Mark Galeotti on Trump, Putin, Zelenskyy and the European posse

Donald Trump met with Vladimir Putin in Alaska, then with Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Washington, then with a posse of European leaders who joined Zelenskyy as back up. Everyone was polite to one another, but as Russia expert Mark Galeotti reminds us on today’s episode, there were a lot of questions left unanswered.

Mark, who hosts the popular podcast, In Moscow’s Shadows, says the best thing about the string of meetings over recent days was that it might kick start the hard work of proper, behind-the-scenes detailed negotiations, without which meetings of leaders aren’t going to advance the peace process. He talks through all the key issues, including the talk of a temporary ceasefire, the difficulties of security guarantees—particularly a European “coalition of the willing” with boots on the ground—the prospects for further sanctions on Russia, Russia’s broader intentions towards Europe, Putin’s own challenges at home, and the need ultimately for Ukraine to build up its own defence industrial base, and sustain a long-term military force that can protect the nation without massive international support.

Mark is the author of Putin’s Wars, The Weaponisation of Everything, We Need To Talk About Putin and his latest book, Homo Criminalis: How Crime Organises the World.

Episode Transcript

(00:01):
Stop the world. Welcome to Stop the World, the
Aspy Podcast. I'm Olivia Nelson.
And I'm David Rowe. Dave, we're back with another
video podcast this week and we have a timely conversation
between you and Mark Gagliotti. But I want to understand Russia.
Mark is the go to guy. Yep.
He's a brilliant thinker on thislive.
I quite agree. He's one of the few repeat we've

(00:22):
guests we've had on the podcast,and of course we'll happily have
him back anytime he provides a hard headed perspective about
what is realistically going to happen rather than what he wants
to happen. So it's sobering but necessary
analysis. And I've noticed in fact in the
hours since we recorded it, thata lot of the other commentators
who I respect and trust have been coming out with similarly

(00:45):
cautious assessments. I.
Agree, Dave. For our listeners who haven't
come across him, where have you been?
But a little background. Mark is a globally renowned
expert on Russia. He's host of the podcast In
Moscow Shadows, a prolific author with books including
Putin's Wars, The Weaponization of Everything in my personal
favourite, We Need to Talk AboutPutin.
These are just a few of his credits.

(01:06):
If I had to continue, if I had to talk about all of them, I'd
be talking for the next 10 minutes.
Indeed, and you miss one of the the most important ones live,
which is he's got a new book outtitled Homo Criminalis, how
crime Organises the World. And I think that's one of the
most brilliant titles I've come across.
It's out in Australia already. So for our Australian listeners
and viewers, you can grab a copynow.

(01:29):
It's coming out in the US shortly, I gather.
Mark was very generous with his time.
We discussed obviously the TrumpPutin meeting at Trump's meeting
with Zelensky and European leaders in DC and whether the
critical question whether we're any closer to an end to Russia's
war on Ukraine. I really liked Mark's phrase of
not yet being optimistic, but that he's more optimistic about

(01:50):
becoming optimistic than he has been at any point since the
start of the war. I think your conversation
provides a really useful overview of recent events, but
also outlines the many steps ahead to achieving peace and
security for Ukraine and Europe.Yep, and optimistic about being
optimistic is about as positive as Mark gets at the moment.
But I thoroughly enjoyed the conversation.
I felt much wiser. Let's hear from Mark.

(02:11):
Welcome to STOP THE WORLD. I'm here with the incomparable
Mark Galliotti. Mark, thanks for joining me.
Oh, my pleasure. So what's happened in the last
two or three days? I want to start by getting an
overview from you. Just give us a quick sort of
burst of a minute or two on yourkey takeaways of the various
meetings where you think things are AT.

(02:35):
And I suppose are you more or less confident than you were,
say, a week ago that we might end up with a peace agreement
out of all of this? All of that in a minute.
No problem. Yeah, I, I would say that I'm
not yet optimistic, but I'm sureI say more optimistic about
becoming optimistic than I have been, frankly, at any point
since the start of this war. And in some ways, however much I

(02:59):
will confess, it does tend to stick in the craw to praise
Donald Trump. I think that his his willingness
frankly to be fairly brutal in advancing American interests,
but also in saying the unspoken about, for example, the fact
that Ukraine is not about to join NATO, about the fact that
there is no real theory of victory that allows Ukraine in

(03:21):
the foreseeable future to take back the occupied territories
has in many ways I think unblocked a process.
Now we've had this, this faintlysurreal Alaskan summit between
Trump and Putin in which clearlyPutin frankly had the the whip
hand and was very much more competent and even sort of

(03:42):
putting Trump on the spot at theend by suggesting he come to to
Moscow. But nonetheless, I think from
that it is clear that some senseof not an agreement, but shall I
say a framework for an agreementhas emerged.
And although the White House meeting that then followed with
Zelensky, I mean, it was positive in the sense of it

(04:03):
wasn't essentially an ambush anda punishment beating like the
the previous Oval Office meeting.
But on the other hand, I don't really think it necessarily
advanced the process in, in, in,in detail much more.
And it really has just reminded us that the usual process, after
all, with summits is that you have weeks and months in which
the Sherpas, all the experts andtechnocrats do all the hard

(04:25):
work. And then the presidents just
come together to sign a documentand maybe resolve one or two
final sticking points. This way with with Trump, it's
the other way around. So in some ways, we've still got
all the detailed negotiation. And that's frankly where it may
well breakdown, but nonetheless,at least we are at the point
where we have the opportunity for detailed negotiations, which

(04:46):
we haven't really had since the start of this war.
OK, that's great. All right, let's I'm going to
try and work through things systematically here because
there's there, there is a lot toit.
Let's start with this, this question of a ceasefire.
Clearly the Europeans are still pushing for it.
And in fact, perhaps the the theclosest thing to an awkward
moment in the the on camera partof the the interview where the

(05:09):
all of the European leaders werewere sat with Trump was when the
German Chancellor, Friedrich Metz said, well, we, we are, we
still think there needs to be a ceasefire and Trump sort of
shutting down and then and then moved on to Macron having no
ceasefire clearly advantages Putin, because he can keep

(05:30):
claiming momentum tried to shiftthe the facts on the ground in
in his favour. Plus, it encourages presumably a
more rushed negotiation, which can, I suppose, harness or even
weaponize Trump's inherent impatience.
Whereas a ceasefire would have, I suppose, allowed Ukraine to

(05:50):
regroup, although it would have allowed Russia to to regroup as
well. I mean, how important in your
view is it that there is a ceasefire in order to create the
breathing space for Ukraine to actually, well, Ukraine and its
supporters to, to negotiate properly towards the best
possible agreement from their point of.
View Look, let's be clear about this.
There is going to be no ceasefire in advance.

