The newsletter vs. the high-ticket coaching model. Why Conor Lynch, who helped build a $50 million publishing business is making the switch.

Episode Transcript
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John Newtson (00:02):
All right, hey everybody, today we're going to
be talking about something thatI think is a little bit
different and a little bitinteresting.
I got Connor Lynch here with meand, as all of you know, connor
was the publisher of a groupthat went from zero to about 50
million really, really fast.
And then they had someregulatory issues and you know,

(00:23):
connor's moved on to otherthings and he's launching a new
company.
What I think is fascinating isthat what Connor originally did
with his business was somethingthat's very, very, um,
understandable to most peoplewho have a newsletter publishing
business, right, um, you havefront end products to multiple
backend products, the pricepoints are things you're all
familiar with and things likethat.
But now, after having built a$15 million company, he's

(00:47):
launching something new and he'snot going to take that approach
at all, and I think he's goingto do a different business model
that is better math, better forthis current environment and
has a higher likelihood ofreaching bigger numbers faster
than kind of the traditionalmodel that we think of a
front-end newsletter product toback-end newsletter product, and

(01:10):
so that's what we're going tobe talking about today is what
this model is, why he chose togo this route versus what worked
before for him and kind of diginto the details.
So, connor, thanks for beinghere.

Conor Lynch (01:22):
Absolutely.
I love these, so excited todive in.

All right.
So let's start with kind oflet's go back to WealthPress and
kind of do a review of whatthat approach was in terms of
because what we're about to talkabout here is a difference in
marketing and sales model and adifference in product model, and
then with that comes adifference in copy model.
So let's go ahead and just kindof go back and look at like

(01:49):
what was the basic businessmodel, product model of
WealthPress when you launched?

Yeah, absolutely so .
When we first launched, wedidn't actually have any front
ends to start.
We had a collection of backendoffers and we introduced front
ends because that's theacquisition model that everyone
in the space was using you runpeople to something low priced,
under a hundred bucks, youconvert them and then you sell
backends to those people.
Now we started doing that andwe had a limited level of

(02:21):
success and that was the sort offirst year of our growth.
And again, it was a traditionalmodel.
We would do lead gen to a frontend and then we would sell not
just to the front end buyers, wewould sell to the entire lead
pool back ends which some pubsat different points in the
history of the industry didn'teven do.

(02:41):
That they would sell back endsonly to front end buyers.
I mean, even in the last fiveyears I've heard people say that
they do that still, which blowsmy mind, because they didn't
think you could sell a backenddirectly to a free lead, much
less to cold traffic.
When we achieved our bigbreakthrough, part of it
happened on the copy side, withthe Blitz promo that Kyle

(03:03):
Milligan wrote, but the biggerreason why that was a
breakthrough for us was becausewe went up the value and price
scale and we did that toexternal.
So Blitz was, I think it was a$2,300 product and we sold that
directly to cold traffic and Iremember at the time everyone
would tell me that that can'twork and it won't work.

(03:25):
I had pretty sophisticatedmedia buyers saying like, if it
is working for a bit it's just afluke.
But we got that one to work.
We did probably $5 million ofexternal sales on that offer and
realized that you could sellthose backends directly to cold
traffic.
Now, that said, our model afterthat was very, very similar to

(03:48):
what everybody else was doing,which is selling a basket of
similar backends, differentstrategies, different big ideas
to that audience.
So an individual franchisemight have three to five backend
services and you wereconstantly in a cycle of killing
services that you know weren'tgetting a lot of interest,

(04:11):
launching new ones, having towrite a huge volume of copy
across all of those differentpromotions, support all of those
different services from afulfillment perspective which is
manpower intensive.
And so in that sense, theWealthPress model beyond the
acquisition step was prettyfamiliar to everybody in the

(04:31):
space.
It would look the same as whatback-end monetization would look
like for any of the Agoraaffiliates, and a lot of that we
learned from working with BrettHolmes holmes, for example.
He was an early consultant withus who kind of taught us that
model.
So we we built it that way.
Our acquisition model wastotally different.
It was a bit innovative, buteverything after that was what

(04:54):
the whole industry essentiallyhas been doing for years and
years and years and years, whichis you have a lead pool, some
of whom are buyers, some of whomare non-buyers, and you're
marketing two thousand dollarproducts, one thousand to like,
twenty2,500 products to thosepeople, and each franchise has
to have a catalog of these towork.
You can't make a franchise workon a single offer.
So that's how we did it atWealthpress, and even leaving

(05:18):
aside the regulatory issues thatI mean but at this point
everybody knows that story, sowe won't dive into that one
again.
Leaving aside that for a second,we hit other headwinds over
that period that would havecaused a significant trouble,
even if, even leaving aside theFTC, the media costs everyone's
noticed this media costs acrossthe industry have exploded.

(05:40):
Tracking is worse, so thequality of the, of the traffic
that you're getting in, isn't asgood as it could have been in
the past.
The propensity for people tobuy some of these backends, at
least over the last year and ahalf two years, has not been
what it was, I mean even beforethe 2000 boom.
So the model as it stands now,especially with increased media

(06:05):
costs, it just it's tighter,it's a lot harder to make it
work, which puts more demand oncopy, uh to to really hit above
its weight class, which isadmittedly somewhat harder with
intense, much more intenseregulatory scrutiny.
So you've got this model that'sbeing squeezed from basically
all sides and everyone's stilltrying to make that model work.

(06:27):
Well, I wouldn't say everyone.
There's a few people who aredoing what I'm sort of proposing
to do, who have already made ita success.
So I'm not exactly a fullpioneer in that sense.
But the existing model is underintense pressure and I mean the
interesting thing to me is Idon't think it really has to be
pressure.
And I mean the interestingthing to me is I don't think it
really has to be.

(06:48):
If you look at every otherniche outside of financial
publishing, even what's isolatedto just the other make money
niches, real estate, investing,biz, op, career, op, spaces,
things like that, make moneyonline they've all shifted to a
model that downplays sellingfront ends of any kind.
Many of these businesses haveno front end, nothing for sale

(07:12):
even under a $5,000 price point,and they go direct to a sale at
$5,000 or higher and haveproducts that range in price up
to $50,000, sometimes $100,000.
And our space has been kind ofthe last to adopt a lot of
marketing innovations.

