August 4, 2024 • 37 mins
What happens when the struggle for land and equality ignites a decades-long conflict? Join us on Double Helix Blueprint of Nations as we uncover the origins of Colombia’s guerrilla warfare, spotlighting the rise of FARC and ELN in the tumultuous late 1950s and early 1960s. Fueled by land inequality, poverty, and political exclusion, these movements faced off against a government response marked by heavy-handed military operations and Cold War-era strategies such as Plan LASSO and Operation Marquetalia, often exacerbating civilian suffering.
Explore the profound global influences that shaped this conflict, from the ideological and logistical support provided by communist states like the Soviet Union and Cuba to the parallel governments established by FARC and ELN in rural areas. This chapter reveals how this external backing fortified the guerrillas’ revolutionary resolve and prompted them to engage in tactics aimed at crippling infrastructure and foreign corporations. We dive into the daily lives of rural Colombians caught in this struggle, experiencing firsthand the guerrillas' bid for legitimacy amidst widespread chaos and displacement.
Witness the harrowing rise of paramilitary brutality as we turn our focus to the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and other groups whose extreme violence often surpassed even that of the guerrillas. From massacres to forced disappearances, these paramilitaries, funded by landowners, businesses, and drug traffickers, left a bloody stain on Colombia's history. Delve into the murky alliances between these groups and the Colombian government and the ethical quandaries such associations pose. Finally, prepare for our next episode where we delve into the explosive ascent of drug cartels, further entangling Colombia in a web of violence and corruption.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:06):
Welcome to Double Helix Blueprint of Nations,
season 2, episode 1.3, guerrillaWarfare and the Iron Fist.
In our last episode, we coverthe second part of our journey
(00:28):
through the Colombian conflictand its history.
We dove into the brutal periodknown as La Violencia, which I
just now realized.
I never said what it means inEnglish, but it should be pretty
self-explanatory it means theviolence.
It means the violence.
During this period, we exploredthe decade of violence and
terror that ripped throughColombia and, in its aftermath,
(00:49):
the rise of the two primaryleft-wing guerrilla movements
that dominated Colombia for over50 years.
In this episode, we enter a newchapter in Colombia's history
the early stages of guerrillawarfare and the relentless
government efforts to suppressit.
We also begin to see theimpacts of the Cold War as it
(01:09):
takes full effect on theconflict as it does begin to
settle from La Violencia.
In the late 1950s, thesocio-political landscape of
Colombia remained deeplyfractured.
While the power-sharingagreement known as the National
Front had temporarily stemmedthe bloodshed between liberal
and conservative parties, it didlittle to address the root
(01:30):
causes of the conflict.
Land inequality remained,poverty was still rampant and
political exclusion was stillthe standard practice of the
political class.
These unresolved issuescontinued to give Colombians
cause for rebellion anddiscontent, as we saw before.
In the early 1960s, colombiasaw the emergence of the
(01:52):
guerrilla movements that wouldcome to define the country's
internal conflict for decades tocome.
Among these two groups hadstood out the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia, theFARC, and the National
Liberation Army, the ELN.
We discussed their ideologiesand the key players in their
founding in our last episode.
(02:12):
The FARC and the ELN wouldbecome ubiquitous with the
Colombian armed conflict.
These guerrilla movements wouldspend nearly five decades at
the top of the heap of theColombian conflict, turning into
a defining characteristic ofthe Colombian conflict, turning
into a defining characteristicof the conflict in Colombia and,
in some respects, they woulddefine the image of Colombia to
itself and to the world.
(02:35):
As FARC and ELN solidified theirpresence in Colombia during the
1960s and early 1970s, thegovernment's response was a
critical determinant of thetrajectory of the country's
internal conflict.
The response of the Colombianstate was multifaceted.
It was, of course, violent andoften misguided, involving
(02:56):
military initiatives andattempts at political reform to
address the insurgency'sgrievances, sometimes
successfully, sometimes not.
Finally, american involvementin setting the shape and pace of
the response embroiled Americainto a conflict that had been
nearly 100 years in the makingand would be a key feature of
(03:18):
this early stage.
Facing an increasingly organizedand determined guerrilla
insurgency, by the mid-1960s thegovernment, with substantial
support from the United States,launched a series of aggressive
counterinsurgency operations.
The early phase of thisinvolvement had a name.
It was called Plan LASSO, orthe Latin American Security
(03:40):
Operation, which was acomprehensive strategy designed
to crush the guerrilla movementsand reassert government control
over the countryside.
Plan Lasso was introduced in1962 as part of a broader United
States-backed effort to containthe spread of communism in
Latin America.
The plan was a direct responseto the recent successes of the
(04:03):
Cuban Revolution led by FidelCastro.
The plan aimed to neutralizeguerrilla activities through a
combination of military forceand civic action programs,
reflecting the dual approach ofcounterinsurgency tactics.
On the surface, the plan seemedsound.
The implementation, however,would leave a lot to be desired.
(04:24):
Sound, the implementation,however, would leave a lot to be
desired.
The plan involved extensivemilitary operations targeting
guerrilla strongholds.
The Colombian military, trainedand equipped by the United
States, launched coordinatedassaults on regions known to
harbor guerrilla fighters.
These operations includedaerial bombardments, ground
assaults and the establishmentof military bases and conflict
(04:46):
zones, supported by US militaryaid, military advisors and
political advisors.
Through initiatives, colombianforces embarked on aggressive
counterinsurgency campaigns.
Historians note that the use ofAmerican military tactics,
including search and destroymissions, often did more harm
(05:06):
than good, alienating the verypopulations the government
needed to win over.
These operations frequentlyinvolved aerial bombardments and
the use of napalm to targetsuspected guerrilla hideouts,
which historian Mark Bowdendescribes as tactics that
inevitably affected civilians,thereby driving a wedge further
between the populace and thegovernment.
(05:27):
The harsh military actionsoften resulted in significant
civilian casualties anddisplaced communities,
inadvertently serving asrecruitment tools for guerrilla
movements.
One of the early and notablemilitary actions under Plan
Lasso was Operation Marquetaliain 1964, targeting the early
(05:49):
FARC stronghold in theMarquetalia region in the
central highlands of Colombia.
Although the operation aimed todecimate the FARC forces, it
inadvertently solidified theirresolve and helped them gain
greater support among the ruralpopulation.
Resolved and helped them gaingreater support among the rural
population, fully establishingthem as a force to be reckoned
with.
Historian Jorge Orlando Meloexplains that Marquetalia was
(06:12):
marketed by the government as aredoubt of communism,
necessitating an aggressivestrike to uproot potential
insurgent threats.
Over 16,000 troops weredeployed to eliminate a few
hundred guerrillas, a moveintended to showcase the
government's resolve, but whichactually ended up showcasing its
incompetence andheavy-handedness.
(06:34):
At one point, madolanda wascornered by the army but managed
to escape the encirclement in alast-ditch effort.
Despite the military'snumerical superiority, the
guerrillas, adept in ruralguerrilla warfare, led by
seasoned leaders like ManuelMarulanda, managed not only to
survive but to use the siege asa rallying cry for further
(06:56):
resistance.
Eyewitness and former guerrillamember, jose Gonzalez, later
recounted the government'soperation intended to destroy us
, but it ultimately forged usinto a unified force under the
FARC banner.
Alongside military efforts, planLazo included civic action
programs intended to win thehearts and minds of the rural
(07:18):
population.
This program sought to improveinfrastructure, provide social
services and offer economicincentives to undermine
guerrilla influence.
During Carlos Lleras Vestrepo'spresidency, from 1966 to 1970,
initiatives like the NationalAssociation of Peasant Workers,
anuc, which we mentioned lastepisode, sought to implement
(07:42):
agrarian reforms.
Last episode sought toimplement agrarian reforms.
However, as we said before,these reforms were often too
limited and met with stiffopposition from the landowning
elites.
