August 13, 2025 • 46 mins
Donald Trump famously called him “little rocket man”. Xi Jinping just thinks he’s a punk. But North Korea’s delphic leader Kim Jong-un has played a savvy hand and brought his country back from the ruinous Covid era to put himself in a strong position through his deals with Russia’s Vladimir Putin.
Anna Fifield, long-time foreign correspondent and North Korea-watcher who is now the Washington Post’s Asia Editor, explains the Kim’s strategic cunning, his relations with Moscow and Beijing, the state of the country for its tyrannised people and its bizarre two-track economy. She also talks about public positioning of his ‘tweenage daughter Kim Ju-ae as part of a possible succession plan, the reality that North Korea has consolidated itself as a nuclear weapons power, and what the failure of Donald Trump’s first-term nuclear negotiations with Kim portends for Trump’s coming talks with Putin on Ukraine.
Anna is the author of The Great Successor: The Divinely Perfect Destiny of Brilliant Comrade Kim Jong Un.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
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(00:01):
Stop the world. Welcome to STOP THE WORLD.
I'm David Rowe. And I'm Olivia Nelson.
Now, Liv, we love journos on Stop the World.
I'm obviously biassed because I used to be 1.
But you love them too, because they're great storytellers and
they're good at bringing all of their insights together in a way
(00:21):
that makes you want to keep listening.
Today's guest personifies that skill.
Yes, we have a real treat for our listeners.
We have the Washington Post, Asia Pacific Editor and a
Fifield. I am a huge, huge fan,
particularly in the strength of her book The Great successor,
The Divinely Perfect Destiny of Brilliant Comrade Kim Jong Un,
which I can't recommend. Another, I mean, the title alone
is is fantastic. Yes, I agree.
(00:43):
We were feeling that North Koreahad been squeezed out of
everyone's attention span, understandably by events
elsewhere. But really it remains one of the
great flashpoints because it's still a nuclear armed problem
child. That it is, and we're not the
only ones who felt like getting into it this week.
Obviously, The New York Times has been running a really
interesting series on Kim Jong UN's mysterious daughter, who is
seemingly being positioned as his successor despite being a
(01:07):
tweenager. And well, it's like putting my
daughter really in charge of a country, which I, much as I love
her, I probably wouldn't do. And despite the obvious power
and influence of Kim's sister, who's a who's an adult.
So there's a succession style rivalry brewing and I couldn't
resist the temptation to get stuck into the HBO series, which
(01:28):
as you know Liv, I thought was the most pointless and overrated
TV show of the decade. Dave, we don't disagree on much,
but this is an area of serious disagreement.
It went round and round for FourSeasons and then the dad just
conveniently killed over and died.
It was silly. Anyway, we digress.
Anna has been The Post's Bureau chief in Beijing, Bureau chief
in Tokyo and also editor of the Genuine Post in her native New
(01:50):
Zealand. Before that, she worked as a
foreign correspondent for your favourite paper, Dave, the
Financial Times. She is a brilliant journal who
spent time in North Korea and really genuinely understands Kim
Jong UN's regime like a few other people.
Yeah, it's one of the more fascinating conversations I've
had in a long time. Such a bizarre regime.
It's so dangerous and it's obviously so destructive for the
(02:11):
North Korean people and, and, and as insights really capture
the full spectrum of that. So we covered how Kim compares
with his father and grandfather,the prospects for a managed
succession, as, as mentioned, North Korea's involvement in
Ukraine, as relationships with Russia and China, parallel
economies that you have where there's a sort of feeble
domestic economy. And then a you've got a regime
that's sort of with all these global criminal enterprises.
(02:34):
Donald Trump's failed negotiations with Kim during his
first term and the lessons for that for the upcoming summit
with Donald, with Vladimir Putin, pardon me.
And of course, the sad reality that North Korea is now now a
consolidated nuclear power, and there doesn't seem to be any way
to unwind that. Yeah, that's the situation
today. And Anna also shares with us her
favourite anecdote about North Korea.
(02:55):
So listen out for that. But really, the whole
conversation is just packed withcolour and insight.
We promise you'll enjoy it. Let's hear from Anna.
I'm here with Anna Fifield. Anna, thanks for coming on STOP
THE World. Oh.
I'm thrilled to be here, Dave. It's great to have you.
So we're going to talk mostly here about North Korea.
Despite being a rogue nuclear armed nation, it's been nudged
(03:16):
out of our attention span by allthe other crises.
So we're going to treat this as a kind of a chance to to catch
up on it and think about how it fits in with all the other
crises. So, and perhaps we can just
start with a snapshot of North Korea's strength this time
around with in the second Trump administration relative to say
(03:37):
the first Trump administration, which was really the last time
it was front and centre of the attention on global affairs in
the sense of how strong its military is, how strong its
economy is, how strong its relationships with other major
dictatorships or disruptive powers around the region.
(03:59):
Does Kim have essentially more leverage than ever before?
That's the way it looks to a nonexpert like myself.
What do you think? Yeah, well, as so many times
before, North Korea and the Kim regime continues to confound and
surprise us. So when we look back to the
first Trump administration and the various diplomatic efforts
(04:21):
during that period, which which led to nothing like.
So when at the end of that, at 2019, when the diplomatic
process with Donald Trump fell over with no result, you would
think that North Korea would be in a really weak position.
And in fact, in 2020, North Korea did become in a very much
weakened even compared to itselfbecause it really properly
(04:44):
closed its borders to China, to the outside world with the
outbreak of COVID. So this is something, you know,
we call it the hermit Kingdom. North Korea had actually not
been in that hermetic for some time because they had allowed a
lot of trade over that border with N with not between North
Korea and China and people to goback and forth, goods to go back
(05:06):
and forth. But with the arrival of COVID,
they properly shut their borders.
There was nothing going over that river border.
And so that should have been an existential crisis for North
Korea because their decrepit economy relies on that little
trickle of trade with the outside world.
So it's really surprising, you know, And then through that
(05:27):
three year, 4 year period, we knew almost nothing of what was
happening inside North Korea. We got almost no news whatsoever
other than what the North Koreans told us.
So that really should have been yet another existential moment
for the Kim regime where it's access to funding, licit and
illicit, had dried up with theirability to get their money back
(05:50):
from overseas that they'd earnedthrough whatever means had also
dried up. But in fact, we see Kim Jong Un
now stronger than ever, despite Cova, despite this enforced
hermit Kingdom period. And that's basically because he
really lucked out with Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
(06:11):
You know, North Korea has very little that the world wants
during normal times, but in the and has very few friends in this
situation. We saw Vladimir Putin left with
very few friends after his invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
February and also really hungry for ammunition, for artillery,
(06:34):
for troops, for cannon fodder for one of the better friends.
And what does North Korea have? It has a lot of Soviet
compatible old artillery ammunition stuff that it can
continue to make. It has, you know, people.
And we know that Kim Jong Un does not care about the welfare
of the people and he's happy to send them into battle.
(06:55):
So suddenly Kim Jong Un was relevant and needed and in
demand in a way like never before.
And I think that has given him alot more confidence on the world
stage. He doesn't need to talk to
Donald Trump this time around orthe South Koreans or the Chinese
for that matter, because he now has the strategic comprehensive
(07:16):
partnership with Vladimir Putin that really, I mean, very few
details have come out. They're not exactly forthcoming,
these two, but it does seem to be operational.
They're both getting something out of that.
So Kim Jong Un, see, you know, despite all the odds, appears to
have emerged even stronger than than before.
And that's why this time around,you know, Donald Trump keeps
(07:38):
talking about how he would be willing to talk to Kim, Kim Jong
Un. We haven't heard a peep out of
North Korea on anything like that because they just don't
need him in the way they did previously.
That's a lovely summary of the trajectory of the last six years
or so. We'll definitely come back to to
North Korea, Russia, North Korea, China and so forth.
(07:59):
I just want to concentrate on Kim in a little bit more detail
for the moment. As a, as a leader, as a
dictator, as a, as a personality.
How does he compare with his father and his grandfather who
ruled the country before him? Is it a case of similar
ambitions, different era? Does he have different qualities
(08:19):
to his predecessors and and how do they manifest in terms of the
the leadership that he imposes on his country and the relations
with the rest of the world? Yeah, I mean, he has the same
aims overall, which is, you know, for the Kim raging to stay
in power and to keep enriching themselves.
So the overarching goal is definitely the same.
(08:40):
But his method is quite different from his father's.
In particular, his grandfather, Kim Illinois Sung was the
founding leader of North Korea and was genuinely beloved by
North Korean people during that time.
Because it was a period of when North Korea was strong, was
relevant during the Cold War, had friends in the communist
(09:01):
bloc, but the economy in North Korea was doing better than
South Korea's right up till 1975.
And so to this day, defectors from North Korea will remember
Kim Illinois Sung relatively fondly as opposed to his son Kim
Jong Illinois's father, Kim JongUN's father, Sorry, Kim Jong
Illinois, who was the second Kimin the mix.
(09:22):
He presided during quite difficult times.
There was this devastating famine, the collapse of the
Soviet Union, a whole bunch of events that should have spelled
the end of the regime that he somehow managed to survive.
But he was a very different kindof leader from his own father in
terms of being quite restrained,quite reserved.
(09:43):
He only said one sentence in public during his 17 years in
power. Yeah.
And then? Right, I did not know that.
That's right, he uttered a phrase, glory to the military
kind of thing at a military parade one time.
That is the only time that he spoke in public.
