August 7, 2025 • 40 mins
Britain’s 2018 “fusion doctrine” was an effort to bring together the elements of national power to enhance the country’s security and strategic interests under the post-Brexit “global Britain”.
Its architect, Lord Mark Sedwill, is today’s guest. He assesses the key global trends, challenges and crises—Donald Trump’s second administration; Chinese assertiveness; Russia’s war on Ukraine and the unfolding tragedy in Gaza—and talks about what a fusion doctrine might look like for 2025, including the dynamic elements of rapid technology advances and turmoil in international trade.
Mark held the dual roles of national security adviser and cabinet secretary—or the head of the UK civil service—under Prime Ministers Theresa May and Boris Johnson. He’s previously served as UK ambassador to Afghanistan, the NATO senior civilian representative in Afghanistan and the head of the Home Office. He’s now a Member of the UK House of Lords and chair of the think tank International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
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(00:01):
Stop the world. Welcome to Stop the World, the
Aspy Podcast. I'm Olivia Nelson.
And I'm David Rowe. Dave, we're bringing our
listeners another video podcast.So for our listeners that prefer
to get their podcast in video form, head over to Spotify or
Aspy's YouTube channel. For the rest of our listeners
who prefer audio, carry on as you were.
Personally live I'm an audio only guy but our listeners have
(00:23):
spoken as it were and clearly a lot more of them would like to
watch us as well as hear us so. We are.
Doing our best to bring more videos.
Now, Dave, today we have a trulyfascinating guest, another Brit,
the second in a matter of weeks.And as it happens, they're both
former the UK National Security Advisors.
Yep, we had Stephen Lovegrove a few weeks ago.
Today it's Lord Mark Sedwell. Mark, as you say, is a very
(00:46):
interesting guy. He was previously National
Security Advisor and also Cabinet Secretary, which is the
head of the civil service in theUK system.
It's also a key position advising the Prime Minister in
his case, first under Theresa May, who appointed him, and then
under Boris Johnson. He also previously served as UK
Ambassador to Afghanistan, the NATO senior civilian
(01:06):
representative in Afghanistan and the head of the Home Office.
He's now a member of the UK House of Lords and chair of the
think tank International Institute or Strategic Studies.
That is their mouthful. Yes indeed, he was also a diving
instructor in his early days after after he finished school
and went travelling. I was more jealous of that than
anything else on his CV, as impressive as it is.
(01:27):
Because I've always Harvard secret desires to be a diving
instructor myself. It's one of the many unfulfilled
ambitions that I have. One of many, Dave Yes, Sedwell
is known for setting out a fusion doctrine which meant
ensuring the UK was deploying the full set of its national
security, economic and influencecapabilities against the full
set of its national security, economic and influence goals.
(01:47):
So what does that mean? Yep, we talked about that and
how it would look in 2025. But first we went, we went
around the world and discussed all the major global challenges.
He's he's a, he's a big picture thinker.
He's a great thinkers, so we hada big picture discussion.
It seemed fitting. A lot of pictures.
I I can't wait to hear it. Let's hear from Dave and Lord
Sedwill. Welcome to STOP the World.
(02:08):
I'm here with Lord Mark Sedwill.Mark, thanks for coming on.
Very good to be with you, David.So, OK, I'm going to go around,
I'm going to point the the viewers and the, and the, and
the listeners in the direction of the conversation a little bit
just so they know where we're going.
You're known for your national security capability review.
I mean you're known for a lot ofthings, but that was one thing
you did is in your roles as headof the civil service in the UK
(02:30):
and National Security Advisor simultaneously 2018 and was
centred around something called the fusion doctrine bringing
together the various elements ofnational power, military,
economic, diplomatic, social, etcetera.
So I do want to bring the conversation back around to that
and, and talk about how countries like the UK and
Australia can structure themselves for the future,
(02:52):
including in cooperation with one another.
But a lot's happened in the seven years since he wrote that
document, obviously. And so I, I do, I feel like a, a
quick jaunt around the world is,is, is useful.
First of all, I mean, one of thebig trends, obviously, Trump's
second term, he's I I suppose, using U.S.
National power in his unorthodoxway in an even more pronounced
(03:15):
fashion than he did during his first term to to reshape the
world or in some cases, well, neglect to use it to reshape the
world. And and you in your previous
roles dealt with Trump during his first term.
What do you see as the obvious opportunities for other
(03:36):
democracies who are perhaps a little more wedded to the idea
of a traditional liberal international order to try and
shape policy? Trump 2.0 policy, either by
minimising the the damage that it could do to their interests
or by even perhaps encouraging Trump's unorthodox instincts to
(03:59):
try and leverage global solutions of some kind, perhaps
to to long standing problems forinstance.
Yeah, look, it's a great question.
I think what is really striking is just how much better prepared
he was, as you would expect in away for his second term that he
was for his first. He's hit the ground running.
We've seen this. It's a Blizzard really of
executive orders. Of course, there's a lot of
controversy within American politics about the governing
(04:22):
style, the the unorthodox oppressed cheques and balances,
you know, the judicial system and so on.
But, but internationally, of course, the key issue for allies
is the tariff policy and, and the, the thing that most other
countries are wrestling with is not necessarily the imposition
of tariffs and, and, and a new level of tariffs.
(04:43):
If those are stable, then you know, trade patterns can adjust
and, and are optimised for them.It's the, the thing that most
governments are wrestling with is just how, how changeable that
policy is and the use of tariffsnot just for economic purposes,
but for political purposes. Of course, Australia and the UK
(05:03):
have actually managed to secure the baseline tariff of 10% and,
and demonstrate to the Trump administration that actually it
is in American interests as wellas ours that we stabilise those
relationships and, and that we operate genuinely, as genuinely
as ours. I think the key to dealing with
President Trump is you have to recognise this America First
(05:27):
imperative that he has. The policies do vary.
He, he's a, he's a very unusual politician.
But the, the key theme is America First.
So it's showing that we are willing to be genuine partners
that genuinely share the burden in our collective interest,
economic interest, security interest, etcetera.
Be completely upfront with him about what we see our national
(05:49):
interests are. He he he expects countries to be
willing to talk about their national interest in quite
transactional terms, doesn't mind that that isn't necessarily
the same as the US because then,OK, we can make a deal on that
basis. And but it's, it's being willing
to come to the table in that wayand show him that what we're
proposing the, the whatever the line is, whatever the issue is,
(06:11):
what we're proposing is there's some benefit to his view of what
the American National interest is.
And actually, as I say, be upfront about it being in the
interest of the UK, the interestof Australia, whatever it is,
whatever it is as well. Of course, it is just worth
keeping in mind though, that noteverything has changed since
January the 20th. You know, the really big issues
(06:31):
that affect businesses and investors and governments and
citizens, climate change, demographic change,
technological revolution, those things are much longer term than
any particular presidency. And we've got to deal with we've
got to deal with those as well because those are going to shape
the world over the next 25 years.
Yeah. So, yeah, I mean those problems,
those international problems you're describing obviously
(06:54):
require global cooperation and and global solutions.
And the approach that you're describing from individual
countries, including I guess fellow democracies, fellow rule
abiding that nations might be grateful their their own
national interests and preserving their national
(07:14):
interests in their relationship with the US.
But is there some way for us to I guess, you know, continue
well, I guess try and keep the US on some sort of course that
preserves an element of the rolethat it's played for the last
7580 years that have been, I guess, to my mind, so beneficial
to the to the stability of the world.
(07:36):
Well, I think again, by showing that it benefits the US, you,
you agree or disagree with it. The, the Trump analysis is that
American partners have essentially benefited from the U
SS security umbrella, the, the underwriting by the US of the,
(07:56):
of the economic system, the trading system.
So, and the, but the US hasn't benefited from that.
And he wants to reset that. Now you can agree or disagree
with that, but that is clearly his world view.
So I think what we have, what partners have to do is to show,
OK, yeah, we are willing to share the burden, we are willing
to address the issues that he cares about it and therefore
keep the keep the United States engaged on that basis.
(08:16):
So you look at the recent NATO summit, a lot of concerns that
that President Trump was going to come into that and
essentially tear up a lot of thea lot of the understandings on
which which NATO has has been based for for 80 odd, 80 odd
years. And had the Europeans refused to
(08:36):
commit to increasing defence investment up to 3 1/2% of their
national income, 5% in total, including resilience and other
and other things. And I think that would have been
a real risk because we saw that during the First Presidency.