You know, you would think that10 years of savage violence
would do the trick in convincingthe vast majority of a
population that it is time togive up some land so that what
(08:03):
just happened doesn't happenagain.
But yet they did not relent theopposition of political and
landed elites, undermined theeffectiveness of ANUK and
initiatives like it, leavingmany past grievances unaddressed
.
The half-hearted reforms failedto make substantial changes to
rural inequality, allowingguerrilla groups to continue
(08:25):
advocating for radical socialchange as an alternative to the
status quo.
Other projects sponsored byColombian administrations with
US backing in the 1960s includedbuilding schools, roads and
medical facilities, as well asoffering agricultural assistance
to improve local farmingpractices.
Hearts and minds kind of stuff.
(08:47):
However, the effectiveness ofthese programs was often limited
by corruption, mismanagementand the pervasive distrust of
the government among ruralcommunities.
And I mean they had reason to.
While doing hearts and mindscampaigns, the Colombian
government was bombing ruralfarmlands into oblivion.
The United States played acrucial role in supporting Plan
(09:10):
Lasso by providing training,equipment and logistical support
to the Colombian military.
Counterinsurgency techniquesdeveloped during the early
stages of the Vietnam War andother Cold War conflicts were
adapted for use in Colombia,emphasizing small unit tactics,
intelligence gathering.
And other Cold War conflictswere adapted for use in Colombia
, emphasizing small unit tactics, intelligence gathering and
psychological operations.
(09:31):
Despite the full court pressfrom the Colombian government
and the Americans, the guerrillamovements proved resilient the
rugged terrain of Colombia'scountryside.
Years of rebellion andinsurgency and the problems
endemic to Colombia proved toomuch.
The country provided idealconditions for guerrilla warfare
, and the deep-seated grievancesof the rural population ensured
(09:54):
a steady stream of recruits forgroups like FARC and ELN.
As the conflict escalated, sodid the violence and the human
right abuses.
The Colombian military'saggressive tactics often
resulted in significant civiliancasualties and widespread human
right abuses.
Villages suspected of harboringguerrillas were frequently
(10:14):
subjected to collectivepunishment, including mass
arrest, torture andextrajudicial killings.
The feared paramilitary groupsof La Violencia began making a
comeback, ostensibly to defendagainst guerrilla activities,
but in practice bringingpunishment and retribution back
to the Colombian countryside.
We will have more to say on theguerrillas later on in this
(10:36):
episode and summary executionsbecame commonplace again,
further alienating the ruralpopulations from the government
and driving more people into thearms of the guerrilla movements
.
To be fair, the guerrillagroups employed their own brutal
tactics, including kidnapping,extortion and targeted
(10:57):
assassinations.
They attacked militaryinstallations, sabotaged
infrastructure and engage inhit-and-run attacks to weaken
the government's control andspread fear.
Both FARC and ELN increasinglyfinanced their operations
through criminal activities,including drug trafficking,
which provided them with theresources needed to sustain
(11:17):
their insurgency.
Despite receiving someideological support from
communist states.
Farc and ELN primarily fundedtheir activities to various
illegal enterprises.
As the conflict dragged on,these guerrilla groups turned to
more systematic methods ofgenerating revenue, which
significantly impacted theColombian social and economic
(11:40):
dynamics dynamics, I mean.
Imagine You're a poor farmer inthe hinterlands of Colombia,
miles and miles from any form ofgovernment control or help.
The only help you have is aguerrilla local commander who
offers you protection from theroaming bands of self-defense
forces and criminals.
In exchange for you to farm andproduce coca leaves or
(12:03):
marijuana plantations, you getprotection, maybe a trickle of
money to get their drug rawmaterials.
In this way, drug traffickingbecame a major source of funding
for both FARC and ELN.
Initially, these groups taxedlocal coca farmers and cocaine
producers operating in theirterritories.
Over time, they became moredeeply involved in the drug
(12:26):
trade, overseeing thecultivation, production and
distribution of cocaine.
Later, during the heyday of themajor drug cartels in Colombia,
the supply chain will besolidified, with the poor coca
farmer at the bottom, theguerrillas guarding and
transporting the raw materialsin the middle and the cartels
acting as the refining andguarding and transporting the
raw materials in the middle andthe cartels acting as the
refining and distribution arm atthe top.
(12:48):
In our next episode, we willcover the advent of the cartels
and their role in the Colombianconflict.
The revenue generated from drugtrafficking allowed the
guerrillas to purchase weapons,recruit and train new members
and sustain their operations.
The lucrative nature of thedrug trade also incentivized the
expansion of their territorialcontrol into key coca-growing
(13:11):
regions.
Kidnapping for ransom wasanother significant revenue
stream for FARC and ELN.
They targeted wealthyColombians, foreign nationals
and government officials,demanding substantial ransoms
for their release.
This tactic provided financialresources and served as a means
of exerting pressure on thegovernment and spreading fear
(13:33):
among the populace.
The practice of kidnappingbecame so pervasive that it led
to the creation of specializedanti-kidnapping units within the
Colombian military and policeforces.
It also gave Colombia areputation from which it has yet
to escape.
Additionally, both guerrillagroups imposed war taxes on
(13:54):
businesses and landowners withintheir areas of influence.
Failure to pay these extortionfees often resulted in violent
reprisals, including thedestruction of property and
physical harm.
This method of extortionensured a steady flow of income
and reinforced their authorityin controlled territories.
The extortion network extendedto various sectors, including
(14:17):
agriculture, mining andtransportation, embedding the
guerrilla groups deeply into theeconomic fabric of the regions
they controlled, and this is aproblem nowadays, because
decoupling between the guerrillaadministrative structure from
daily life is an extremelydifficult task.
Finally, in addition to drugtrafficking and extortion,
(14:39):
illegal mining operations,particularly gold mining, became
a lucrative enterprise for FARCand ELN.
These groups controlled andtaxed mining activities,
exploiting the mineral wealth ofColombia's remote areas to fund
their insurgency.
The environmental and socialimpact of illegal mining was
devastating, causing significantecological damage and
(15:01):
displacing local communities.
The extensive involvement inthese illegal activities funded
guerrilla movements, but alsoentrenched them deeply within
Colombia's rural economicstructures.
This dual role as bothinsurgents and criminal
enterprises complicated effortsto combat them and blurred the
lines between politicalrebellion and organized crime
(15:25):
and outright governmentalstructure.
We mentioned that the Cold Warhad poured rocket fuel into the
already hypercharged Colombianconflict.
As such, the rise of guerrillaswas also not occurring in a
vacuum.
It was heavily influenced bythe broader context of the Cold
War.
The ideological battle betweenthe United States and the Soviet
(15:47):
Union played out in Colombia,with each side supporting
factions aligned with theirrespective interests.
The United States viewed theColombian insurgency through the
lens of the Cold War and theglobal struggle against
communism.
As part of its containmentstrategy, the United States
provided substantial militaryand economic aid to the
(16:07):
Colombian government, includingweapons training and advisors.
Of recent memory for Americanswas the successful Cuban
Revolution, which had justinstalled a communist
dictatorship just 90 miles fromUS shores, and preventing the
same sort of takeover in the farricher and more populous
(16:28):
Colombia was of paramountimportance to the US government.
As I said before, the US alsoplayed a role in shaping
Colombia's counterinsurgencystrategy, promoting a hardline
approach that prioritizedmilitary solutions over
political and social reforms.
Plan Lasso laid out the lengthsof American involvement in the
(16:48):
early days of the conflict, withan increasingly unforgiving
tone as the quagmire of Vietnamunfolded elsewhere in the world.
Another US entity that played asignificant role in adding fuel
to the Colombian fire was ourold friends United Fruits
Company.
These guys were a piece of workand, before you get too
(17:10):
scandalized, I bet you dobusiness with them every single
time you go to the grocery storeand pick up some delicious
fruits.
You may know them by adifferent name Chiquita Brands
International.
More on them shortly.
