November 28, 2023 • 22 mins
Daniel Fitzgerald Runde is a senior executive and strategist in international development, international trade, investment, global business and organizational change. Runde is the author of the book, "The American Imperative: Reclaiming Global Leadership through Soft Power."
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:18):
Hello and welcome to World Outlooks podcast the
Outlook.
I'm Adam Salzman, a 24, andtoday we're excited and honored
to be joined by Dan Rundie.
Daniel Rundie is a Dartmouth 94and the senior vice president
and director of the Project onProsperity and Development at
the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies.
(00:40):
His work is oriented around theUS leadership in building a
more democratic and prosperousworld.
He recently published a book,the American Imperative
Reclaiming Global Leadershipthrough Soft Power, in which he
advocates building a new globalconsensus through vigorous
internationalism.
So, daniel, thanks for comingon with us today.
Speaker 2 (00:59):
Thanks for having me on.
It's great to be back atDartmouth.
Speaker 1 (01:02):
Yeah, for sure.
So first of all,congratulations about your book
and before we dive into thespecific topic matter of your
book, my first question is howdo you approach a topic as
nuanced and interdisciplinary asdevelopment?
Speaker 2 (01:16):
Yeah, so that's interesting.
So I kind of learned by doing.
I was.
I had left Dartmouth and Iworked on Wall Street for a
couple of years and then I wentto the Kennedy School of
Government.
I'd lived in Spain for a littlebit and I also then lived in
Argentina for three years.
I worked for Citibank it'scommercial banking.
So I worked on Wall Streetdoing corporate finance and I
(01:39):
did emerging markets, commercialbanking and I had an degree
from the Kennedy School.
I then worked.
I went to work for USAID whereI spent five years learning the
international developmentbusiness from a number of
different perspectives, where Ibuilt multi-stakeholder
partnerships for globaldevelopment.
So I learned about differentpieces of the development puzzle
(02:00):
and ultimately foreign aid,which USAID is a foreign aid
provider.
Development is a country ledprocess and, like these are
requires you need you need goodgovernance and domestic rule of
law, you need stability, andthen you also need you know over
(02:22):
time much of the money is goingto come from within a society.
It's going to come through thetaxes collected or local savings
or, yes, sometimes it's foreigndirect investment or private
investment, or foreignassistance plays a role.
So foreign aid is a supportingactor in somebody else's movie.
That's a way to think about it.
So I would just say thatdevelopment is a real, is a, you
(02:44):
know, a multi-disciplinaryprocess.
The UN has something called theUN Human Development Report.
It looks at things likeeducation and health and those
that role of women and thingslike levels of you know.
Also, you know there's otherdimensions like the levels of
human freedom or the levels ofwhether the quality of
governance in the society or howsafe is the society, how
(03:06):
whether a country is like in alot of conflict or not.
So there's lots of dimensionsto this.
So I would say A lot of peoplethat come into places like an
AID are people who areanthropologists, they're
epidemiologists, they areagricultural experts, sometimes
(03:26):
they're engineers or economists.
And then I would say that someare political scientists and I'm
having studied government atDartmouth, I guess that counts
as a political scientist andthen I would say that you have
some accountants, and so I'djust say it's a
multidisciplinary world and Ithink it's a very interesting
(03:48):
world and I think it's been, youknow, for the most part not
been boring, and I see it as aform of applied foreign policy.
You know that there'stheoretical mathematics and
applied mathematics.
This is sort of like appliedmathematics of foreign policy is
a way to think aboutdevelopment.
Speaker 1 (04:06):
Thank you.
Yeah, so clearly you've had alot of experiences across a
number of different firms andindustries.
So just one more question aboutthe topic of development.
I'm wondering what's the mostcommon misunderstanding or
misperception that ordinaryAmericans hold about
international development?
Speaker 2 (04:23):
So I think two things .
One is this issue of like thatour foreign aid is like the
central funding that drives thisstuff.
We're a minority shareholder insomeone else's movie.
Foreign aid is catalytic that'skind of the think of it like
yeast it's not totally like that, but it's you're also bringing
expertise or change, or so Ithink that's the first thing.
(04:44):
I think the second misconceptionis that, as a percentage of the
American budget, they've donepolling where they say, well,
it's like 20, or you know, 10,20, 30% of the American budget
is foreign aid to developingcountries.
It's 1% or less than 1% of ourbudget.
And so I think if you andthere's always a little bit of a
kind of a little trickery wherepeople then say, well, what
(05:07):
percentage of the foreign aid ofthe US budget would be willing
to spend on foreign aid untillike 5% or something, and then
the advocates of foreign aid say, well, good, I want to have
more money I'm not necessarilysure I would necessarily agree
to that, but I would just saythat there's this misperception
that we spend far more than wedo on foreign aid.
We don't, and it's a muchsmaller percentage than we
(05:28):
realize.
And then I would say that if welook at how whether the
spending on education or thespending on healthcare in a
developing country mosteducation and most healthcare in
most countries is often fundedout of the taxes of a developing
country, out of their ownresources, not ours.
(05:49):
So even some of the world'spoorest countries not all of
them, but many of them are ableto finance a lot of their own
development.
So that's something else.
People don't understand that alot of the financing of
development comes from within.
Not all of them, but, like say,most developing countries have
an ability to finance a lot oftheir own development.
Speaker 1 (06:08):
Right, thank you for elaborating on that.
