On Nietzsche and posthumanist philosophy

Focusing on Friedrich Nietzsche’s reception of the life sciences of his day (including concerns with insects and the emergent social properties they exhibit) and his reflections on technology—research areas as central to Nietzsche’s work as they are to posthumanism—Edgar Landgraf provides fresh readings of Nietzsche and a critique of posthumanist and transhumanist philosophies in his new book, Nietzsche’s Posthumanism. Here, Landgraf is joined in conversation with Christian Emden and Stefan Herbrechter.

Edgar Landgraf is distinguished research professor of German at Bowling Green State University. He is author of Nietzsche’s Posthumanism and Improvisation as Art, and coeditor of Posthumanism in the Age of Humanism and Play in the Age of Goethe.

Christian Emden is Frances Moody Newman Professor at Rice University where he teaches German intellectual history and political thought. He is author of several books on Nietzsche, including Nietzsche’s Naturalism and Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness, and the Body.

Stefan Herbrechter is former Reader in Cultural Theory at Coventry University and former professor of English and cultural studies at Heidelberg University in Germany. He is an independent scholar of critical posthumanism and author of several books including Before Humanity and Posthumanism.

Episode references:

Friedrich Nietzsche

Cary Wolfe

Baruch Spinoza

Jane Bennett

Alfred Espinas

Bernard Stiegler

Ernst Kapp

Charles Darwin

Rosi Braidotti

Francesca Ferrando

Patricia MacCormack

Tamar Sharon 

Reading list:

Vibrant Matter / Jane Bennett

On Animal Societies / Alfred Espinas

Nietzsche’s Animal Philosophy / Vanessa Lemm

Meeting the Universe Halfway / Karen Barad

Nietzsche’s Naturalism / Christian J. Emden

Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness, and the Body / Christian J. Emden

How We Became Posthuman / N. Katherine Hayles

Staying with the Trouble / Donna Haraway

Posthumanism / Stefan Herbrechter

The Will to Technology and the Culture of Nihilism / Arthur Kroker

Insect Media / Jussi Parikka

Before the Law / Cary Wolfe

Keywords: Nietzsche, posthumanism, transhumanism, critical posthumanism, swarm theory, insects, history of technology, human agency, posthumanist ethics, posthumanist politics

Episode Transcript

Christian Emden (00:04):
What is the nature in humanism, and what
does nature have to contributeabout the question of of
posthumanism ultimately?

Stefan Herbrechter (00:12):
We need to develop a much, much richer and
much more open minded historicalawareness of of all those kind
of knowledges that have beenproduced and have been repressed
as well. So Nietzsche is is agood, case study.

Edgar Landgraf (00:27):
Nietzsche was not necessarily pro democracy,
which is not surprising at theend of the nineteenth century,
but his philosophy can actuallyhelp us reinvigorate democracy.
Hello everyone. My name is EdgarLandgraf. I'm a professor of
German at Bowling Green StateUniversity in Ohio. And today I
have the honor and I'm gratefulto talk to Christian Emden and

(00:51):
Stephan Herbrechter, two leadingscholars, in Nietzsche and
Persueminism, to discuss my bookon Nietzsche's Persueminism.
I'd say my personal interests inNietzsche go all the way back to
high school in Switzerland,wrote a few articles in between,
but never booked till now. Andmy interest in prosumanism
predate prosumanism a little bitas a term. Go back to graduate

(01:12):
my graduate studies in thenineteen nineties in Baltimore
where we did all kind ofdifferent theories that today
would be considered at leastprecursors to, posthumanist
theories. So maybe I'd letChristiane and Stefan introduce
themselves too, briefly so youcan associate the voices too
with their names, and then we'lltake it from there again.

Christian Emden (01:33):
I'm Christian Emben. I'm the, Francis Moody
Newman professor at RiceUniversity, where I mainly
teach, intellectual history,German intellectual history,
and, with an emphasis also onpolitical thought. And, of
course, I have an interest inNietzsche. I've written several
books on Nietzsche, including,one on Nietzsche's naturalism.
And some of the themes of thatparticular book overlap, of

(01:56):
course, with, Edgar's brilliantbook on Nietzsche's
posthumanism.

Stefan Herbrechter (02:01):
Hi. I'm I'm Stefan Herbrecher. I used to be
a leader in cultural theory atCoventry University and
professor of English andCultural Studies at Heidelberg
University in Germany. I I guessI'm included in this because I
wrote a positive report on onEdna's book, of course. And my
investment is mainly in, theterm critical posthumanism.

(02:21):
I think I wrote the first firstbook about it using that label
in 02/2009. The German editioncame out as a translation in
02/2013. I'm the, the directorof the, Critical Posthumanism
Network, which has justpublished the, Paul Grave
Handbook of CriticalPosthumanism, to which, Edgar
also contributed. And, we havean online project called The

(02:46):
Genealogy of the Posthuman. And,I also direct a book series on
Critical Posthumanism.
So that's going to be my focuson this discussion.