On the other side, guerrillagroups like FARC and ELN
received ideological and in somecases, material support from
(17:33):
communist states, including theSoviet Union and Cuba.
This support was often moresymbolic than substantial, but
it enforced the guerrillas'commitment to their
revolutionary cause andincreased concerns back in
Washington.
The Soviet Union and Cubaprovided ideological support by
promoting Marxist-Leninistdoctrines, which helped to
(17:54):
solidify the politicalfoundations of the Colombian
guerrillas.
This ideological alignment withglobal communist movements gave
the guerrillas a broader senseof purpose and legitimacy,
positioning the struggle withinthe context of the worldwide
fight against imperialism andcapitalism.
Cuban influence wasparticularly significant.
(18:15):
Following the Cuban Revolutionin 1959, cuba under Fidel Castro
became a beacon ofrevolutionary fervor for Latin
American insurgent groups.
The success of the CubanRevolution inspired Colombian
guerrillas to believe that asimilar uprising could succeed
in their own country.
Guerrillas to believe that asimilar uprising could succeed
(18:36):
in their own country.
Selected members of FARC and ELNwere sent to Cuba, and some to
the Soviet Union as well, toreceive military training, learn
guerrilla warfare tactics andstudy Marx's Leninist theory.
Cuban military advisorsoccasionally traveled to
Colombia to provide directtraining to guerrilla fighters.
This training included not onlycombat skills but also the
(18:56):
organization and operation ofinsurgent cells, and while the
extent of material support fromthe Soviet Union and Cuba varied
over time, there were instanceswhere the guerrillas received
arms, ammunitions and othersupplies.
These resources were crucial insustaining prolonged
engagements with Colombianmilitary forces.
Cuba, in particular, was knownto have supplied small arms and
(19:20):
other military equipment toguerrilla groups throughout
Latin America, includingColombia.
Both the Soviet Union and Cubaused their global influence to
support the Colombianguerrillas' cause on
international stage.
Through diplomatic channels andpropaganda efforts, they worked
to cast the Colombiangovernment in a negative light,
highlighting human rights abusesand framing the guerrillas'
(19:43):
struggle as a legitimate fightfor social justice and
liberation.
International communistpublications and broadcasts
often feature storiessympathetic to the Colombian
guerrillas, helping to generateglobal awareness and support for
their cause.
Despite these supports, it isimportant to note that the
assistance from the Soviet Unionand Cuba was often more
(20:06):
ideological and symbolic thansubstantial.
The primary burden ofsustaining the insurgency still
rested on the guerrillas andtheir ability to fund their
operations through local means,like we discussed before.
However, the ideological andoccasional material backing from
these communist states providedthe guerrillas with valuable
(20:26):
resources and a broader contextto their struggle, reinforcing
their commitment to theirrevolutionary goal.
Their struggle reinforcingtheir commitment to their
revolutionary goal.
Additionally, the conflict ledto the displacement of hundreds
of thousands of Colombians, asrural communities fled the
violence and sought refuge inurban areas or neighboring
countries.
La violencia began this trend,and the rise of the guerrillas
(20:49):
made it worse.
This mass displacementdisrupted traditional social
structures and created newchallenges for cities unprepared
to accommodate the influx ofrefugees.
The ongoing conflict disruptedeconomic activities as well,
particularly in the same ruralareas that had been hurt by
displacement, leading toincreased poverty and hardship.
(21:10):
The destruction ofinfrastructure and agricultural
lands further exacerbated theeconomic woes of the rural
population.
Entire villages were oftenforced to flee their homes to
escape the fighting.
For instance, in the 1990s, theFARC's aggressive territorial
expansion and clashes withparamilitary forces and
government forces caused massivedisplacement in regions like
(21:33):
the Meta and Caquetá.
Families abandoned their farmsand belongings, seeking refuge
in overcrowded urban areas ormakeshift camps.
As the conflict intensified,the guerrilla movements in
Colombia adopted increasinglysophisticated strategies to
expand their influence andcontrol over vast territories.
(21:59):
The FARC and ELN, thoughdifferent in their origins and
ideologies, both sought toundermine the government's
authority and build their ownparallel structures of power.
The FARC utilized a mix ofmilitary and political
strategies to assert itsdominance.
They operated in small mobileunits capable of executing
hit-and-run attacks ongovernment forces and
infrastructure.
Ambushes, sabotage andassassinations were common
(22:20):
tactics aimed at destabilizinggovernment control and creating
an environment of fear anduncertainty.
To build support among therural population, the FARC
implemented social programs inareas under their control
population.
The FARC implemented socialprograms in areas under their
control.
They provided basic servicessuch as health care, education
and agricultural assistance,which the government often
(22:41):
failed to deliver.
This dual approach of coercionand provision helped the FARC
establish a semblance ofgovernance and gain legitimacy
in the eyes of many ruralColombians.
And gain legitimacy in the eyesof many rural Colombians.
The ELN, inspired by the CubanRevolution, placed a strong
emphasis on political educationand community organization.
They aimed to create arevolutionary consciousness
(23:03):
among the rural poor, viewingtheir struggle as part of a
broader fight againstimperialism and capitalism.
The ELN's tactics included notonly armed attacks, but also
efforts to disrupt the economicactivities of multinational
corporations, particularly inthe oil industry.
They frequently bombedpipelines and kidnapped foreign
(23:24):
oil workers to draw attention totheir cause and exert economic
pressure on the government.
Both guerrilla groups sought toexpand their territorial
control by establishingliberated zones where they could
operate with relative freedom.
These areas could serve asbases for launching attacks,
training recruits andadministering their own form of
(23:45):
governance.
The FARC strongholds wereprimarily located in the
southern and eastern regions ofColombia, including areas like
Meta, caquetá and Guaviare.
These regions, characterized bydense jungles and remote
landscapes, provided idealconditions for guerrilla warfare
.
The FARC's control over theseterritories allowed them to
(24:05):
cultivate coca and engage indrug trafficking, which became a
major source of funding fortheir operations.
Meanwhile, the ELN establishedits presence in the northern
regions, particularly in areasrich in natural resources like
Arauca and the Norte deSantander.
By targeting the oil industry,the ELN aimed to disrupt one of
(24:27):
the government's key economicsectors and highlight the
exploitation of Colombia'snatural resources by foreign
corporations.
Furthermore, guerrilla tacticsoften involved the destruction
of infrastructure to disruptgovernment control and economic
activities.
Bridges, roads and utilitieswere frequently targeted,
(24:47):
isolating rural communities andmaking it difficult for
residents to access markets,health care and education.
For example, the ELN was knownfor bombing oil pipelines and
electricity towers, leavingcommunities without power and
severely hindering localeconomies.
The conflict disruptedagricultural production as well,
(25:11):
which was the primarylivelihood for many rural
Colombians.
Fields were often abandoned dueto the threat of violence, and
landmines planted by guerrillagroups made it dangerous to
cultivate the land.
In areas like Antioquia andBolívar, farmers faced severe
economic hardship as crops wentunharvested and livestock was
lost.
The inability to farm safelypushed many into poverty and
(25:32):
forced some to join the ranks ofinternally displaced persons.
The forced recruitment of youngmen and women by guerrilla
groups furthered the stabilizedrural communities.
These groups often targetedteenagers and young adults,
coercing them into joining theirranks under the threat of
violence.
This practiced deprivedfamilies of their members and
(25:53):
also instilled fear in thecommunity.
Finally, the conflict's impactextended beyond immediate
physical harm and displacement.
Of course, the social fabric ofrural communities was deeply
affected as trust eroded andpeople became wary of strangers
and even neighbors.
The pervasive atmosphere offear and suspicion made it
difficult for communities torebuild and recover from the
(26:14):
trauma.
The guerrillas' control overcertain areas also meant that
civilians had to navigate acomplex and dangerous political
landscape, often caught betweenthe demands of guerrilla forces
and the punitive actions of thegovernment and paramilitaries.