So you mentioned that, althoughit acts as kind of like a
catalyst and plays a little bitof a smaller role, usaid is
still important.
I think this is a goodtransition point to talking
about your new book, whichcongratulations on its
publication, by the way, thankyou.
I'm wondering what are the bigthemes you discuss in your new
book and what do you hope thatreaders take away from it?
Speaker 2 (06:30):
So I wrote this book.
I spent I've spent 20 years inWashington.
I worked in the Bushadministration at USAID for five
years, I worked at the WorldBank Group for four and I've
been at CSIS for the last 12 anda half years, and so in my time
I would say a couple things.
One is that we're in a new ageof great power competition with
Chinese Communist Party, withthe Chinese Communist Party and
(06:51):
with Vladimir Putin's Russia.
We're not in competition withthe Chinese people and we're not
in competition with the Russianpeople.
We most of that competition isgonna play out in developing
countries.
It's gonna play out in LatinAmerica, it's gonna play out in
Africa, it's gonna play out inSouth Asia, southeast Asia, the
Pacific Island states, centralAsia and places like Ukraine and
Moldova.
So largely what you mightcharacterize is developing
(07:14):
countries.
It's not gonna play out inChina.
It's not gonna play out inRussia.
Most of that competition is notgonna be military.
In fact, the vast majority ofit's not gonna be military.
So therefore, we need anon-military strategy for these
other parts of the world, and sothat's why I wrote the book.
I basically am saying likewe're gonna have to use, we have
(07:36):
to rethink how we apply oursoft power and where we apply it
to respond to the challenge ofthe Chinese Communist Party in
Vladimir Putin's Russia.
Speaker 1 (07:44):
Thank you.
So, before we dig into thespecific ways in which the US
can reclaim its soft power, I'mwondering why should we care
about in exerting more influenceover developing countries, as
opposed to letting Putin'sRussia and the CCP's China
exerting its influence?
What's the case for usinvesting more taxpayer money in
(08:06):
these countries?
Speaker 2 (08:09):
So the case is that are you.
I believe that each of thesecomponents of our soft power are
like Lego building blocks of asystem that was set up after
World War II, and so, to theextent that we're not investing
in these things and we'reletting China or Russia supplant
us, they're in the process ofbuilding a separate Lego
(08:30):
building block set that createsa separate system that, over
time, will allow them to set theglobal rules of the road.
And if you just did a thoughtexercise, if your listeners did
a thought exercise and said okay, what are the things I most
care about?
Do I care a lot aboutenvironmental stewardship,
things like climate change?
Or am I concerned about freedomof expression or about the most
(08:52):
important choices a person canmake in their personal lives?
Do you think that the ChineseCommunist Party in Vladimir
Putin's Russia are gonna bebetter stewards of the things
that you hold most dear?
I've yet to have anybody in theUnited States tell me yes, the
Chinese Communist Party ofVladimir Putin will be a far
better steward of the globalsystem than the United States in
(09:14):
the West.
But what I would just say isthat we're you know we're so
each of these things are part ofa competition to, and, if we
let them, they will supplant usand they will run a system that
I don't think you're gonna.
You're not gonna like theoutcome.
Your listeners aren't gonnalike the outcome.
Speaker 1 (09:36):
Right.
Thank you for elaborating that.
So you mentioned the ChineseCommunist Party and the role of
great power competition in termsof the US versus China.
So and you alluded to the factthat China, or more specifically
the Communist Party, is tryingto act as a revisionist power
and kind of change the rules ofthe game in their own way.
So is the Belt and RoadInitiative an example of them
(09:59):
trying to gain influence overthese countries?
And heck.
Speaker 2 (10:01):
yeah, it absolutely is.
It's a positive, hopeful,future oriented project that
speaks to the hopes, the deepesthopes and aspirations of
developing countries.
Developing countries wantinfrastructure and they want
energy, and if we're notoffering them high quality
infrastructure and energy, ifI'm a tin pot dictator in some
(10:24):
developing country, I'm gonnatake.
If I've got no other optionthan China, I'm going with China
.
They would like to havealternate options, but if I've
got the option of no port or aport, I'm going with a port.
And I'm going with a crappybuilt hydroelectric dam or no
hydroelectric dam, I'm goingwith a hydroelectric dam.
So I would just say that it'snot your grandparents'
(10:45):
developing world.
It's a much richer, freer, morecapable place with a lot more
options and agency.
So if we're not answering themail on developing countries'
hopes and aspirations, they'lltake their business to China,
and so the BRI is a vector forthat and speaks to the hopes and
aspirations of countries.
Everybody in Congress has heardof it.
They don't like it, but guesswhat A strategy is?
(11:07):
Saying don't take the Chinamoney or their stuff is crap is
not a strategy, and that'softentimes what our answer is.
That's like it's anon-acceptable answer.
Speaker 1 (11:17):
Yeah, for sure.
So in that case should the USkind of create essentially an
American BRI version.
Speaker 2 (11:24):
So I think we don't have to compete with them dollar
for dollar, but I do think weneed to have a vision, for I
think there'd been a.
I think we need to have apositive, forward-looking agenda
in the realm of energy andinfrastructure.
That speaks to a better qualityone.
We don't necessarily have tokind of, you know, ape them or
kind of copy them, but I dothink we need to kind of wake up
(11:47):
and smell the coffee a littlebit.
We can't fight something withnothing.