We've seen that with the VSL, with webinars,
with the product launchstructure, and so it's not
surprising that our space is thelast to kind of move to make
this transition, as well, Ialways laugh when I hear people
who are like talking about acompany in our space that
innovated some big thing and youand you're like right, really
disconnected from the rest ofthe marketing community, because

(07:48):
really everything you've listedis very much something that
happened first, with possiblypossibly the exception of, like
the e-letter yeah well, otherthan that guys like like sam
ovens had been doing this, thisformula of high-ticket telesales
thing for what 10 years andsold his business like three or
four years ago, so he had thefull career of this before we

(08:11):
even discovered it as a niche.
You have some people like Zachand Tim who've built a business
around a telesales model, andthat's kind of what we're going
to talk about here is thedifference in building a
telesales-focused marketingfunnel on the front than a

(08:33):
product front-end to back-end,and how this really pulls
through every aspect of yourbusiness.
It has a very differentexperience as a business owner
of the business.
There are issues, there arelimitations in terms of where it
could possibly go, but I thinkthat the limitations on it are

(08:55):
much higher than people mightexpect, and so, yeah, sorry to
interject that there, but no, no.

Those are good points.
Where do you think we shouldtake the conversation next?

Well, I think the thing is is that what I really
want to highlight here in thefront is that there is an
existing acquisition marketingfunnel model, right, that then
pulls through, like when wethink of a direct response
business.
Right, a direct responsebusiness is built around an
acquisition model, fundamentallybecause you are going that is

(09:28):
the customer generation.
Right, you're not a retailbusiness that is relying on foot
traffic.
You're not doing like all youradvertising and all of your
marketing is essentially, how doyou proactively go out and find
customers, bring them in andsell them more stuff?
And so the business is like wetalk about publishing, but it is

(09:49):
first and foremost a directresponse marketing business.
That's like the info pubbusiness.
And there are unique things tofinancial, for sure, but I think
sometimes we've spent a lot oftime focusing on those unique
things and we need to step backsometimes and be like wait a
second.
This is info marketing in thesense of direct response
marketing and with that, yourchoice of acquisition model kind

(10:14):
of determines your structure inyour business.
And that means like yourproduct model.
In some product models like, Iwould say, the current
newsletter product model is very, very, very copy intense
because you have a constant needof promotions.
Um uh, it's very, very um likethe new ideas constantly, um,

(10:34):
the products you're in order toexpand, like each product, like
however good your business is atacquiring customers and
bringing them in, you kind ofhave a limitation on the size of
any particular product.
You'll have an average size ofwhat a good product is in your
business, and bigger companieshave a bigger average size, but
a smaller company will have asmaller average size, and so

(10:56):
then, in order to grow, you needto then add more product, which
puts more work on both youreditorial teams, your production
teams, your copy teams.
You have to find new gurus,maybe you have to add more
products, and then you have thisconstant kind of churn on your
product model as well as, kindof on your customer base,
because products work and theydon't work, and so one of the

(11:16):
very normal things in thebusiness is this idea that you
have to close a couple ofproducts every year in order to
relaunch a new thing, becausethe new products are the things
that are most profitable, whichis entirely a different type of
experience than what we're goingto talk about next.

Yeah, absolutely.
And if you think about it for asecond before talking about
what comes next, that wholemodel of launching, supporting
and then killing services overtime is so problematic across
multiple dimensions.
One just in terms of theinternal resources the cost to
support that is extremelyexpensive.

(11:55):
You need copy for each of thoseoffers.
You need an editorial supportstaff for each of those offers.
There's a customer support costto maintain each of those
offers.
There's a customer support costto maintain each of those
offers.
I mean, anyone who's workedwith a guru who has to support
five different offers knows thatit strains the guru and it
means that their fulfillmentacross the basket of stuff that

(12:15):
they're doing is probably not asgood as it would be if it was
focused on one thing or one ortwo things.
So that's the internal supportcost side.
Then the fact that you'reconstantly killing offers that
people got excited about andpurchased.
Sometimes if you launch a newproduct in some cases and it
bombs completely and they're notable to figure out a way to

(12:37):
sell it within six months, thatthing might not even survive a
year.
So someone got excited, spentreal money, got into the service
, was trading it.
Maybe they enjoy it, maybe not,who knows, but they were
excited at one point and theygot in, and now, six months
later, they're killed andthey're being moved over to some
other offer that they weren'tnecessarily enthusiastic about,
and so that's a bad customerexperience.
It's also not a great customerexperience in the sense that

(13:01):
people come in, they want to getproximity with the guru that's
a big thing that we know isattractive to the customer base
and they find out that they haveto buy like 12 things in order
to do that Also not a greatcustomer experience.
Whereas you could get them tospend the same average amount of
money on a single offer andhave them be thrilled to do it,

(13:22):
as opposed to being like fuck,another offer I have to purchase
.
And.
And have them be thrilled to doit, as opposed to being like
fuck, another offer I have topurchase.
Um then the third dimensionwhere it's like really not ideal
is on the regulatory side.
Like, if you're constantlykilling offers, the perspective
on the part of a regulator isgoing to be like well, how, how
legitimate can these services beif you're constantly killing
them?
So it it's.
It's bad for a number ofreasons beyond just the

(13:46):
economics, right right andthere's a lot there with that.

And then one of the things that I remember, like
it was a frame that PorterStansbury put forward in 2005, I
think it was when there was abig kind of Agora marketing
conference.
And he got up there and he'slike there is no Agora model
because we're all differentbusinesses and this is I'm gonna
tell you my view of things.

(14:11):
And he's like I don't thinkyou're paying attention to me.
If you subscribe to a freebieletter, like you opted in, you
were interested, but you're notreally listening.
And so he talks to hisAscension model and he goes
through like you know the frontend product, okay, you're paying
attention a little bit, but notreally, you're not really
listening.
And he goes up and it's notuntil you get to that $25,000
Atlas Club that he's like I haveyour attention, you're really

(14:33):
paying attention to what we'redoing, you're really engaged in
the business, like that's mycustomer.
And so there's this really coolperspective he had on the
business was essentially whatall of us know is that the front
end product exists to do twothings right.
Normally it's there to subsidizethe media costs to acquire a
customer and to identify whothat paying customer is so that

(14:55):
you can sell the higher priceproducts, because someone who's
going to put some money out islikely to put more money out,
and so that's the initialpurpose of the front end product
.
In terms of just the marketingmath not like part of that is
building a relationship is hugethere, and that's why the front
end product has to be amazing,because you have to build a
great relationship in order tobe able to keep them.
But what he was saying was morethat the perspective is like.

