October 13, 2021 • 23 mins
How did Madigan survive so long in Illinois politics? How did busted budgets and a slurry of scandal leave him untouched?
History’s longest-serving statehouse speaker, Madigan will be remembered less for the policies he enacted than for the power he extracted. In this episode of BGA’s “The Madigan Rule” host Justin Kaufmann explore Mike Madigan’s political acumen and the infamous showdown with Governor Bruce Rauner.
With special guests former Illnois Governor Bruce Rauner, Former State Senator Heather Steans (7th), Former State Representative Ken Dunkin (5th), State Representative Will Guzzardi (39th), John Tillman, Pat Brady and John Chase.
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Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:05):
In 1998, Illinois House Speaker Michael Madigan
added another huge piece to hispowerful chessboard.
He was elected to take over aschairman of the Illinois State
Democratic Party.
Becoming party chair meantMadigan could control
legislation in the house andcontrol which candidates
received money and fundraisingsupport from the Democratic
(00:26):
Party.
The BGA's John Chase.
Speaker 2 (00:29):
That did open up a world where he didn't have any
interference whatsoever in, inrunning now, not just the State
House, but the state DemocraticParty and the Democratic Party
was, at that point, the dominantparty and has ever since been in
Illinois.
And it goes to this point aboutfunding campaigns.
Other than a few races, hereally just cared about, uh,
(00:52):
reelecting or electing newDemocrats to the state House of
Representatives.
He didn't care really much aboutGovernor, even.
He really just you know, hewasn't supporting the whole
party in Cook County or inDuPage County.
It was all just about state repraces.
And that's because that's wherehis power was.
Speaker 1 (01:16):
I'm Justin Kaufmann.
This is the"Madigan Rule." Thispodcast is a production of the
Better Government Association,episode three"Power over
Policy".
In 2012, Will Guzzardi was ayoung, progressive Democrat
(01:38):
living on Chicago's NorthwestSide.
He hated the way machinepoliticians played favorites and
perpetuated the status quo.
So he decided to mount aninsurgent campaign.
He challenged incumbent Democratstate representative Toni
Berrios to a primary race.
It was a bold move, especiallyfor a political novice.
(01:58):
That's because Berrios wasn'tjust any incumbent.
She was the daughter of thepowerful chair of the Cook
County Democratic Party JoeBerrios.
She and her dad were both loyalallies of Michael Madigan.
Not surprisingly theGuzzardi-Berrios primary
attracted a lot of attention anda lot of blowback for Guzzardi,
but he did better than manyexpected.
(02:18):
He lost that first election byjust 125 votes.
Two years later, he challengedBerrios again.
Speaker 3 (02:27):
Speaker Madigan worked really hard to keep me
from having this job.
Uh, I ran against the Democraticincumbent and his policy was
always to support incumbents.
So his political apparatus spenthalf a million dollars against
me and said all kinds ofterrible things about me during
that campaign.
(02:48):
And then I won and it allchanged.
I saw a very different side ofthe speaker, a different side of
him than I had experienced and adifferent side than I think
people in the general public,think about.
A side of him that was funny andwelcoming and friendly and
(03:09):
engaging and frustrating in lotsof ways.
But yeah, very different fromthe Tribune editorial board
version of him that we mightknow.
I didn't know much about MikeMadigan at all before I got into
politics.
I really did know him as thecaricature, you know, as the
sorta all powerful puppetmaster, like subject of endless
speculation who never emergesfrom behind the curtain and, you
(03:32):
know, who's responsible for theoutcomes of everything in
Springfield.
He was really sort of a cartoonfigure to me.
After I won my primary, hecalled me in for a meeting to
his law office downtown, and Iwas, you know, 26 and terrified.
I show up in in this likeoak-paneled boardroom.
And he's just like, tell me whatyou're interested in.
And we just had this hour-longconversation.
We talk about clean energy.
We talk about, uh, you know,raising the minimum wage,
progressive economic politics.
He's telling me about thisbiography he's reading of LBJ.
You know, he's reading the Carobooks at the moment and we talk
about like that, that whole, youknow, navigating that process.
And he says it in the meetinglike, listen, my job here is to
help you succeed.
So when you get down to thelegislature, let me know the
bills you're working on and ifyou ever have any challenges
with it, my goal is to help youget them passed.
I was just flabbergasted.
I was expecting a very differentapproach from him and, and that
turned out to be how he was as aleader, um, in my experience of
him anyway.
He would make whatever effortshe could to help out other
Democrats and other colleagues.
(04:44):
And, and I think perhaps to afault.
I think that a lot of what sortof has subsequently come out
about him has been that hehelped people get jobs and get
placed in places that heshouldn't have that were
unethical and corrupt in ways.
But I think it came from thatsort of basic impulse of like
(05:06):
rather have you as a friend thanan enemy.
In many ways, he really was likethat.
He really was the caricaturethat, um, that has been
portrayed in a lot of ways,right.
He controlled the legislativeprocess.
It all flowed through himpersonally.
(05:28):
He used that control to deliverfavors and benefits to the
people close to him and to thepeople who he thought should
have those favors and benefits.
And then that was a decisionmade by him and not by a sort of
process of good governance orpublic policy making.
You know, that stuff is true,but I think it's like a yes/and
(05:49):
situation, where yes, that isall true of him.
And it's not the caricature thatyou have seen in the newspapers.