Edgar Landgraf (02:56):
Great. Thank you. Yes. And and as I said, I'm
very grateful for you spendingyour time here to discuss my
book, with me. Again, StefanHabergehta's book, Beneventas a
few years back now reallysparked the idea for my book, as
you put Nietzsche at thebeginning of a genealogy of
prosumerism.
And I thought at the time,absolutely, and there's more to

(03:17):
it. And and few years laterfound the time to really engage
that more critically and moresystematically, really. I also
wanted to mention briefly beforewe maybe talk or profile a
little bit more what we mean byposthumanism, which is this very
diverse field with oftencontradictory strands of thought
and arguments. I also wanted toaddress, which I do in my
introduction, the apparentcontradiction to write a book on

(03:38):
posthumanism on a single author,no less on the author who is
known to, or at least in thepopular understanding, to
promote exceptionality and andsovereignty and the very things
that posthumanists or criticalposthumanists like to challenge.
But the the impetus here is, ofcourse, not so much to to write
a book on Nietzsche, but reallyto understand Nietzsche himself
in a context, not just thephilosophy of his time, but also

(04:01):
the scientific findings of histime that he studied quite
intensely.
And and Christian Emdon reallycontributed heavily to our
better understanding what kindof sciences that, Nietzsche
engaged and to which he respondsphilosophically. And that
already foreshadows kind ofcontemporary prosumerism, which
breaches the difference betweenthe humanities and the natural
sciences and tries to to mediatebetween these two areas. Now

(04:24):
within that frame too inposthumanism and with Nietzsche,
it's, it's not so much the ideato run away from humanism, but
to redefine a little bit how thehuman in the singular, which is
problematic already, isunderstood, how concepts of
life, of self, of self interest,of will, of agency understood.
And, there too, even asuperficial understanding of
Nietzsche shows that he iscontesting these kind of

(04:47):
concepts of our thinking. And socontributes to a larger episteme
that once or believes as CareyWolf, you know, puts it, that
thinking itself has to change tobecome really posthumanist.
And so it's it's that kind ofapproach to Nietzsche that I'm
pursuing in my book. Stefan,maybe you wanna say a few more
words about posthumanism,critical posthumanism, different

(05:08):
kinds of posthumanism?

Stefan Herbrechter (05:10):
Yeah. Thanks. I can try. As you
rightly said, Ed Gey, I useNietzsche as a sort of entrance
into the whole topic ofposthumanism. But I'm, of
course, as you know, not aNietzsche scholar as such.
But Nietzsche, of course, playeda very important part in, post
structuralism anddeconstruction, and the anti

(05:31):
humanist stance that prevailedin those formations who used
Nietzsche as an ally in theirproject to deconstruct the
liberal humanist subject and soon. Posthumanism, if you want,
my take on it has always beenthat it is a discourse because
it is an ism. Any ism is adiscourse. And in the case of

(05:53):
posthumanism, it's sort ofdouble discourse. On the one
hand, it is the discourse onthis figure you can call
posthuman, the idea that we areno longer or content with, being
human in the traditional sense,in a humanist sense.
It's also the discourse thatcritiques or tries to go beyond

(06:13):
humanism, itself a discourse. Soit's quite it's complicated. So
there's there's three elements,posthumanism in this work, and,
it's not always made quite clearin the way in which people use
the term. There's a very popularnotion of posthumanism that
everybody will have come across,it, which sort of, I would say,

(06:33):
is actually transhumanismbecause it's about overcoming
the limits of the human throughtechnology. The idea that we can
soon be able to download ourminds into computers or the idea
that AI will soon take over and,and help humans to overcome
their natural biologicallimitations, all these kind of

(06:54):
things, I would put in the, inthe bracket of transhumanism.
Posthumanism, in my view, is abit more more complicated and
also a bit more critical. Notall of it, but my take is that
it's a critique, the ongoingcritique or deconstruction, if
you want, of what humanism isand was and wants and the idea

(07:14):
of the human that underlieshumanist discourse. There are a
couple of questions that focusthis discussion and this this
critique. One is the return ofthe question of technology. What
role does technology play incolonization and becoming human
and therefore also becomingsomething other than human?
Of course, that cannot just bean instrumentalist role. No.

(07:38):
It's not just a tool. It goes alot more, let's say, deeper than
that, our implication with withtechnology. On the other hand,
of course, this this ishappening in the context where
we are becoming increasinglyaware that humans are maybe not
such nice people in terms ofenvironmental deterioration that

(07:59):
that we are causing, the thekeyword of the Anthropocene
here, which has been exercisingpeople's minds.
And I want the idea that humanshave become the main geological
force and are now sort of in aresponsibility situation towards
non human others and the planetand so on. What do we do with
this knowledge, right? What doesthe human do with this

(08:20):
knowledge? And and so there'sthis this second aspect, if you
want to predict the consumer,which is an attempt to to think
post anthropocentrism seriously.Think it through.
What what would a postanthropocentric world look like?
A world, not necessarily a worldwithout humans, but a world
where humans are no longer on aconfrontational course with one

(08:41):
human, others, and the planet,and the environment. I guess
this is this is whatposthumanism, if it's taken
seriously, is about. And thecritical posthumanism that I've
been working towards, and Ithink Ed Gass's book is very
much going in the samedirection, is the the additional
one for one dimension is that ithas a genealogical dimension.

(09:04):
It's not something that ispurely future oriented.
It is, hence, the interest inNietzsche. It has precursors. It
has important thinkers anddiscussions that, have opened up
avenues not taken necessarilybut still there and to which we
can return. That's why it's nota purely future oriented
discourse in my in my sense.