(06:12):
And I must admit it was interesting seeing Italy's Prime
Minister Maloney, her response when when Mertz ventured into
his little lecture almost speaksto every single crass German
stereotype that, you know, he even that he feels he still
needs to get deliver a little sort of morally superior
lecture. The point is this for exactly
from the Russians point of view,they have the the momentum on on

(06:34):
the battlefield a cease fire just simply means that they
sacrifice that in the the promise that there will be some
talks that quite possibly will get nowhere.
Because frankly that will give the Ukrainians the opportunity
to basically stall constructively haggling over
every single comma in any singledocument because that's what the

(06:55):
Russians would do in their circumstances.
So I think in that case actuallythis continued previous European
demand for a ceasefire before negotiations was actually
preventing there being any negotiations.
And so in the circumstances and look, you know, this is this is
by no means unusual. I mean, if one looks at, for

(07:16):
example, the resolution of the Korean War, which offers quite a
few parallels, given that it's likely to be a similar sort of
de facto partitioning that we'regoing to see, unfortunately.
Well, there the the negotiationstook place concurrent with with
the fighting on on the ground. And again, I think this is this
idea that somehow there's something inherently wrong about

(07:37):
a negotiation. Yes, of course it's wrong from
the Ukrainian's perspective because they would like not to
be having to hide in bomb shelters every night.
They would like to be able to negotiate with, as you say, that
lessened pressure. But to be perfectly honest,
this, this is again one of the areas in which actually trump
by, if we're blunt, not really caring about Ukraine, but just

(07:58):
simply regarding this conflict as an inconvenience that he'd
like to have swept away as quickly as possible, actually
has perversely forwarded the cause of some kind of potential
negotiations. Security guarantees, I mean,
that's, I mean, the ceasefire seemed to be the focus of a lot

(08:18):
of the public commentary around the Alaska meeting.
Security guarantees has been very much top of the, the
discussion around the, the, the,the meetings in, in the White
House. Interesting.
Well, I mean, there seems to have been shifting on, on
Trump's, Trump's part in, in this respect.
And that was welcomed by European leaders.
So Trump posted that they would be Trump posted that they would

(08:42):
be quote provided by various European countries, referring to
the security guarantees here with a coordination with the
United States. He he said, I think verbally,
we'll help them out. We'll be involved.
Everyone's pretty excited about that.
Even if it's not clear what he means, I'd I'd point out that
Trump also said on the matter ofdeterring future Russian

(09:03):
aggression against Ukraine, thatquote, I actually don't think
I'm sorry, I actually think there won't be IE referring to
to future Russian aggression. He said, I think that's even
overrated, largely overrated. But we're going to find out now
that's that's clearly a bit worrying as to where he he sees
things. Can you break down for us what a

(09:26):
a reliable set of security guarantees looks like?
Obviously there's continued material support for Ukraine's
military, some form of European backup, which I know you've
expressed scepticism about over over a period of time.
And then US backup for the European backup, including in

(09:46):
the areas that the, the the Europeans aren't terribly good
at, but not involving presumablyEurope, US boots on the ground.
Just just talk through what whatit what the best realistic
scenario looks like. Yeah, I mean, this is the
absolutely crucial issue becausethe whole point is not only that

(10:09):
if the Ukrainians aren't going to have to swallow any bit of
pills such As for example, recognising de facto, though not
Jay Jury, in other words, practically but not in under
international law that they havelost at least for the moment,
20% of their territory. They need to be absolutely
certain or as certain as is possible that the remaining 80%
can actually develop in a sovereign, democratic, stable

(10:31):
and above all secure manner. So this is also actually about
selling peace to the Ukrainians who, you know, after all,
ultimately get the final veto, whatever Trump may think.
So I think in in that context there is a problem because
there's now talk about, if not NATO membership and NATO like

(10:53):
Article 5 security guarantee. And the trouble is that that
implies that people haven't really read Article 5
particularly well because Article 5 is a very, very woolly
wording. And people, there's this
assumption that it means all an attack on one is an attack on
all. And therefore all your, your
friends will rally round. Actually all it just says is the

(11:13):
other members of the alliance will react appropriately.
And the definition of appropriate could mean anything
from a mechanised brigade to a stiffly worded communique to the
Russian foreign ministry. And I think that given that up
to now we've seen absolutely no enthusiasm for the Europeans
sending their troops in to fightand die for Ukraine, why should

(11:36):
Ukraine think that they would inthe future because they've
reached some kind of an agreement.
But even more importantly, why should Russia believe that?
Remember, deterrence depends on credibility.
If the Russians don't actually believe that the Ukrainians
would would be end would actually be backed up by the
Europeans in any meaningful way,then even if in fact the

(11:58):
Europeans would, we'd only find out when it's too late.
So I think the first point is interms of sort of European
guarantees, I think we have to, you know, be realistic.
And this is not saying all the Europeans are that we can flabby
and so forth, though some of theEuropeans are indeed we can
flabby. It is rather also talking about
kind of capabilities and political intent and actually
how important Ukraine is really to many European countries.