That IPI cartoon of him is notwho he is.
And like, just to close the loopon this story.
After that first meeting withhim, you know, my jaw kinda
drops and I'm like, okay, thanksvery much, and I go home.
(06:10):
And two days later, there's amanila envelope in my mailbox.
And it has a note from him.
And it's a copy of that RobertCaro book that he was talking
about"Master of the Senate." Hesays, hey, we talked about this
the other day, thought you mightbe interested.
You know, just like a thoughtfulguy who wanted to help people
succeed.
Speaker 1 (06:34):
Helping a young freshman representative succeed
after he just took out a loyalally, you spent half a million
dollars trying to defend couldbe a profile in sportsmanship or
a lesson in how to losegracefully, or it could be
evidence of a realpolitik, thehard-nosed realism of a veteran
more concerned with maintainingpower than debating policy
(06:55):
platforms.
Again, Will Guzzardi.
Speaker 3 (06:57):
I think he was able to hold onto power for as long
as he did.
I think one central reason whyhe was able to hold on to power
as long as he did is that he didnot let his personal ideological
compunctions get in the way ofhis desire to hold on to power.
And that's not something I cansay for myself if I were in his
(07:18):
shoes.
Like I go to Springfield becausethere's a set of values that I
believe in.
And like, I don't think I couldjust sort of ditch those and
pick up another set of values tohold onto power, right?
Like that's not how I operate.
You look at the issue of choicewhere like Madigan grew up in an
Irish Catholic family and in thechurch and came into the
(07:40):
legislature really anti-choice.
And, and there was a lot ofspace for an Irish, Irish
Catholic anti-choice Democrat.
When he came into thelegislature in the seventies.
Politics changed, the electoralenvironment, changed the
fundraising environment changed,and he was able to really change
(08:01):
with that.
And to say, I'm going to leadthis party in a sort of
relentlessly and unflinchinglypro-choice direction to capture
the electorate that we need towin, to capture the fundraising
base that we need to win.
I mean, truly, uh, like aremarkable pivot in that way,
(08:21):
that like in the final years ofhis tenure as speaker, we were
passing the most progressivepro-choice legislation in the
country, right?
Medicaid funding for abortion.
I mean really likegroundbreaking stuff.
Speaker 1 (08:40):
Despite those and other legislative achievements,
many say Michael Madigan was farmore concerned with maintaining
power than advancing anyideology.
Pat Brady is the former head ofthe Illinois Republican Party.
He only cares aboutself-preservation.
So if he needs to
Speaker 5 (08:55):
Go to the left to keep it in that spot, he'll do
it.
And he did it.
He, he would do whatever it tookto keep him in that spot.
Everybody down there, uh,treated him like some kind of
God.
And he was Mike Madigan and hehad his office he didn't let
anybody in.
And it was a weird world youcouldn't get beyond Tim Mapes.
It was just strange.
(09:16):
It's he's an odd little guy.
And those are questions that alot of people had, but everybody
had to kiss his backside becausehe had the power that he had.
Speaker 1 (09:24):
Brady became chair of the Illinois Republican Party in
2009.
At the time the Illinois GOP wasdecimated.
The party had just come off anembarrassing campaign for the US
Senate against Barack Obama.
Democrats were adding to bigmajorities in Illinois House and
Senate and Democrats alsocontrolled the all-important
legislative map.
Republicans couldn't even defeatthe scandal-plagued Democratic
(09:45):
Governor Rod Blagojevich.
Pat Brady knew that theRepublican Party needed to
change its ways if it was goingto have any hope of winning
again.
Speaker 5 (09:54):
In 2009, my strategy was fire Madigan.
It wasn't so much that we weregoing to beat Mike Madigan, but
we needed to make voters awareof who Mike Madigan is and how
he operates.
And I remember Rick Pearson, youwere probably there at the WGN
studios, going hey, we just dida poll and only 29% of the
people know who Madigan is.
And I go, Rick, that's my point.
Now, 80% of the people know whopeople is because I think in
(10:18):
part what we did in 2010 andwhat they did in 2016, when I
wasn't chairman, was to pointout who Mike Madigan is and how
he operates and tie that intohow poorly managed the state has
been.
And I think that wastremendously effective, but that
being said, Mike Madigan, uh, inthe last couple cycles, had,
had, had some big gains.
So, you know, mixed bag.
But from my perspective, thegoal, we set to make people
(10:40):
aware of who he is and how hemanages the state.
I think we were successful.
Brady
Speaker 1 (10:45):
had planted a seed that others on the political
right continued to cultivate.
John Tillman is the founder ofthe Illinois Policy Institute, a
conservative think tank.
Speaker 6 (10:54):
I sat down and had lunch with two very prominent
Chicago business leaders.
Names you would know.
And had a discussion about thisexact subject in 2013.
And I made the argument that wecan't fix the state until Mike
Madigan is gone and he won't begone until, uh, the rank and
file members fear their ownvoters more than they fear Mike
Madigan.
(11:14):
And the only way they were goingto fear their own voters more
than they feared Mike Madiganwas if he became an albatross.
Uh, in politics, you know, the,the political opponents of, uh,
tobacco growers and tobacco, uh,processors have done a very good
job of making Big Tobacco toxic.
Big Oil has been made toxic bysome in the political debate.
Uh, for a lot of thatconversation, uh, we set a goal
(11:36):
of not making Mike Madigantoxic, but simply educating the
public on the truth of who MikeMadigan was.