Christian Emden (09:25):
I can jump in and complicate things a little
bit, of course, And sort of likejump right into the sort of like
the the fray of the title ofyour book on Nietzsche's
posthumanism because there couldalso be a question mark behind
that particular title thatreflects on some of the issues
that, Stefan Haberge justmentioned. Namely, the sort of
like uneasy and strange presenceand relationship that Nietzsche

(09:47):
has in those debates just, youknow, that we just discussed. On
the one hand, Nietzsche is thisuncanny presence in all of these
debates. He pops up constantlylike another prominent figure in
the history of philosophy namelySpinoza. But while the sort of
like the image and discussion ofSpinoza in posthumanism, is
often more focused, Nietzsche issort of, like, often sort of,

(10:10):
like, presented as somethinginteresting, but it's not
really, you know, clear whatnature has to contribute to this
to this particular debate, whichis, I guess, always Nietzsche's
fate to some extent.
But so the the great achievementof the book, as I think I've
mentioned before, is is toclarify this particular point.
Namely, what is the Nietzscheinhumanism and what does

(10:32):
Nietzsche have to contributeabout the question of of
posthumanism ultimately? IsNietzsche sort of like a
posthumanist in the sense thatwe discuss this sort of
discourse today? Of course, he'snot because he's a child of the
nineteenth century in many ways.But in many ways also what he
has to say about therelationship between self and

(10:55):
nature or between nature andculture to use sort of like an
old fashioned sort of likeopposition tie in very nicely
and very well and veryfruitfully with current
discussions about posthumanismthat raise exactly this
particular point.
This kind of like brings us soin that sense, on the one hand,
Nietzsche is and is not aposthumanist at the very same

(11:16):
time. It depends a little bit onhow you read them, ultimately.
Within that context, of course,Nietzsche's reception of the
life sciences in particular, inthe context of the nineteenth
century play a crucial role. Andthat is also in many ways then
philosophically a link toSpinoza, that second prominent
philosophical figure of debatesin in posthumanism. This opens

(11:39):
up, you know, as far asNietzsche is concerned, this
sort of like tableau of topicsand links and problems that his
philosophical project presents,generally speaking, but also in
particular to our discussion ofposthumanism.
And one aspect that I hope wecan return to later on again is
also the question of thepolitical import of nature's,

(12:02):
attempt to rethink the self asconstitutive of nature and not
as separate from nature in anyway.

Edgar Landgraf (12:10):
Yeah. Yeah. Thank you. If if I just can
connect a little bit to thesetwo complex and interesting
comments here. In some sense, ofcourse, my project tries to use
Nietzsche a little bit inNietzsche's philosophy, and it's
it's a close reading of hisphilosophy, including his
epistemology, his kind of socialtheory and his takes on
technology to use it a littlebit to sort out the different

(12:32):
often rather superficial takesof Nietzsche in the posthumanist
literature.
So so I I know the great divide,for example, within critical
pursue not within posthumanismgenerally. And so I think
Nietzsche can give us some kindof direction here or or
orientation a little bit, wherethe fault lines are, where the
differences are, and what's atstake in these various debates.

(12:54):
And, and, and see in eachchapter kind of there's some
reflection, where I putNietzsche in dialogue with
particular theories. Forexample, this new materialism in
the epistemology chapter, kindof the vitalist Jean Bennett
line with, Doulouse Guattari,etcetera. And on the other hand,
I found it also very interestingto come back to Nietzsche with
kind of the questions andconcepts and ideas that

(13:16):
contemporary posthumanism isengaged in.
And it had opened new venues,new outlooks on Nietzsche's
philosophy too. So I found thiskind of dialogue really
productive. For example,something that I don't think
anyone had really written abouton Nietzsche before, the idea
that there's actually some kindof anticipation of it comes in a
later twentieth century known asswamp theory as my two chapters

(13:39):
on insects in Nietzsche expandor find actually that Nietzsche
was familiar with theentomological research of his
time. And that he had read, forexample, very carefully this
book by Alfred Espinat, Frenchwriter on on animal societies,
it's called, where heextensively discusses the
research on insects, on insecthives, on beehives, on anthills,

(14:00):
etcetera, in the nineteenthcentury. And and Switzerland at
the time, Michel was a residentof Switzerland, was the hotbed
of entomological studies.
And so there is evidence that hewas familiar with what was going
on in this regard. So that, thatreally, I think, opened up a new
venue to also think aboutNietzsche's philosophy and, and
focus on things that had been abit neglected before. Similarly

(14:21):
in technology, I think therehave been a few things written
about technology, but, my book,I try to take a wider angle on
technology and how wastechnology actually understood
in the nineteenth century, whichis quite different from the kind
of gadget orientation that wehave today when we talk about
technology. And, and whichbrings us then to a concept,
Stephan, I have, had mentionedalready of harmonization, right?

(14:45):
We cannot separate the evolutionof humans from the evolution of
technology.
The two go hand in hand and thatis really only established fully
in the twentieth century. BernasDieckler comes to mind here as
as really spelling this out asthe paleontological research to
it and has been done and has,you know, has continued to being
done and and finds theseinteresting developments in how

(15:07):
simple tools have allowed thehuman body even physically to
evolve. The space same time thatthat Nietzsche writes, the first
philosophy of technology by nameby Ernst Kapp is published in in
1872, if I remember correctly,which makes already these kind
of arguments. Kapp is kind of adialectical thinker, a Hegelian
thinker in essence, that, aretools, basic simple tools have

(15:30):
allowed humans to evolve the waythey did. And this process
continues, of course, today, andwe're maybe a little bit more
aware today, but it'sinteresting to find this theme
also in the theme ofharmonization, the hominization
effects of technology to findthis already in Nietzsche.
Maybe we go back to the socialtheory on insects, which
challenges kind of the popularunderstanding of Nietzsche as a

(15:55):
promoter of individualism of,you know, just strong survive
and the weak will die etcetera.And these kind of simplistic
readings. But close readings ofhis work show and then also of
his notes is that he was tryingto understand how social
aggregates form. And if youthink of insects that they
provide us a wonderful examplehow social aggregates can

