Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:02):
Emergency alerts are
designed to be fast,
far-reaching and unmissable, butwhat happens when they aren't,
when they're delayed,misdirected or never sent at all
?
Today we're looking at what cango wrong with the emergency
alert system and why it mattersmore than you think.
(00:24):
Hey, I'm tyler woodward, acertified broadcasting
(01:01):
networking technologist from theSociety of Broadcast Engineers,
and I'm a senior broadcastengineer based in the Midwest.
This is Fully Modulated, wheresignal meets podcast.
We're continuing our series onthe emergency alert system and
today we're going to talk aboutone of the most important tools
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we have in the United States forkeeping people safe.
One of the most important toolswe have in the United States
for keeping people safe, butit's not perfect.
Today we're going to explorethe weak links in the chain
human mistakes, hardware hiccups, gaps in coverage and why those
things matter when secondscount.
We'll look at real-worldfailures, uneven infrastructure
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and the limits of clarity andlanguage access when delivering
a message that's supposed tosave lives.
But first a little disclaimerFully Modulated is an
independent podcast and website.
It is not affiliated with,endorsed by or represents any
radio or television station,media company or broadcast
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network.
All opinions expressed arethose of myself.
At its core, eas is a system oftrust.
We trust it to interrupteverything from the morning
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traffic reports to primetimesitcoms when something serious
is happening.
But EAS is only as strong asits weakest link in the chain,
and that weak link could be atired engineer, a misconfigured
receiver or a missed softwareupdate.
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Take the infamous 2018 falsemissile alert in Hawaii.
A routine test became afull-blown panic when a worker
clicked the wrong item in adrop-down menu.
Speaker 2 (03:04):
People ran for their
lives after an alert mistakenly
warned residents and visitors ofan incoming ballistic missile.
An employee at Hawaii'semergency management agency
pushed the wrong button not oncebut twice, triggering a wave of
panic amid tensions over thethreat of a nuclear strike from
North Korea.
At 8.07 Saturday morning, cellphones started buzzing with a
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message saying seek immediateshelter.
This is not a drill.
State authorities canceled thealert at 8.13, six minutes later
.
Speaker 1 (03:33):
That was broadcast
across radio television and even
sent to phones using thewireless emergency alert.
It took 38 minutes to issue acorrection.
The system worked technically,but procedurally it was an
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absolute disaster.
There weren't enough fail-safes, the interface was confusing
and, because the system dependson humans to initiate it, it
will always be vulnerable tohuman mistakes.
Now zoom out.
Eas relies heavily on thebroadcast ecosystem radio TV,
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cable systems and satellite butmany stations, especially in
smaller markets, may not haveupdated gear or consistent
procedures.
I've worked at both LP1s andLP2 stations and I currently
engineer several SR stations.
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Even with regular vigilance,breakdowns happen.
If the designated LP1 or LP2station in a market is off the
air or maybe their decoder ismisconfigured, the entire local
relay can fail.
Cap servers can go down,software certifications expire.
(05:01):
If stations aren't regularlytesting and logging, nobody
might notice until well, a realalert fails.
According to a 2021 FCC report,nearly 14% of broadcasters did
not successfully transmit thenationwide EAS test.
The reasons Equipment failures,reception issues and outdated
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firmware.
I mean, you name it.
It probably happened.
That's not a design flaw,that's just a maintenance
failure.
Lisa Fowkes, former chief atthe FCC's Public Safety and
Homeland Security Bureau, put itbest To the public.
The emergency alert systemseems automatic, like a fire
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alarm, but it's really more likea fire drill.
It only works when everyoneknows their part and the system
is regularly tested andmaintained Unquote when the EAS
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works.
There's another big issue Canpeople understand the message?
Clarity is everything in anemergency, but EAS audio,
especially the robotictext-to-speech versions, can be
difficult to understand.
Robotic text-to-speech versionscan be difficult to understand.
Between compression, broadcastprocessing and station audio
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chains, the results can soundjumbled, flat or just flat-out
unintelligible.
Messages are often built fromtemplates filled with
abbreviations, acronyms and FIPScodes.
That might work internally, butit can confuse the public.
During a weather emergency, amessage like Tornado Warning for
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FIPS Code 017031 meansabsolutely nothing to most of
the public.
The National Weather Servicehas improved messaging, using
clearer language and betterlocalization, but EAS is still
bound by character limits andrigid formatting and if the
alert is too long or toofrequent, people start ignoring
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it altogether A well-known crywolf effect.
Broadcast processing also playsa role.
Heavy audio compression on FMstations can garble alerts On HD
radio.
Digital time delays can makealerts feel out of sync, and on
streaming platforms alerts maynot reach listeners at all.
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A study from the Journal ofHomeland Security and Emergency
Management found that EASmessage comprehension drops
sharply when alerts usetechnical terms run over 30
seconds or are repeated withoutany updates, but when alerts are
rewritten in plain English andvoiced by an actual human public
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, understanding jumped by 22%.