And the public would come to itsown decisions as to whether or
not he was toxic or not.
The key to Mike Madigan's poweris there's not a lot of tape on
him.
He doesn't speak publicly veryoften.
Uh, his whole idea is to operatebehind the scenes.
He is the wizard behind thecurtain.
We want to pull back the curtainand tell his story.
(11:58):
So we started writing about himin 2013, 2014, 2015 with a much
greater frequency and in depthstarted examining his rules back
then and educating people on howhis power actually worked.
Speaker 1 (12:14):
By this time, wealthy Chicago businessman Bruce Rauner
was becoming more involved inlocal politics and public
policy.
He was a rising campaign funder,a philanthropist and civic
leader.
That's how he first met Chicagopoliticians like Mike Madigan.
Speaker 7 (12:29):
He knew that I was a big Democratic funder.
I was a huge funder of RichDaley and other Democrats.
And, and he said, uh, you know,I was school reformer.
Bruce, I'd love to work with youand see what we can do to help
improve the schools.
And I'm like, awesome.
That's fantastic.
I've heard.
So we met, he came to my office,my business office downtown.
We had a very cordial meeting.
We were both buttering eachother up.
(12:50):
You know, he wanted some of themoney from the PAC.
I wanted his support forlegislative changes and we were,
you know, had an interesting,good, very positive.
He was a funny guy, gregarious,really.
We had a lot of fun.
And, uh, so we had our firstmeeting.
Then we had a second meeting.
We actually had breakfasttogether and we had multiple
meetings and meals together overthe, over that time.
(13:10):
In that window of time, thesecond meeting, we're alone,
just the two of us over at theChicago Club.
And we're getting to know eachother, we're buttering each
other up.
You know, he wants, you know,I'm a fairly successful business
guy.
I got a lot of money.
I fund Democrats.
He loves that.
I need him, you know, we'retalking family, we're talking
politics we're yucking it up andshining each other's knobs.
And you know, we're going toneed each other work if we're to
(13:31):
work together.
And during the course of thatdiscussion, I said, so Mike,
you're the most powerfulpolitician, maybe in Illinois
history.
I mean, you, it's incredibleyour power.
Like, what's it.
Tell me about that.
What, what's your goal?
What do you want to do withthat?
And he said, I don't know,Bruce.
I just like to work.
I just love to work.
And I said, oh, that's ablessing.
Yeah.
We all, I love to work too, butI mean, you must have a goal.
(13:52):
Like, what's your goal forimproving the quality of life
for the people of Illinois, asthe most powerful politician in
the state.
And he looked at me like I hadthree heads and he laughed and
he said, Bruce, I got no goallike that.
I don't even think about that.
I said, really what so?
And he said, Bruce, I do twothings.
I manage power and I make moneyfrom managing power.
(14:15):
And I said, uh, I didn't knowwhat to say.
I sorta choked on my egg alittle bit.
And then I was like, okay, uh,like I got that.
And boy, has he ever beensuccessful in accomplishing his
goals.
I mean, good grief.
Speaker 1 (14:24):
Rauner had supported both Democratic and Republican
candidates as a donor, but hispolitics lean to the right.
He grew increasingly frustratedwith political corruption in
Illinois and the gridlock inSpringfield.
So he decided to run forgovernor.
And in 2014 he became theRepublican Party's nominee.
Even though Illinois had trendedsolidly Democratic in recent
(14:45):
years, Rauner was able tonarrowly defeat the incumbent
Pat Quinn.
That's the same Pat Quinn wholaunched a cutback amendment
drive Madigan despised yearsago.
And even though they were bothDemocrats, Quinn and Madigan
battled mightily during Quinn'stime as governor.
Well, it was very hard.
Speaker 8 (15:02):
I think anybody would tell you that.
Probably Mike Madigan would saythat.
Uh, he's, you know, doesn'tyield easily.
He and I disagreed on many, manythings, especially on direct
democracy and on ideas aboutethics and reform.
He wasn't really interested inmy ideas.
Speaker 1 (15:21):
When Rauner took over as governor, he didn't find
Madigan any easier to deal with.
The two went toe to toe oneverything from budgets to
workers' compensation reform topublic sector unions.
The battles between Rauner andMadigan were daily front-page
news, and they created alegislative and budgetary
stalemate for months.
State workers were furloughed.
(15:42):
Social service providers wentunpaid as the two battled for
control over the budget.
Their fight culminated in adramatic scene on the floor of
the Illinois House.
Rauner had vetoed a key billthat Madigan supported.
Madigan was now trying to getthe legislature to vote to
override Rauner's veto.
It required a vote fromthree-fifths of the House to
succeed.
Everyone knew the vote would beclose.
(16:03):
Again, Bruce Rauner.
Speaker 7 (16:06):
I was able to get one legislator to stay away when I
vetoed a spending bill that wasgoing to crush taxpayers in
Illinois.
I vetoed the bill.
Madigan has a super majority, hewas going to beat me.
I convinced that legislator tostay at the, uh, at the, uh, the
US Open tennis tournament in NewYork and not show up for the,
um, the veto override.
Uh, we beat him.
(16:27):
My veto stood and he had a supermajority.
He was apoplectic.
He was furious.
I've never seen him so pissed.
And he was like, and what did hedo?
He brought President Obama, asitting United States president
back to Chicago to campaign in aprimary for a state legislative
seat.