Speaker 1 (11:52):
Right, is there a risk of the US dollar being
replaced as a global reservecurrency?
Speaker 2 (11:58):
So I think that's a super great question.
There are a number ofmacroeconomists that could tell
you, but I think it's likecompared to what?
So like I, think the question isyeah, I think a lot of people
are going to say well, somecryptocurrencies or whatever,
though I think crypto has takena big whack, as you know, in the
last couple of months.
I'm actually happy about that,because I thought it was kind of
goofy and I didn't understandit.
The thing about the yuan or therenminbi or whatever you want
(12:21):
to call it, like I know they'redoing this funny stuff or I'll
barter with you and whatever.
But how many central banks doyou really see saying, oh, I'm
going to put money, I'm going touse the renminbi as a store of
value.
Like, almost nobody does that.
And watch Chinese wealthypeople, so they put their money
and savings to.
They say, oh, I'm going to keepmy hard earned money and
(12:41):
renminbi no one does that.
They say I'm going to put it indollars or Euro or Swiss francs
or yen or gold.
So I think I don't think so.
So I actually think this islike not a thing.
I know people use this to saythis, and maybe there's some.
You can say, okay, we're goingto default, but like, where's
that money going to go?
They're going to go to gold,it's not going to go to crypto
(13:03):
and it's not going to go torenminbi.
I don't believe that.
I ultimately don't believe likethey're until they have such a
goofy economy, like you can'teasily trans.
You know there's somethinghaving to do with, like, getting
money in and out of China isnot easy, and if and until they
were prepared to do that andthey're not prepared to do that,
I don't think it's going to bea competitor of ours.
Don't I think the answer is no.
Speaker 1 (13:24):
Right, china does have capital controls in place.
Speaker 2 (13:27):
Yeah, that's what I'm talking about.
And so what I'm saying is liketell me when that changes and
then I'll say, okay, that'sinteresting.
I'm talking about, you know,all these central banks like
where do you see the Saudisparking their money in renminbi?
I don't see that.
I mean they'll say all tradeoil and whatever.
I guess there's a little bit,but it's like if they're these
like goofy, like barter thingsthat don't make any sense to me.
(13:48):
So I know people say like, oh,this is the beginning of the end
.
They've been saying that for along time.
I don't believe it.
Speaker 1 (13:55):
I'm not losing sleep about it.
So I mean, in lieu ofincreasing great power
competition, what should the USdo?
Like what?
What's your, what's your agenda?
What's my agenda is.
Speaker 2 (14:07):
We need a top-to-bottom review of what
kind like what we want to do inthe world and then apply our non
military forms of our power tothose, to those goals.
What I think ultimately is Iwant the United States of
America To continue to lead theinternational system for the
next hundred years and I believewe don't get to a shooting war
with China.
(14:27):
They're gonna run out ofdemographic gas in about 25
years.
We just don't rather BS thanthem.
Like how many people do youknow that want to migrate to
Beijing that aren't Han Chinese?
Like nobody.
Do you see people like youdon't even see people like China
illegally enter China?
Like, oh my gosh, I've got adesperately other than the North
Koreans who's like I got amigrate, I'm gonna have a better
(14:49):
job opportunity in mainlandChina?
Nobody does that.
Do you see a lot of peopleDying to move to Moscow?
No one wants to move there.
Like, do you know anybody atDartmouth?
It's like, oh my gosh, when Igraduate, I'm moving to Beijing
and when I graduate, I'm movingto Moscow.
No one's saying that.
You maybe a couple kids who arelike but, from me?
no, nobody.
And then I'd say, okay, howmany poor people in neighboring
(15:10):
countries like I gotta move toChina and Russia to like go work
?
No, but very few people want todo that.
So my point is we are winningthe global migration race, like
some of its list it, some of itsillicit and uncontrolled.
I think we need to get a handleon that.
But I would just say like we'vegot a lot going for us if we
just don't, you know, okay, weneed a, we need a bipartisan
(15:31):
consensus on where we're going.
I think the fear of China willhelp us get there.
I think we're still kind ofworking it out.
I think it'll take another fiveyears, but I think well, I'm
optimistic we're gonna get to aplace where we have a bipartisan
consensus on China and we havea bipartisan consensus.
Speaker 1 (15:45):
We have a bipartisan consensus.
Speaker 2 (15:46):
We have a problem with Russia and we have a
bipartisan consensus.
We have a problem with China.
We don't yet have a bipartisanconsensus about what to do about
it, and so I wrote this book toBegin, to initiate or further a
conversation.
And what should we do aboutthis problem that we have with
the Chinese Communist Party?
In this problem, we have aVladimir Putin's Russia.
Speaker 1 (16:05):
Yeah, thank you for elaborating.
So I think one example of aCountry in which the, in this
new era of great powercompetition, a conflict is this
is Ukraine, and you've writtenmany op-eds in terms of Ukraine
and what the US role should beon Ukraine.
So just five days ago, forexample, you've written a piece
in the wash in the WashingtonTimes Titled Ukraine's future is
(16:27):
a good bet for global investors.
So I'm just wondering, in termsof a great power competition,
how do you see Ukraine?
And then how do you see whatthe US role should be in Ukraine
in terms of rebuilding thecountry?
Speaker 2 (16:39):
so I was in Ukraine three little over three weeks
ago and it was very inspiring.