But knowing that he kind of means it, Europeans did commit
(08:57):
to that skilful NATO Secretary general, put that package
together. And President Trump reaffirmed
American commitment to the alliance because he saw that the
the the Europeans were willing to share the burden, were
willing to do their do their part.
So the answer kind of lies in that, I think.
And some of this is about him and his particular world view.
(09:17):
But actually, he isn't wrong about the burden sharing.
And although he puts it in his own very vivid way, that's just
the way he, you know, he operates many Americans who
express themselves in more measured terms.
And he tends to have told us over many years that we simply
weren't doing enough. The American taxpayer could no
longer essentially subsidised a welfare model.
(09:39):
He didn't enjoy themselves, you,etcetera, etcetera.
And he just says that out loud in a way that others have.
Others have said it in more measured or more diplomatic
terms. But fundamentally, American
allies do have to accept we needto do more in our own and in our
collective defence interest in order to maintain US engagement.
(10:00):
Because the bigger risk is not the sort of particular sort of
Trump style, if you like, quite a unilateral style, quite a
quite an unpredictable, unorthodox style.
As you've said, the bigger risk lies in isolationism.
And there is a tendency in American politics which is
towards isolationism. It's always been there.
It comes and goes. We saw a bit of it over the over
(10:22):
the, the 12 day war and and the involvement in Iran when there
was a bit of a backlash in some of the MAGA movement against the
Trump policy of getting engaged.You you see that isolationist
tendency, that's a bigger risk for allies than actually dealing
with a president who is transactional and determined to
put American interests first. Yeah, that's that's fair.
(10:44):
I do hope that Mark Rutte gets the last laugh, having been the
butt of cartoonists and Saturn exactly over.
That he's had a he's had a fairly tough time.
I don't think he'll be using thedaddy word.
Again for a while, but I, I, I hope that his, his, his wise
handling pays off, as you say. Well, I think it has.
I think genuinely has. I mean, as you say, we can poke
(11:05):
fun at the particular language and and so on.
But fundamentally, like his predecessor, actually like Jens
Stoltenberg, who did this duringthe first Trump administration,
he has skilfully managed to bring the Europeans together to
make the commitments necessary and to hold the alliance
together. That's a, you know, that's a
really important role for the secretary general.
Agree. And I think that we're both have
(11:26):
been both fantastic China, the other superpower.
Is there still a prospect of a cooperation among democratic
partners. This relates to, to the answers
that you've, that you've given already to, to constrain China's
ambitions and and tame its behaviour.
You know, we've, we've, we've, we've hoped for much of the last
10/15/20 years that some combination of deterrence and
(11:47):
reassurance can, can, can put constraints on China's more, I
suppose, hegemonic ambitions, particularly for the Indo
Pacific. Clearly orcas is alive.
No one's going to breathe out until Elbridge Colby's review
drops. But it you know it probably
it'll probably be OK. The Quad big interest for
Australia seems pretty shaky right now with the, with US,
(12:10):
India relations going the way they're going.
NATO in pretty good shape as we've talked about, but but it's
focus is understandably Russia first and foremost.
The US talks about China as it'ssystemic rival, but Trump does
seem prepared to do deals with it.
Can can rule abiding states still shape China's behaviour
(12:32):
and if so, how? So the short answer is yes.
And the answer is if we act together, I mean that's now I
could give you a very long version of that, but that is
fundamentally it. And now and actually we can do
that in, in, in, in I think really effective ways.
So you talked about a a blend ofdeterrence and reassurance.
(12:53):
It is still that blend. There are things on which we
have to work with China. We have to work with China on
climate change. China is a major economic power.
Every country wishes to, to trade with China.
It's obviously an important export market for Australia, but
it's an important market for theUK.
And actually it's America's biggest trading partner outside
the NAFTA, the NAFTA area. So every country is, you know,
(13:17):
is trading, is trading with China.
And we need China engaged in thein the, in the world, in the
world economy. But of course there are elements
of Chinese behaviour we have to we have to push back against and
particularly as they become moreassertive in their region.
We have the UK carrier strike group with HMS Prince of Wales,
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which was just in Australia heading up to Japan over the
next couple of weeks. And part of that is to
demonstrate a continuing UK commitment to freedom of
navigation, maintaining the sea,the open free trade routes in
the, in the Pacific, including the South China Sea and so on.
And Australia's done that in thepast and, and, and the United
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States as well. So all of those things are
necessary. We'll do those most effectively
if we will essentially take a position in concert.
And that doesn't mean being hostile to China.
It just means being firm and being clear about where the red
lines are. And if we act in concert, then
we can clearly influence Chinesebehaviour and we can also induce
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China to behave as a responsibleinternational player.
And I think some of the talk about the US China rivalry is,
is somewhat overdone. You know, I genuinely don't
think we're in a second Cold Warand and we're not yet in in the
sort of facilities trap place. Actually, the US and China, of
course, a highly competitive andrivalrous, but they are also
managing that relationship. Both countries actually with
(14:44):
real skill. They've avoided any of the
regional conflicts, Ukraine, theMiddle East wars in Africa,
where their interests are are not aligned.
They've avoided any of those bringing them into real tension,
let alone confrontation with each other.
And they seem determined to ensure that they put a boundary
around their competition to ensure that it doesn't get out
(15:05):
of hand. They don't miscalculate.
It doesn't become confrontational.
Of course there are risks, and one can think of examples where
it could trigger a confrontationof that kind, but they they seem
determined to avoid it. And of course that's in the
interests of all of us. Sure they do.
Sure. Are the current settings though
in terms of the I guess the degree of coordinated pushback
(15:29):
enough or can you see us needingto step those up?
No, I think we should do a better job of it.
If you think over the past few years, both Australia and
Canada, for example, have felt pretty lonely when some of your
citizens have in effect been, you know, just just take taken
hostage in effect by the by the Chinese system.
And you probably felt, you know,your allies were a bit too quiet
(15:52):
about dealing with that. So I think you know the only
answer. I mean, the United States, of
course, can stand on their own 2feet.
But for the rest of us, whether or not we have the direct
support on any particular issue in the United States.
But if yeah, let's say the rest of the G7 plus Australia, plus
South Korea, plus others who arealigned with us.
And by the G7, I mean the whole of the EU, not just the, the
(16:14):
countries at the, the table. If if all of those other
countries, you the the next tierof western oriented democratic
countries, Japan, Australia, theUK, South Korea, France,
Germany, etcetera, take a, a coherent approach and say we're
all taking this position on whatever it might be, human
rights, Hong Kong, the South China Sea, etcetera.
(16:40):
Then China has no choice but to respect that.
If we take different positions or if one or other just finds
ourselves in the crosshairs and no one comes to their support,
then we will be played off. And when I chaired G7 panel back
in back in 20/20/21, we talked about solidarity among Western
(17:02):
nations. And actually that G7 panel
included Australia because they were Australians.
At that summit we talked about exactly that point.
How do we act in solidarity? Because by acting in solidarity
doesn't have to be hostile, doesn't have to be
confrontational, but we can thenset boundaries that China has to
respect. OK.
(17:23):
Closer to home for you, Russia, Europe, UK, how confident are
you that that the UK and Europe can rise to the challenge of of
containing and pushing back Russia, keeping the US involved
enough for long enough to give the rest of NATO the runway it
(17:44):
needs to to compose itself and rise to that challenge?
What, How nervous are you as a, as a, as an Englishman right
now? I was more nervous even a few
months ago than I am now. I think the later summit was an
important moment because it wasn't clear that that we would
achieve exactly that, that goal that you just set out.
(18:04):
But the fact that European NATO committed to this increased
investment in defence and that that is real investment in real
capability, that there's also a commitment which is less in the
headlines than the 3 1/2% but but which is in many ways
equally important, that that we're going to integrate that
(18:25):
capability and that we're going to integrate our defence
industrial base to produce what we need more effectively
together. Those elements are really,
really important. And in the end, we need to, you
know, we need to remember that together, even if the United
States isn't directly involved or although providing enablers,
providing the underlying assurance, but even if they
(18:47):
aren't directly involved, together we do outmatch the, the
Russian threat. And of course, we do have in
Western Europe 2 nuclear weaponsstates as well who can provide,
We don't have as many, but we can still provide that minimum
level of nuclear deterrence against Russia that deters the
Russian nuclear threat as well. And both we and the French,
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we've always done it, Ours is ours is always, the UK has
always been a NATO oriented deterrent.
The French are talking in the same kind of terms about
providing that reassurance to allies alongside us and
alongside the US. So the simple truth is we had to
get our act together in order tobe able to provide that that
(19:31):
common front against the Russianthreat.