Whereas then we had Kim Jong Illinois come in there.
We had Kim Jong Un come in. You know, the least.
(10:05):
Yeah, even I get confused with all the Kims.
The least qualified of all. You know, he was 27 years old,
no political experience, no military experience.
Really difficult to see how thisyoung guy could take the reins
of this decrepit regime that should have collapsed a long
time ago. But against the odds, he did it.
And a big part of that was because he tried to literally
(10:28):
embody his grandfather. You know the funny haircut, the
the horn rimmed glasses, the suits, the gravelly voice, even
this is all reminiscent of Kim Illinois Sung.
And you know it shocked N Koreans when they first saw him
just how much he looked like hisgrandfather.
And that's all designed to to instil legitimacy in him and to
(10:50):
say this person is the clear, legitimate successor of this
regime. And in many ways, it's worked.
But at the same time, he's really been his own person in
terms of being quite bold and audacious.
Many surprising things he did, like drink Coca Cola with Dennis
Rodman in North Korea, had to explain that according to
(11:13):
communist ideals, you know, leaving the country, flying to
Singapore to see to meet Donald Trump, you know, he has done a
whole bunch of things that were unprecedented.
And so he has set out to chart his own path.
And then on the military front as well, he's obviously
continued the ambitions of his predecessors, but has made much,
(11:36):
much more progress in terms of being able to now demonstrate
credible missile programmes, nuclear destinations and things
to show that they are. They have got a long way to go,
but they have been really clearly making progress under
the third Kim. There, there are certainly some
of the current crop of leaders around the world, both dictators
(11:57):
and Democrats, who I wish would only after one sentence in 17
years, but sadly not OK. If if you were to, if you were
to use a few adjectives to describe the Kim Jong Un.
I mean, is he, is he? Does he, do you think he's
smart? Do you think he's a good
strategic thinker? Do you think he's ruthless in an
(12:18):
effective way? How?
How effective is he? Yes, all of those things.
He is absolutely very smart, very strategic, very ruthless.
And I don't say this to flatter him.
The the proof is the fact that he has been able to keep this
regime together, right? Like, it's a pretty hard thing
to do in 2011 as a 27 year old to hold together this regime
(12:43):
full of octogenarians who, yeah,have been helping to run the
state, which is close to collapse.
But he has managed to do it in part by the internal management
there in North Korea. You know, he took advantage of
all the institutional knowledge that was there.
His uncle was the money man. You know, there was the
(13:03):
propaganda chiefs, the army chief, all of these people who
knew how the system worked. He took advantage of that over
the first couple of years in power, set himself up and then
one by one dispatched with all of these people.
You know, he had his uncle executed, hauled out of a
Politburo meeting. He had his defence minister blow
into smithereens with an anti aircraft gun.
(13:25):
You know, he sent a message in the way that he dispatched with
these people as well. But again, it's very like if
you're wanting to send a messageto the people who remain in the
regime, don't cross me. Nobody is safe having your uncle
kill executed in that way. Having your half brother
assassinated in an airport in Malaysia also sends a real
(13:47):
message. So I think he has been ruthless
and strategic along the way. And even if we look to the way
that he played Donald Trump during Trump's first term, you
know, now we see all these leaders around the world, you
know, from Japan to Cambodia to Latin America saying that they
(14:07):
will nominate Donald Trump for the Nobel Prize, Peace Prize,
you know, trying to Curry favour.
Kim Jong Un is the OG of that, you know, approach.
And he was the one who sent thiscomedic sized letter and Boston
gold flowery language to Donald Trump, flattering him in that
first administration that DonaldTrump, you know, that was one of
the classified documents that was found at Mar a Lago because
(14:31):
Donald Trump was so proud of it.So he really knew how to play
Donald Trump at that stage as well and appeal to him and get
what he wanted, which was was that meeting.
You know, his grandfather had wanted that meeting as well with
the American president. Kim Jong Un was the one who
actually got it. And that bestowed so much
legitimacy on him because he went on to the world stage
(14:52):
standing shoulder to shoulder with the leader of, you know,
the strongest, richest country on earth.
So. So he has been very tactical and
strategic in the way he's approached the job of being a
21st century dictator. This might be a question that's
almost beside the point, but I mean, obviously you see those
ridiculous videos where he's parading in front of his his
(15:14):
troops and his officials and they're all clapping their hands
so loudly, so hard, you worry they're going to break bones in
their fingers. But do you have any way of
assessing how liked or loved I mean, you, you mentioned Kim
Illinois Sung being genuinely loved by by the people.
Is there any way of assessing the the degree of his popularity
(15:36):
or unpopularity and whether you know his the stability of his
rule is purely down to ruthlessness, or how have have
people actually sort of embracedhim as a leader in in any
genuine way? Yeah, short answer is no, there
is no public polling in North Korea to tell us that.
But there's a lot of anecdotal evidence that, I mean, at those
(15:58):
military parades, that's obviously a select group of
people from Pyongyang brought inthere.
And you know, those people don'tneed to be told to clap and
cheer hard. Like you don't want to be the
one with the camera on you whereyou're being half hearted about
the applause, right? So that's people know what they
need, what their role is and that kind of situation.
And what we have had in talking to people over the years who
(16:20):
have escaped from North Korea, almost universally, they have
talked about how, you know, theythere was some hope when he came
in this millennial young leader that he would be a liberalizer
and that he would do things differently.
But that really has not turned out to be the case.
He has centralised the economy more.
He has tightened security and the border more.
(16:41):
He has been very harsh in his role.
So of all of the people who haveescaped that I have spoken to
and my colleagues have spoken to, people you know, have no
affection for him. They and try to ignore him as
much as they can in their daily lives, right?
They're just trying to get on, feed their families, make the
best of a bad situation. And really, Kim Jong Un doesn't
(17:02):
care about those people because they are no use to him.
He really only cares about that top elite in Pyongyang, the
people who keep him in power. They are the ones who, if you're
doing the public opinion poll, they are the ones he cares about
because they are the ones who have who know where the money
is, who know how the system works, who could potentially
(17:25):
build factions to rival him. So they are the people that he
wants to keep under control, most of all to keep in fear of
him, but also he they are the ones he wants to enrich and make
them feel like they have something to gain from the
system. So throughout his Kim Jong UN's
(17:46):
leadership, we have seen these kleptocrats in Pyongyang get
richer and richer and enjoy an increasing standard of living
under Kim Jong Un, mostly thanksto corruption that he is allowed
to flourish. But you know, the 20 somethings
in North Korea, but well before COVID at least used to call it
Pyong Hatton, they would joke about the skyline in North Korea
(18:08):
now looking like New York because it had so many more
skyscrapers and things like that.
I mean, it's still very much a Potemkin village.
They do have 70 Storey skyscrapers now, but the
elevators don't work because there's not enough electricity.
So nobody wants to live on the top floor of these fancy new
buildings, that's for sure. But Kim Jong Un wanted to try to
create a sense that their lives were getting better under him
(18:32):
and therefore they should keep him as the leader, and that they
would occupy a a social and economic position in North Korea
that they would not occupy if they escaped to South Korea and
had to be a taxi driver. Yeah, meanwhile, the rest of the
country would make the Bronx in the 1920s look good, presumably.
One more question on the the people before we get on to the
(18:54):
geopolitics. But Kim's only 41 years old, but
he doesn't look to be in great shape.
And there's the history of I think there's the family history
of heart problems. There's been talk recently and
some stories about his, his daughter Kim Juai succeeding
him. I hope I'm pronouncing that
correctly. She's only about 12 years old, I
(19:14):
think. At the same time, his sister,
Kim's sister Kim Yo Jong, seems to be fairly influential.
What's your what's your assessment, I guess, of the sort
of succession dynamic series? Is it unusual, first of all, for
for a child to be publicly positioned in the way that that
Kim the daughter is? What kind of potential future
(19:36):
trouble does that Does that portend in the vein of the
vastly overrated HBOTV show succession?
Yes, yes, even by North Korean standards, this is extremely
unusual. This daughter, Kim Joo A is her
name. We know her name because Dennis
(19:57):
Rodman held her when she was a baby and he went to see on he
was on the yacht with Kim Jong Un and one son.
So this is our source of intelligence.
She has never been named in the North Korean media, but she is
referred to as Kim's daughter. And recently she has been called
a great person of guidance as she's been out and about with
(20:18):
her great her with her father. So he's clearly positioning her
look. North Korea, and to a lesser
extent South Korea, remains a very Confucian hierarchical
country, has a culture of Confucian hierarchy where
maleness and age is prized. So it was surprising in many
(20:39):
ways that Kim Jong Un was able to take over being only 27.
But at least he was a man, you know?
And then that's been the kind ofthinking around his sister as
well, Kim Yo Jong, as she has risen to prominence over the
past decade or so, that it's hard to see how she could take
over being a woman and young as well, not even 40 years.
(21:02):
But also there's nobody else like is clearly the only person
in the family and this is very much run as a family business
that Kim say they have this kindof like God like blood running
through their veins that enablesthem to lead the country and
only them. So it has to be a family member.
So Kim Yo Jong had been on the scene.
Obviously she still is there. She is kind of the attack dog
(21:25):
who comes out and issues all of these very fierce statements,
but she is very much working in the system.
Whereas over the past couple of years, we have seen Kim Jong Un
take his young daughter with himto a lot of military events in
particular. And at the beginning, it seemed
like maybe she was going to be the successor.
(21:47):
Maybe he's trying to prepare North Korea for this.