(12:22):
You know, it's very different perspective if you're in Poland
or if you're in Portugal about the the imminence of the, the
reality of a security threat. So we're often talking about
things that in practise don't mean, you know, NATO battle
groups in Ukraine, which is alsoan absolute red line for the
Russians, we should note. But instead, you know, how can

(12:42):
they provide, for example, air cover, which is something that
can be provided from bases outside Ukraine, which would
then presumably move into Ukraine in the time of a
conflict, but would actually leverage where Europe actually
has strengths rather than it's weaknesses, which are precisely
in the kind of, you know, knock down and drag out ground
fighting that we might see. So yes, there's a certain amount

(13:04):
of provision that the Europeans can provide.
But when it comes down to it, ultimately the primary security
guarantee for Ukraine is a powerful, well resourced
military, which also does not depend on the largest of
outsiders. So it's not just about building
up Ukrainian forces. It's also about building up
Ukraine's defence industries so that they can produce what they

(13:26):
need and they don't have to ask anyone else's permission to use
them in whatever way they want. And I think that is really the
sort of the crucial element because, you know, the one thing
that Ukrainians have been lacking has been manpower rather
than kit or more than kit, shallwe say, except in very specific
capabilities like, you know, Patriot missile interceptors and

(13:47):
such like. But on the other hand, you know
what, what we can do is ensure that to go back to actually a
formulation that Zelensky had been talking about back in 2022,
which is, as he put it, Ukraine as a big Israel.
That sense of a formidable regional military power with,
yes, inevitably an economy and asociety that is

(14:08):
disproportionately skewed towards the military, but which
is able to do that precisely because of the political,
economic and indeed military assistance that it gets from its
allies. That is a conceivable model.
And it's also a plausible 1 not just because the Ukrainians have
demonstrated extraordinary resilience and will to fight,
but also because, remember, whenPutin went in to Ukraine in

(14:31):
February 2022, he did not anticipate that he was starting
a major war. And the whole point was he
thought this was going to be a pushover, that the Ukrainians
wouldn't really resist that. Yes, there would probably be
some small scale fighting with some particular sort of, you
know, hard line elements. But the main potential risk
would be St protests, which is why a large proportion of his

(14:53):
invading force was actually National Guard, paramilitary
riot police rather than soldiers.
And that essentially, you know, a few weeks, maybe a couple of
months and it would all be a done deal and some kind of
friendly proxy regime will be installed in in in Kiev.
So in that context, now he's in a war, clearly he's going to
fight it to the best. Well, I say his abilities, best

(15:14):
of ordinary Russians abilities. But at the same time, it doesn't
necessarily mean that if he's thinking that a second war would
be another massively bloody, economically ruinous enterprise,
he would necessarily venture into one.
OK. So just I guess the first, first

(15:37):
question out of that is can Ukraine in some reasonable time
frame pull together what you're actually talking about there to
create a sustainable future for itself?
Or I mean, what what you've laidout does sound like.
I mean, there, there is an option for continued supply to
the Ukrainian military at least for an interim period while they

(16:00):
get their defence industry, their, you know, I guess their
national mobilisation in place to, to describe what you're
talking about there with some kind of European back up in, you
know, again for, for a, for a set period.
And then with, with the US playing some kind of supporting
role. I mean, do you think that is a
that is a feasible way forward, you know, if if there is some

(16:24):
kind of agreement in the next say six months?
Feasible, yes. I think that again, this is in
some ways where the American role comes in.
Yes, maybe, you know, America iswell, at first it was, you know,
providing kind of a, a backstop for the Europeans.
And then we have Trump talking about coordinating the
Europeans, which is more, I think how he sees his role, you

(16:46):
know, very much he he is the world king and, and the
Europeans are his, his, his loyal and sometimes recalcitrant
vassals. But if, let's say this was part
of the some kind of comprehensive peace structure,
Well, the issue up to now is that obviously the Americans
have essentially yanked their, well, not all their military

(17:06):
systems. We're still getting a lot of
intelligence sharing and so forth.
But they're no longer providing the the military aid.
What they are willing to do after the largesse of their
hearts is to allow the Europeansto buy kit to give to the
Ukrainians. Now, the problem with that is
that unless the White House is willing to basically put
political pressure to bear you, what that means is you are at

(17:29):
the back of the sales sort of lines.
And so even if you've got the money to suddenly say, let's buy
100 Patriot missiles, that doesn't necessarily mean that
you're going to get them quickly.
And in fact, that is already a problem we're getting is that a
lot of these pledges are pledgesthat will actually play out in
months or in some cases years tocome.

(17:49):
On the other hand, if the if theUnited States was willing to
move back at least even in a temporary frame to simply say,
well, OK, yes, as part of this peace deal, we need to make sure
that within four months the Ukrainian military is really
sort of back up to the best shape, at least in terms of its
kit as we can provide. Well, yes, we can.
We can surge various, you know, lend least or just given kit to

(18:14):
to the Ukrainians and also to the Europeans to allow them to
cascade down some of their stocks to the Ukrainians.
I mean, I think there there is the scope for for movement
quickly. And we've got to realise also
that the Ukrainians themselves are actually developing their
defence industries at quite a rapid rate.
And it's amazing how far wars tend to be engines, not just of
innovation, as we've seen, particularly with the with the

(18:36):
proliferation of drones and like, but also actually allows
nations to push away a lot of the inertia and the cobwebs of
regulation and such like and really build fast.
So anyway, the Ukraine has already got a good start with an
influx of money and money is, after all, what the West
certainly can provide. Then actually that that could
move fast. And we shouldn't forget that

(18:58):
also the Russians will will wantand indeed need to regroup and
there will be a lot of disruption.
It will be hard for the Russians, for example, to hold
on to the various soldiers who have signed up, you know,
because their contracts end at the end of the so called special
military operation. Now, Moscow could always say,
well, it's not really over yet, but if you've signed some kind

(19:19):
of an agreement, it would be very, very politically
problematic to keep these peoplein the ranks when in a way, the
war that they that they agreed to fight is over.
So actually we're going to see amassive haemorrhaging, I think
of many of these people back to their various sort of
impoverished home regions. So, you know, I think we, we, we

(19:42):
shouldn't understate the degree of disruption that will also be
taking place on the Russian sideof the line.
OK, that's, that's fascinating. I want to come back to where,
you know, what Russia's positionis in a moment.
Just sticking with Europe though.
I mean, you're, I mean, you're a, you're, you're AI suppose a,

(20:03):
a realist analyst of, of these issues.
And, and, and, and, and I, I mean, I recognise that as
extremely important. I suffer from a, from a quite a
different affliction, which is a, which is a hopeless idealism
and, and always wanting to sort of say what, what should happen.
But I mean the European, the Europeans, even if they're not.