(16:47):
That has never happened in UShistory.
It shows the muscle that Madiganhas to get a sitting US
President to come back andcampaign on behalf of one of
Madigan's people so that hecould knock out one of his
opponents.
It's extraordinary.
Speaker 9 (17:01):
It was a bunch of bull crap.
Speaker 1 (17:03):
The state representative who stayed away,
Democrat Ken Dunkin.
Speaker 9 (17:07):
Every single person knows that Mike Madigan could
suspend the rules, or he couldplay by the rules.
Leaders or people who are incharge of a mob or a gang or
legislative body for thatmatter, they're going to do
everything that they can to setprecedent for the good guys and
the bad guys.
(17:28):
And I was one of thoseindividuals who happen to think
independently, not Republican,not Democrat, but really for the
best interest of the state,because when Mike Madigan was in
place, it was nothing aboutanything about the citizens by
and large.
There were some exceptions, ofcourse, but it was about what
Mike Madigan wanted.
There was not about me not beingsomewhere.
(17:49):
It was about Mike Madiganseizing, an uh, me, presenting
an opportunity for him to seizeand take advantage of and create
a narrative that he wanted toaddress really through Governor
Bruce Rauner.
I was merely the pawn.
Prior to Obama getting involvedin a local statehouse race.
(18:10):
There was legislation that movedthrough the House, and it
passed, that said, we're goingto grant$100 million to the
Barack Obama Library or ObamaCenter.
That's legislative fact.
And so I had to believe that asitting president of the most
powerful nation in the world,getting involved in a race where
(18:35):
there are 118 members that hadto be something additional that
incentivized him to get into amere race of someone who played
basketball with someone whoserved in the, in the
legislature with, and someonewho had visited the White House
several times with him sittingas the president.
I wasn't in the room or whatcatapults him, Barack Obama, to
(18:56):
support someone that he hadnever even met.
But Mike Madigan again is knownfor creating a narrative and
he'll use anything and anybodyto push his agenda and, or play
people against themselves to hisadvantage.
Speaker 1 (19:19):
In the end, both Dunkin and Rauner failed to win
re-election.
They may have won thelegislative battle to stop the
veto override, but they lost thewar.
Again, the Illinois PolicyInstitute's John Tillman.
Speaker 6 (19:32):
The thing that Governor Rauner misunderstood
about that election.
When he won in 2014 was peopleweren't voting for him.
They were rejecting GovernorQuinn and his governance.
And so I call that a repudiationelection.
And so when you become governorafter repudiation election, your
job is to get people to supportyour agenda and go out and sell.
And instead, what GovernorRauner did is he took on Madigan
(19:54):
and the unions and all theirpower directly head-on instead
of finding ways on the marginsto start winning people over.
And I thought that was astrategic error, which of course
I, to be clear, I said at thetime, and have said ever since.
I didn't say this after thefact.
Uh, the second mistake thatMadigan made was Madigan in his
power-hungry ways, and he couldnot get past his joy.
(20:14):
He wanted to destroy, uh,Governor Rauner.
Speaker 1 (20:19):
Many criticized Rauner for not finding a way to
work more effectively withMadigan.
Others simply felt the politicalnewcomer was outplayed by the
political veteran.
But Bruce Rauner doesn't see itthat way.
Speaker 7 (20:30):
So I got to tell you, Justin, I've been approached by
more than a dozen Democraticlegislators who were in office
while I was governor.
Some are still in office, somearen't.
Who come to me and said, Bruce,we should have, we should have
just done a deal with you.
Everything would be so muchbetter, but Mike wouldn't, you
know, Speaker wouldn't do it.
He just would not negotiateanything.
(20:52):
And it's it's, it's so tragic.
This was good government.
Did Mike Madigan want goodgovernment?
Hell no.
He wanted the political power.
And he wanted me gone.
And he succeeded.
By blocking me out, they couldsay, well, he was a do-nothing,
governor, he should be tossed.
In the end we took each otherout.
I defined him as a crook.
And that's how they were able todefeat the property, the income
tax hike.
And the Democrats said, we can'tlet you there, Mike, Mike you're
(21:14):
too much of a foil.
You got to go.
They tossed him because of mydefinition of him.
They tossed me cause I couldn'tget stuff done because he
wouldn't let me.
We took each other out.
Speaker 1 (21:29):
But the cost of the router, Madigan battles, isn't
just measured in the career.
Fortunes of two powerfulpoliticians.
It's measured in the toll.
It took on the state and itscitizens.
By the time Rauner left officein 2018, Illinois, unpaid
pension deficit had ballooned torecord high and the state's bond
rating dipped to record lows andIllinois ranked near the bottom
(21:50):
of all 50 states in severalfinancial categories, the
problems weren't all roundersfault.
They'd been mounting for decadesacross multiple administrations,
but neither governor rounder norgovernor Quinn before him could
find a way to fix them by the2018 election.
More and more Illinoisans,including some Democrats were
pinning the blame on the oneconstant in Illinois politics.
(22:12):
Michael J Madigan, Next time ona Madigan rule, the downfall,
how state finances, politicalscandals, and the me too
movement spelled the beginningof the end for Madigan
Speaker 10 (22:30):
Or applied.
There was no HR set up in thisorganization.
So the only two options I had toreport it to was the brother of
my harasser or the most powerfulpolitician in the state.
