Local Heroes: The County Emergency Managers Who Keep You Safe

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Ever wondered who actually pushes that button sending jarring alerts over your radio and phone? The answer might surprise you - it's usually not someone in Washington, but your neighbors working in county emergency operations centers.

Most county EOCs aren't glamorous command centers but rather ordinary rooms in courthouse basements or sheriff's departments. Inside, dedicated professionals monitor weather radar and emergency feeds, making critical decisions about when to interrupt your favorite show with potentially life-saving information. They use IPAWS (Integrated Public Alert and Warning System) to create standardized messages that flow through a complex network of broadcasters and wireless carriers.

What's fascinating—and concerning—is the dramatic disparity between different counties' capabilities. While major metropolitan areas maintain fully-staffed operations with modern technology, many smaller communities rely on a single emergency manager carrying a laptop everywhere to ensure they can respond after hours. Some counties aggressively use alerts to protect residents, while others remain overly cautious, fearing public backlash from "false alarms." This creates a patchwork of inconsistent practices across the country.

Behind every alert is an intricate relay network outlined in state EAS plans. Local Primary stations serve as the main distribution points, while State Relay stations bridge communication between state emergency centers and broadcasters. Despite increasing automation, human relationships remain crucial—engineers and emergency managers must coordinate regularly to ensure systems work when needed most. When one pathway fails, personal connections often determine how quickly backup plans activate.

The challenges facing local emergency alerting are substantial: outdated equipment held together with creative fixes, insufficient staffing in smaller communities, unreliable internet connections, and the delicate balance between alerting promptly and avoiding alarm fatigue. Yet dedicated professionals continue working with what they have to keep their communities safe.

Want to learn more or share your own alert experience? Email [e-mail] or follow the link in the show notes. And if you found this information valuable, please follow and review the podcast wherever you listen.

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Episode Transcript

Tyler (00:00):
Have you ever wondered who actually pushes the button
to send those jarring alertsover your radio or your phone?
Here's a hint it's usually notsomeone in Washington.
Today we're pulling back thecurtain on the county emergency
managers and the state teams whodecide when to hit that big red
send button Music.

(00:47):
Hey, I'm Tyler Woodward, acertified broadcast networking
technologist from the Society ofBroadcast Engineers.
I'm a broadcast engineer basedin the Midwest and this is Fully
Modulated, where signal meetspodcast.
So far, we've spent a lot oftime talking about big national

(01:11):
pieces of the emergency alertsystem, like FEMA, the FCC and
PEP stations.
But EAS isn't just a federaloperation.
Isn't just a federal operation.
In fact, the alerts that mattermost to you tornado warnings,

(01:34):
evacuation orders or missingchildren often start in your
backyard.
Today we'll talk about howstate and local emergency
managers decide when to issue analert, how those messages move
through the relay networks andwhy your county's approach might
be very different from the onenext door.
But let's get the disclaimerout of the way first.
Fully Modulated is anindependent podcast and website.
It is not affiliated with,endorsed by or represents any

(01:59):
radio or television station,media company or broadcast
network.
All opinions expressed aresolely those of myself.
Most of us have probablyimagined the emergency alert
system as this big facelessfederal machine, some bunker

(02:20):
somewhere with a giant map onthe wall.
Bunker, somewhere with a giantmap on the wall, full of people
in uniform waiting to hit thatbig red button.
But the reality is usually alittle more closer to home and,
honestly, a lot less glamorous.
Your county emergencyoperations center, or the EOC.

(02:41):
It's often a pretty ordinarylooking place.
Maybe it's in the basement ofthe county courthouse or a side
room at the sheriff's department.
Inside you'll find a few desks,computer screens showing
weather, radar, emergency feedsand maybe a big binder or two
with protocols for everyimaginable scenario.
Eocs are responsible forcoordinating all kinds of

(03:03):
emergencies Flooding winterstorms, wildfires, hazardous
material spills and even publichealth crises.
When it comes to issuing alerts,these teams are often the first
line of defense.
They decide whether somethingrises to the level of an

(03:29):
official warning or remains aninternal advisory.
Let's say, a severethunderstorm is moving in, the
National Weather Service mightissue a severe thunderstorm
watch and the EOC startsmonitoring things a little more
closely.
If the storm starts showing anyrotation, meaning it could
spawn a tornado, someone at theEOC has to decide.
Do we activate the sirens, dowe push an alert out to people's

(03:52):
phones or do we send an EASmessage that interrupts radio
and television?
To do this they use a securesystem called IPAWS, the
Integrated Public Alert andWarning System.
Ipaws is like a hub thatconnects everything the
emergency alert system, wirelessemergency alerts, noaa, weather

(04:14):
radio and others.
Through IPAWS, authorizedofficials can create a common
alerting protocol or CAP message.
That's the format that carriesall the details what kind of
emergency, where it's happening,when it expires and any
instructions for the public.
Here's where things get a littlemessy.