(20:27):
Prepared to fight and die for Ukraine in any significant and
serious way that you know, that that that their own national
politics won't permit it or theyjust don't, you know, they're
just not up to that. That task.
I mean, isn't, isn't there a degree of self interest here in
the sense that European securityis ultimately at stake?

(20:49):
So I suppose an alternative proposition, if I can just put
it is, I mean, even if we don't know what the next step is that
Putin might take, let's say he is successful in, in Ukraine in
some way that would, you know, could consider to be, could be
considered to be a victory and asuccess on his part.

(21:10):
I mean, you know, and, and even if we can't say, well,
obviously, you know, the next step would be say one of the,
the Baltics, for instance, the, the mega trend beyond Ukraine is
clearly that Europe is going to have to look after its own
security increasingly that the US is not prepared to continue
playing that role in it to such a degree as it has been.

(21:32):
And whether Trump, you know, however, however long Trump
remains around or whether he's succeeded by JD Vance or whoever
it is, that seems to be a sort of a, a structural larger trend.
So I mean, it just seems to me if the Europeans don't step up
on this first, most important test of their willingness to do

(21:52):
that, then they are potentially sort of consigning themselves to
a future of weakness riddled with all sorts of security
risks. I mean, don't they sort of have
to do this to to prove that theyactually can in the in the
interests of their long term security future?
So in other words, that the Europeans in order to deter war,

(22:14):
must invade, engage themselves in war.
I mean, I think I, I, I would, would counter on, on a variety
of fronts. I mean, first of all, if we take
away the rhetoric and I think this is one of the problems that
a lot of the, the, the, the public narrative has been sort
of hijacked by these high flown mantras.

(22:35):
I think about Ukraine without Ukraine, you know, as whatever
it takes, as long as it takes and all that.
And then when you talk to peopleoff the record, you get a very,
very different perspective. And I think that that's been one
of the real problems for Europe is actually an inability to have
a serious conversation amongst themselves about their
interests. Because no one really wants to
be the first to break ranks or else they end up being sort of

(22:58):
regarded as, you know, the likesof, you know, Hungary as Viktor
Orban or whatever, some kind of Russophile.
No, I mean, I think, you know, realistically speaking, first of
all, there is an acceptance thatthat Ukraine is is something
separate. I mean, the very reason why, you
know, frankly, it is not surprising that Trump is, you
know, has basically said that NATO membership is off the table
because NATO membership has always been off the table.

(23:20):
And every time they say that, you know, Ukraine joining NATO
is inevitable, what they're saying is not in my lifetime or
certainly not in my political lifetime.
Secondly, look, now I could easily be wrong, which is why
Europe does need to sort of think otherwise, but
nonetheless, I see no evidence that Putin has any aspirations

(23:40):
to a war with the largest and most powerful military alliance
in the world. Ukraine is different.
Ukraine, we can go back to his writings and and speeches even
before he was president, and it was clear that he does not
really regard Ukraine as a real country, that he thinks Ukraine.
All you know is all of Ukraine really is part of Russia's
rightful sphere of interest and indeed historical patrimony.

(24:01):
But actually the eastern Ukraineanyway is really a part of
Russia. That it was Lenin who stole from
Russia to create the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic way
back in the beginning of the 1920s.
In a way that he doesn't think that Russia is incomplete
without Helsinki, without the Baltic states, let alone Warsaw.

(24:21):
So, you know, yes, there is always the possibility, but
nonetheless, I think we have to realise the difference between
Ukraine and and and Europe in inPutin's geopolitical imagination
at least. And again, to go back to that
earlier point, in any case, you know, if Putin had known what
kind of a war he was going to bestumbling into in 2022, I
honestly don't know. I suspect that he would not have

(24:44):
gone into it because Putin is notoriously risk averse for all
the sort of macho persona. But yes, I could be wrong.
Or indeed, Putin could could dietomorrow in someone even more
hawkish and smarter could actually come come to power.
So, you know, circumstances, absolutely, Europe does have to
look to its own security, not least because frankly, its long

(25:07):
term dependence on America was also, frankly an infantilizing
process. That it meant that, you know,
this is one of the reasons why Europe today does not have the
kind of geopolitical clout that it feels it's right to.
You know, it's all very well Europe saying, well, we are a
regulatory superpower. But you know, just as Stalin
asked how many divisions has thePope, how do you regulate A

(25:29):
mechanised brigade out of existence?
So I mean, in in this context, yes, Europe can no longer
automatically assume that it hasa blank cheque from the United
States. And it's about time it realises
this because it's not just Trump, it's successive American
presidents have been warning this is the case.
And that will also help give it a a greater degree of of

(25:50):
autonomy, but also security. So when it come come down to it,
I mean, actually if one looks at, well, if the Russians were
going to try anything in Europe,where would that be?
Would it be the Baltic states, which yes, are small but
nonetheless have multinational forces there.
So if you'd invade the Estonia, you're going to be fighting and
you're going to be killing Brits, for example.
You know, it's not just simply about an Estonian issue.

(26:12):
Poland, well, Poland is currently going through a
massive armament programme. I mean, they've ordered 1000
tanks and well, one, one can argue that that actually may be
a little bit more than they can possibly digest, but
nonetheless, it says something about the Poles commitment to
their security. Where else are you going to go?
Finland? I mean, this is a nation that
more or less has made a nationalcharacteristic, I would say, of
bloody mindedness. They, they, they call it Sisu.