Mike Madigan,
Speaker 1 (22:45):
The Madigan rule is produced by me, Justin Kaufman,
with the better governmentassociation, the executive
producer, David grazing, SteveEdwards gets a big thanks for
story consulting.
Alex Sugihara did the music tofind out more about the BGAs
investigative reporting andwatchdog efforts go to better
gov.org.
In 1998, Illinois House Speaker Michael Madigan
added another huge piece to hispowerful chessboard.
He was elected to take over aschairman of the Illinois State
Democratic Party.
Becoming party chair meantMadigan could control
legislation in the house andcontrol which candidates
received money and fundraisingsupport from the Democratic
(00:26):
Party.
The BGA's John Chase.
Speaker 2 (00:29):
That did open up a world where he didn't have any
interference whatsoever in, inrunning now, not just the State
House, but the state DemocraticParty and the Democratic Party
was, at that point, the dominantparty and has ever since been in
Illinois.
And it goes to this point aboutfunding campaigns.
Other than a few races, hereally just cared about, uh,
(00:52):
reelecting or electing newDemocrats to the state House of
Representatives.
He didn't care really much aboutGovernor, even.
He really just you know, hewasn't supporting the whole
party in Cook County or inDuPage County.
It was all just about state repraces.
And that's because that's wherehis power was.
Speaker 1 (01:16):
I'm Justin Kaufmann.
This is the"Madigan Rule." Thispodcast is a production of the
Better Government Association,episode three"Power over
Policy".
In 2012, Will Guzzardi was ayoung, progressive Democrat
(01:38):
living on Chicago's NorthwestSide.
He hated the way machinepoliticians played favorites and
perpetuated the status quo.
So he decided to mount aninsurgent campaign.
He challenged incumbent Democratstate representative Toni
Berrios to a primary race.
It was a bold move, especiallyfor a political novice.
(01:58):
That's because Berrios wasn'tjust any incumbent.
She was the daughter of thepowerful chair of the Cook
County Democratic Party JoeBerrios.
She and her dad were both loyalallies of Michael Madigan.
Not surprisingly theGuzzardi-Berrios primary
attracted a lot of attention anda lot of blowback for Guzzardi,
but he did better than manyexpected.
(02:18):
He lost that first election byjust 125 votes.
Two years later, he challengedBerrios again.
Speaker 3 (02:27):
Speaker Madigan worked really hard to keep me
from having this job.
Uh, I ran against the Democraticincumbent and his policy was
always to support incumbents.
So his political apparatus spenthalf a million dollars against
me and said all kinds ofterrible things about me during
that campaign.
(02:48):
And then I won and it allchanged.
I saw a very different side ofthe speaker, a different side of
him than I had experienced and adifferent side than I think
people in the general public,think about.
A side of him that was funny andwelcoming and friendly and
(03:09):
engaging and frustrating in lotsof ways.
But yeah, very different fromthe Tribune editorial board
version of him that we mightknow.
I didn't know much about MikeMadigan at all before I got into
politics.
I really did know him as thecaricature, you know, as the
sorta all powerful puppetmaster, like subject of endless
speculation who never emergesfrom behind the curtain and, you
(03:32):
know, who's responsible for theoutcomes of everything in
Springfield.
He was really sort of a cartoonfigure to me.
After I won my primary, hecalled me in for a meeting to
his law office downtown, and Iwas, you know, 26 and terrified.
I show up in in this likeoak-paneled boardroom.
And he's just like, tell me whatyou're interested in.
And we just had this hour-longconversation.
We talk about clean energy.
We talk about, uh, you know,raising the minimum wage,
progressive economic politics.
He's telling me about thisbiography he's reading of LBJ.
You know, he's reading the Carobooks at the moment and we talk
about like that, that whole, youknow, navigating that process.
And he says it in the meetinglike, listen, my job here is to
help you succeed.
So when you get down to thelegislature, let me know the
bills you're working on and ifyou ever have any challenges
with it, my goal is to help youget them passed.
I was just flabbergasted.
I was expecting a very differentapproach from him and, and that
turned out to be how he was as aleader, um, in my experience of
him anyway.
He would make whatever effortshe could to help out other
Democrats and other colleagues.
(04:44):
And, and I think perhaps to afault.
I think that a lot of what sortof has subsequently come out
about him has been that hehelped people get jobs and get
placed in places that heshouldn't have that were
unethical and corrupt in ways.
But I think it came from thatsort of basic impulse of like
(05:06):
rather have you as a friend thanan enemy.
In many ways, he really was likethat.
He really was the caricaturethat, um, that has been
portrayed in a lot of ways,right.
He controlled the legislativeprocess.
It all flowed through himpersonally.
(05:28):
He used that control to deliverfavors and benefits to the
people close to him and to thepeople who he thought should
have those favors and benefits.
And then that was a decisionmade by him and not by a sort of
process of good governance orpublic policy making.
You know, that stuff is true,but I think it's like a yes/and
(05:49):
situation, where yes, that isall true of him.
And it's not the caricature thatyou have seen in the newspapers.
That IPI cartoon of him is notwho he is.
And like, just to close the loopon this story.
After that first meeting withhim, you know, my jaw kinda
drops and I'm like, okay, thanksvery much, and I go home.
(06:10):
And two days later, there's amanila envelope in my mailbox.
And it has a note from him.