Now, I think there's no doubt that that is exactly what he is
trying to do. She is, yes, maybe 12, maybe 13.
But she is increasingly prominent in all of these public
appearances. She is there when the missiles
are launched. She is there at military
celebration, sitting in the front row with her father.
(22:08):
She dresses like a 40 year old rather than a year old.
And she's wearing, like leather coats and skirt suits and things
that are not typical tweenage attire.
And so he is clearly positioningher for that.
I think a big part of that is the fact that his own succession
was very rushed. Whereas the transition from Kim
(22:29):
one to Kim 2, they laid the foundations over 25 years, the
second Kim was steadily elevatedthrough the ranks.
Kim Jong Un did not have that same preparation.
He was introduced to the public and then installed as leader.
Within a couple of years, barelytwo years had passed.
(22:50):
So that felt very rush and may have been a little hairy in
terms of getting his grip on control.
So I would say that that is whathe is doing now.
He is laying the groundwork for the North Korean public to
accept the idea of a woman taking over because she has this
special blood in her veins. And that Kim Yo Jong, the
(23:11):
sister, would be a kind of Regent who would be able to
guide her as Kim Ju A rose up through the ranks.
I mean, I've learned a long timeago not to dismiss things as
impossible with North Korea. This seems impossible to me that
that a 17 year old girl you know, Kim Jong Un clearly is not
(23:32):
healthy. It's clearly obese.
He continues to smoke a lot. If he was to drop dead in the
next 5 years, would the North Korean people accept Kim Jong Un
as their leader? I don't know.
I mean, we, we can't, as with Kim Jong Un, we, we can never
say never. It seems really difficult to
understand. But they have a lot of tools at
(23:52):
their disposal to be able to keep people under control in
terms of the censorship and the really brutal prison system.
You know, you only have to raiseyour eyebrows at the Kims really
to, to end up in a gulag. So never say never.
Fascinating. You talked in your first answer
about the, the benefit that Kim had got from North Korea's
(24:15):
involvement in Ukraine and it's stepped up relationship with,
with Russia generally. I mean, it's certainly from the
outside it, it seems to have been a pretty clever play by Kim
as you, as you said, he, he sends the things that he has in
abundance, which is, which is people as cannon fodder and and
basic ammunition that the Russians have been running short
on. He in, in return, he gets
(24:35):
military tech, He gets, you know, I suppose, diplomatic
credibility, at least in certaincircles.
He gets some money, hard cash, by the sound of things, fuel.
I think they've got a security treaty as well, correct?
They do. Yeah.
So I mean, just expand on that alittle bit.
I mean, you, you've, you've saidbasically it was central to the
reviving of North Korea's and and Kim's power and leverage.
(24:58):
Just give us a bit more of a sense of just, I suppose how
it's unfolded and is there, I don't know.
I mean, does that just go on in perpetuity for as long as the as
Russia's war against Ukraine goes on?
Yeah. I mean, I guess it depends on
how long that does go on. Maybe Donald Trump will have
(25:18):
solved it all by the end of thisweek.
Who knows? Yeah, I think that this is it
looks to be more than just transactional now.
These two seem to have forged something more like an
ideological bond around the strategic partnership that they
have forged there. And in addition to this, you
(25:41):
know, there's been quite a lot of activity like Russians are
the only foreigners who can enter North Korea at the moment.
There's this big water park thathe's created.
So there's like quite a lot of tourism going on at the same
time and people to people exchanges in addition to the to
the military stuff. And a lot of Russian oil is also
flowing to North Korea, which isalso something that North Korea
(26:03):
needs. We don't know what is happening
with the military cooperation. These two leaders are obviously
very secretive. But we do know that, you know,
over the years, Russia and the Soviet Union before it made a
lot of advances in terms of missile technology, more
recently in terms of drone technology, nuclear powered
(26:29):
submarines and things that they have proven to be able to do and
that North Korea would dearly like to do.
So it's reasonable to think thatthis technology and knowledge
transfer is part of the deal. We probably won't know until we
see proof of that. And it's actually been quite a
surprisingly quiet period. And it's the quiet periods that
(26:52):
make me most concerned, you know, because we can absolutely
believe that North Korea is developing, testing missile
technology like they've they've made clear they want hypersonic
vehicles, weapons and drones andall these other more.
(27:12):
Kim Jong Un wants a more developed and more diversified
arsenal. And so I think they are probably
working away on it and eventually we will begin to see
launches and tests of these kindof technologies.
And, and probably some of them will fail at the beginning as
they usually do, but they will continue to test and test until
they are able to master a lot ofthis stuff.
(27:33):
So I think this, we should be quite worried about what Russia
is teaching North Korea how to do.
And then at the same time, I think one of the big questions
and the big changes about North Korea is where they're getting
the money from. And when we think back like even
20 years ago and you'd think like Russia, North Korean
diplomats were used to be caughtin Eastern Europe with, you
(27:56):
know, boots full of heroin. And there were these super
dollars, these counterfeit $100 notes that they could make,
which were incredible, undetectable almost.
We don't hear any of that kind of stuff anymore because it's
all become cyber now. They've trained this incredible
army of hackers who are going out there planting malware,
(28:16):
ransomware, conducting these enormous cyber thefts or crypto
theft. So that, I mean, there was 1, I
think last year where they managed to get their hands on
$1.5 billion worth of crypto. So North Korea has found new
modern ways to steal money so that it doesn't need to be doing
(28:38):
so many of these, you know, piece meal things like they were
before. So between these newfangled
technologies that they've got tomake money and the technology
and know how that they're getting from North Korea, I
think they're probably feeling like they're in quite a good
position. Yeah, really interesting.
The well, let's stay on that fora moment.
I mean, I'm always fascinated byNorth Korea's well, quote
(28:59):
unquote economy and how much of it is, I suppose, legitimate or
normal economic activity going on within the country itself.
So people growing things, peoplemaking things, people, people
selling them back and forth. Is that sort of happening on one
level? And meanwhile, the regime has
(29:19):
this sort of global network of acombination of, you know, sort
of criminal enterprises, relationships with other
dictatorships that simply supplythem things on a out of
geopolitical transactionalism oror shared values and and shared
interest in disrupting the AUS LED order.
(29:42):
Can you just, I mean how would you sort of quantify and
characterise the the internal economy and what portion of that
is just completely illegitimate criminal activity?
Yeah, I would say there's almost2 economies operating in North
Korea and that there's the ordinary everyday, day to day
economy. You know, the official state
(30:03):
economy doesn't really work anymore.
You know, there are still shoe factories, but with no energy
and no raw inputs, you know, they can't make shoes and things
like that. So people don't really, I mean,
they still have to go to work inmany cases, but that is not
their source of income. There's still this unofficial
trading economy that takes placeoften through the markets, often
(30:26):
run by women because they are not required to go to the
workplace like the men are. And so that economy was
flourishing before COVID and that Kim Jong Un had allowed
that kind of grey market economyto thrive because that was the
way for ordinary people to make ends meet.
(30:49):
And so there were various kind of ways that people would let
people in the border regions would bribe their way across the
river, go to China, buy second hand clothes or washing machines
or rice cookers or what have your DVDs and bring them back
into North Korea. And that would kind of be the
lifeblood of the economy as thatwas sold in the markets.
(31:10):
And meanwhile, you had, yeah, women cutting hair or making
tofa, or you're producing on a low level to make ends meet.
And the regime turned a blind eye to all of that stuff because
it knew that that's how they could just like it would let out
steam out of the, you know, people wouldn't be angry about
not being able to eat. They could feed themselves.
(31:31):
So that was existing until, I mean, and the big question about
this is what happened on the border when COVID came and that
border was shut down and that kind of seed money that would
come in from China all dried up.It has become much, much more
difficult for people to trade. They can only really trade on
the things that they have or they can make in North Korea,
(31:53):
not so much in terms of imports coming in from China.
So that's a big stress on ordinary people.
And then there's the the regime economy.
And so we've we've seen that KimJong Un and his family have
continued to flourish despite the COVID closures.
You know, he's still getting thelatest model Mercedes Benz
(32:14):
delivered to him somehow in North Korea.
His 12 year old daughter is wearing what appears, according
to experts, not me, to be Christian Dior and Gucci outfits
there in North Korea. So the family continues to
prosper. They are clearly still getting
the money and the goods that they need to run the missile
(32:35):
programme and to pursue their military aims.
But, you know, it's difficult totell how they are doing that.
I mean, a lot of the money will be stolen, as I said before, in
terms of the crypto assets or other scams that they've come up
with to get money. So they can and, and that's what
Kim Jong Un really cares about, right?
He wants his family and his cronies to continue to feel rich
(32:59):
and prosper. And so he has prioritised that
for sure over the way that the ordinary people live.
Big question in all of this is how China is viewing North
Korea's direction at the moment.How would you describe the
trajectory or how would you, howhas the the North Korea China
(33:19):
relationship been tracking recently and what impact has the
closeness between North Korea and Russia had?
Is China worried about that? Are they happy about it?
What do you? Think, yeah, I think ever since,
you know, Xi Jinping took power in China at the same time almost
just a little after Kim Jong Un in North Korea, so 2012, she has
(33:43):
really made it clear he has no time for this little punk next
door who fires missiles during big important events in China
and things. And so they had had been very
little contact until Donald Trump came along and started
with the summits. That is what focused she Jinping
mind and and forced them to havetheir first meeting, she and Kim
(34:03):
before the Trump summit. I think XI Jinping's preferred
position would be to just ignoreNorth Korea.