(16:18):
accomplish amazing things. Inthe nineteenth century, we knew
already that insects would notjust build elaborate
architectures, hives, and andanthills, etcetera, but that
they would actually do somethingakin to farming.
They can domesticate otherspecies. They map the
environment. All these thingswere being recognized already.
And they do these things,obviously, without the

(16:38):
individual members of the hiveor of this the individual ant
doesn't know what the whole hiveis doing. And they do it without
having kind of an authoritydictating or plan what needs to
happen.
So it also challenges this kindof social hierarchy idea that is
often associated still withNietzsche. Instead, it shows
what today we show, you know, wecall emergent properties, how

(17:01):
through interactive processes,structures emerge over time and
in time where the individualcontribution is not one of
dictating things, but very muchneeds to be understand in
reference or in relation towhat's going on in the
surroundings and through theinteractions between the members
of a group. If we then look, forexample, at and we we can kind

(17:23):
of pinpoint when Nietzsche wasmost engaged with this kind of
research because we have thispersonal copy of him of reading
a of Ed Espinath's book, and wehave the markings that I looked
at, which can look at thesethings online now, which is
really, really interesting howhe really puts three lines and
exclamation marks next to whathe thinks are interesting or
important arguments. It doesn'talways mean means he agrees, but

(17:46):
it means that he noticed themand and saw them as significant.
And then articulations of of thewill that we find, for example,
in beyond good and evil, whichhe deconstructs as we say today
and develops very much an analogto kind of the interactive
processes from which, again,insects or other species gain
kind of agencies anddirectionalities.

Christian Emden (18:08):
I can, elaborate a little bit more on
this particular aspect becausealso it raises many sort of,
like, philosophical questionsthat are really that go to the
core of nature's project as awhole. The question of the will,
the question of teleology, andalso the question of sort of
like how to look at the humansocial world from this

(18:29):
particular perspective, withthis particular perspective in
the background of insects and awhole range of other animals and
species that he considers, andinsects are particularly
prominent and interesting.Nietzsche often speaks about
sort of almost as though hewants to deliver a kind of like
a zoology of the human insteadof really a social theory of the
human. Because he does considerthis particular background or

(18:51):
this particular perspective asas crucial for understanding
what human societies do, andespecially what individuals
within that society do and howthey how they conceive of
themselves, both morally,politically, but also socially,
and what they do in terms ofwhat does human agency actually
mean seen from this perspective.And one of the issues that comes

(19:12):
up when you look at sort of,like, insects broadly speaking
is the question of teleology.
So I mean, Darwin uses thiswonderful example of like, you
know, the bees building thebeehive and that led to a debate
among commentators of Darwin. IsDarwin a teleologist or isn't he
a teleologist? Does he believethere's an overarching goal of
the bees or not? AndNietzsche's, like, picks up on
this. He's very sort of, like,attuned to those to those

(19:35):
debates and often reads sort of,like, between the lines of the
many texts that he reads.
He links this to broaderphilosophical issues about how
evolution works also with regardto humans. So what's important
in that context is thatNietzsche on the one hand
certainly does deny theexistence of teleology, for
instance. The idea that natureas a whole or human agency is in

(19:59):
some way goal directed. He wouldfundamentally deny this, but he
does not give up in light ofsort of evolutionary debates on
the question of the directednessof societies, how societies
develop. It's just that heunderstands sort of like this
directedness as something thatis built into the path dependent

(20:20):
development of societies ratherthan looking at it from the
perspective of some goal.
And the same can be said withregard to, of course, like how
insects respond to theirenvironment. There is not a sort
of like a goal directedteleology that is that is really
at stake here, but it'ssomething that is emergent as in
a sense while something ishappening on the ground. And
that that I think is a veryimportant, you know, aspect of

(20:42):
nature's thinking about naturefor want of a better term. I
just wanted to say a couple ofthings also about Nietzsche's
reading habits because they'reactually quite wonderful. There
are few philosophers where wehave such detailed knowledge
about his reading habits becausewe have access to all all but
most of the material that heactually read.
And he was a prolific underlinerand constantly writing comments

(21:05):
in the margins. And sometimesthey're very cryptic. And
sometimes you can see this likethe imprint of the pencil when
he disagrees or agrees withsomething very fervently. And
there's this materiality of thisengagement with scientific texts
that is really crucial andfascinating. Now, of course,
it's, like, more easilyaccessible because most of this
is online and you can look atit.

(21:26):
I remember that when I wrote myPhD way back when in the
nineties, you still had to go tothe archive and you had this
example, these books in yourhand with like Nietzsche's
underlinings. That's becausethis is like a tangible aspect
of this deep involvement withthe natural sciences of his
time. Sometimes commentators ofNietzsche from analytic
philosophies have like pushedthis a little bit to the side

(21:47):
and argued that, well, Nietzschejust always read the foreword or
the introduction and then theconclusion and didn't really
read anything in between. So hereally doesn't have any clue
about what's going on in thenatural sciences in the
nineteenth century. But then youlook at this material and, yeah,
sure, sometimes hemisunderstands things.
Sometimes you just wonder whycould he possibly have
underlined a particular sentencewhich makes no sense anymore,

(22:10):
but made perfect sense toNietzsche clearly. But he was an
avid reader of all thismaterial. So when you actually
look at the entire list of hispersonal library and also, as
far as we know, what he borrowedas a professor from the
university library in Basel inSwitzerland. There are two kinds
of books that really dominate.Early on, it's philology, of
course, because that's hisprofession.