And I think that the NATO summitjob not done yet, but the NATO
summit, which have a really important step forward.
And, and I'm, I'm confident people understand the the nature
of the threat. It isn't just Poland and the
Baltics who are right up againstit.
Of course you see it. It is the rest of nature that
understands we need to act in concert in that way.
Yeah, I mean, that's certainly the impression that we get from
(19:54):
further afield here. I can't resist asking you for a
quick prediction. We're roughly 72 hours away as
we're recording from the deadline that Trump has set for
Putin to come up with a ceasefire deal.
I think Saturday our time, it works out, too.
I can't say I'm overwhelmingly confident that he will come up
with that. He won't take the take the
Mickey. But what do you think Putin
might come up with? I'm not sure he's going to come
(20:16):
up with very much. He's, he's shown no sign of
doing so so far. So I think he's going, he will
probably put the Trump administration to the test, say,
OK, you you've said there are going to be consequences if I
don't. Well, let's see what those are.
And I and I think, yeah, he'll do that in a way that's more
measured than the recent Medvedev language and looks.
(20:39):
Yeah, of course. I mean, he's largely talking to
a Russian audience. It's not an international one in
order to shore up his own position.
But I don't think we'll see thatkind of language from Putin.
He's always more measured and sort of colder and more sinister
in many ways as a result. But I'd be pretty surprised if
the Americans come away with what they're hoping for.
And I think Putin will want to say, OK, let's just see how
serious, how serious this this pressure is.
(21:02):
And then of course, the ball is then back in the in the in the
Washington court. It doesn't say if they're
willing to to see it through it.Does feel more serious this
time? It it.
Just yeah, it does. And, and I welcome that totally.
After the episode with Zelensky in the Oval Office back in back
at the beginning of the the the Trump administration, I think we
were all really concerned that adeal would be imposed that the
(21:24):
rest of us really couldn't get behind.
I think that threat is that riskhas ebbed.
And it's partly because Putin has overplayed, overplayed it.
He's been utterly intransigent. He's he's clearly wants to keep
the war going. He's still making demands that
are simply untenable for for thefor, for Ukraine itself, for the
government in Ukraine, for Western Europe.
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And we've got to stay solid on those.
And the only thing this guy understands is strength.
So, you know, strength and unitywill constrain that threat.
Hold on to that anger, PresidentTrump quickly on the other
flashpoint, Middle East. I mean quickly, he says.
I mean, I see it right now to bebluntly tell you what I think
(22:10):
Israel feels to me like it's throwing away the strategic
advantage that it won for itselfwith its, its military victories
over its regional antagonists, throwing away international
support with its, with the starvation in Gaza.
Interested in your views of of, I mean how you would
characterise it and to what extent do you think it's going
to continue to contribute to broader global risks for the, I
(22:33):
suppose, the next decade or so? Yeah, I mean the situation of
golfer is just utterly appallingand unnecessary.
I mean, even even if one didn't care about the humanitarian
catastrophe there, and there areclearly some who don't, we all
must. But it's also against Israel's
long term security interests because by allowing this to
(22:54):
happen and not dealing with it as effectively as as they could
and should. If you, if you carry out a
military campaign is the old, what Conan Powell called it, the
Pottery Barn argument. If you break it, you own it.
If you carry out a military campaign, you are responsible
for the humanitarian consequences of that campaign,
whether those consequences are directly from the campaign or
because your adversaries behaving badly or whatever.
(23:16):
You, you, you have to take responsibility for that.
And in in allowing this to happen, Israel is creating
another generation of disaffection and resentment
which will damage their securityinterest in the long term.
So even if you only care about security, and I'm a strong,
always been a strong supporter of the relationship, the
alliance with Israel, the intelligence relationship with
(23:37):
Israel, etcetera. Even even if you only care about
security and not and not the immediate humanitarian
catastrophe, their action in Gaza is actually damaging their
long term security. And it is frustrating as a
friend of Israel to to to see that.
I mean, one has to admire the capability of the action they
(24:00):
took against Hezbollah and Iran,clearly superb intelligence.
And, and what that demonstrates,of course, is that with that
they were able to use precision force in those cases with very
little collateral damage, very few civilian casualties and an
effective an effective effort then, of course, reinforced by
(24:21):
the American that those those those American strikes.
And I think we have to acknowledge that the handling of
that has been genuinely quite skillful in that there was
clearly a risk it would escalate, but it hasn't.
The Iranians have understood thethe weakness of their position,
(24:41):
but also were reassured by the Americans that that, you know,
that action, those strikes were all that they were intending to
do. They felt they'd achieved their
objectives. And if the Iranians didn't
escalate, then it would finish their the 12 day, the 12 day war
as President Trump christened it.
(25:02):
And, and that has reduced dramatically the Iranian threat
to the, to the region, which we were all wrestling with for a,
for a really long period. And in a sense, it's the
contrast between these two elements of the of the campaign,
which is, which is most tragic and, and frustrating because as
(25:23):
you say, there's been a real advance in, in reducing the
Iranian threat on one front at the same time as seeing this,
this ghastly situation, this humanitarian catastrophe and
actually damage to the security of the region on the other.
And we, we have to stay focused on that.
Yeah, yeah, I couldn't agree more.
I mean, is for one, one who is instinctively sympathetic
(25:47):
towards Israel, it can be frustrating.
All right, let's bring this all around to, to to a fusion
doctrine today. Now I'm going to, at the risk of
asking you to do 6 months of work in 3 minutes.
If you were doing the same sort of review in 2025, thinking
about the next decade or so, I mean just in just in broad terms
and what are the, what are the sort of major considerations
that you'd be taking? Account well, actually we've
(26:08):
been talking about them. So when we when we put that
together, one of the things we were one of the policy areas we
were wrestling with was the challenge of China.
Now, of course it's evolved in the past several years, but we
were dealing with fundamentally exactly the same question.
How do we maintain a positive economic relationship?
How do we find ways of working with China on global challenges
(26:29):
like climate change, whilst alsoconstraining those elements of
Chinese behaviour that we can't live with and that we see as A
and and mitigating the security threats.
So we were wrestling with exactly that issue and the whole
fusion approach. I mean, essentially to put it in
a nutshell, it was that, you know, for a country like the UK,
we have security, economic and and wider kind of interests
(26:51):
about global influence. And we have capabilities in all
those areas as well. Security and defence
capabilities, economic and development capabilities,
diplomatic influence, communications capabilities.
And the central idea was use allof the capabilities in support
of all of the objectives. And what does that mean?
It means the national security gang need to care about our
economic and trading interests. The economic departments need to
(27:14):
recognise they have a responsibility for national
security. Yeah, etcetera, etcetera.
And, and recognise that if you want to make a, a system like
the UK is, which actually has pretty balanced capabilities,
you know, world class diplomaticservice, great intelligence
services, effective and actuallyquite large military, big
development budget, etcetera. That that balanced set of
(27:37):
capabilities is most effectivelyapplied if we recognise it's
fundamentally A-Team sport. And that was the basic view
insight behind the fusion doctrine.
And I think that if anything, it's even more relevant today as
we're dealing with these evolving challenges.
To what extent would you bring the private sector into it more?
(28:01):
I mean, industry is a really interesting, I mean, obviously
an interesting component of national power.
If you are trying to harm, harmonise all of your, all of
the elements of your national power.
You know, I mean, I suppose it'salways been the case, but it, it
feels right now as if, you know,so much of the innovation is, is
happening in the private sector now, you know, the tech, the
(28:21):
tech sector and so forth. We see these, I guess,
aberrations like, and, you know,I mean, an Australian talking
to, to, to a Brit here. But to use the, the US as an
example, the reversal of the export restrictions on NVIDIA
(28:42):
H20 chips, for instance, clearlydue to some effective lobbying
from, from Jensen Huang doesn't seem to be terribly consistent
with the idea of a, of a, of a sort of, you know, nationally
fused approach. Even though Trump in a lot of
ways, does seem to have this sort of instinctive feel of
using national power in a sort of coordinated way.
(29:03):
Certainly, I mean, you know, using Americans his economic
might more effectively to get toget the outcomes that he wants
is a good example. But I mean, and there are
probably instances in the UKI mean one that I think of in in
Australia is, you know, we've talked about diversification of
our export markets since the thepattern of coercion that we
(29:27):
faced around the 2020 period. I don't think it's really quite
happened because we've sort of we we seem to have forgotten
that that period or put it behind us, I guess.
