working with the moderate
(05:45):
Gulf states which are which are todayengage Israel themselves so that contradiction is no
longer there. Second, I thinkthey're also close partners for India in battling
religious extremism. And finally, theeconomic links between the subpoint in between India
and on the Gulf, mainly throughthe UAE and Saudi Arabia of growing rapidly,
(06:09):
and India hopes that the Gulf capital, which has grown in large volumes,
will play a big role in India'sacceleration of India's economic growth. So
I would say at this point themoderate Arab States are major partners and over
the last few decades India has alsobuilt up a good relationship with Israel,
and now we have the eye toIndia, Israel, Emirates, and the
(06:32):
United States. It's interesting that thesewere the three forces we tried to keep
away from, away from the UnitedStates, away from Israel, and away
from the Gulf Arabs. Today,I think they're also close partners. Luckily
for US. They were closely withEgypt, they were closely with Israel.
So I think we are in avery very different framework in dealing with the
(06:55):
Middle East. That's a really greatoverview. One of the points you brought
up, Um, I think isreally important that that there are eight million
plus Indian residents in the Golf loan. That really complicates or or gives more
depth, I guess, to thestrategic side of things, and the defense
side of things. When when Indianleaders have to think about the Golf um
(07:18):
you know, security or insecurity here, it has a deep impact I'm sure
on the domestic political narratives within Indiaitself. I'm sure everybody in India has
family here, everybody here has familyback in India. It's a very deep
in measurement, I'd say, yeah, it's it's a huge as as you
rightly said, it's an opportunity aswell as a danger. In when Iraq
(07:42):
invaded Grewate in nineteen ninety, youknow, and they had to evacuate,
you know, thousands of Indians fromthe from the war theater. And later
when things were happening in Libya intwenty sixteen, if i'd a called right,
and they had to evacuate close tothirty thousand Indians from Libya. So
I think the presence of such alarge number of Indians also has increased responsibility
(08:03):
in India for their security, fortheir welfare. So in a way,
the use of Indian army, whichNehru shunned in the post independence years,
today Indian you know, security forcesbecome critical for uh you know, evacuating
in crisis and increasingly also work withthe Gulf countries to improve the life and
(08:28):
improve the life of the Indian workersin the in the Gulf, you know,
giving the better rights, giving thembetter insurance, a whole range of
factors. Because unlike the previous governments, mister Moody is deeply committed to the
welfare of the Indian diaspora. SoI think that that brings it to a
whole new dimension where he's taken itup directly, and I think he's had
(08:50):
some success with the UAE, withsauth Arabia, that which which are the
two largest hosts of Indian population,to respond more positively to the concern of
the Indian books. Oh yeah,well here and a wild we see it.
I mean, they're building an Indiantemple here. Um. You know,
the Indian community as acknowledge as beinga really important pillar of the society
(09:11):
here. I think something like fortypercent of the UAE is South Asian,
so you know that that independence worksboth ways. I would say you mentioned
a lot about the golf, andI think that's it's it's really interesting for
me living here in the UAE andfocusing a lot on golf. International politics,
there's been a bit of a shiftfor India, you know. It's
the GCC has become more important andit's kind of backed away from Iran,
(09:33):
which traditionally has been a little closerto India, at least in strategic affairs.
Is this about the economic opportunity?Is it about, like you describe
the population shift where there's so manyIndian resident of residents living in the GCC
countries, or is there a largergeopolitical logic at play as well. Yeah,
(09:54):
I think there's been a lot oftalk about India's partnership with Dada,
but it doesn't get to anyway becauseIran is locked in a confrontation with its
neighbors, and it's locked in aconfrontation with the US and the West.
So while Iran is important for Indiasurely because it's as a huge border with
Pakistan and Afghanistan, and it alsoprovides access to India to Central Asia.
(10:18):
So therefore, from a long termgeopolitical perspective, Iran is important. It's
location, its population all make itimportant. But right now there is not
very much we can do with Iran. There was some coordination with them during
the when the Taliban was in power, hopefully there will be more today again.