As we said before, the earlygovernment responses to rising
guerrilla movement wasineffective at best, but
(26:36):
increasingly it became moreviolent and forceful as
government frustration grew.
Dual approach of appliedmilitary force, while only
tentatively addressing theunderlying issues, set the stage
for enduring and complexconflict that we have today.
As historian Malcolm Deeseobserves, this period laid the
groundwork for the prolongedstruggle, embedding patterns of
(26:57):
violence and resistance thatwould characterize Colombian
politics for decades to come.
As the guerrillas expandedtheir influence and control over
more territories into the 1970s, new left-wing movements also
began to emerge.
One notable group was the M-19,or 19th of April Movement,
(27:18):
which traced its origins to theallegedly fraudulent
presidential election of April19, 1970.
Unlike the rural-based FARC andELN, m-19 operated primarily as
an urban guerrilla andterrorist organization carrying
out high-profile actions incities.
There are lots of actions thatM-19 took on.
(27:39):
They were often flashy andbombastic, like stealing the
sword of the liberator SimonBolivar, but we are going to
skip over the majority of thosefor now.
The effectiveness of thoseactions was questionable at best
.
So if you are keeping track ofall the sides in the conflict,
we are about to introduce one ofthe worst.
(27:59):
In response to the growing powerof the guerrilla groups, a new
force entered the Colombianconflict the paramilitaries.
Funded and organized by wealthylandowners, cattle ranchers and
business interests.
Paramilitary groups wereinitially formed to counter
guerrillas.
However, their methods quicklybecame even more brutal and
(28:19):
ruthless than those of theguerrillas.
The rise of paramilitary groupsadded a new and terrifying
dimension to the already complexand violent landscape of
Colombia, as they sought toeliminate any perceived threat
to their power with extremeviolence and impunity.
I certainly think this guiseturned out to be worse than the
guerrillas that they wereestablished to fight, and you
(28:40):
will hear why.
As the Colombian governmentintensified its efforts to crush
the guerrilla insurgencies ofFARC and ELN, paramilitary
groups emerged as theenforcement mechanism of the
government's will and theinterest of powerful entities
within Colombia.
One such interest was ourfriends from before, the United
Fruit Company.
United Fruit played asubstantial role in funding and
(29:05):
establishing early paramilitarygroups in Colombia to protect
its investments, often with thetacit or explicit support of the
US government.
In fact, united Fruit and itssubsidiary companies, like
Chiquita Brands, were foundliable for killings committed by
paramilitary forces in Colombiafrom 1997 to 2004.
(29:27):
Forces in Colombia from 1997 to2004.
This is after thoseorganizations were labeled
organizations sponsored ofterrorism by the United States
government because they fundedthem.
Oh, and did you know thatUnited Fruits was also involved
in a plot to overthrow thegovernment of Guatemala in 1954?
And also, don't forget thebanana massacred of 1928 in
(29:49):
Colombia, which pretty much gotthe whole thing started.
Like I said, these guys werepieces of work.
I guess an argument could bemade that United Fruits Company
is responsible for the entiremodern conflict in Colombia,
with the start of the 1928massacre.
But hey, we have fresh fruit atthe supermarket.
(30:11):
Anyway, these paramilitarygroups acted with brutal
efficiency, targeting not onlyguerrilla fighters but also
civilians suspected ofsympathizing with the insurgents
.
Their rise marked a new andterrifying phase in the
Colombian conflict, as theyengaged in widespread human
right abuses and extremeviolence to assert control and
eliminate any perceived threats.
(30:32):
The involvement of corporateand foreign interests further
complicated the conflict,entrenching a cycle of violence
and impunity that would plagueColombia for decades.
The Colombian government wasstruggling to maintain control
and to combat thewell-entrenched guerrilla forces
, and found itself in adifficult position.
The military's heavy-handedtactics had not only failed to
(30:54):
eradicate the guerrilla threat,but had also alienated large
segments of the population andattracted international
criticism.
Paramilitary groups such as theUnited Self-Defense Forces of
Colombia, the AUC, the PeasantSelf-Defense Forces of Córdoba
and Urabá, accu, and theColombian Self-Defense Forces,
(31:15):
the ACDE-GAM, were notorious fortheir extreme violence and
human right abuses, and also forhaving really sucky acronyms.
Anyway, these groups, funded bywealthy landowners, cattle
ranchers and businesses, as wellas by their own involvement in
drug trafficking, operated witha high degree of autonomy and
often acted with total impunity.
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The atrocities committed bythese paramilitary groups were
shocking in their brutality,recalling the worst days of La
Valencia.
Their methods of control andintimidation included massacres,
forced disappearances, tortureand assassination.
It is important to note thatparamilitary forces have stayed
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operational in Colombia to thisvery day in an almost
uninterrupted fashion, since thelate 1970s.
One of the most infamousexamples of paramilitary
brutality was the El SaladoMassacre of 2000.
Over the course of several days, auc paramilitaries brutally
killed more than 60 people inthe small village of El Salado
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in northern Colombia.
The attackers used machetes,guns and even torture to instill
fear in the population.
Survivors recounted horrifictales of violence, including
public executions and torture ofresidents accused of supporting
the guerrillas.
The paramilitaries raped women,mutilated bodies and forced
villagers to watch as theirfriends and family members were
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brutally murdered.
In another horrific incident,the Mapiripan Massacre of 1997
saw AUC paramilitaries killapproximately 49 people in the
town of Mapiripan.
The paramilitaries took controlof the town, systematically
torturing and killing residentsover several days.
Bodies were dismembered andthrown into the Guaviare River
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to prevent identification.
This massacre exposed theparamilitary's willingness to
use extreme violence to assertcontrol and instill terror.
And then there is the ChengueMassacre of 2001, which is yet
another example of theparamilitary's brutality.
Brutality, members of the AUConce again entered the village
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of Chengue in the department ofSucre and killed 27 villagers
using stones and machetes.
The paramilitaries accused thevillagers of collaborating with
FARC.
The massacre was marked by itsbarbarity, as victims were
brutally bitten to death infront of their neighbors and
family members.
The paramilitary's use of forcedisappearances also terrorized
communities.
Thousands of people wereabducted, never to be seen again
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.
The bodies of many of thesevictims were buried in
clandestine graves.
Their families left inperpetual uncertainty and grief.
Paramilitary groups alsoengaged in sexual violence as a
weapon of war.
Women and girls in paramilitarycontrol areas were frequently
subjected to rape and otherforms of sexual assault.
These acts of violence wereused to intimidate communities,
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punish those suspected ofdisloyalty and exert control
over populations.
Historian Michael Taussig, inhis book Law in a Lawless Land,
describes the paramilitary'srise.
The paramilitaries filled thevacuum left by the state's
failure.
Acting as both enforcers andprofiteers, their methods were
brutal and their impact on ruralcommunities devastating.
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They used terror to controlpopulations and eliminate
perceived threats.
The paramilitary's influenceextended beyond their military
operations.
Perceived threats.
The paramilitary's influenceextended beyond their military
operations.
They often formed allianceswith local politicians, security
forces and drug traffickers,creating a powerful network that
wielded significant economicand political power.
The lucrative drug trade, whichalso funded guerrilla
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activities, became a key sourceof income for paramilitary
groups.
They controlled drug productionand trafficking routes, further
entrenching their power andfueling conflict.
The relationship of theColombian government with
paramilitaries was complex andcontroversial.
While some elements within thegovernment and the military saw
the paramilitaries as usefulallies in their fight against
the guerrillas, their brutaltactics and involvement in drug
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trafficking created significantethical and legal challenges.
International human rightsorganizations have frequently
condemned the Colombiangovernment for its tacit support
or outright collusion withparamilitary forces.
Historians also point out thatparamilitaries operate in a gray
area, often enjoying theimplicit support of state actors
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who viewed them as a necessaryevil.
This unholy allianceperpetuated a cycle of violence
and impunity, underminingefforts to achieve an
everlasting peace.