Yeah. And and this is this is turning
into a waffly question here, Butcan you just give me your
thoughts on how, how you would bring industry into it in a, in
(29:48):
a, in a more forceful sense thistime around?
And just how, how easy is that to do in a, you know, in a
country that still believes in fundamentally open economies?
You know, I mean this, this fusion idea, I guess it's it,
it, it's become a fashionable idea in, in in lots of ways, But
you know, whether anyone has ever quite sort of mastered the
(30:10):
implementation of it seems to bea.
An outstanding question. You're absolutely right.
I mean implementation is, is tough.
Of course, it has become a fashionable idea in some
quarters, but the the inherent structures of government are
still highly siloed. And so building the connective
tissue to, to ensure that on thethings we really care about,
government is a team sport. And that team does, as you say,
include private industry and in some areas can include even the
(30:33):
third sector and wider civil society is a really tough thing
to, to, to, to pull off because the leavers aren't always
direct. And I think that's part of the
answer to this. So there are clearly areas, and
this is probably is, is is probably more acute now in 2025
than it was when we were thinking about this in, in the
run up to that capability review.
(30:53):
One area that is that there was definitely a feature of our
recent national security strategy in the UK and the
defence review is national resilience.
You've got to think in the modern economy, in the modern
society, critical national infrastructure is not just the,
the core defence establishment that we used to think of it of
in the Cold War involves mobile phone networks, involves the
food retailers. It certainly involves all your
(31:15):
power networks and water and other utilities and so on.
And most of those are in privatehands.
So if you're thinking about resilience, contingency
planning, resilience against cyber attacks, you know,
etcetera, you've just got to have a conversation with all of
those, all of those actors. And some of that does involve
regulatory tools in order to ensure that everyone you whom
(31:36):
you're asking to commit resources and so on feels that
there isn't a competitive disadvantage in doing so.
But some of it is simply engaging them in that national
conversation, particularly the bigger players who are, who are
who, who, who can have a material, you know, material
effect. If I think of the UK, most of
our food security lies in the hands of a handful of very big
(32:00):
retailers, Tesco and Sainsbury'sand others of others of that
kind. And the same of course is, is,
is true elsewhere in, in Australia, indeed in the, in the
United States. I think when you're looking out
in terms of projecting that influence out, it's, it's more
indirect. You know, we, we can't, we can't
really be in, in free market economies.
Governments don't do this very well anyway.
(32:22):
We can't really be telling them where to go and invest and so
on. But what we can do is try and
create the conditions in which in which it makes sense for our
big investors, our big businesses to do so by pursuing
free trade deals and so on. So the UK, you know, and
Australia made a free trade agreement a priority after after
(32:45):
Brexit. We've made one with India a
priority after Brexit. That sets some guidelines and
parameters which the private sector can then follow.
Now it'd be up to them whether they whether they do so.
But creating that market access that does create some of the
connective tissue we want on which you can build national
security, national security relationships.
And of course the other thing wecan do is align some of our
(33:07):
investment regimes. So we developed actually using
Australia as a model, the national security investment
regime to try and ensure that wewere able to protect our
critical areas of our, our economy and ensure that that
investment in them didn't, didn't create a create a
vulnerability. I think in terms of diversifying
export markets, you, you, you comment on Australia and many of
(33:31):
your natural resources exports still going to China.
Of course you can't, you can't direct where the demand is.
And at the moment the demand still sits in China and that's
therefore a natural place to to sell.
China does have a near monopoly in the refining and processing
of in particular critical raw materials.
They haven't done anything nefarious to get that by the
(33:52):
way. They just invested in it.
But we are going to have to invest in alternative
capabilities of that kind. In my view, Australia would be a
very natural place for us all tothink about doing that.
Canada, one or two other places as well, because otherwise we
have created a critical dependency.
And we already know that China is willing to turn the dial on
(34:15):
some of those refined critical raw materials in order to put in
pressure, including, for example, into into the United
States. There's a piece in the Wall
Street Journal reflecting a report recently about just how
dependent the US military is on critical raw materials that come
from China. Well, we're going to have to
diversify those things and that is going to require some
(34:36):
government intervention to enable those industries to build
up and not find themselves essentially undercut by China,
you know, who are operating to lower it, labour and
environmental standards. But fundamentally, we've got to
get the private sector and we'vegot to get, you know, the Super
funds and others to invest in inthose areas.
And they can only do so if it makes commercial sense.
So you've got to make sure it makes commercial sense, right?
(34:57):
Good. OK, one final one and another,
I'm afraid, sort of fairly broadone.
I'm going to splice a couple of ideas together here, but I mean,
social resilience in, in advanced democracies right now
feels a little bit frayed as well.
You know, obviously think basic things like trust in
institutions is low. I, I, I, I'd have to check the
(35:21):
stats across all countries, But I mean, there is, there are
clear indicators that suggest that the quality of life for the
first time in the, you know, thegeneration that is at school now
or finishing university now is projected to be lower than, than
their parents. And, and, and you know, it's,
it's the first time in a long time that that trend has started
to, to go downwards. If we're going to 0 in on one
thing, it's a fascination of mine and that is the, the impact
(35:44):
of artificial intelligence on, on the job market.
I would go so far as to say it's, it's not an unreasonable
fear that it is going to disruptthe job market so severely that
it could put pressure on, on, you know, the well that it could
cause political and social upheaval, you know, sometime in
the next decade. How worried are you about that
(36:07):
particular issue? And do you have any broader
reflections just on the on, on how we try to shore up our
social resilience as well? Big question.
I think you're right, by the way, you know, as a parent, I, I
like you worry that about exactly that question whether
the next generation are going tohave the same opportunities as
(36:28):
advantage and the opportunity to, you know, we all as parents
want our kids to have a better life than we have.
You know, whatever, whatever your start point is, you want
your kids to have a better startpoint than than than you had.
And we all work very hard for that.
And you're right to point to therisk that generationally there
is a, there's a genuine questionthere.
And part of that is the technological revolution, not
(36:51):
just AI, but the other, the other technologies all coming
together in, in, in one go. And part of it actually just
over the past 15 years was the financial crisis and COVID.
You know, they, I mean, those were, those were major shocks to
the, to the system. The financial crisis had the
effect of damaging societal resilience.
I think paradoxically, COVID, ifyou look at the response to how
(37:11):
vaccines were organised and so on, actually probably probably
actually strengthened some of that, that societal engagement.
If I think of getting off and getting a getting a vaccine
during the COVID period, you hadyoung students doing all the
data entry, you have the medicalstaff doing the jobs and you
had, you know, people from the local business clubs running the
(37:32):
car parking and making the wholekind of thing thing work.
So people do, you know, under pressure come together.
We did look after the vulnerablepretty well in most of our
communities and that took a lot of just local, you know, local
people looking after, you know, taking care of people and so on.
So I don't think we should be too apocalyptic about it.
I think those underlying elements of societal resilience,
particularly in stable communities are are there.
(37:55):
But you're right to point to thedisruption of the technological
revolution. I think one of the things that
is that is that all governments and indeed citizens have to get
our heads around is the sheer scale of change that's all
coming together at one time. So we have climate change, we
have demographic change, ageing populations, increasing
longevity, a lot of that very positive, of course.
And we have the technological revolution all coming together
(38:18):
in one time. And that's pretty much
unprecedented, at least since the first industrial revolution.
And of course the first industrial revolution, we did
see major societal disruption coming around that time.
And it's, it's to put it in, it's absolute simplest, the
people in the sunset industries,the people in the sunset jobs
whose jobs are going to go as a result of technological change,
(38:41):
will, will protect, will resent that and can be seduced by
populist politics, which is always essentially pull up the
drawbridge, turn back the clock,blame someone else.
And those who benefit in the newjobs, many of which, you know, I
have no clue what those will be,but there will be new jobs, new
areas of activity, as there has been with every other
(39:02):
technological change. Just get on with the lives and,
and, and, and make A and, and, and, and make the best of their
lives. And so there's a, there's always
a risk that the political systemis skewed towards those who are
protesting the disruption ratherthan those who benefit from the
from the change. And that's the challenge.
I think if you look back over history, countries who've
(39:23):
managed the disruptive effects of a transition through a
technological revolution prosperand businesses prosper and
citizens prosper. And those that don't will
genuinely fall off the pace. And that I think is the, the,
the central challenge for moderngovernments.
As I say, it isn't just the technological revolution, it's
(39:43):
coming together with the disruptive effects of climate
change, both the green transition and indeed climate
resilience. Ageing populations welcome
increasing longevity, but of course the effect of low birth
rates and increasing dependency ratios, all of those things
coming together in one go are are a massive challenge for for
for governments. Some will definitely figure
(40:04):
their way through it and those countries will do really well.