And it's a copy of that RobertCaro book that he was talking
about"Master of the Senate." Hesays, hey, we talked about this
the other day, thought you mightbe interested.
You know, just like a thoughtfulguy who wanted to help people
succeed.
Speaker 1 (06:34):
Helping a young freshman representative succeed
after he just took out a loyalally, you spent half a million
dollars trying to defend couldbe a profile in sportsmanship or
a lesson in how to losegracefully, or it could be
evidence of a realpolitik, thehard-nosed realism of a veteran
more concerned with maintainingpower than debating policy
(06:55):
platforms.
Again, Will Guzzardi.
Speaker 3 (06:57):
I think he was able to hold onto power for as long
as he did.
I think one central reason whyhe was able to hold on to power
as long as he did is that he didnot let his personal ideological
compunctions get in the way ofhis desire to hold on to power.
And that's not something I cansay for myself if I were in his
(07:18):
shoes.
Like I go to Springfield becausethere's a set of values that I
believe in.
And like, I don't think I couldjust sort of ditch those and
pick up another set of values tohold onto power, right?
Like that's not how I operate.
You look at the issue of choicewhere like Madigan grew up in an
Irish Catholic family and in thechurch and came into the
(07:40):
legislature really anti-choice.
And, and there was a lot ofspace for an Irish, Irish
Catholic anti-choice Democrat.
When he came into thelegislature in the seventies.
Politics changed, the electoralenvironment, changed the
fundraising environment changed,and he was able to really change
(08:01):
with that.
And to say, I'm going to leadthis party in a sort of
relentlessly and unflinchinglypro-choice direction to capture
the electorate that we need towin, to capture the fundraising
base that we need to win.
I mean, truly, uh, like aremarkable pivot in that way,
(08:21):
that like in the final years ofhis tenure as speaker, we were
passing the most progressivepro-choice legislation in the
country, right?
Medicaid funding for abortion.
I mean really likegroundbreaking stuff.
Speaker 1 (08:40):
Despite those and other legislative achievements,
many say Michael Madigan was farmore concerned with maintaining
power than advancing anyideology.
Pat Brady is the former head ofthe Illinois Republican Party.
He only cares aboutself-preservation.
So if he needs to
Speaker 5 (08:55):
Go to the left to keep it in that spot, he'll do
it.
And he did it.
He, he would do whatever it tookto keep him in that spot.
Everybody down there, uh,treated him like some kind of
God.
And he was Mike Madigan and hehad his office he didn't let
anybody in.
And it was a weird world youcouldn't get beyond Tim Mapes.
It was just strange.
(09:16):
It's he's an odd little guy.
And those are questions that alot of people had, but everybody
had to kiss his backside becausehe had the power that he had.
Speaker 1 (09:24):
Brady became chair of the Illinois Republican Party in
2009.
At the time the Illinois GOP wasdecimated.
The party had just come off anembarrassing campaign for the US
Senate against Barack Obama.
Democrats were adding to bigmajorities in Illinois House and
Senate and Democrats alsocontrolled the all-important
legislative map.
Republicans couldn't even defeatthe scandal-plagued Democratic
(09:45):
Governor Rod Blagojevich.
Pat Brady knew that theRepublican Party needed to
change its ways if it was goingto have any hope of winning
again.
Speaker 5 (09:54):
In 2009, my strategy was fire Madigan.
It wasn't so much that we weregoing to beat Mike Madigan, but
we needed to make voters awareof who Mike Madigan is and how
he operates.
And I remember Rick Pearson, youwere probably there at the WGN
studios, going hey, we just dida poll and only 29% of the
people know who Madigan is.
And I go, Rick, that's my point.
Now, 80% of the people know whopeople is because I think in
(10:18):
part what we did in 2010 andwhat they did in 2016, when I
wasn't chairman, was to pointout who Mike Madigan is and how
he operates and tie that intohow poorly managed the state has
been.
And I think that wastremendously effective, but that
being said, Mike Madigan, uh, inthe last couple cycles, had,
had, had some big gains.
So, you know, mixed bag.
But from my perspective, thegoal, we set to make people
(10:40):
aware of who he is and how hemanages the state.
I think we were successful.
Brady
Speaker 1 (10:45):
had planted a seed that others on the political
right continued to cultivate.
John Tillman is the founder ofthe Illinois Policy Institute, a
conservative think tank.
Speaker 6 (10:54):
I sat down and had lunch with two very prominent
Chicago business leaders.
Names you would know.
And had a discussion about thisexact subject in 2013.
And I made the argument that wecan't fix the state until Mike
Madigan is gone and he won't begone until, uh, the rank and
file members fear their ownvoters more than they fear Mike
Madigan.
(11:14):
And the only way they were goingto fear their own voters more
than they feared Mike Madiganwas if he became an albatross.
Uh, in politics, you know, the,the political opponents of, uh,
tobacco growers and tobacco, uh,processors have done a very good
job of making Big Tobacco toxic.
Big Oil has been made toxic bysome in the political debate.
Uh, for a lot of thatconversation, uh, we set a goal
(11:36):
of not making Mike Madigantoxic, but simply educating the
public on the truth of who MikeMadigan was.
And the public would come to itsown decisions as to whether or
not he was toxic or not.
The key to Mike Madigan's poweris there's not a lot of tape on
him.
He doesn't speak publicly veryoften.
Uh, his whole idea is to operatebehind the scenes.
He is the wizard behind thecurtain.