(22:31):
Later on, a bit more philosophy.But books on the natural
sciences are really dominantthroughout his entire career.
Sometimes he consulted them inmore detail, sometimes in in
less detail. But he wascompletely aware of both the
overall trends of the naturalsciences in the nineteenth
century as well as the disunityand debates among the sciences

(22:56):
in the nineteenth century. Andthat, in many ways, also informs
his sort of philosophical takeon some of those particular kind
of issues.

Edgar Landgraf (23:04):
Thank you. Yes. I think I read somebody else.
10% of his library was wasreally books from the natural
sciences, which which is amazingconsidering he's a philologist
by profession. In my insectchapter, the the most
interesting part from theEspinar book is is a lengthy
footnote, which is in the middleof the book.
So he did read this book in muchdetail, including the footnotes,

(23:25):
etcetera. Stefan, maybe if I canpitch that back to you, but the
swamp theory also raises, aterm, I think, you mentioned
earlier of embeddedness, whichis in posthumanist theory today,
quite important, socialembeddedness, environmental
embeddedness. And we we see kindof a recognition of that
thinking in Nietzsche alreadybased on these kind of studies

(23:47):
from the life sciences. Maybe ifyou wanna take it back a little
bit to the posthumanist angle

Stefan Herbrechter (23:52):
there. Yeah. So this is, as I said before,
I'm not here as a as a Nietzschescholar. But what what I like
about your book, of course,Edgar, is that you provide these
detailed and historicallyfounded connections between
Nietzsche and the naturalsciences of this time. And as
you say, this is a goodnurturing ground for the kind of

(24:13):
ideas that are that have beencoming back in, in a
posthumanist context, to be theidea that the humanities and the
sciences are, again, interestedin each other, at least from
from reading that humanitiespoint of view, that's that's the
case.
I'm not so sure how manyscientists actually read
posthumanist theory. But theidea that solutions to problems

(24:35):
that that we face can only beapproached or be gleaned from a
new, you know, willingness tocooperate between, you know, all
sorts of humanistic backgroundsand natural science and life
science backgrounds backgroundsin new contexts, which Gary
Wolfe has called theposthumanities, if you want. The

(24:56):
fact that your book is isappearing in the series is, of
course, no coincidence becausethe meeting ground is mired with
misunderstanding. It's also veryrich, right, in terms of
information that is there andwhich needs to be excavated and
and returned to. If we want to,address problems like climate
change and the future ofhumanization or post

(25:20):
humanization, then of course weneed to develop a much, much
richer and more open mindedhistorical awareness of of all
those kind of knowledges thathave been produced and have been
repressed as well.
So Nietzsche is a good casestudy here, I'd say, for this
sort of, as you call it,embeddedness. This is not just a

(25:40):
success story of individualsthat have acquired rational
knowledge in order to producefantastic scientific and
technological exploits and havegone to, you know, are about to
go explore space or whatever andfind exoplanets. Where are we
going to start this wholesuccess story all over again?
No, I think I think embeddednessgoes back to what I said about

(26:04):
postantopocentrism, actually.You know, the idea that that our
self identity as exceptionaloutcomes of biological and
technological evolution needs tobe complicated.
We need to re anchor ourselvesin, in all sorts of
biopolitical, biotechnologicalways to address, the current

(26:25):
crisis. If we don't do that,there will no there will not be
a continuation of the successstory. So the embeddedness is is
actually ontologically vital ifwe want to continue our story,
if we want to survive, but alsoif we want the planet to
survive. So I think your book inthis series, Posthumanity

(26:45):
series, which is exceptional, asfar as I can tell, in bringing
together studies and authorsthat look at this current
problem from a highly politicalbut also from a genealogical
point of view, so going back toprevious, maybe avenues not
taken. And this is I think thisis what constitutes the
fascinating thing that is thisseries.

(27:06):
Hearing you talk aboutNietzsche, of course, I think we
need to address, and Kristinalso already pointed towards
this topic. Right? We need weneed to talk about Nietzsche as
a highly ambiguous and alsohighly dangerous figure. Right?
Let's let's face it.
You know, we need to talk aboutthe bugbear. I mean, Nietzsche's
overman because of the two waysin which Nietzsche is being read

(27:28):
again today, right, as, on theone hand, as a precursor of all
sorts of critical questions thatcontinue to haunt us, and on the
other hand, as the guy whoshowed us the way how to
overcome ourselves in in atranshumanist fashion. In terms
of political explosiveness ofNietzsche, we need I think we
need to address this.

Edgar Landgraf (27:48):
Oh, yeah. Absolutely. And and I do address
it. I think that's kind of thecentral topic of of my last
chapter, but it comes up earlieralready. And I'm gonna detour
just a little bit, not avoidingthe question, but leading to it
through the two technologychapters, which I think reveal
as a a larger theme.
I think Nietzsche's philosophycan be really helpful in
understanding better how thehumanist tradition fails to live

(28:11):
up to its own ideals. Theseideals include creating a more
humane, sustainable civilsociety. Right? In my technology
chapters, I focus first on,advantages and disadvantages of
history for life, where whenNietzsche embeds a really
visionary critique of the massmedia of his time, the printing
press, and of the moderneducational system, which he

(28:33):
argues rather than throughknowledge that become more
civil, has actually producedthese technologies have produced
a way of processing informationthat makes us more barbaric,
desensitizes us actually towardshe mentions the the a war and
that is, you know, put into anewspaper a thousand times
before it's even over that hasno real effect anymore. We're

(28:55):
not taking it seriously anymore.
So it's this kind of reallyinteresting, communication media
technology critique and culturalcritique embedded here that is
targeting this kind ofenlightenment belief in
education equals less violence,equals more civility, etcetera.
Nietzsche turns this on itshead. Another area, and this is
in the second chapter on ontechnology in my book, a return