I met President Zelensky and I'mon the board of an investment
fund that has been investing inUkraine, moldova for 30 years,
and we spun out a private equityfund about 15 years ago, and so
the parent company was hasbecome a limited partner and I
(17:00):
was an advocate for this ofInvesting $10 million into a
fourth investment fund for thedaughter organization called
Horizon capital, and Horizoncapital has has pulled together
20 250 million dollars and it'sstarting to deploy capital this
month, investing in projects inUkraine right now.
And so I'm optimistic because Ibelieve that Ukraine is
(17:22):
ultimately going to join theEuropean Union, and so that
means they're gonna.
They're they're getting aviolent, angry divorce after a
shotgun wedding 400 years agofrom Russia, and they're in the
process of Linking with the West.
They're gonna become a formalpart of Europe as a member of
the European Union, and they'reeither going to join NATO or
they're going to have some kindof special defense relationship
(17:43):
like we have with Israel, and so, as a result of that, if their
security situation is kind ofspoken for and kind of their
future is what the West isspoken for I'm optimistic that
they're going to kind of getover the next 20 years.
They're going to get it right.
Speaker 1 (17:59):
Yeah, thank you for elaborating on that.
So, just taking a step back,what inspired you to go into
this field?
Speaker 2 (18:07):
So I out of Dartmouth , I spent a couple years on Wall
Street at what's called nowDeutsche Bank, but at the time
was Alex Brown and Sons, andBaltimore.
They had a big tech presence.
They had a financialinstitutions group and an
environmental group and a mediagroup, so I joined their
financial institutions practice.
(18:28):
I did that for a couple years.
I then went to the KennedySchool of Government.
I lived in Argentina working incommercial banking, at Citibank,
and I joined the BushAdministration at USAID and I
sort of stumbled into it becausemy professional mentor at
Harvard became the head of USAID, the foreign aid arm of the US
(18:48):
government, in the BushAdministration, and that was
just tremendous, it was justfantastic and I had a wonderful,
wonderful experience at USAID.
I loved working for my boss,andrew Natsios.
I loved working for George WBush and I liked it very, very
much and so I missed and so Iliked it.
(19:11):
I saw it as a form of appliedforeign policy and I thought
this was really interesting andso I stuck with it.
And then I went to the WorldBank Group for four years and
was able to kind of combine allthese other experiences I had.
And then I've been at CSISwhere I've been interested in
various forms of non-militaryforms of our power, and so I've
(19:33):
been able to kind of create aniche for myself and a unique
role for myself, and it's beenan interesting run at CSIS.
I've been there for 12 and ahalf years.
Speaker 1 (19:41):
Yeah, well, just a couple more questions, sure.
First, I'm going to circle backto something you said a little
bit earlier about demographics,which you're completely correct
about.
If you look at Russia'sdemographics and China's
demographics, they're terrible.
In 20, 30 years, it's going tobe very interesting to see how
the governments are going todeal with the declining
population, and especially inChina, with the increasing
(20:04):
proportion of older individuals.
So I'm wondering a critic, sosomeone who would disagree with
you would say, would make thefollowing argument they would
say hey, well, if China'sdemographic is going to,
population means it's going torun out of gas in 20 years.
And Russia, which already lookslike it's on the forefront of
decline, why should the US stillbe investing in the developing
(20:26):
world when it's clear thatthere's no other large
developing power to threaten theUS's grasp on the world order?
Speaker 2 (20:34):
So that's a very good question.
I would say that Russia andChina are seeking to kind of
lock in gains right now beforethey kind of run out of gas.
And so if they lock in certainkinds of relationships and
certain kinds of sort of statusquo, they're going to do so in a
way that's not.
It's antithetical to ourinterests, is against our
American interest, and so it'llbe much harder to kind of unwind
(20:57):
that later.
So we want to try and blockthem now from doing so while
they've got the ability to do so.
Speaker 1 (21:03):
Right, thank you.
And then last question is that,what is the most important
thing, or the most two importantthings you would like a reader
to take away from your book orfrom this podcast?
Speaker 2 (21:13):
Well, I want them to read my book, the American
Imperative, by Daniel Rundy.
I'm really.
It published in February and Ireally like writing the book and
I would just say that we can'tfight something with nothing, so
we need to have a something.
And then I would say we need tohave a bipartisan consensus on
the fact that we have abipartisan consensus on that.
(21:34):
We have a problem with theChinese Communist Party.
We have bipartisan consensusthat we have a problem with
Vladimir Putin's Russia.
We don't yet have a bipartisanconsensus on what to do about it
and I wrote this book, theAmerican Imperative, to try and
begin to shape and create thatbipartisan consensus about what
are we going to do about it.
Speaker 1 (21:51):
Right.
Well, thank you for coming on.
Speaker 2 (21:53):
Thank you.
Hello and welcome to World Outlooks podcast the
Outlook.
I'm Adam Salzman, a 24, andtoday we're excited and honored
to be joined by Dan Rundie.
Daniel Rundie is a Dartmouth 94and the senior vice president
and director of the Project onProsperity and Development at
the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies.
(00:40):
His work is oriented around theUS leadership in building a
more democratic and prosperousworld.
He recently published a book,the American Imperative
Reclaiming Global Leadershipthrough Soft Power, in which he
advocates building a new globalconsensus through vigorous
internationalism.
So, daniel, thanks for comingon with us today.
Speaker 2 (00:59):
Thanks for having me on.