They want them to be, they want them to exist.
They want them to be stable and quiet and acting as that buffer
between northeastern China and American backed democratic South
Korea. So they would really like to
(34:24):
just be able to ignore them mostof the time.
And and that has been they have been able to do that.
They did support them somewhat during the COVID years just to
make sure it didn't collapse. But I think this development
with the friendship with Russia will be quite concerning to them
because China does want to have all of the leverage over North
(34:46):
Korea. They do want to be able to force
Kim Jong Un to act or not act incertain ways.
It's quite a surprise that they North Korea has not conducted a
nuclear test since 2017. And that may well be because Xi
Jinping has made it really clearthat that's a red line.
They certainly have the nuclear material for it in North Korea
to be able to do it. So it's puzzling that they
(35:07):
haven't. But so I think from XI Jinping's
perspective, they will very muchbe looking at this and concerned
about the relationship and wanting to keep a sense that
they have some control over North Korea in there.
But at the same time, you know, China, Beijing wants Russia to
prevail in its war against Ukraine, right?
They look at this very much through the lens of China's own
(35:32):
territorial claims ambitions over Taiwan.
And so they do not want this idea that the West or democratic
world will help Ukraine prepare,get kick out Russia so or
prevail over Russia. So I think that remains their
top priority. They could definitely have done
(35:54):
more in terms of China supporting Russia in this.
They have been quite guarded in what they have done and said
publicly, but despite the no limits friendship, but I think
that this is kind of a careful balancing act that they are
trying to keep in place in NorthEast Asia.
OK, OK. Perhaps we can look at a, a
(36:17):
parallel and we, we're getting into, into Donald Trump a bit
here. I, I try not to make every
episode focus too much on, on Trump just because he's, it's,
it's easy to get drawn into that.
But it's, it's as we're recording this, he's, we're a
few days away from the planned summit between Trump and
Vladimir Putin. Of course, it's a tremendously
(36:39):
important moment. But I've always felt when it
comes to Trump, Putin negotiations, there's a, there's
the danger of a, of a, of a repeat of what we saw between
Trump and Kim Jong Un, where thethe, the the summits themselves
are portrayed as some, as successors.
But Trump ultimately loses patience, loses interest, walks
(37:00):
away, and then the dictator goeson doing what he pleases.
I suppose I'm just interested inyour reflections on that.
What lessons, if any, do you draw from that episode between
Trump and Kim Jong Un in terms of, you know what, what we may
see between Trump and Putin in the coming days?
(37:23):
Yeah. I mean, there are so many
parallels in terms of Trump's kind of the art of his deal, I
guess, in that if you cast your mind back to 2017 when Donald
Trump was talking about Little Rocket Man and talking about
being locked and loaded and all this kind of fire and fury and
all of this kind of rhetoric that we were getting out of him.
And he was really in that bad cop mode until he was in good
(37:45):
cop mode. And I think we've seen a lot of
back and forth on this in terms of Trump's approach to Putin
over the past few months, right?But I think that this both in
both cases that it comes down toTrump thinking as a
personalistic leader that he andas a deal maker, that he alone
(38:07):
can cut this kind of deal with another world leader.
I'm no expert on Russia, so I will not opine on that.
But it certainly didn't work with Kim Jong Un at that time.
I think, I mean, I was probably a little bit of an outlier in
2018. And I actually thought it was
good that Donald Trump went and met with Kim Jong Un because
(38:31):
over the previous like 2-3 decades, various American
leaders had been trying the samething over and over again to
convince the North Koreans to denuclearize.
And it hadn't worked, right? That's kind of horse trading
through the six party talks and that oil for denuclearization
hadn't worked. So I thought why not try
something different? You know, it, it made a little
(38:55):
bit of progress, I guess in, in Singapore and, and that they
agreed to meet again, but obviously ultimately failed, did
not lead to anything that is widely credited to John Bolton
nixing the deal and and Hanoi and stopping it going any
further. So clearly it didn't work.
But I still do think that at least now we know that that
(39:15):
approach doesn't work. You know, that we don't have to
imagine there are no more what ifs around that.
So I think it was worth a go. And now the dynamic, I think is
very different partly because, and this is part of the reason
as well why North Korea has fallen off the front pages
because there are so many other crises around the world
(39:36):
happening, you know, other people dying of starvation,
other nuclear armed powers locked in conflicts, you know,
So the threat of North Korea, while still there and still
really credible, doesn't seem asurgent as the ongoing conflicts
that are happening in other parts of the world.
So I think that has distracted Donald Trump a bit.
(39:56):
But also the fact that Kim Jong Un has this new strategic
partnership that is multifacetedand seems to be working for his
to his advantage with Russia just reduces his reliance on
other people in the outside world too, so.
We've even seen that over the past couple of months with South
Korea, which now has a new progressive, you know, more
(40:19):
talks, diplomacy friendly leaderin place there in South Korea.
But so far, their efforts to forge like send an olive branch
to North Korea and things have met with nothing except, you
know, slamming the door in theirface again.
So there is this real sense thatwhether it's South Korea, the
US, China, Kim Jong Un doesn't feel like he needs them as much
(40:43):
anymore. The real question then, you
know, is what happens if if Putin goes away And whatever way
that happens, you know, where does that leave Kim Jong Un?
But I think the fact that he still does have, you know, then
he goes back to his old playbook, right?
He still does have nuclear and nuclear stockpiles.
All of these missiles, he can goback to using them as a
(41:04):
bargaining chip for talks once again.
But I mean, the bottom line hereis that he holds a lot of the
cards. Kim Jong Un holds a lot of the
cards right now. Yeah, yeah.
So in terms of North South relations, would you summarise
it as being largely just disengaged at the moment?
I remember there was, I think itwas Kim's sister, Kim Yo Jong,
who made some remarks a while back that no, they have no
(41:27):
interest in in talking to the new leader in the South.
And does that just look like theway it's going to continue for
the time being? Yes, I think so.
I mean, I think they have no need to talk to them.
It's there's a real limit as to what South Korea could give them
other than talks and face. So I think that there is no
nothing really for them to gain North Korea to gain from that.
(41:50):
So I can't imagine a situation where North Korea would want to
talk to them anytime soon. And also it goes back to the
same old playbook you know of, of treating them mean.
What are they going to do? They're not the South.
The South Korean government isn't going to walk away and
refuse to talk it down the line.So North Korea does keep all of
the cards in its hand. All right, now I am in danger of
(42:13):
running over time, so I'll just,we'll go through a couple of
other quick ones that I do need to cover, cover off.
I mean, one is, and, and you've,you've touched on this in, in
your, your last answer, but I mean, is, is denuclearisation
pretty much a dead idea today? You know, I mean, we haven't
talked seriously about it for a number of years now.
And if So, what? What should a reasonable
(42:36):
realistic expectation be for theUS or for for the international
community in terms of the expectations that they might put
to North Korea in terms of some sort of international agreement
to tame the future that it represents?
Yeah, I mean, yes, it's definitely dead.
There's no way that Kim Jong Un would ever consider giving up
(42:57):
his nuclear weapons. They are what makes him relevant
and powerful. You know, Donald Trump wouldn't
be bothered with a country of 25million people, one of the
poorest countries in the world, if they did not have nuclear
weapons. And the fact that, I mean, that
relates to the first term, of course, But the fact that Kim
Jong Un, you know, he rose to power just after Muammar Gaddafi
(43:19):
was pulled out of, you know, a drain in Libya and now looks at
how Ukraine has been invaded andis, you know, doing pretty well
but has not been able to prevailin that war.
Both of these countries are onesthat gave up their nuclear
weapons, right? So why would North Korea ever
give up their nuclear stockpiles?
(43:41):
That is what makes them relevantand that's what serves as a
deterrent. So I think now, I mean, even if
countries don't say it out loud,I think there is an
acknowledgement that North Koreais a nuclear state and will be
remain one for the foreseeable future.
And that the all of the emphasisis on containment, you know,
(44:03):
deterrence, not letting them, you know, the the three knows
the US could have no more no exporting something.
You know, I can't remember that the three now, but but that
they, as long as they don't use this in an offensive way, I
think the world will just have to live with it.
So managing it as a nuclear power basically.
(44:25):
Correct. Yeah, yeah.
All right. Look, 11 last one.
And it's it's a sort of a quirky1.
I won't say lighthearted becauseit might not be.
But you've you've written a bookabout North Korea, You've spent
time there. Give us an anecdote that you
feel would best sum up the country, the regime, and just
(44:49):
the life there in North Korea. Yeah, I think the the stories
about Pyonghatten are the ones that are emblematic of North
Korea today because and the And the last time I went to North
Korea, it was in 2016. The the North Koreans have not
let me back in since then. And actually, I wouldn't go
anymore. Yeah, but when I arrived after
(45:14):
not having been for a few years and arrived into Kim Jong UN's
North Korea, it did look impressive that he has obviously
poured a lot of money into Pyongyang, where the elite live.
And there are buildings. There is a, you know, a German
restaurant and a pizza parlour and the young people can go and
do yoga and things like this. But it is.
(45:36):
So it looks like it's getting better and looks like people
have a better standard of living.
But it is still very much a facade.
Like when you get up close to those buildings, you see the
tiles are already falling off. Yeah.
There is not enough electricity to power the lift or pump the
water up to the upper floors. You know, it's still decrepit on
(45:57):
the inside even though it's had a facelift on the outside.
So that's how I kind of think about North Korea and that we
shouldn't be fooled by the facade that Kim Jong Un has put
up. And that's the capital, right?