Seize the moment. Yes, Mark.
We've gone around the world in 40 minutes.
Thank you. Thank you so much for talking to
me. Thank you.
That's all we have time for on Stop the World this week.
We'll be back with another episode next week.
Ciao for now.
Stop the world. Welcome to Stop the World, the
Aspy Podcast. I'm Olivia Nelson.
And I'm David Rowe. Dave, we're bringing our
listeners another video podcast.So for our listeners that prefer
to get their podcast in video form, head over to Spotify or
Aspy's YouTube channel. For the rest of our listeners
who prefer audio, carry on as you were.
Personally live I'm an audio only guy but our listeners have
(00:23):
spoken as it were and clearly a lot more of them would like to
watch us as well as hear us so. We are.
Doing our best to bring more videos.
Now, Dave, today we have a trulyfascinating guest, another Brit,
the second in a matter of weeks.And as it happens, they're both
former the UK National Security Advisors.
Yep, we had Stephen Lovegrove a few weeks ago.
Today it's Lord Mark Sedwell. Mark, as you say, is a very
(00:46):
interesting guy. He was previously National
Security Advisor and also Cabinet Secretary, which is the
head of the civil service in theUK system.
It's also a key position advising the Prime Minister in
his case, first under Theresa May, who appointed him, and then
under Boris Johnson. He also previously served as UK
Ambassador to Afghanistan, the NATO senior civilian
(01:06):
representative in Afghanistan and the head of the Home Office.
He's now a member of the UK House of Lords and chair of the
think tank International Institute or Strategic Studies.
That is their mouthful. Yes indeed, he was also a diving
instructor in his early days after after he finished school
and went travelling. I was more jealous of that than
anything else on his CV, as impressive as it is.
(01:27):
Because I've always Harvard secret desires to be a diving
instructor myself. It's one of the many unfulfilled
ambitions that I have. One of many, Dave Yes, Sedwell
is known for setting out a fusion doctrine which meant
ensuring the UK was deploying the full set of its national
security, economic and influencecapabilities against the full
set of its national security, economic and influence goals.
(01:47):
So what does that mean? Yep, we talked about that and
how it would look in 2025. But first we went, we went
around the world and discussed all the major global challenges.
He's he's a, he's a big picture thinker.
He's a great thinkers, so we hada big picture discussion.
It seemed fitting. A lot of pictures.
I I can't wait to hear it. Let's hear from Dave and Lord
Sedwill. Welcome to STOP the World.
(02:08):
I'm here with Lord Mark Sedwill.Mark, thanks for coming on.
Very good to be with you, David.So, OK, I'm going to go around,
I'm going to point the the viewers and the, and the, and
the listeners in the direction of the conversation a little bit
just so they know where we're going.
You're known for your national security capability review.
I mean you're known for a lot ofthings, but that was one thing
you did is in your roles as headof the civil service in the UK
(02:30):
and National Security Advisor simultaneously 2018 and was
centred around something called the fusion doctrine bringing
together the various elements ofnational power, military,
economic, diplomatic, social, etcetera.
So I do want to bring the conversation back around to that
and, and talk about how countries like the UK and
Australia can structure themselves for the future,
(02:52):
including in cooperation with one another.
But a lot's happened in the seven years since he wrote that
document, obviously. And so I, I do, I feel like a, a
quick jaunt around the world is,is, is useful.
First of all, I mean, one of thebig trends, obviously, Trump's
second term, he's I I suppose, using U.S.
National power in his unorthodoxway in an even more pronounced
(03:15):
fashion than he did during his first term to to reshape the
world or in some cases, well, neglect to use it to reshape the
world. And and you in your previous
roles dealt with Trump during his first term.
What do you see as the obvious opportunities for other
(03:36):
democracies who are perhaps a little more wedded to the idea
of a traditional liberal international order to try and
shape policy? Trump 2.0 policy, either by
minimising the the damage that it could do to their interests
or by even perhaps encouraging Trump's unorthodox instincts to
(03:59):
try and leverage global solutions of some kind, perhaps
to to long standing problems forinstance.
Yeah, look, it's a great question.
I think what is really striking is just how much better prepared
he was, as you would expect in away for his second term that he
was for his first. He's hit the ground running.
We've seen this. It's a Blizzard really of
executive orders. Of course, there's a lot of
controversy within American politics about the governing
(04:22):
style, the the unorthodox oppressed cheques and balances,
you know, the judicial system and so on.
But, but internationally, of course, the key issue for allies
is the tariff policy and, and the, the thing that most other
countries are wrestling with is not necessarily the imposition
of tariffs and, and, and a new level of tariffs.
(04:43):
If those are stable, then you know, trade patterns can adjust
and, and are optimised for them.It's the, the thing that most
governments are wrestling with is just how, how changeable that
policy is and the use of tariffsnot just for economic purposes,
but for political purposes. Of course, Australia and the UK
(05:03):
have actually managed to secure the baseline tariff of 10% and,
and demonstrate to the Trump administration that actually it
is in American interests as wellas ours that we stabilise those
relationships and, and that we operate genuinely, as genuinely
as ours. I think the key to dealing with
President Trump is you have to recognise this America First
(05:27):
imperative that he has. The policies do vary.
He, he's a, he's a very unusual politician.
But the, the key theme is America First.
So it's showing that we are willing to be genuine partners
that genuinely share the burden in our collective interest,
economic interest, security interest, etcetera.
Be completely upfront with him about what we see our national
(05:49):
interests are. He he he expects countries to be
willing to talk about their national interest in quite
transactional terms, doesn't mind that that isn't necessarily
the same as the US because then,OK, we can make a deal on that
basis. And but it's, it's being willing
to come to the table in that wayand show him that what we're
proposing the, the whatever the line is, whatever the issue is,
(06:11):
what we're proposing is there's some benefit to his view of what
the American National interest is.
And actually, as I say, be upfront about it being in the
interest of the UK, the interestof Australia, whatever it is,
whatever it is as well. Of course, it is just worth
keeping in mind though, that noteverything has changed since
January the 20th. You know, the really big issues
(06:31):
that affect businesses and investors and governments and
citizens, climate change, demographic change,
technological revolution, those things are much longer term than
any particular presidency. And we've got to deal with we've
got to deal with those as well because those are going to shape
the world over the next 25 years.
Yeah. So, yeah, I mean those problems,
those international problems you're describing obviously
(06:54):
require global cooperation and and global solutions.
And the approach that you're describing from individual
countries, including I guess fellow democracies, fellow rule
abiding that nations might be grateful their their own
national interests and preserving their national
(07:14):
interests in their relationship with the US.
But is there some way for us to I guess, you know, continue
well, I guess try and keep the US on some sort of course that
preserves an element of the rolethat it's played for the last
7580 years that have been, I guess, to my mind, so beneficial
to the to the stability of the world.
(07:36):
Well, I think again, by showing that it benefits the US, you,
you agree or disagree with it. The, the Trump analysis is that
American partners have essentially benefited from the U
SS security umbrella, the, the underwriting by the US of the,
(07:56):
of the economic system, the trading system.
So, and the, but the US hasn't benefited from that.
And he wants to reset that. Now you can agree or disagree
with that, but that is clearly his world view.
So I think what we have, what partners have to do is to show,
OK, yeah, we are willing to share the burden, we are willing
to address the issues that he cares about it and therefore
keep the keep the United States engaged on that basis.
(08:16):
So you look at the recent NATO summit, a lot of concerns that
that President Trump was going to come into that and
essentially tear up a lot of thea lot of the understandings on
which which NATO has has been based for for 80 odd, 80 odd
years. And had the Europeans refused to
(08:36):
commit to increasing defence investment up to 3 1/2% of their
national income, 5% in total, including resilience and other
and other things. And I think that would have been
a real risk because we saw that during the First Presidency.
But knowing that he kind of means it, Europeans did commit
(08:57):
to that skilful NATO Secretary general, put that package
together. And President Trump reaffirmed
American commitment to the alliance because he saw that the
the the Europeans were willing to share the burden, were
willing to do their do their part.
So the answer kind of lies in that, I think.
And some of this is about him and his particular world view.
(09:17):
But actually, he isn't wrong about the burden sharing.
And although he puts it in his own very vivid way, that's just
the way he, you know, he operates many Americans who
express themselves in more measured terms.