But the eight million people that remittancesthe oil we get from the Gulf,
(10:41):
I mean, you know, isway way above what we do with
Iran. And while ideally we wouldlike to do business with Iran, I
mean it's constrained, as I said, the limits to what we can do
with them. So I think Iran, the talk is more than the actual
action. While the Gulf, Ithink in the past, we tended to
(11:03):
look at it very in a merchantilistfashion, merely looking at oil and the
export of labor. One of thethings mister Modi has changed is really to
take a more strategic view of theGulf that we can do things with them.
And I think we're beginning to geta recognition that the kind of capital
what some of the scholars in theGulf called the Kalegi capital. The volumes
(11:26):
of Kalegi capital are so large thatactually, for an India that's looking for
capital for its own growth, it'sgoing to be the Gulf is going to
be a great partner. And mysenses, we're just beginning to explore those
possibilities and you'll see a lot moreof that happened. We've just signed an
FDA with the UA, as youknow, hopefully we can do something similar
(11:50):
with the with the GCC as awhole, and a little more difficult would
be while there are talks about Indiaplaying a security role that I think we'll
have to work out in greater detailof how we do this in the in
the days ahead. I think oneof the problems with the focus on the
Gulf in the last few years hasbeen we tended to neglect the western part
(12:13):
of the Arab world. Our relationshipwith Israel a dramatically improved under mster Mudi,
but the western part of the Levant, the North Africa, Egypt were
neglected. And I think I wouldsee Elsie's visit really as a as a
way of getting back to Egypt,because Egypt was a great partner in the
fifties and the sixties. So insome senses, you know, we're getting
(12:37):
back to because it's Egypt that hasthe heft, large population, large standing
army, and its pivotal position inthe region. So for us, getting
back to Egypt brings back some balanceinto a policy which is not you know,
just limited to the to the Gulf. Yeah. I mean it's interesting
(12:58):
because that leads into you know,my next question. You mentioned, you
know, India's rising presence in theLevant, and I was in Israel recently
and there was a lot of talkabout Israel India ties. Pretty much everybody
I spoke with we're becoming, youknow, kind of expert on India very
quickly because they were realizing that thatthings have changed pretty dramatically, especially over
(13:22):
the past year with this I too, you two that you mentioned this,
this configuration of the two eyes ofIsrael and India and the two years of
the UAE and the US. SoI'm still surprised it doesn't get as much
notice here as I thought it would. Um, I'm not sure how people
in other places are thinking about it. So could you give our listeners just
(13:43):
a quick description of what I too? You two is and how have the
Abraham Accords reconfigured India's approach to theMiddle East. Yeah, I think for
us, for India, given itschampion of championship of the Arab nationalism and
its support for Palestinians in the past, there was a problem of how do
(14:03):
we normalize relationship with Israel well atthe same time keeping up our traditional positions
in the in the Arab world.And I think the the Abraham Accords have
actually made it easier for us todon't have to constantly look out our shoulders.
So I think that opened a lotof space for India to work with
work with Israel and the Gulf Arabsat the same time. The Eye to
(14:24):
YouTube at this point, I mean, I think it's still really the beginnings
of a major project. The initialfocus is on economic issues, but I
think the question how soon would itrequire a strategic character, I would say,
look, it will take some moretime. It's better to build this
slowly and strongly rather than rushing intogrand security structures at this point. But
(14:52):
the idea was to have the USas part of this and get India,
UA and Israel to do a lotmore things, so they just I think
that at the beginning of the process. Yeah, and I think it's it's
been pretty interesting to watch at thisstage because, like you say, the
focus I think has been very careful, you know, focusing on issues like
food security, on development, ontechnology, you know, things that everybody
(15:16):
needs more of, and kind ofkeeping the geopolitics out of it. But
of course geopolitics is a big partof what we talk about on this show,
and I think it's kind of hardto not think about what those consequences
might be. I mean, Ithink the I two YouTube members have been
really good at framing it as ageo economic initiative, and it's not balancing
(15:37):
against Iran, it's not balancing againstChina. There's no balancing. It's it's
meant to be inclusive. But Iimagine the view from Beijing is pretty different.