(04:35):
Not every county has the samelevel of access or capability.
Bigger metro areas might have adedicated staff member on duty
24-7, trained to issue alertsquickly.
However, the smaller countiesoften have a much smaller team.
Sometimes it's a singleemergency manager who's also

(04:58):
juggling other responsibilities.
I've talked to emergencycoordinators who admitted they
have to carry a laptop with themeverywhere so they can log into
iPulse from home if somethinghappens after hours.
Some counties have moderncloud-based alerting dashboards
with templates and automaticgeo-targeting.
Others rely on older desktopsoftware or, in rare cases,

(05:23):
still pass information by phoneto the state, eoc or a
neighboring county to issue thealert on their behalf and when
you're relying on someone else'ssystem, that adds precious
minutes of delay.
One Royal Emergency Managertold me Our ability to get
alerts out to the public isn'tjust about software.

(05:45):
It's about who's here when thestorm hits.
And that stuck with me, becauseeven the best tools can't help
if no one's available orauthorized to use them, or even
trained.
Then there's the issue of policyand confidence.
Some counties are much moreaggressive about using EAS and

(06:05):
wireless emergency alertsbecause they want to make sure
no one misses a life-threateningsituation.
Others are cautious, sometimestoo cautious, because they're
afraid of backlash if theyover-alert and people complain
about the false alarms.
All this means there's a hugevariation in how often alerts

(06:27):
are issued and how muchinformation they contain.
One county might send outmultiple updates during a
weather event, while the countynext door stays silent.
That inconsistency can confusethe public and it can also
frustrate broadcasters who aretrying to relay timely, accurate
information.

(06:49):
At the end of the day, theemergency alert system starts
with the people people makingjudgment calls, often under
immense pressure, with imperfectinformation, and in many
counties those people are doingit with limited resources,
outdated equipment and notenough hands on deck.
It's a huge responsibility andmost of them do it because they

(07:13):
care about their community andwant to keep people safe.
So next time you hear an alertbreak out into your favorite
show, remember it probablywasn't a federal office.
It was your neighbors down atthe EOC working with what they
have to get you the informationyou need.
Once that alert is created,whether it's for a tornado, a

(08:08):
hazardous spill or a missingchild, it has to get from the
county or state system into theears and eyes of the public.
That's where the relay networkcomes in, and this part is,
frankly, more complex thanpeople realize.
Every state has what's called astate EAS Plan.
It's a document, sometimeshundreds of pages long, that

(08:31):
lays out in detail exactly howalerts are supposed to flow,
who's responsible for monitoringwhich sources, which stations
rebroadcast which signals andwhat equipment is required and
how tests should be conducted.
At the core of this network arethe LP1 and LP2 stations, local

(08:52):
primary stations.
Lp1 stations are the main entrypoint for alerts in a given
area.
They monitor a combination ofsources, including national
feeds from FEMA, state-levelfeeds and sometimes direct
connections from emergencyoffices.
Lp2 stations well, they serveas the backup in case the LP1 is

(09:14):
off the air or fails to receiveand relay the message.
Then there's the state relay orSR stations.
This is where my work comes in.
I currently engineer SRstations that act as bridges
between the state emergencyoperations center and all the LP
stations across the state.

(09:35):
Sr stations typically monitorthe FEMA, pep stations, those
high-powered primary stationsthat originate the national
alerts, and also state-levelalerting sources.
Some states also designate SRstations to originate their own
messages, like evacuation ordersor AMBER alerts that need

(09:57):
statewide coverage.
Imagine it like a giant chainof dominoes the EOC creates the
alert, pushes it in the IPALs,the state relay picks it up,
retransmits it over a designatedfrequency.
Lp1 stations then monitor thatand rebroadcast it to the other

(10:19):
local stations in their region.
Each station down the chainmonitors assigned sources to
ensure redundancy.
If one fails, another issupposed to catch it.
But like any chain, it's onlyas strong as its weakest link.
That's why coordination isessential.

(10:43):
Some states have formal EAScommittees, groups of
broadcasters, emergency managers, cable operators and state
officials who meet quarterly orat least annually to review
performance, conduct tabletopexercises and update procedures.
These meetings are usuallywhere you find out about

(11:04):
monitoring assignments that needchanging or discovering that an
LP1 might have upgraded theirequipment and it might affect
how they relay In other places.
It's more informal.
Maybe there's an email list ora group chat where engineers can
flag issues like receiversgoing down, audio quality

(11:24):
problems or confusion over thelatest cap configuration.
I've seen states where a singleengineer or a public safety
official serves as the de factocoordinator, fielding questions
and keeping everyone on the samepage.
From the broadcaster'sperspective, maintaining that
relationship with emergencymanagers is critical.