And he tends to have told us over many years that we simply
weren't doing enough. The American taxpayer could no
longer essentially subsidised a welfare model.
(09:39):
He didn't enjoy themselves, you,etcetera, etcetera.
And he just says that out loud in a way that others have.
Others have said it in more measured or more diplomatic
terms. But fundamentally, American
allies do have to accept we needto do more in our own and in our
collective defence interest in order to maintain US engagement.
(10:00):
Because the bigger risk is not the sort of particular sort of
Trump style, if you like, quite a unilateral style, quite a
quite an unpredictable, unorthodox style.
As you've said, the bigger risk lies in isolationism.
And there is a tendency in American politics which is
towards isolationism. It's always been there.
It comes and goes. We saw a bit of it over the over
(10:22):
the, the 12 day war and and the involvement in Iran when there
was a bit of a backlash in some of the MAGA movement against the
Trump policy of getting engaged.You you see that isolationist
tendency, that's a bigger risk for allies than actually dealing
with a president who is transactional and determined to
put American interests first. Yeah, that's that's fair.
(10:44):
I do hope that Mark Rutte gets the last laugh, having been the
butt of cartoonists and Saturn exactly over.
That he's had a he's had a fairly tough time.
I don't think he'll be using thedaddy word.
Again for a while, but I, I, I hope that his, his, his wise
handling pays off, as you say. Well, I think it has.
I think genuinely has. I mean, as you say, we can poke
(11:05):
fun at the particular language and and so on.
But fundamentally, like his predecessor, actually like Jens
Stoltenberg, who did this duringthe first Trump administration,
he has skilfully managed to bring the Europeans together to
make the commitments necessary and to hold the alliance
together. That's a, you know, that's a
really important role for the secretary general.
Agree. And I think that we're both have
(11:26):
been both fantastic China, the other superpower.
Is there still a prospect of a cooperation among democratic
partners. This relates to, to the answers
that you've, that you've given already to, to constrain China's
ambitions and and tame its behaviour.
You know, we've, we've, we've, we've hoped for much of the last
10/15/20 years that some combination of deterrence and
(11:47):
reassurance can, can, can put constraints on China's more, I
suppose, hegemonic ambitions, particularly for the Indo
Pacific. Clearly orcas is alive.
No one's going to breathe out until Elbridge Colby's review
drops. But it you know it probably
it'll probably be OK. The Quad big interest for
Australia seems pretty shaky right now with the, with US,
(12:10):
India relations going the way they're going.
NATO in pretty good shape as we've talked about, but but it's
focus is understandably Russia first and foremost.
The US talks about China as it'ssystemic rival, but Trump does
seem prepared to do deals with it.
Can can rule abiding states still shape China's behaviour
(12:32):
and if so, how? So the short answer is yes.
And the answer is if we act together, I mean that's now I
could give you a very long version of that, but that is
fundamentally it. And now and actually we can do
that in, in, in, in I think really effective ways.
So you talked about a a blend ofdeterrence and reassurance.
(12:53):
It is still that blend. There are things on which we
have to work with China. We have to work with China on
climate change. China is a major economic power.
Every country wishes to, to trade with China.
It's obviously an important export market for Australia, but
it's an important market for theUK.
And actually it's America's biggest trading partner outside
the NAFTA, the NAFTA area. So every country is, you know,
(13:17):
is trading, is trading with China.
And we need China engaged in thein the, in the world, in the
world economy. But of course there are elements
of Chinese behaviour we have to we have to push back against and
particularly as they become moreassertive in their region.
We have the UK carrier strike group with HMS Prince of Wales,
(13:39):
which was just in Australia heading up to Japan over the
next couple of weeks. And part of that is to
demonstrate a continuing UK commitment to freedom of
navigation, maintaining the sea,the open free trade routes in
the, in the Pacific, including the South China Sea and so on.
And Australia's done that in thepast and, and, and the United
(14:00):
States as well. So all of those things are
necessary. We'll do those most effectively
if we will essentially take a position in concert.
And that doesn't mean being hostile to China.
It just means being firm and being clear about where the red
lines are. And if we act in concert, then
we can clearly influence Chinesebehaviour and we can also induce
(14:22):
China to behave as a responsibleinternational player.
And I think some of the talk about the US China rivalry is,
is somewhat overdone. You know, I genuinely don't
think we're in a second Cold Warand and we're not yet in in the
sort of facilities trap place. Actually, the US and China, of
course, a highly competitive andrivalrous, but they are also
managing that relationship. Both countries actually with
(14:44):
real skill. They've avoided any of the
regional conflicts, Ukraine, theMiddle East wars in Africa,
where their interests are are not aligned.
They've avoided any of those bringing them into real tension,
let alone confrontation with each other.
And they seem determined to ensure that they put a boundary
around their competition to ensure that it doesn't get out
(15:05):
of hand. They don't miscalculate.
It doesn't become confrontational.
Of course there are risks, and one can think of examples where
it could trigger a confrontationof that kind, but they they seem
determined to avoid it. And of course that's in the
interests of all of us. Sure they do.
Sure. Are the current settings though
in terms of the I guess the degree of coordinated pushback
(15:29):
enough or can you see us needingto step those up?
No, I think we should do a better job of it.
If you think over the past few years, both Australia and
Canada, for example, have felt pretty lonely when some of your
citizens have in effect been, you know, just just take taken
hostage in effect by the by the Chinese system.
And you probably felt, you know,your allies were a bit too quiet
(15:52):
about dealing with that. So I think you know the only
answer. I mean, the United States, of
course, can stand on their own 2feet.
But for the rest of us, whether or not we have the direct
support on any particular issue in the United States.
But if yeah, let's say the rest of the G7 plus Australia, plus
South Korea, plus others who arealigned with us.
And by the G7, I mean the whole of the EU, not just the, the
(16:14):
countries at the, the table. If if all of those other
countries, you the the next tierof western oriented democratic
countries, Japan, Australia, theUK, South Korea, France,
Germany, etcetera, take a, a coherent approach and say we're
all taking this position on whatever it might be, human
rights, Hong Kong, the South China Sea, etcetera.
(16:40):
Then China has no choice but to respect that.
If we take different positions or if one or other just finds
ourselves in the crosshairs and no one comes to their support,
then we will be played off. And when I chaired G7 panel back
in back in 20/20/21, we talked about solidarity among Western
(17:02):
nations. And actually that G7 panel
included Australia because they were Australians.
At that summit we talked about exactly that point.
How do we act in solidarity? Because by acting in solidarity
doesn't have to be hostile, doesn't have to be
confrontational, but we can thenset boundaries that China has to
respect. OK.
(17:23):
Closer to home for you, Russia, Europe, UK, how confident are
you that that the UK and Europe can rise to the challenge of of
containing and pushing back Russia, keeping the US involved
enough for long enough to give the rest of NATO the runway it
(17:44):
needs to to compose itself and rise to that challenge?
What, How nervous are you as a, as a, as an Englishman right
now? I was more nervous even a few
months ago than I am now. I think the later summit was an
important moment because it wasn't clear that that we would
achieve exactly that, that goal that you just set out.
(18:04):
But the fact that European NATO committed to this increased
investment in defence and that that is real investment in real
capability, that there's also a commitment which is less in the
headlines than the 3 1/2% but but which is in many ways
equally important, that that we're going to integrate that
(18:25):
capability and that we're going to integrate our defence
industrial base to produce what we need more effectively
together. Those elements are really,
really important. And in the end, we need to, you
know, we need to remember that together, even if the United
States isn't directly involved or although providing enablers,
providing the underlying assurance, but even if they
(18:47):
aren't directly involved, together we do outmatch the, the
Russian threat. And of course, we do have in
Western Europe 2 nuclear weaponsstates as well who can provide,
We don't have as many, but we can still provide that minimum
level of nuclear deterrence against Russia that deters the
Russian nuclear threat as well. And both we and the French,
(19:09):
we've always done it, Ours is ours is always, the UK has
always been a NATO oriented deterrent.
The French are talking in the same kind of terms about
providing that reassurance to allies alongside us and
alongside the US. So the simple truth is we had to
get our act together in order tobe able to provide that that
(19:31):
common front against the Russianthreat.
And I think that the NATO summitjob not done yet, but the NATO
summit, which have a really important step forward.
And, and I'm, I'm confident people understand the the nature
of the threat. It isn't just Poland and the
Baltics who are right up againstit.
Of course you see it. It is the rest of nature that
understands we need to act in concert in that way.