It's great to be back atDartmouth.
Speaker 1 (01:02):
Yeah, for sure.
So first of all,congratulations about your book
and before we dive into thespecific topic matter of your
book, my first question is howdo you approach a topic as
nuanced and interdisciplinary asdevelopment?
Speaker 2 (01:16):
Yeah, so that's interesting.
So I kind of learned by doing.
I was.
I had left Dartmouth and Iworked on Wall Street for a
couple of years and then I wentto the Kennedy School of
Government.
I'd lived in Spain for a littlebit and I also then lived in
Argentina for three years.
I worked for Citibank it'scommercial banking.
So I worked on Wall Streetdoing corporate finance and I
(01:39):
did emerging markets, commercialbanking and I had an degree
from the Kennedy School.
I then worked.
I went to work for USAID whereI spent five years learning the
international developmentbusiness from a number of
different perspectives, where Ibuilt multi-stakeholder
partnerships for globaldevelopment.
So I learned about differentpieces of the development puzzle
(02:00):
and ultimately foreign aid,which USAID is a foreign aid
provider.
Development is a country ledprocess and, like these are
requires you need you need goodgovernance and domestic rule of
law, you need stability, andthen you also need you know over
(02:22):
time much of the money is goingto come from within a society.
It's going to come through thetaxes collected or local savings
or, yes, sometimes it's foreigndirect investment or private
investment, or foreignassistance plays a role.
So foreign aid is a supportingactor in somebody else's movie.
That's a way to think about it.
So I would just say thatdevelopment is a real, is a, you
(02:44):
know, a multi-disciplinaryprocess.
The UN has something called theUN Human Development Report.
It looks at things likeeducation and health and those
that role of women and thingslike levels of you know.
Also, you know there's otherdimensions like the levels of
human freedom or the levels ofwhether the quality of
governance in the society or howsafe is the society, how
(03:06):
whether a country is like in alot of conflict or not.
So there's lots of dimensionsto this.
So I would say A lot of peoplethat come into places like an
AID are people who areanthropologists, they're
epidemiologists, they areagricultural experts, sometimes
(03:26):
they're engineers or economists.
And then I would say that someare political scientists and I'm
having studied government atDartmouth, I guess that counts
as a political scientist andthen I would say that you have
some accountants, and so I'djust say it's a
multidisciplinary world and Ithink it's a very interesting
(03:48):
world and I think it's been, youknow, for the most part not
been boring, and I see it as aform of applied foreign policy.
You know that there'stheoretical mathematics and
applied mathematics.
This is sort of like appliedmathematics of foreign policy is
a way to think aboutdevelopment.
Speaker 1 (04:06):
Thank you.
Yeah, so clearly you've had alot of experiences across a
number of different firms andindustries.
So just one more question aboutthe topic of development.
I'm wondering what's the mostcommon misunderstanding or
misperception that ordinaryAmericans hold about
international development?
Speaker 2 (04:23):
So I think two things .
One is this issue of like thatour foreign aid is like the
central funding that drives thisstuff.
We're a minority shareholder insomeone else's movie.
Foreign aid is catalytic that'skind of the think of it like
yeast it's not totally like that, but it's you're also bringing
expertise or change, or so Ithink that's the first thing.
(04:44):
I think the second misconceptionis that, as a percentage of the
American budget, they've donepolling where they say, well,
it's like 20, or you know, 10,20, 30% of the American budget
is foreign aid to developingcountries.
It's 1% or less than 1% of ourbudget.
And so I think if you andthere's always a little bit of a
kind of a little trickery wherepeople then say, well, what
(05:07):
percentage of the foreign aid ofthe US budget would be willing
to spend on foreign aid untillike 5% or something, and then
the advocates of foreign aid say, well, good, I want to have
more money I'm not necessarilysure I would necessarily agree
to that, but I would just saythat there's this misperception
that we spend far more than wedo on foreign aid.
We don't, and it's a muchsmaller percentage than we
(05:28):
realize.
And then I would say that if welook at how whether the
spending on education or thespending on healthcare in a
developing country mosteducation and most healthcare in
most countries is often fundedout of the taxes of a developing
country, out of their ownresources, not ours.
(05:49):
So even some of the world'spoorest countries not all of
them, but many of them are ableto finance a lot of their own
development.
So that's something else.
People don't understand that alot of the financing of
development comes from within.
Not all of them, but, like say,most developing countries have
an ability to finance a lot oftheir own development.
Speaker 1 (06:08):
Right, thank you for elaborating on that.
So you mentioned that, althoughit acts as kind of like a
catalyst and plays a little bitof a smaller role, usaid is
still important.
I think this is a goodtransition point to talking
about your new book, whichcongratulations on its
publication, by the way, thankyou.
I'm wondering what are the bigthemes you discuss in your new
book and what do you hope thatreaders take away from it?
Speaker 2 (06:30):
So I wrote this book.
I spent I've spent 20 years inWashington.
I worked in the Bushadministration at USAID for five
years, I worked at the WorldBank Group for four and I've
been at CSIS for the last 12 anda half years, and so in my time
I would say a couple things.
One is that we're in a new ageof great power competition with
Chinese Communist Party, withthe Chinese Communist Party and
(06:51):
with Vladimir Putin's Russia.
We're not in competition withthe Chinese people and we're not
in competition with the Russianpeople.
We most of that competition isgonna play out in developing
countries.