(11:45):
You want to be confident thatwhen the EOC issues a message,
you'll receive it promptly andclearly, and they need to trust
that you'll rebroadcast itaccurately without unnecessary
delays.
I can think of plenty ofexamples where this coordination

(12:07):
made a huge difference.
During a tornado outbreak acouple of years ago, one of the
LP1 stations I worked with lostthe primary monitoring receiver
due to a lightning strikeBecause they had a secondary
path through an SR station.
They were still able to get thealerts out with only a few
seconds of delay.

(12:27):
That backup plan and therelationship behind it probably
saved lives that night.
It's easy to forget how EASrelies on human connection,
especially in the age when weassume everything is automated,
but a big part of my job isstill picking up the phone

(12:48):
calling the county EOC oremailing other engineers to sort
out little issues before theybecome big ones.
So when you think about how analert gets from the county
laptop to a radio in your car,remember it's not just servers
and satellites, it's people,protocols and a lot of teamwork.

(13:25):
Let's talk about four ways youcan strengthen your local
alerting.
Number one know your plan.
If you work in broadcasting,get familiar with your state EAS
plan.
It's usually online somewhere.
Number two make sure you testoften, even if you're confident
your gear works, test.

(13:45):
Uncover little surprises likeoutdated monitoring assignments.
Number three buildrelationships.
Meet your local emergencymanagers before there's a crisis
, exchange phone numbers.
Learn their process.
Number four stay updatedSoftware and IPAL certificates.

(14:06):
They expire.
Make sure your systems arecurrent so you're not scrambling
during an activation.
Now my favorite part ListenerQ&A.
Here's a question I get a lotwhy do some areas send a lot of

(14:31):
alerts and others almost neveruse EAS?
Great question.
Part of it is local policy.
Some agencies are more cautiousabout using EAS because they
don't want to cause unnecessarypanic.
Another factor is staffing andtraining.
If a county doesn't have afull-time emergency management
team, there may be fewer alertssimply because there's less

(14:54):
capacity to monitor and issuethem.
That's why you see such apatchwork across the country.
If you're a broadcaster, thebest thing you can do is stay
connected to your localauthorities, so you know what to
expect.
Even in the best case scenario,local alerting comes with real

(15:17):
obstacles.
Some are technical, some areprocedural and some that are
just plain human.
First, there's funding.
Yeah, the money.
Many counties and smallerbroadcasters they're operating
on shoestring budgets.
Updating alerting softwarecosts money.

(15:38):
Replacing old receivers andencoders costs money.
Training staff on how to useIPOS or maintain EAS gear takes
time, and well, time is moneytoo.
I've visited stations where EASequipment was over a decade old
and in some places it's stillworking fine, but in others it's

(16:00):
held together by spare partsand well creative fixes.
That might be okay on a normalday, but when there's a real
emergency, you don't want to beleft wondering if the encoder
will fire correctly, be leftwondering if the encoder will

(16:21):
fire correctly.
Then there's staffing the humanelement.
A lot of smaller counties don'thave a full-time emergency
manager.
The person who's authorized toissue an alert might be the
sheriff or the countyadministrator or the 911
director.
If they're not available when acrisis hits, the alert might be
delayed or not issued at all.
Even when the person isavailable, they may be hesitant

(16:45):
to act without clearconfirmation of the threat.
Another issue is publicperception.
False or poorly worded alertscan cause panic or erode trust
in the public.
You probably remember the falsemissile alert in Hawaii a few
years ago.
It was a classic example of howone bad message can damage the

(17:09):
confidence in the whole system.
Ever since, a lot of agencieshave become more conservative
about issuing alerts, sometimesto the point where they don't
send anything when they probablyshould.
And let's not forget theinfrastructure challenge In
smaller areas.

(17:29):
Internet connections can beunreliable.
A county might lose theirconnection to IPALs during a
storm just when they need it themost.
Some stations rely onover-the-air monitoring of LP1s
that can fade out or becomenoisy.
Even the telephone lines usedas backup can be vulnerable to

(17:51):
outages.
One EAS chair I interviewed toldme quote you can have all the
technology in the world, but ifpeople don't trust each other or
don't know who to call, itfalls apart.
I think about that a lot,because the emergency alert
system is built on relationships.

(18:12):
Trust between emergencymanagers, broadcasters and the
public is glue that holds it alltogether.
That's why investing intraining, modern equipment and
clear communication protocols isalso important, and why it's
critical for broadcasters andemergency managers to meet on a

(18:34):
normal basis, not just whensomething goes wrong, because
when the pressure is on, youdon't want to be scrambling to

(18:55):
figure out who has the keys tosend the message.
Today, we pulled the lens in tolook at the unsung heroes of EAS
the state and local teamsmaking the real-time decisions
to keep people safe.
Next time we're going to zoomback out and talk about what's

(19:18):
holding EAS back and how it canget better.
From outdated equipment toevolving threats, there's a lot
to tackle.
If you've got a story about analert good or bad I'd love to
hear it.
You'll find the link in theshow description where you can
text in your thoughts, or youcan email me directly, tyler at

(19:43):
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(20:15):
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