Yeah, I mean, that's certainly the impression that we get from
(19:54):
further afield here. I can't resist asking you for a
quick prediction. We're roughly 72 hours away as
we're recording from the deadline that Trump has set for
Putin to come up with a ceasefire deal.
I think Saturday our time, it works out, too.
I can't say I'm overwhelmingly confident that he will come up
with that. He won't take the take the
Mickey. But what do you think Putin
might come up with? I'm not sure he's going to come
(20:16):
up with very much. He's, he's shown no sign of
doing so so far. So I think he's going, he will
probably put the Trump administration to the test, say,
OK, you you've said there are going to be consequences if I
don't. Well, let's see what those are.
And I and I think, yeah, he'll do that in a way that's more
measured than the recent Medvedev language and looks.
(20:39):
Yeah, of course. I mean, he's largely talking to
a Russian audience. It's not an international one in
order to shore up his own position.
But I don't think we'll see thatkind of language from Putin.
He's always more measured and sort of colder and more sinister
in many ways as a result. But I'd be pretty surprised if
the Americans come away with what they're hoping for.
And I think Putin will want to say, OK, let's just see how
serious, how serious this this pressure is.
(21:02):
And then of course, the ball is then back in the in the in the
Washington court. It doesn't say if they're
willing to to see it through it.Does feel more serious this
time? It it.
Just yeah, it does. And, and I welcome that totally.
After the episode with Zelensky in the Oval Office back in back
at the beginning of the the the Trump administration, I think we
were all really concerned that adeal would be imposed that the
(21:24):
rest of us really couldn't get behind.
I think that threat is that riskhas ebbed.
And it's partly because Putin has overplayed, overplayed it.
He's been utterly intransigent. He's he's clearly wants to keep
the war going. He's still making demands that
are simply untenable for for thefor, for Ukraine itself, for the
government in Ukraine, for Western Europe.
(21:48):
And we've got to stay solid on those.
And the only thing this guy understands is strength.
So, you know, strength and unitywill constrain that threat.
Hold on to that anger, PresidentTrump quickly on the other
flashpoint, Middle East. I mean quickly, he says.
I mean, I see it right now to bebluntly tell you what I think
(22:10):
Israel feels to me like it's throwing away the strategic
advantage that it won for itselfwith its, its military victories
over its regional antagonists, throwing away international
support with its, with the starvation in Gaza.
Interested in your views of of, I mean how you would
characterise it and to what extent do you think it's going
to continue to contribute to broader global risks for the, I
(22:33):
suppose, the next decade or so? Yeah, I mean the situation of
golfer is just utterly appallingand unnecessary.
I mean, even even if one didn't care about the humanitarian
catastrophe there, and there areclearly some who don't, we all
must. But it's also against Israel's
long term security interests because by allowing this to
(22:54):
happen and not dealing with it as effectively as as they could
and should. If you, if you carry out a
military campaign is the old, what Conan Powell called it, the
Pottery Barn argument. If you break it, you own it.
If you carry out a military campaign, you are responsible
for the humanitarian consequences of that campaign,
whether those consequences are directly from the campaign or
because your adversaries behaving badly or whatever.
(23:16):
You, you, you have to take responsibility for that.
And in in allowing this to happen, Israel is creating
another generation of disaffection and resentment
which will damage their securityinterest in the long term.
So even if you only care about security, and I'm a strong,
always been a strong supporter of the relationship, the
alliance with Israel, the intelligence relationship with
(23:37):
Israel, etcetera. Even even if you only care about
security and not and not the immediate humanitarian
catastrophe, their action in Gaza is actually damaging their
long term security. And it is frustrating as a
friend of Israel to to to see that.
I mean, one has to admire the capability of the action they
(24:00):
took against Hezbollah and Iran,clearly superb intelligence.
And, and what that demonstrates,of course, is that with that
they were able to use precision force in those cases with very
little collateral damage, very few civilian casualties and an
effective an effective effort then, of course, reinforced by
(24:21):
the American that those those those American strikes.
And I think we have to acknowledge that the handling of
that has been genuinely quite skillful in that there was
clearly a risk it would escalate, but it hasn't.
The Iranians have understood thethe weakness of their position,
(24:41):
but also were reassured by the Americans that that, you know,
that action, those strikes were all that they were intending to
do. They felt they'd achieved their
objectives. And if the Iranians didn't
escalate, then it would finish their the 12 day, the 12 day war
as President Trump christened it.
(25:02):
And, and that has reduced dramatically the Iranian threat
to the, to the region, which we were all wrestling with for a,
for a really long period. And in a sense, it's the
contrast between these two elements of the of the campaign,
which is, which is most tragic and, and frustrating because as
(25:23):
you say, there's been a real advance in, in reducing the
Iranian threat on one front at the same time as seeing this,
this ghastly situation, this humanitarian catastrophe and
actually damage to the security of the region on the other.
And we, we have to stay focused on that.
Yeah, yeah, I couldn't agree more.
I mean, is for one, one who is instinctively sympathetic
(25:47):
towards Israel, it can be frustrating.
All right, let's bring this all around to, to to a fusion
doctrine today. Now I'm going to, at the risk of
asking you to do 6 months of work in 3 minutes.
If you were doing the same sort of review in 2025, thinking
about the next decade or so, I mean just in just in broad terms
and what are the, what are the sort of major considerations
that you'd be taking? Account well, actually we've
(26:08):
been talking about them. So when we when we put that
together, one of the things we were one of the policy areas we
were wrestling with was the challenge of China.
Now, of course it's evolved in the past several years, but we
were dealing with fundamentally exactly the same question.
How do we maintain a positive economic relationship?
How do we find ways of working with China on global challenges
(26:29):
like climate change, whilst alsoconstraining those elements of
Chinese behaviour that we can't live with and that we see as A
and and mitigating the security threats.
So we were wrestling with exactly that issue and the whole
fusion approach. I mean, essentially to put it in
a nutshell, it was that, you know, for a country like the UK,
we have security, economic and and wider kind of interests
(26:51):
about global influence. And we have capabilities in all
those areas as well. Security and defence
capabilities, economic and development capabilities,
diplomatic influence, communications capabilities.
And the central idea was use allof the capabilities in support
of all of the objectives. And what does that mean?
It means the national security gang need to care about our
economic and trading interests. The economic departments need to
(27:14):
recognise they have a responsibility for national
security. Yeah, etcetera, etcetera.
And, and recognise that if you want to make a, a system like
the UK is, which actually has pretty balanced capabilities,
you know, world class diplomaticservice, great intelligence
services, effective and actuallyquite large military, big
development budget, etcetera. That that balanced set of
(27:37):
capabilities is most effectivelyapplied if we recognise it's
fundamentally A-Team sport. And that was the basic view
insight behind the fusion doctrine.
And I think that if anything, it's even more relevant today as
we're dealing with these evolving challenges.
To what extent would you bring the private sector into it more?
(28:01):
I mean, industry is a really interesting, I mean, obviously
an interesting component of national power.
If you are trying to harm, harmonise all of your, all of
the elements of your national power.
You know, I mean, I suppose it'salways been the case, but it, it
feels right now as if, you know,so much of the innovation is, is
happening in the private sector now, you know, the tech, the
(28:21):
tech sector and so forth. We see these, I guess,
aberrations like, and, you know,I mean, an Australian talking
to, to, to a Brit here. But to use the, the US as an
example, the reversal of the export restrictions on NVIDIA
(28:42):
H20 chips, for instance, clearlydue to some effective lobbying
from, from Jensen Huang doesn't seem to be terribly consistent
with the idea of a, of a, of a sort of, you know, nationally
fused approach. Even though Trump in a lot of
ways, does seem to have this sort of instinctive feel of
using national power in a sort of coordinated way.
(29:03):
Certainly, I mean, you know, using Americans his economic
might more effectively to get toget the outcomes that he wants
is a good example. But I mean, and there are
probably instances in the UKI mean one that I think of in in
Australia is, you know, we've talked about diversification of
our export markets since the thepattern of coercion that we
(29:27):
faced around the 2020 period. I don't think it's really quite
happened because we've sort of we we seem to have forgotten
that that period or put it behind us, I guess.
Yeah. And and this is this is turning
into a waffly question here, Butcan you just give me your
thoughts on how, how you would bring industry into it in a, in
(29:48):
a, in a more forceful sense thistime around?
And just how, how easy is that to do in a, you know, in a
country that still believes in fundamentally open economies?
You know, I mean this, this fusion idea, I guess it's it,
it, it's become a fashionable idea in, in in lots of ways, But
you know, whether anyone has ever quite sort of mastered the
(30:10):
implementation of it seems to bea.