As we conclude this episode, wesee that the rise of
paramilitary groups added adangerous new dimension to
Colombia's already volatileconflict.
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The brutality and power ofthese groups not only mirror,
but often surpass that of theguerrillas, leading to a new era
of violence and terror.
Their involvement in the drugtrade and alliances with
political and economic elitesfurther muddied the waters,
making peace and justice seemeven more distant.
But the story does not end here.
(36:29):
The intertwining of theColombian conflict with the
burgeoning drug trade would soongive rise to some of the most
infamous and powerful drugcartels the world has ever seen.
These cartels would transformthe nature of the conflict,
bringing new levels of violence,corruption and international
attention to Colombia.
Join us next time on DoubleHelix as we uncover the rise of
(36:54):
the drug cartels, their impacton the Colombian conflict and
the international efforts tocombat this new and formidable
threat.
Join us next time for Part 4 ofthe Colombian Confl the cocaine
wars, cartels and corruption.
Welcome to Double Helix Blueprint of Nations,
season 2, episode 1.3, guerrillaWarfare and the Iron Fist.
In our last episode, we coverthe second part of our journey
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through the Colombian conflictand its history.
We dove into the brutal periodknown as La Violencia, which I
just now realized.
I never said what it means inEnglish, but it should be pretty
self-explanatory it means theviolence.
It means the violence.
During this period, we exploredthe decade of violence and
terror that ripped throughColombia and, in its aftermath,
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the rise of the two primaryleft-wing guerrilla movements
that dominated Colombia for over50 years.
In this episode, we enter a newchapter in Colombia's history
the early stages of guerrillawarfare and the relentless
government efforts to suppressit.
We also begin to see theimpacts of the Cold War as it
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takes full effect on theconflict as it does begin to
settle from La Violencia.
In the late 1950s, thesocio-political landscape of
Colombia remained deeplyfractured.
While the power-sharingagreement known as the National
Front had temporarily stemmedthe bloodshed between liberal
and conservative parties, it didlittle to address the root
(01:30):
causes of the conflict.
Land inequality remained,poverty was still rampant and
political exclusion was stillthe standard practice of the
political class.
These unresolved issuescontinued to give Colombians
cause for rebellion anddiscontent, as we saw before.
In the early 1960s, colombiasaw the emergence of the
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guerrilla movements that wouldcome to define the country's
internal conflict for decades tocome.
Among these two groups hadstood out the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia, theFARC, and the National
Liberation Army, the ELN.
We discussed their ideologiesand the key players in their
founding in our last episode.
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The FARC and the ELN wouldbecome ubiquitous with the
Colombian armed conflict.
These guerrilla movements wouldspend nearly five decades at
the top of the heap of theColombian conflict, turning into
a defining characteristic ofthe Colombian conflict, turning
into a defining characteristicof the conflict in Colombia and,
in some respects, they woulddefine the image of Colombia to
itself and to the world.
(02:35):
As FARC and ELN solidified theirpresence in Colombia during the
1960s and early 1970s, thegovernment's response was a
critical determinant of thetrajectory of the country's
internal conflict.
The response of the Colombianstate was multifaceted.
It was, of course, violent andoften misguided, involving
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military initiatives andattempts at political reform to
address the insurgency'sgrievances, sometimes
successfully, sometimes not.
Finally, american involvementin setting the shape and pace of
the response embroiled Americainto a conflict that had been
nearly 100 years in the makingand would be a key feature of
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this early stage.
Facing an increasingly organizedand determined guerrilla
insurgency, by the mid-1960s thegovernment, with substantial
support from the United States,launched a series of aggressive
counterinsurgency operations.
The early phase of thisinvolvement had a name.
It was called Plan LASSO, orthe Latin American Security
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Operation, which was acomprehensive strategy designed
to crush the guerrilla movementsand reassert government control
over the countryside.
Plan Lasso was introduced in1962 as part of a broader United
States-backed effort to containthe spread of communism in
Latin America.
The plan was a direct responseto the recent successes of the
(04:03):
Cuban Revolution led by FidelCastro.
The plan aimed to neutralizeguerrilla activities through a
combination of military forceand civic action programs,
reflecting the dual approach ofcounterinsurgency tactics.
On the surface, the plan seemedsound.
The implementation, however,would leave a lot to be desired.
(04:24):
Sound, the implementation,however, would leave a lot to be
desired.
The plan involved extensivemilitary operations targeting
guerrilla strongholds.
The Colombian military, trainedand equipped by the United
States, launched coordinatedassaults on regions known to
harbor guerrilla fighters.
These operations includedaerial bombardments, ground
assaults and the establishmentof military bases and conflict
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zones, supported by US militaryaid, military advisors and
political advisors.
Through initiatives, colombianforces embarked on aggressive
counterinsurgency campaigns.
Historians note that the use ofAmerican military tactics,
including search and destroymissions, often did more harm
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than good, alienating the verypopulations the government
needed to win over.
These operations frequentlyinvolved aerial bombardments and
the use of napalm to targetsuspected guerrilla hideouts,
which historian Mark Bowdendescribes as tactics that
inevitably affected civilians,thereby driving a wedge further
between the populace and thegovernment.
(05:27):
The harsh military actionsoften resulted in significant
civilian casualties anddisplaced communities,
inadvertently serving asrecruitment tools for guerrilla
movements.
One of the early and notablemilitary actions under Plan
Lasso was Operation Marquetaliain 1964, targeting the early
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FARC stronghold in theMarquetalia region in the
central highlands of Colombia.
Although the operation aimed todecimate the FARC forces, it
inadvertently solidified theirresolve and helped them gain
greater support among the ruralpopulation.
Resolved and helped them gaingreater support among the rural
population, fully establishingthem as a force to be reckoned
with.
Historian Jorge Orlando Meloexplains that Marquetalia was
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marketed by the government as aredoubt of communism,
necessitating an aggressivestrike to uproot potential
insurgent threats.
Over 16,000 troops weredeployed to eliminate a few
hundred guerrillas, a moveintended to showcase the
government's resolve, but whichactually ended up showcasing its
incompetence andheavy-handedness.
(06:34):
At one point, madolanda wascornered by the army but managed
to escape the encirclement in alast-ditch effort.
Despite the military'snumerical superiority, the
guerrillas, adept in ruralguerrilla warfare, led by
seasoned leaders like ManuelMarulanda, managed not only to
survive but to use the siege asa rallying cry for further
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resistance.
Eyewitness and former guerrillamember, jose Gonzalez, later
recounted the government'soperation intended to destroy us
, but it ultimately forged usinto a unified force under the
FARC banner.
Alongside military efforts, planLazo included civic action
programs intended to win thehearts and minds of the rural
(07:18):
population.
This program sought to improveinfrastructure, provide social
services and offer economicincentives to undermine
guerrilla influence.
During Carlos Lleras Vestrepo'spresidency, from 1966 to 1970,
initiatives like the NationalAssociation of Peasant Workers,
anuc, which we mentioned lastepisode, sought to implement
(07:42):
agrarian reforms.
Last episode sought toimplement agrarian reforms.
However, as we said before,these reforms were often too
limited and met with stiffopposition from the landowning
elites.
You know, you would think that10 years of savage violence
would do the trick in convincingthe vast majority of a
population that it is time togive up some land so that what
(08:03):
just happened doesn't happenagain.
But yet they did not relent theopposition of political and
landed elites, undermined theeffectiveness of ANUK and
initiatives like it, leavingmany past grievances unaddressed
.
The half-hearted reforms failedto make substantial changes to
rural inequality, allowingguerrilla groups to continue
(08:25):
advocating for radical socialchange as an alternative to the
status quo.
Other projects sponsored byColombian administrations with
US backing in the 1960s includedbuilding schools, roads and
medical facilities, as well asoffering agricultural assistance
to improve local farmingpractices.
Hearts and minds kind of stuff.
(08:47):
However, the effectiveness ofthese programs was often limited
by corruption, mismanagementand the pervasive distrust of
the government among ruralcommunities.