(26:35):
But certainly, you know, the Finns could not by any stretch
of the imagination be called an easy target.
I mean, actually, if one looks at it, it's going to take about,
I would say, eight years for theRussians to reconstitute their
forces after the end of fightingin Ukraine.
Now, first of all, in that eightyears, Europe is already heavily
committed to arming itself properly.

(26:57):
And people say, well, Russia doesn't need to fully
reconstitute its forces to try something in a little green men
going in across the border into Nava or something.
But The thing is, this is no longer 2014 or even 2022 for
that matter. We see little green men without
Insignia and Moscow says, oh, nothing to do with us.
We're not going to be bamboozlednext time.

(27:18):
What the Estonians are going to do is basically shoot every one
of them they can. Likewise, unlike the situation
just before the invasion, when we have the inevitable
intelligence reports about massings of, of forces and such
like, we're unlikely just to shrug that off.
I mean, you know, the Brits and the Americans in particular were
saying Putin's getting ready to invade.
Ukrainians themselves were saying no, no, no, we're sure

(27:40):
that's not the case until 72 hours before when they began
picking up communications intercepts, making it clear that
there was a lot of very surprised Russian senior
officers along the front who just opened their sealed orders
and thinking what the Hell's going to happen.
Now this time again, I, you know, I can't see the the
Estonians saying no, no, I'm sure those Russians don't mean
anything, you know, so we won't be in the same position.

(28:02):
And a final point, and I'm run abit of a soapbox, but I will
climb off in a moment, is precisely that, yes.
So the Russians could send some little green men into Nava,
whereas again they, they, they would not have a happy
experience. But if you haven't fully
reconstituted your forces, you then lack options up the
escalatory ladder. You basically have got little

(28:23):
green men or thermonuclear Armageddon and really not much
in between. And again, that is not a
situation that I think Russia and certainly not Russia's
military commanders would want to find themselves in.
So yes, because it it is entirely possible that Mark
Galliotti is wrong. But nonetheless, I think we have
to recognise that the strategic realities of the situation do

(28:46):
not mean that the the presence or the lack of presence of, of
European troops in Ukraine is going to determine whether or
not the the Russian legions rollwestwards because they haven't
been able to roll westwards across Ukraine, let alone in
NATO. OK, that's, that's really
fascinating stuff. I want to, I want to, I want to

(29:08):
sort of apply that now to, I guess what Putin's incentives
are in the, in the Ukraine negotiations for a moment.
Because I mean, the, in the sense he's got the upper hand
because he's happy to keep fighting where, you know, to
work to a much greater degree than the Ukrainians are.

(29:28):
But the way you're, the way you're portraying it, I mean,
the, the, the, the cost is not negligible to him, or I mean,
obviously not negligible, but not even insignificant.
I mean, the, the, the cost to Russian, you know, in terms of,
you know, human lives in, in terms of, you know, economic
costs, material costs and so forth.

(29:49):
The, the way you're describing it, military costs are, are
substantial. I mean, he has a number of
constraints on him that are obvious in terms of the the
negotiations with, with Ukraine via the USI mean he needs to
keep Trump on side at the very least.

(30:10):
He he, you know, he if he fears upsetting Trump if Trump says
right, I've I've finally had enough.
Vladimir's making me look ridiculous.
And, and, and Trump then turns and either imposes some costs
on, on Russia in the form of sanctions or, or, or starts
providing greater support to to Ukraine.
That's obviously an issue for for Putin, but just talk about,

(30:35):
I mean, what, what other constraints does he have
following on from what you were just talking about then in terms
of, you know, even if he had histime again, then he then he
might well he wouldn't have doneit because it has come at such a
greater cost than he actually expected.
I mean either that the economic costs, political pressure from
Russian elite, Russian elites, for instance, how much

(30:59):
constraining forces are those are those putting on Putin now
as he negotiates? Yeah.
Look, I, I wish that the constraining forces were
greater. I mean, we have to accept that,
that that they are limited. I mean, if one you mentioned
keeping Trump on side, I think it's likely that the worst case
scenario, frankly, would be in effect that Trump reverts to the

(31:21):
Biden era policy. So we have more assistance and
so forth. You know, the, the days when we
could even wonder if Trump was actually going to be that much
more vicious an enemy if if alienated, I think have gone and
sanctions, look, sanctions on onRussia are at the moment, you
know, from this point of view, the sort of things that that
Trump is talking about meaningless.
We're talking about tariffs, 100% tariffs on Russian exports.

(31:44):
That's $3 billion worth of stuff.
You know, it's, it's, it's not even worth mentioning.
The issue which could have hurt Russia would be the secondary
sanctions on countries buying Russian oil.
Well, he's put sanctions on the Indians.
And yes, some Indian companies are now diversifying their
supply. But India as a country, as a
nation, as a government is not bowing.

(32:04):
And interestingly, we now, you know, we, we have had, if
anything, an uptick in bilaterals between India and
Russia. And now Narendra Modi after
seven years is going to be goingto China.
So if anything, there's actuallybeen a sort of closer link
there. And as regards the Chinese, I
mean, they've been much more, you know, intransigent
themselves and they just simply said, we are not going to bow to

(32:25):
illegal tariff sanctions. And they're, they're, they're
still buying. So, you know, it's clear that
that particular sort of armour pressure actually, if anything
is, is pushing these countries closer together rather than
anything else. So, you know, I think I think
the Trump factor is more that from Putin's point of view,
there is a window of opportunitythat is worth exploring to the
fullest. But as you've suggested, with

(32:48):
also a sense that if it doesn't work out, it doesn't work out
because I think Putin doesn't need to fight a forever war.
He just needs to be able to fight longer than the Ukrainians
can. And, you know, we often focus on
the pressures on on the Russians, and I'll talk about
those in a moment. But I think we sometimes forget
to also look at the pressures onthe Ukrainians, which

(33:10):
particularly at the moment is interms of manpower.
I mean, a recruitment process which is increasingly beginning
to look more like press ganging than anything else, you know,
and is beginning to generate something of a political
backlash. And it says worrying things.
And as we can see at the moment,you know, Ukrainian forces are
exhausted and overstretched and in order to deal with incursions

(33:32):
by what were often sort of 20 to30 man diversionary sabotage
reconnaissance groups, the Ukrainians have actually had to
move whole brigades from other parts of the front lines.
So you know, again, the Russian strategy is precisely pressure
all along the front line to overstretch the Ukrainians.
Now that said and said, there are pressures on, on, on Putin.