So God knows what's happening inthe rest of the country.
Yeah, yeah, that's right. All right, look, and I like, I
have to say that's been one of the most informative
conversations I've had this year.
(46:18):
It was really, really interesting and I've learnt a
lot. So thank you so much for coming
on Stop THE World. Oh, thank you so much for having
me. I appreciate it.
Thanks for listening to Stop theWorld.
That's all we have time for today, folks.
We'll be back with another episode soon.
Stop the world. Welcome to STOP THE WORLD.
I'm David Rowe. And I'm Olivia Nelson.
Now, Liv, we love journos on Stop the World.
I'm obviously biassed because I used to be 1.
But you love them too, because they're great storytellers and
they're good at bringing all of their insights together in a way
(00:21):
that makes you want to keep listening.
Today's guest personifies that skill.
Yes, we have a real treat for our listeners.
We have the Washington Post, Asia Pacific Editor and a
Fifield. I am a huge, huge fan,
particularly in the strength of her book The Great successor,
The Divinely Perfect Destiny of Brilliant Comrade Kim Jong Un,
which I can't recommend. Another, I mean, the title alone
is is fantastic. Yes, I agree.
(00:43):
We were feeling that North Koreahad been squeezed out of
everyone's attention span, understandably by events
elsewhere. But really it remains one of the
great flashpoints because it's still a nuclear armed problem
child. That it is, and we're not the
only ones who felt like getting into it this week.
Obviously, The New York Times has been running a really
interesting series on Kim Jong UN's mysterious daughter, who is
seemingly being positioned as his successor despite being a
(01:07):
tweenager. And well, it's like putting my
daughter really in charge of a country, which I, much as I love
her, I probably wouldn't do. And despite the obvious power
and influence of Kim's sister, who's a who's an adult.
So there's a succession style rivalry brewing and I couldn't
resist the temptation to get stuck into the HBO series, which
(01:28):
as you know Liv, I thought was the most pointless and overrated
TV show of the decade. Dave, we don't disagree on much,
but this is an area of serious disagreement.
It went round and round for FourSeasons and then the dad just
conveniently killed over and died.
It was silly. Anyway, we digress.
Anna has been The Post's Bureau chief in Beijing, Bureau chief
in Tokyo and also editor of the Genuine Post in her native New
(01:50):
Zealand. Before that, she worked as a
foreign correspondent for your favourite paper, Dave, the
Financial Times. She is a brilliant journal who
spent time in North Korea and really genuinely understands Kim
Jong UN's regime like a few other people.
Yeah, it's one of the more fascinating conversations I've
had in a long time. Such a bizarre regime.
It's so dangerous and it's obviously so destructive for the
(02:11):
North Korean people and, and, and as insights really capture
the full spectrum of that. So we covered how Kim compares
with his father and grandfather,the prospects for a managed
succession, as, as mentioned, North Korea's involvement in
Ukraine, as relationships with Russia and China, parallel
economies that you have where there's a sort of feeble
domestic economy. And then a you've got a regime
that's sort of with all these global criminal enterprises.
(02:34):
Donald Trump's failed negotiations with Kim during his
first term and the lessons for that for the upcoming summit
with Donald, with Vladimir Putin, pardon me.
And of course, the sad reality that North Korea is now now a
consolidated nuclear power, and there doesn't seem to be any way
to unwind that. Yeah, that's the situation
today. And Anna also shares with us her
favourite anecdote about North Korea.
(02:55):
So listen out for that. But really, the whole
conversation is just packed withcolour and insight.
We promise you'll enjoy it. Let's hear from Anna.
I'm here with Anna Fifield. Anna, thanks for coming on STOP
THE World. Oh.
I'm thrilled to be here, Dave. It's great to have you.
So we're going to talk mostly here about North Korea.
Despite being a rogue nuclear armed nation, it's been nudged
(03:16):
out of our attention span by allthe other crises.
So we're going to treat this as a kind of a chance to to catch
up on it and think about how it fits in with all the other
crises. So, and perhaps we can just
start with a snapshot of North Korea's strength this time
around with in the second Trump administration relative to say
(03:37):
the first Trump administration, which was really the last time
it was front and centre of the attention on global affairs in
the sense of how strong its military is, how strong its
economy is, how strong its relationships with other major
dictatorships or disruptive powers around the region.
(03:59):
Does Kim have essentially more leverage than ever before?
That's the way it looks to a nonexpert like myself.
What do you think? Yeah, well, as so many times
before, North Korea and the Kim regime continues to confound and
surprise us. So when we look back to the
first Trump administration and the various diplomatic efforts
(04:21):
during that period, which which led to nothing like.
So when at the end of that, at 2019, when the diplomatic
process with Donald Trump fell over with no result, you would
think that North Korea would be in a really weak position.
And in fact, in 2020, North Korea did become in a very much
weakened even compared to itselfbecause it really properly
(04:44):
closed its borders to China, to the outside world with the
outbreak of COVID. So this is something, you know,
we call it the hermit Kingdom. North Korea had actually not
been in that hermetic for some time because they had allowed a
lot of trade over that border with N with not between North
Korea and China and people to goback and forth, goods to go back
(05:06):
and forth. But with the arrival of COVID,
they properly shut their borders.
There was nothing going over that river border.
And so that should have been an existential crisis for North
Korea because their decrepit economy relies on that little
trickle of trade with the outside world.
So it's really surprising, you know, And then through that
(05:27):
three year, 4 year period, we knew almost nothing of what was
happening inside North Korea. We got almost no news whatsoever
other than what the North Koreans told us.
So that really should have been yet another existential moment
for the Kim regime where it's access to funding, licit and
illicit, had dried up with theirability to get their money back
(05:50):
from overseas that they'd earnedthrough whatever means had also
dried up. But in fact, we see Kim Jong Un
now stronger than ever, despite Cova, despite this enforced
hermit Kingdom period. And that's basically because he
really lucked out with Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
(06:11):
You know, North Korea has very little that the world wants
during normal times, but in the and has very few friends in this
situation. We saw Vladimir Putin left with
very few friends after his invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
February and also really hungry for ammunition, for artillery,
(06:34):
for troops, for cannon fodder for one of the better friends.
And what does North Korea have? It has a lot of Soviet
compatible old artillery ammunition stuff that it can
continue to make. It has, you know, people.
And we know that Kim Jong Un does not care about the welfare
of the people and he's happy to send them into battle.
(06:55):
So suddenly Kim Jong Un was relevant and needed and in
demand in a way like never before.
And I think that has given him alot more confidence on the world
stage. He doesn't need to talk to
Donald Trump this time around orthe South Koreans or the Chinese
for that matter, because he now has the strategic comprehensive
(07:16):
partnership with Vladimir Putin that really, I mean, very few
details have come out. They're not exactly forthcoming,
these two, but it does seem to be operational.
They're both getting something out of that.
So Kim Jong Un, see, you know, despite all the odds, appears to
have emerged even stronger than than before.
And that's why this time around,you know, Donald Trump keeps
(07:38):
talking about how he would be willing to talk to Kim, Kim Jong
Un. We haven't heard a peep out of
North Korea on anything like that because they just don't
need him in the way they did previously.
That's a lovely summary of the trajectory of the last six years
or so. We'll definitely come back to to
North Korea, Russia, North Korea, China and so forth.
(07:59):
I just want to concentrate on Kim in a little bit more detail
for the moment. As a, as a leader, as a
dictator, as a, as a personality.
How does he compare with his father and his grandfather who
ruled the country before him? Is it a case of similar
ambitions, different era? Does he have different qualities
(08:19):
to his predecessors and and how do they manifest in terms of the
the leadership that he imposes on his country and the relations
with the rest of the world? Yeah, I mean, he has the same
aims overall, which is, you know, for the Kim raging to stay
in power and to keep enriching themselves.
So the overarching goal is definitely the same.
(08:40):
But his method is quite different from his father's.
In particular, his grandfather, Kim Illinois Sung was the
founding leader of North Korea and was genuinely beloved by
North Korean people during that time.
Because it was a period of when North Korea was strong, was
relevant during the Cold War, had friends in the communist
(09:01):
bloc, but the economy in North Korea was doing better than
South Korea's right up till 1975.
And so to this day, defectors from North Korea will remember
Kim Illinois Sung relatively fondly as opposed to his son Kim
Jong Illinois's father, Kim JongUN's father, Sorry, Kim Jong
Illinois, who was the second Kimin the mix.
(09:22):
He presided during quite difficult times.
There was this devastating famine, the collapse of the
Soviet Union, a whole bunch of events that should have spelled
the end of the regime that he somehow managed to survive.
But he was a very different kindof leader from his own father in
terms of being quite restrained,quite reserved.
(09:43):
He only said one sentence in public during his 17 years in
power. Yeah.
And then? Right, I did not know that.
That's right, he uttered a phrase, glory to the military
kind of thing at a military parade one time.
That is the only time that he spoke in public.
Whereas then we had Kim Jong Illinois come in there.
We had Kim Jong Un come in. You know, the least.
(10:05):
Yeah, even I get confused with all the Kims.
The least qualified of all. You know, he was 27 years old,
no political experience, no military experience.
Really difficult to see how thisyoung guy could take the reins
of this decrepit regime that should have collapsed a long
time ago. But against the odds, he did it.
And a big part of that was because he tried to literally
(10:28):
embody his grandfather. You know the funny haircut, the
the horn rimmed glasses, the suits, the gravelly voice, even
this is all reminiscent of Kim Illinois Sung.