I think they probably see this andassociate with other Indo Pacific mini laterals
like the quad or Aucus, andthis seems to be yet another US centered
approach to limiting Chinese gains in theregion. So I imagine in Beijing it's
(16:03):
probably not perceived as an entirely positivedevelopment. How are people in New Daily
thinking about the India US China trianglein the Middle East? Yeah, I
mean, you know, put itvery bluntly. I mean, we'd rather
have the Americans sit on the oilsfigured than the Chinese, There's no question.
I mean, there was a timewhen we were very anti American,
(16:26):
but I think today, given ourcontradictions with China, which have sharpened,
that we would rather see the USremain a major player in the in the
in the Gulf, and I thinkand in the Middle East as a whole.
That suits our larger Indo Pacific strategyas well, because there we need
the US might to be able toproduce a stable balance, suppose system in
(16:49):
the East, and I think thesame thing applies to the West. Unfortunately,
the Biding administration's initial mistakes in thein the Middle East of framing you
know too much of this democracy versusautocracy business. It's uh, you know,
by targeting so much fire it mombeIN Salman there, I think created
(17:15):
problems for themselves and you know,compelled I think the region to to diversify
away from the US. But hopefully, I mean, this is not a
permanent rupture, and the US wouldcome back to be a part of the
security structure and remain an important partof the security structure. Because there's too
(17:36):
much talk about US pivoting away orUS burning its bridges with the with the
Gulf. But I think both sideswill need each other. And for US,
as we build our capabilities, we'drather have the Americans for as long
as we can, rather than Americansleave, and we are not in a
position to fill the vacuum. Soso I don't think there are any illusions
in Delhi that if the US leaves, we can simply step in. So
(18:00):
for US, I think to workwith the US, with France, with
Britain wherever possible to be able tohave a structure there that is not left
to Russia and China to simply walkall over. But my senses, I
hope that the Bush Biden administration willbegin to make the adjustments necessary to make
(18:21):
shore that there's no geopolitical vacuum,are there. Yeah, I think that
really accurate. I actually also thinkthat they kind of have gotten their feet
under them a little bit in theregion in the past few months. You
know, you saw UM there.Everybody focused on the Biden trip to Saudi
and the negative you know imagery thatcame of that, or even the negative
(18:45):
consequences of it, but it's trippedIsrael. They signed this UM Strategic Dialogue
on technology cooperation. They're really showingthat commitment. We saw recently this hundred
billion dollars development project with the UAEon on clean energy. You saw them
them talking to Turkey just last week, and then in December there's report about
(19:08):
how the US have been working withstory with Saudi to help them develop their
national security strategy. So it doesseem that they've you know, um got
some success that they're building on,and like you said, I think that's
really good for countries like India,like the UK, like France, and
Asian allies and partners that rely onthis kind of US security structure that that
allows these countries to have, youknow, the interests in the region met
(19:32):
with a pretty low security cost.Absolutely, and and because I think the
depth of the guys between US andthe and to say, let's put more
bluntly, the Anglo American world andthe Gulf is so deep that it'll be
you know, it's not easy orwise for either side to simply walk away.
(19:52):
But as you know in Washington,you're right in the Beltway. I
mean, they're always ideological groups seekingyou know, you know, and solutions.