(33:55):
And yeah, the key one is, is economics, because it's not just
economics from the second of thecountry as a whole.
But the recruitment model that is being used at the moment is
not to send conscripts, not evento, to mobilise reservists, but
to offer eye watering sums of money to Russians to, to sign
up. And at the moment it's still
very successful. I mean, they're recruiting more

(34:16):
people than they're losing. And in that context, fine, but
that means you have to be able to constantly offer and indeed
actually up the offer because you sort of begin to sort of use
up your obvious reservoir of potential recruits and therefore
you need to attract other people.
And that in turn is leading to atight labour market.

(34:37):
There's just not enough workers at the moment.
The police are about 25% under strength for example, because
people are thinking, well I can earn a lot more money by signing
up for the SVO or going and working in the defence
industrial complex. So there's all kinds of economic
knock ONS. And The thing is we're
increasingly getting Putin made aware of that.
Putin on the whole is not interested in economics.

(34:59):
I mean, he's not in any way a communist, but he has enormous
Bolsheviks sense that the political always dominates the
economic and somehow you, you decree something and elves off
stage, elves not being a particularly Bolshevik concept,
elves off stage somehow sort it out.
And for example, he's shown himself to be increasingly
tetchy with his phenomenally well talented chairwoman of the

(35:24):
central bank, Elvira Nabulina, simply because she hasn't been
able to. If I can get continue my my
mixing of metaphors, wave her magic wand and deal with
inflation, everyone, everyone complaints about their central
bank as not being magicians, butshe is frankly as close to a
magician as you get in the modern financial world.

(35:46):
But Even so, you know, he's he'sclearly getting irritated.
But the point is more and more he's being forced to become
aware of this. At the recent Saint Petersburg
International Economic Forum, heactually had to address the
question of potential recession.Now he addressed it by simply
saying, well, this is clearly, you know, this is unacceptable.
If only economic recessions could be deflected as easily.

(36:07):
But the point is, he's having totalk about it now in a way that
for a long time he didn't. He at the beginning of last week
had a a meeting of key economic advisers and officials.
Usually these things are actually open, televised,
formulaic meetings where everyone says how wonderful
things are. This was a closed meeting and

(36:27):
interestingly, all the various officials present, all but one
are on what you might think of as the economic liberal angle of
things who have all been going public about how there are
serious risks. And I think there is a sense
that frankly, next year is, is when a lot of very large
chickens come home, home to roost.
Now, that's not that means the economy is going to constantly
crash or collapse. We are closer to sort of late

(36:50):
Brechtian of ISM, you know, a sort of slow stagnating grind
down because too many of the resources are being sent to the
defence industrial side of things rather than anything more
showy and catastrophic like sortof like Gorbachev.
But nonetheless, you know that that is a possibility.

(37:11):
Now can, if need be Putin sustained that.
Well, yes, because it takes timefor that to have the political
impacts. The moment, you know, we're not
talking about for example, mass unemployment or anything like
that. Quite the opposite.
There's actually sort of more pressure on on the workforce,
but in due course it will lead to protests and strikes and
slowdowns and such, right. But that's somewhere down the
line. And at least in the earlier

(37:31):
stages, that's something that can be dealt with with
repression rather than anything else.
So, you know, I think from his point of view, there are risks
coming up, risks that sort of concatenate the economic and the
political. And remember, this is someone
who has seen not one, but two authoritarian regimes collapse
around him, East Germany and then the Soviet Union.
So, you know, this is this is a man who somewhere awareness of

(37:53):
the risks, but a, the lessons hetook from those wrongly but
nonetheless sincerely are that the reason why those two regimes
collapsed is because they weren't forceful enough in
defending themselves. And he knows that he will be
forceful. And so for the moment at least,
you know, he he he can ride out a considerable amount of
pressure. And he also thinks that Ukraine

(38:15):
ultimately will face much more catastrophic problems.
So this is what I mean about if I can loop back to end on where
I started. From Putin's point of view, I
think he regards this as a moment that is worth exploring.
He may well get a deal that he will be able to sell as a
triumph at home. And frankly, Russians will be so

(38:36):
relieved by the end of the war that they will accept that the
emperor has whatever clothes he wants to claim that he has and
also create transatlantic rifts and create a Ukraine that
probably will be actually, despite whatever assistance is
provided, in a state of turmoil,which will give him
opportunities for political and economic leverage in in the

(38:57):
future. So, you know, this could lead
somewhere. But ultimately, he is in that
blessed position of being able to feel.
But if it doesn't, that's fine. I can walk away and I can still
win, but at greater cost to myself and my state.
Yeah, yeah, I'm, I'm glad to hear you say all of that about
the Russian economy and the politics of the economy, because

(39:18):
it it I've, I'm always a bit confounded when people point to
the, the, you know, the switch to a wartime economy.
And I think I read a figure somebody's saying, well, the
economy's actually not doing toobadly.
It grew by 4% last year. I mean, I don't know whether
that's actually accurate or not.But I mean, even if it is true,
it's the most meaningless numberon paper you've ever heard.
Because, I mean, obviously the more, the more of your factories

(39:38):
are building ammunition and, andweaponry and the fewer are
building household goods, cars and all those sorts of things.
What whatever your economic figures say, the quality of life
of your, of your citizens is notimproving in a wartime economy.
Is that as it ought to be and therefore it should bring
political pressure. So I, I, I, I do.
I'm glad that you said all of that.
Just on sanctions, just quickly,I mean, there are a couple of

(40:00):
things that you didn't mention. One, I mean things like the
shadow fleet, for instance, sanctions on targeting energy,
maybe some of the Russian banks that haven't already been.
Being sanctioned in some way. I did read somewhere that the,
the, the Gazprom bank, for instance, is still on the SWIFT
payment system. Perhaps some of the national
institutions that that Russia, you know, deems important their

(40:20):
version of NASA or their versionof a of the sort of nuclear that
the, the national nuclear institution.
Is there not space to sanction those some more and put some of
that pressure which it just doesn't.
I mean, one of the things that bugs me, I suppose, is just
watching this, this all being negotiated without any added
pressure on Putin that should bebrought to bear.