And you know it shocked N Koreans when they first saw him
just how much he looked like hisgrandfather.
And that's all designed to to instil legitimacy in him and to
(10:50):
say this person is the clear, legitimate successor of this
regime. And in many ways, it's worked.
But at the same time, he's really been his own person in
terms of being quite bold and audacious.
Many surprising things he did, like drink Coca Cola with Dennis
Rodman in North Korea, had to explain that according to
(11:13):
communist ideals, you know, leaving the country, flying to
Singapore to see to meet Donald Trump, you know, he has done a
whole bunch of things that were unprecedented.
And so he has set out to chart his own path.
And then on the military front as well, he's obviously
continued the ambitions of his predecessors, but has made much,
(11:36):
much more progress in terms of being able to now demonstrate
credible missile programmes, nuclear destinations and things
to show that they are. They have got a long way to go,
but they have been really clearly making progress under
the third Kim. There, there are certainly some
of the current crop of leaders around the world, both dictators
(11:57):
and Democrats, who I wish would only after one sentence in 17
years, but sadly not OK. If if you were to, if you were
to use a few adjectives to describe the Kim Jong Un.
I mean, is he, is he? Does he, do you think he's
smart? Do you think he's a good
strategic thinker? Do you think he's ruthless in an
(12:18):
effective way? How?
How effective is he? Yes, all of those things.
He is absolutely very smart, very strategic, very ruthless.
And I don't say this to flatter him.
The the proof is the fact that he has been able to keep this
regime together, right? Like, it's a pretty hard thing
to do in 2011 as a 27 year old to hold together this regime
(12:43):
full of octogenarians who, yeah,have been helping to run the
state, which is close to collapse.
But he has managed to do it in part by the internal management
there in North Korea. You know, he took advantage of
all the institutional knowledge that was there.
His uncle was the money man. You know, there was the
(13:03):
propaganda chiefs, the army chief, all of these people who
knew how the system worked. He took advantage of that over
the first couple of years in power, set himself up and then
one by one dispatched with all of these people.
You know, he had his uncle executed, hauled out of a
Politburo meeting. He had his defence minister blow
into smithereens with an anti aircraft gun.
(13:25):
You know, he sent a message in the way that he dispatched with
these people as well. But again, it's very like if
you're wanting to send a messageto the people who remain in the
regime, don't cross me. Nobody is safe having your uncle
kill executed in that way. Having your half brother
assassinated in an airport in Malaysia also sends a real
(13:47):
message. So I think he has been ruthless
and strategic along the way. And even if we look to the way
that he played Donald Trump during Trump's first term, you
know, now we see all these leaders around the world, you
know, from Japan to Cambodia to Latin America saying that they
(14:07):
will nominate Donald Trump for the Nobel Prize, Peace Prize,
you know, trying to Curry favour.
Kim Jong Un is the OG of that, you know, approach.
And he was the one who sent thiscomedic sized letter and Boston
gold flowery language to Donald Trump, flattering him in that
first administration that DonaldTrump, you know, that was one of
the classified documents that was found at Mar a Lago because
(14:31):
Donald Trump was so proud of it.So he really knew how to play
Donald Trump at that stage as well and appeal to him and get
what he wanted, which was was that meeting.
You know, his grandfather had wanted that meeting as well with
the American president. Kim Jong Un was the one who
actually got it. And that bestowed so much
legitimacy on him because he went on to the world stage
(14:52):
standing shoulder to shoulder with the leader of, you know,
the strongest, richest country on earth.
So. So he has been very tactical and
strategic in the way he's approached the job of being a
21st century dictator. This might be a question that's
almost beside the point, but I mean, obviously you see those
ridiculous videos where he's parading in front of his his
(15:14):
troops and his officials and they're all clapping their hands
so loudly, so hard, you worry they're going to break bones in
their fingers. But do you have any way of
assessing how liked or loved I mean, you, you mentioned Kim
Illinois Sung being genuinely loved by by the people.
Is there any way of assessing the the degree of his popularity
(15:36):
or unpopularity and whether you know his the stability of his
rule is purely down to ruthlessness, or how have have
people actually sort of embracedhim as a leader in in any
genuine way? Yeah, short answer is no, there
is no public polling in North Korea to tell us that.
But there's a lot of anecdotal evidence that, I mean, at those
(15:58):
military parades, that's obviously a select group of
people from Pyongyang brought inthere.
And you know, those people don'tneed to be told to clap and
cheer hard. Like you don't want to be the
one with the camera on you whereyou're being half hearted about
the applause, right? So that's people know what they
need, what their role is and that kind of situation.
And what we have had in talking to people over the years who
(16:20):
have escaped from North Korea, almost universally, they have
talked about how, you know, theythere was some hope when he came
in this millennial young leader that he would be a liberalizer
and that he would do things differently.
But that really has not turned out to be the case.
He has centralised the economy more.
He has tightened security and the border more.
(16:41):
He has been very harsh in his role.
So of all of the people who haveescaped that I have spoken to
and my colleagues have spoken to, people you know, have no
affection for him. They and try to ignore him as
much as they can in their daily lives, right?
They're just trying to get on, feed their families, make the
best of a bad situation. And really, Kim Jong Un doesn't
(17:02):
care about those people because they are no use to him.
He really only cares about that top elite in Pyongyang, the
people who keep him in power. They are the ones who, if you're
doing the public opinion poll, they are the ones he cares about
because they are the ones who have who know where the money
is, who know how the system works, who could potentially
(17:25):
build factions to rival him. So they are the people that he
wants to keep under control, most of all to keep in fear of
him, but also he they are the ones he wants to enrich and make
them feel like they have something to gain from the
system. So throughout his Kim Jong UN's
(17:46):
leadership, we have seen these kleptocrats in Pyongyang get
richer and richer and enjoy an increasing standard of living
under Kim Jong Un, mostly thanksto corruption that he is allowed
to flourish. But you know, the 20 somethings
in North Korea, but well before COVID at least used to call it
Pyong Hatton, they would joke about the skyline in North Korea
(18:08):
now looking like New York because it had so many more
skyscrapers and things like that.
I mean, it's still very much a Potemkin village.
They do have 70 Storey skyscrapers now, but the
elevators don't work because there's not enough electricity.
So nobody wants to live on the top floor of these fancy new
buildings, that's for sure. But Kim Jong Un wanted to try to
create a sense that their lives were getting better under him
(18:32):
and therefore they should keep him as the leader, and that they
would occupy a a social and economic position in North Korea
that they would not occupy if they escaped to South Korea and
had to be a taxi driver. Yeah, meanwhile, the rest of the
country would make the Bronx in the 1920s look good, presumably.
One more question on the the people before we get on to the
(18:54):
geopolitics. But Kim's only 41 years old, but
he doesn't look to be in great shape.
And there's the history of I think there's the family history
of heart problems. There's been talk recently and
some stories about his, his daughter Kim Juai succeeding
him. I hope I'm pronouncing that
correctly. She's only about 12 years old, I
(19:14):
think. At the same time, his sister,
Kim's sister Kim Yo Jong, seems to be fairly influential.
What's your what's your assessment, I guess, of the sort
of succession dynamic series? Is it unusual, first of all, for
for a child to be publicly positioned in the way that that
Kim the daughter is? What kind of potential future
(19:36):
trouble does that Does that portend in the vein of the
vastly overrated HBOTV show succession?
Yes, yes, even by North Korean standards, this is extremely
unusual. This daughter, Kim Joo A is her
name. We know her name because Dennis
(19:57):
Rodman held her when she was a baby and he went to see on he
was on the yacht with Kim Jong Un and one son.
So this is our source of intelligence.
She has never been named in the North Korean media, but she is
referred to as Kim's daughter. And recently she has been called
a great person of guidance as she's been out and about with
(20:18):
her great her with her father. So he's clearly positioning her
look. North Korea, and to a lesser
extent South Korea, remains a very Confucian hierarchical
country, has a culture of Confucian hierarchy where
maleness and age is prized. So it was surprising in many
(20:39):
ways that Kim Jong Un was able to take over being only 27.
But at least he was a man, you know?
And then that's been the kind ofthinking around his sister as
well, Kim Yo Jong, as she has risen to prominence over the
past decade or so, that it's hard to see how she could take
over being a woman and young as well, not even 40 years.
(21:02):
But also there's nobody else like is clearly the only person
in the family and this is very much run as a family business
that Kim say they have this kindof like God like blood running
through their veins that enablesthem to lead the country and
only them. So it has to be a family member.
So Kim Yo Jong had been on the scene.
Obviously she still is there. She is kind of the attack dog
(21:25):
who comes out and issues all of these very fierce statements,
but she is very much working in the system.
Whereas over the past couple of years, we have seen Kim Jong Un
take his young daughter with himto a lot of military events in
particular. And at the beginning, it seemed
like maybe she was going to be the successor.
(21:47):
Maybe he's trying to prepare North Korea for this.
Now, I think there's no doubt that that is exactly what he is
trying to do. She is, yes, maybe 12, maybe 13.
But she is increasingly prominent in all of these public
appearances. She is there when the missiles
are launched. She is there at military
celebration, sitting in the front row with her father.
(22:08):
She dresses like a 40 year old rather than a year old.
And she's wearing, like leather coats and skirt suits and things
that are not typical tweenage attire.
And so he is clearly positioningher for that.