(15:17):
My real business is having asystem to find that $25,000
buyer right, and that view onthe business is, I think, a
little bit different than a lotof people have, because we don't
think about it as much is thatthe lower price products are
there to find the really greatbuyers, the hyper buyers, at the

(15:38):
higher price point, and if youhave a model that can identify
that guy at a cheaper cost moreeffectively with less work,
maybe that's something that'sworth exploring and that's kind
of where we're going to go herenext.

That's a really great perspective and I think
that that is sort of thetransition that I've made in
terms of my thinking.
But also a number of other pubsin the space have done the idea
that there is a core customeryou're looking for.
They spend a lot of money.
You want to create a very highlevel, very expensive core

(16:11):
customer experience for them.
Now how do you find someone tobuy that?
Now you could sell 500,000front ends and then sell those
people some $2,000 back ends andthen sell those people into an
alliance program or somethingakin to that.
But it turns out you don't haveto do all those things.
You can actually find people,relatively cold, who are willing

(16:33):
to make that higher ticketcommitment almost right off the
hop.
And I think that goes back toagain that parallel with
WealthPress where people didn'tthink that people would spend
$2,000 off the hop from cold to40 minutes later they've given
you two grand.
Well, they will.
We know that they will, and soI think a lot of pubs still

(16:54):
think that people won'tnecessarily come in and spend
that kind of money within a weekof knowing you $5,000, $6,000,
$7,000 within a week of knowingyou.
But the reality is they willand we see it in these other
niches.
We see it with a few exampleswithin our niche Tim Sykes, for
example, and Zach.
That's the number one example.

(17:14):
But there are other pubs doingit Stock Navigators they've got
a pretty decent size businessdoing this.
I saw Funnel today, prosperprosper trading.

They've got a funnel that does exactly this
now they've been doing thisversion that prospers, new
inversion of this for 20 years.

Well, there you go so it's um, it definitely does
work, and it's working in nicheslike make money online where,
frankly, people are a lot poorerthan in our niche.
The reality is people have alot of money to spend on
financial information.
If you look at the skew ofpeople within our audience and

(17:57):
how much money they have toinvest and how valuable good
information, good insight, goodintelligenceences for those
people it's extremely power lawconcentrated.
So you have this chunk ofpeople who, for them, $5,000 is
amazing value to be able to getthe right investment advice.

And well, it's not investment advice, right,
investment research information.
I think this is interestingbecause this is like there is
this continuum of education toadvice, right, yeah, and it's
where you kind of place theproduct on the continuum.
We should get into that, Ithink, a little bit later here,
yeah, but first let's just laythis out, because what I want to

(18:38):
do is like, let's, let's layout what the what the model is,
um for people, and then I wantto talk through through a few
things on it.
One is the idea of therelationship building that you
do with the customer.
Two, the copy model.
That is most effective here,why I think it's so effective
and I think I'd like to get yourtake on that.
And then also how this changesthe acquisition math.

(19:04):
And then, finally, how thisaffects the staffing issues
around running a business here.
And I think those four areasare pretty much where this gets
really, really interesting.
And so why don't you go aheadand describe what the model

(19:27):
looks like?
Sure, why don't?

you go ahead and describe what the model looks
like.
Sure, so the way the model kindof works is you're buying cold
media into a short lead capturepage with, typically, to do it
well, you want a really reallyhigh quality lead magnet, like
something that would be morevaluable, higher perceived value
than what people would normallyexpect to find on a lead

(19:51):
capture page.
And I'll explain why in just asecond.
Because you're using the leadmagnet in more ways than just at
the lead capture step.
So someone will opt in, they'llland on a page where there's a
video between sort of 10 and 30minutes in length.
Most of them kind of landaround 20 minutes, and the
purpose of this video is acouple of things.
I mean, the final call toaction you're getting here is

(20:13):
not for them to buy the program,but for them to complete a
qualifying survey and schedule aphone call with a phone sales
rep.
Now the reason that you want tohave a really really high
perceived value giveaway on thelead capture step is in the
opening of the video.
You're using that in anotherway.
You're not immediately givingthat lead magnet out in an email

(20:35):
fulfillment.
As soon as they opt in, theyland in the video there's the
opening promise of the lead.
However, you're opening it andthen you're telling them, if
they watch through to the end ofthe video, they'll get
instructions on how to claimtheir lead magnet.
They watch through the promostructure We'll get a little bit
more into promo structure in asecond and how to claim their
lead magnet.
They watch through the promostructure We'll get a little bit
more into promo structure in asecond and how the copy works a
little bit differently.

(20:55):
Towards the end, in the call toaction for them to schedule the
call, they're told hey, when youget on the call, we're going to
evaluate to see if you're fitup for the program, but we're
also going to give you this freelead magnet.
So that's how you collect it.
So that's how you collect it,so that and so that, that.
So that's the reason you wantsomething very high quality,
high perceived value, becauseit's not just for capturing the
lead, it's to get them to watchthe video and to get them to

(21:18):
schedule and then show up forthe for the call.
Okay, and then it's close.
And so, in terms of economicsor through economics a little
bit, actually, yeah, typicallyyou're trying to get a CPL
somewhere in the $5 to $15 range.
You want to get somewhere like5% to 10% of the viewers of
leads, basically to complete thesurvey and schedule a call.

And then you're hoping for like 30% to 50% show
up rate and 25% close rate onthe call itself, right, okay, so
it's basically a veryqualifying opt-in page to a
video that's selling the ideaand the conception of your sales
call on the program.
So you're selling a big idea ofthe program essentially, but
you're not closing them.
You're trying to get basicallyjust it's almost like with a

(22:06):
normal lead gen funnel.
There's this issue of friction,right, like that always uses a
measure.
So more friction is morequalifying, less friction.
You get more people to opt inand friction is more things they
have to do, more things theyhave to consume, and every time
they consume something and keepgoing, they are more and more
qualified.
And then so it's kind of likethe simplest version of this is

(22:29):
there a link above the fold inthe email or a link below the
fold in the email, right Likethere's more intent on the.
If someone had to scroll down,they actually were paying
attention more theoretically toclick on it.
Same thing with opt-in, likeopt-in to get this thing versus
just click here to see it.
Like the person who opted in toget something had to go through
a higher level of friction toget it.

(22:49):
So they are therefore morequalified, they're more
interested, they're payingattention a little bit more than
the person on average who justclicked through.
And so here you have clickthrough to video.
You're going to lose a lot ofpeople.
I'm imagining here who will notschedule a phone call.
Yeah Right, because that's avery high friction step.