(40:41):
The problem is that we're now ata stage where further sanctions
are possible, but also self harming.
Now, again, one could say, well,actually the, the balance is
that they, they, they still should be adopted, but just just
go through some of those things.The, the shadow fleet, yes, one
can sanction the shadow fleet. Remember the sanction the, the
shadow fleet was precisely a wayround other sanctions.

(41:02):
And you know, if the Russians have demonstrated themselves to
be good at something, it's, it'sgetting round inconvenient rules
and regulations. They have had a lot of
experience doing it. And the real reason why that
exists is the supply and demand.I mean, the fact of the matter
is there are a lot of countries,not just in India and China who
can be supplied in alternative means anyway, but there are a

(41:23):
lot of countries that want to buy cheap Russian and
hydrocarbons. Remember that for most of the
world, this is not their war. And if anything, they regard
secondary sanctions. I mean, just to, I was talking
to a a little while back, a W African diplomat who, you know,
it's not a, you know, not a, a Russophile particularly, but who

(41:46):
very much was describing secondary sanctions as economic
imperialism. Because what he was saying was
we are basically being told thatwe have to give up this
particular cheap source of, of, of oil and buy more expensive
stuff simply because there's a war going on.
Now, how many wars did you Europeans not care about?

(42:10):
You know, how many wars did you not get envened?
But this well, and I mean, he explicitly made the point, you
know, is it because they're white?
And there's there's a certain point now, it's more than that.
It's also because they haven't been on the borders of Europe
and all the other issues. But nonetheless, you know, for a
lot of the world, it's not that they necessarily are supportive
of Russia, but they don't see this as actually a big deal.

(42:30):
They don't see it as their conflict and they certainly
don't think they should pay for it.
So, you know, there are other, there are fall backs after fall
backs. So yes, sanctioning the shadow
fleet would have some effect, but actually it would also
create more, more problems down the line.
Likewise, I mean, the reason whyGazprom bank is is still
connected is precisely because it is used for the supply of

(42:52):
energy into Europe. You know, let's not forget that
Europe is buying massive amountsof, of Russian gas still, you
know, and then they're surprisedthat people regard them as
sanctimony, as hypocrites when complaining about other people
buying Russian oil. But oh, but gas, gas that, that
that's apparently absolutely fine.
You talk about hypocrisy. Yeah.

(43:14):
I mean, you talk about the the Russian Space Agency.
Well, it's in part precisely because actually that is needed
for, you know, it is important to have continued connections
for our our mutual of, you know,operations within, within space.
So, you know, I think that, you know, we are at the point where
there is basically everything that that can be sanctioned

(43:34):
easily has been sanctioned. The what's left and not just
because no one thought of it wasbecause actually when when we
worked out the same way as we saw when first sanctions were
placed on Russian aluminium, which lead led to a massive
spike in prices and therefore that had to be sort of weakened
back. We're now at the point where
further sanctions, yes, there's room for closing loopholes, but

(43:58):
dramatic extra pressure is not going to come from sanctions.
I think we, we kidded ourselves that we are in that much more
control of the global financial system than we really are at the
moment. The sort of sanctions we're
talking about would would, if nothing else, only make Russia
more and more dependent upon China.
And there is this other issue about the fact that, you know,

(44:19):
we don't necessarily want Russiato become entirely a Chinese
vassal state, something ironically that many within the
Russian elite don't want to see either, you know, so, so again,
I mean, it's, it's, it's a very banal way to end this point.
But you know, it's actually bloody difficult in a globalised
economy to do this. Fair.

(44:41):
All right 2 two other things that I want to cover before I
let you go. One is territory the the other,
you know, big piece of the negotiation puzzle.
Now, if, if Ukraine were to submit to everything that Trump
is that sorry Putin, pardon me, is currently demanding, it would
I mean, my my understanding of it and I'm going to get you to

(45:03):
talk through the military strategy side of things.
It would make it very difficult for Ukraine to to defend itself.
So the, the, the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, Donetsk in
particular, despite, I mean, sorry, beyond the symbolic issue
of conceding territory that Ukraine has been so passionately

(45:24):
defending for so long and, and all of the blood that's been
spilt and all that kind of thing.
Conceding that territory that, that, that Russia doesn't
currently control, as I understand it would be conceding
this, this line of fortified towns along the river through
that quarter of Donetsk that, that, that Ukraine does still
hold. And it seems to me that would

(45:45):
essentially sort of open a gateway to central Ukraine for
the Russians. As as I'm going to challenge you
again a little bit here just as as as sort of simply as you can.
Can you just talk through the the military strategic
implications of Ukraine's submitting to those particular
demands? Look.
I think when it comes to this, this remaining 30 odd percent of

(46:08):
the Donetsk region, first of all, I mean, let's keep it in
context. It's very rare that a territory
is actually of that pivotal importance.
Yes, it does matter and it matters particularly because of
the so called fortress belt, about 50 kilometres in length, 4
cities and a few other smaller towns do represent a very tough
strategic bastion. And clearly from the Ukrainian's

(46:29):
point of view, they will be thinking about how even with
security guarantees, there is the chance of the Russians
coming back for another crack atthem.
And therefore clearly they want these fortresses to be on their
side of the border, not the Russian side.
That said, the Russian perspective is, well, we're
we're going to take this territory anyway.
If there's not a peace deal now,you know, maybe in a year's

(46:51):
time, especially because the Russians are now adopting a
strategy of not as they did, forexample, back in the days of the
the Bakhmut campaign, you know, terrible meat grinder of a war
where they tried to take a city head on.
Now they're actually encircling them.
And we're seeing, for example, you know, another strategic hub,
Pakharovsk, quite likely to fallfor this very reason.