We want to pull back the curtainand tell his story.
(11:58):
So we started writing about himin 2013, 2014, 2015 with a much
greater frequency and in depthstarted examining his rules back
then and educating people on howhis power actually worked.
Speaker 1 (12:14):
By this time, wealthy Chicago businessman Bruce Rauner
was becoming more involved inlocal politics and public
policy.
He was a rising campaign funder,a philanthropist and civic
leader.
That's how he first met Chicagopoliticians like Mike Madigan.
Speaker 7 (12:29):
He knew that I was a big Democratic funder.
I was a huge funder of RichDaley and other Democrats.
And, and he said, uh, you know,I was school reformer.
Bruce, I'd love to work with youand see what we can do to help
improve the schools.
And I'm like, awesome.
That's fantastic.
I've heard.
So we met, he came to my office,my business office downtown.
We had a very cordial meeting.
We were both buttering eachother up.
(12:50):
You know, he wanted some of themoney from the PAC.
I wanted his support forlegislative changes and we were,
you know, had an interesting,good, very positive.
He was a funny guy, gregarious,really.
We had a lot of fun.
And, uh, so we had our firstmeeting.
Then we had a second meeting.
We actually had breakfasttogether and we had multiple
meetings and meals together overthe, over that time.
(13:10):
In that window of time, thesecond meeting, we're alone,
just the two of us over at theChicago Club.
And we're getting to know eachother, we're buttering each
other up.
You know, he wants, you know,I'm a fairly successful business
guy.
I got a lot of money.
I fund Democrats.
He loves that.
I need him, you know, we'retalking family, we're talking
politics we're yucking it up andshining each other's knobs.
And you know, we're going toneed each other work if we're to
(13:31):
work together.
And during the course of thatdiscussion, I said, so Mike,
you're the most powerfulpolitician, maybe in Illinois
history.
I mean, you, it's incredibleyour power.
Like, what's it.
Tell me about that.
What, what's your goal?
What do you want to do withthat?
And he said, I don't know,Bruce.
I just like to work.
I just love to work.
And I said, oh, that's ablessing.
Yeah.
We all, I love to work too, butI mean, you must have a goal.
(13:52):
Like, what's your goal forimproving the quality of life
for the people of Illinois, asthe most powerful politician in
the state.
And he looked at me like I hadthree heads and he laughed and
he said, Bruce, I got no goallike that.
I don't even think about that.
I said, really what so?
And he said, Bruce, I do twothings.
I manage power and I make moneyfrom managing power.
(14:15):
And I said, uh, I didn't knowwhat to say.
I sorta choked on my egg alittle bit.
And then I was like, okay, uh,like I got that.
And boy, has he ever beensuccessful in accomplishing his
goals.
I mean, good grief.
Speaker 1 (14:24):
Rauner had supported both Democratic and Republican
candidates as a donor, but hispolitics lean to the right.
He grew increasingly frustratedwith political corruption in
Illinois and the gridlock inSpringfield.
So he decided to run forgovernor.
And in 2014 he became theRepublican Party's nominee.
Even though Illinois had trendedsolidly Democratic in recent
(14:45):
years, Rauner was able tonarrowly defeat the incumbent
Pat Quinn.
That's the same Pat Quinn wholaunched a cutback amendment
drive Madigan despised yearsago.
And even though they were bothDemocrats, Quinn and Madigan
battled mightily during Quinn'stime as governor.
Well, it was very hard.
Speaker 8 (15:02):
I think anybody would tell you that.
Probably Mike Madigan would saythat.
Uh, he's, you know, doesn'tyield easily.
He and I disagreed on many, manythings, especially on direct
democracy and on ideas aboutethics and reform.
He wasn't really interested inmy ideas.
Speaker 1 (15:21):
When Rauner took over as governor, he didn't find
Madigan any easier to deal with.
The two went toe to toe oneverything from budgets to
workers' compensation reform topublic sector unions.
The battles between Rauner andMadigan were daily front-page
news, and they created alegislative and budgetary
stalemate for months.
State workers were furloughed.
(15:42):
Social service providers wentunpaid as the two battled for
control over the budget.
Their fight culminated in adramatic scene on the floor of
the Illinois House.
Rauner had vetoed a key billthat Madigan supported.
Madigan was now trying to getthe legislature to vote to
override Rauner's veto.
It required a vote fromthree-fifths of the House to
succeed.
Everyone knew the vote would beclose.
(16:03):
Again, Bruce Rauner.
Speaker 7 (16:06):
I was able to get one legislator to stay away when I
vetoed a spending bill that wasgoing to crush taxpayers in
Illinois.
I vetoed the bill.
Madigan has a super majority, hewas going to beat me.
I convinced that legislator tostay at the, uh, at the, uh, the
US Open tennis tournament in NewYork and not show up for the,
um, the veto override.
Uh, we beat him.
(16:27):
My veto stood and he had a supermajority.
He was apoplectic.
He was furious.
I've never seen him so pissed.
And he was like, and what did hedo?
He brought President Obama, asitting United States president
back to Chicago to campaign in aprimary for a state legislative
seat.
(16:47):
That has never happened in UShistory.
It shows the muscle that Madiganhas to get a sitting US
President to come back andcampaign on behalf of one of
Madigan's people so that hecould knock out one of his
opponents.
It's extraordinary.
Speaker 9 (17:01):
It was a bunch of bull crap.