Another FEMA study showed thatwireless emergency alerts those
brief mobile messagesoutperformed EAS and clarity and
speed in many urban areas.
So what's the takeaway?
Jeanette Salton, a disastercommunications expert, said,
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quote unquote.
Now let's talk about some quicktips.
Number one double checkinterfaces and menus.
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If you work at an agency orbroadcast station that sends
alerts, pay close attention tothe software you're using.
Many past incidents, like theHawaii Missile Crisis, started
because someone selected thewrong option in a confusing
drop-down menu.
Ask yourself does this systemmake it clear whether you're
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sending a test or a real alert?
If you're not in the industry,think about the systems you use
every day, whether it'sscheduling software or banking
apps.
Better design can prevent bigmistakes.
Clear labels, confirmationprompts and smart defaults are
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good for everyone.
Number two keep systems andsoftware updated.
A surprising number of EASfailures happen because stations
don't keep their equipment upto date.
Certificates expire, firmwaregets old, compatibility breaks
down.
For the broadcast professionals.
(10:04):
Put software updates andcertificate renewals on your
maintenance calendar.
Don't wait for something tofail.
For everyone else out there,this is a reminder that the same
principle applies to your owntech.
Update your phone, yourcomputer and your router.
Many outages and securityissues can be prevented with a
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simple routine update.
Number three use plain languagewhenever you can.
Technical jargon might be clearto the insiders, but in a
crisis, simplicity saves lives.
If you're writing an alert, useeveryday words.
Instead of FIPS code 017031,say Southwestern Jefferson
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County For non-broadcast folks.
Think about how you writeinstructions or share
information at work.
Can a new person understand iton the first read?
And if not, it's probably toocomplicated?
And number four audit youralert chain.
On a normal basis Inbroadcasting, eas relies on a
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chain of stations relayingmessages.
If any link in that chain goesdown, like a station off the air
, a decoder misconfigured or anantenna that got accidentally
disconnected, the alert maynever reach the public.
Engineers know your LP1 and LP2stations and verify their
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signals, often Log your weeklyand monthly tests and actually
read the logs For everyone elseout there.
This is a great analogy for anyprocess you depend on If your
emergency plans, supply chainsor workflows rely on multiple
steps.
Do a dry run every now and thenMake sure each link is solid
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before you actually need it.
Now, my favorite part of theepisode listener questions.
I got one from Mike down inTexas.
He asked why doesn't EAS comein multiple languages,
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especially in places likeCalifornia or my home state of
Texas?
Well, and that's a greatquestion.
Technically it can.
Fema Common Alerting Protocol,cap, supports multiple language
fields, but in practice, manyalert originators use
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English-only templates.
Why Time and resources?
Basically, a UCLA study in LosAngeles found that, although
more than half of the populationspeaks another language other
than English, only 12% of alertsinclude a second language.
This is such a solvable issue,but it needs policy, staffing
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and a workflow that makestranslation fast and automatic.
So here's the bottom line.
Eas was built for the medialandscape of the 1990s and it's
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done well adapting, but itwasn't designed to interrupt
your podcast or pause yourNetflix stream, and that's kind
of a problem.
Streaming platforms likeYouTube TV, spotify or Apple
Podcasts.
They're not required to carryEAS alerts, which means more
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people could miss criticalwarnings, especially because
they're not tuned in totraditional media.
We're living in a hybrid worldone foot in broadcast one foot
in digital, and EAS hasn't fullymade the leap.
Fema and the FCC have exploredways to mandate, or at least
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incentivize, alert deliverythrough streaming, but the legal
path is, well you know,complicated and slow.
There's also the challenge oflanguage.
Most EAS messages are inEnglish only.
Some large market stations doissue bilingual alerts, but
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there's no standard.
That leaves out millions ofpeople.
Fema's IPAL system can'tsupport multilingual messages,
but most alerts still go out inEnglish only.
Why?
Because writing and translatinga message under pressure isn't
easy.
Until that process is automatedor at least better supported,
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huge portions of the publicremain underserved.
Antoine Johnson, former directorof FEMA's IPAWS division, said,
quote emergency alerting is apublic service, not a technical
one.
If the alert doesn't reacheveryone, it hasn't done its job
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.
Unquote reach everyone, ithasn't done its job.
Unquote.
Today we saw how EAS is greatfor broadcast but struggles to
keep up with streaming andmobile.
Wea and iPause help fill in thegaps, but other gaps still
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remain.
The future calls for newsystems designed for the digital
media landscape, with strongerparticipation from tech
platforms.
Next time we'll dig into howstate and local emergency
managers actually use EAS behindthe scenes, the coordinations
and challenges that make it allwork.
If you've got a question orfeedback or maybe a story about
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emergency alerting, I'd love tohear from you.
There's a link down in theepisode description or you can
email Tyler at fullymodulatedcom.
Fully Modulated runs oncuriosity and modulators.
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Like you, if you want to helpkeep this show going and explore
broadcast tech with me, headover to fullymodulatedcom to
become a modulator today.