(29:18):
to the genealogy of morals,which I think can also be read
as Nietzsche trying tounderstand better how western
society has cultivated or howwe've been harmonized to certain
interpretive and even economicstrategies that have produced a
consolidation of power, but notreally a reduction of violence,

(29:40):
just a consolidation andinstitutionalization of
violence. Nietzscheinterestingly has some really, I
mean, today would sayprogressive views on on
punishment, for example, whichjust reveals or hides the
underlying violence that isstill part of society in the
late nineteenth century thatprides itself in its

(30:01):
enlightenment and civilizedstatus and advanced status. You
know, there's no excuse,Nietzsche argues, for punishing
people anymore.
It's it's it's like they used topunish sick people. Why do we
continue to do this? And and Iknow Christiane has written
about this this too and maybe,we're moving towards a political
here already. This is whereNietzsche, I think, yes, is

(30:23):
dangerous, but also reallyhelpful in understanding the
contradictions and problemswithin the larger humanist
discourse and and facing up toits own, let's say, power
assertions to its, and failingto address really systemic
problems by focusing much toomuch on moral compass of of
individuals, etcetera.

Christian Emden (30:43):
I can jump right in there, of course. Not
only because it's a bit of aintellectual hobby also, of
course, but, you know, it goesto the core of some of my own
work on nature. I think we needto make a number of distinctions
here. Nietzsche is dangerousonly to those who want to avoid
uncomfortable questions. AndNietzsche poses plenty of

(31:04):
uncomfortable questions aboutthe reality of what it means to
be human, of what it means tolive in a society, and what
society really looks like.
And one of those uncomfortablequestions is concerned with
violence, the presence ofviolence, and whether humans
have been able and will ever beable to avoid violence.
Nietzsche is very skepticalabout that, also in the sense in

(31:25):
which he sees the overallevolution and development of any
morality, of any ethical claimsas intimately connected to forms
of violence. That's a verycrucial understanding in our
societies and relativelyaffluent liberal democracies
where violence is seen as sortof like a deviation from the

(31:46):
norm. Nietzsche reminds us thatas far as the human species is
concerned, violence has beenpart of our history, will be
part of our history, and thatposes uncomfortable questions
about what to do with this. Soin a sense, you know, sort of
like, I'm already indicatingthat in the political realm,
Nietzsche is far more of arealist in many ways than we

(32:07):
often give him credit to.
And the reason why sort of likehe appears to be dangerous has,
of course, a lot to do with hisreception in in the sense that,
of course, you know, sort oflike the Nietzsche image,
especially the popular Nietzscheimage, is in many ways shaped by
the very different sort of,like, strange ways in which he
has been read in the already inthe context of the first World
War, where, you know, Nietzschesort of like especially the idea

(32:29):
of the Ubermensch, of the overhuman, became particularly
popular. And in fact, the Germanmilitary even doled out to its
soldiers in the French trenchescopies of Zarathustra, which I I
doubt anybody any of them reallyread and other things to do. So
there is a reception ofNietzsche on the far right,
especially, that is verydifferent from what Nietzsche

(32:51):
says about many of these topics.Much of the misunderstanding of
Nietzsche as a sort of, like, aparticularly dangerous thinker
in that respect has, of course,something to do with the
metaphors and models thatNietzsche uses. Think about the
will to power, the overman.
These are sort of likeintentionally polemical terms
with which Nietzsche, of course,wants to have an effect, but he

(33:12):
also wants to describe somethingreally complicated. Another
example is sort of like the wayin which Nietzsche is, because
of his reception during the Naziregime, is often seen as sort of
like, well, his biologicalphilosophy, of course, entails a
certain racism. And he uses theterm race, of course, throughout
his writings. But the way inwhich race as a concept is being

(33:33):
used in some of thosephilosophical debates in the
nineteenth century does not mapat all and not easily on the way
in which race as somethingexclusionary is being used today
in the contemporary debate. Sowe need to sort of, like, you
know, make all kinds ofdistinctions here between
original context and what we canlearn from the original context
on the one hand and the sort of,like, broad popular reception of

(33:55):
Nietzsche and reading that isalso often highly problematic,
both on the left as well as onthe right.
This is sort of like somethingthat sort of, like, happens on
on both sides of the politicaldivide in many ways. There is
one particular area in which Ithink Nietzsche is particularly
helpful with regard to thepolitical dimension of the

(34:16):
debate about posthumanism, butalso new materialism. And that
is the question of normativity.How do norms, the norms that
guide us and the norms thatsometimes we disagree with and
sometimes we embrace, how dothey actually come about if we
think about this in naturalterms and in terms of emergent
properties and so on? One of theproblems of, new materialism in
particular is a relatively flatontology that does not allow,

(34:36):
ultimately, for making flatontology that does not allow,
ultimately, for making normativedistinctions between certain
things.
So on the one hand, you have a abroader intellectual trend and
new materialism that wants tosay something distinctly
political that speaks to ourcurrent situation. But at the
same time, it has greatdifficulties in making normative

(34:57):
distinctions because its ownontology does not allow for, you
know, a valid concept ofnormativity. And on the other
side, you have critical theoryand political liberalism and
political theory. So I'mthinking about Rawls and
Habermas, of course, and andothers who have a strong sense
of normativity and how normscome about, but they connect
them to reasons and to forms ofjustification. And they

(35:21):
completely ignore the naturalcontext within which these
justifications actually occurand what makes these
justifications possible.
What Nietzsche here brings tothe table is ultimately a way to
think about this particularrelationship between, on the one
hand, an ontology that is deeplyrooted in the idea that there is
nothing special about humans andthat we are part of whatever

(35:44):
else we call nature. But on theother hand, also that there is
something about humans as thisparticular kind of species that
allows us to make normativedistinctions. Think about the
sort of, like, the figure of thesovereign individual, in the
context of the genealogy ofmorality. Nietzsche uses
interesting metaphor of thatsovereign individual is
something that the ripest fruiton the tree of human evolution.