And I mean they had reason to.
While doing hearts and mindscampaigns, the Colombian
government was bombing ruralfarmlands into oblivion.
The United States played acrucial role in supporting Plan
(09:10):
Lasso by providing training,equipment and logistical support
to the Colombian military.
Counterinsurgency techniquesdeveloped during the early
stages of the Vietnam War andother Cold War conflicts were
adapted for use in Colombia,emphasizing small unit tactics,
intelligence gathering.
And other Cold War conflictswere adapted for use in Colombia
, emphasizing small unit tactics, intelligence gathering and
psychological operations.
(09:31):
Despite the full court pressfrom the Colombian government
and the Americans, the guerrillamovements proved resilient the
rugged terrain of Colombia'scountryside.
Years of rebellion andinsurgency and the problems
endemic to Colombia proved toomuch.
The country provided idealconditions for guerrilla warfare
, and the deep-seated grievancesof the rural population ensured
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a steady stream of recruits forgroups like FARC and ELN.
As the conflict escalated, sodid the violence and the human
right abuses.
The Colombian military'saggressive tactics often
resulted in significant civiliancasualties and widespread human
right abuses.
Villages suspected of harboringguerrillas were frequently
(10:14):
subjected to collectivepunishment, including mass
arrest, torture andextrajudicial killings.
The feared paramilitary groupsof La Violencia began making a
comeback, ostensibly to defendagainst guerrilla activities,
but in practice bringingpunishment and retribution back
to the Colombian countryside.
We will have more to say on theguerrillas later on in this
(10:36):
episode and summary executionsbecame commonplace again,
further alienating the ruralpopulations from the government
and driving more people into thearms of the guerrilla movements
.
To be fair, the guerrillagroups employed their own brutal
tactics, including kidnapping,extortion and targeted
(10:57):
assassinations.
They attacked militaryinstallations, sabotaged
infrastructure and engage inhit-and-run attacks to weaken
the government's control andspread fear.
Both FARC and ELN increasinglyfinanced their operations
through criminal activities,including drug trafficking,
which provided them with theresources needed to sustain
(11:17):
their insurgency.
Despite receiving someideological support from
communist states.
Farc and ELN primarily fundedtheir activities to various
illegal enterprises.
As the conflict dragged on,these guerrilla groups turned to
more systematic methods ofgenerating revenue, which
significantly impacted theColombian social and economic
(11:40):
dynamics dynamics, I mean.
Imagine You're a poor farmer inthe hinterlands of Colombia,
miles and miles from any form ofgovernment control or help.
The only help you have is aguerrilla local commander who
offers you protection from theroaming bands of self-defense
forces and criminals.
In exchange for you to farm andproduce coca leaves or
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marijuana plantations, you getprotection, maybe a trickle of
money to get their drug rawmaterials.
In this way, drug traffickingbecame a major source of funding
for both FARC and ELN.
Initially, these groups taxedlocal coca farmers and cocaine
producers operating in theirterritories.
Over time, they became moredeeply involved in the drug
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trade, overseeing thecultivation, production and
distribution of cocaine.
Later, during the heyday of themajor drug cartels in Colombia,
the supply chain will besolidified, with the poor coca
farmer at the bottom, theguerrillas guarding and
transporting the raw materialsin the middle and the cartels
acting as the refining andguarding and transporting the
raw materials in the middle andthe cartels acting as the
refining and distribution arm atthe top.
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In our next episode, we willcover the advent of the cartels
and their role in the Colombianconflict.
The revenue generated from drugtrafficking allowed the
guerrillas to purchase weapons,recruit and train new members
and sustain their operations.
The lucrative nature of thedrug trade also incentivized the
expansion of their territorialcontrol into key coca-growing
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regions.
Kidnapping for ransom wasanother significant revenue
stream for FARC and ELN.
They targeted wealthyColombians, foreign nationals
and government officials,demanding substantial ransoms
for their release.
This tactic provided financialresources and served as a means
of exerting pressure on thegovernment and spreading fear
(13:33):
among the populace.
The practice of kidnappingbecame so pervasive that it led
to the creation of specializedanti-kidnapping units within the
Colombian military and policeforces.
It also gave Colombia areputation from which it has yet
to escape.
Additionally, both guerrillagroups imposed war taxes on
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businesses and landowners withintheir areas of influence.
Failure to pay these extortionfees often resulted in violent
reprisals, including thedestruction of property and
physical harm.
This method of extortionensured a steady flow of income
and reinforced their authorityin controlled territories.
The extortion network extendedto various sectors, including
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agriculture, mining andtransportation, embedding the
guerrilla groups deeply into theeconomic fabric of the regions
they controlled, and this is aproblem nowadays, because
decoupling between the guerrillaadministrative structure from
daily life is an extremelydifficult task.
Finally, in addition to drugtrafficking and extortion,
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illegal mining operations,particularly gold mining, became
a lucrative enterprise for FARCand ELN.
These groups controlled andtaxed mining activities,
exploiting the mineral wealth ofColombia's remote areas to fund
their insurgency.
The environmental and socialimpact of illegal mining was
devastating, causing significantecological damage and
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displacing local communities.
The extensive involvement inthese illegal activities funded
guerrilla movements, but alsoentrenched them deeply within
Colombia's rural economicstructures.
This dual role as bothinsurgents and criminal
enterprises complicated effortsto combat them and blurred the
lines between politicalrebellion and organized crime
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and outright governmentalstructure.
We mentioned that the Cold Warhad poured rocket fuel into the
already hypercharged Colombianconflict.
As such, the rise of guerrillaswas also not occurring in a
vacuum.
It was heavily influenced bythe broader context of the Cold
War.
The ideological battle betweenthe United States and the Soviet
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Union played out in Colombia,with each side supporting
factions aligned with theirrespective interests.
The United States viewed theColombian insurgency through the
lens of the Cold War and theglobal struggle against
communism.
As part of its containmentstrategy, the United States
provided substantial militaryand economic aid to the
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Colombian government, includingweapons training and advisors.
Of recent memory for Americanswas the successful Cuban
Revolution, which had justinstalled a communist
dictatorship just 90 miles fromUS shores, and preventing the
same sort of takeover in the farricher and more populous
(16:28):
Colombia was of paramountimportance to the US government.
As I said before, the US alsoplayed a role in shaping
Colombia's counterinsurgencystrategy, promoting a hardline
approach that prioritizedmilitary solutions over
political and social reforms.
Plan Lasso laid out the lengthsof American involvement in the
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early days of the conflict, withan increasingly unforgiving
tone as the quagmire of Vietnamunfolded elsewhere in the world.
Another US entity that played asignificant role in adding fuel
to the Colombian fire was ourold friends United Fruits
Company.
These guys were a piece of workand, before you get too
(17:10):
scandalized, I bet you dobusiness with them every single
time you go to the grocery storeand pick up some delicious
fruits.
You may know them by adifferent name Chiquita Brands
International.
More on them shortly.
On the other side, guerrillagroups like FARC and ELN
received ideological and in somecases, material support from
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communist states, including theSoviet Union and Cuba.
This support was often moresymbolic than substantial, but
it enforced the guerrillas'commitment to their
revolutionary cause andincreased concerns back in
Washington.
The Soviet Union and Cubaprovided ideological support by
promoting Marxist-Leninistdoctrines, which helped to
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solidify the politicalfoundations of the Colombian
guerrillas.
This ideological alignment withglobal communist movements gave
the guerrillas a broader senseof purpose and legitimacy,
positioning the struggle withinthe context of the worldwide
fight against imperialism andcapitalism.
Cuban influence wasparticularly significant.
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Following the Cuban Revolutionin 1959, cuba under Fidel Castro
became a beacon ofrevolutionary fervor for Latin
American insurgent groups.
The success of the CubanRevolution inspired Colombian
guerrillas to believe that asimilar uprising could succeed
in their own country.