An outstanding question. You're absolutely right.
I mean implementation is, is tough.
Of course, it has become a fashionable idea in some
quarters, but the the inherent structures of government are
still highly siloed. And so building the connective
tissue to, to ensure that on thethings we really care about,
government is a team sport. And that team does, as you say,
include private industry and in some areas can include even the
(30:33):
third sector and wider civil society is a really tough thing
to, to, to, to pull off because the leavers aren't always
direct. And I think that's part of the
answer to this. So there are clearly areas, and
this is probably is, is is probably more acute now in 2025
than it was when we were thinking about this in, in the
run up to that capability review.
(30:53):
One area that is that there was definitely a feature of our
recent national security strategy in the UK and the
defence review is national resilience.
You've got to think in the modern economy, in the modern
society, critical national infrastructure is not just the,
the core defence establishment that we used to think of it of
in the Cold War involves mobile phone networks, involves the
food retailers. It certainly involves all your
(31:15):
power networks and water and other utilities and so on.
And most of those are in privatehands.
So if you're thinking about resilience, contingency
planning, resilience against cyber attacks, you know,
etcetera, you've just got to have a conversation with all of
those, all of those actors. And some of that does involve
regulatory tools in order to ensure that everyone you whom
(31:36):
you're asking to commit resources and so on feels that
there isn't a competitive disadvantage in doing so.
But some of it is simply engaging them in that national
conversation, particularly the bigger players who are, who are
who, who, who can have a material, you know, material
effect. If I think of the UK, most of
our food security lies in the hands of a handful of very big
(32:00):
retailers, Tesco and Sainsbury'sand others of others of that
kind. And the same of course is, is,
is true elsewhere in, in Australia, indeed in the, in the
United States. I think when you're looking out
in terms of projecting that influence out, it's, it's more
indirect. You know, we, we can't, we can't
really be in, in free market economies.
Governments don't do this very well anyway.
(32:22):
We can't really be telling them where to go and invest and so
on. But what we can do is try and
create the conditions in which in which it makes sense for our
big investors, our big businesses to do so by pursuing
free trade deals and so on. So the UK, you know, and
Australia made a free trade agreement a priority after after
(32:45):
Brexit. We've made one with India a
priority after Brexit. That sets some guidelines and
parameters which the private sector can then follow.
Now it'd be up to them whether they whether they do so.
But creating that market access that does create some of the
connective tissue we want on which you can build national
security, national security relationships.
And of course the other thing wecan do is align some of our
(33:07):
investment regimes. So we developed actually using
Australia as a model, the national security investment
regime to try and ensure that wewere able to protect our
critical areas of our, our economy and ensure that that
investment in them didn't, didn't create a create a
vulnerability. I think in terms of diversifying
export markets, you, you, you comment on Australia and many of
(33:31):
your natural resources exports still going to China.
Of course you can't, you can't direct where the demand is.
And at the moment the demand still sits in China and that's
therefore a natural place to to sell.
China does have a near monopoly in the refining and processing
of in particular critical raw materials.
They haven't done anything nefarious to get that by the
(33:52):
way. They just invested in it.
But we are going to have to invest in alternative
capabilities of that kind. In my view, Australia would be a
very natural place for us all tothink about doing that.
Canada, one or two other places as well, because otherwise we
have created a critical dependency.
And we already know that China is willing to turn the dial on
(34:15):
some of those refined critical raw materials in order to put in
pressure, including, for example, into into the United
States. There's a piece in the Wall
Street Journal reflecting a report recently about just how
dependent the US military is on critical raw materials that come
from China. Well, we're going to have to
diversify those things and that is going to require some
(34:36):
government intervention to enable those industries to build
up and not find themselves essentially undercut by China,
you know, who are operating to lower it, labour and
environmental standards. But fundamentally, we've got to
get the private sector and we'vegot to get, you know, the Super
funds and others to invest in inthose areas.
And they can only do so if it makes commercial sense.
So you've got to make sure it makes commercial sense, right?
(34:57):
Good. OK, one final one and another,
I'm afraid, sort of fairly broadone.
I'm going to splice a couple of ideas together here, but I mean,
social resilience in, in advanced democracies right now
feels a little bit frayed as well.
You know, obviously think basic things like trust in
institutions is low. I, I, I, I'd have to check the
(35:21):
stats across all countries, But I mean, there is, there are
clear indicators that suggest that the quality of life for the
first time in the, you know, thegeneration that is at school now
or finishing university now is projected to be lower than, than
their parents. And, and, and you know, it's,
it's the first time in a long time that that trend has started
to, to go downwards. If we're going to 0 in on one
thing, it's a fascination of mine and that is the, the impact
(35:44):
of artificial intelligence on, on the job market.
I would go so far as to say it's, it's not an unreasonable
fear that it is going to disruptthe job market so severely that
it could put pressure on, on, you know, the well that it could
cause political and social upheaval, you know, sometime in
the next decade. How worried are you about that
(36:07):
particular issue? And do you have any broader
reflections just on the on, on how we try to shore up our
social resilience as well? Big question.
I think you're right, by the way, you know, as a parent, I, I
like you worry that about exactly that question whether
the next generation are going tohave the same opportunities as
(36:28):
advantage and the opportunity to, you know, we all as parents
want our kids to have a better life than we have.
You know, whatever, whatever your start point is, you want
your kids to have a better startpoint than than than you had.
And we all work very hard for that.
And you're right to point to therisk that generationally there
is a, there's a genuine questionthere.
And part of that is the technological revolution, not
(36:51):
just AI, but the other, the other technologies all coming
together in, in, in one go. And part of it actually just
over the past 15 years was the financial crisis and COVID.
You know, they, I mean, those were, those were major shocks to
the, to the system. The financial crisis had the
effect of damaging societal resilience.
I think paradoxically, COVID, ifyou look at the response to how
(37:11):
vaccines were organised and so on, actually probably probably
actually strengthened some of that, that societal engagement.
If I think of getting off and getting a getting a vaccine
during the COVID period, you hadyoung students doing all the
data entry, you have the medicalstaff doing the jobs and you
had, you know, people from the local business clubs running the
(37:32):
car parking and making the wholekind of thing thing work.
So people do, you know, under pressure come together.
We did look after the vulnerablepretty well in most of our
communities and that took a lot of just local, you know, local
people looking after, you know, taking care of people and so on.
So I don't think we should be too apocalyptic about it.
I think those underlying elements of societal resilience,
particularly in stable communities are are there.
(37:55):
But you're right to point to thedisruption of the technological
revolution. I think one of the things that
is that is that all governments and indeed citizens have to get
our heads around is the sheer scale of change that's all
coming together at one time. So we have climate change, we
have demographic change, ageing populations, increasing
longevity, a lot of that very positive, of course.
And we have the technological revolution all coming together
(38:18):
in one time. And that's pretty much
unprecedented, at least since the first industrial revolution.
And of course the first industrial revolution, we did
see major societal disruption coming around that time.
And it's, it's to put it in, it's absolute simplest, the
people in the sunset industries,the people in the sunset jobs
whose jobs are going to go as a result of technological change,
(38:41):
will, will protect, will resent that and can be seduced by
populist politics, which is always essentially pull up the
drawbridge, turn back the clock,blame someone else.
And those who benefit in the newjobs, many of which, you know, I
have no clue what those will be,but there will be new jobs, new
areas of activity, as there has been with every other
(39:02):
technological change. Just get on with the lives and,
and, and, and make A and, and, and, and make the best of their
lives. And so there's a, there's always
a risk that the political systemis skewed towards those who are
protesting the disruption ratherthan those who benefit from the
from the change. And that's the challenge.
I think if you look back over history, countries who've
(39:23):
managed the disruptive effects of a transition through a
technological revolution prosperand businesses prosper and
citizens prosper. And those that don't will
genuinely fall off the pace. And that I think is the, the,
the central challenge for moderngovernments.
As I say, it isn't just the technological revolution, it's
(39:43):
coming together with the disruptive effects of climate
change, both the green transition and indeed climate
resilience. Ageing populations welcome
increasing longevity, but of course the effect of low birth
rates and increasing dependency ratios, all of those things
coming together in one go are are a massive challenge for for
for governments. Some will definitely figure
(40:04):
their way through it and those countries will do really well.
Seize the moment. Yes, Mark.
We've gone around the world in 40 minutes.
Thank you. Thank you so much for talking to
me. Thank you.
That's all we have time for on Stop the World this week.
We'll be back with another episode next week.
Ciao for now.
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