Speaker 1 (17:03):
The state representative who stayed away,
Democrat Ken Dunkin.
Speaker 9 (17:07):
Every single person knows that Mike Madigan could
suspend the rules, or he couldplay by the rules.
Leaders or people who are incharge of a mob or a gang or
legislative body for thatmatter, they're going to do
everything that they can to setprecedent for the good guys and
the bad guys.
(17:28):
And I was one of thoseindividuals who happen to think
independently, not Republican,not Democrat, but really for the
best interest of the state,because when Mike Madigan was in
place, it was nothing aboutanything about the citizens by
and large.
There were some exceptions, ofcourse, but it was about what
Mike Madigan wanted.
There was not about me not beingsomewhere.
(17:49):
It was about Mike Madiganseizing, an uh, me, presenting
an opportunity for him to seizeand take advantage of and create
a narrative that he wanted toaddress really through Governor
Bruce Rauner.
I was merely the pawn.
Prior to Obama getting involvedin a local statehouse race.
(18:10):
There was legislation that movedthrough the House, and it
passed, that said, we're goingto grant$100 million to the
Barack Obama Library or ObamaCenter.
That's legislative fact.
And so I had to believe that asitting president of the most
powerful nation in the world,getting involved in a race where
(18:35):
there are 118 members that hadto be something additional that
incentivized him to get into amere race of someone who played
basketball with someone whoserved in the, in the
legislature with, and someonewho had visited the White House
several times with him sittingas the president.
I wasn't in the room or whatcatapults him, Barack Obama, to
(18:56):
support someone that he hadnever even met.
But Mike Madigan again is knownfor creating a narrative and
he'll use anything and anybodyto push his agenda and, or play
people against themselves to hisadvantage.
Speaker 1 (19:19):
In the end, both Dunkin and Rauner failed to win
re-election.
They may have won thelegislative battle to stop the
veto override, but they lost thewar.
Again, the Illinois PolicyInstitute's John Tillman.
Speaker 6 (19:32):
The thing that Governor Rauner misunderstood
about that election.
When he won in 2014 was peopleweren't voting for him.
They were rejecting GovernorQuinn and his governance.
And so I call that a repudiationelection.
And so when you become governorafter repudiation election, your
job is to get people to supportyour agenda and go out and sell.
And instead, what GovernorRauner did is he took on Madigan
(19:54):
and the unions and all theirpower directly head-on instead
of finding ways on the marginsto start winning people over.
And I thought that was astrategic error, which of course
I, to be clear, I said at thetime, and have said ever since.
I didn't say this after thefact.
Uh, the second mistake thatMadigan made was Madigan in his
power-hungry ways, and he couldnot get past his joy.
(20:14):
He wanted to destroy, uh,Governor Rauner.
Speaker 1 (20:19):
Many criticized Rauner for not finding a way to
work more effectively withMadigan.
Others simply felt the politicalnewcomer was outplayed by the
political veteran.
But Bruce Rauner doesn't see itthat way.
Speaker 7 (20:30):
So I got to tell you, Justin, I've been approached by
more than a dozen Democraticlegislators who were in office
while I was governor.
Some are still in office, somearen't.
Who come to me and said, Bruce,we should have, we should have
just done a deal with you.
Everything would be so muchbetter, but Mike wouldn't, you
know, Speaker wouldn't do it.
He just would not negotiateanything.
(20:52):
And it's it's, it's so tragic.
This was good government.
Did Mike Madigan want goodgovernment?
Hell no.
He wanted the political power.
And he wanted me gone.
And he succeeded.
By blocking me out, they couldsay, well, he was a do-nothing,
governor, he should be tossed.
In the end we took each otherout.
I defined him as a crook.
And that's how they were able todefeat the property, the income
tax hike.
And the Democrats said, we can'tlet you there, Mike, Mike you're
(21:14):
too much of a foil.
You got to go.
They tossed him because of mydefinition of him.
They tossed me cause I couldn'tget stuff done because he
wouldn't let me.
We took each other out.
Speaker 1 (21:29):
But the cost of the router, Madigan battles, isn't
just measured in the career.
Fortunes of two powerfulpoliticians.
It's measured in the toll.
It took on the state and itscitizens.
By the time Rauner left officein 2018, Illinois, unpaid
pension deficit had ballooned torecord high and the state's bond
rating dipped to record lows andIllinois ranked near the bottom
(21:50):
of all 50 states in severalfinancial categories, the
problems weren't all roundersfault.
They'd been mounting for decadesacross multiple administrations,
but neither governor rounder norgovernor Quinn before him could
find a way to fix them by the2018 election.
More and more Illinoisans,including some Democrats were
pinning the blame on the oneconstant in Illinois politics.
(22:12):
Michael J Madigan, Next time ona Madigan rule, the downfall,
how state finances, politicalscandals, and the me too
movement spelled the beginningof the end for Madigan
Speaker 10 (22:30):
Or applied.
There was no HR set up in thisorganization.
So the only two options I had toreport it to was the brother of
my harasser or the most powerfulpolitician in the state.
Mike Madigan,
Speaker 1 (22:45):
The Madigan rule is produced by me, Justin Kaufman,
with the better governmentassociation, the executive
producer, David grazing, SteveEdwards gets a big thanks for
story consulting.
Alex Sugihara did the music tofind out more about the BGAs
investigative reporting andwatchdog efforts go to better
gov.org.
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