So the person who 90 to 95% you lose.

Right.
So there's a very large numberof those people who will be gone
, but the people who do schedulethe phone call are
extraordinarily interested inthis, which speaks to one thing
that we do know in this businessis there's a lot of price
elasticity and that sometimesyou'll have a bit.
You'll have a product twothousand dollars.

(23:32):
It's not converting super well,so you'll make the thing oh,
I'm gonna drop it down to ahundred dollars or two.
You know.
You know, cut the price downand you don't really get that
much more.
You get a bonus of people, butit's not that many more to make
it worthwhile the reality is,the people who were interested
in it were willing to pay waymore, but there's not as many
people interested in it.
Um, yeah, and that's whatyou're looking for is those

(23:53):
people here who are superinterested in this program
because they're willing to geton a phone call to get this lead
magnet and go through this veryhigh friction process to what
they probably know is a salescall.
They kind of get that um inorder to um, continue, continue
down this path because they'reso interested, and so from that

(24:15):
then, do you do anything withthe loss leads?

Yeah, so you do Typically.
So I'm working with a guy whohas built a lot of these funnels
and niches outside of financial.
He's not experienced in thefinancial publishing space, but
literally every other niche thatruns this funnel structure like
.
He's built these for Frank Kerrand he ran this program

(24:42):
internally at GKIC for DanKennedy.
He said that typically whenthey roll one of these funnels
you don't really think about theemail follow ups or setters or
any of those pieces at first.
You want the economics to workliterally on first run through
the thing and if it's notworking there then you probably
have to go back to the drawingboard.
But then once that is workingthere's a lot you can do with

(25:05):
those names Because again thereare some people who are not
ready to spend five or sixthousand dollars right off the
top.
So there there's typically asequence that they build that
that runs over about 30 days,that that tries to sweep more of
that audience in.
Some people do things like try,like try to sell a qualifying
front end to then push them intoit, but not as the initial

(25:27):
touch point, usually like aftersomeone scheduled a call, or
deeper into that 30-day sequence.
Some of them don't do that atall.
But the other big piece thatthey use is something that is
not super common in most of thenewsletter space, which is
what's called a setter.
And for those of you who arenot familiar with what a setter

(25:48):
does, setter looks at leadscoring and that could be things
like a lead that comes in maybewatch the video.
You have data on how much of itthey watched.
They didn't schedule a call, butthey're continuing to open
emails and engage, so they havea high enough lead score that
this person manually reaches outand says hey, I see you're
interacting with our stuff.
I'd really love to set you upwith a demo of the program, or
I'd really love to set up a callwith our team to answer your

(26:09):
questions.
And then they kind of helpclose the gap between some
people who, for whatever reason,there's something keeping them
from taking action, but they'reengaged enough to be interested.
So that piece usually getsadded at a certain point.
So there are a lot of layers tothis and the sophistication can
get quite complicated over time.
But again, the model shouldwork with just that sort of

(26:30):
first pass right and then.

So there's a lot of things you can do to move
people from those leads to get ahigher percentage of them.
And then if you're an existingpublishing business with an
existing model, you're usingthis.
You would, of course, after acertain you could probably just
push your other stuff and youget some success there too with
that.
So the I guess the next thingto talk about then, I think,
would be, um, the product modelitself, and then we'll get to

(26:57):
the copy, because I think thoseare two very interesting things
to kind of get into.
And so, um, what does a productlook like?
Because you're coming in at afive thousand dollar price point
, what does the product looklike?
Um, for that.
And and I guess I'm going toback up one thing is, generally
speaking, is the the concept forthe call, essentially a demo of

(27:19):
the program?

It can be.
It often is.
It's usually structured in away so it feels like the person
has already started on the calland it's it's not like here's a
sales pitch and then if youagree and give us money, then we
start.
It's like, no, let's start.
We're giving you this leadmagnet, the value.
We'll probably get a demo youthrough that and and and kind of

(27:41):
future pace experience of theprogram.
So it feels like you've startedand then it's like, if you wish
to, continue, then you must pay.

So that's, that's okay.
Once it works well that way,right?
So once you're moving, thenthat's like lowering friction on
the commitment level that theyhave.
Like, you're getting on thecall, you're not.
You're starting the program.
We're giving you some of theelements of it for free.
You just have to kind of get onhere to consume it with us, and
then then we'll move to ahigher friction point of like to
kind of get on here to consumeit with us, and then then we'll
move to a higher friction pointof like give us money, which is
the ultimate friction point.

(28:13):
Um, all right, so what does theproduct look like?

so, I can answer that a couple ways, like across
the the full sort of space wherethey're using this funnel
structure.
There's two broad categories ofthings that I see.
One is some sort of educationalcourse that's packaged usually

(28:36):
across an eight or 12 weekbootcamp period.
That I mean it's a la carte, sopeople can go in and go through
all 12 weeks or whatever in thefirst week if they literally
just do that.
But there's that component.
There's usually a communitycomponent and there's usually a
live component, that's you knowtwo to you know one to three

(28:58):
times a week, I would say whereyou're live with the guru, you
have proximity, you're able toask questions and that proximity
is a big piece.
Frankly, the community is a bigpiece and that's something that
a lot of newsletter productshave shied away from the idea.
I know there's probably peoplewho are going to watch and
listen to this and think likeholy shit, the idea of a forum
where my customers can talk toeach other sounds terrifying.

(29:20):
But it's like these productsare built in a way where they're
good fucking products and,because it's the core of the
business, product developmentdoesn't end at the point of
launch.
It continues on an ongoingbasis.
So the version of the productthat you launch, compared to the
version that exists in sixmonths to 12 months, continues
to develop and respond to thecustomer feedback in the

(29:42):
community.
So it becomes a stronger thingover time.

And these are not fundamental.
Go ahead finish.

Yeah, sorry.
The other model, which may ormay not be applicable to our
space, is the commoditizedservice model, which is more of
a B2B thing.
But I've seen B2C versions ofit where there's some service.
It's not an educational thing.
People aren't expecting to geteducated, they're expecting to
get a result or deliverable ofsome kind and again, a lot of

(30:11):
this is B2B.
So you see, agencies docommoditized service packages
that they sell this waydevelopers, that kind of thing.
I suspect that if you created areally high quality done for
you service in certaincategories, in financial, you

(30:32):
could do this, like the one thatstands out to me as obvious is
private equity, so venturecapital stuff, so an early stage
private placement done for youservice where you have direct
proximity to like.
If Marin Katusa did a funnellike this, it would definitely
fucking work, um, so I thinkthat there's a space for that

(30:52):
kind too, but for the most part,what we have seen so far is the
educational version.