It's gonna play out in LatinAmerica, it's gonna play out in
Africa, it's gonna play out inSouth Asia, southeast Asia, the
Pacific Island states, centralAsia and places like Ukraine and
Moldova.
So largely what you mightcharacterize is developing
(07:14):
countries.
It's not gonna play out inChina.
It's not gonna play out inRussia.
Most of that competition is notgonna be military.
In fact, the vast majority ofit's not gonna be military.
So therefore, we need anon-military strategy for these
other parts of the world, and sothat's why I wrote the book.
I basically am saying likewe're gonna have to use, we have
(07:36):
to rethink how we apply oursoft power and where we apply it
to respond to the challenge ofthe Chinese Communist Party in
Vladimir Putin's Russia.
Speaker 1 (07:44):
Thank you.
So, before we dig into thespecific ways in which the US
can reclaim its soft power, I'mwondering why should we care
about in exerting more influenceover developing countries, as
opposed to letting Putin'sRussia and the CCP's China
exerting its influence?
What's the case for usinvesting more taxpayer money in
(08:06):
these countries?
Speaker 2 (08:09):
So the case is that are you.
I believe that each of thesecomponents of our soft power are
like Lego building blocks of asystem that was set up after
World War II, and so, to theextent that we're not investing
in these things and we'reletting China or Russia supplant
us, they're in the process ofbuilding a separate Lego
(08:30):
building block set that createsa separate system that, over
time, will allow them to set theglobal rules of the road.
And if you just did a thoughtexercise, if your listeners did
a thought exercise and said okay, what are the things I most
care about?
Do I care a lot aboutenvironmental stewardship,
things like climate change?
Or am I concerned about freedomof expression or about the most
(08:52):
important choices a person canmake in their personal lives?
Do you think that the ChineseCommunist Party in Vladimir
Putin's Russia are gonna bebetter stewards of the things
that you hold most dear?
I've yet to have anybody in theUnited States tell me yes, the
Chinese Communist Party ofVladimir Putin will be a far
better steward of the globalsystem than the United States in
(09:14):
the West.
But what I would just say isthat we're you know we're so
each of these things are part ofa competition to, and, if we
let them, they will supplant usand they will run a system that
I don't think you're gonna.
You're not gonna like theoutcome.
Your listeners aren't gonnalike the outcome.
Speaker 1 (09:36):
Right.
Thank you for elaborating that.
So you mentioned the ChineseCommunist Party and the role of
great power competition in termsof the US versus China.
So and you alluded to the factthat China, or more specifically
the Communist Party, is tryingto act as a revisionist power
and kind of change the rules ofthe game in their own way.
So is the Belt and RoadInitiative an example of them
(09:59):
trying to gain influence overthese countries?
And heck.
Speaker 2 (10:01):
yeah, it absolutely is.
It's a positive, hopeful,future oriented project that
speaks to the hopes, the deepesthopes and aspirations of
developing countries.
Developing countries wantinfrastructure and they want
energy, and if we're notoffering them high quality
infrastructure and energy, ifI'm a tin pot dictator in some
(10:24):
developing country, I'm gonnatake.
If I've got no other optionthan China, I'm going with China
.
They would like to havealternate options, but if I've
got the option of no port or aport, I'm going with a port.
And I'm going with a crappybuilt hydroelectric dam or no
hydroelectric dam, I'm goingwith a hydroelectric dam.
So I would just say that it'snot your grandparents'
(10:45):
developing world.
It's a much richer, freer, morecapable place with a lot more
options and agency.
So if we're not answering themail on developing countries'
hopes and aspirations, they'lltake their business to China,
and so the BRI is a vector forthat and speaks to the hopes and
aspirations of countries.
Everybody in Congress has heardof it.
They don't like it, but guesswhat A strategy is?
(11:07):
Saying don't take the Chinamoney or their stuff is crap is
not a strategy, and that'softentimes what our answer is.
That's like it's anon-acceptable answer.
Speaker 1 (11:17):
Yeah, for sure.
So in that case should the USkind of create essentially an
American BRI version.
Speaker 2 (11:24):
So I think we don't have to compete with them dollar
for dollar, but I do think weneed to have a vision, for I
think there'd been a.
I think we need to have apositive, forward-looking agenda
in the realm of energy andinfrastructure.
That speaks to a better qualityone.
We don't necessarily have tokind of, you know, ape them or
kind of copy them, but I dothink we need to kind of wake up
(11:47):
and smell the coffee a littlebit.
We can't fight something withnothing.
Speaker 1 (11:52):
Right, is there a risk of the US dollar being
replaced as a global reservecurrency?
Speaker 2 (11:58):
So I think that's a super great question.
There are a number ofmacroeconomists that could tell
you, but I think it's likecompared to what?
So like I, think the question isyeah, I think a lot of people
are going to say well, somecryptocurrencies or whatever,
though I think crypto has takena big whack, as you know, in the
last couple of months.
I'm actually happy about that,because I thought it was kind of
goofy and I didn't understandit.
The thing about the yuan or therenminbi or whatever you want
(12:21):
to call it, like I know they'redoing this funny stuff or I'll
barter with you and whatever.
But how many central banks doyou really see saying, oh, I'm
going to put money, I'm going touse the renminbi as a store of
value.
Like, almost nobody does that.
And watch Chinese wealthypeople, so they put their money
and savings to.