(47:12):
So, you know, from the Russians point of view, they're going to
be ours anyway. So let's accept that from the
Ukrainians point of view, it will be difficult.
But I, I can't help but feel that whatever the strategic
importance of Donetsk or the remaining bits of Donetsk, it is
the political one that is in many ways more important.
As you said, this, this is a ground that is soaked in the

(47:34):
blood of Ukrainian soldiers. And to just simply give it away,
I mean, I'm not even convinced that if Zelensky gave the
orders, he could be absolutely certain that the military would
obey. I've heard.
And it may just simply be empty talk.
But nonetheless, you know, in the last couple of days, just
from contacts in, in Kiev, you know, I've heard some rumblings

(47:55):
about that. This may well be a step too far,
which again is one of the reasons why Zelensky needs to be
given political ammunition if heis going to make any kind of
concessions. So we'll have to wait and see.
I have to say that I think that the Donetsk issue, this
territorial quote, unquote, swap, because the Russians might
give back some insignificant little slivers of Sumi and
Herzog regions that they've taken, may well be the rock on

(48:18):
which this current negotiation process founders.
Right, right, OK, all right. And that well then that flows
into to the last thing that I just want to cover and that is
that is looking forward to what happens next.
This you know Trump has announced this trilateral
meeting. My understanding is that that
Putin has not expressed any willingness to that obviously

(48:39):
Zelensky has. I mean, do you think that Putin
has any kind of escape route to to wriggle out of attending that
meeting? Could you have a stab at what
happens if it if it does go ahead?
I mean, you've just, you've justpointed to, to it to 1 potential

(49:00):
rock on which the, the, the shipof progress gets dashed as it's
as it were. I mean, it feels like everyone
in a sense has figured out at least a superficial, at a
superficial level, how to manageTrump.
You know, the, the Europeans, aswe saw today and we've seen
previously with Mark Rutte, you know, a, a degree of flattery
and biting one's tongue seems toat least get you through the

(49:23):
moment. But is, is Putin actually sort
of still better at Trump management than anyone else?
And, and would, I mean, is, is there a way in which Putin sort
of goes into it with with this sort of stronger hand and just
sort of finds his way through it?
Do you think so that the the wargoes on?

(49:44):
Is that AI mean what is? Is that sadly the most likely
outcome? I think unfortunately, the most
likely outcome is indeed that the war goes on and that Putin
is able to manage Trump enough that although the Americans
might provide a little bit more assistance to the Ukrainians,
but essentially the Americans are looking to withdraw rather

(50:07):
than engage in this conflict. As you said, Putin has
demonstrated himself to be a depressingly capable Trump
Wrangler. And interestingly, again, if one
compares the Alaska summit with others, he he doesn't depend on
quite the same rather fawning flattery that we get, you know,

(50:27):
the whole calling him daddy or whatever else.
In some ways what Putin is able to do because he is member of
the sort of the strongman club of leaders, which is in many
ways something that Trump aspires to being considered.
So in some ways, his flattery ismuch more that sense of, you
know, you, you can be one of us.It's much more, you know, equal
to equal rather than vassal to, to, to monarch.

(50:51):
So, you know, he he so far at least has managed to play it.
And I think that this sort of issue of a trilateral meeting,
which frankly would be prematureat this stage, I don't think you
would get anything from, you know, putting Putin and Zelensky
into one room would be a very combustible binary mix.
And I think exactly we're now atthe stage when the hard, quiet

(51:13):
work needs to be done. So I think, you know, the issue
of security guarantees, the issue of the future of that
remaining part of of Donetsk andthe the the potential for the
Russians to push harder. They have attendance.
Again, it's a very classic Russian style of diplomacy and
negotiation that you push and you push and you push because in

(51:34):
a way you, you, you demand ridiculous amounts because you
expect to be haggled down to merely excessive amounts.
So I think we may well see the Russians, for example, pushing
for what they call demilitarisation of Ukraine,
limits to the size of Ukraine armed forces, an absolute non
starter for all kinds of reasons.
So there's still lots and lots of of nuts and bolts issues to
be addressed before there's really any point in a

(51:56):
trilateral. And yeah, it's it's it's in
dealing with the details that I think it's still most likely
that this attempt at negotiationwill fail.
But for all that, we are closer to the prospect that there could
be some kind of peace, even if it is an ugly, unfair peace,

(52:17):
let's be clear. But we're closer to that than we
have been at any point since thestart of the war.
It's a really important point you make that I mean the the
this this assumption as as it's well or this portrayal that is
being put that that if if we getthese two guys in in the room
together and then we get Trump to sort of to mediate.
I mean, I'm not saying anyone's so credulous is to assume that's
going to work out, but it but itis, it is well.

(52:38):
Except for Donald Trump, it seems.
Apparently so. I and, and, and the fact that I
mean, I, I can't recall Trump ever knocking back one of
Putin's demands as being completely and utterly
outrageous and ridiculous. So of course Putin has this
added secret weapon of making demands that he knows that
Zelensky can't actually agree to.

(52:59):
And therefore putting Zelensky in the position where he has to
be the one who says, no, I'm notgoing forward with that.
And therefore attracting Trump'sire on on that basis.
So yeah, it's, it's a bit of a depressing situation, but I
suppose, I mean, I think, I think the point that you make
about, I mean, there's, there's some really hard details, long

(53:19):
slog type work to be, to be gonethrough before the the leaders
actually sit down and and wrap it up is one that probably most
people aren't really acknowledging as much as they
should be. Absolutely.
This is the start of a process, not the end.
Yeah, yeah. All right, Mark, look, you've
been super generous with your time and I think we've really
delved into it. And look, I feel much better

(53:41):
informed. I'm sure I'll listen as well as
well. Thank you so much for joining
us. My pleasure.
Thanks for listening to or watching Stop the World.
We'll be back with another episode soon.
Ciao for now.