Uh, and at least in our space right, and I think
that's where I'm gonna go nextis is kind of so.
One of the problems with a lotof community things in our space
would be it's with productsthat are that are pick based um,
you're only as good as yourlast pick when people are
talking, yeah, education basedis, and so if you're on that
continuum of like this is how todo it, versus it's done for you

(31:21):
, which traditionally you wouldthink of as the more done for
you, it is the higher price.
It is um, which is why a wealthadvisor is paying.
You know you're getting apercentage of your portfolio
which is insane in and of itself, um, but um, with education
right on the other.
On the other end, it's likehere's how to do it, um, and you

(31:41):
would normally think ofeducation as being, uh, it's
like a book.
It's, it's less intense untilyou, until you frame it in the
context of like college,university course, um, really
like highly skilled things, andI think this is where we go into
the copy approach, um, becausefrom what I've seen, you tell me
if this is, this is the way yousee it too is that these are

(32:02):
fundamentally guru funnels.
It's very much about the personand building up the credibility
and expertise that you can onlyget this exact version of this
education from this person,because it's his method, his
model, his unique strategy.

Yeah, you see it, that's 100% the case.
It is much more guru driven.
One thing that comes up in copyin our space quite a bit with
new copywriters who come in fromoutside the space.
They come from niches wherevirtually every promo is some
version of Hero's Journey andthen they come and they try to
write that kind of copy for anewsletter and it bombs

(32:40):
completely because thathistorically doesn't really work
that well.
For 99% of newsletter ideas itdoesn't.
And for these sorts of funnelsHero's Journey does work because
the person buying has anaspirational desire to become a
trader, become, you know, learnthat investment skill set, learn

(33:01):
that trading skill set, masterit themselves.
So the idea of following in thepath blazed by the guru, that's
important.
So Hero's Journey copy not onlyworks but is dominant in in
this category.

And so I think that that's where it's hero's
journey.
But also like the, the proofand credibility element of the
guru.
Like yes, this is harder, thethe, the the weaker the
credibility and element of theguru.
Like yes, this is harder, thethe the weaker the credibility
and story of the guru, theharder this is to do.

And so, like this this is a business model for
some, for gurus who are solidand who can stand on on their
own laurels uh, without withoutyou know the embellishment that
sometimes happens in this spaceguys who who could go into a
room and actually talk shop onthis stuff, and the other guys
who know how to talk shop willbe like yeah, this, this, this

(33:57):
guy gets it Right.

Right, and so I think that's that's an.
That's a key.
Key component is you need tohave somebody who's really good,
um, in terms of, like their,maybe their track record, their
professional history, theirconnections, like whatever it is
.
They have to have a strategythat they use.
It's fundamental to how theyapproach the markets, and the

(34:20):
interesting thing to me when Iwas thinking about this and
going back is how, you know, oneof the best versions of this
has always been Tim Sykes'millionaire challenge in my mind
, and how Tim has consistentlysaid, like this is how I do it,
this is what I do.
You could probably do it betterthan I could.
In fact, lots of my studentshave outperformed me once I

(34:41):
taught them how to do this,because, while I know everything
that I how to do it, likeyou're still a trader and your
miles may vary.
Miles may vary.
Like you can be better than me,you could be worse than me.
Um, it's the same approach andthat always was interesting to
me.
It's such an interesting point,right, because, uh and he does
have that one guy who I think,tim grittani, who crushed,

(35:02):
crushed, uh, sykes's results andis in a lot of yeah, and he has
a bunch of students who havegotten up to a million dollars
in profits and real money, so hecan really put.
He has his own track recordwhich is proven and phenomenally
as a statements for Then he hasstudents' track records now and
so that's very active tradingin what he does, but it's a very
niche, niche, niche nicheservice but they've sold

(35:24):
hundreds of millions of dollarsright, so they're amazing at
that.
And so I think that's the thingis that you need that guy who
is kind of unquestionably goodat what he does and if someone
tried to punk him out and saythis is bs, he'd be able to kind
of slam him right, and so Ithink that's the.

(35:46):
That's the key difference inthis space, um, versus kind of
how a newsletter guru right nowin community, right now, like
you keep community away because,like you have so many editors
and things like that who youknow.

There's editors who are really good analysts but
they've never really managedmoney, they've never really
traded successfully, but they'rereally good at doing this piece
manage money They've neverreally traded successfully, but
they're really good at doingthis piece, yeah, or even I mean
there could be editors who aregood and have a good track
record, but they know that, justbecause of the way that
statistical distribution works,eventually they're going to have
a bad run.

(36:22):
And so if it's an entirelypicks-based service, if you have
a community in there and peoplebuy during a period right
before a bad run begins whichstatistically is going to happen
, no matter how good you arethen all of a sudden the vibe in
that room is going to beapocalyptic for some period of
time.

Yeah, exactly, and that's the risk of the
community model with a lot ofthese things.
But I think education-based,and I think that the education
market in this space is veryunderdeveloped, because there's
a couple of arguments against itthat I've heard.
One is it's purely tradereducation, because there's no
investment in education, which Ithink is a huge hole actually

(37:02):
in the market.
I do too.
Two is that there's no A lot ofthe publishing business is
generally in its, I'd say, bestform, is a renewals based
business, and there's a lack ofrenewals on the lower products,
sometimes because it's a 12month bootcamp or 12 week
bootcamp, and so the lack ofrenewal revenue is less

(37:26):
attractive.
When you're selling lower priceeducation products, I would say
that at the $5,000 price pointyou're already at a price point
where you're getting more money.
Your LTV on that one purchaseis higher than your LTV on your
other customer.
It's a question of how many youhave.

I would definitely interject on.
That purchase is higher thanyour other customer and the
question of how many you have,I'll interject on that.
Usually when you buy it's notlifetime access to that
community, it's usually like 12months and the renewal is
usually at the full price.
So there is quite a lot ofrenewal activity.
I mean it's probably similar,on a percentage basis, that you
would see with products in thenewsletter category.

(38:04):
It may even be higher becausethe community engagement is so
intense, but your revenuedefinitely doesn't end at that
$5,000 purchase, right.