(36:07):
I don't know whether I reallywanna be a ripe fruit, but there
we go.
But it's the ripest fruit on thetree of human evolution. And
then he explains, well, whatreally distinguishes the
sovereign individual from theirprecursors is that he doesn't
have to make any promises. Thesovereign individual has a right
to make promises. But a right tomake promises doesn't mean that
you have to make a promise, thatit means you don't have to

(36:28):
engage within a particular, say,moral or ethical setting or even
a particular political context.What Nietzsche is sort of like
going on about here is in asense can also be understood
sort of like in a different way.
Ultimately, he accepts the wayin which natural or what we call
nature for want of a betterterm, serves as sort of like the

(36:49):
condition or the possibility ofhaving norms. But what we
ultimately do with thatpossibility is something
entirely different. We have ashumans, as it were, sort of like
a framework, a sort of like acontext of possibilities within
which we can operate and withinwhich we have a certain kind of
freedom that is actuallyprovided by something that does
not allow for freedom. This iskind of the paradox, which is

(37:11):
nature, of course. And I thinkNietzsche makes a really
valuable contribution about howto think about the fundamental
conditions of political norms,which is something that I think
posthumanism has greatdifficulties with.
But equally, critical theory andpolitical liberalism have great
difficulties with because theyignore the side of nature
ultimately.

Edgar Landgraf (37:31):
Thank you. Yes. Very interesting. I I do think
the ripest fruit is actually anegative metaphor even though it
seems like a greataccomplishment here. He uses the
same metaphor in the seconduntimely meditation already, and
that's clearly used in a in acritical sense.
But it maybe also curious thisidea of a new morality that
needs to grow that does notrepeat the pitfalls. And I try
to pin this down in how heexplains how we were harmonized,

(37:55):
what interpretive strategies hascreated this modern human,
ultimately, the sovereignindividual that harks a lot back
on this kind of I call it a apsychoeconomic calculus that
somehow there is equivalency insomebody doing something that
needs to, we say today, youknow, that ask for payback. But

(38:15):
what what is being paid back ifyou punish somebody? Right? This
is really interesting analysis.
In some sense, what Nietzschechallenges us to understand
better is is how much our moderninstitutions, even when we show
mercy, is still built on thiskind of tradition of seeking
equivalencies or a a reward andpunishment regiment
institutionally, politically,you know, in education even.

(38:39):
That is, at least from today'sperspective, not very helpful in
addressing the kind ofchallenges, environmental
challenges we talked about,migration challenges, etcetera,
that we face today. So in manyways, I think Nietzsche can help
us understand a little howhumanist modes of thinking
persist that are, let's say, toosimple to actually address the

(39:00):
main challenges humanity facestoday, which in part are brought
in, you know, throughtechnologies, obviously, the
Anthropocene we've mentioned. Somy reading there is a little bit
I I fully agree, of course, boththe far right appropriation of
Nietzsche and the liberalcritique of Nietzsche. They're
very superficial readings of ofNietzsche.
Like, Beiner would say, we haveto take him by his word. Well,
we're not taking him by his wordwhen Nietzsche says he doesn't

(39:22):
wanna take be taken by his word,which caused, again, which I
hope I do a little bit in mybook for a closer analysis,
actually, what the arguments arerather than working with some of
the legacy, I call it, of ofNietzsche's philosophy that
often does not really engagecritically on Nietzsche's
philosophy. And there, it'sinteresting that in recent
years, in recent ten years,we've had a number of arguments
actually in Nietzsche'sscholarship that have pointed

(39:43):
out how Nietzsche was notnecessarily pro democracy, which
is not surprising at the end ofthe nineteenth century when he
writes, but his philosophy canactually help us reinvigorate
democracy. And this is an areawhere I I try to engage a little
bit also some of posthumanistethics, in particular, Rosie
Breitotti, Francesca Farandu,Patricia McCormack, who kind of

(40:05):
emphasized this idea ofcommunity, of togetherness, of a
new togetherness that needs tobe defined or found to tackle
the, dangers and and andchallenges we face today as a
society. And that obviouslydoesn't mesh well with with
Nietzsche's philosophies.
Whether I personally might thinkabout this or not, these are
great ideals. But Nietzsche'sinsistence that we cannot avoid

(40:29):
competitiveness, competition,opposition. I think we need to
take seriously as prosumaniststoo in articulating an ethics
that doesn't fall back into somekind of idealist stance and the
idealization of community thatultimately will have to turn
against community in the name ofcreating community that prolongs
or extends this kind of humanistthought patterns that, again, I

(40:53):
I think ultimately the lessonhere from Nietzsche is I'm not
able to counter effectively thechallenges that humanity faces
today. And so I I kind of end inthis last chapter on on
promoting, this might be alittle disappointing for some, a
more pragmatist approach withNietzsche. The idea that, I
think, with Nietzsche, we weshould focus more on our

(41:14):
embeddedness and what within thecircumstances within individuals
find themselves, can be donerather than maybe articulate
moral ideals.
And I Stephan, we kind ofapproached your dangerousness
question appropriately here.