But but I think common sense willwill come back because the scale of
interest, because it looked like Gulfoil did not matter when the by then
administation took charge here, laid upit's essential to the world of energy security,
(20:17):
of dealing with the consequences of thewater in Ukraine. Yeah, absolutely,
just that recognition. That's sure.The US isn't reliant on golf energy,
but everybody's affected by you know,energy pricing, and of course golf
countries have a major role in this, right. So I think they've they've
realized that they have to be involvedhere politically, and that might require them
(20:40):
to maybe swallow some things politically thatthey weren't willing to maybe this time last
year, especially like you mentioned therelations with Saudi But but I think it
has been shifting. It's also interestingtoo because like we were just saying with
it to you two with the quad, you know, as you described,
India's really reconsidered how it approaches thisrelations with the US a lot this century.
(21:00):
UM. This show, of course, we talk a lot about China,
and I always see China as askind of an animating factor in that
that the strategic landscape in Asia hasreally changed with China becoming much more active
throughout Asia above for India especially,I mean, I think of what China's
been doing throughout South Asia, youknow, with with speck with you know,
(21:23):
it's it's Brii projects in all ofthe smaller South Asian states. UM.
So it really does seem for Indiathat it's it's a pretty difficult balancing
act to consider. How to youknow, cooperate with the US without antagonizing
China overtly. You know, howhow do you see this India China relationship?
Um? Right now, No,we have had a pretty rough relationship
(21:48):
or China. We've had a seriesof military crisis on the border in twenty
thirteen, twenty fourteen, twenty seventeen, twenty twenty. So this idea that
India should not get closer to theUS because China will get upset. That
has been a powerful argument because ofIndia's historic nonalignment ation, solidarity, multipolarity,
(22:11):
these kind of goals. I mean, it was a very deeply held
view. But I think we shouldreally thank Cashijan Ping for pushing India to
the other side that whatever the ambivalenceis that India has had, I think
a Chinese military assertiveness in the lastdecade in the Himalayas has really compelled India
to take a fresh look. SoI don't think there are any illusions of
(22:34):
the kind that Miscenehu started with thatChina has a natural partner for India in
building a new order in Asia andin the international system. Those illusions are
no longer there. I mean thatit's quite clear that we need the US,
we need the West to deal withthe China's China challenge. But at
(22:55):
the same time, it's a factthat China's power has grown dramatically on the
economic front, and its power isbeing projected into the Indian Ocean, and
the first military base abroad is inDjibouti, right next to the Gulf,
and probably they'll be looking around fornew places to acquire a permanent military presence.
(23:15):
So it's not it's no longer aquestion of weather, but it is
a question of when. Notwithstanding thecurrent crisis in his China Sea, in
the South China Sea, I don'tthink China is going to give up its
two ocean strategy, that it willcontinue to project power into the into the
Indian Ocean. And I think forIndia this is really so a problem is
(23:37):
not just in the Himalayas, butalso in the in the south, in
the waters of the Indian Ocean,and the fact that China has cultivated special
relationships with the key island states luSri Lunka, mold Leaves Mauritius Sayshells.
I think the Chinese presence has grown, so so this is really a long
(23:59):
term challenge for India and that againI think makes it clear that India has
to work with the Western partners.And that's why the COD is so focused
on maritime security issues and on doinga range of things to secure the ocean
spaces from being you know, Chinesetaking a much larger role in this part
(24:19):
of the world. So so thatI think is set now. It is
both in the in the Himalayas aswell as in the Indian Ocean. India's
problems which are only going to rise. And for all the talk about she
Dident being charm diplomacy, we haven'tseen much in relation to India. They're
doing a lot of sweet talk tothe US Finance capital Endavos, but with
(24:41):
Japan, where they have a massiveterritorial dispute, or with India, there
is no sign of any easing upof the treasures. So I don't see
she Dident being giving up on theon the territorial questions where they think it
is their right to unilaterally change theborders. So I think our problems with
(25:02):
China are only going to grow whilethe US there are sections which you will
continue to argue, Look, thereis room for God, rays is room
for collaboration. All that is finemy senses. For India, the contradiction
with China will be the principal contradictionfor the next three decades and coming decades.
And addressing that any answer that weproduced to will will necessarily involve the
(25:26):
US and its allies, and notonly in Asia but also in Europe.