Nice.
And so then from a copy like afunnel here, then you were
telling me this offline was thata promo here?
Like that, um, you were tellingme this offline was that a
promo here?
Like that 20 minute video isthe is the heaviest lift on the
copy side.
Yeah, um, and that is a 4,000word video.
It's not like a 15,000, 20,000word promo hour long video that
has to do all the heavy lifting,and so the copy approach is

(38:37):
actually um easier in that sense.

Once the offer in Vuru, it's not only that when
you have one that works, theytend to.
Because here's the thing, likeif you do a promo around.
I just reviewed on a copy callwith Oxford James Altucher's
recent launch around the AppleVision Pro launch and literally
this promo went live and wasdeadlined the next morning,
which was the Apple Vision Prolaunch.

(39:02):
And literally this promo wentlive and was deadlined the next
morning, which was the time ofthe launch.
So this entire promo was likethe launch period, where it was
active and relevant, was 12hours, so you need to then write
a new promo, whereas thesepromos they tend to run for much

(39:23):
longer minor release changes onthe landing page, but the core
promo could last years, which isunheard of in the financial
space.
It's much more common in othercategories, especially outside
of make money.
But even in like real estate,investment, biz, op copy lasts
longer investment and biz opcopy lasts longer than.

But the reason is is that it's it's focused on the
guru more than it is on themarket, because it's more
important to sell the personthan it is to sell what's
happening in the marketplace.
That's exactly why and I thinkjust just just to interject on
this real quick I think one ofthe things that I find
interesting about this andexciting for especially smaller
publishers is, like, the hardestpoint of competition in this

(40:06):
industry is finding copywritershigh performing copywriters.
Despite all the copy educationthat's been out there and the
number of people who have triedto be financial copywriters, the
actual talent pool continues tobe extraordinarily small.
Actual talent pool continues tobe extraordinarily small.
And once somebody gets goodenough, they go to, they go to

(40:27):
market wise.
They go to the largerpublishers because they can get
much higher bonuses, becausethose companies have much larger
scale, so their promo can runfarther they can.
They can make more money.
They also get stability, whichis a freelancer stability.
It's not something that afreelance copywriter has,
generally speaking, um and so,uh, finding, finding like great

(40:50):
copywriters is the constantstruggle of um every publisher,
and the smaller the publisher is, the harder it is, and it's a
huge pain point across theindustry.
And what's interesting aboutthis model is because you don't
need as many copy packages.
The copy package doesn't haveto do the entire lift because

(41:12):
you have a sales process, thatkind of erases.
I mean, frankly, I think iterases that pain point almost
entirely.

Yeah, if you are a smaller pub and instead of
having to write six packagesthat are good over the course of
a year, or 12 or whatever it is, because even a single small
franchise could easily need sixpromotions over the course of a
year and either you're writingthose internally yourself or you
have to find other writers.
It's expensive, it's hard to doWith this.
It's one offer that could workfor multiple years and you can,

(41:50):
you know, with the sameresources that you're going
after six promotions that youknow are going to be dead within
18 months.
You could write, you could takemultiple shots of something
that could last years and be acore of your business for that
entire period of time, for bothacquisitions and internal
monetization.

Right, and so then the other main difference is
then is that, like, the amountof production you need to do on
a weekly basis drops, I mean?
I mean it's cutting not in half, it's cutting probably to a
tenth of what it was.
Yeah, um, you need the salesteam, which there's a lot more

(42:34):
um setter sales groups out therethan there are um copywriters.
So your, your marketingcalendar is different.

Yeah, the other thing to just note on, like it
used to be that findingtelesales, people and setters
was challenging because it wassuch a niche thing.
But over the last five or sixyears that became a career op in
the make money space to becomea high ticket closer and most of
the people who sell that as abiz op have a flywheel business
where they also take their owngraduates and then position them
with other companies.

(43:09):
So there are a lot more sourcesfor trained closers and setters
than there ever was prior tonow.

Yeah, and I have Zach.
He made great contact who heuses to.
He basically specializes inthis and he can specialize in
building, helping you build outa team yourself, also referring
people for outsource.
Then when you're ready to do itlike in-house, he can help
there.
And so there's a lot of goodcontacts I can share with people
who are interested in that.
I'm actually do a call with himlike this and talk about his

(43:41):
process on that quite a bit toosoon, cause I think it's it's a
growing area and it's not andI'm not saying I'm not saying
that this should replacenecessarily all the newsletter
approaches.
It's, but it's such aneffective model that if you have
the right guru and the rightapproach like this, is an

(44:01):
amazing business.
Um, that is a lot lessproduction work.

It's a lot less um copy about less production if
you have a franchise with justone of these offers, compared to
a franchise with four or fiveoffers.
It's a lot less editorialsupport.
It's a lot less um, you know,the mail volume, just like the
time it takes to queue up andsend fulfillment emails across
five services versus one.
There's a lot of extra effortthere.

(44:27):
I mean the cost in manpower andproduction in terms of
production and broadcast aloneto support these more
traditional style franchises.
I know I've done it.
It is is expensive, uh, and fora lot of smaller pubs.
They see, I think this is amistake a lot of people make.

(44:47):
They look at Agora, for example, and they think, wow, like
Agora got so big and even nowmarket-wise it's still
relatively big, not as big as itonce was, but very big.
And they look at that model andthey say, okay, I'm going to
emulate that because that's whatthe big guys do.
But the reality is the guys whoare looking at that and trying
to copy that are sub-milliondollar businesses or sub-$2

(45:11):
million businesses, and theupper limits of scale for this
kind of group mentorship, groupcoaching funnel, where it's a
single offer franchise, be 10 or20 million dollars a year in
sales, with better uniteconomics, better media
economics.
Uh, so it's like okay, uh,maybe you shouldn't emulate what

(45:35):
the what the biggest guys aredoing, cause maybe there's a
reason that they're able to makethat work, that that you're not
.