They say, oh, I'm going to keepmy hard earned money and
(12:41):
renminbi no one does that.
They say I'm going to put it indollars or Euro or Swiss francs
or yen or gold.
So I think I don't think so.
So I actually think this islike not a thing.
I know people use this to saythis, and maybe there's some.
You can say, okay, we're goingto default, but like, where's
that money going to go?
They're going to go to gold,it's not going to go to crypto
(13:03):
and it's not going to go torenminbi.
I don't believe that.
I ultimately don't believe likethey're until they have such a
goofy economy, like you can'teasily trans.
You know there's somethinghaving to do with, like, getting
money in and out of China isnot easy, and if and until they
were prepared to do that andthey're not prepared to do that,
I don't think it's going to bea competitor of ours.
Don't I think the answer is no.
Speaker 1 (13:24):
Right, china does have capital controls in place.
Speaker 2 (13:27):
Yeah, that's what I'm talking about.
And so what I'm saying is liketell me when that changes and
then I'll say, okay, that'sinteresting.
I'm talking about, you know,all these central banks like
where do you see the Saudisparking their money in renminbi?
I don't see that.
I mean they'll say all tradeoil and whatever.
I guess there's a little bit,but it's like if they're these
like goofy, like barter thingsthat don't make any sense to me.
(13:48):
So I know people say like, oh,this is the beginning of the end
.
They've been saying that for along time.
I don't believe it.
Speaker 1 (13:55):
I'm not losing sleep about it.
So I mean, in lieu ofincreasing great power
competition, what should the USdo?
Like what?
What's your, what's your agenda?
What's my agenda is.
Speaker 2 (14:07):
We need a top-to-bottom review of what
kind like what we want to do inthe world and then apply our non
military forms of our power tothose, to those goals.
What I think ultimately is Iwant the United States of
America To continue to lead theinternational system for the
next hundred years and I believewe don't get to a shooting war
with China.
(14:27):
They're gonna run out ofdemographic gas in about 25
years.
We just don't rather BS thanthem.
Like how many people do youknow that want to migrate to
Beijing that aren't Han Chinese?
Like nobody.
Do you see people like youdon't even see people like China
illegally enter China?
Like, oh my gosh, I've got adesperately other than the North
Koreans who's like I got amigrate, I'm gonna have a better
(14:49):
job opportunity in mainlandChina?
Nobody does that.
Do you see a lot of peopleDying to move to Moscow?
No one wants to move there.
Like, do you know anybody atDartmouth?
It's like, oh my gosh, when Igraduate, I'm moving to Beijing
and when I graduate, I'm movingto Moscow.
No one's saying that.
You maybe a couple kids who arelike but, from me?
no, nobody.
And then I'd say, okay, howmany poor people in neighboring
(15:10):
countries like I gotta move toChina and Russia to like go work
?
No, but very few people want todo that.
So my point is we are winningthe global migration race, like
some of its list it, some of itsillicit and uncontrolled.
I think we need to get a handleon that.
But I would just say like we'vegot a lot going for us if we
just don't, you know, okay, weneed a, we need a bipartisan
(15:31):
consensus on where we're going.
I think the fear of China willhelp us get there.
I think we're still kind ofworking it out.
I think it'll take another fiveyears, but I think well, I'm
optimistic we're gonna get to aplace where we have a bipartisan
consensus on China and we havea bipartisan consensus.
Speaker 1 (15:45):
We have a bipartisan consensus.
Speaker 2 (15:46):
We have a problem with Russia and we have a
bipartisan consensus.
We have a problem with China.
We don't yet have a bipartisanconsensus about what to do about
it, and so I wrote this book toBegin, to initiate or further a
conversation.
And what should we do aboutthis problem that we have with
the Chinese Communist Party?
In this problem, we have aVladimir Putin's Russia.
Speaker 1 (16:05):
Yeah, thank you for elaborating.
So I think one example of aCountry in which the, in this
new era of great powercompetition, a conflict is this
is Ukraine, and you've writtenmany op-eds in terms of Ukraine
and what the US role should beon Ukraine.
So just five days ago, forexample, you've written a piece
in the wash in the WashingtonTimes Titled Ukraine's future is
(16:27):
a good bet for global investors.
So I'm just wondering, in termsof a great power competition,
how do you see Ukraine?
And then how do you see whatthe US role should be in Ukraine
in terms of rebuilding thecountry?
Speaker 2 (16:39):
so I was in Ukraine three little over three weeks
ago and it was very inspiring.
I met President Zelensky and I'mon the board of an investment
fund that has been investing inUkraine, moldova for 30 years,
and we spun out a private equityfund about 15 years ago, and so
the parent company was hasbecome a limited partner and I
(17:00):
was an advocate for this ofInvesting $10 million into a
fourth investment fund for thedaughter organization called
Horizon capital, and Horizoncapital has has pulled together
20 250 million dollars and it'sstarting to deploy capital this
month, investing in projects inUkraine right now.
And so I'm optimistic because Ibelieve that Ukraine is
(17:22):
ultimately going to join theEuropean Union, and so that
means they're gonna.
They're they're getting aviolent, angry divorce after a
shotgun wedding 400 years agofrom Russia, and they're in the
process of Linking with the West.
They're gonna become a formalpart of Europe as a member of
the European Union, and they'reeither going to join NATO or
they're going to have some kindof special defense relationship
(17:43):
like we have with Israel, and so, as a result of that, if their
security situation is kind ofspoken for and kind of their
future is what the West isspoken for I'm optimistic that
they're going to kind of getover the next 20 years.