M So, yeah, there's alot of really great stuff in that.
But one thing that I kept thinkingabout while you're describing this is, you
know, the China Iround relationship,which seems very troubling to folks in Washington.
And I always caution, you know, just by looking at the numbers
(25:48):
and saying, I don't think thatChina's engagement with Iran is really as deep
as it's often portrayed. I'm oftenasked to explain how, you know,
China can can have this good relationshipwith Iron and also have this good relationship
with the Saudis and the Amadis.And I think that a lot of folks
seem to think that when when I'mtrying to announced the strategic partnership or comprehensive
(26:11):
strategic partnership, that it would somehowalter the balance of power in the Gulf.
And I didn't think that was thecase at all, But I did
think it did alter or it haspotential to alter the balance of power in
South Asia. You know, Ithought that a deeper China Iran relationship probably
isn't going to mean much to Saudiin the big picture, but for India
(26:32):
it actually could be problematic. Doyou agree with that assessment or do you
think that it's not really a bigdeal in South Asia either. You are
right, and I think we shouldalso see this as part of a growing
Sino Russian partnership. That is,they've been enticing Pakistan. I mean,
in fact, the fact that Pakistan'sPrime Minister, then Prime Minister Imran Khan
(26:53):
showed up on February twenty third inMoscow just before Putin was ordering the invasion.
A lot of people thought, atleast in daily the speculation was that
the Chinese encouraged him to go toMoscow. So this idea that you know,
Russia China can drawin other you know, partners in the greater at least
to show up their alliance. Andboth Pakistan and Iran are natural partners there.
(27:18):
But Pakistan still has a lot oflinks with the UK and the US,
so I don't see them, whilethey're very close to China, whether
they will actually be allowed. Youknow, they're trying to make some adjustments
the army now after Imran Khan,you know, resetting their relationship with the
US, trying to reset the relationshipwith the US with Iran, you know,
it's always a difficult partner for anyone. I mean that you know,
(27:44):
they're not easy to deal with.So it's not that the Chinese just because
they signed a declaration it's automatically goingto translate into something you know, immediate
outcome. They might be able tobuild a relationship or the period and that
will certainly, and live Ussia andChina do it together, it'll certainly could
become a problem for India. Andthe fact is that Iran, if you
(28:08):
know, unlike Saudi Arabia today orUa, which are taking a more moderate
position, which are doing social reforminternally, we don't see Iran actually cracking
down on what against the women,against the various forces. So I think
that's also going to be a problemfor us. Though idely for us in
(28:29):
Iran that's at peace with device wouldprovide us a lot of opportunities, but
that's not in our hands to produce. Yeah, yeah, there's there's just
so many moving parts here, rightAnd you know, when you're talking about
maritime securities being such an important considerationin the Indian Ocean region, I was
thinking about Guadar and how much Chinais you know, put into this this
(28:52):
port in Pakistan, and also thinkingjust up the coastline a bit in Schabahar
and how India has been working wantingto work on forever um and starts making
headway and then something happens in Iran, or something happens with the Iran US
relationship, and it just keeps beingharder. But we saw a couple of
years ago some Iranian officials talking about, you know how they're very happy to
(29:14):
engage much more closely with China anddeveloping Chabahar UM. I think that would
really change the maritime landscape for India. If if if China were you know,
investing deeply into that port, investinginto Guadar, becoming a resident actor
in a lot of other Indian oceanports, this could really be an issue
for for India. Yeah, no, no, absolutely, I think the
(29:36):
we did build a terminal in youknow, in Chabahar, one terminal,
But you know, Irani classical tradingnation of the type that the Gulf Arabs
are, so the structure of theeconomy, the nature of their politics continue
to prevent where they have the naturalgateway to the inn aditia. But getting