I think a big part of that is the fact that his own succession
was very rushed. Whereas the transition from Kim
(22:29):
one to Kim 2, they laid the foundations over 25 years, the
second Kim was steadily elevatedthrough the ranks.
Kim Jong Un did not have that same preparation.
He was introduced to the public and then installed as leader.
Within a couple of years, barelytwo years had passed.
(22:50):
So that felt very rush and may have been a little hairy in
terms of getting his grip on control.
So I would say that that is whathe is doing now.
He is laying the groundwork for the North Korean public to
accept the idea of a woman taking over because she has this
special blood in her veins. And that Kim Yo Jong, the
(23:11):
sister, would be a kind of Regent who would be able to
guide her as Kim Ju A rose up through the ranks.
I mean, I've learned a long timeago not to dismiss things as
impossible with North Korea. This seems impossible to me that
that a 17 year old girl you know, Kim Jong Un clearly is not
(23:32):
healthy. It's clearly obese.
He continues to smoke a lot. If he was to drop dead in the
next 5 years, would the North Korean people accept Kim Jong Un
as their leader? I don't know.
I mean, we, we can't, as with Kim Jong Un, we, we can never
say never. It seems really difficult to
understand. But they have a lot of tools at
(23:52):
their disposal to be able to keep people under control in
terms of the censorship and the really brutal prison system.
You know, you only have to raiseyour eyebrows at the Kims really
to, to end up in a gulag. So never say never.
Fascinating. You talked in your first answer
about the, the benefit that Kim had got from North Korea's
(24:15):
involvement in Ukraine and it's stepped up relationship with,
with Russia generally. I mean, it's certainly from the
outside it, it seems to have been a pretty clever play by Kim
as you, as you said, he, he sends the things that he has in
abundance, which is, which is people as cannon fodder and and
basic ammunition that the Russians have been running short
on. He in, in return, he gets
(24:35):
military tech, He gets, you know, I suppose, diplomatic
credibility, at least in certaincircles.
He gets some money, hard cash, by the sound of things, fuel.
I think they've got a security treaty as well, correct?
They do. Yeah.
So I mean, just expand on that alittle bit.
I mean, you, you've, you've saidbasically it was central to the
reviving of North Korea's and and Kim's power and leverage.
(24:58):
Just give us a bit more of a sense of just, I suppose how
it's unfolded and is there, I don't know.
I mean, does that just go on in perpetuity for as long as the as
Russia's war against Ukraine goes on?
Yeah. I mean, I guess it depends on
how long that does go on. Maybe Donald Trump will have
(25:18):
solved it all by the end of thisweek.
Who knows? Yeah, I think that this is it
looks to be more than just transactional now.
These two seem to have forged something more like an
ideological bond around the strategic partnership that they
have forged there. And in addition to this, you
(25:41):
know, there's been quite a lot of activity like Russians are
the only foreigners who can enter North Korea at the moment.
There's this big water park thathe's created.
So there's like quite a lot of tourism going on at the same
time and people to people exchanges in addition to the to
the military stuff. And a lot of Russian oil is also
flowing to North Korea, which isalso something that North Korea
(26:03):
needs. We don't know what is happening
with the military cooperation. These two leaders are obviously
very secretive. But we do know that, you know,
over the years, Russia and the Soviet Union before it made a
lot of advances in terms of missile technology, more
recently in terms of drone technology, nuclear powered
(26:29):
submarines and things that they have proven to be able to do and
that North Korea would dearly like to do.
So it's reasonable to think thatthis technology and knowledge
transfer is part of the deal. We probably won't know until we
see proof of that. And it's actually been quite a
surprisingly quiet period. And it's the quiet periods that
(26:52):
make me most concerned, you know, because we can absolutely
believe that North Korea is developing, testing missile
technology like they've they've made clear they want hypersonic
vehicles, weapons and drones andall these other more.
(27:12):
Kim Jong Un wants a more developed and more diversified
arsenal. And so I think they are probably
working away on it and eventually we will begin to see
launches and tests of these kindof technologies.
And, and probably some of them will fail at the beginning as
they usually do, but they will continue to test and test until
they are able to master a lot ofthis stuff.
(27:33):
So I think this, we should be quite worried about what Russia
is teaching North Korea how to do.
And then at the same time, I think one of the big questions
and the big changes about North Korea is where they're getting
the money from. And when we think back like even
20 years ago and you'd think like Russia, North Korean
diplomats were used to be caughtin Eastern Europe with, you
(27:56):
know, boots full of heroin. And there were these super
dollars, these counterfeit $100 notes that they could make,
which were incredible, undetectable almost.
We don't hear any of that kind of stuff anymore because it's
all become cyber now. They've trained this incredible
army of hackers who are going out there planting malware,
(28:16):
ransomware, conducting these enormous cyber thefts or crypto
theft. So that, I mean, there was 1, I
think last year where they managed to get their hands on
$1.5 billion worth of crypto. So North Korea has found new
modern ways to steal money so that it doesn't need to be doing
(28:38):
so many of these, you know, piece meal things like they were
before. So between these newfangled
technologies that they've got tomake money and the technology
and know how that they're getting from North Korea, I
think they're probably feeling like they're in quite a good
position. Yeah, really interesting.
The well, let's stay on that fora moment.
I mean, I'm always fascinated byNorth Korea's well, quote
(28:59):
unquote economy and how much of it is, I suppose, legitimate or
normal economic activity going on within the country itself.
So people growing things, peoplemaking things, people, people
selling them back and forth. Is that sort of happening on one
level? And meanwhile, the regime has
(29:19):
this sort of global network of acombination of, you know, sort
of criminal enterprises, relationships with other
dictatorships that simply supplythem things on a out of
geopolitical transactionalism oror shared values and and shared
interest in disrupting the AUS LED order.
(29:42):
Can you just, I mean how would you sort of quantify and
characterise the the internal economy and what portion of that
is just completely illegitimate criminal activity?
Yeah, I would say there's almost2 economies operating in North
Korea and that there's the ordinary everyday, day to day
economy. You know, the official state
(30:03):
economy doesn't really work anymore.
You know, there are still shoe factories, but with no energy
and no raw inputs, you know, they can't make shoes and things
like that. So people don't really, I mean,
they still have to go to work inmany cases, but that is not
their source of income. There's still this unofficial
trading economy that takes placeoften through the markets, often
(30:26):
run by women because they are not required to go to the
workplace like the men are. And so that economy was
flourishing before COVID and that Kim Jong Un had allowed
that kind of grey market economyto thrive because that was the
way for ordinary people to make ends meet.
(30:49):
And so there were various kind of ways that people would let
people in the border regions would bribe their way across the
river, go to China, buy second hand clothes or washing machines
or rice cookers or what have your DVDs and bring them back
into North Korea. And that would kind of be the
lifeblood of the economy as thatwas sold in the markets.
(31:10):
And meanwhile, you had, yeah, women cutting hair or making
tofa, or you're producing on a low level to make ends meet.
And the regime turned a blind eye to all of that stuff because
it knew that that's how they could just like it would let out
steam out of the, you know, people wouldn't be angry about
not being able to eat. They could feed themselves.
(31:31):
So that was existing until, I mean, and the big question about
this is what happened on the border when COVID came and that
border was shut down and that kind of seed money that would
come in from China all dried up.It has become much, much more
difficult for people to trade. They can only really trade on
the things that they have or they can make in North Korea,
(31:53):
not so much in terms of imports coming in from China.
So that's a big stress on ordinary people.
And then there's the the regime economy.
And so we've we've seen that KimJong Un and his family have
continued to flourish despite the COVID closures.
You know, he's still getting thelatest model Mercedes Benz
(32:14):
delivered to him somehow in North Korea.
His 12 year old daughter is wearing what appears, according
to experts, not me, to be Christian Dior and Gucci outfits
there in North Korea. So the family continues to
prosper. They are clearly still getting
the money and the goods that they need to run the missile
(32:35):
programme and to pursue their military aims.
But, you know, it's difficult totell how they are doing that.
I mean, a lot of the money will be stolen, as I said before, in
terms of the crypto assets or other scams that they've come up
with to get money. So they can and, and that's what
Kim Jong Un really cares about, right?
He wants his family and his cronies to continue to feel rich
(32:59):
and prosper. And so he has prioritised that
for sure over the way that the ordinary people live.
Big question in all of this is how China is viewing North
Korea's direction at the moment.How would you describe the
trajectory or how would you, howhas the the North Korea China
(33:19):
relationship been tracking recently and what impact has the
closeness between North Korea and Russia had?
Is China worried about that? Are they happy about it?
What do you? Think, yeah, I think ever since,
you know, Xi Jinping took power in China at the same time almost
just a little after Kim Jong Un in North Korea, so 2012, she has
(33:43):
really made it clear he has no time for this little punk next
door who fires missiles during big important events in China
and things. And so they had had been very
little contact until Donald Trump came along and started
with the summits. That is what focused she Jinping
mind and and forced them to havetheir first meeting, she and Kim
(34:03):
before the Trump summit. I think XI Jinping's preferred
position would be to just ignoreNorth Korea.
They want them to be, they want them to exist.
They want them to be stable and quiet and acting as that buffer
between northeastern China and American backed democratic South
Korea. So they would really like to
(34:24):
just be able to ignore them mostof the time.
And and that has been they have been able to do that.
They did support them somewhat during the COVID years just to
make sure it didn't collapse. But I think this development
with the friendship with Russia will be quite concerning to them
because China does want to have all of the leverage over North
(34:46):
Korea. They do want to be able to force
Kim Jong Un to act or not act incertain ways.