Guerrillas to believe that asimilar uprising could succeed
(18:36):
in their own country.
Selected members of FARC and ELNwere sent to Cuba, and some to
the Soviet Union as well, toreceive military training, learn
guerrilla warfare tactics andstudy Marx's Leninist theory.
Cuban military advisorsoccasionally traveled to
Colombia to provide directtraining to guerrilla fighters.
This training included not onlycombat skills but also the
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organization and operation ofinsurgent cells, and while the
extent of material support fromthe Soviet Union and Cuba varied
over time, there were instanceswhere the guerrillas received
arms, ammunitions and othersupplies.
These resources were crucial insustaining prolonged
engagements with Colombianmilitary forces.
Cuba, in particular, was knownto have supplied small arms and
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other military equipment toguerrilla groups throughout
Latin America, includingColombia.
Both the Soviet Union and Cubaused their global influence to
support the Colombianguerrillas' cause on
international stage.
Through diplomatic channels andpropaganda efforts, they worked
to cast the Colombiangovernment in a negative light,
highlighting human rights abusesand framing the guerrillas'
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struggle as a legitimate fightfor social justice and
liberation.
International communistpublications and broadcasts
often feature storiessympathetic to the Colombian
guerrillas, helping to generateglobal awareness and support for
their cause.
Despite these supports, it isimportant to note that the
assistance from the Soviet Unionand Cuba was often more
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ideological and symbolic thansubstantial.
The primary burden ofsustaining the insurgency still
rested on the guerrillas andtheir ability to fund their
operations through local means,like we discussed before.
However, the ideological andoccasional material backing from
these communist states providedthe guerrillas with valuable
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resources and a broader contextto their struggle, reinforcing
their commitment to theirrevolutionary goal.
Their struggle reinforcingtheir commitment to their
revolutionary goal.
Additionally, the conflict ledto the displacement of hundreds
of thousands of Colombians, asrural communities fled the
violence and sought refuge inurban areas or neighboring
countries.
La violencia began this trend,and the rise of the guerrillas
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made it worse.
This mass displacementdisrupted traditional social
structures and created newchallenges for cities unprepared
to accommodate the influx ofrefugees.
The ongoing conflict disruptedeconomic activities as well,
particularly in the same ruralareas that had been hurt by
displacement, leading toincreased poverty and hardship.
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The destruction ofinfrastructure and agricultural
lands further exacerbated theeconomic woes of the rural
population.
Entire villages were oftenforced to flee their homes to
escape the fighting.
For instance, in the 1990s, theFARC's aggressive territorial
expansion and clashes withparamilitary forces and
government forces caused massivedisplacement in regions like
(21:33):
the Meta and Caquetá.
Families abandoned their farmsand belongings, seeking refuge
in overcrowded urban areas ormakeshift camps.
As the conflict intensified,the guerrilla movements in
Colombia adopted increasinglysophisticated strategies to
expand their influence andcontrol over vast territories.
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The FARC and ELN, thoughdifferent in their origins and
ideologies, both sought toundermine the government's
authority and build their ownparallel structures of power.
The FARC utilized a mix ofmilitary and political
strategies to assert itsdominance.
They operated in small mobileunits capable of executing
hit-and-run attacks ongovernment forces and
infrastructure.
Ambushes, sabotage andassassinations were common
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tactics aimed at destabilizinggovernment control and creating
an environment of fear anduncertainty.
To build support among therural population, the FARC
implemented social programs inareas under their control
population.
The FARC implemented socialprograms in areas under their
control.
They provided basic servicessuch as health care, education
and agricultural assistance,which the government often
(22:41):
failed to deliver.
This dual approach of coercionand provision helped the FARC
establish a semblance ofgovernance and gain legitimacy
in the eyes of many ruralColombians.
And gain legitimacy in the eyesof many rural Colombians.
The ELN, inspired by the CubanRevolution, placed a strong
emphasis on political educationand community organization.
They aimed to create arevolutionary consciousness
(23:03):
among the rural poor, viewingtheir struggle as part of a
broader fight againstimperialism and capitalism.
The ELN's tactics included notonly armed attacks, but also
efforts to disrupt the economicactivities of multinational
corporations, particularly inthe oil industry.
They frequently bombedpipelines and kidnapped foreign
(23:24):
oil workers to draw attention totheir cause and exert economic
pressure on the government.
Both guerrilla groups sought toexpand their territorial
control by establishingliberated zones where they could
operate with relative freedom.
These areas could serve asbases for launching attacks,
training recruits andadministering their own form of
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governance.
The FARC strongholds wereprimarily located in the
southern and eastern regions ofColombia, including areas like
Meta, caquetá and Guaviare.
These regions, characterized bydense jungles and remote
landscapes, provided idealconditions for guerrilla warfare
.
The FARC's control over theseterritories allowed them to
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cultivate coca and engage indrug trafficking, which became a
major source of funding fortheir operations.
Meanwhile, the ELN establishedits presence in the northern
regions, particularly in areasrich in natural resources like
Arauca and the Norte deSantander.
By targeting the oil industry,the ELN aimed to disrupt one of
(24:27):
the government's key economicsectors and highlight the
exploitation of Colombia'snatural resources by foreign
corporations.
Furthermore, guerrilla tacticsoften involved the destruction
of infrastructure to disruptgovernment control and economic
activities.
Bridges, roads and utilitieswere frequently targeted,
(24:47):
isolating rural communities andmaking it difficult for
residents to access markets,health care and education.
For example, the ELN was knownfor bombing oil pipelines and
electricity towers, leavingcommunities without power and
severely hindering localeconomies.
The conflict disruptedagricultural production as well,
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which was the primarylivelihood for many rural
Colombians.
Fields were often abandoned dueto the threat of violence, and
landmines planted by guerrillagroups made it dangerous to
cultivate the land.
In areas like Antioquia andBolívar, farmers faced severe
economic hardship as crops wentunharvested and livestock was
lost.
The inability to farm safelypushed many into poverty and
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forced some to join the ranks ofinternally displaced persons.
The forced recruitment of youngmen and women by guerrilla
groups furthered the stabilizedrural communities.
These groups often targetedteenagers and young adults,
coercing them into joining theirranks under the threat of
violence.
This practiced deprivedfamilies of their members and
(25:53):
also instilled fear in thecommunity.
Finally, the conflict's impactextended beyond immediate
physical harm and displacement.
Of course, the social fabric ofrural communities was deeply
affected as trust eroded andpeople became wary of strangers
and even neighbors.
The pervasive atmosphere offear and suspicion made it
difficult for communities torebuild and recover from the
(26:14):
trauma.
The guerrillas' control overcertain areas also meant that
civilians had to navigate acomplex and dangerous political
landscape, often caught betweenthe demands of guerrilla forces
and the punitive actions of thegovernment and paramilitaries.
As we said before, the earlygovernment responses to rising
guerrilla movement wasineffective at best, but
(26:36):
increasingly it became moreviolent and forceful as
government frustration grew.
Dual approach of appliedmilitary force, while only
tentatively addressing theunderlying issues, set the stage
for enduring and complexconflict that we have today.
As historian Malcolm Deeseobserves, this period laid the
groundwork for the prolongedstruggle, embedding patterns of
(26:57):
violence and resistance thatwould characterize Colombian
politics for decades to come.
As the guerrillas expandedtheir influence and control over
more territories into the 1970s, new left-wing movements also
began to emerge.
One notable group was the M-19,or 19th of April Movement,
(27:18):
which traced its origins to theallegedly fraudulent
presidential election of April19, 1970.
Unlike the rural-based FARC andELN, m-19 operated primarily as
an urban guerrilla andterrorist organization carrying
out high-profile actions incities.
There are lots of actions thatM-19 took on.
(27:39):
They were often flashy andbombastic, like stealing the
sword of the liberator SimonBolivar, but we are going to
skip over the majority of thosefor now.
The effectiveness of thoseactions was questionable at best
.