(29:57):
that translating that beautiful line on themap into an operational corridor will be will
be quite hard, and I thinkthat's a part of the problem. So
so and then the UH if theChinese do make a major presence in the
in Iran, in Chabbaha and tobuild a military relationship. And I think
(30:18):
that's why it's important for India tostep up on the security partnership with the
Gulf Arabs. We need to doa lot more with them, look for
alternative routs. I mean, Ithink there are some people who suggested we
could work through you a Israel,Greece, you know, used you know,
roots into the Mediterranean, rather thanbeing fixated simply on cutting through Iran
(30:42):
into the into the to the north. Because it doesn't look like the regime
is changing on its own volution oris going to be forced out. Because
if Iran remains a block, it'sgrowing compulsion to align with Shan China will
grow and that will be a problem. See this problem for India. Yeah,
(31:06):
you know, it's it's it's beenreally interesting to watch. I've been
based in the Emirates now since twothousand and six, and I've been watching
this stuff for quite a while.And you know, there's a point maybe,
I guess in two thou and fifteen, when there was so much talk
about or twenty and sixteen, allthis talk about spak and I thought,
you know, the China China PakistanEconomic Quarter, it just seemed natural to
me. I thought you'd see alot more investment from the Saudis, from
(31:30):
the Amaradis going into it. AndI talked to a Pakistani officially and said,
actually, we haven't really seen themoney from the Gulf that we were
hoping for. And he said,well, you know, I kind of
blame their closer economic engagement with India. And it just seemed to me a
really fascinating kind of rectangle where youknow, historically the GCC in Pakistan lined
up pretty neatly in Iran and Indialined up pretty neatly, and that kind
(31:52):
of explained things, and just inthe past few years it doesn't anymore.
And you just look at how thosetwo very intense rivalries um that spans across
these you know, the Gulf andSouth Asia really does make for a very
interesting geopolitical chessboard here. No,absolutely, if you take a longer view.
(32:14):
I mean, when in fact Iranand Pakistan and Turkey were part of
the you know Cento, then youknow, Iraq left the Baghdad Pact,
so we were closer to Iraq atthat point of we were. India was
closer to the Abatis, the guysin the pin stripes, while the Turks
the Pakistani's. But it was thePakistanis who joined an anti Arab alliance while
(32:38):
India was actually you know, championingthe Arab course. It was Pakistan knows
that the UK that sponsored CENTO,but they didn't last too long. And
later it's post seventies we saw theGulf Arabs come much closer to closer to
Pakistan and India attending to take avery negative view and I think took a
(32:59):
uni dimensional view of the Gulf Arabs, and I don't think we fully understood
their problems post seventy nine. Imean three, you know, three major
things, as you know, happenedin seventy nine. You had the Russian
intervention Afghanistan at the end of itIranian Revolution, the attack on the Grand
Mosque in Mecca, as well asthe Arabs Arab Israel Egypt a peace treaty.
(33:22):
So in a wayse seventy nine dramaticallyaltered the structure of geopolitics in the
in the in the Middle East,and I think our Russia connection and the
problems with Pakistan and the rise ofIslamic terrorism I think made us lose our
way in terms of how we dealwith the with the with the Arabian Peninsula
(33:43):
which was historically being closed to us. But I think we've overcome those those
hurdles today. I think Inda doesnot view the Arabia through the lengths of
Pakistan or the lengths of Islam.Attracts very interesting that mister MBI's had in
MBAs or the close as friends misterModi has in the in the Middle East.
So so I think we are anegg in a new situation. And
(34:06):
I think there's a lot more sophisticationtoday in terms of how India thinks about
it. It's not because Indian economyis, for example, ten times larger
than Pakistan's, so the Gulf capitalsees a lot more opportunities in India,
and for Pakistan has becomes saying someonealways seeking money to build them out,
rather than it's not an investment opportunity. So I think those equations have changed.