It's quite a surprise that they North Korea has not conducted a
nuclear test since 2017. And that may well be because Xi
Jinping has made it really clearthat that's a red line.
They certainly have the nuclear material for it in North Korea
to be able to do it. So it's puzzling that they
(35:07):
haven't. But so I think from XI Jinping's
perspective, they will very muchbe looking at this and concerned
about the relationship and wanting to keep a sense that
they have some control over North Korea in there.
But at the same time, you know, China, Beijing wants Russia to
prevail in its war against Ukraine, right?
They look at this very much through the lens of China's own
(35:32):
territorial claims ambitions over Taiwan.
And so they do not want this idea that the West or democratic
world will help Ukraine prepare,get kick out Russia so or
prevail over Russia. So I think that remains their
top priority. They could definitely have done
(35:54):
more in terms of China supporting Russia in this.
They have been quite guarded in what they have done and said
publicly, but despite the no limits friendship, but I think
that this is kind of a careful balancing act that they are
trying to keep in place in NorthEast Asia.
OK, OK. Perhaps we can look at a, a
(36:17):
parallel and we, we're getting into, into Donald Trump a bit
here. I, I try not to make every
episode focus too much on, on Trump just because he's, it's,
it's easy to get drawn into that.
But it's, it's as we're recording this, he's, we're a
few days away from the planned summit between Trump and
Vladimir Putin. Of course, it's a tremendously
(36:39):
important moment. But I've always felt when it
comes to Trump, Putin negotiations, there's a, there's
the danger of a, of a, of a repeat of what we saw between
Trump and Kim Jong Un, where thethe, the the summits themselves
are portrayed as some, as successors.
But Trump ultimately loses patience, loses interest, walks
(37:00):
away, and then the dictator goeson doing what he pleases.
I suppose I'm just interested inyour reflections on that.
What lessons, if any, do you draw from that episode between
Trump and Kim Jong Un in terms of, you know what, what we may
see between Trump and Putin in the coming days?
(37:23):
Yeah. I mean, there are so many
parallels in terms of Trump's kind of the art of his deal, I
guess, in that if you cast your mind back to 2017 when Donald
Trump was talking about Little Rocket Man and talking about
being locked and loaded and all this kind of fire and fury and
all of this kind of rhetoric that we were getting out of him.
And he was really in that bad cop mode until he was in good
(37:45):
cop mode. And I think we've seen a lot of
back and forth on this in terms of Trump's approach to Putin
over the past few months, right?But I think that this both in
both cases that it comes down toTrump thinking as a
personalistic leader that he andas a deal maker, that he alone
(38:07):
can cut this kind of deal with another world leader.
I'm no expert on Russia, so I will not opine on that.
But it certainly didn't work with Kim Jong Un at that time.
I think, I mean, I was probably a little bit of an outlier in
2018. And I actually thought it was
good that Donald Trump went and met with Kim Jong Un because
(38:31):
over the previous like 2-3 decades, various American
leaders had been trying the samething over and over again to
convince the North Koreans to denuclearize.
And it hadn't worked, right? That's kind of horse trading
through the six party talks and that oil for denuclearization
hadn't worked. So I thought why not try
something different? You know, it, it made a little
(38:55):
bit of progress, I guess in, in Singapore and, and that they
agreed to meet again, but obviously ultimately failed, did
not lead to anything that is widely credited to John Bolton
nixing the deal and and Hanoi and stopping it going any
further. So clearly it didn't work.
But I still do think that at least now we know that that
(39:15):
approach doesn't work. You know, that we don't have to
imagine there are no more what ifs around that.
So I think it was worth a go. And now the dynamic, I think is
very different partly because, and this is part of the reason
as well why North Korea has fallen off the front pages
because there are so many other crises around the world
(39:36):
happening, you know, other people dying of starvation,
other nuclear armed powers locked in conflicts, you know,
So the threat of North Korea, while still there and still
really credible, doesn't seem asurgent as the ongoing conflicts
that are happening in other parts of the world.
So I think that has distracted Donald Trump a bit.
(39:56):
But also the fact that Kim Jong Un has this new strategic
partnership that is multifacetedand seems to be working for his
to his advantage with Russia just reduces his reliance on
other people in the outside world too, so.
We've even seen that over the past couple of months with South
Korea, which now has a new progressive, you know, more
(40:19):
talks, diplomacy friendly leaderin place there in South Korea.
But so far, their efforts to forge like send an olive branch
to North Korea and things have met with nothing except, you
know, slamming the door in theirface again.
So there is this real sense thatwhether it's South Korea, the
US, China, Kim Jong Un doesn't feel like he needs them as much
(40:43):
anymore. The real question then, you
know, is what happens if if Putin goes away And whatever way
that happens, you know, where does that leave Kim Jong Un?
But I think the fact that he still does have, you know, then
he goes back to his old playbook, right?
He still does have nuclear and nuclear stockpiles.
All of these missiles, he can goback to using them as a
(41:04):
bargaining chip for talks once again.
But I mean, the bottom line hereis that he holds a lot of the
cards. Kim Jong Un holds a lot of the
cards right now. Yeah, yeah.
So in terms of North South relations, would you summarise
it as being largely just disengaged at the moment?
I remember there was, I think itwas Kim's sister, Kim Yo Jong,
who made some remarks a while back that no, they have no
(41:27):
interest in in talking to the new leader in the South.
And does that just look like theway it's going to continue for
the time being? Yes, I think so.
I mean, I think they have no need to talk to them.
It's there's a real limit as to what South Korea could give them
other than talks and face. So I think that there is no
nothing really for them to gain North Korea to gain from that.
(41:50):
So I can't imagine a situation where North Korea would want to
talk to them anytime soon. And also it goes back to the
same old playbook you know of, of treating them mean.
What are they going to do? They're not the South.
The South Korean government isn't going to walk away and
refuse to talk it down the line.So North Korea does keep all of
the cards in its hand. All right, now I am in danger of
(42:13):
running over time, so I'll just,we'll go through a couple of
other quick ones that I do need to cover, cover off.
I mean, one is, and, and you've,you've touched on this in, in
your, your last answer, but I mean, is, is denuclearisation
pretty much a dead idea today? You know, I mean, we haven't
talked seriously about it for a number of years now.
And if So, what? What should a reasonable
(42:36):
realistic expectation be for theUS or for for the international
community in terms of the expectations that they might put
to North Korea in terms of some sort of international agreement
to tame the future that it represents?
Yeah, I mean, yes, it's definitely dead.
There's no way that Kim Jong Un would ever consider giving up
(42:57):
his nuclear weapons. They are what makes him relevant
and powerful. You know, Donald Trump wouldn't
be bothered with a country of 25million people, one of the
poorest countries in the world, if they did not have nuclear
weapons. And the fact that, I mean, that
relates to the first term, of course, But the fact that Kim
Jong Un, you know, he rose to power just after Muammar Gaddafi
(43:19):
was pulled out of, you know, a drain in Libya and now looks at
how Ukraine has been invaded andis, you know, doing pretty well
but has not been able to prevailin that war.
Both of these countries are onesthat gave up their nuclear
weapons, right? So why would North Korea ever
give up their nuclear stockpiles?
(43:41):
That is what makes them relevantand that's what serves as a
deterrent. So I think now, I mean, even if
countries don't say it out loud,I think there is an
acknowledgement that North Koreais a nuclear state and will be
remain one for the foreseeable future.
And that the all of the emphasisis on containment, you know,
(44:03):
deterrence, not letting them, you know, the the three knows
the US could have no more no exporting something.
You know, I can't remember that the three now, but but that
they, as long as they don't use this in an offensive way, I
think the world will just have to live with it.
So managing it as a nuclear power basically.
(44:25):
Correct. Yeah, yeah.
All right. Look, 11 last one.
And it's it's a sort of a quirky1.
I won't say lighthearted becauseit might not be.
But you've you've written a bookabout North Korea, You've spent
time there. Give us an anecdote that you
feel would best sum up the country, the regime, and just
(44:49):
the life there in North Korea. Yeah, I think the the stories
about Pyonghatten are the ones that are emblematic of North
Korea today because and the And the last time I went to North
Korea, it was in 2016. The the North Koreans have not
let me back in since then. And actually, I wouldn't go
anymore. Yeah, but when I arrived after
(45:14):
not having been for a few years and arrived into Kim Jong UN's
North Korea, it did look impressive that he has obviously
poured a lot of money into Pyongyang, where the elite live.
And there are buildings. There is a, you know, a German
restaurant and a pizza parlour and the young people can go and
do yoga and things like this. But it is.
(45:36):
So it looks like it's getting better and looks like people
have a better standard of living.
But it is still very much a facade.
Like when you get up close to those buildings, you see the
tiles are already falling off. Yeah.
There is not enough electricity to power the lift or pump the
water up to the upper floors. You know, it's still decrepit on
(45:57):
the inside even though it's had a facelift on the outside.
So that's how I kind of think about North Korea and that we
shouldn't be fooled by the facade that Kim Jong Un has put
up. And that's the capital, right?
So God knows what's happening inthe rest of the country.
Yeah, yeah, that's right. All right, look, and I like, I
have to say that's been one of the most informative
conversations I've had this year.
(46:18):
It was really, really interesting and I've learnt a
lot. So thank you so much for coming
on Stop THE World. Oh, thank you so much for having
me. I appreciate it.
Thanks for listening to Stop theWorld.
That's all we have time for today, folks.
We'll be back with another episode soon.
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