So if you are keeping track ofall the sides in the conflict,
we are about to introduce one ofthe worst.
(27:59):
In response to the growing powerof the guerrilla groups, a new
force entered the Colombianconflict the paramilitaries.
Funded and organized by wealthylandowners, cattle ranchers and
business interests.
Paramilitary groups wereinitially formed to counter
guerrillas.
However, their methods quicklybecame even more brutal and
(28:19):
ruthless than those of theguerrillas.
The rise of paramilitary groupsadded a new and terrifying
dimension to the already complexand violent landscape of
Colombia, as they sought toeliminate any perceived threat
to their power with extremeviolence and impunity.
I certainly think this guiseturned out to be worse than the
guerrillas that they wereestablished to fight, and you
(28:40):
will hear why.
As the Colombian governmentintensified its efforts to crush
the guerrilla insurgencies ofFARC and ELN, paramilitary
groups emerged as theenforcement mechanism of the
government's will and theinterest of powerful entities
within Colombia.
One such interest was ourfriends from before, the United
Fruit Company.
United Fruit played asubstantial role in funding and
(29:05):
establishing early paramilitarygroups in Colombia to protect
its investments, often with thetacit or explicit support of the
US government.
In fact, united Fruit and itssubsidiary companies, like
Chiquita Brands, were foundliable for killings committed by
paramilitary forces in Colombiafrom 1997 to 2004.
(29:27):
Forces in Colombia from 1997 to2004.
This is after thoseorganizations were labeled
organizations sponsored ofterrorism by the United States
government because they fundedthem.
Oh, and did you know thatUnited Fruits was also involved
in a plot to overthrow thegovernment of Guatemala in 1954?
And also, don't forget thebanana massacred of 1928 in
(29:49):
Colombia, which pretty much gotthe whole thing started.
Like I said, these guys werepieces of work.
I guess an argument could bemade that United Fruits Company
is responsible for the entiremodern conflict in Colombia,
with the start of the 1928massacre.
But hey, we have fresh fruit atthe supermarket.
(30:11):
Anyway, these paramilitarygroups acted with brutal
efficiency, targeting not onlyguerrilla fighters but also
civilians suspected ofsympathizing with the insurgents
.
Their rise marked a new andterrifying phase in the
Colombian conflict, as theyengaged in widespread human
right abuses and extremeviolence to assert control and
eliminate any perceived threats.
(30:32):
The involvement of corporateand foreign interests further
complicated the conflict,entrenching a cycle of violence
and impunity that would plagueColombia for decades.
The Colombian government wasstruggling to maintain control
and to combat thewell-entrenched guerrilla forces
, and found itself in adifficult position.
The military's heavy-handedtactics had not only failed to
(30:54):
eradicate the guerrilla threat,but had also alienated large
segments of the population andattracted international
criticism.
Paramilitary groups such as theUnited Self-Defense Forces of
Colombia, the AUC, the PeasantSelf-Defense Forces of Córdoba
and Urabá, accu, and theColombian Self-Defense Forces,
(31:15):
the ACDE-GAM, were notorious fortheir extreme violence and
human right abuses, and also forhaving really sucky acronyms.
Anyway, these groups, funded bywealthy landowners, cattle
ranchers and businesses, as wellas by their own involvement in
drug trafficking, operated witha high degree of autonomy and
often acted with total impunity.
(31:37):
The atrocities committed bythese paramilitary groups were
shocking in their brutality,recalling the worst days of La
Valencia.
Their methods of control andintimidation included massacres,
forced disappearances, tortureand assassination.
It is important to note thatparamilitary forces have stayed
(31:57):
operational in Colombia to thisvery day in an almost
uninterrupted fashion, since thelate 1970s.
One of the most infamousexamples of paramilitary
brutality was the El SaladoMassacre of 2000.
Over the course of several days, auc paramilitaries brutally
killed more than 60 people inthe small village of El Salado
(32:19):
in northern Colombia.
The attackers used machetes,guns and even torture to instill
fear in the population.
Survivors recounted horrifictales of violence, including
public executions and torture ofresidents accused of supporting
the guerrillas.
The paramilitaries raped women,mutilated bodies and forced
villagers to watch as theirfriends and family members were
(32:42):
brutally murdered.
In another horrific incident,the Mapiripan Massacre of 1997
saw AUC paramilitaries killapproximately 49 people in the
town of Mapiripan.
The paramilitaries took controlof the town, systematically
torturing and killing residentsover several days.
Bodies were dismembered andthrown into the Guaviare River
(33:07):
to prevent identification.
This massacre exposed theparamilitary's willingness to
use extreme violence to assertcontrol and instill terror.
And then there is the ChengueMassacre of 2001, which is yet
another example of theparamilitary's brutality.
Brutality, members of the AUConce again entered the village
(33:31):
of Chengue in the department ofSucre and killed 27 villagers
using stones and machetes.
The paramilitaries accused thevillagers of collaborating with
FARC.
The massacre was marked by itsbarbarity, as victims were
brutally bitten to death infront of their neighbors and
family members.
The paramilitary's use of forcedisappearances also terrorized
communities.
Thousands of people wereabducted, never to be seen again
(33:53):
.
The bodies of many of thesevictims were buried in
clandestine graves.
Their families left inperpetual uncertainty and grief.
Paramilitary groups alsoengaged in sexual violence as a
weapon of war.
Women and girls in paramilitarycontrol areas were frequently
subjected to rape and otherforms of sexual assault.
These acts of violence wereused to intimidate communities,
(34:17):
punish those suspected ofdisloyalty and exert control
over populations.
Historian Michael Taussig, inhis book Law in a Lawless Land,
describes the paramilitary'srise.
The paramilitaries filled thevacuum left by the state's
failure.
Acting as both enforcers andprofiteers, their methods were
brutal and their impact on ruralcommunities devastating.
(34:39):
They used terror to controlpopulations and eliminate
perceived threats.
The paramilitary's influenceextended beyond their military
operations.
Perceived threats.
The paramilitary's influenceextended beyond their military
operations.
They often formed allianceswith local politicians, security
forces and drug traffickers,creating a powerful network that
wielded significant economicand political power.
The lucrative drug trade, whichalso funded guerrilla
(35:04):
activities, became a key sourceof income for paramilitary
groups.
They controlled drug productionand trafficking routes, further
entrenching their power andfueling conflict.
The relationship of theColombian government with
paramilitaries was complex andcontroversial.
While some elements within thegovernment and the military saw
the paramilitaries as usefulallies in their fight against
the guerrillas, their brutaltactics and involvement in drug
(35:26):
trafficking created significantethical and legal challenges.
International human rightsorganizations have frequently
condemned the Colombiangovernment for its tacit support
or outright collusion withparamilitary forces.
Historians also point out thatparamilitaries operate in a gray
area, often enjoying theimplicit support of state actors
(35:48):
who viewed them as a necessaryevil.
This unholy allianceperpetuated a cycle of violence
and impunity, underminingefforts to achieve an
everlasting peace.
As we conclude this episode, wesee that the rise of
paramilitary groups added adangerous new dimension to
Colombia's already volatileconflict.
(36:09):
The brutality and power ofthese groups not only mirror,
but often surpass that of theguerrillas, leading to a new era
of violence and terror.
Their involvement in the drugtrade and alliances with
political and economic elitesfurther muddied the waters,
making peace and justice seemeven more distant.
But the story does not end here.
(36:29):
The intertwining of theColombian conflict with the
burgeoning drug trade would soongive rise to some of the most
infamous and powerful drugcartels the world has ever seen.
These cartels would transformthe nature of the conflict,
bringing new levels of violence,corruption and international
attention to Colombia.
Join us next time on DoubleHelix as we uncover the rise of
(36:54):
the drug cartels, their impacton the Colombian conflict and
the international efforts tocombat this new and formidable
threat.
Join us next time for Part 4 ofthe Colombian Confl the cocaine
wars, cartels and corruption.
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