(34:31):
And Iran, which was very closeto the West, I mean he's
on the other camp today. Butfor India, I think the real prospect
is the convergences with the Arab Gulf, with the moderates with the best of
significantly increase. And with this right, that's where I think, if we
keep building up this relationship, weshould be able to counter any potential negative
(34:52):
developments that would take place in Iran. Yeah, it's funny why you're describing
this as just thinking. I tookmy family on a vacation to Kerala,
you know, in twenty seventeen,and we were driving across the province and
it was beautiful, but I keptsawing these large banners with pictures of different
(35:12):
shakes from Saudi and from the UAE. When I asked the you know,
the locals, why why why somany that, Oh, there's so much
investment that has poured in from Dubai, from Riyad, from Apple, Dabian
too, this province. Um,it really just kind of hit home the
deep interdependence between you know, Indianand the UAE, Indian and Saudi.
It's interesting on the whole diplomacy thatthose always came from, you know,
(35:37):
the Trucial States to Indian West coast, and after seventy three we saw on
a dramatic expansion of Indian labor exportsand Kerala was one major source of those
source of those exports. So ina sense, Kerala has a very very
special connection to the to the Gulf, and you'll see them everywhere. Though
it's a tiny state by Indian standards. I mean, it's presence in the
(36:00):
in the in the Gulf is huge. But my sense is today the connections
are much wider in many other partsof India. And again I mean I
think the Gulf capital what it cando to India's real estate, construction,
telecom sectors, is events and space. For example, UA has been very
keen to develop space cooperation with India. So I think we're looking at a
(36:22):
whole range of possibilities in a waythat is positive. While the story with
Iran is always a negative, negativeone. Okay, how do we deal
with the Taliban or how do weyou know, you know, contain Pakistan
support for crazy forces in Taliban inAfghanistan. But I think the economic dimension
(36:44):
with the Gulf hireups is huge andas Gulf opens up becomes more moderate politically
and modernizers socially. The the thethe the the connections between India and they
are of gulfill only will only deepen, so so I would say this is
really we just at the beginning ofshell, we say, the whole line
(37:04):
of a really beautiful relationship. Yeah, I mean, it's it's it's a
really fascinating time to watch this stuff. Before I moved to the Gulf,
I'd spent you know, most ofmy twenties living in East Asia, and
when I came here, I hadthis in my mind. You know,
I was going to a different place. I was going from Asia to the
Middle East. And then, youknow, having been here so long,
I think of the Gulf as youknow, rather than the the easternmost limits
(37:30):
of the Middle East, I thinkof it as more of the westernmost limits
of this bigger Asia. And youknow, you just see so much happening
here in that space. You know. I had a group of students from
the US visit our campus last semesterand they were saying, like, wow,
this this is a really kind ofwesternized place. They were in Dubai,
and I was like, this isvery Asian. Look around. Everybody
(37:51):
who sees from India, or they'refrom Sri Lanka, they're from Philippines,
and it's really is this kind ofasianization process, which the way you're describing,
like all these opportunities and economic engagementand space and tourism. You know,
you can see a lot of thisstuff happening all the time, this
really positive narrative, which you know, frankly in the West, we don't
hear very many positive narratives about theMiddle East. It's usually a problem to
(38:14):
be solved, and that's just notthe way it's kind of described. You
know, this is late January thatwe're recording this. Just last week the
South Korean president was here in town. They're talking about cooperation on nuclear on
defense, on security, on anynumber of things. It really is you're
seeing a lot of these linkages betweenAsian countries and societies, and these Golf
(38:36):
ones or Middle Eastern ones really intensifyingin a very interesting way. Absolutely,
and I think I see even youknow, many people from the Gulf who
land up in Singapore used to say, oh, we had an Asia,
the notion, you know, thatMiddle East and Asia were different. Partly,
I think the colonial era way thesedivisions were identified in the faun offices
(39:00):
of the West, Near East,Far East, Middle East. I think
those divisions are breaking down. Ithink because East Asia is an economic dynamo.