Right and and and it's still like you know,
there's a.
My view is that the industry isin an ongoing state of
transformation that we're notgoing to be done with for a few
years at best, and productmodels are changing, marketing
models are changing.
The other thing about thereally large businesses is I've

(46:01):
yet to well, not yet.
I can think of maybe one personI know who's pushed over a
hundred to 200 million.
Um, who's happy to get it.
Everybody else hits a hundredand they're like what a mistake.
It is so rough this way.
Um, once you get to a certainsize size, you're constantly

(46:21):
dealing with lawsuits from thismanager down here did something
inappropriate to this staffemployee and now you have a
lawsuit.
You're just dealing with allkinds of garbage.
That happier business isactually in that $20 to $50
million range from a businessowner's perspective.
They're all pretty happy whenthey're hit $10 million, or $10

(46:44):
to 10, to 30 to 40.
Like, yeah, there's problems,there's always issues, there's
constant problems, but likethey're generally a lot of
stress, there's great money andand it's a great place to be.
And then I would say the otherthing about and this is a much
bigger conversation that I keepmeaning to do with, but, like I
don't know how many people, it'smore interesting than it is
useful for most of us and it hasto do with looking at the

(47:08):
actual, like ecosystem modelsthat have been used to build
large companies and that whatyou have is there's a marketing
acquisition model for afranchise and then there's a
business model for havingmultiple franchises, and there
are two different business modelfor having multiple franchises
and there are two differentthings that are obviously
related.
But to get to the large scalegroups like MarketWise and Agora

(47:28):
, there is a model there that isbeing used to create multiple
franchises, and those franchisesare going to range from X to X.
Sometimes they get really big,like they did in the 2021 period
and leading up to it, um, andsometimes they're smaller and
what that is.
But that's, you know, for anindividual publisher, it's like

(47:49):
most guys have like, hey, I wanta stable business at 20, like
that would be great, maybe 30,maybe push up, but, like you
know, uh, and with that, likethis kind of approach is really
interesting, yeah, becausethere's a lot of people in a lot
of niches who are making thiswork, you know, and with that,
like this kind of approach isreally interesting.
Yeah, because there's a lot ofpeople in a lot of niches who
are making this work to that to20 to 50 to even a hundred in
some cases, with essentially oneor two product lines like this.

Yeah, outside of our outside, I mean even within
our space.
You know, sykes, I don't knowwhat their top year on this
model would have been, but it Imean, do you have a sense of
that ballpark?

I'm not gonna I, out of respect for zach and tim,
I'm not gonna say like whatthey've told me, if you actually
have it, it's, it's substantial, they're, they're, they're,
they're a substantial business.
They have done substantialnumbers for a very long time.
Yeah, um, and so, even withinour space.

There've been significant results that way.
But if you look outside of ourspace, you know there's, there's
, you know real estateinvestment businesses and career
op businesses that you've nevereven heard of that are doing 20
, 30, $40 million a year insales on this model and know
frankly, with with worse copythan is is standard for our

(49:05):
space.
Like, even the shittiercopywriters in our space are
better than a lot of the writersin other spaces, just because
the gauntlet of financial copyhaving to come up with new
promos so often to beat.
Uh, you know prior controlsbecause, like all of a AI isn't
as hot as it was six weeks ago,it creates rapid iteration for

(49:28):
writers.
So, even using not the bestwriters in our space to create a
funnel like this, you got shotat having pretty substantial
business.

Well, that's the thing is that in a lot of spaces
like you talk about the hero'sjourney copy there's copywriters
in other industries who neverwrite a different type of promo.
Yeah, they write the same,that's all they ever, that's all
they've ever written, and it'sthe same version of the same
promo with a few differentchanges that they do and that's
just what they do.
And so, like, the copy musclesof the of writers in this space
are actually pretty phenomenal.
Um, because it's constant ideas, constant approaches, changes

(50:00):
and approaches.
There's so many different typesof packages and so much that
can be applied within a gurumodel, guru approach, because
it's still a guru thing.
It's a question of is this trendidea leading?
Is it this, is it that there's?
It's such a like, you know, Ithink of like the, the great
financial copywriters are kindof like the super athletes of
copy.
Um, and uh, you're onlycompeting in the hardest market

(50:24):
there is because of that.
And so when you switch to likehey, we're gonna just like make
the most perfect guru um funnelpossible, like that's a, that's
a really interesting challengefor a copywriter.
Um, because it is.
It's about building therelationship really fast around
this guy and highlighting theyou know, and that's much easier

(50:45):
than trying to time a trendwith your ideas, which is what
you're doing fundamentally withmost other copy in the space.
So, yeah, it's, and that's whyI thought this was important to
do is that it is such a solidmodel that it's worth being
explored explored, for there's alot of publishers who could add
a significant amount of revenuereally fast.

(51:06):
On a relative basis, that isless of a workload than what
they're, what they're used todoing

right now, and so I would say, even even if you
don't want to put together thisparticular model, a useful
exercise.
Exercise to say, okay, let'sassume that Porter's right, and
the best version of thisbusiness is to have a structure
of some kind to find your$25,000 buyer, $20,000 buyer,
whatever it is, that very highticket person, who?

(51:35):
Those are the guys who arereally paying attention.
All right, if our business goalis to find that person, is the
model that you're using rightnow the only way to find that
person?
Ok, is it the best way to findthat person?
And I bet you the answer is no.
I bet you that there are amultitude of other pathways to
find that very, very high ticketbuyer who, from a power law

(51:59):
perspective, represents a hugeproportion of your overall
revenue.
And this is one of them, andthis is one of the ways to do it
that involves the leastcomplexity in terms of number of
products in a franchise, interms of frequency of putting
out new promos, and it offers,at first touch, some of the best

(52:21):
media economics.
So it's definitely worth takinga crack.

Well, I think that too, so like your media
economics.
So let's just come back to thatfor a few minutes too, just to
kind of wrap this up, because,other than staff costs, media
costs are the highest percentageof your spend that you're going
to have in the business youroverhead goes to.
If you can't spend on media,your business dies and like that
is where, like when things areworking, you you ramp up the

(52:48):
spend and things like that.
So, um, like if you were goingto compare, like wealth, press,
media spend, when you and youguys caught youtube at the right
time, when YouTube was reallycheap and productive, it's
gotten more expensive.
How would you look at the twomodels in terms of your

(53:09):
economics you mentioned earlier,but let's dive into a little
bit more of it.

So we never made the front-end acquisition model
work.
The front end acquisition modelwork.
We couldn't get promos thatconverted at a high enough level
at those price points for it toback out.
So we not because we'remarketing geniuses but because
we literally couldn't make frontends work shifted to selling
back ends direct to cold trafficand our copy was strong there.