Stefan Herbrechter (41:31):
I don't think there's a there's an
appropriate way of of doingthis. But, I mean, we we cannot
ignore the fact that, Nietzscheis again being hijacked by,
transhumanists like SteveFuller. There is something in
Nietzsche, undoubtedly, thatallows for that. And then it's
it's no there's no need to argueargue that away. I mean,

(41:52):
Nietzsche is a self stylizedprovocateur.
He wants to smash, with his bighammer. And and, of course, the
pieces, yes. There's a greatdeal of, let's say, nihilism
that can be appropriated in allsorts of ways. And I I think
it's best to accept this, butthis is the case with a number
of of important thinkers. Ithink it's ultimately a

(42:14):
political question.
Right? And and that's where thepragmatism comes in. I have a
lot of time for a certain kindof pragmatism that in the end
sort of says, oh, to hell withthe idealist philosophical
questions. What does that meanpolitically? What what can we
do?
What is to be done? I mean, thatthat's the the way I think
pragmatism, in the end, managesto, to bring people around. It's

(42:38):
a move that isn't entirelyproblematic in itself. Right?
Pragmatism is not is not thesolution necessarily, but it's
it is a point in an argumentwhere you have, you know, you
have to sort of come to acritical distance where you say,
but, yes, but what does thatmean?
What what do we do with this?What do we do with posthumanism?
What do we do with Nietzsche andposthumanism? And then, and I

(43:00):
agree with with Edgar very muchin his conclusion that that,
yes, there's a need for allthese philosophical arguments,
these ethical questions, aboutviolence and why why humanism
continues to to disappoint us.Where does the violence come
from?
Now, I said at the beginning,I'm not a Nietzsche, in in in

(43:22):
that's in in the same way thatyou are engaging with with
Nietzsche. And I think I wouldwant to poke a little bit
further than than Nietzsche'sDarwinism here. Maybe the the
idea of violence is a very hottopic for for all sorts of
reasons because we're we seem tobe returning to to more violent
patterns of behavior, which wethought we'd overcome. But, no,

(43:43):
they're still there. And why isthat so?
And I guess you could reproachhumanism with this idea of
perfectibility, right, wherewhere, you know, the the the the
maybe naive or idealist ideathat, you know, through cultural
refinement, we we become lessviolent. This has been disproven
for some time, but but I thinkit's still one of the pillars

(44:05):
of, liberal humanism. Right? Butif you take that away, if you
destroy that with your bigNietzschean hammer, what
remains? What's the alternative?
Pragmatically, you know, wheredoes that leave you? And the
question here where I found,Edgar's book is really important
is and I don't I don't knowexactly where where you say it
or whether you actually say itout loud or whether I just heard

(44:28):
it. Is the question of address.Who is this addressed to? Who is
this critique of violenceactually addressed to?
Who is this all wonderfulembedded posthumanist politics
actually addressed to, if not inthe end, a liberal humanist
subject again? This is the mostpolitical question that you can
probably ask right now. Whatkind of address would you have

(44:51):
to configure that goes or fallsoutside these three main
political discourses that youmentioned? You know, liberalism,
fascism, communism, socialism,if you want. How do you get
people, but not just people,everybody, right, into the
political sphere which you needto create in order to address
problems that no longer justconcerns unions?

(45:14):
And that's where I found yourbook really opens up that
question. And I think in myreport, I said, that's where I
knew you mentioned some peoplemight be disappointed. I I was
both disappointed but alsointrigued because that's where
the follow-up will have to be.

Edgar Landgraf (45:29):
There's an article in the works on
addressing this more heads on, II think. And I do come back to
this at the very end of thebook. Right? And and I do try to
situate too my own book, who amI talking to, which is, you
know, I'm not naive about. It isan academic book.
I'd I'd hope it's accessible.I'd try my writing to make
demanding arguments accessibleto an interested readership. But

(45:53):
just to bring it back toNietzsche in a second, and at
the end in the book, if youremember, I'd quote Thomas
Sheeran, who very concretely,pragmatically tries to analyze
what do you do, for example, ina Google health system
complexities where you have cometogether economic questions,
questions of regulation,questions of medicine, of

(46:13):
science, etcetera. And peoplethat work in that environment
have to make very complexdecisions. There are no simple
answers here.
Right? And she just in aparenthesis says and and kind of
tomorrow lies here is nothelpful. It just doesn't take us
anywhere. And I think thatNietzsche's proshumanism can can
open up a little bit to hear theperspective on a a more
pragmatic approach needs to becontextual and negotiate these

(46:36):
complexities. And I wouldinclude, by the way, that once
once in a while, it might bequite pragmatic to be idealist
about things in certainsettings.
I don't want to deny that atall. I just thought that in a
posthumanist discussions ofethics, a dose of Nietzsche can
be really helpful and maybe,challenging. I want to thank
Kristina Emden again, StephanHerbichter for volunteering your

(46:59):
time. I really, reallyappreciate it and your expertise
on the topic and your support. Ialso want to thank the
University of Minnesota Press.
It's been a great team, atutorial team. The feedback
channel I got and copy editingand and now even making this
podcast possible, I think, hasbeen really wonderful, and I'm
I'm really grateful. I'd like tothank everyone again, for making
this possible. And, again,Stefan and Christian for for

(47:22):
this, I think, very productivediscussion.

Christian Emden (47:24):
Thank you for writing this this book in the
first place. I think we'll havea a a really lasting impact in
two different fields.

Edgar Landgraf (47:31):
Thank you.

Stefan Herbrechter (47:32):
Yeah. It was a it was a pleasure, Edgar. Of
course. I hope you'll sell loadsof copies.

Edgar Landgraf (47:37):
I appreciate that. Thank you. Yes.