West Asia in has all the energyresources as the capital now to to
transform the region. And then wesee the integration of North Africa, the
North, you know, the Hornof Africa. I think you see this
(39:22):
fusing off eastern West Asia. Wehad this talk about you know narrow in
the FORTI stalking about Asia. Wesaid, look West Asia, East Asia.
But it had no economic component atthe time. It was really a
political idea. Today it is beingdriven by by economics, by commerce,
(39:44):
by by movement of labor capital.This is this is where I think the
real connections get established. In mysenses, there will be more and more
of this where the Gulf capital contributesto the growth of the rest of the
region, while the moment of peopleinto these countries for labor and for other
purposes, we'll also grow. Soso I think we're going to see Asianization
(40:07):
of Asia in a sense. No, absolutely, Um, I couldn't agree
more. But I also am somebodywho spends a lot of time thinking about
geopolitics. And you know, whileI love these positive stories, the cultural
the you know, my students whoare fascinated by yourselves Korean you know,
cultural products in Japanese manga and Indiayou know, Bollywood film. But I
(40:30):
kind of also see the you know, the dark cloud on the horizon too,
And I do see there's a lotof tensions geopolitically across Asia which often
don't feature, you know, inthis broader narrative of the Asian century,
you know, nothing but bright skysahead economic growth. Folks on fta's um
do you see like me, Iknow you think about geopolitics a lot.
(40:51):
Do you see the potential for theseAsian tensions that are kind of beneath the
surface building out into the gulf ina way that folks that you're having had
to think about very much? Yet, Yeah, I think the Asian century
was always a simplistic idea. Imean, you know, it's really still
the colonial post colonial argument. Imean, if you think of the European
century or European centuries, it wasfull of conflict, right, I mean
(41:14):
this no, I mean European storywas also about inter European conflict, both
within the continent as well as forthe colonies outside. So I think the
myth of you know that Asia isone has been broken because of China's own
assertiveness, and it's attempt to alterterritorial status go across the region. But
(41:35):
I think, as I said forthe Thomas, I mean it is producing
new connections. I mean both themoment of capital and labor producing new connections.
I think this over the longer term, we still need a security architecture.
It can't just be built on ideasof Asian century or Asian unity,
because even after say four hundred yearsafter Europe's right, this still doesn't have
(41:58):
a security architecture. As we discoveredlast year that the notion that Europe has
transcended geopolitics I mean, has turnedout to be utterly false. So similarly
in Asia, I mean, Ithink we have a long way to go,
but I think if we can buildon the positive forces and it's again
it can't be something exclusive that itshould not be that Asia. You know,
(42:19):
for a long time, this framingAsia versus the West, East versus
the West, a lot of itreally was self defeating because I think we
need the West Western powers, ifyou will, I mean, to be
able to stabilize this region, andAsia will increasingly contribute to the to the
west as well. So so Ithink the if we can keep backing up
(42:44):
the positive forces in the region whilekeeping in check the negative forces those who
want to establish hegemony, whether there'sIran trying to establish hegemony in the Gulf
in the name of religion or theChinese trying to do it in the name
of their great channel Dream. ThenI think the positive story can can uh
you know, can be expriended.I would say that to me, is
(43:07):
a perfect note to end on.You know, we're ending with something positive
that doesn't come up much on showslike this where we're talking about a lot
of Middle Eastern geopolitics. So sothank you, um Roger. I always
enjoy talking politics with you. Ialways learn a lot from it, from
from your perspective. I mean,you've been based in so many fascinating places.
(43:27):
You know, everybody you've you've reallylooked at from a lot of angles.
Thanks so much for joining us onthe show today. Thank you as
wonderful speaking to today, Jonathan.Okay, and hopefully I'll see you either
here in Apple Dabi soon or inIndia. To our listeners, thanks for
joining us again. Um. Pleasecheck us out on you know, on
our YouTube channel, or like andrate and subscribe and all that stuff on
(43:52):
on stitcher. Spotify and iTunes andall those great venues, and we'll see
you next month. Thank You.Produced by haartcast Media
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