(53:39):
But really like the biggestadvantage was because of the
higher price point and priceelasticity in our space.
Like there are pockets ofpeople who, for them, spending
$2,000 for an alert service isnothing like it like literally
doesn't phase them it.
It meant that it was mucheasier to have these things back

(54:03):
out, even if the copy wasn'tlike AAA tier and sometimes it
was.
But we had promos that were noteven that great, that still
backed out and we were lookingfor stuff to back out in a
72-hour period positive ROAS in72 hours and that was more
aggressive than I think a lot ofdifferent pubs even now,

(54:23):
especially on front-endacquisitions.
I talked to people who are like90 days if it backs up by then
we're feeling good about it.
For us we were targeting 72hours and we could make that
work with copy that wassometimes very good and
sometimes was just more mediocre, but still make it work because
of that $2,000 price point workbecause of that $2,000 price
point.
Once you get up to a $5,000 or$6,000 or $7,000 price point,

(54:50):
that elasticity effect is stillthere.
So you're not seeing like.
If this was all normallydistributed, the drop-off would
be so pronounced that therewouldn't really be an advantage
to going up the price curveversus a lower price point
product.
The conversion rate woulddecline in proportion with price
.
But as you know, and as I thinkmost people in space know,
that's not how it works.
So the conversion rate declinedoesn't completely offset the

(55:13):
increase in price.
So the economics again getbetter to the point where, even
with higher media costs todayand worse targeting, you can get
this to back out in that firstpass period.
And some people, especiallyoutside of this niche, are
running these funnels where coldtraffic goes in and 72 hours
later they've doubled theirmoney.

And that's not like that's like early 2000s
internet marketing numbers.

People are seeing this outside of this niche In
real estate investment.
I know people who are doingthis outside of this niche in
real estate investment.
Like I know, I know people whoare doing this outside of this
niche where if they startrunning a funnel like this and
if on their initial traffic theyaren't seeing that like a
double or better, um cause theyknow it would decline a bit as
they scale, but if they aren'tseeing that off the hop, they
consider that a failed funnel.
So so I see that I'm like, ohyou, sweet summer child, that's

(56:05):
amazing, that's amazing.
But uh, but so you know, theeconomics is just way, way
better.

Uh, right, and and you know I want to go back to
something you said when youstarted this part is that you
said you know you could makefront-end work, and that's true
for everybody.
Like at the best I'm like Idon't care the best publishers
in the space.
I've had conversations yeah, wehaven't had a front end working
in a year and a half atdifferent points.
Right, like that's.
The hardest part of thebusiness is making that front

(56:32):
end work.
And even when you have themoney and the staff and the best
copywriters in the business,it's still the hardest part of
this business to make that frontend work.
Now, when it works, it'sphenomenal because you get this
huge influx of paying customersand then your back ends all
explode and so it's a fantasticmodel, but it's hard as hell.

Yeah, and it comes with other costs.
When you're selling a front end, you really need to maximize
the conversion, right.
You don't necessarily need todo that with a $5,.
You really need to maximize theconversion rate.
You don't necessarily need todo that with a $5,000 or $6,000
product.
So in the copy for the $6,000product you can have a lot of
hedging, qualifying language.
That makes, frankly, the copy alot more compliant and balances

(57:14):
expectations with likelyresults.
A lot of front end copy.
The incentive is there, themarket incentive is there for
you to get as aggressive and upto the line as you possibly can
within the regulatory framework.
And that is fundamentallydangerous because, as we know,
where that regulatory line sitscan change at any time and we
don't control that.
So that's a problem.

(57:35):
And then, because you'reselling to a large volume of
units, the volume of complaintsis necessarily going to be
higher, just as a function ofscale.
And we know that thosecomplaints drive all kinds of
things, from reputation issuesto lawsuit issues, from your own
customer base to regulatoryissues.
So front ends, leaving asidethe more challenging economics,

(57:59):
have that whole other basket ofissues that come with them that
you know.
No matter, no matter, no matterwhat you do, like you can't you
can't eliminate those sorts ofrisks.

Right, right, and so that's that's.
Yeah, I mean the the way thisis sold by them not everybody,
but I know some people that thisis more like buying a car.
You have a contract, um havedifferent approaches to how they
do the clothes, but you have ahigher price customer who tends

(58:28):
to be less of a pain in the buttthan low price products
customers.
You tend to have a bettercustomer base because they're
much more qualified.
They're much more engaged andmuch more interested
specifically in this person inhis approach.
Um, and so lower refund ratetoo right, that's the that's.
The fascinating thing is thatthe refund rate is not like

(58:50):
these crazy high refund numbers.
They're actually relatively lowcompared, like what you would
expect from a front end in somecases.

I mean well, front ends often have higher refund
rates than these products.

Well, I mean, like I've seen guys with like 12
refund rates on this stuff, yeah, and that's ridiculously low
compared to like your average$2,000 back end, $3,000 back end
.

Whereas if you're selling a front end with a money
back guarantee, I can virtuallyassure you, especially in cold
traffic, your refund rate isgoing to be higher than 12%.
It doesn't matter how good theservice is.
It's going to be higher than12%.

Right.
So I think for everybody whohasn't considered this model,
it's worth talking about, andI'm trying to pull together more
resources for everybody.
I'm going to do anotherconversation like this with
somebody who helps build thesephone teams or talk to some
other publishers who are doingthis, but I thought this is a

(59:48):
great way to talk because Ithink that you know kind of your
, your, your experience buildinga more traditional fin pub, um,
and switching to this, I think,is a sign of the times right
now.
I think it's a sign of wherethings are going um, and also
because the economics are sogood that if you can make this
model work, you can have a muchmore enjoyable business, both in
terms of the total, the top endnumbers, and in terms of, like

(01:00:09):
how much work it takes it to runthe business.

Conor Lynch (01:00:11):
Yeah, so thanks for doing this.
And just as a final note realquick, as a publisher, if you
have a one product franchise andyou know that you can put all
of your creativity on theproduct side into making this
one experience better for thecustomers, honestly I I just
feel better about puttingputting out a product that I
know is going to be solid andwe'll continue to get more and

(01:00:32):
more solid over time and thatthat there's.
You can't put a price oreconomics on that part of it.

John Newtson (01:00:40):
That's a that reminds me of a recent post who
Brett Holmes made aboutbasically, your products suck.
People Like you've gotten usedto accepting lower quality
products over the years and I'mnot saying everybody's product
sucks but there are definitelypeople whose products are lower
quality than, or some of theirproducts are lower quality than,
others, and there are people inthe business who are like the

(01:01:02):
product doesn't matter.
That's increasingly problematic, I think, in this environment.
Totally so awesome.
Thanks, man, this has beenfantastic.

Conor Lynch (01:01:13):
Yeah, this is good, I love doing these.
All right, take care.
Bye.

John Newtson (01:01:17):
Cheers.

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