They're going to get it right.
Speaker 1 (17:59):
Yeah, thank you for elaborating on that.
So, just taking a step back,what inspired you to go into
this field?
Speaker 2 (18:07):
So I out of Dartmouth , I spent a couple years on Wall
Street at what's called nowDeutsche Bank, but at the time
was Alex Brown and Sons, andBaltimore.
They had a big tech presence.
They had a financialinstitutions group and an
environmental group and a mediagroup, so I joined their
financial institutions practice.
(18:28):
I did that for a couple years.
I then went to the KennedySchool of Government.
I lived in Argentina working incommercial banking, at Citibank,
and I joined the BushAdministration at USAID and I
sort of stumbled into it becausemy professional mentor at
Harvard became the head of USAID, the foreign aid arm of the US
(18:48):
government, in the BushAdministration, and that was
just tremendous, it was justfantastic and I had a wonderful,
wonderful experience at USAID.
I loved working for my boss,andrew Natsios.
I loved working for George WBush and I liked it very, very
much and so I missed and so Iliked it.
(19:11):
I saw it as a form of appliedforeign policy and I thought
this was really interesting andso I stuck with it.
And then I went to the WorldBank Group for four years and
was able to kind of combine allthese other experiences I had.
And then I've been at CSISwhere I've been interested in
various forms of non-militaryforms of our power, and so I've
(19:33):
been able to kind of create aniche for myself and a unique
role for myself, and it's beenan interesting run at CSIS.
I've been there for 12 and ahalf years.
Speaker 1 (19:41):
Yeah, well, just a couple more questions, sure.
First, I'm going to circle backto something you said a little
bit earlier about demographics,which you're completely correct
about.
If you look at Russia'sdemographics and China's
demographics, they're terrible.
In 20, 30 years, it's going tobe very interesting to see how
the governments are going todeal with the declining
population, and especially inChina, with the increasing
(20:04):
proportion of older individuals.
So I'm wondering a critic, sosomeone who would disagree with
you would say, would make thefollowing argument they would
say hey, well, if China'sdemographic is going to,
population means it's going torun out of gas in 20 years.
And Russia, which already lookslike it's on the forefront of
decline, why should the US stillbe investing in the developing
(20:26):
world when it's clear thatthere's no other large
developing power to threaten theUS's grasp on the world order?
Speaker 2 (20:34):
So that's a very good question.
I would say that Russia andChina are seeking to kind of
lock in gains right now beforethey kind of run out of gas.
And so if they lock in certainkinds of relationships and
certain kinds of sort of statusquo, they're going to do so in a
way that's not.
It's antithetical to ourinterests, is against our
American interest, and so it'llbe much harder to kind of unwind
(20:57):
that later.
So we want to try and blockthem now from doing so while
they've got the ability to do so.
Speaker 1 (21:03):
Right, thank you.
And then last question is that,what is the most important
thing, or the most two importantthings you would like a reader
to take away from your book orfrom this podcast?
Speaker 2 (21:13):
Well, I want them to read my book, the American
Imperative, by Daniel Rundy.
I'm really.
It published in February and Ireally like writing the book and
I would just say that we can'tfight something with nothing, so
we need to have a something.
And then I would say we need tohave a bipartisan consensus on
the fact that we have abipartisan consensus on that.
(21:34):
We have a problem with theChinese Communist Party.
We have bipartisan consensusthat we have a problem with
Vladimir Putin's Russia.
We don't yet have a bipartisanconsensus on what to do about it
and I wrote this book, theAmerican Imperative, to try and
begin to shape and create thatbipartisan consensus about what
are we going to do about it.
Speaker 1 (21:51):
Right.
Well, thank you for coming on.
Speaker 2 (21:53):
Thank you.
Popular Podcasts
On Purpose with Jay Shetty
I’m Jay Shetty host of On Purpose the worlds #1 Mental Health podcast and I’m so grateful you found us. I started this podcast 5 years ago to invite you into conversations and workshops that are designed to help make you happier, healthier and more healed. I believe that when you (yes you) feel seen, heard and understood you’re able to deal with relationship struggles, work challenges and life’s ups and downs with more ease and grace. I interview experts, celebrities, thought leaders and athletes so that we can grow our mindset, build better habits and uncover a side of them we’ve never seen before. New episodes every Monday and Friday. Your support means the world to me and I don’t take it for granted — click the follow button and leave a review to help us spread the love with On Purpose. I can’t wait for you to listen to your first or 500th episode!
24/7 News: The Latest
The latest news in 4 minutes updated every hour, every day.
Crime Junkie
Does hearing about a true crime case always leave you scouring the internet for the truth behind the story? Dive into your next mystery with Crime Junkie. Every Monday, join your host Ashley Flowers as she unravels all the details of infamous and underreported true crime cases with her best friend Brit Prawat. From cold cases to missing persons and heroes in our community who seek justice, Crime Junkie is your destination for theories and stories you won’t hear anywhere else. Whether you're a seasoned true crime enthusiast or new to the genre, you'll find yourself on the edge of your seat awaiting a new episode every Monday. If you can never get enough true crime... Congratulations, you’ve found your people. Follow to join a community of Crime Junkies! Crime Junkie is presented by audiochuck Media Company.